Eugenio vs Civil Service Commission

GR. No. 115863

DOCTRINE: The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
function. Corollary, an administrative agencys power to reorganize does not include the
power to abolish and is merely limited to offices under its control as provided for by law.
Facts: Aida Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute.
She then applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank.
Eventually she was given a CES eligibility and was even recommended to the President
for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board (CESB). However, then
respondent Civil Service Commission subsequently passed a Resolution which abolished
the CESB, while relying on the provisions of Section 17 , Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987, allegedly conferring on the said Commission the power
and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Finding herself
bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has in fact been abolished, petitioner filed the petition
at bench to annul, among others, the said resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is vested with the proper authority
to abolish the Office of the CESB.
Held: No. The petition is granted and the Resolution of said respondent Commission is
hereby annulled and set aside. CESB was created by virtue of PD No. 1 on September
1,1974. It cannot be disputed that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be
abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation
and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition
of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993,
the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of the CESB. Respondent
Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 as its source of power to abolish the CESB. But as well
pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with
Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent
Commission. As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent
Commissions power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in
Section 16.
Moreover, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively
attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee
"the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up
executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook." 6 The
essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose

of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain

"policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7,
Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department
or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation,
either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted
by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of
periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and
having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency.

Azarcon vs Sandiganbayan
GR. No. 116033
DOCTRINE: Administrative agencies exercise only that power delegated to them as
defined either in the Constitution or in legislation or in both. The quantum of powers

possessed by an administrative agency forming part of the executive branch will still be
limited to that conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication. Corollarily,
implied powers are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser
degree than the power granted.
Facts:
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt
and ore.His services were contracted by the Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines (PICOP) at its concession in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. Occasionally, he
engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the
formers premises.From this set of circumstances arose the present controversy. On May
25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa)
or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the
latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla,
a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender,
transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla.
The Warrant of Garnishment was received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985 and was
signed by the same. Moreover, the subect property of the warrant was an Isuzu dump
truck owned by Ancla. Subsequently, however, Azarcon wrote a letter to the BIR stating
that Ancla intended to cease operations with Azarcon, evidenced by the surreptitious
withdrawal by Ancla of his equipments from the custody of Azarcon. Incidentally, the
petitioner reported the taking of the truck to the security manager of PICOP, Mr. Delfin
Panelo, and requested him to prevent this truck from being taken out of the PICOP
concession but it was already too late. The BIR in its analysis, concluded that since
Azarcon signed the said warrant, he voluntarily assumed the liabilities of safekeeping and
preserving the unit in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Eventually along with his
co-accused Jaime Ancla, petitioner Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with
the crime of malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to
Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner was found guilty of said crime but on a
petition for review petitioner presented, among others, the following defenses: a) The
Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed solely by private
individuals; b) In any event, even assuming arguendo that the appointment of a private
individual as a custodian or a depositary of distrained property is sufficient to convert
such individual into a public officer, the petitioner cannot still be considered a public
officer because there is no provision in the National Internal Revenue Code which
authorizes the Bureau of Internal Revenue to constitute private individuals as depositaries
of distrained properties.
Issue: Whether or not an administrative agency such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
in designating a private individual as a custodian of distrained property, may cause the
latter to become a public officer.

Held: No. The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint
over the truck allegedly owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner Alfredo
Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt for it, effectively
designated petitioner a depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo, a public
officer.This is based on the theory that the power to designate a private person who has
actual possession of a distrained property as a depository of distrained property is
necessarily implied in the BIRs power to place the property of a delinquent tax payer in
distraint as provided for under Sections 206, 207 and 208 (formerly Sections 303, 304
and 305) of the National Internal Revenue Code, (NIRC).
However, the case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the present case simply
because the facts therein are not identical, similar or analogous to those obtaining here.
While the cited case involved a judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached
property in the hands of the debtor, the case at bench dealt with the BIRs administrative
act of effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of taxpayer Ancla in relation
to his back taxes, property which was received by petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it
was clearly within the scope of that courts jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute
the judicial deposit and give the depositary a character equivalent to that of a public
official. However, in the instant case, while the BIR had authority to require petitioner
Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to
appoint Azarcon a public officer.
It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited
government, that its branches and administrative agencies exercise only that power
delegated to them as defined either in the Constitution or in legislation or in both. Thus,
although the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, the
quantum of powers possessed by an administrative agency forming part of the executive
branch will still be limited to that conferred expressly or by necessary or fair
implication in its enabling act. Hence, an administrative officer, it has been held, has
only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof. Corollarily, implied powers are those which are necessarily included
in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other
matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto. For to so extend the
statutory grant of power would be an encroachment on powers expressly lodged in
Congress by our Constitution. It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the
prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any
person to preserve a distrained property.
However, there is clearly no provision which may be found in the NIRC constituting such
person a public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a
private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to
appoint him as a public officer.

