Much has been written about the Ebola Crisis in West Africa; this piece will focus on

the response of the African Union (AU) to the crisis from an institutional and
normative perspective. This is from the starting point that this is instructive to those
that are watching regional organizations and their responses to the increasingly
frequent and complex challenges facing the continent. Indeed, this piece will outline
some of the institutional experimentation and attempts at consolidating emerging
thinking and practice that are features of the AUs response to this unprecedented
crisis1.
On August 19th, 2014, back to back with the African Unions (AU) commemoration of
World Humanitarian Day, the AU Peace Security Council (PSC) met and authorized
the immediate deployment of an AU-led Military and Civilian Humanitarian Mission 2,
thereafter named African Union Commission Support to Ebola Outbreak in West
Africa (ASEOWA). This decision is notable for a number of reasons. For one, it is the
first time that the PSC has invoked the provisions of the Protocol Establishing the
PSC (Article 6 h), relating to its mandate with regards to humanitarian action and
disaster management as well as the role of the African Standby Force (ASF) in
emergency situations, to authorize humanitarian action. This is also an important
indication of where practice is ahead of policy; the ASF is yet to be fully
operationalized and guidelines for humanitarian assistance and natural disaster
support (HANDS) yet to be formulated. Moreover, while the constitution of
Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) is enumerated in the AU Commissions 2014-17
Strategic Plan, this is yet to be implemented.
Secondly, and related to the first, the PSC acknowledged that the Ebola crisis was
not just a humanitarian and public health emergency, but also one with serious
security implications. The PSC, cognizant that the three initially affected countries
are in a post-conflict situation, highlighted its concerns that the epidemic would rollback the progress3 that the three countries had made in rebuilding their countries.
Indeed, two of the three countries-namely Liberia and Sierra Leone-are part of the
AUs pilot post-conflict reconstruction and development support 4. This may also
1 This is without prejudice to the varied international (multilateral and bilateral) support and
collaboration that forms the overall global response to the crisis.

2 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL, 450 TH MEETING, 19 AUGUST 2014, ADDIS

ABABA, ETHIOPIA, accessed at http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-com-450-ebolaoutbreak-19-8-2014.pdf
3 It has been argued by some commentators that this crisis is precisely a sign of the
failure of post-conflict reconstruction and development in the said countries.
4 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL, 352 TH MEETING, 16 JANUARY 2013, ADDIS
ABABA, ETHIOPIA, accessed at http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-352-report-pcrd-

reflect a broadly situated concern about the wider region, which has faced a number
of multi-faceted security and development challenges.
Institutionally, this response has provided impetus for a stronger whole-ofCommission approach, with the Mission drawing on the planning and deployment
experience of the Peace and Security Department, the public health expertise of the
Department of Social Affairs, and the high-level mobilization and advocacy capacity
within the leadership of the AU Commission (Chairpersons Office). In terms of
strategic orientation, the model has been one of coordination, with the AU serving
as a hub for advocacy, mobilization, and coordination, with Member States/national
hubs responsible for the response. The Ebola response has also profiled the
principle of African Solidarity in the face of African challenges. This has manifested
itself in terms of private sector outreach and subsequent support for the response
as well as contributions by AU Member States for ASEOWA. Mobilizing domestic
resources and involvement of the private sector and Member States is a
cornerstone of the AU Commissions 2014-17 Strategic Plan and Agenda 2063.
There have been a number of previous attempts to mobilize private sector
resources for the AUs responses-the African Solidarity Initiative Conference being a
case in point5. This current push for ASEOWA has been largely successful, mobilizing
over $31 million for the response from a wide range of the African private sector, as
well as exploration of how to leverage the non-financial resources and capacities of
the private sector for the Mission6. AU Member States have also been forthcoming
in terms of offering technical assistance to affected countries, including the
deployment of health care personnel as part of the Mission.
The Ebola crisis has undoubtedly pushed the AU and its security architecture in
terms of its practice and thinking around responding to emerging challenges which
do not necessarily fit the conventional understanding of security. The long-term
institutional and normative implications of broadening security thinking and the
PSCs purview of the same need to be closely followed, as well as interrogating
whether this Mission can provide lessons, and impetus for speeding up the
operationalization of mechanisms such as the ASF and standing ERTs, as well as
requisite guidelines and policies. Lastly, an orientation which sees technical support
from AU Member States beyond the Mission, and which is strategically focused on
building the health systems and related institutions of the affected countries will be
key in the long-term thinking of the AU.
16-01-2013.pdf.
5 http://summits.au.int/en/22ndsummit/events/african-solidarity-initiative-asisolidarity-conference-launch-pledging-process-su
6 http://pages.au.int/ebola/events/african-union-rallies-private-sector-fight-ebola-8november-addis-ababa