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What if
Check Lists
HAZOP
FMEA
FTA
CPQRA
Quantitative
Quantitative
FMEA, Failure Mode Effects Analysis
is a preliminary qualitative technique
that may require preliminary
quantitative analysis (Mini-QRA)
This presentation only considers the HAZOP technique.
HAZOP
HAZOP was developed by Lawley (1974) of ICI. Based on early account by Elliott & Owen (1968)
Hazop studies are carried out by an experienced, multidisciplanary team, who review all physical
aspects of a process (lines, equipment, instrumentation) to discover potential hazards and
operability problems using a check list approach.
The basis for a HAZOP is a critical examination of information found in a word model, a process
flowsheet, a plant layout, equipment specification or a P&ID, (Piping and Instrument Drawing).
The principals of examination include:
1
2
3
4
Intention
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
(a) hazards
(b) operating difficulties
5 Safeguards
6 Recommendations / Actions
continue to page 3
Early HAZOP studies used the following set of Guide Words to systematically review the process:
NO or NOT
Negation of intention
No Flow of A
MORE
Quantitative increase
LESS
Quantitative decrease
AS WELL AS
Quantitative increase
PART OF
Quantitative decrease
REVERSE
Flow
Time
Frequency
Mixing
Pressure
Composition
Viscosity
Addition
Temperature
pH
Voltage
Separation
Level
Speed
Toxicity
Reaction
continue to page 5
Attitude
Preparation
Meeting Leadership
HAZOP
Review By
Team
Knowledge
Experience
Teams HAZOP
Experience
Documentation
Follow-up
Table
Deviation
continue to page 6
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Action
Explain design
intention
Select a process
variable or task
Examine
Consequences
associated with
deviation
Develop action
items
List possible
causes of
deviation
Assess acceptability
of risk based on
consequences
6 con't
Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent deviation
continue to page 7
continue to page 8
625
5
6
18750
5
93750
250
375
5
75
items
variables
guide words
questions
min./question
minutes
minutes/day
days
days/week
weeks
c
d = axbxc
e
f = dxe
g
h=f/g
I
j=h/I
Common Mistakes
1 Failing to establish a "safe" environment for team members
2 Consequences of events not carried to conclusion.
3 Taking unwarranted credit for safeguards
HAZOP Example
To Compressor Inlet
LAH
FV
1
Inlet Line
LIC
1
end
Dev'ns
Table 1
Source
ID No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Deviation
High Flow
High Level
High Interface
High Pressure
High Temperature
High Concentration
Low / No Flow
Low Level
Low Interface
Low Pressure
Low Temperature
Low Concentration
Reverse / Misdirected Flow
Tube Leak
Tube Rupture
Leak
Rupture
Column
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Tank or
Vessel
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Line
X
Heat
Exchanger
Pump
Compressor
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
More Flow
Less Flow
More Pressure
Less Pressure
More Level
Less Level
Part of, wrong concentration
As well as, contaminants
other than, wrong material
More Reaction
Less Reaction
No Reaction
More Mixing
Less Mixing
More Corrosion
More Erosion
Sampling
Page 10
X
X
X
X
D1
Company Nova
Location Corunna
Leader
RAH
Scribe
GFR
Prod'n
PM
Node No.
Revision
Dwg No.
Proc Des
Instr'ts
Mech
Describe
JB
GH
FD
0
Cor -123-4567
Research
Electrical
HH
Safety
MN
Date
Page
Op Tech
Other
Other
2-Jun-97
1
Intention The intent is to transfer 150,000 lb/hr of C2/C2= mix at 300 psig and at -30 F for the startup period.
Guide Wrd
High
Param
Flow
Possible Causes
1
FV-1 Wide open
2
3
Consequences
1
High level in KO pot with liquid carry-over to compressor with serious damage to rotor. Potential hydrocarbons release.
2
3
Safeguards
1
High level alarm LAH-1
2
3
Recommendation / Actions
Respib
By
Date
1
Consider limiting flow orifice, auto SD trip on High-High level, smart check valve.
1
JB
1-Jan-99
2
2
3
3
Page 11
D2
Company
Location
Leader
Scribe
Prod'n
Nova
Corunna
RAH
GFR
PM
Node No.
Proc Des JB
Instr'ts
GH
Mech
FD
Revision
0
Dwg No. Cor -123-4567
Research
Electrical HH
Safety
MN
Date
Page
Op Tech
Other
Other
2-Jun-97
2
0
0
0
Intention The intent is to transfer 150,000 lb/hr of C2/C2= mix at 300 psig and at -30 F for the startup period.
0
0
Guide Wrd
Low
Param Flow
Possible Causes
1
2
3
Consequences
1
2
3
Safeguards
1
2
3
Rec / Actions
1
2
3
Respib
1
2
3
Page 12
By
Date
D3
Company
Location
Leader
Scribe
Prod'n
Node No.
Revision
Dwg No.
Proc Des
Instr'ts
Mech
Date
Page
Op Tech
Other
Other
Research
Electrical
Safety
Describe
Intention
Guide Wrd
Param
Dev'n
Possible Causes
1
2
3
Consequences
1
2
3
Safeguards
1
2
3
Rec / Actions
1
2
3
Respib
1
2
3
Page 13
By
Date
Chk List
High Flow
Loss of automatic
control
Low Flow
Operator error
No Flow
Reverse Flow
High or Low
pressure
High or Low
Temperature
Static buildup
2 same as 1
3 Changes in chemical a
condition
b
High or Low
Conentration
Contaminants
4 Startup and
Shutdown
Condiotion.
Testing
Commissioning
Maintenance
Pipeline
registration
2 Changes in physical
condition
5 Hazardous Pipelines a
Page 14