Republic of the Philippines Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME

COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6853

December 29, 1953

FRANCISCO F. ILLESCAS, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF

APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Quintin Paredes, Benjamin H. Aquino, Domingo F. de Guzman, M.G.
Bustos and Remedios D. Garcia for petitioner.Ramon Diokno, Jose
W. Diokno and Pablo G. Santos for respondent Benito Cruz.

PARAS, C.J.:
In the elections held on November 13, 1951, Benito Cruz and
Francisco F. Illescas were candidates for mayor, and Victor Cruz and
Francisco Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor in the municipality of
Angat, Province of Bulacan. Francisco Illescas was proclaimed
elected by municipal board of canvassers, having received 2,200
votes as against 2,181 votes of Benito Cruz. In due time the latter
filed a motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
impugning the result in all the 23 precincts, except precinct 13-A.
Francisco Illescas in turn entered his protest as to precincts Nos. 2, 4,
4-A, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16 and 16-A. After necessary revision of ballots
and trial, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered a decision
declaring Francisco Illescas elected municipal mayor with a plurality
of four votes, the votes being 2,176 for Illescas and 2,172 for Benito
Cruz. Both appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in its decision
promulgated on July 26, 1953, found that Benito Cruz won with a
plurality of five votes, he being credited with 2,185 votes, and
Francisco Illescas 2,180 votes. The latter (petitioner) has appealed to
this court by way of certiorari, and limits the controversy only to the
25 ballots specified in his six assignments of error. On the other hand,
Benito Cruz (respondent), in further support of the appealed decision,
has imputed error to the Court of Appeals insofar as the 20 ballots
mentioned in his two counter-assignments of error are concerned.

Ballot Exhibit (I-4) is sought to be rejected by petitioner, because V.

Cruz is written in the space for the mayor. This vote was correctly
counted for the respondent inasmuch as the erroneous initial of the
name which accompanies the correct surname of a candidate does
not annul the vote in favor of the latter (Revised Election Code,
section 149, paragraph 6), and the fact that the voter desired to vote
for the respondent as mayor is definitely shown when he wrote his
correct surname in the proper space (Id., section 135). The name of
Victor Cruz will not affect the vote in favor of the petitioner, since he
was not a candidate for mayor. (Id., section 149, paragraph 7).
Ballot Exhibit (3-4) is alleged by the petitioner to have been
erroneously counted in favor of the respondent, because B or F. Cruz
is written in the space for mayor. The Court of Appeals did not commit
any mistake, since if B is considered, it is the initial of respondent's
name, and if F is deemed as having substituted B, the wrong initial
does not annul the vote for the respondent (Revised Election code,
section 149, paragraph 6).
In ballot Exhibit (3-6) V. Cruz is written in the space for mayor. Under
section 149, paragraph 6 of the Revised Election Code, this vote was
correctly counted for the respondent. But it is contended for the
petitioner that the vote should be rejected, because B or R Cruz
appears in the space for member of the provincial board and the
voter might have intended to vote the respondent for the latter
position, and not for mayor. Petitioner's contention is not tenable, for
the reason that when the name of a candidate appears in two spaces
of the ballot, it shall be counted in favor of the candidate, and the vote
for the office for which he is not a candidate shall be counted as stray
(Revised Election Code, section 149, paragraph 3).
The petitioner wants this court to reject ballot Exhibit (4-2) in which R.
Cruz is written in the space for mayor. The respondent was properly
credited with this vote in accordance with section 149, paragraph 6,
of the Revised Election Code.
Another ballot assailed by the petitioner is Exhibit 4-3 in which V.
Cruz is voted for mayor. Similarly with Exhibit 1-4, said vote for
respondent must be sustained.

