EN BANC

DECISION
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO,

G.R.MENDOZA,
No. 192935
J.:

Petitioner,
- versus THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.,
Petitioners,

- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Respondents.

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

When the judiciary mediates to

allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
G.R. No. 193036
assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority
Present:
under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the
CORONA,
rights which that instrument secures and
CARPIO,
guarantees to them.
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
--- Justice Jose P.
NACHURA,
Laurel[1]
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is
PERALTA,
through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
BERSAMIN,
government are established, limited and defined, and by which
DEL these
CASTILLO,
powers are distributed among the several departments.
ABAD,
[2] The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all
VILLARAMA,
JR.,must conform and to which all persons, including the
other laws
PEREZ,
highest officials of the land, must defer.[3] Constitutional
MENDOZA,
andmust remain steadfast no matter what may be the
doctrines
SERENO,
tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and
accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself
Promulgated:
to the whims and caprices of government and the people who
run it.[4]
December 7, 2010
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated
cases[5] both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010,

entitled Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action
for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in
his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive
Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of
Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution[6] as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a
public office and to appropriate funds therefor.[7]
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and
Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the
events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then
Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch
condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino people,
convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this
noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality,
President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate
reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed
during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President
on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the

1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly

enshrines the principle that a public office is
a public trust and mandates that public
officers and employees, who are servants of
the people, must at all times be accountable
to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility,
integrity,
loyalty
and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the
most despicable acts of defiance of this
principle and notorious violation of this
mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and
scourge which seriously affects the political,
economic, and social life of a nation; in a
very special way it inflicts untold misfortune
and misery on the poor, the marginalized
and underprivileged sector of society;
WHEREAS,
corruption
in
the
Philippines has reached very alarming levels,
and undermined the peoples trust and
confidence in the Government and its
institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for
the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the peoples
faith and confidence in the Government and
in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry

during his campaign for the Presidency in the

last elections kung walang corrupt, walang
mahirap expresses a solemn pledge that if
elected, he would end corruption and the evil
it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a
separate
body
dedicated
solely
to
investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption
during
the
previous
administration, and which will recommend
the prosecution of the offenders and secure
justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10,
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise
known
as
the
Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives
the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO
SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION
1.
Creation
of
a
Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter
referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall
primarily seek and find the truth on, and
toward this end, investigate reports of graft
and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people, committed by
public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories from
the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend

the appropriate action or measure to be

taken thereon to ensure that the full measure
of justice shall be served without fear or
favor.
The Commission shall be composed
of a Chairman and four (4) members who will
act as an independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions.
The Commission, which shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and
corruption referred to in Section 1, involving
third level public officers and higher, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories from
the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its
finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a)
Identify and determine the reported
cases of such graft and corruption which it
will investigate;
b)
Collect, receive, review and evaluate
evidence related to or regarding the cases of
large scale corruption which it has chosen to
investigate, and to this end require any
agency, official or employee of the Executive
Branch, including government-owned or
controlled
corporations,
to
produce
documents, books, records and other papers;
c)
Upon proper request or representation,
obtain information and documents from the

Senate and the House of Representatives

records of investigations conducted by
committees thereof relating to matters or
subjects
being
investigated
by
the
Commission;
d)
Upon
proper
request
and
representation, obtain information from the
courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the
Office of the Court Administrator, information
or documents in respect to corruption cases
filed with the Sandiganbayan or the regular
courts, as the case may be;
e)
Invite or subpoena witnesses and take
their testimonies and for that purpose,
administer oaths or affirmations as the case
may be;
f)
Recommend, in cases where there is a
need to utilize any person as a state witness
to ensure that the ends of justice be fully
served, that such person who qualifies as a
state witness under the Revised Rules of
Court of the Philippines be admitted for that
purpose;
g)
Turn over from time to time, for
expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities, by means of a
special
or
interim
report
and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption
of public officers and employees and their
private sector co-principals, accomplices or
accessories, if any, when in the course of its
investigation the Commission finds that there
is reasonable ground to believe that they are
liable for graft and corruption under
pertinent applicable laws;

h)
Call
upon
any
government
investigative or prosecutorial agency such as
the Department of Justice or any of the
agencies under it, and the Presidential AntiGraft Commission, for such assistance and
cooperation as it may require in the
discharge of its functions and duties;
i)
Engage or contract the services of
resource persons, professionals and other
personnel determined by it as necessary to
carry out its mandate;
j)
Promulgate its rules and regulations or
rules of procedure it deems necessary to
effectively and efficiently carry out the
objectives of this Executive Order and to
ensure
the
orderly
conduct
of
its
investigations, proceedings and hearings,
including the presentation of evidence;
k)
Exercise such other acts incident to or
are appropriate and necessary in connection
with the objectives and purposes of this
Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements.
x x x.
x.

SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x

SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts.

xxx
x x x.

SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings.

SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of

Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.

SECTION
8.
Protection
Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.

of

SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey

Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony.
Any government official or personnel who,
without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon
subpoena issued by the Commission or who,
appearing before the Commission refuses to
take oath or affirmation, give testimony or
produce documents for inspection, when
required, shall be subject to administrative
disciplinary action. Any private person who
does the same may be dealt with in
accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend
Assistance to the Commission.
x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the
Commission. The Office of the President
shall provide the necessary funds for the
Commission to ensure that it can exercise its
powers, execute its functions, and perform
its duties and responsibilities as effectively,
efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x
x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission.
The Commission shall accomplish its
mission on or before December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final
Report. x x x.

SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and

Facilities of the Commission. x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision
Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need to
expand the mandate of the Commission as
defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft
and
corruption
during
the
prior
administrations, such mandate may be so
extended
accordingly
by
way
of
a
supplemental Executive Order.

SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If

any provision of this Order is declared
unconstitutional, the same shall not affect
the validity and effectivity of the other
provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity.
Executive
Order
shall
take
immediately.

This
effect

DONE in the City of Manila,

Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.
AQUINO III

(SGD.)

BENIGNO

S.

By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions,

the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body

formed under the Office of the President with the primary task
to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices
and
accessories
during
the
previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an independent
collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of the
President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it
constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.[8]
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of
graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a factfinding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable
cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil
or administrative penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in
other countries which have been created as official, transitory
and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and
context of serious violations of human rights or of international
humanitarian law in a countrys past.[9] They are usually
established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest,
civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for
transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies
that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine only
past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed
over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they
are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission

of a report containing conclusions and recommendations; and

(4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by
the State.[10] Commissions members are usually empowered
to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through
their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and
learn more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them.
They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and
recommend institutional reforms.[11]
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to
reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals
are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try
and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A
form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which was
to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future
conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The
latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial
retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the
identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer[12]
puts it:
The order ruled out reconciliation.
It translated the Draconian code spelled out
by Aquino in his inaugural speech: To those
who talk about reconciliation, if they mean
that they would like us to simply forget
about the wrongs that they have committed
in the past, we have this to say: There can
be no reconciliation without justice. When we
allow crimes to go unpunished, we give
consent to their occurring over and over
again.
The Thrusts of the Petitions

Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order

No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both
cases shows that they are essentially the same. The
petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following
manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the
separation of powers as it arrogates the
power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III,
Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the
President to structurally reorganize the Office
of the President to achieve economy,
simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the
Constitution and pertinent statutes when it
vested the Truth Commission with quasijudicial
powers
duplicating,
if
not
superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the Department of Justice
created under the Administrative Code of
1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if
corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations,

past and present, who may be indictable.

