INTHE CIRCUIT COURT OF HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE,
DONALD M. CLARK and
BEVERLY J. CLARK
Plains,
v8 DOCKET NO. 12C1147
AIMEE L, CAIN, AT&T CORP., ATT
MOBILITY, LLC, and ROBERT E. DIVISION IV
COOPER, JR, in his official eapacity
as Attomey General fr the State of
Tennessee,
Defeadanes
‘MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
‘This mater is before the Court upon the motions for partial summary judgment
‘of Defendants, AT&T Corp., AT&T Mobility, LLC, AT&T Mobility Services, LLC and Amie
L. Cain (heveinafier the “AT&T Defendants”), pursuant to Rule 56 of the Teanessee Rules of
‘Civil Provedure andthe responses thereto ofthe Plaintifs and the Attorney General of the State
‘of Tennessee (hercnafler “State"), The motions were argued on January 26, 2015, and token
‘under advisement,
‘The Standard of Rule 56
‘Summary judgments appropriate ifno factual dispute exist, no disputed fact is
‘material fo the outcome and a disputed fact doesnot creat genuine issue forteial, Byrd. Hal
‘847 S.W, 24 208 (Tenn, 1993). The old ruleset forth in Hannan v. Alle! Publishing Co.,270
8,W.3d | (Tenn. 2008), has boen replaced by T.C.A. § 20-16-101, which adopted a “put up or
shut up” standard in deciding motions for summary judgment. Under that rule, not applicablehere, a genuine isue of material fact must be created by papers submitted in opposition to the
‘The main thrust of AT&T"s motion is that partial summary judgment should be
granted {0 dismiss Plaintiff's non-economic damages in excess of the statutory amount of
$5750,000 set forth in T.C.A. § 29-38-101, et. seq, Although AT&T also seeks the grant ofa
rmotion for partial summary judgment on the isue of economic damages with reapest 10
Plant's tue cre, that lei i more appropriately addressed in a fashion other than under
the present motion for partial summary jxlgment. As to the former elim, thee is no genuine
‘suocof mara fact withrespectto the construction and consitutonality oft Teanesso0 Civil
Iustice Act of2011. The State angues, however, thatthe constitutional issve isnot pe and thst
the Cour should defer decision until there i a jury verdit in excess of $750,000
Background: The Bass of the Su
‘This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident which occured on oF about
‘March 20, 2012. In their complaint, the Plaintiffs seck, inter alia, non-economic damage
‘excess of $750,000. Non-economie damages are damages for pain and suTering and loss of
‘enjoyment of life, That demand is in excess ofthe statutory caps under the provisions of T.C.A.
§ 29.39-102. In addition, none ofthe exceptions to that statutory cap are pled, and none are in
issue. Thus, squarely presented for decision is whether the Plaintiffs wil be permitted to obtain
«juny verdit in excess of $750,000 for non-economic damages.Overview
Before discussing in detail the legal principles involved inthis eae, Jet me give
an overview of what the issues re, the ilustaton of those issues both practically and legally and
the results which sre mandated. First, and obviously, he issue is whether legislative limits on
Jury's determination of pain and sulfeving damages ina personal injury case are constitutional
‘Those limits were justified as necessary for economic development in the State of Tennesse.
Without those limits, the legislature has found that businesses would not have the economic
predictability of jury verdicts for them fo move to, or say i, the State. They further say tha
these verdicts are widespread and, implicitly, unfounded, The first question to be asked then is
“What right does the judiciary have to question this policy?” The answer is there is none, But
there is aright, indeed au obligation, of the judiciary to question the legislative assumplion that
‘hore are widespread, unfounded jury verdicts that are a detriment to economic development!
‘Thatobligation derives from the Constitution ofthe State of Tennessee inthe very creation ofthat
‘government with its three coordinate branches of govemment ~ executive, legislative and
jjudicial. That obligation derives fom the concept of the separation of powers, that is, thatthe
three branches of government are co-equal, and under that concept tbe judicial branch must
examine not just aecop, ations of the other branches to see if those actions are prohibited by the
Constitution,
* More fundamentally, [find no study or data which supports any conclusion that jury
verdicts in Tennessee are excessive or not supported by the evidence. 1 further have found no
study or data which shows that economie development is hindered or encouraged by limits on
otherwise valid jury verdicts. Nordid find any stady or data which supports the proposition that
Timits on damages injury verdicts hinders or encourages economic development.In making the analysis of constitutionality, therefore, the Court must fist apply
an appropriate test, andthe test to be used depends upon the right which is abridged, I the right
‘oa jury trialisa fundementel constitutional right, then the legislation must be strictly construe.
‘Whether the right here is fundamental involves an analysis ofthe origins ofthe right at the time
of the adoption of the Tennessee Constitution and whether the right includes both the issues of
liability aod damages. Ifthe right is fundamental, then it must be determined whether there is @
compelling intrest greater than the constittional right forthe statue o survive, In applying the
strict serutiny test see if there is a compelling State itezes the basis of the legislation, the
legislative history, is examined,
‘After making this analysis, the Court can only conehude thatthe right to ial by
Juyisa fundamental interest, and, when strictly scrutinized, theres no compelling State interest
forthe statute to tramp the constitutional righttoajury trial. The conclusion seached is that since
‘there is no such interes, the Act is unconstitutional
[Let me now show the practicality of why this igislation is unconstitutional, oth
from a common sense, feimoss and a legal standpoint.
Assume an individual is injured in an accident through the foult of another and
suffersa broken leg. That person receives teatment and returns to normal life. Ina subsequent
Jaw, that person receives an award for psin and suffering and los of enjoyment of life which
‘ill not even be close tothe upper limit of $750,000 in damages set bythe limit inthe statute.
‘Further, assume, then, another Young individual who, ina snslar accident, receives broken arms
snd legs an other serious injuries ftom which he will suffer for the remainder of his or he ie‘That person then files afte an evaluation of the ease by aa atteney based onthe fcts
‘knownto the Plaintlf: The Defendant then answers the suit though his or her rtomey based on
{acts known othe Defendant. During preparation ofthe ase for wal, che ttomneys exchange
information and then attempt to settle the case, IF they are not sucess, the case may g0 10
mediation, Ime
jo snot success the case goes otal before ajury whichis presensd
the facts of the acident and the eical analysis ofthe condition ofthe Paint. The jury may