As ballot Exhibit (4-6), also impugned by the petitioner is analogous

to Exhibit 3-6, it should be counted for respondent.
The petitioner argues that ballot Exhibit (4-7) cannot be considered
as a valid vote for the respondent, because V. Cruz appears in the
space for mayor and V. Cruz appears in the space for vice-mayor.
The vote for the respondent as mayor was correctly counted under
section 149, paragraph 6, of the Revised Election Code.
Ballot Exhibit (5-7) is found by the Court of Appeals to contain in the
space for mayor Binti or Bintu Kris or Kais, and was counted for the
respondent under the principle of idem sonans. Contrary to
petitioner's contention, no error was committed by the court a quo.
As ballot Exhibit (5-10) is similar to Exhibit 4-7, the petitioner's plea
for its rejection is without merit.
Ballot Exhibit (6-1) is in the same class as Exhibits 3-6 and 4-6.
Hence petitioner's contention that it should not be counted is
overruled.
In ballot Exhibit (6-4) Benito Alinsangan Cruz is voted in the space for
mayor, and it is insisted for the petitioner that the word Alinsangan
was inserted to identify the voter. The speculative argument of the
petitioner cannot prevail over the contrary finding of the Court of
Appeals, and the vote must accordingly be credited in favor of the
respondent in virtue of section 149, paragraph 9, of the Revised
Election Code which provides that the use of a nickname, if
accompanied by the name or surname of the candidate, does not
annul such vote, except when it was used as a means to identify the
voter. It is uncontroverted that Alinsangan is the family nickname of
the respondent.
Ballot Exhibit (6-2) is objected to by the petitioner for being marked,
the words "Panlao ang nacio" having been written thereon. As the
ballot does not contain such expression, the Court of Appeals having
in fact made no finding on the matter, the vote was properly counted
for the respondent.
V. Cruz is written in the space for mayor and B. Cruz in the space for
member of the provincial board in ballot Exhibit (6-5), and the

petitioner claims that the vote should be considered stray. The ballots
is in the same group as Exhibits 3-6, 4-6 and 6-1 and, for the reason
we have already set forth, must be awarded to the respondent.
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Ballot Exhibit (9-13) is protested by the petitioner on the ground that

A. Bento, the name of a person distinct from that of the respondent, is
written in the space for mayor. Bento readily has the sound of Benito
and is therefore good under the principle of idem sonans (Revised
Election Code, section 149, paragraph 2). As the erroneous initial of
the surname accompanying the correct name of a candidate does not
annul the vote in favor of the latter (Id., paragraph 6), this vote was
rightly considered for the respondent.
The petitioner question ballot Exhibit (8-1) in which V. Cruz appears
in the space for mayor. Under section 149, paragraph 6, of the
Revised Election Code, this vote must be held valid for the
respondent, in parity with Exhibits 1-4 and 4-3.
The petitioner wants ballot Exhibit (12-1) rejected because F. Coros is
written in the space for mayor. This is a valid vote for the respondent,
since Coros may easily sound Cruz and should be accepted under
the principle of idem sonans (Revised Election Code, section 149,
paragraph 2) in connection with paragraph 6, section 149, of the
same code, which provides that the erroneous initial of the name
which accompanies the correct surname of a candidate does not
annul the vote in favor of the latter.
Ballots Exhibits (13-6 and 13-7) are alleged by the petitioner to be
marked, because in the first Sotto Lombir (meaning lumberyard)
appears on the first line for municipal councilors, and in the second S.
Lamber appears on the first line for councilors. The proof shows,
however, that there was a candidate by the name of Soto known as
Soto Lumber because he owns a lumberyard. Moreover, even
assuming that there was no such candidate, as the Court of Appeals
held, the votes can be validly counted for respondent, in view of
paragraph 13, section 149, of the Revised Election Code to the effect
that any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of
candidacy or in favor of a candidate for an office for which he did not
present himself, shall be void and counted as a stray vote, but shall
not invalidate the whole ballot. Hence these two votes are valid for

