1945

FARABrS PLATO

By Leo Strauss
Eben derselbe Gedanke kann, an

"The identical thought Can have

a completely different meaning in an other

einem andern Orte. einen pan?

andem Wert

habcn.

Leasing, Leibniz, von den evn%en Strafen.

place"

admitted that one cannot understand the teachone has undering of Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed before
present?
former
stood the teaching of "the philosophers"; for the
one
with,
latter. To begin
itseFf as a Jewish correction of the
Aristotelians,
can identify "the philosophers" with the Islamic
Arisone may describe their teaching as a blend of genuine
It is generally

and

Islamic tenets.
totelianism with Neo-platonism and, of course.
principle transforming that
If, however, one wants to grasp the
heterogeneous elements into a consistent, or intel-

mixture of
ligible,

by
whole, one does well to follow the signpost erected

Maimonides

himself.

it abundantly
In his letter to Samuel ibn Tibbon, he makes
in philosophy,
clear that he considered the greatest authority
Averroes, nor even
.part from Aristotle himself, not Avicenna or
that
Avempace, but Far&bi. Of F&rabi's works, he mentions in
to ibn Tibbon
context only one by its title, and he recommends it
begin with
to
assume
may
we
Thus
terms.
in the strongest
He calls
book.
important
most
F&r&bi's
it
that he considered

that book The principles of the beings.

Its original title

is

The

political governments.
i. c.
There can then be no doubt as to the proper beginning,
the understanding
the only beginning which is not arbitrary, of
has to start from
one
background:
philosophic
of Maimonides
1

my

wish to express my thanks to Professor A.

translations from the Arabic.

357

H. Halkin

for kindly checking

STRAUSS

358

12]

359

FARABI'S PLATO
13]

tra-

would be unwise
place, we lack a sat2
isfactory edition. Above all, the full understanding of the book
presupposes the study of two parallel works of Farabi s, The
principles of the opinions of the people of the virtuous city* and
The virtuous religious community, the second of which has not
yet been edited at all. Maimonides presumably preferred The

an analysis of Farabi's Political governments.

to attempt such an analysis now. In the first

It

political governments to these parallel presentations.

To

discover

the reason for that preference, or, at any rate, to understand The
conpolitical governments fully, one has to compare the doctrines
parallel
the
in
contained
doctrines
tained in that book with the

works, and thus to lay bare the teaching characteristic of The

extent,
political governments. For that teaching consists, to some

adhered to in
of the silent rejection of certain tenets which arc
the two other works.
to stressing one feature of The political
governments ,(and, mutatis mutandis, of the two parallel works)
which by itself clearly indicates the most striking trait of Farabi's

We limit ourselves here

philosophy.

As

authentic and

is

shown already by the

its

customary

title,

difference

between

its

the book treats the whole

with the omission of logic and matheFarabt

matic) within a political framework. In this respect.
known
writings
Aristotelian
takes as his model, not any of the
extent,
to him or to us, but Plato* Republic and, to a lesser
within
philosophy
Laws which also present the whole of

of philosophy proper

e.

(i.

Plato's

wA4Xjlitkaliamework

particular Platonist
not necessary to look out for any
Laws were accessible to F^bi
dition: the Republic^ the

it is

Arabic translations.
F4rftbt followed Plato not

The

original

translation

was

was edited

Hyderabad

in

edited..by Filipowski in the

Leiden 1904. The

is less

vwn

'o,

Leipzig 1849, 1-64.

German

till the end is missing in

the passage from p. 62, line 21 in Filipowski's edition
it can partly be
translation;
German
the
and
edition
both the Hyderabad
A comparison of the
traced in Farabi's Musterstart (ed. Dieterici. 71 f.).
the
political governments with the parallel in

Hebrew

translation of

The

whole
Musterstoat shows that the text of the former is also incomplete: the
Musterto
corresponding
(roughly
governments
concluding part of The political
stoat 72
*

end)

is

at present lost.

Edited by Dieterici under the

title

in

the true

three more or less different

herence to Aristotle, he could take
the explicit teachings of
that
wavs. First, he could try to show
with each other. He devoted
both philosophers can be reconciled
the opinions of Plato and
to this attempt his Concordance of
the
that work is partly based on
Aristotle. The argument of
neoof
piece
this
accepting
so-called Theology of Aristotle: by
Aristotle, he could easily
of
work
genuine
platonic origin as a
agreement of the explicit
succeed in proving the substantial
concerning the.crucial bjts.
teachings of both philosophers
his
doubtful whether Flrlbt considered

is however very
treatise, and thus whether
Concordance as more than an exoteric
its explicit
us to attach great importance to
it would be wise of
that the esoteric teachings
argument.' Secondly, he could show
Thirdly, he could show that
of both philosophers are identical.
third approach
is identical. The
the aim- of both philosophers
hy
the
tripartite work The aims of
is used bv him in his
two
Averroes quotes it. The
Plato' and of Aristotle, or, as

it

P^oP

of

exclusively

The second part of that work is devoted

that centidjwt which al<
to Plato's philosophy. JJy studying
philosophies.

critical edition.*
at present accessible in a

one

is

enabled to

1346 H. Ibn Tibbon's Hebrew

translation (Die Staatsleitung von Alfdr&bt),

German
text underlying the Hyderabad edition as well as the
complete than the one underlying the Hebrew translation;

Cf. also F. Dieterici's

translation

in

merely as regards the manner

teachinp in his most imwhich he presented the philosophic

Plato's philosophy was
that
view
portant books. He held the
Platonism with his adphilosophv. To reconcile his

is

Der Musterstaat, Leiden 1895.

ut
Arabes". Bulletin de Vlnstit
J^yjjr.
Paul Kraus. "Plotin chez les
in the title of the
"opinion"
term
the
of
use
Note the
v. 23. IMMl. 269.
4

Cf

*^
l": *
Jd^Vs^uLdcm

Rosenthal
PUUonis philosophia, edd. F.
saccompamed
Theedition
(Warburg Institute) 1943.
in the following^no e
and by no.es. It will be quoted
pages and 1 nc
|f will indicate
%iMPta*: fibres in parentheses afterphilosophies
under he
edited
was
exf- The first part of Farabfs Two

S:
o tht

lion

tu

SU al^dda

in

SSi^^Ari-olle)

Hyderabad 1345 H.; the third part

The whole is
is not yet edited

(dealing with

^bfem

he

the

David. 61
Falkera (ReshU hokma, ed. by
Tncomplete Hebrew translation by
92).

360

STRAUSS

[4]

grasp fully the character of FAi-Sbi's Platonism and

therewith
of FSr&bi's own philosophy, and thus to take the first
step toward
the understanding of the philosophic background of

Maimonides.

FARABl'S PLATO

[5]

this or that dialogue

361

which he never read.

What

matters

is

what he thought about the philosophy of Plato as a whole which

he certainly knew from the Republic, the Timaeus and the
Laws.

I.

First Impressions

According to F&r4b!, Plato was guided by the question of the

man, or of happiness. After having realized that
man's perfection or his happiness is identical with, or at least
inseparable from, "a certain science (iTnarijfxri) and a certain
perfection of

Farabfs exposition of Plato's philosophy claims to be

a commain topics:6 Platonic topics which are not
mentioned in it, are considered by him either unimportant
or
merely exoteric. The procedure which he chooses, may
be called
genetic: he does not present the final Platonic
"dogmata" by
plete survey of its

following the scheme supplied

by the division of philosophy into

physics and ethics or any other scheme; nor does he
adopt
the procedure of Theo of Smyrna by describing
the sequence in
which the Platonic dialogues should be read; on the
other hand,
he does not engage in a historical study of the
"development" of
Plato's thought; 7 he simply describes what he
considers the inner"
and necessary sequence of the investigations of the mature
Plato.
He tries to assign to each step of Plato's investigations one
Platonic dialogue; one way or the other, he
succeeds in
logic,

thus

accounting for most, if not for almost all, of the dialogues

belonging to the traditional Corpus Platonicum.
What he says about
the individual dialogues, sounds in some cases
fairly fanciful.

He certainly had no access to all of them, and we do not know

to what extent the indirect knowledge which he
owed to Aristo^
M5alen^heo,^f^usor^6therriias been

distorted on the more

reached him. But it is unimportant what he believed or guessed about the
purport of

or less circuitous

way

in

which

is

most clearly by

independent of the
investigations of any predecessors, although
he knew of course (from the
Metaphysics e. g.) that Plato was a disciple of
Socrates as well as of other
philosophers. It is only when describing one
of the last steps of Plato's, that
he mentions "the way of Socrates" which a
historian would have explained at
the beginning of his exposition.
Cf. p. 376 f.. below.

life (/Slos)",

of

life in

he

question.

tries to

discover both the science and the

The successive examination

of all sciences

and ways of life which are generally accepted (lriooi) leads

him to the result that none of them meets his demands. 1 Compelled to discover the desired science and way of life by himself^ he finds first that the former is supplied by philosophy and
that the latter is supplied by the royal or political art, and then
that "philosopher" and "king" are identical. This identity
v

implies that virtue

not identical with, at least inseparable

Since this contradicts the popular notions
of the virtues, he investigated first the various virtues;" he
is, if

from, philosophy.

found that the genuine virtues are different from the virtues
"which are famous in the cities" (from the dpcrai woXirtical
or bw&btis)." But the central question concerns, on the basis
of the result mentioned, the precise meaning of "philosopher".
This subject to whose discussion the Phacdrus is devoted," divides
itself

into four parts: 1) the tpverts of the future philosopher (the

fffii!osophic"^pws)n) **~the""ways '"of philosophic investigation

(diairesis

and synthesis);

The

3) the

ways

of teaching (rhetoric

Platonic model of Farabi's presentation of the successive examination

of the generally received sciences

and

arts

is

to be found in the Apology of

b 9-22 e 5). Cf. also for the whole

Euthydemus 282 a-4 3 and 288 d 5-290 d 8.