(e) The creation of the Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010 violates the
consistent and general international practice
of four decades wherein States constitute
truth commissions to exclusively investigate
human rights violations, which customary
practice forms part of the generally accepted
principles of international law which the
Philippines is mandated to adhere to
pursuant to the Declaration of Principles
enshrined in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the Truth
Commission is an exercise in futility, an
adventure in partisan hostility, a launching
pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a
mere populist propaganda to mistakenly
impress the people that widespread poverty
will altogether vanish if corruption is
eliminated without even addressing the other
major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous
commissions
were
not
constitutionally
challenged is of no moment because neither
laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual
question on the constitutionality and validity
of an executive issuance or even a
statute.[13]
In their Consolidated Comment,[14] the respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially
questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the
assailed executive order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the
powers of Congress to create a public office

because the Presidents executive power and

power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed and
that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292),
[15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416[16]
(as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No.
9970,[17] and settled jurisprudence that
authorize the President to create or form
such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the
power of Congress to appropriate funds
because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not
duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is
a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not
violate the equal protection clause because
it was validly created for laudable purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and
validity of other executive orders and presidential issuances
creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as
Presidential Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by
President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on
Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by President
Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and
Government Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.[18]

From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and

memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be
resolved:
1.
Whether or not
the petitioners have the legal standing to file
their respective petitions and question
Executive Order No. 1;
2.
Whether or not
Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle
of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order
No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order
No. 1 violates the equal protection clause;
and
5. Whether or not petitioners are
entitled to injunctive relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to
ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power
of judicial review are present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the
power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial

interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,

direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.[19]

which can be questioned by a member of

Congress. In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it

that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to
their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.[22]

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the

petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to
demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It
argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have
sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury
attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the
subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not
sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.
[20]

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a

taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the
PTC and the budget for its operations.[23] It emphasizes that
the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the
commission are to be taken from those funds already
appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and
disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail
congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the
Presidents power over contingent funds.

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the

legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive
Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes
usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to
take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the
complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as
members of the legislature before the Court. As held in
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[21]

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not

shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of
a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise
judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances
in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo[24]
explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the

petitioners has been put at issue.

To the extent the powers of

Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise
of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which
injures the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,

Locus standi is defined as a right

of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. In private suits, standing is
governed by the real-parties-in interest
rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest. Accordingly,
the real-party-in interest is the party who

stands to be benefited or injured by the

judgment in the suit or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the
plaintiffs standing is based on his own right
to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus
standi arises in public suits. Here, the
plaintiff who asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
does so as a representative of the general
public. He may be a person who is affected
no differently from any other person. He
could be suing as a stranger, or in the
category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In
either case, he has to adequately show that
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In
other words, he has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order
and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now
allows both citizen and taxpayer
standing in public actions. The distinction
was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,
where it was held that the plaintiff in a
taxpayers suit is in a different category from
the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former,
the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of
public funds, while in the latter, he is but the
mere instrument of the public concern. As
held by the New York Supreme Court in
People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of
mere public right, howeverthe people are
the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not
the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see
that a public offence be properly pursued
and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits,

Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen

and a taxpayer to maintain an action in
courts to restrain the unlawful use of public
funds to his injury cannot be denied.
However, to prevent just about any
person from seeking judicial interference in
any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the
activities of governmental agencies engaged
in public service, the United State Supreme
Court laid down the more stringent direct
injury test in Ex Parte Levitt, later
reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same
Court ruled that for a private individual to
invoke the judicial power to determine the
validity of an executive or legislative action,
he must show that he has sustained a
direct injury as a result of that action,
and it is not sufficient that he has a
general
interest
common
to
all
members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct
injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v.
Vera, it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result. The
Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases,
such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,
Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v.
De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works and Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included.
Citations omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that

the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be

relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.[25]
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v.
Torres,[26] the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved,
the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the
party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first
Emergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers
were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders although they had only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public.
The
OSG
claims
that the determinants
of
transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v. ERC and
Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however,
finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the
petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the
issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not
only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they
should be resolved for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the
Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of
the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to
the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due
to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in
the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its
oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal
controversies with overreaching significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo

asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not

merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President.[31] Thus,
in order that the President may create a public office he must
be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization
vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power
cannot be presumed[32] since there is no provision in the
Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to
create a truth commission.[33] He adds that Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the
continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as
basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the
aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as reorganize,
transfer, consolidate, merge, and abolish.[34] Insofar as
it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the
Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office,
Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of
powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed
repealed upon the effectivity thereof.[35]
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators
argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province
of Congress and not with the executive branch of government.
They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to
reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative
Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public office,
much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the
reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of
the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal
organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of
functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency.[36] Such continuing
authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and
by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the
limits of this delegated authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively
legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding
body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices
created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the
President to create public offices within the Office of the

President Proper has long been recognized.[37] According to the

OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of
government, possesses the inherent authority to create factfinding committees to assist it in the performance of its
constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its
administrative functions.[38] This power, as the OSG explains it,
is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President
under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both
of Article VII of the Constitution.[39]
It contends that the President is necessarily vested
with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant
to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public
officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of
his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion
of his officials.[40] The power of the President to investigate is
not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his
subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the
exercise of his other powers, such as his power to discipline
subordinates,[41] his power for rule making, adjudication and
licensing purposes[42] and in order to be informed on matters
which he is entitled to know.[43]
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,
[44] where it was held that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department
in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by
virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to
reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control
necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG,
the President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put
a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in the
government.[45]
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does
the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised

Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization

as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2)
transferring any function under the Office of the President to
any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring
any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers
to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
These point to situations where a body or an office is already
existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be
effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much
less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the
question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of
the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the
term restructure an alteration of an existing structure.
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of
the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.
As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,
[46]
But of course, the list of legal basis
authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive
branch does not have to end here. We must
not lose sight of the very source of the
power that which constitutes an express
grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the
President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have the continuing authority to reorganize

the administrative structure of the Office of

the President." For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments
or Agencies to the Office of the President. In
Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312
(2000)], we ruled that reorganization
"involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions." It takes place when there is
an alteration of the existing structure
of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority
and responsibility between them. The
EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department
of Finance. It falls under the Office of the
President. Hence, it is subject to the
Presidents
continuing
authority
to
reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not
justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of
the latter.[47] Clearly, the power of control is entirely different
from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent
in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully
execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of
power from Congress, empowering the President to create a
public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth
commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory
basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.[48] The
said law granted the President the continuing authority to

reorganize the national government, including the power to

group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries
and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I,
Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as
Larin v. Executive Secretary.[49]
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No.
1416 as a justification for the President to create a public
office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and
inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President
Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the national government including the power to
create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the
purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards
the parliamentary form of government will
necessitate flexibility in the organization of
the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing
manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416,
as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the
convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even
the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:l to
parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of government, the
legislative and executive powers are fused, correct?
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass
muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No.
1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President
the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section
17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall

have
control
of
all
the
executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the
allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in
ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is
inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That
the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to
create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft
of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case of
Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]
x x x. The 1987 Constitution,
however, brought back the presidential
system of government and restored the
separation of legislative, executive and
judicial powers by their actual distribution
among
three
distinct
branches
of
government with provision for checks and
balances.
It would not be accurate, however,
to state that "executive power" is the power
to enforce the laws, for the President is head
of state as well as head of government and
whatever powers inhere in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution
itself
withholds
it.
Furthermore,
the
Constitution
itself
provides
that
the
execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve
the execution of any provision of law, e.g.,
his power over the country's foreign

relations.
On these premises, we hold the
view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of "executive
power." Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific
powers so enumerated.
It
has
been
advanced
that
whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to
be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring
that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution.[53] One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated
duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from
the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have
been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v.
Camposano,[54] the authority of the President to issue
Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative
committee to look into the administrative charges filed against
the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous
purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to
create
the
Ad
hoc
Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of

the
Executive
Department,
to
which
respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive
officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the
legality of the investigation is sustained.
Such validity is not affected by the fact that
the investigating team and the PCAGC had
the same composition, or that the former
used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad
hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective
of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC,
PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission
and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the
government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such
executive power as non-existent just because the direction of
the political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1
transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the
operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation
on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds
the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission.[55]
Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC
shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there
is no impropriety in the funding.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows
from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under
Article VII, Section 17 thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the
president represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has the authority to directly assume the
functions of the executive department.[57]
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC
to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has
been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is
to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same
law.[58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the
exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively
vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the
legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and
the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario
v. Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:
"Investigate,"
commonly
understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on,
study.
The
dictionary
definition
of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically: "to search or
inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe
x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The
purpose of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated

is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving

a controversy involved in the facts inquired
into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate"
is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step
by step by patient inquiry or observation. To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and
inquire into with care and accuracy; to find
out by careful inquisition; examination; the
taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire;
to
make
an
investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn described as
"(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2
Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry,
judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and
collection of facts concerning a certain
matter or matters."
"Adjudicate,"
commonly
or
popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve,
rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the
term as "to settle finally (the rights and
duties of the parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment
on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a
case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate"
means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
"adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn.
x
x.
Implies
a
judicial