the respondent.
Ballot Exhibit (13-9) should be discarded, according to the petitioner,
because E. Cruz is voted for mayor. Under section 149, paragraph 6,
of the Revised election Code, this vote was properly counted for the
respondent.
The petitioner contends that ballot Exhibit (G-5) was erroneously
rejected by the Court of Appeals which held the same as marked,
because of the mere fact that the word "nardo" is written above the
letter "F" of F. Illescas voted for mayor. The Court of Appeals made its
deduction from a penmanship comparison of some letters in "nardo"
with corresponding letters in "Briones" and "Delgado" appearing in
the same ballot. On the other hand, it is insisted for the petitioner that
the word was not written by the voter. In the absence of positive
evidence on the point, other than the ballot itself, we are inclined to
hold that the basis for the conclusion of the court a quo is rather
inconclusive, and we therefore rule that this vote should have been
counted in favor of the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals rejected ballot Exhibit (H-5) as a valid vote for
the petitioner, on the ground that only the word "Kiko" is written in the
space for mayor. We have, however, already ruled that "when the
nickname of a candidate is a derivative or contraction of his Christian
name or his surname and if he is popularly and commonly known by
that nickname, a ballot where only such nickname appears is valid for
such candidate if there is no other candidate with the same nickname
for the same office." (Abrea vs. Lloren, * 46 Off. Gaz., 439). It cannot
be alleged that there is no evidence that the petitioner is popularly
known with the name "kiko", because the Court of Appeals pointed
out that "the protestee tried to show through the testimony of Tomas
Pablo that his nicknames were 'kikoy', 'kiko', 'Dong, or 'Dodong'", and
even admitted that "in this country, the diminutive of 'Francisco' are
usually 'Paquing', 'Paquito', 'Paco', 'Pacoy', 'Kiko', 'Kikoy', or 'Koko'.
As there was no other candidates for mayor with the same derivative
nickname 'Kiko', the vote in question should be credited for the
petitioner.
Ballot Exhibit (H-6) was rejected by the Court of Appeals because
Dodong Illescas is written in the space for mayor, and there is no

evidence that "Dodong" is petitioner's nickname. This is erroneous,

inasmuch as said court admitted that, as already stated, "the
protestee tried to show through the testimony of Tomas Pablo that his
nicknames were 'Kikoy', 'Kiko', 'Dong', or 'Dodong'", and no pretense
is made that said testimony has ever been contradicted. Hence this
particular vote is valid for the petitioner.
With respect to ballot Exhibit (J-8), claimed by the petitioner to be a
valid vote for him, the Court of Appeals made the following finding :
"Rejected on the ground that it is marked because there is a big cross
or 'X' on the space for Senator as well as a small cross or 'X' and an
arrow on the fourth line for Councilors. The ballot supports the ruling
of the lower court for we can see in the ballot the following : there has
been written the name 'B. Cruz' in big letters covering the lines 2, 3,
4, 5 and 6 for Senators which was cancelled by a big cross and
thereafter the voter wrote another cross or 'X' immediately in the
upper part of the letter 'Z' of 'Cruz' and which small cross was later on
crossed by a long line, which crosses in our opinion unnecessary.
Again, the elector wrote the name 'B. Cruz' on the fourth line for
Councilors and immediately after the name the elector wrote an 'X'
and then an arrow toward said letter 'X'. Evidently, these crosses and
arrow are distinguishing marks which makes this ballot void. Hence, it
was properly rejected by the lower court." This conclusion of the
Court of Appeals is, we think, unassailable.
The rejection by the Court of Appeals of ballot Exhibit (J-11) is based
upon the following finding : "Contested on the ground that it was
prepared by the two persons of different culture. Upon examination of
the ballot, we find the objection completely well taken. The names 'P.
Elysascas' voted for Mayor and the initial 'P' superimposed by the
initial 'V' followed by the surname 'Coros' on the line for Vice-Mayor
were written by a person not well schooled while the rest of the
names appearing on the other positions were written by a person
skilled in writing. Therefore, this ballot should be rejected and
discarded from those admitted by the lower court in favor of the
protestee, it having been prepared by two hands." We are not inclined
to adopt the contrary position of the petitioner.
Ballot Exhibit (K-3) is claimed as a valid vote for the petitioner. Like
Exhibit J-11, this ballot was found by the Court of Appeals to have