Socrates (21

was concerned with history,

shown
J fact that heFirabl
the
presents Plato's investigations as entirely
little

of

it

Its title is: "The philosophy of Plato, its parts,

and the grades of dignity
of its parts, from it* beginning to its end."
Cf. also the end of the TahsU
(quoted in Farabl. Plato, IX).

How

way
way

first

part of the treatise

Cf. note 7 above.

With

the exception of justice;

cf*

the distinction between justice and the

virtues in Farabi's Plato 30 (22, 5).

Phaedo 68 c 5-69 c 3 and 82 a 11 fT.; Republic 430 c 3-5; 500 d 8; 518 d

9-*3;619c6ff.;Iatw7l0a5and968a2. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1116 a 17 ff.
" At the beginning of his summary of the Pkaedrus (J 22), Farabl uses
tajabhasa instead of the usual fakasa, thus indicating the particular significance
of that passage.

362

and

STRAUSS
dialectic)

4) the

t6]

ways

of transmitting the teaching (oral

After the question of what human perfection is,

or in writing).

has thus received a

full

answer, Plato had to turn his attention

to the conflict between happiness fully understood

ally accepted opinions

about happiness,

or, in

and the gener-

other words, to

the conflict classically represented by the fate of Socrates, between

the views and the way of life of the philosopher and the opinions

and the way of

of his unphilosophic fellow-citizens.

life

Re-

jecting both the assimilation of the philosopher to the vulgar*

and the withdrawal from political life, he had to seek a city,
different

from the

completed

mented

cities

speech

in

cerned the

way

in

converted to the
It is

in his time: the city

evident at
the

The

final

which the

life

question which he raised, con-

cities of his

time could be gradually

of the perfect city.

first

first

363

Philosophy and Politics

II.

The expression "Plato's philosophy"

F&ribi uses

in the

it

is

When

ambiguous.

heading of his treatise and again

in its

concluding sentence, he refers to Plato's investigations as sum-

marized

in

essentially

"Plato's philosophy" thus understood

the treatise.

concerned with happiness and

relation of philosophy to happiness;

science, ,s

subject of political
"Plato's

philosophy"

is

we

in particular

is

with the

and since happiness

is

the

are justified in saying that

essentially

a political

investigation.

Within the context of this political philosophy, Farabi's Plato dis-

and other dialogues.

confirms

which existed

* in the Republic whose results

are supplevarious ways by the Timaeus, the Laws, the Menexenus

in

FARABI S PLATO

[7]

sight

and closer investigation merely

that
view of Plato's

impression 1 '

this

philosophy cannot be traced to Neoplatonism.

identification of philosophy with

The apparent

the royal art. the apparent

subordination of the subject of the Timaeus to the political

theme of the Republic, the implicit rejection of the "meta-

cusses

among other

things the essential character of philosophy:

in order to establish the relation of philosophy to happiness,

he

what philosophy itself is. Now it would be

rash, if not altogether foolish, to assume that the philosophy
whose relation to happiness is the theme implying all Platonic
has to establish

first

subjects, exhausts itself in the investigation of its

own

relation to

AVe are thus led to another meaning of "Plato's

philosophy", viz. what FSrabi's Plato himself understood by
"philosophy". The second meaning ought to be authoritative,
if for no other reason at least for this that Farabi himself means

happiness.

to introduce his readers, not to his

own

view, but to Plato's

physical" interpretation of the Philebus, the Parmenides, the

Phaedo and the Phaedrus might lead one to suspect that, accord-

as his view of philosophy to what he considers the genuinely

ing

atonfc"viw^6

toJFjfc&ttf# JEIatoi^hiio^phyM8-oMenUally^x)liticaL^6ino^

F&rabi considered the Platonic view of philosophy the true view,

we would thus be driven to believe that F&r&bf himself attributed
to philosophy an essentially political meaning. This belief would
be so paradoxical, it would be so much opposed to all opinions

which we have inherited, that we cannot but

to accept

it.

What

is

feel

view:

Farabi gradually leads his readers from what he presents

Philosophy would be essentially

of philosophy

were "the

political,

political things",

noble things and the just -things".

and

if

the sole subject

in particular

Such a view

is

"the

traditionally

attributed to Socrates as distinguished from Plato. 17

Farabi

very hesitant

then Farabi's real view of the relation of

philosophy and politics in Plato's philosophy?

*
14

Farftbi, Ibsd al-'ul&m. ch. 5. Cf. Maimonides, Millot ha-higgayon, ch. 14.
Observe the distinction, made at the end of the Tabsil. between "Plato's

philosophy" and

,4

thc aim of Plato'* philosophy", and also the reference to

the different ranks of dignity of the different parts of Plato's philosophy in

* a. Republic 369 c 9, 472 1 1 473 t

Fartbf, Plato. 17 f.. 20, 22-24.

2.

501 e4-5 and 592 a

the title of the Plato.

1 1.

"Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987b

1 ff.

Cf. Eth. End. 1216 b 3

Gargias 521 d 6-8; Phaedrus 229 e2-230a2;

A p.

Socr. 38al-6.

ff.

(Cf. also

Plato.

Xeno-

364

[8]

alludes to this difference between the Platonic and the Socratic

view when speaking of "the way of Socrates' which consisted
of, or culminated in, "the scientific investigation concerning
'

justice

and the virtues": he does not identify that

investigation,

or "the way of Socrates" generally speaking, with philosophy.

In fact, he distinguishes philosophy as unmistakably from "the
way of Socrates" as he distinguishes it from "the way of Thra-

be identified with political

and the virtues" were the main subjects
of philosophy, and this would be the case, if justice and the
virtues were the highest subjects in general. A Platonist who
would adopt such a view, might be expected to refer to the
"ideas" of justice and the other virtues: F4rabi is completely
19
His
silent about these as well as about any other "ideas".
of
study
to
the
philosophy
Plato is so far from narrowing down

symachus".

philosophy,

Philosophy could

if

"justice

political things that he defines philosophy as the theoretical art

which supplies "the science of the essence of each of all beings.""

That

is

to say:

onstration ". ai

he identifies philosophy with "the art of demAccordingly, his Plato actually excludes the

and moral subjects from the domain of philosophy proper. His investigations are guided throughout by the
fundamental distinction (constantly repeated in FSrabi's exposition) between "science" and "way of life", and in particular
between that science and that way of life which are essential
study of

365

FARABl'S PLATO

[9]

STRAUSS

political

^tQjiappinesSv^Jhe .desired science^is the, science of theju*$g$fa

of each of all beings or, more generally expressed,- the science

from the science of the ways

of the beings which is distinguished
is supplied by philosophy
beings
of life." The science of the
distinguished ffom Unfundamentally
which is a theoretical art
life is supplied by the
of
way
practical arts, whereas the desired
a view to the fact
With
art.
royal
highest practical art, i. c. the
(i.e. the art of
"philosophy"
that the theoretical art called
science of the
the
to
leading
demonstration) is the only way
the science ot
excellence,
par
beings, i. c. the theoretical science
Theoretical science (the
the beings too

is

called "philosophy"."

in the Timaeus whose subjects

science of Timaeus) is presented
beings", and practical or political
are "the divine and the natural

form)
is presented (in its final
science (the science of Socrates)
.'<
Sinco
life
"the virtuous way of
in the Laws whose subject is
political,
or
theoretical and not practical

philosophv

is essentially

and

it

since

is

science only
essentially related to theoretical

and not moral or political

onlv the subjects of the Timaeus,
in the precise sense of the
subjects, can be called philosophic
according to Farabi. "the aim
term." This, it seems to me, is.
of Plato.
reconciled

meaning of "philosophy" can easily be

Farabl's expression Plato s
with the broader meaning underlying
who, transcending the sphere
philosophy". For the philosopher

The

precise

in the quest for the essence

of moral or political things, engages
7 16 I ) and 9 (8. 2 l.y
^philosophy ^wdently
-where
wCfrlt 22-<15. 18 *.>"nd 43 16,*13-15)
of the beings., acquired
science
the
which
of
mean,
means.' not the art by
investigate of beings wh.ch
itself, at least the actual
if not that science

Farftbt. Plato,

6 (6.