determination of a fact, and the entry of a

judgment."
[Italics
included.
Citations
Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of
receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may
be provided by law.[60] Even respondents themselves admit
that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.[61]
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not
supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission
will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a
consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a
fact-finding investigation.[62] The actual prosecution of
suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of
the charges against them,[63] is certainly not a function given
to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its
investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives
credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the
filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to
be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.[64]
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under
R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of
Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it was written:
This power of investigation granted
to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution

and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive

but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies such as
the PCGG and judges of municipal trial
courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The
power to conduct preliminary investigation
on charges against public employees and
officials is likewise concurrently shared with
the Department of Justice. Despite the
passage of the Local Government Code in
1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent
jurisdiction with the Office of the President
and the local Sanggunians to investigate
complaints against local elective officials.
[Emphasis supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power
of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section
15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its
own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory
agency
of
government,
the
investigation of such cases. [Emphases
supplied]
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as
enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary
investigation or the determination of the existence of probable
cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of

functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts

so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance
of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of
usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority
under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised
Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be
shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred
that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness.
Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the
Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its
findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And
being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of
latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation.
These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated
duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for
possible indictments for violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls
within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it

is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it

does not apply equally to all members of the same class such
that the intent of singling out the previous administration as
its sole object makes the PTC an adventure in partisan
hostility.[66] Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the
commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in
virtually all administrations previous to that of former President
Arroyo.[67]
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind
the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts
committed not only during the administration of former
President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the
same magnitude of controversies and anomalies[68] were
reported to have been committed against the Filipino people.
They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as
it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first,
there is no substantial distinction between the group of
officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and
other groups or persons who abused their public office for
personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not
germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end
corruption.[69] In order to attain constitutional permission, the
petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with
graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo
administration with the strong arm of the law with equal
force.[70]
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1
identifies the previous administration as the initial subject of
the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not
confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption solely
during the said administration.[71] Assuming arguendo that
the commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the
previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is
committed against the equal protection clause for the
segregation of the transactions of public officers during the
previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a

valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is

germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to
correct.[72] To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past
administrations, it recited the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view
of widespread reports of large scale graft
and corruption in the previous administration
which have eroded public confidence in
public institutions. There is, therefore, an
urgent call for the determination of the truth
regarding certain reports of large scale graft
and corruption in the government and to put
a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the peoples
faith and confidence in the Government and
in their public servants.
Second. The segregation of the
preceding administration as the object of
fact-finding is warranted by the reality that
unlike with administrations long gone, the
current administration will most likely bear
the immediate consequence of the policies
of the previous administration.
Third. The classification of the
previous administration as a separate class
for investigation lies in the reality that the
evidence of possible criminal activity, the
evidence that could lead to recovery of
public monies illegally dissipated, the policy
lessons to be learned to ensure that anticorruption laws are faithfully executed, are
more easily established in the regime that
immediately
precede
the
current
administration.

Fourth.
Many
administrations
subject
the
transactions
of
their
predecessors to investigations to provide
closure to issues that are pivotal to national
life or even as a routine measure of due
diligence and good housekeeping by a
nascent administration like the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
created by the late President Corazon C.
Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to
pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of
her predecessor former President Ferdinand
Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag
Commission created by former President
Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order
No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent
citizens committee to investigate all the
facts
and
circumstances
surrounding
Philippine Centennial projects of his
predecessor, former President Fidel V.
Ramos.[73] [Emphases supplied]
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government
was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements
of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate
clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the
due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of
an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to
cut it down is the equal protection clause.[74]
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and

responsibilities imposed.[75] It requires public bodies and

institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner.[76] The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities.[77] In other
words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the
state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.[78]
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official
state actions, not just those of the legislature.[79] Its inhibitions
cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of
a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken. [80]
It, however, does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally
to all members of the same class.[81] Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification.[82]
For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class.[83] The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made
with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the
class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is

achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be

treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a
class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the
non-application of the law to him.[84]
The classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to
the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as
to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or
underinclude those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases,
[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of
the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of
the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement,
in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every
man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact
be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which
it is directed or by the territory within which
it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws
clause
of
the
Constitution
allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the

other departments of knowledge or practice,

is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very
idea of classification is that of inequality, so
that it goes without saying that the mere fact
of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality. All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable,
which
means
that
the
classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must
apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations
omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order
No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission
is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration[87] only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has
been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate
body dedicated solely to investigating and
finding out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders
and secure justice for all;

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission.

There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to
as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily
seek and find the truth on, and toward this
end, investigate reports of graft and
corruption of such scale and magnitude that
shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people, committed by
public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories from
the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration; and thereafter
recommend the appropriate action or
measure to be taken thereon to ensure that
the full measure of justice shall be served
without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The
Commission, which shall have all the powers
of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code
of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a
thorough
fact-finding
investigation
of
reported cases of graft and corruption
referred to in Section 1, involving third level
public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its
finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
[Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include
past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such

discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the

commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences
between
the
Arroyo
administration
and
other
past
administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to
merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous
administration only. The reports of widespread corruption in
the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for
distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations
which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of
impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to,
the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it,
Superficial
differences
do
not
make
for
a
valid
classification.[88]
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive
Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended
investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG
ventures to opine that to include other past administrations, at
this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and
lead it to lose its effectiveness.[89] The reason given is
specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and
noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and
the evil it breeds.[90]
The probability that there would be difficulty in
unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the
earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the
point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have
already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by
the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous
investigations of previous administrations, given the bodys
limited time and resources. The law does not require the
impossible (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).[91]
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility,
the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating

almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact

remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary
classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching
for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations.
The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
While
reasonable
prioritization
is
permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for
being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo
v. Hopkins,[92]

Though the law itself be fair on its

face and impartial in appearance, yet, if
applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition
of
the
constitution.
[Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an
ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the
considered view that although its focus is restricted, the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws
should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights determined and all public authority administered.[93]
Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken
down for being unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of the PTC
is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and
corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read
together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the
earlier administrations in the guise of substantial distinctions
would only confirm the petitioners lament that the subject
executive order is only an adventure in partisan hostility. In
the case of US v. Cyprian,[95] it was written: A rather limited

number of such classifications have routinely been held or

assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin,
gender, political activity or membership in a political party,
union activity or membership in a labor union, or more
generally the exercise of first amendment rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the
requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class.[96] Such a
classification must not be based on existing circumstances only,
or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number
included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in
situations and circumstances which are relative to the
discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from
those of the members of the class must be brought under the
influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are
the members of the class.[97]
The
Court
is
not
unaware
that
mere
underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the
equal protection clause.[98] Legislation is not unconstitutional
merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all
the evils within its reach.[99] It has been written that a
regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not
devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be
incomplete.[100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness
was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or
regulation where the purpose can be attained in future
legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step by
step process.[101] With regard to equal protection claims, a
legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial
scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or
otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been
attacked.[102]
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no
inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out
was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact

that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed

executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1
does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be
focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the
past. The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and
intentional discrimination.[103]
To disprove petitioners contention that there is
deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission
does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and
corruption committed during the previous administration.[104]
The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which
provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning
Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the
President there is a need to expand the
mandate of the Commission as defined in
Section 1 hereof to include the investigation
of cases and instances of graft and
corruption during the prior administrations,
such mandate may be so extended
accordingly by way of a supplemental
Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17
allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of
investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and
corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not
guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such
expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the
whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to
include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will
only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order
No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and
personalities of the Arroyo administration.[105]

The Court tried to seek guidance from the

pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,[106]
that the PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1,
2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause. The
decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on how such
conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said
case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present
is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect
to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest
Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the
doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has
been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present
political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal
basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a
hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power
that includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with
the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to
rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,

ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however,

have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme
Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has been
accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.

remain supreme. All must bow to the

mandate of this law. Expediency must not be
allowed to sap its strength nor greed for
power debase its rectitude.[109]

To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel

would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.[107]

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for

a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present
administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive
issuance
so
as
to
include
the
earlier
past
administrations would allow it to pass the test of
reasonableness and not be an affront to the
Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the
judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and
so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its
attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search
for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for ours is
still a government of laws and not of men.[110]

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial

review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but
rather simply making sure that any act of government is done
in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by
the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more
authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the
Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and
unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are
inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the
betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is
important to remember this ethical principle: The end does not
justify the means. No matter how noble and worthy of
admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be
employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.[108]
The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It
will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined
principles.
The

Constitution

must

ever

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive

Order
No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as
it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby
ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27811

November 17, 1967

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.JOSE

PAO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, defendants-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera for plaintiff-appellant.Victorio Advincula

for defendant Jose Pao.Office of the Solicitor General for
defendant Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
Executive Secretary.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question May the Executive Secretary, acting by
authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of
Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources yielded an affirmative
answer from the lower court.1
Hence, this appeal certified to this Court by the Court of
Appeals upon the provisions of Sections 17 and 31 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
The undisputed controlling facts are:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant
of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon,
Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao.
On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests
to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land to
plaintiff.
On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was
officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and
declared agricultural land.
On January 26, 1955, Jose Pao and nineteen other claimants 2
applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area.
On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own
sales application covering the entire released area. This was
protested by Jose Pao and his nineteen companions upon the
averment that they are actual occupants of the part thereof

covered by their own sales application.