been prepared by two hands because of some obvious variance of

the handwriting contained therein. We are not in a position to alter the
finding of the Court a quo.
It results that, out of the 25 ballots questioned by the petitioner, only
three should be added to the total number of votes received by and
credited to him by the Court of Appeals, thus still making the
respondent the winner with a plurality of two votes. Although already
unnecessary and superfluous, it may not be amiss to state that, as
contended by the respondent, the Court of Appeals erred in not
counting the 14 votes represented by colored ballots Exhibits (C-1) to
(C-14). The reason for the rejection is that they are sample ballots,
and, under section 128 of the Revised Election Code, no name of any
actual candidate shall be written on sample ballots, nor shall they be
useed for voting, nor shall they be counted. In this case, there is no
question that as well the election inspectors as the voters to whom
the sample ballots were distributed acted in good faith. The injunction
contained in section 128 is addressed mainly to the election officials,
and the latter's innocent mistake should not be used as a means to
deprive likewise innocent voters of their right to vote. In a situation
like this, we are constrained to hold the provision to be merely
directory. It appears that, out of 14 votes, nine are for the respondent
and five are for the petitioner. If these are added to their respective
totals, the respondent will have a final plurality of six votes.
The respondent also claims that ballots Exhibits (3-11) and (9-1)
should have been counted by the Court of Appeals in his favor and
that ballots (Exhibits B-1, I-7, J-9 and J-10), which were credited by
said court in favor of the petitioner, should be discarded. We need not
pass on respondent's claim, for the result reached herein already
favorable to the respondent will not be affected thereby.
The appealed decision will therefore be and it is hereby affirmed, and
final judgment will be entered five days after notice of this decision to
the petitioner. So ordered, with costs against the petitioner.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
* 81 Phil., 809.l protestante presento una mocion de nueva vista en la
que, entre otras cosas, dice:
2. That on May 29, and 30, 1952, in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
of Ilocos Sur, the Municipal Mayor of Burgos, Ilocos Sur, the
Municipal Treasurer of same municipality, two councilors of Burgos,
Ilocos Sur, in the presence of Fiscal Manuel Montilla and Assistant
Fiscal Alfredo Laya, Sgt. Melchor Rojas, P. C. as representative of the
Provincial Commander, P. C., and Antonio Soller, as representative of
the Provincial Treasurer of Ilocos Sur, opened ballot boxes for
Precinct No. 4 and 5 of the said municipality,in accordance with
section 157 of the Revised Election Code and in the ballot box No. 5,
evidences of tampering of the box and its contents were found, ....
A renglon seguido enumero las irregularidades que suponiahabian
sido cometidas y pidio la revocacion de la decision y que se le
concediese nueva vista para la admision de las pruebas nuevamente
descubiertas. A dicha petitiocn se opusoel protestante; y el Hon. Juez
recurrido,olvidandose de las rzaones que tuvo al no permitir la
apertura de las urnas que no eran objecto de protesta, cuando la
causa estaba pendiente, aprobo la mocion de nueva vista en 18 de
junio, revocando la decision del 23 de mayo.
Despues de various aplazamientos, se llamo a vista la causa el 7 de
julio de 1953, y el protestado presento al sargento Melchor Rojas con
la intencion de presentar como prueba el contenido de las urnas de
los precintos Nos.4 y 5 del municipio de Burgos. Despues de una
largadiscusion entre las partes, el Hon. Juez recurrido permitiola
suspension de la vista y la presentacion por el protestante ante este
Tribunal Supremo de una recurso de interdictoprohibitorio, y en
efecto, se presento la solicitud correspondiente en 17 de agosto.
En su contestacion, el recurrido Fidel Escobar admite los hechos ya
relatados; pero, por los fraudes que el cree fueron cometidos en los
diferentes precintos, contiende que las balotas encontradas en las
urnas abiertas en la oficina del fiscal provincial deben ser
conservadasen vez de quemadas para ser presentadas como
prueba; que al Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Ilocos Sur se le

conceda poder libre e ilimitado para recibir dichas pruebas,y pide que
se deniegue la peticion de interdicto prohibitorio.conceda poder libre
e ilimitado para recibir dichas purebas, y pide que se deniegue la
peticion de interdicto prohibitorio.
En una large serie de decisiones, este Tribunal declaro que el plazo
concedido a un protestado para contestar y presentar su
contrademanda es Perentorio y que, expirado dicho plazo, el
protestado y no puede enmendar su contestacion o presentar
contrademanda o enmendarla alegando nuevos hechos que no
habian sido alegados en la contetacion o contrademanda originales.
(Orencia contra Araneta Diaz, 47 Jur. Fil., 875; Valenzuela contra
Revilla y Carlos, 41 Jur. Fil., 4; Cailles contra Gomez y Barbaza,42
Jur. Fil., 522; Tengco contra Jocson, 43 Jur. Fil., 748; Gallares contra
Casenas, 48 Jur. Fil., 385.) El objeto de la ley es poner fin a las
luchas electrorales, y que no se eternicien los procedimientos de
protesta en los tribunales. El Juez recurrido habia denegado con
acierto la apertura de las urnas de los otros precintos del municipio
de Burgos en sus ordenes de 27 de febrero y 9 de abril de 1952;
peroal conceder la mocion de nueva vista, fundada en el
descubrimiento de nuevas pruebas consistentes en el contenido de
las balotas halladas en las urnas de los precintos que no fueron
objeto de la protesta ni de la contestacion,se extralimito en el
ejercicio de su jurisdiccion. Las pruebasse presentan para justificar
ciertas alegaciones, y en el expediente no existe ninguna alegacion
debidamente planteada dentro del plazo legal sobre los otros
precintosdel municipio de Burgos fuera del precinto No. 3.
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Si las alegaciones de la mocion de nueva vista se consideran como