15

(.).

(7.

13

f.: cf.

but.

phon. Mentor.

1,

11-16).

That Far&b! knew of differences between Plato

and Socrates, appears from

cd.

by

Dieterici, 19

his

Concordance (Pkilosopkische Abhandlungen,

f.).

Farabl. Plato 30 (22, 4-5). Cf. 5 28.

Rosenthal AValzcr (XII).

/&., XVIli. Cf. Republic 504 d 4

The opposite view

is

held by

Parmenides 130b-c Pkaedrus 262b7-8 and 270a-d i

\ " Observe the absence of the art of demonstration from the
;

in

14.

of the parts

As regards the use

the sense of "art of demonstration",

kittayon. ch.

list

cf.

of "philos-

Maimonides, Millot ha-

and

not ao*>la.

which

Metaphysics 993bl9

uSn

ff.

of the story of

Jlessed

is

...

ff.

of
traced (considering the etymology

..

nh;.oW>)
philosophy

*v.

between *p6n,<m and ao^a:

Cf. also
concerned with moral or poht.cal subjects.
intcrpreMa.mon.des
underlying
is
view
same
The

to the Aristotelian distinction

/&.,
( 2 (4, 1-3) and 16 (12, 10-15). As regards the science of the essence
of each of all beings, cf. Republic 480a 11-13. 4S4d5-6, 485b5-8, 490b2-4;

ophy

126Sall

also * 12 (9. 11-17).

to Socrates is not alto-

cf.

Urn

gether surprising; cf. Aristotle. Politic,

This vw can be

ff.

of logic in 558-11: aee in particular } 11 (9, 8).

leads to that science.

* 65 16 and 26-28. a. 1 16 with { 18 in prtne.;
of the
The implied attribution of the teaching

Adam",

(all

in the

Guide

(I 2):

he
the highest intellectual perfection:

prior to the

knew aU

the

and

Adam

fa.

(and.

e. of

no knowledge of "good
course, also the aUrfnra). but had
difftrencc
Millot ha.hi ayon ch. 8 on the
also
Cf.
pa.
ofr
and
aXA
X
the
knowledge.
moral
demonstrative and

between

ev.1

STRAUSS

366
of

all

[10]

beings, has to give an account of his doings

by answering the

"why philosophy?'* That question cannot be answered

but with a view to the natural aim of man which is happiness,
and in so far as man is by nature a political being, it cannot be

question

answered but within a political framework. In other words, the

question "why philosophy?" is only a special form of the general
question "what

is

the right

way

of life?",

i.

e.

of the question

moral or political investigations. This question and

the answer to it which are strictly speaking merely preliminary,
can nevertheless be described as philosophic since only the
philosopher is competent to elaborate that question and to
answer it. One must go one step further and say, using the
language of an ancient, that ccxpia and coxppoavvrj, or philosophy
(as quest for the truth about the whole) and self-knowledge (as
realization of the need of that truth as well as of the difficulties
obstructing its discovery and its communication) cannot be
separated from each other. This means, considering the relation
of the questions "why philosophy?" and "what is the right
way of life?" that one cannot become a philosopher without
becoming engaged in "the scientific investigation concerning

guiding

all

and the virtues". Yet it must be understood that phi-^

losophy projKT on the one hand and the reflection on the human
or political meaning of philosophy, or what is called moral and
political philosophy, on the other, do not belong to the same
level. If FSr&bS's Plato had disregarded that difference of level,
he ^ould-ftoUiiave -distinguished philosophy -as the-way ^earJing"
to theoretical science from the practical or political arts or
sciences, but would have accepted the usual view, adopted in
the other writings of F&r&bi, according to which philosophy
consists of theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy.
justice

Both that usual view and the view suggested in the Plato
imply that philosophy is not essentially political. Both these
views imply that philosophy is not identical with political philosophy or with the art to which political philosophy leads, the
royal or political art.

Plato philosophy

is

Vet,

it

may

be objected, precisely in the

explicitly identified with the royal art.

Our

answer has to be that this is not the case. Even they who
believe that FarSbl adopted the political interpretation of

first

367

FARADl'S PLATO

in]

that his Plato identified, not

Plato's philosophy, have to admit
the "true" philosophy with
but
art.
philosophy with the royal

not very precise. What Farabi

homo philosophus
that, according to Plato, the
thing." This by itself docs not

the "true" roval art."

savs

is, first

of

all,

This

is

and the homo rex are the same

acquire the specific
mean more than that a human being: cannot
time acquiring; the
same
the
of the philosopher without at
art

does not necessarily

Farabi conmean that these two
two>\sc.
the
of
Plato.) each
tinues as follows: "(According to
funcone
by
perfect
rendered
the philosopher and the king) is
perfection
his
philosopher reaches
tion and one facultv." The
the training of
of one specific function and by

specific art of the king

and

vice versa:

it

arts themselves are identical.

bv the
one

exercise

the
and the king reaches his perfection by
of
training
another specific function and by the

specific facultv.

exercise of

which supplies

"[According to Plato.] each

one function
the philosopher and the king) has
and the way
the science desired from the outset

of life desired

from the outset; each of the two

another specific faculty.

of the

two

(sc.

Farabi:

of

(sc.

and

functions)

in all

other

produces in those who take possession

happiness.
1 hehuman beings that happiness which is truly
itself both the science of
function of the philosopher supplies by
produces trueright way of life and thus
it.

the beings and the

all other human beings;
happiness in both the philosophers and
both the science of
itself
by
the function of the king supplies
.produces -true
.thus
-the^right-wayof 4ife**nd

the-beings-and
happiness in both the kings and

all

other

human

beings.

One

on the subject
may sav that in the last of his three statements
royal art:
the
with
Farabi practically identifies philosophy
the
supplies
it
(since
philosophy proves to contain the royal art
the
and
art)
royal
product of the
right wav of life which is the
*

Farabi. Plato, 25 and XI.

the expression "homo philosophus
lb i 18. As regards "homo" in
of S 32
16 (12. 10-13). (In the translate
cf. Elk. Kit. H78b5-7 with J
homo
by
replaced
be
should
"vir indagator"
122 1S1 "vir perfectus" and
must not presume to
translator
The
indagator".
perfectus" and "homo
.nvest.gat.on.
to whether perfection, or
decide for the author the question as
below.
and
54
notes
35
Cf.
sex.)
is a prerogative of the male
.

'

STRAUSS

368

U2]

royal art proves to contain philosophy (since it supplies the

science of the beings which is the product of philosophy). But

one would be equally justified in saying that even the last statement does not do away with the fundamental distinction between philosophy and the royal art: while it is true that the
specific function of the philosopher which is primarily directed
toward the science of the beings, cannot be exercised fully without
producing the right way of life, and that the specific function
of the king which is primarily directed toward the right way of
life, cannot be exercised fully without producing the science of
the beings,

it is

no

less true that

philosophy

is

primarily and

essentially the quest for the science of the beings, whereas the
royal art is primarily and essentially concerned with the right

way of life. Even the last statement does then not necessarily
do away with the difference of level between philosophy proper
While F&rabi's third
political investigations.
statement leaves no doubt as to this that philosophy and the
royal art are coextensive, he certainly does not say with so many

and moral or

words that they are

identical.*

would be unfair however to insist too 6trongly on subtleties

and thus to overlook the wood for the trees. We
certainly cannot assume that the average reader will consider
It

of this kind

In a different context

25 (20, 9)

he states that, according to

Plato, the royal function exercised in the perfect city is "philosophy simplicilet" (not, as R.-W. translate, "philosophia ipsa"). But "philosophy simpliciter"

which embraces the theoretical perfection as well as other perfections is jicrt

#
i
pnilosophy* which consists of the theoretical perfection alone

^identical with
(see

TabfU 42, 12

fT.

and

39, 11

exercised in the perfect city

is

If.).

Besides, the fact that the royal function

philosophy, does not

mean more than that in

it does not mean that,
it mean that they iw

the perfect city philosophy and kingship are united:

they are identical in the perfect city; still less does

Finally, the royal function exercised in the perfect city is

royal art: the royal art, or the perfect king, exist also
the
.with
identical
not

identical as such.

in imperfect cities (J 23).

It

should also be noted that in the last remark

occurring in the Plato, which explicitly bears on the subject, not the identity,}
but the union of theoretical and practical sciences is, not so much asserted,

Note also the silence about politics in the latter part of

with the first part: while the jsfoif of the phicompared
as
ff.)
18
| 22 (15,
losopher is the same as that of the king or statesman, the specific work of the
Cf. note 57 below.
former is different from that of the latter.

as demanded: { 28.