The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict,
rendered a decision on July 31, 1956 giving due course to the
application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of
Jose Pao and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.
On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on appeal by Jose Pao for himself and his
companions held that the appeal was without merit and
dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority
of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision
of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it
would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly
landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be
allocated
that portion
on
which they have
made
improvements;" and (2) directed that the controverted land
(northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of
Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should
be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to
actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to
reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." It may be
well to state, at this point, that the decision just mentioned,
signed by the Executive Secretary, was planted upon the facts
as found in said decision.
Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of
First Instance praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1)
that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources has full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of
the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force
and effect.

And now subject of this appeal is the judgment of the court a

quo dismissing plaintiff's case.

This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President

cannot undo an act of his department secretary.

1. Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141.

The precept there is that decisions of the Director of Lands "as
to questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved" by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Plaintiff's
trenchment claim is that this statute is controlling not only upon
courts but also upon the President.

2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive

Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power. The
Constitution, petitioner asserts, does not contain any provision
whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to
the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional
duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The President's duty to execute

the law is of constitutional origin.3 So, too, is his control of all
executive departments.4 Thus it is, that department heads are
men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his,
too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he
controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to
go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that
the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a
department secretary.

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which

the President must exercise in person.10 Not as correct,
however, is it so say that the Chief Executive may not delegate
to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not
command that he perform in person.11 Reason is not wanting for
this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all
the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The
Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which
assists the President. The rule which has thus gained
recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive
Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or
even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. 12

Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of

Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the standard practice is to allow appeals from such
decisions to the Office of the President. 5 This Court has
recognized this practice in several cases. In one, the decision of
the Lands Director as approved by the Secretary was
considered superseded by that of the President's appeal. 6 In
other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of
appeal was considered a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of
the case, for non-exhaustion of all administrative remedies.7
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the
President reposes upon the President's power of control over
the executive departments.8 And control simply means "the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter."9

3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive Secretary

is equal in rank to the other department heads, no higher than
anyone of them. From this, plaintiff carves the argument that
one department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of
the President, cannot intrude into the zone of action allocated
to another department secretary. This argument betrays lack of
appreciation of the fact that where, as in this case, the
Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President," his
decision is that of the President's. Such decision is to be given
full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the
Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President
may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized
to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive,"13 that remains the act of the

Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed. 14 No such

disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this
case.
For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby
affirmed. Costs against plaintiff. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-32370 & 32767 April 20, 1983

SIERRA MADRE TRUST, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
DIRECTOR OF MINES, JUSAN TRUST MINING COMPANY,
and J & S PARTNERSHIP, respondents.
Lobruga Rondoz & Cardenas Law Offices for petitioner.
Fortunato de Leon for respondents.

duly registered with the office of the Mining Recorder at

Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on May 14, 1965.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources dated July 8, 1970, in DANR
Cases Numbered 3502 and 3502-A. The decision affirmed a
decision of the Director of Mines dated November 6, 1969.
The appeal was made pursuant to Sec. 61 of the Mining Law
(C.A. No. 137, as amended) which provides: "... Findings of facts
in the decision or order of the Director of Mines when affirmed
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be
final and conclusive, and the aggrieved party or parties desiring
to appeal from such decision or order shall file in the Supreme
Court a petition for review wherein only questions of law may
be raised."
The factual background is given in the brief of the petitionerappellant which has not been contradicted by the respondentsappellees and is as follows:
On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of
Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) of the
Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6) lode mineral claims,
viz.: (1) Finland 2, (2) Finland 3, (3) Finland 5, (4) Finland 6, (5)
Finland 8 and (6) Finland 9, all registered on December 11, 1964
with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and all
situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax,
Province of Nueva Vizcaya.
The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode
minerals claims covered by LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) encroached
and overlapped the eleven (11) lode mineral claims of the
herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust, viz., (1) A-12, (2) H-12, (3)
JC-11, (4) W-11, (5) JN-11, (6)WM-11, (7) F-10, (8) A-9, (9) N-9,
(10) W-8, and (11) JN-8, all situated in Sitio Taduan Barrio of
Abaca, Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and

The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the

above- mentioned six (6) lode mineral claims of respondent
Jusan Trust Mining Company, null, void, and illegal; and denying
lode lease application LLA No. V-7872 over said claims. Further,
the adverse claimant prayed for such other reliefs and remedies
available in the premises.
This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as
Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case
No. 3502.
Likewise, on the same date July 26, 1966, the same Sierra
Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim
against LLA No. V-9028 of the J & S Partnership over six (6) lode
mineral claims viz.: (1) A-19, (2) A-20, (3) A-24, (4) A-25, (5) A29, and (6) A-30, all registered on March 30, 1965 and amended
August 5, 1965, with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva
Vizcaya, and situated in Sitio Gatid, Barrio of Abaca Municipality
of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya.
The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode
mineral claim covered by LLA No. V-9028, encroached and
overlapped the thirteen (13) lode mineral claims of herein
petitioner Sierra Madre Trust, viz.: (1) Wm-14, (2) F-14, (3) A-13,
(4) H-12 (5) Jc-12, (6) W-12, (7) Jn-11, (8) Wm-11, (9) F-11, (10)
Wm-11, (11) F-11; (12) H-9 and (13) Jc-9, all situated in Sitio
Taduan, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of
Nueva Vizcaya and duly registered with the office of the Mining
Recorder at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, on May 14,1965.
The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the
above- mentioned six (6) claims of respondent J & S Partnership,
null void, and illegal; and denying lode lease application LLA No.
V-9028 over the said claims. Further, the adverse claimant
prayed for such other reliefs and remedies available in the

premises.
This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as
Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case
No. 3502A.
These two (2) adverse claims, MAC Nos. V-403 and V-404 were
jointly heard in the Bureau of Mines, and also jointly considered
in the appeal in the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by the Director
of Mines reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office believes and so holds
that the respondents have the preferential right over their
"Finland-2", "Finland- 3", "Finland-5", "Finland-6", "Finland-8",
"Finland-9", "A-19", "A-20", "A-24", "A-25", "A-29" and "A-30"
mining claims. Accordingly, the protests (adverse claims) filed
by protestant Sierra Madre Trust should be, as hereby they are,
DISMISSED.
And that of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal interposed by
the appellant, Sierra Madre Trust is hereby dismissed and the
decision of the Director of Mines dated November 6, 1969,
affirmed. "
The adverse claims of Sierra Madre Trust against Jusan Trust
Mining Company and J and S Partnership were based on the
allegation that the lode lease applications (LLA) of the latter
"encroached and overlapped" the former's mineral claims,
However, acting on the adverse claims, the Director of Mines
found that, "By sheer force of evidence, this Office is
constrained to believe that there exists no conflict or