Mateo vs Court of Appeals

GR. No. 113219
DOCTRINE: Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction over cases involving the
dismissal of employees of government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters as the latter rather falls under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Facts:Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees,
petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private
respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. On December 13, 1992, private
respondent was placed under preventive suspension and Maximo San Diego was

designated in his place as Acting General Manager. He was later dismissed on January 7,
1993.
On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto
and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
Branch 78, challenging his dismissal by petitioners. Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss
the case on two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of
government employees which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service Commission; and
(2)quo warranto was not the proper remedy.
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over Sp. Civil
Case No. 014-M involving dismissal of an employee of quasi-public corporation.
Held: No. There is no question that MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created
pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities
Act of 1973, as amended. In Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commissions , the
Court en banc ruled that employees of government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Hence,the
established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and
controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and
Rules and Regulations.
Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, and Rule II section 1 of
Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out
the initial remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically
provide that the party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the
government involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within
fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari to the Supreme
Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the
Civil Service Commission. Moreover,under the present rule, Revised Circular No. 1-91
as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1,
1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court
of Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts
have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees
covered by the Civil Service Law.

Republic vs. Capulong

GR. No. 93359
DOCTRINE: The courts will not interfere to modify, control or inquire into the exercise
of an administrative agencys discretion unless it be alleged or proven that there has been
an abuse of or an excess of authority on the part of the officer concerned.
Facts: On July 26,1989 the Air Transportation Office (ATO) and its Prequalification
Bidding and Award Committee (PBAC) publicly invited prequalified bidders to furnish
the necessary goods and services for works under the Nationwide Air Navigation
Facilities Modernization Project Phase II wherein Inter Technical Pacific, Inc. was

prequalified as a bidder and submitted its bidding documents. The bidding was conducted
by the PBAC and when the bidding documents of Inter Technical was opened and
examined, it was found to have not contained a Form of Bid. Consequently the PBAC
refused to read Inter Technicals documents and rejected the same, stating the same as
non complying. In its defense, Inter Technical protested that the bid price was spelled
out in the bidding documents; taht its bid was accompanied by a bid bond attached to the
documents and that the Form of Bid was a mere formality which can be rectified.
Despite Inter Technicals plea the PBAC adjourned the proceedings hence the instant
complaint filed by Inter Technical for specific performance and mandatory and
prohibitory injunction for the reconsideration by ATO and PBAC of Inter Technicals bid.
In their defense, ATO and PBAC contended that the Form of Bid is an indispensable
document, and the failure to enclose the same would nullify the bid, treating the same as
non-complying as if no bid was submitted at all to be read or considered. Eventually
respondent Judge Capulong granted the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against ATO and PBAC, ruling that Inter Technical submitted a bid bond and bidders
bond which are indispensable to the validation of a bid proposal. Moreover, while the
case was pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, respondent Judge rendered a
decision directing ATO and PBAC to immediately reconvene and to read and consider
Inter Technicals bid.
Issue: Whether or not an action for Mandamus is proper in this case.
Ruling: No. A perusal of Inter Technicals complaint shows that it is bereft of any
allegation that ATO and PBAC committed grave abuse of discretion in rejecting its bid.
Thus, the courts will not interfere to modify, control or inquire into the exercise of this
discretion unless it be alleged or proven that there has been an abuse of or an excess of
authority on the part of the officer concerned. Furthermore, as a rule, mandamus lies only
to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty and not a discretionary act. Under Rule
132.3 of the Rules implementing PD No. 1594, and in the Invitation to Bid, the
government has expressly reserved the right to reject any or all bids. PBACs authority to
evaluate the bids during the opening and examination thereof clearly indicates its
discretion to determine compliance or non compliance with the bidding requirement.
Consequently, when PBAC made a preliminary evaluation of the required documents and
found Inter Technicalss bid non-complying for lack of a Form of Bid, the former merely
exercised its discretion under the law.