369

FARABl'S PLATO

U3]
subject
statement his last word on the
Farabi's second or central
wi h
philosophy
Farabi identified
al poetical purposes.
overtly?'
so
do
to
why then did he hesitate
roval art
plulosophy
intelligible seeing that

S
iZ

Sdeli,

We

must
art is a practical art?
"theoretical art and the royal
once
promm
into
having brought
tn ^understand why. after
dirtinas
philosophy
character of
the essentiallv theoretical
ton b>
Farab! blurs that d.stinc
art.
royal
g uUheTfromthe
he
life,
of
the right way

supplies
fmplying that philosophy
the
same way. and, as it were, in
pT^duct of the roval art. in the
\V
e
beings
science of the
me brith. in which it supplies the
Phosoph>
why. after having taught that
S t tn-to understand
order to produce
something else
"s oe supplemented by
to be
philosophy does not need
happiness, he teaches that
s.happme
order to produce
suppTmented bv something else in
thing
the same
''philosophy" in both cases
If he understands by
be a together
not
would
This
he flathContradicts himself.
Matmonides
from
learned
ought to have
surori ing For, as we
pedagogK
norma
a
are
who knew his Farabi, contradictions
woul be
it
case
philosophers- In that
device of the genuine
f
reflection
own
find out by his
fncumbent upon the reader to
contratwo
which of the
guTd by the author's intimations,
H
the author to be true.
by
considered
statements was
in both cases
h understands by "philosophy"
unter
revealing: no careful
equally
that ambiguity would be
at
and
about an important
would express himself ambiguously

rT
m

lto^

-*^ *

the^me-time^ematic-ubject^rithout good

reasons.

is
philosophy to the royal art
The question of the relation of
que^ion
the
with
Farabi's argument,
inseparably connected, in
To begin
perfection to happiness
human
oTthe relation of
supply
does
to Plato, philosophy
he teaches that, according

Ihl
.,

The very

identification of "phi.osopher"

and

identification occurs
tion considering that that

mary

of the

philosopher

trine.

i'

'

^
^^

W'

" wha
,

^;

t
PMicus. For the PolUuus js bas
See So phut 217a3
and king are not .dent.cal

Cf. .1*0 Phaedrus 2S2el-2

tta

and 2S3W-3.

mentioned in note
Cf. i 18 with the passages
Munk).
Guide I lntrod. (b-ll b

a.

jck

371

FARABI'S PLATO
1151

STRAUSS

370

114]

considerations scientiarum
ness consists "in

the science of the beings and therewith man's highest perfection,

but has to be supplemented by something else in order to produce

That supplement

happiness.

is

3J
the product of the royal art.

is
is
is

the right

By

way

of

life

which

-j*^

is

asserting that the philosopher

seems to suggest that philosophy

thus that philosophy by itself
and
identical with
But whereas he leaves in
sufficient to produce happiness.
identical with the king, he

the royal art,

doubt the precise relation of philosophy to the royal art, he

makes it perfectly clear in his second statement that philosophy
by itself is sufficient to produce happiness. And whereas it is
understand why he should speak circumlocutorily
about the relation of philosophy to the royal art, it is easy to
understand why he should speak evasively, or even contradictorily, about the relation of philosophy to happiness. We
contend that he uses the identification of philosophy with the
royal art as a pedagogic device for leading the reader toward

difficult to

the view that theoretical philosophy

produces true happiness in this

which

is

It is

itself,

i.

e.

and nothing

casv to see that the initiation

is

the theoretical

an

in

as compared with

the
.he immortality o.

Mr

Pa

SLTa:^S"rs^ura;t.avi<,

2.

(Cf. also the allusion

{ 12 (9, 12).

and 23

4 f.;
Observe the distinction between
(16,

WA
Voider

2.

intimated in 4 (5. 7) and 6 (6, 3-4).| Happiness requires the right

way of life in addition to man's highest perfection: cf. 3 with 2, 16 (12,
to"]
10-13) and 1 (3, 13 f.). |Cf. the allusion to the relation of "happiness"
of life" as distinguished

o.

which supplies the science of the beings,

is

"way

of course."

SLoexir

^phikMophylUad^
view

tte

happiness ,n the other life

and "the ultimate
is the second and
In the Plato, which

else,

the doctrine that happi-

to the relation of "perfection" to "science" in 14 (11, 4)

crit.)

life"

the only happiness

and that science is man's highest perfection: 16 and

see app.

possible.

Philosophy

*>

by

life,

as

Inthis

from "science"

in 5 16 (12, 7-10)

and

Cf.

/M JW. *. 5

Cicero,

(near the be^nmng).

(WW * T *"*"' "* W

In Falkera'. translation

we

find

one ment.on of

^ nes9 o{
^tajj
-

tnis
,.

of "happi-

ness" to "practical art" as distinguished from "theoretical art''jnX! 8 (13,

4-5) as compared with { 16.) In 1 (3, 8) Farabl does not say (a{R^WJmake

him say) "beatitudo quae summa hominis pcrfectio (est)", but "beatitudo
quae est ultimum quo homo perficitur". Falkcra translates the expression by
"beatitudo ultima" thus certainly avoiding the identification of "happiness"
As regards the distinction between perfection and
with "perfection".

happiness,
tion

is

cf.

III 27 (60a Munk), where human perfecsame way as by Farabf's Plato and where the remark

Maimonides. Guide

described in the

Ephodi ad loe.);
is added that perfection is the cause of the eternal life (see
from perdistinguished
is
life)
eternal
(the
happiness
that
this implies
fection.

ho*

fer. in.nni.

f>"

<*
*iJ^V & <**'
n

srsr ssfissri rtssr-

*-.

372

STRAUSS

[16]

summaries of the Phaedo and of the Republic the very

term "soul", and as to observe, throughout the Plato, a deep
silence about the vovs, )l to say nothing of the vol.

in his

He

could go to 6uch lengths in the Plato, not merely because

is the second and by far the shortest part of a tri-

that treatise

partite work, but also because

own

his

it

sets forth explicitly,

not so much

Wc

have noted

views, as the views of someone else.

two beatituTabfU on the

the difference of treatment which he accords to the

dines in the Plato on the one hand, and in the

Employing fundamentally the same method, he pronounces more or less orthodox views concerning the life after
death in The political governments and The virtuous religious
community, i. c. in works in which he expounds his own doctrine.
More precisely, in The virtuous religious community he pronounces
simply orthodox views, and in The political governments he
pronounces heretical, if what one could consider still tolerable
views. But in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics he
other.

373

FARABl'S PLATO

117]

of religion. In other words,

truth of the super-rational teaching
description of the religious
one might believe that Farabt's

sciences is merely a

distinguished from natural theology

possible revealed theology as
this kind is avoided in the
(metaphysics). Every ambiguity of
Farabl declares that religious
Plato. Through the mouth of Plato,
of the beings, and the rel.speculaTion, and religious investigation
the science of the beings/ of
gious syllogistic art do not supply

whereas philosophy docs

which man's highest perfection consists,
present religious knowledge in
supplv it. Ho goes so far as to

and "religious speculation"

general

in particular" as thr lowest

result of Plato'*

and that
divergent statements are based on "ravings and old women's

all

is

only the happiness of this

life

tales"."

Si

Falkcra

who wrote

clusions reached

for a

somewhat

by Plato concerning

different

religion in

both

pubheom-.s
| **

for adducing a third example.

In his Enumeration of the Sciences

which he speaks in his own name, Farabl presents the religious

and kal&m) as corollaries to political science. At
first sight one might believe that by assigning to the religious

in

sciences {fiqh

sciences that particular status Farabi merely wants to say that

^!igtan;^?revealea religion; i.e. the revealed hw (the shari'a)^
comes first into the sight of the philosopher as a political fact:
precisely as a philosopher, he suspends his judgment as to the.

No*?* is mentioned in ( 27 (20, 16).

In the summary of the Phaedo,
Farabi mentions once "corpus animatum": % 24 (18, 16).
> Ibn Tufail. Hayy ibn Yaqdh&n, ed. by L. Gauthier. Beyrouth 1936, 14.

account quoted by Steinschneider, Al-Fdrdbt, 94.

Cf.

note 58 below.
*

In the Plate, there

concerning religion: {
(IS. 5).

*'-

K.-w
the Guidr-.U 1 8 vers, finmonides exclusion of religious subjects from
-otur
"on
PUtone
cultus a
make this comment on J 6: "Certe deorum
(bee
quadrare videntur
Cum .. Alfarabii opinionibus haec omnia bene
Farabi e.ther who exby
rejected
not
is
worship
d*ine
p. XIV). But
with the laws and behefs of
pStly following Plato, considers conformity
up.
brought
is
one
which
in
religious community
speaks.
J 6 Fftrab.
6ff.). Above all.
45.
(Tahiti
philosopher
future
for the
rehg.on. H.s v,ew conof
value
cognitive
the
~not of religious worship, but of
with PUto^s v,ew as appears I
thlt matter is in full agreement
ComLetter 330c. and / 533d ff
Seventh
such passage, as Timoeus 40d6 ff ..
that he defied theexjstence
charge
the
refute
to
failure
pare ITso Lrates'
*eTntK,e
In the 'Apology *f 5*ntf.d
of the gods of the city of Atnens
the i. Farfb.
of
book
first
the
in
Sparta
of he Svine law. of Crete and
in this
(with speaal regard to 20d7ff.)
interpreted the thesis of the Apology
d.vme
ther
deny
not
does
he
that
way- Socrates say. to the Athenian,
human
is
.wisdom
hi,
and that
.SaomTb?t that he doe. not comprehend it.
According
abot (Livomo 1785). 2b.
only. Cf. Simon Duran. Mogtn
saying..
Socratic
the
of
interpretation
to
based o
refer, to the divine wisdom
by Farabl. that saying specifically
et sensolo, Pans B.bl.o
Daentu
of
(Paraphrase
transmitted by. prophecy.
172 d).
theoue Nationale, Ms. Hebreu 1009. fol.
the cognitive
examined
Plato
-According to Farab..
religious
of the being* and of the
investigation
religious
the
of
speculation,
value to
that Plato ascribed, hm, ed

m Mj J"T

Se

mm

ding

wom
Woes'

<^;

"^^

***
.

is

no .mention

of ikri'i (nor of tniUa).