overlapping between the protestant's and respondents' mining

claims. " And this finding was affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources thus: "Anent the first
allegation, this Office finds that the Director of Mines did not err
when he found that the twelve (12) claims of respondents Jusan
Trust Mining Company and J & S Partnership did not encroach
and overlap the eighteen (18) lode mineral claims of the
appellant Sierra Madre Trust. For this fact has been
incotrovertibly proven by the records appertaining to the case."
It should be noted that according to the Director of Mines in his
decision, "during the intervening period from the 31st day after
the discovery [by the respondents] to the date of location
nobody else located the area covered thereby. ... the protestant
[petitioner herein] did not establish any intervening right as it is
our findings that their mining claims do not overlap
respondents' mining claims."
After the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had
affirmed the factual findings of the Director of Mines to the
effect that there was no overlapping of claims and which
findings were final and conclusive, Sierra Madre Trust should
have kept its peace for obviously it suffered no material injury
and had no pecuniary interest to protect. But it was obstinate
and raised this legal question before Us: "May there be a valid
location of mining claims after the lapse of thirty (30) days from
date of discovery, in contravention to the mandatory provision
of Section 33 of the New Mining Law (Com. Act No. 137, as
amended)?" It also raised ancillary questions.
We see no reason why We have to answer the questions in this
petition considering that there is no justiciable issue between
the parties. The officers of the Executive Department tasked
with administering the Mining Law have found that there is
neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims
involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the
questions will not materially serve the interests of the
petitioner. In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone
individuals that the interpretation by officers of laws which are

entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect.' In

his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings of the
Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were
validly located, surveyed and registered."
Finally, the petitioner also asks: "May an association and/or
partnership registered with the Mining Recorder of a province,
but not registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, be vested with juridical personality to enable it to
locate and then lease mining claims from the government?"
Suffice it to state that this question was not raised before the
Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. There is also nothing in the record to indicate
whether or not the appellees are registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. For these reasons, even assuming
that there is a justiciable issue between the parties, this
question cannot be passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and
Escolin JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.THE
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in
his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing
Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as
Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON,
respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose

Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over
Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in
Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation.
On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot
No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. The transfer was
embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor
(Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in
which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's
obligations under the original contract, including payment of his
predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of
Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance
with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr.
Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to,
and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all
monthly installment payments falling due thereafter Clause 17
reads:
Clause 17. SUBDIVISION BEAUTIFICATION. To insure the
beauty of the subdivision in line with the modern trend of urban
development, the SELLER hereby obligates itself to provide the
subdivision with:
a) Concrete curbs and gutters
b) Underground drainage system
c) Asphalt paved roads
d) Independent water system
e) Electrical installation with concrete posts.
f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall
g) Developed park or amphi-theatre

h) 24-hour security guard service.

These improvements shall be complete within a period of two
(2) years from date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER shall
permit the BUYER to suspend his monthly installments without
any penalties or interest charges until such time that such
improvements shall have been completed. 1
On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a
notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required
improvements in the subdivision had already been completed,
and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly
installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that
he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to
verify the truth of the representation in the notice.
In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty
reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of his
monthly installments, citing the decision rendered by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case
No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S.
Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have
"substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers
pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed by and between the
lot buyers and the respondent." In addition, a formal demand
was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of
P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty
alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements
were being completed i.e., between September 1972 and
October 1976.
Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976
monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976
installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the
Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment
payments previously made by Mr. Yuson.
Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson
brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public

respondent NHA through a letter-complaint dated 10 May 1977

which complaint was docketed in NHA as Case No. 2123.
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was heard on 2
September 1977. Antipolo Realty, without presenting any
evidence, moved for the consolidation of Case No. 2123 with
several other cases filed against it by other subdivision lot
buyers, then pending before the NHA. In an Order issued on 7
February 1978, the NHA denied the motion to dismiss and
scheduled Case No. 2123 for hearing.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978
ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under the
following conditions:
l) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] to Virgilio Yuzon a
statement of account for the monthly amortizations from
November 1976 to the present;
m) No penalty interest shall be charged for the period from
November 1976 to the date of the statement of account; and
n) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days to pay the arrears
shown in the statement of account. 2
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a)
that it had been denied due process of law since it had not been
served with notice of the scheduled hearing; and (b) that the
jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged
in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since that complaint
involved the interpretation and application of the Contract to
Sell.
The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June 1978 by
respondent NHA General Manager G.V. Tobias, who sustained
the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson
complaint. He also found that Antipolo Realty had in fact been
served with notice of the date of the hearing, but that its

counsel had failed to attend the hearing. 3 The case was

submitted for decision, and eventually decided, solely on the
evidence presented by the complainant.
On 2 October 1978, Antipolo Realty came to this Court with a
Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-49051. Once more,
the jurisdiction of the NHA was assailed. Petitioner further
asserted that, under Clause 7 of the Contract to Sell, it could
validly terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a
consequence thereof, retain all the prior installment payments
made by the latter. 4
This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11
December 1978, "without prejudice to petitioner's pursuing the
administrative remedy." 5 A motion for reconsideration was
denied on 29 January 1979.
Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA
decision with the Office of the President which, on 9 March
1979, dismissed the same through public respondent
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave. 6
In the present petition, Antipolo Realty again asserts that, in
hearing the complaint of private respondent Yuson and in
ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the
parties, the NHA had not only acted on a matter beyond its
competence, but had also, in effect, assumed the performance
of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was not
authorized to perform.
We find the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit.
It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative
agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and
functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of
judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies
(e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National

Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our

jurisdiction, 7 basically because the need for special
competence and experience has been recognized as essential
in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized
character and because of a companion recognition that the
dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and
clogged. In Spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al. vs. Hon.
Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et al., 8 the Court, through Mr. Chief
Justice Teehankee, said:
In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest
jurisdiction in administrative commissions and boards the power
to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in
corporations, public transportation and public utilities) ruled
that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in
the resolution of labor management controversies likely to
cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be
exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The
Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious
doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of
the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered"
(Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc.,
94 Phil, 932, 941 [1954]).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual
matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of
discretion has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984,
the Court noted that 'between the power lodged in an
administrative body and a court, the unmistakeable trend has
been to refer it to the former, "Increasingly, this Court has been

committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and
unequivocably, the choice should fall on fan administrative
agency]" ' (NFL v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419, 428, citing
precedents). The Court in the earlier case of Ebon vs. De
Guzman (113 SCRA 52, 56 [1982]), noted that the lawmaking
authority, in restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their
jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as
against the previous P.D. amendment splitting their jurisdiction
with the regular courts, "evidently, . . . had second thoughts
about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the
jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup
would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and
possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on
one and the same claim."
In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National
Housing Authority, et al., 9 Mr. Justice Gutierrez, speaking for the
Court, observed that:
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original
jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes
and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise.
The very definition of an administrative agency includes its
being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing
variety of powers and functions given to administrative
agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of
administrative agencies in matters calling for technical
knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot
possibly be handled by regular courts.
In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which
an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the
enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which
an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends
largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency. 10 In the exercise of such powers,
the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such
contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative

agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the

determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a
uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular
courts.
Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasijudicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms
of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Decree." 11 Section 3 of this statute
provides as follows:
National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree
(emphasis supplied)
The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority
thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the second and third
preambular paragraphs of the statute which provide:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate
subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have
reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and
maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water
systems lighting systems and other similar basic requirements,
thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of
swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles
free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes,
and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different
innocent purchasers for value . (emphasis supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out the
quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to
the NHA in the following quite specific terms:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real

estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided
for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman. (emphasis supplied.)
The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the
NHA in the instant case are found in Section 23 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 which reads:
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment
made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for
the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of
the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the
owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the
failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved plans and
within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer
may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid
including amortization and interests but excluding delinquency
interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis
supplied.)
Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to
complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision
within the specified period of two years from the date of the
execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to

exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence,

petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the
installment payments made by the private respondent as
forfeited in its favor. Indeed, under the general Civil Law, 13 in
view of petitioner's breach of its contract with private
respondent, it is the latter who is vested with the option either
to rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of an
installment payments (with legal interest) made for the
purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to suspend
payment of further purchase installments until such time as the
petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was
therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior
installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of
petitioner.
Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse
of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered
the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties.
Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of
the NHA's correct ruling, just noted, that the petitioner was not
entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no
question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was
legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of
contracting parties under the law administered by it and under
the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their
obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.
We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the
right to due process. This assertion lacks substance. The record
shows that a copy of the order denying the Motion to Dismiss
and scheduling the hearing of the complaint for the morning of
6 March 1978, was duly served on counsel for petitioner, as
evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom of said
copy indicating that such service had been effected. 14 But
even if it be assumed, arguendo, that such notice had not been
served on the petitioner, nevertheless the latter was not
deprived of due process, for what the fundamental law abhors is
not the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack
of opportunity to be heard. 15 In the instant case, petitioner