Carpio vs Executive Secretary

GR No. 96409
DOCTRINE: The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowest clerk which
means it is the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter.
Facts: The Congress enacted RA 6795 entitled An Act establishing the Philippine
National Police under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government,
and for Other Purposes. Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of
the Philippine Bar filed a petition seeking the unconstitutionality of RA 6795, contending
that RA 6795 emasculated the National Police Commission by limiting its power to
administrative control over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus control
remained with the Department Secretary under whom the National Police Commission

and the PNP were placed.

A brief history shows that during the Commonwealth period, the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) was the nucleus of the Philippine Ground Force (PGF), now the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The PC was made part of the PGF but its
administrative, supervisory and discretional control was handled by the then Department
of the Interior. After the war, it remained as the National Police under the Department
of National Defense, as a major service component of the AFP. Later , the Integration Act
of 1975 created the Integrated National Police(INP) under the Office of the President
with the PC as the nucleus and the local police forces as the civilian components. The
PC-INP was headed by the PC chief who, as current Director-General of the INP,
exercised
command
functions
over
the
INP. The
National
Police
Commission(NAPOLCOM) exercised administrative control and supervision while the
local executives exercised operational supervision and discretion over the INP units
assigned within their respective localities. The set-up whereby the INP was placed under
the command of the military component, which is the PC, severely eroded the INPs
civilian character and the multiplicity in the governance of the PC-INP resulted in
inefficient police service. Moreover the integration of the National Police forces with the
PC also resulted in inequities since the military component had superior benefits and
privileges. Hence, through the Constitutional Commission of 1986, the one police force,
national in scope, and civilian in character provision emerged which is now Article XVI,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 6975 emasculated the NPC by limiting its power to
administrative control over the PNP, thus, control remained with the Department
Secretary under whom both the NPC and PNP were placed.
Held: No. Reference must simply be made to the fundamentally accepted principles in
Constitutional Law that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus
and offices to lay at rest petitioners contention on the matter. This presidential power of
control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowest clerk and has been held by the Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Mondano vs Silvosa to mean the power of the President to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. It is said to
be at the very heart of the meaning of Chief Executive. Equally well accepted as the
corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers at
the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet
Members.

Cabarrus Jr. vs. Bernas

AC No. 4684
Ponente: Justice Torres
DOCTRINE: The functions of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and
is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It
is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes
investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may require.
Facts: On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code and Code of Professional Responsibility. Cabarrus alleged that
Bernas and his client Ramon B. Pascual, Jr. caused the preparation and filing of a
criminal complaint for falsification of a public document on April 11, 1996, (three days
before the filing of the afore-cited Civil Case) at the
AOED of the National Bureau of Investigation in violation of the non-forum shopping
rule by the Supreme Court. The gravamen of the affidavit complaint of the respondent is
forgery, the same legal issue in Civil Case No. 65646. Cabarrus contended that Atty.

Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated, abetted and

facilitated the perversion and subversion of truth in the said verification and certification
of non-forum shopping. Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. In his Comment, Bernas averred
that he has not committed forum shopping because the criminal action is not an action
that involves the same issue as those in a civil action and both suits can exist without
constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not been prosecuted in the
criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only exists when identical reliefs are
issued by the same parties in multiple fora.
Issue: Whether or not the filing a complaint before the National Bureau of Investigations
when another action has already been filed in another court constitutes forum shopping as
it is one of the courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91,
Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
Held: : No. The courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91,
Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with
judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not only hear and determine
controversies between adverse parties, but to make binding orders or judgments. As
succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums
contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any
relief, declaratory or otherwise.
The functions of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of
granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an
investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes
investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may require. It
renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which
precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those persons responsible for
defrauding his client.