The

root verb

of tkart'a (thara'a) occurs shortly before the statement, discussed in the text,

22

the con-

a M

2.

Considering the importance of the subject, we will be excused

Cf. also Averrocs'

invest^-

Fartbl. Plato $ 6. It is significant that the final

.n * 6 ( hewith the greatest precise, not
tion concerning religion is stated
at the
first look for ,t. bu
would
one
where
religion)
section dealing with
of
beginnings
S
7 and
the
with
of J 8
beginning of J 8. (Cf. the beginning

declares that there

for a

somewhat awkward way of making room

(6, 6).

"Belief"

is

mentioned in {{ 4

(5, 2 f.)

and

logistic art. But whereas he .Ute.

SI two Utter dwciplines. he i. completely

.ilent

about the

result of Plato .

STRAUSS

374

U8j

step of the ladder of cognitive pursuits, as inferior even to gram-

mar and

With grammar,

to poetry.

common

religion has this in

of a particular

that

or rather with language,

essentially the property

it is

to begin with that in order to get hold of

FSrSbi's views, one ought to consult primarily the works in

which he sets forth his own doctrine, and not his expositions of
the doctrines of other men, especially if those other men were
pagans. For may one not expound, as a commentator, or as a
historian, with the greatest care and without a muttering of
dissent such views as he rejects as a man? May F&r&b! not
have been attracted as a pupil of philosophers by what he abhorred as a believer? I do not know whether there ever was a
"philosopher" whose mind was so confused as to consist of two
hermetically sealed compartments: FSr&bi was a man of a
different

stamp.

But

let

us assume that his

mind was

type conveniently attributed to the Latin Averroists.

suffices to state that

The Latin

assumption

It

of the

almost

in order to realize its absurdity.

Averroists limited themselves to giving a most

interpretation

of

But

extremely heretical teachings.

literal

FcLr&bf

he gave an extremely unliteral interpreta-

did just the reverse:

most tolerable teaching. Precisely as a mere commentator of Plato, he was almost compelled to embrace a tolerably
orthodox doctrine concerning the life after death. 43 His refusal,
amounting to a flagrant deviation from the letter of Plato's
<4eaching,^o^wccumb*toPlatb'8 ^harms,**proves 4t ^ore*t**fr*
vincingly than any explicit statement of his could have done,
tion of a

375

that he considered the belief in a happiness different from the

happiness of this

life,

or the belief in the other

beginning to

The

religious syllogistic art is the

and the religious investigation of the beings is the kal&m in so far as it is

based on some sort of physics
cf. Ibsd ch. 5 on the study of sensible beings
''religious speculation" may well refer to mystical
by the mutakallimtin
As regards the religious
knowledge of Gx! Himself. (Cf. E. /., s. v. Nazar).
syllogistic art. cf. Steinschneidcr, AUF6r6bt, 31, where a remark of FaTabl

fiqh,

its

end"

sets

it

beyond any reasonable doubt

accommodations
dogma. The same consideration applies to what
the commentator, or historian, F&rSbi says about religion: it
is not easy to see what Platonic passage could have compelled,
or even induced, a believing Muslim to criticize the value of

writings of his, have to be dismissed as prudential

to the accepted

"the syllogistic religious

art,*

i.

e.

of the Islamic science of fiqh.

Farabi avails himself then of the specific immunity of the

commentator, or of the historian, in order to speak his mind

concerning grave matters in his "historical" works rather than
in the works setting forth what he presents as his own doctrine.
This being the case, one has to lay down, and scrupulously to
follow, this canon of interpretation Apart from purely philologic
and other preliminary considerations, one is not entitled to
interpret the Plato, or any part or passage of it, by having
:

recourse to F&rabt's other writings.

interpret^ the

Plato in

One

is

quoted;

cf.

also Maimonides,

Millot ha-hitgayon, ch. 7 vers. fin.

^ The commentator who

after all

see his Paraphrasis in Platonis

c,4(M5 arid

191

not entitled to

F&r&bi elsewhere, which arc not mentioned

goes without saying that

in case the

in

by

the Plato.

It

teaching of the Plato

is

in conflict with the teachings of the TahrtU The

^mentsTThe enumeration Iff the sciences and so onTthc presumption

political govern-

is in

Compared with

favor of the teaching of the Plato.

F&r&bi intimates

And

if

the

it is true, as

by reminding us of the teaching of the Phaedrus

concerning the deficiencies of writing as such, that all writings

as such are exoteric, 44 we have to say that the Plato is merely

11-39).

less exoteric

than the other works indicated and therefore that

every hint however subtle which occurs

in

the Plato, deserves

most emphatically and the most

frequently stated doctrines of his more exoteric works. For

to take precedence over the

was more than a mere commentator,

directly attacks the teaching of the Republic concerning the

182

is

the light of doctrines, expounded

concerning "the religious (p"iin) syllogisms"

utterly

that statements asserting that immortality which occur in other

Plato, all these other writings are exoteric.

examination of "religious speculation ".

life,

His silence about the immortality of the soul in a

destined to present the philosophy of Plato "from its

erroneous.
treatise

community.

One might think

FARABIS PLATO

(19]

RempuU. (Opera

Aristotelis,

life

after death;

Venice 1550,

lilt

Cf. Phaedrus 275 c ff., Timaeus 28c4-5. Seventh

Maimonides. Guide I In trod. (4a Munk).

Letter

341d4~r3.

Cf.

STRAUSS

376

Only because public speech

playfulness, can a true
and
demands a mixture of seriousness

is

philosophic teaching,
Platonist present the serious teaching, the
The sovereign use
garb.
historical, and hence playful,
in

Plato:

To

He presents,

Dcacartcs, Discours de la mtthode, II.

Phaedrus, 27Sb3-4.

only:

Finkcl, 19. 17

ff.

Cf. note 7 above.

"

poetry appli

by

ol
ahould be noted that Farabi* rejection
poetry
common
to
poetry
of
just a Plato'* rejection
It

and Maimonides felt frtr

careful wording of the
Farabi. but likewise the exceedingly
of Plato s
interpretation
But even if Farabi's
Plato itself.
borrowed
be
to
prove
philosophy as a whole should eventually
underto
have
would
from a hitherto unknown source, we still
to
have
would
still
interpretation by itself, and we

men

very fact he reveals himsell

invent Platonic speeches."" By this
are not concerned with the
as a true Platonist. For Platonists
arc exclusively interested
historical (accidental) truth, since they

'

consider the author

only the admiration which
text, means to disregard, not

Greek

say. historical

516.

a number of

Farabi's desire to intimate

of various dialogues mav be due to
than to misinformation.
an important philosophic truth rather
lost
of the Plato a mere epitomist of a

dialogues had been treated by predecessors of

philosopher who,
not so much the historical Plato, as the typical
"comme un
mind,
the
of
as such, after having reached maturity
start afresh
to
has
homme qui marche seul et dans les tenebres,""'
by the
assisted
be
and to go his own wav however much he may
Platois
historical
-exertionf*isiteadiere.-Hi8Attitude tothe
to the historical
comparable to the attitude of Plato himself
Platonic Socrates himself to,
Socrates, and to the attitude of the
F*rab
Egypt: ".With what ease dost thou, o

Treatise on Resurrection, ed.

historical materials, presupposes of

disposal. For the hiscourse that such materials were at his

that the extent, and the
torian it is of utmost importance
Farabt. be established
character, of the information available to
cannot be done properly,
as exactlv as possible. But even this
mind the non-historical purpose of the
if one does not bear in
apparently fanciful remarks on the purport

predecessors whatsoever. Yet he knew

the first philosopher.
from the Metaphysics, that Plato was not
the subject of the
that
remarks
In accordance with this, he
conpredecessors;"
Plato's
by
Menexenus had been neglected
that
written,
is
Plato
the
sidering the extreme care with which
Platonic
other
all
of
remark is meaningful only if the subjects

Maimonidea,
* Cf. i 31 with

which Farabi makes of the

of course, especially

Plato.