was given ample opportunity to present its side and to be heard

on a motion for reconsideration as well, and not just on a
motion to dismiss; the claim of denial of due process must
hence sound even more hollow. 16
We turn finally to the question of the amount of P16,994.73
which petitioner insists had accrued during the period from
September 1972 to October 1976, when private respondent had
suspended payment of his monthly installments on his chosen
subdivision lot. The NHA in its 9 March 1978 resolution ruled
that the regular monthly installments under the Contract to Sell
did not accrue during the September 1972 October 1976
period:
[R]espondent allowed the complainant to suspend payment of
his monthly installments until the improvements in the
subdivision shall have been completed. Respondent informed
complainant on November 1976 that the improvements have
been completed. Monthly installments during the period of
suspension of payment did not become due and demandable
Neither did they accrue Such must be the case, otherwise,
there is no sense in suspending payments. If the suspension is
lifted the debtor shall resume payments but never did he incur
any arrears.
Such being the case, the demand of respondent for
complainant to pay the arrears due during the period of
suspension of payment is null and void. Consequently, the
notice of cancellation based on the refusal to pay the s that
were not due and demandable is also null and void. 17
The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need of
certification and amplification. The NHA correctly held that no
installment payments should be considered as having accrued
during the period of suspension of payments. Clearly, the
critical issue is what happens to the installment payments
which would have accrued and fallen due during the period of
suspension had no default on the part of the petitioner
intervened. To our mind, the NHA resolution is most

appropriately read as directing that the original period of

payment in the Contract to Sell must be deemed extended by a
period of time equal to the period of suspension (i.e., by four (4)
years and two (2) months) during which extended time (tacked
on to the original contract period) private respondent buyer
must continue to pay the monthly installment payments until
the entire original contract price shall have been paid. We think
that such is the intent of the NHA resolution which directed that
"[i]f the suspension is lifted, the debtor shall resume payments"
and that such is the most equitable and just reading that may
be given to the NHA resolution. To permit Antipolo Realty to
collect the disputed amount in a lump sum after it had
defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers, would tend to
defeat the purpose of the authorization (under Sec. 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 957, supra) to lot buyers to suspend
installment payments. As the NHA resolution pointed out, [s]uch
must be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending
payments." Upon the other hand, to condone the entire amount
that would have become due would be an expressively harsh
penalty upon the petitioner and would result in the unjust
enrichment of the private respondent at the expense of the
petitioner. It should be recalled that the latter had already
fulfilled, albeit tardily, its obligations to its lot buyers under their
Contracts to Sell. At the same time, the lot buyer should not be
regarded as delinquent and as such charged penalty interest.
The suspension of installment payments was attributable to the
petitioner, not the private respondent. The tacking on of the
period of suspension to the end of the original period precisely
prevents default on the part of the lot buyer. In the words of the
NHA resolution, "never would [the buyer] incur any arrears."

SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The NHA

decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and clarified as
providing for the lengthening of the original contract period for
payment of installments under the Contract to Sell by four (4)
years and two (2) months, during which extended time private
respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly
installment payments until the entire original contract price
shall have been paid. No pronouncement as to costs.

The Bureau of Lands awarded on May 13, 1966 to Narcisa A.

Placino (Narcisa) a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 10 (the
lot) located at Saint Anthony Road, Dominican-Mirador
Barangay, Baguio City.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento
and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 161811

April 12, 2006

THE CITY OF BAGUIO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, and

ORLANDO GENOVE, Petitioners, vs.FRANCISCO NIO,
JOSEFINA NIO, EMMANUEL NIO, and EURLIE OCAMPO,
Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Francisco Nio (Nio), one of the herein respondents, who has

been occupying the lot, contested the award by filing a Petition
Protest on December 23, 1975 before the Bureau of Lands.

The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest by Order of

November 11, 1976.
Nio appealed the dismissal all the way to the Supreme Court
but he did not succeed.
The decision of the Director of Lands dated November 11, 1976
having become final and executory, 1 the then-Executive
Director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Cordillera Autonomous Region (DENR-CAR), on
petition of Narcisa, issued an Order of Execution dated February
1, 1993 directing the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) Officer to enforce the decision "by
ordering Petitioner Nio and those acting in his behalf to refrain
from continuously occupying the area and remove whatever
improvements they may have introduced thereto." 2
Attempts to enforce the Order of Execution failed, prompting
Narcisa to file a complaint for ejectment before the Baguio City
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). The MTCC dismissed
Narcisas complaint, however, by Order3 of August 7, 1996.
Narcisas counsel, Atty. Edilberto Claravall (Atty. Claravall), later
petitioned the DENR-CAR for the issuance of a Special Order
authorizing the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station,
and the Demolition Team of the City Government to demolish or
remove the improvements on the lot introduced by Nio. The
DENR-CAR denied the petition, citing lack of jurisdiction over
the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the
Demolition Team of the City Government. The DENR-CAR also
invoked Section 14 (now Section 10 (d)) of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court.4
Atty. Claravall thereupon moved to have the Order of Execution
previously issued by the DENR-CAR amended, which was
granted. As amended, the Order of Execution addressed to the
CENRO Officer read:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 1844 of the

Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3077, you
are hereby enjoined to enforce the aforementioned order, with
the assistance upon request of the City Sheriff of Baguio City,
the Demolition Team of Baguio City and the Baguio City Police
Station, by Ordering Petitioner Nio and those acting in his
behalf to refrain from continuously occupying the area and
remove whatever improvements they may have
introduced thereto.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The DENR-CENRO, together with the Demolition Team of Baguio
City and the Baguio City police, desisted, however, in their
earlier attempt to enforce the Amended Order of Execution.6
On July 16, 1997, the Demolition Team of Baguio City headed by
Engineer Orlando Genove and the Baguio City Police, on orders
of then Baguio City Police Officer-In-Charge (OIC) Donato
Bacquian, started demolishing the houses of Nio and his herein
co-respondents.7
The demolition was, however, temporarily stopped upon the
instructions of DENR-CENR Officer Guillermo Fianza, who later
advised Nio that the DENR-CENRO would implement the
Amended Order of Execution on August 4, 1997.8
Nio and his wife Josefina Nio thereupon filed a Petition 9 for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City
against Guillermo Fianza, Teofilo Olimpo of the DENR-CENRO,
Mayor Mauricio Domogan (hereafter petitioner), Atty. Claravall,
Engr. Orlando Genove (hereafter petitioner), Rolando Angara,
and Police Officer Donato Bacquian challenging the Amended
Order of Execution issued by the DENR-CENRO.1avvphil.net

The Nio spouses later filed an Amended Petition 10 by

impleading Emmanuel Nio and Eurlie Ocampo as therein copetitioners and the City of Baguio (hereafter petitioner) and
Narcisa as therein additional respondents, and further praying
for damages.
Branch 6 of the Baguio RTC dismissed the petition of Nio et al.
(hereafter respondents) for lack of merit. 11 Respondents Motion
for Reconsideration12 having been denied, they filed a Petition
for Review13 under Rule 42 of the Rules before the Court of
Appeals.
By Decision14 of December 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals
granted the Petition for Review, holding that Sec. 10(d) of Rule
39 of the Rules reading:
SEC. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.

amended order of execution issued by Oscar N. Hamada,

Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environmental
and Natural Resources, concerning the demolition or removal of
the structures made by petitioners until private respondent
applied for a special order abovementioned with the proper
court.1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED.15 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondents filed before the appellate court an Ex-Parte Motion
for Reconsideration16 on January 9, 2003, alleging that some of
the reliefs they prayed for in their petition were left unacted
upon.17 Petitioners too filed a Motion for Reconsideration 18 on
January 28, 2003, raising the following grounds:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
CITY MAYOR HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THE DEMOLITION OF
ILLEGALLY-BUILT STRUCTURES;

xxxx
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution.
When the property subject of the execution contains
improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor
or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove
said improvements except upon special order of the court,
issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing
and after the former has failed to remove the same within a
reasonable time fixed by the court. (Underscoring supplied)
applies.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING DUE

COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW;
3. THE HONORABLE COURT MISAPPLIED SEC. 10 (d), RULE 39 of
the RULES OF COURT.19 (Underscoring supplied)
In support of the first ground, petitioners raised before the
appellate court, in their Motion for Reconsideration, for the first
time, the power of the City Mayor to validly order the demolition
of a structure constructed without a building permit pursuant to
Sec. 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in
relation to the National Building Code of the Philippines.