enmiendas a la contestacion original, tampoco deban recibirse,
porque este Tribunal, en Demetriocontra Lopez, 50 Jur. Fil., 48, dijo:
". . . las enmiendaspropuestas en las mociones a que se refieren no
son meras ampliaciones a los fundamentos alegados en la protesta
original, la doctrina es aplicable a protestas como a
contestaciones sino que introducen otros nuevos fundamentos no
alegados anteriorment, que cambian esecialmente losmotivos de la
protesta, y Tribunal a quo no ha incurrido motivos de la protesta, y el
Tribunal a quo no ha incurrido en error al rechazar dichas mociones
por haber sido presentadas demasiado tarde, o sea mucho tiempo
despues del plazo marcado por la ley para la presentacion de las

protestas, no obstante no haberse podido descubrir las supuestas

irregularidades sino despues de la apertura de las urans, . . . .
(Valenzuela contra Carlos y Lopez de Jesus, 42 Jur. Fil., 450.)
Reabrir la vista de un expediente ya decidido y recibarpruebas en
apoyo de las alegaciones de la mocion de nueva vista que se
presento despues de vencido el plazo para la presentacion de la
contestacion o contrademanda no puede conducir mas que a la
eternizacion del expediente en dano y perjuicio del protestante que
gano la protesta y en contravencion de la voluntad popular.
El Juzgado de Primera Instancia es un juzgado de jurisdiccion
general; pero, al actuar sobre protestas electorales, es de jurisdiccion
especial y limitada (Tengco contra Jocson, 43 Jur. Fil., 748; Viola
contra Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Camarines Sur y Adolfo, 47
Jur.Fil., 895; y Saldana contra Consunji, 52 Jur. Fil., 446); tiene
jurisdiccion para conocer de la protesta sobre uncargo provincial o
municipal si se presenta la mocion dentro de los semanas siguientes
a la proclamacion del resultado de la eleccion. (Art. 174, Cod. Elec.
Rev.).
En el caso presente, el resultado de la eleccion de alcalde ha sido
proclamado en 14 de noviembre de 1951.No consta en autos cuando
el recurrido habia sido emplazado;pero como su contestacion fue
presentada en 12 de diciembre de 1951, se puede deducir que lo fue
antesde dicha fecha o en la misma fecha a lo mas tardar y sumocion
de nueva vista fue presentada en 2 de junio de 1952, o cinco meses
y veinte dias despues de expirado elplazopara presentar la
contestacion o contraproteta. Lamocion de nueva vista, por tanto, ya
considerada como enmienda a la contestacion o ya como
contrademanda, fue presentada fuera del plazo senalado por la ley,
que es solamente de cinco dias (Art. 176, pars. b y c, Cod.
Elec.Rev.); por lo tanto, el Hon. Juez recurrido, al revocar su decision
y conceder nueva vista, obro sin jurisdiccion.La apelacion contra
decisiones sobre protesta para el cargode alcalde debe presentarse
dentro de cinco dias despues de notificada de la decision (Art. 178) y
el juez recurrido,extralimitandose en sus poderes, revoco en 18 de
junio sudecision, de la cual fue notificado el recurrido en 31 de
mayode 1952. La decision ya estaba firme; la orden de 18 de junio
de 1952, nula y de ningun valor.

Se concede el remedio pedido, con costas contra el recurrido Fidel

Escobar.
Paras, Pres., Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista
Angelo and Labrador, MM., estan conformes.