377

in the philosophic (essential) truth."

connection between
not necessarily, not in all cases, a
or untruth, of an assertion,
a writer's conviction of the truth,
he makes it.
and the frequency, or rarity, with which
about the immortality
Farabi's silence about the ideas and
not hesitate to deviate
does
he
that
of the soul shows certainly
considers that literal
he
if
teaching
from the letter of Plato's
that Plato himself
believed
have
teaching erroneous. He may
exoteric. But he
merely
considered the doctrines in question
which he
teaching
the
that
-may. or he mav not have believed
was the
speech,
his
as by
ascribes to Plato bv his silence as well
teaching.
true
the
it
Platonic teaching: he certainly considered
presents Plato as a
He
work.
historical
a
not
then
is
His Plato
philosophy enman who had to discover the very meaning of
that he had no philosophic
tirely bv himself, thus implying
there

FARABl'S PLATO

[211

120]

of the competence of Avicenna

stand that
adopted it as a true
digest the fact a that man of Farabi's rank
it in his own
account of the classic philosophy and published
precious
most
the
name. It mav be added that by transmitting
of a
guise
in the
knowledge, not in "systematic" works, but
"onginalaccount. Farabi indicates his view concerning
historical

JtV'""and "individuality" in

pW1osophyr-what^om4nt-Kht

"contribution" of a philosopher
as the "original" or "personal"
than his private, and truly original
is infinitely less significant
necessarily anonymous
and individual, understanding of the
truth.

For an
off.
us return to the point where wc left
break a silence which
obvious reason. Farabi did not wish to
the Platonic diawas eloquent for those only who could read
of the soul. There was a
logues dealing with the immortality
compelling reason for
more
further, and in a sense, even

But

let

Cf. Protagoras 347c3-348a6

and Charmides 161c3-6.

STRAUSS

378

guided by philosophers. In other words, the required supplement to philosophy is, not just the royal art, but the actual
exercise of the royal art by philosophers within a definite political
community. Farabi goes still further. He declares that not

To

concealing the philosophic doctrine concerning happiness.

identify happiness with the perfection which consists of the

science of the beings, is tantamount to closing the very prospect

For reasons of
for no other reason, FSrlbi was compelled to
show a possibility of happiness to men other than philosophers.
Therefore, he distinguishes between perfection and happiness:
the large majority of men.

of happiness to

of the citizens as
only the happiness of the non-philosophers
but the very perfection, and therewith the happiness,
citizens
of the philosophers themselves is impossible except in the virtuous

philanthropy, 50 if

fection,

but has to be supplemented by the right

More

way

of

insufficient to lead

man

life

the supplement to philosophy which

of happiness,
politics.*

He

supplied, not

is

by

is

is

"this world"

required for the attaining

city indeed,

religion, or revelation,

substitutes politics for religion.

He

speech".

but by

the right

way

by stating that philosophy by itself supplies

life and therewith by itself produces happiness,

of

were meant to be final; for how can the mere

^act^hatla^in^l^Tiilosopher islri^xistenc^ temewhere^ri^n?!Il
have the slightest influence on the happiness, or misery, of people
living in the remotest parts of Frankistan who have nothing in
if it

,,

common with him or philosophy? The statement that philosophy

produces the happiness of

all

human

beings merely serves the

purpose of indicating the whole extent of the difficulty facing

F&r4bi; it thus paves the way for a provisional solution and
therewith indirectly for the
solution

is

final

solution.

The

provisional

that philosophy produces the happiness of the philo-

sophers and of

all

those non-philosophers

who

are actually

Cf. Elk. Nic. 1094b 9 f. and 1099b 18-20 with Politics 1325a8-H.
As
regards the "'philanthropic" appearance of the teaching of Plato's Republic,

cf.

the virtuous city could become actual, and

how

he answers that this could only be achieved by "the legislator

of this city". "Therefore he investigated thereafter what kind
of man the legislator must be."" Farabi does not reveal to the

but he adds the clause that philosophy produces the happiness, not only of the philosophers, but of all other human beings
as well. This extravagantly philanthropic remark would have
to be dismissed as a sheer absurdity, or its text would have to
be emended,

and "the other world",

the question of

thus lays the

foundation for the secular alliance between philosophers and enlightened princes. It is true, he immediately thereafter retracts
his concession

in so far as it is an earthly
but a city existing, not actually, but only "in
F&rabi's Plato does not leave it at that: he raik-s

Yet, he makes clear,

to happiness.

Aristotle. Politics

1263b15

25

(cf. in

particular 20, 13

f.).

Cf. 24 vers..tin.

Cf. with ( 25 (20,

which R.-W. correctly render by "et philosopher in ea (civitate) partem

maximam esse". Augustinus' Civitas Dei XI 9: "(sancti angeli) <!"* nu J us
10)

magna pars est",

1 (3, 11-13), 11 (9, 8)
25 (19, 12 and 20, 4). Cf. the use of "other" in
Farabi speaks also of
and 22 (16, 2). Cf. also ({ 14 (11, 6) and 24 (17, 7).
*h* ^other at ion'Mn^particuUir^tid ^^atkma*iitfwnaK*but <he<prafer *o
speak of the "other city" and of cities (he uses "city" three times as often as
(sc.

*'

sanctae) civitatis

"nation"):

"Where

first

were great and flourishing

cities,

there

was

first

the

study of philosophy." (Hobbes). In his account of the studies to be pursued

As regards the
in the perfect community, he uses exclusively "city" (J 26).
non-quantitative aspect of the difference between city and nation, one has to
nation
consider g 7, where only "nation", and not "city", is mentioned: the
of the city, on the other
is kept together by a common language. The bond

32 (22, 18-23, 1).

technique of writing is illustrated by the fact that
cf. i 29 (21, 11)
immediately thereafter ( 30 in princ), he uses cU* (fecit)

hand,

is

the law;

29.

WH*

cf.

Farabi's

(actu)

and

not, as he usually does.

<J

Jw

(ei

manifestum fuit)

or another term designating apurely mental activity. The Ju* near the

beginning of 30 refers back, not only to 29, but to \\ 26-29. In this conof the Plato into sections
it may be mentioned that R.-W.'s division

nection
ff.

He

sa
he thus
calls the virtuous city emphatically "an other city":
general
in
religion
simply
indicates that he means to replace, not
life"
other
"the
or
by politics in general, but "the other world"
between
by "the other city". "The other city" stands midway

generally expressed, he

accepts to begin with the orthodox opinion that philosophy

51
whose most important part are the philosophers.

city

he asserts that philosophy, being a theoretical art, supplies

indeed the science of the beings and thus man's highest perin order to produce happiness.

379

FARABl'S PLATO

[23]

[22]

STRAUSS

380

J24]

readers the result of this Platonic investigation.

54

In the treatise

which precedes the Plato, he asserts the identity of legislator

and philosopher, but for the reasons mentioned before one is
not entitled to assume that the teaching of F&r&Bi's Plato
is identical with that set forth by F&r&bi in his own name;"
The silence of the Plato about the subject permits us then
to imagine for a moment that the legislator is a prophet, the
founder of the virtuous
for -the

dition

actualization

Since the legislator, as the

creates the indispensable con-

city,

of

happiness would

happiness,

thus not be possible but on the basis of revelation. Far&bt's

Plato does not close that loophole by identifying the prophet, or
the legislator, with the philosopher. He intimates indeed that
the function of the legislator

is

of

somewhat

Ui

or

arbitrary.

Uj

at

F&rabi's

is

not the highest

own

division

the beginning of a

is

human

perfection,

clearly indicated

paragraph.

by the use

Accordingly, section

consists of SJ 1-3. section II of 4-5, section III of 6-11. section IV of

of { 16-22, section VI of ( 23-25, section VII of (( 26-29,
12-15, section

and section VIII of ( 30-32.

equally reticent as regards the result of Plato's investigations concerning religious speculation (J 6), cutppoainrri ( 19), love and friendship
21). Compare with the last example the different procedure as regards

w He

is

(S

20. His typical procedure is to state first what Plato "investigated"

and thereafter what he "made clear" or what "became clear to htm". Every
deviation from that scheme requires an explanation. One has then to pay

courage:

WtpetM mttentiofiiiot^nly to*hr*ttrvestigati6iw^

add that the difference between what Plato made clear

what become clear to him is not altogether negligible.
and 53 above.

(se.

to others)

and

Cf. notes 12, 40,

the interpretation of the statement on the legislator, one has to

consider Farabi's interpretation of Plato's Laws. He conceives of the Laws,
not, as Plato himself had done, as a correction of the Republic, but as a sup-

plement to the Republic: whereas according to Plato the Republic and the
deal with* essentially different
is

according to

Laws

political

closely akin to that of Cicero (Lcu>,

whom

virtuous
final, revealed religion.
Plato

is

far

But the real

more radical* toward the end

makes it absolutely clear that there can

human

beings

(i.

of the treatise. Farabi

be, not only philosophers,

philosophers

who have

but even perfect

cities." Philosophy
reached the goal of philosophy) in imperfect
happiness do not
hence
and
philosophy
and the perfection of
the estabsubject
the
on
word
Farabi's last
require

this is

community: they are

possible,

lishment of the perfect political

these cities, the imperfect
not onlv in this world, but even in
in the
and this is the essential implication
But
cities.
always
it
as
and
is
imperfect cities, i. e. in the world as it actually
reach of the philosophers alone:
will be, happiness is within the
barred, by the nature of
the non-philosophers ard eternally
consists "in consideratione
things, from happiness. Happiness
else." Philosophy
scientiarum speculativarum" and of nothing
condition of happiness.
is the necessary and sufficient

Cf. I 29 will. J 2.
gov. 72 and 74.
'

Cf. 25 (20.S

and

12) with Musterstaal 70. 9

and

Pol.