Thus disposed the appellate court:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED and the
Orders dated September 24, 1997 and November 23, 1998 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent City Mayor Mauricio
Domogan thru the Demolition Team and City Engineers Office
are hereby ordered to cease and desist from enforcing the

Alleging that respondents built their house without the required

entry and building permits, petitioners argued that the City
Mayor may order the demolition of a house without a special
court order.20
The

Court

of Appeals denied both parties motions for

reconsideration by Resolution21 of December 17, 2003.

Hence, the present petition of the City of Baguio, Mayor
Domogan (now a Congressman), and Orlando Genove, faulting
the appellate court:
1. . . . IN RULING THAT A SPECIAL COURT ORDER IS NEEDED
FOR THE DEMOLITION OF RESPONDENTS STRUCTURES;
2. . . . IN APPLYING SEC. 10(d) RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF
COURT IN THIS CASE;
3. . . . IN ENTERTAINING RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR
REVIEW.22
The petition fails.
While it is noted that respondents appeal to the Court of
Appeals was erroneously brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, instead of under Rule 41, the RTC having rendered the
questioned decision in the exercise of its original, not appellate,
jurisdiction, this Court overlooks the error in view of the merits
of respondents case.23
Petitioners contention that the enforcement of the Amended
Order of Execution does not need a hearing and court order
which Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires does
not lie. That an administrative agency which is clothed with
quasi-judicial functions issued the Amended Order of Execution
is of no moment, since the requirement in Sec. 10 (d) of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court echoes the constitutional provision that
"no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws."24
Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority
teaches:

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers

which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the
enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which
an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends
largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency.25 (Underscoring supplied)
There is, however, no explicit provision granting the Bureau of
Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) or the DENR (which
exercises control over the Land Management Bureau) the
authority to issue an order of demolition 26 which the
Amended Order of Execution, in substance, is.
Indeed,
[w]hile the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the
determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to
public lands or to cases which involve the disposition of public
lands, the power to determine who has the actual,
physical possession or occupation or the better right of
possession over public lands remains with the courts.
The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the
wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the
means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the
occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and
alienation and while it may decide disputes over possession,
this is but in aid of making the proper awards. The ultimate
power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to
be within the legal competence of the civil courts and its
purpose is to extend protection to the actual possessors
and occupants with a view to quell social unrest.27
(Emphasis added)
Consequently, this Court held:28
x x x the power to order the sheriff to remove
improvements and turn over the possession of the land

to the party adjudged entitled thereto, belongs only to

the courts of justice and not to the Bureau of Lands.29
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In fine, it is the court sheriff which is empowered to remove
improvements introduced by respondents on, and turn over
possession of, the lot to Narcisa.
Petitioners invocation of the City Mayors authority under Sec.
455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code to order the
demolition or removal of an illegally constructed house,
building, or structure within the period prescribed by law or
ordinance and their allegation that respondents structures were
constructed without building permits30 were not raised before
the trial court. Petitioners having, for the first time, invoked said
section of the Local Government Code and respondents lack of
building entry permits in their Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals decision, it was correctly denied of merit, 31 it
being settled that matters, theories or arguments not brought
out in the proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered
by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.32
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 162070 October 19, 2005]

No pronouncement as to costs.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by

SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), Petitioner, v. DELIA
T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T.
SUTTON, Respondents.

SO ORDERED.

DECISION

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

PUNO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review filed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,
respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the
Constitution.

The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by

respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and
calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then
existing agrarian reform program of the government,
respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)1 their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives
under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms
used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz
Farms v. Secretary of DAR,2 this Court ruled that lands
devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the
definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they
included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with
petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their
landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.3
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents' land and found that
it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He
recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from
the coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the
withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the
supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.4
Petitioner ignored their request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of
1993,5 which provided that only portions of private agricultural
lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of
June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL.

In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed

the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1
hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the
landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock
infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be
excluded from the operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and
advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal
of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire
landholding is exempted from the CARL.6
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao
issued an Order7 partially granting the application of
respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying
the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner
exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents' land for grazing
purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for
infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents'
landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory
Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that
their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted
exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.8 They
filed a notice of appeal9 with the Office of the President
assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9,
s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock
in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the
CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in
view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands
excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the
impugned Order of petitioner DAR.10 It ruled that DAR A.O. No.
9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the
A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain
parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the
issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was
left for the determination of the courts as the sole

arbiters of such issue.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being
contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to
exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the
government. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order
No. 09, Series of 1993 is hereby DECLARED null and void. The
assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09 October
2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian
Reform's ruling that petitioners' landholding is covered by the
agrarian reform program of the government is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this petition.
The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR
A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum
retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising.
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL,
petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area
of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant
to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands
under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends
that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous
landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock
farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform
program.
Petitioner's arguments fail to impress.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in
nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations. They have
been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to
regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them.

Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in

modern governance due to the increasing complexity and
variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules
and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not
immune from judicial review.12 They may be properly challenged
before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the
Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is
committed by the administrative body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid,
administrative rules and regulations must be issued by
authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions
of the Constitution.13 The rule-making power of an
administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority
given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be
used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative
agencies and the scope of their regulations.14
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate
livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their
ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to
exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry - raising. The Court clarified in
the Luz Farms casethat livestock, swine and poultry-raising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock,
swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an
industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the
investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities,
drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers,
conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing
facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment
like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and

concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses,

sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.15
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock
farms which have been exempted by the Constitution
from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its
power in issuing the assailed A.O.
The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR16
reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia Realty,
the Court heldthat industrial, commercial and residential lands
are not covered by the CARL.17 We stressed anew that while
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall
cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term
"agricultural land" does not include lands classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial.
Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision, which are arable yet still undeveloped, could
not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian
reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands.
A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar.
Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have
been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus
exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in
issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports
it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been
converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid
their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither
merit nor logic in this contention. The undesirable scenario
which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of
the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents'
family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have
long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is
popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the
Philippines.18 Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed,
there is no evidence on record that respondents have just
recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding
cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to
suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It

must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the

conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural
purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been
no change of business interest in the case of
respondents.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that
the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial
change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the
previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law,
Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one.19 In the case at
bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A.
No. 788120 which amended certain provisions of the CARL.
Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the
terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming"
by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising.21 With
this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to
align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent
of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must
be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They
cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must
conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of
conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of
the Constitution, the latter prevails.22 The assailed A.O. of
petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional
as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope
intended by the 1987 Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4634. September 24, 1997]
JESUS CABARRUS, JR., Complainant, vs. JOSE ANTONIO
BERNAS, Respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed and
administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose
Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code and Code of professional Resposibility. In his
complaint-affidavit 1 dated August 12, 1996, complainant
alleged as follows:

A.That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr.,

subscribe under oath before Marie Lourdes T. Sia Bernas, a
notary public in Makati City, wife of lawyer jose Antonio Bernas,
a verification and certification of non-forum shopping which was
appended to a complaint for reconveyance of property and
damages, denominated as Civil Case No. 65646, filed before the
Regional Trial Court in National Capital Region, RTC, which case
was raffled to RTC Branch 159 in Pasig City. A photocopy of said
complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annexex (sic) A, A1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;
B.That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of
public document, I am hereto quoting verbatim, the test (sic) of
Annex A-6, the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping which states:
Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states:
He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he cause the
preparation of the foregoing pleading, the content of which are
true to his personal knowledge and that he has not commenced
any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any
court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency. If he should learn that a similar action
of (sic) proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court or any other Tribunal agency, he undertake to
report to (sic) that the fact within Five (5) days from the notice
to this notice (sic) to this Honorable Court. Underscoring
supplied.
C.That the cause of action relied upon by the respondents in
Civil Case No. 65646 is fraud, facilitated by forgery as gleaned
from paragraph 15, 16, and 22;
D.That contrary to the tenor, import and meanoing (sic) of the
allegation under 1-B of the instant complaint, respondent and
his counsel Jose Antonio Bernas caused the preparation and
filing of a criminal complaint for falsification of a public

document on April 11, 1996, (three days before the filing of the
aforecited Civil Case) at the AOED of the National Bureau of
Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic) Ave., a xerox copy of said
complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annex B.
D-1.That as stated in Annex B, the gravaman of the affidavit
complaint of the respondent is forgery, the same legal issue in
Civil Case No. 65646;
D-2.That as early as August 14, 1995, respondent counsel, Jose
Antonio Bernas filed a written complaint at the NBI for the same
cause of action which was reiterated in another letter
submitting to the NBI standard specimen signitures dated
October 1995, copies of said letter complaint are hereto
attached and marked as Annexes (sic) C.
E. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., on the basis of
Annexes A, B, C, D, inclusive of submarkings knowingly
subverted and perverted the truth when he falsify certified (sic)
and verified under oath in the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, that:
He has not commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in any court, including the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other Tribunal or agency.
Where verification-certification was placed under oath and was
conveniently notarized by the wife of the counsel of respondent
in both cases at Branch 159 of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI,
an agency within the ambis (sic) and purview of the circulus
(sic) of the Supreme Court prohibiting forum shopping.
F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the counsel on record of the
respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is the same lawyer who
instigated a criminal complaint at the NBI for forgery and
respondents themselves conspired and confabulated with each
other in facilitating and insuring the open, blatant and
deliberate violation of Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code which
states:

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified

documents.- The penalty of prison correctional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than p 5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the
falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any
public or official document or letter of exchange (sic) or any
other kind of commercial documents; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of the third party, or with the
intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any
judicial proceeding or the damage of another or who, with the
intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false
documents embraced in the next preceding article, or any of
the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by
the penalty next lower in degree.
G. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred for having
instigated abetted and facilitated the perversion and subversion
of truth in the said verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3, 3.01,
Canon 10 of the code of Professional responsibility for Lawyers,
the pertinent provisions of which are herein below quoted and a
copy of said code is hereto attached and marked as Annex E;
CANON 1. A. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in lawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful (sic) conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities simed

(sic) at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.
CANON 3 A. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES
SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OF (sic) STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualified (sic) or legal
services.
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
In his Comment, 2 respondents Jose Antonio Bernas avers that
he has not committed forum shopping because the criminal
action is not an action that involves the same issue as those in
the civil action and both suits can exist without constituting
forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not yet been
prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum
shopping only exist when identical reliefs are issued by the
same parties in multiple fora.
In his Supplemental Comment,3 respondent further contends
that neither he or his client Pascual has commenced any
criminal action. Pascual merely requested the NBI to assist in
the investigation or prosecution, and left it to the NBI to
determine whether the filing of an endorsement to the
prosecutor, who would determine probable caused, would be
appropriate. It was only upon request of the NBI the he assisted
Ramon Pascual in drafting an affidavit-complaint for falsification
of public documents against complainant. Likewise, respondent
by counsel reiterates that the letter transmitted to the NBI
cannot constitute an action or proceeding because the NBIs
functions are merely investigatory and informational in nature.
NBI has no prosecutorial functions or quasi-judicial power and is

incapable of granting relief or remedy. The NBI cannot be an

agency contemplated by the circular.
The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondent Atty.
Bernas transgressed Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 2891, and administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.
After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the
administrative complaint bereft of merit and should be
dismissed.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other
than by appeal or certiorari) in another. Therefore, a party to a
case resort to forum shopping because by filling another
petition involving the same essential facts and circumstances,
xxx, respondents approached two different for a in order to
increase their chances of obtaining a favorable decision or
action, 4 In this case, there is no forum shopping to speak of
Atty. Bernas, as counsel of Mr. Pascual, Jr., merely requested the
assistance of the NBI to investigate the the alleged fraud and
forgery committed by Mr. Jesus Cabarrus.5 The filing of the civil
case for conveyance and damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City does not preclude respondent to institute a
criminal action. The rule allows the filing of a civil case
independently with the criminal case without violating the
circulars on forum shopping. It is scarcely necessary to add that
Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and applied as to
achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it
promulgated that Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as
an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert and legitimate objective
or the goal of all rules of procedure-which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Adjunct to this, Act No. 157 7, specifically section 1 hereof

provides, viz:
Section 1. There is hereby created a Bureau of Investigation
under the Department of Justice which shall have the following
functions:
(a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other
offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its
initiative and as public interest may require;
(b) To render assistance, whenever properly requested
in the investigation or detection of crimes and other
offenses;
(c) To act as a national clearing house of criminal and
other infromations for the benefit and use of the
prosecuting and law-enforcement entities of the
Philippines, identification records of all person without
criminal convictions, records of identifying marks,
characteristics, and ownership or possession of all
firearms as well as bullets fired therefrom;
(d) To give technical aid to all prosecuting and lawenforcement officers and entities of the Government
as well as the courts that may request its services;
(e) To extend its services, whenever properly
requested in the investigation of cases of
administrative or civil nature in which the Government
is interested;
(f) To undertake the instruction and training of
representative number of city and municipal peace
officers at the request of their respective superiors
along effective methods of crime investigation and
detection in order to insure greater efficiency in the
discharge of their duties;

(g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific

crime laboratory and to conduct researches inn
furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal
investigation;

Mendoza, J., on leave.

(h) To perform such other related function as the

secretary of Justice may assign from time to time.
Explicitly, the function of the National Bureau of Investigations
are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no
judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any
relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is
an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its
own initiative and as public welfare may require. It renders
assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of
crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to
prosecute those person responsible for defrauding his client.
The courts, tribunal and agencies referred to under Circular No.
28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial
powers and those who not only hear and determine
controversies between adverse parties, but to make binding
orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is
not performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI
cannot therefore be among those forums contemplated by the
Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even
grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), and Puno, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 148579

February 5, 2007

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs.MOVIE AND

TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD,
Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Subject of this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the June 18, 2001 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming the January 7, 2000 order 2 of respondent Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) which read:
In view thereof, the BOARD, by the undersigned, hereby
imposes the administrative penalty of SUSPENSION FROM
AIRING/BROADCASTING any program on EMC Channel 27 for a
period of seven (7) days which period shall commence
immediately upon receipt of this Order. Your failure to comply
with this ORDER shall be construed by the BOARD as defiance
on your part of a lawful order of the BOARD.
The facts follow.

Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF

television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000,
respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against
petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first
securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986. 3

First, Section 3 of PD 19865 empowers the MTRCB to screen,

review and examine all motion pictures, television programs
including publicity materials. This power of prior review is
highlighted in its Rules and Regulations, particularly Section 7
thereof, which reads:

The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular

98-17 dated December 15, 19984 which provided for the
penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from
the MTRCB.

SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. -- No motion

picture, television program or related publicity material shall be
imported, exported, produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased,
exhibited or broadcasted by television without prior permit
issued by the BOARD after review of the motion picture,
television program or publicity material.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order

and, at the same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had
complied with the suspension order by going off the air since
midnight of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which
was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying
both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest.

The only exemptions from the MTRCBs power of review are

those expressly mentioned in Section 7,6 such as (1) television
programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government
and/or departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.

Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which

was dismissed in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The
January 7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was
affirmed in toto.

According to the CA, the subject program was a publicity for the
movie, "Muro Ami." In adopting this finding, we hold that "Muro
Ami: The Making," did not fall under any of the exemptions and
was therefore within the power of review of MTRCB.

Hence, this recourse.

On the other hand, petitioner claims that "Muro Ami: The

Making" was a public affairs program.7 Even if that were so, our
resolution of this issue would not change. This Court has already
ruled that a public affairs program -- described as a variety of
news treatment; a cross between pure television news and
news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of
opinions -- is within the MTRCBs power of review. 8 Clearly,
"Muro Ami: The Making" (which petitioner claims to be a public
affairs program) was well within the purview of MTRCBs power
of prior review.1awphi1.net

The pivotal issues for our resolution are:

(1) whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the
show "Muro Ami: The Making" prior to its broadcast by
television and
(2) whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable
and binding on petitioner.

However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject

program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of
the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The
Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof,
expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the

National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the

Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published
or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced. 9
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the
penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting
programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been
registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000. 10 Hence, the
same is yet to be effective. 11 It is thus unenforceable since it
has not been filed in the ONAR. 12 Consequently, petitioner was
not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the
sanction provided thereunder.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 18, 2001,
insofar as it affirmed the public respondent Movie and Television
Review and Classification Boards jurisdiction over "Muro Ami:
The Making," is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the suspension order issued against petitioner GMA
Network, Inc. pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 is
hereby declared null and void.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.