In the last thaivert. fin. and 25.

Cf. 5 32 in prim, with 55 23. 24
philosopher and
of
relation
of
the
view
paragraphs. Farabt indicates his real
philosophers, kings,
enumerates
he
which
in
maimers
kine by the different
30 (22, 6 f.). 31. and 32 (22. 15) That v.ew
and the virtuous:
'

legislators,

ambiguous term which designates

can be stated as follows: "king" is an
art and who is necessarily subject
political
the
.powewes.
ho
cither Obe Juan
reached his goal by having comhas
who
legislator, or the philosopher

orders

(*oXiTiai), FArabi's

5, 15; 6,

14; 10, 23; III 2, 4),

the Republic deals with the best political order

deal with the best laws belonging to the very

same best

pleted the philosophic investigation.

At* Cf it 1-2 and the remark of Averroes (quoted by Steinschneider.
(Firabll negare continuavidetur
Nicomachia
de
etrim
Farabi 106): "In H.
dicit hanc esse opinionen.
uonem esse cum intelligentiis abstract: et
finis humanus sit aliud quam
quod
opinionandum
est
Alexandri, et quod non
Aquinas' commentary on Eth. Nic. A.
perfectio speculativa." (Cf. Thomas
interpretation of the thesis of the Plato is conlect.

For

view

it

to the

what Plato "made clear" or of what "became clear to him", but likewise to the
cases in which no investigation is mentioned. Probably the most important
example of omissions of "investigation" is the statement concerning the
identity of philosopher and king: { 18 (13, 6-11). It is hardly necessary to

Laws

be a plurality of
a single true, or
remedy employed in the

for granted that there could

6
in
cities.' thus excluding the belief

and he takes

founder of a revealed religion.

381

FARABI'S PLATO

125]

-Our

to a certain extent,

by Falkcra's remark

(Reshit

hokma

72. 22-25)

happiness consists of knowledge viz. knowlthat, according to Plato, true

without the knowledge of the creatures.
possible
not
is
which
edge of God
change
alt beings. As regards a similar
Farabt does not .peak of God. but of
cf. the authentic text of Maview.
theologic
more
a
to
from the philosophic
(Hyamson 50. 19 f.) with the vulgaa
monides' Mishna tora, H. De'ot IV 1

and the

political order.

13. vers. fin.).

firmed

text.

STRAUSS

382

[26]

would be a mistake however to consider F&r3bi s emphatic statements about the political aspect of philosophy a
mere stepping-stone destined to facilitate the ascent from the
It

popular notions about the happiness of the other world to

philosophy.

For the philosopher necessarily

lives in

political

and he thus cannot escape the situation created by the

naturally difficult relations between the philosopher and the

society,

non-philosophic citizens, "the vulgar": the philosopher living

in a society which is not ruled by philosophers, i. e. the philos-

opher living in any actual society, is necessarily "in grave

danger". 59 F&rabi intimates his solution by speaking of the
twofold account which Plato gave of Socrates' life: he tells us
that Plato repeated his account of Socrates' way and that he
repeated his mention of the vulgar of the cities and nations which
60
existed in his time.

ides, "repetition" is

Maimon-

learned from

As we might have

a normal pedagogic device which is destined

who are able to understand by them-

to reveal the truth to those

whereas the vulgar are

statement and the
will pay the
understand
able
to
who
are
"repetition", those
negapparently
however
differences,
utmost attention to the

selves while hiding

it

from the vulgar:

blinded by the features common to the

ligible,

first

between the two statements and

"addition",

made

in

in the "repetition", to the

particular to the
first

statement. 61

According to FSrSbi, Plato's first account of the way of Socrates

deals with Socrates' attitude toward the opinions and habits of
-Jiis^eilow-ciuiens. *!heecondecoountr*on <he*other4iand,>
deals with Plato'6 correction of the Socratic attitude, or with
. Plato's
attitude. 6 * Socrates' attitude was determined by the
fact that he limited his investigations to moral and political

"J

32

in

princ.

Cf.

Plato,

Phaedo 64 b;

Republic

494a4-10

and

383

FARABI'S PLATO

[27]

philosophy. Being
subjects," i.e. that he neglected natural
Hence, he did
moralist.
a
merelv a moral philosopher, he was
with the
comply
to
either
not look bevond this alternative:
openly
or
opinions
conduct and the accepted

accepted rules of
to challenge

them and therewith

to expose himself to persecution

of
and violent death.* As a consequence

attitude, he
of Plato

fell

his

uncompromising

victim to the rage of the multitude.

was fundamentally

different.

The attitude

As we have

seen, he

theoretical pursuit, and

considered philosophy an essentially
fervor was mitigated
moral
his
moralist:
therefore he was not a
he could adjust
thus
beings;
of
bv his insight into the nature
the ways and
to
or
life,
political
himself to the requirements of
subjects in
the
of
treatment
opinions of the vulgar. In his
way of
the
with
Socrates
question, he combined the way of

Thrasymachus*

While the intransigent way of Socrates,

is

with the political elite

appropriate in the philosopher's dealings
Thrasymachus is appropriate in
only, the less exacting way of
the young. By combining the
his dealings with the vulgar and
the vulgar and thus
two wavs. Plato avoided the conflict with
the "revolutionary" quest
the fate of Socrates. Accordingly,
necessity: Plato substituted for
for the other citv ceased to be a
"conservative" way of action, vis. the gradual

a much more'
the truth or an apreplacement of the accepted opinions by

it

however gradual,

proximation to the truth. The replacement,

a destruction of the accepted
of the accepted opinions is of course
opinionB.**^ButJjeing-nphaucally.radual. it -is best described
opinions. For it would not be
as an undermining of the accepted
a provisional acceptance
with
were not combined
gradual,

if it

of the accepted opinions:

as Farabi elsewhere declares, con-

community in which
formity with the opinions of the religious
for the future
qualification
one is brought up, is a necessary

520b2-3.

30

and 32

{{

*'

Guide, 111 3 in princ. and 23 (50a Munk).

Note the emphatic j+ (which R.-W.

(22, 1)

(22, 14).

Plato described in his Letters

'i

left

untranslated) in

find

it

32 (23, 2):
of dealing

Compare this with the corresponding $+ in 16

he (Plato) was compelled to present philosophy because he did not

with his fcllow-citizcns.

(12, 10):

what he thought about the manner

among

the arts and sciences which were generally known.

Cf. I 16 with 11 28

"5

24(19.3-11).

30

and 30

(22, 4-5).

summary ol the
Even if that paragraph should be meant to be a
fact that Fflrftbi knew the Thrasymathe
disregard
cannot
we
only,
Cliiopho
combination of the way of Socrates
chus of the Republic. His statement on the
498c9-dl.
of Thrasymachus is based on Republic
{

with that

-J

32.

STRAUSS

384
philosopher. 67

[28]

The goal of the gradual destruction of the accepted

is the truth, as far as the 61ite. the potential philosophers,

concerned, but only an approximation to the truth (or an
6
imaginative representation of the truth) * as far as the general

opinions
is

run of

men

may say that

philosopher-king who rules

concerned. 6 ' ,\Ye

is

replaces Socrates'
perfect city

by the

FSrSbi's Plato

openly in the

secret kingship of the philosopher

who

lives

an imperfect community. That kingship is exercised by means of an exoteric teaching which, while
not too flagrantly contradicting the accepted opinions, undermines them in such a way as to guide the potential philosophers
toward the truth. 70 F&rabi's remarks on Plato's own policy
privately as a

define

the

member

general

of

character

of

all

literary

productions of

385

FARABI'S PLATO

(29]

"ultimum quo homo

FarSbi savs that happiness is
the actualization of man s
he thinks'of the pleasure attending
which "renders perfect
highest perfection. For it is pleasure
is a s|>ecific pleasure
the exercise of a faculty, and it
perficitur

(rAio?)

hiphest perfection which

together with the exercise of man's
being the case, happiness
constitutes human happiness." This
with human perfection or its exercise.
is not simplv identical
importance of pleasure by saying
Farab! indicates the particular
praises true pleasure (what he
of the Platonic dialogue which
that it is "attributed" (i..e.
says of no other Platonic dialogue)
Socrates was compelled by
merclv attributed) to Socrates*/' for
noble and the
stress the conflict between the
his

moralism to

pleasant rather than their harmony.

"the philosophers".
it may be remarked that the distinction between
happiness is not altogether exoteric. When
and
perfection

In conclusion

two maxims

"morale par
provision" (Disown de la mtthodc, III). Cf. also Fontcnellc, floge de Mr.
Umery: "Leschoses fort etablies ne j>euvcnt C*tre attaquees que par degres."
As regards the necessity of the gradual change of laws, cf Plato. Laws 736d2~4

Cf. note 41 above.

Cf. the

first

of Descartes'

and
*
*

of

Aristotle. Politics

1269a 12

fT.

Cf. note 48 above.

Note Farabi's replacing "the truth" (22, 17) first by "the virtuous way
or "the correct nomoi" (23, 3) and then by "opinions" (23, 6). Falkera

life*'

appropriately translates

+\a ("opinions")

or42deaigiM 4.*i<ia 4 22rA>e*raniiates

,

text

by

rwiDK).

The meaning

of

!*>

msy

is

in this context

by

rory ("plans"

Uqually appropriately in *hatm>n*i

explained by him in Reshii kokma

Maimonides, Guide, 1 34 (40b Munk).

The distinction made by Farabi between the attitude of Socrates and that
of Plato corresponds, to a certain extent, to the distinction made by Muhammad b. Zakariyya al-Razt in his k. al-strat aUfalsafiyya, between the attitude
of the young Socrates and that of the mature Socrates. Razi's opponents had
70,

fT.

Cf. also

asserted that his model Socrates "n'a pas pratique

la

dissimulation, ni vis-

mais il les a affrontees en leur

disant ce qu'il considerait *tre vrai en des termes clairs et non-equivoques."
Razi admits that this account is correct as far as the young Socrates is concerned: "les traits qu'ils rapport en t dc Socrate lui ont etc propres au debut
de fa carriere jusqu'a une date asscz avancee de sa vie, date a laquelle il en a
abandonne la plupart." Paul Kraus, "Raziana" I. Orictilalia, N. S., v. 4,
As regards the life of the philosopher in an imperfect commu1935, 322 f.

a-vis

du vulgaire

ni vis-a-vis des autoritcs,

nity, cf. Plato's Republic

496 d

fT

III.

The

Philosophy and Morals

relation of philosophy to morals

the first
third paragraph of the Plato. In
certain
a
and
science
stated that a certain

is

adumbrated

in the

paragraph, Farabi had

way

of

life

are essential

paragraph, he answers the question

to happiness. In the second
third paragraph deals with the
as to what that science is. The
with it thcmatically:
in question, but it does not deal

way

of

life

of life, but happithematic subject is, not the desired way

to disclose what
going
not
is
he
that
ness Farabi thus intimates
^Deinde-postca^investigavit,
s^ys:
-He
the^desired wav of life is.
beatitudo esset et ex qua
quid esset beatitudo quae revera
et quae actio. Quam
habitus
scientia oreretur et quis esset
non est. Et aperuit
sed
putatur
distinxit ab ea quae beatitudo
qua haec [R.-W.:
earn
esse
vitam virtuosam [R.-W.: optimam]
of life leads to
way
The virtuous
ilia] beatitudo obtineretur."
which is dishappiness
i. e. to the apparent
"haec beatitudo
of life is
way
virtuous
the
tinguished from the true happiness;
which
of
life
way
desired
fundamentally distinguished from the
confirmed
is
happiness. Our interpretation

its

is

essential to true

by Falkera's
*

translation:

"he made

it

1176a24-28.
Eth. Sic. 1174 b23. 1175a21.

15.

known

that the virtuous

Cf. Politics 1339bl8-2Q.

386

STRAUSS

way

[30]

the one by which the happiness of this world Is

obtained/' The happiness of this world is naturally distinguished
of

life is

from, and inferior

tuous

to, the happiness of the other world: the virdoes not lead to the happiness of the other
In accordance with Farabi's statement, Maimonides

way

world.

of

life

teaches that the moral virtues serve the well-being of the body
or man's "first perfection" as distinguished from the well-being

man's "ultimate perfection" which consists

produced by, knowledge or contemplation alone. 7J

of the soul or

or

is

of,

way

of

the virtuous

life is

that the desired

way

of

life is

states later on that the desired

and immediately

art

royal art

is

identical

way

he tacitly asserts
the contemplative way of life. He
of

life,

way of life is supplied by

thereafter he

the royal

seems to suggest that the

with philosophy.

The

identification of

philosophy as the highest theoretical art with the royal art as

the highest practical art can be literally valid only if the specific
products of both arts, the science of the beings and the desired

way
is

of life, are identical, in other words,

the highest form of action. 71

if

contemplation

itself

The translators can justly be blamed for the unnecessarily

unhtcral character of their translation. On the other hand, they
deserve praise for bringing out in their translation their understanding of the passage mentioned. For while that understanding amounts.to a radical misunderstanding^ JEaribi ' -ultimate

does not proceed from an accidental error: FSrSbi

wanted to be understood by the majority of his readers in
exactly the same way in which he has been understood by his
intention,

it

modern translators. He has built up the three first paragraphs

as a whole 75 and the third paragraph in particular in such a way
as to create the impression as if he were going to identify the

"

way

of

He knew

life.

will most readers not

large majority of his readers. Not only
subject of the
expected
the
between
observe the difference
subject (happiactual
its
and
life)
of
paragraph (the desired way
they perwhat
determine
will
expectation
i.e.
most readers will* besides expect from the outset,
author
the
that
independently of any suggestions of the author,

ceive;

will identify the desired

life,

way

of life

because they themselves believe

with the virtuous

in their identity.

way

Aristotle, Politics 1325bl6-22.

of

7'

taken up again by F&rabi in his

Those arts, he says,
discussion of the ordinary practical -arts.
things
do not supply the desired way of life, but only the useful

The

question of morals

is

and the
(ra vviHpipovTO.) which are necessary (avayKaXa)
but
necessary,
gainful things (ra Kf>5a\ia) which are not
(rd
things
noble)
practically identical with the virtuous (or
belong
not
*aXd). 77 That is to say: the desired way of life does
the virtuous way of
to the class of the noble things, and since
excellence; the desired way of life is
life is the noble thing par
By
life.
fundamentally different from the virtuous way of
practical purposes, the noble with
in particular are
the gainful, Far&bi indicates that the virtues

identifying, at least for

all

world", or man's
jnerely-a .means toward ^xlieJiappmess^f ^bis
4

7
"first perfection".

he distinguishes between the truly

one hand, and what
useful and the truly gainful or noble on the
After having gone thus

far,

* Cf. the remarks of Montesquieu on this subject in

2.
'Avertissement dc 1'auteur" and

De

VEsprit des Lois,

XXV

J 12

(10,

1-10).

Cf. Aristotle, Politics 1291a

ff.

Cf. Plato, Republic

558 d 11-e
with 1 (3, 10 f.): the apparent happiness
7 Cf
J 3 as interpreted above
and the like. Cf. the distinction between
honours
consist* of health, riches,
and the noble thing? on the
philosophy or the political art on the one hand,
between the philosopher,
distinction
the
and
(14. 5; cf. 14. 18);

in

w The first three paragraphs, and not merely, as K.AV. assume, the first
paragraph by itself, form the first section of ihv. Plato. Cf. note 53
above.

387

PLATO

makes
of life with the virtuous way of life. For he
will be devoted to
paragraph
third
the
that
expect
his readers
and the only
the disclosure of what the desired way of life is;
is the virtuous way
paragraph
third
the
in
mentioned
wav of life
of course that he would be met half-way by the

desired

77

Guide, 111 27. Accordingly, Maimonides treats medicine and morals

one and the same section of the Mishne tora (H. De'ot).

ness), because their

FSrabi does not say then what the desired way of life is; he
merely makes it known what it is not. Yet by denying that the
desired

FARABI

[31]

other

in

22

the perfect

human

being and the virtuous in 5 31

388

STRAUSS

(32]

the vulgar believes to be useful and painful or noble

on the other.
He makes it clear that the (truly) painful and the (truly) noble
things are the desired science and the desired way of
life/whereas
philosophy which leads to the desired science and the
desired
way of life, is the truly useful." He thus paves the wav for
the
identification

of the desired way of life essential to

happiness
with the truly virtuous way of life/ and for
the distinction
between genuine virtue, love and friendship on the one
hand,
and what the vulgar considers virtue, love and friendship
on the

FARABI

133]

389

PLATO

other ways of life is based, not on a difference of purpose, of

other
quality of the will, but on a difference of knowledge. In
moral
of
words, there is a broad agreement between the conduct
man and that of the philosopher: that agreement permits one to
apply one and the same term ("virtue") to both. But the same
conduct is interpreted in a fundamentally different manner by
moral man on the one hand, and by the philosopher on the other:
with that the
that difference compels FSrSbi to deny to begin
life.
of
way
virtuous
the
is
life
of
desired way

all

other. 81
If FarSbi's last word on the subject
is then hardly discernible
from what the most influential moral teachers of mankind
have
always insisted upon, why did he suggest in the first

place a
doctrine as shocking as the distinction between the
way of life
which is essential to happiness, and the virtuous way
of life is
bound to be? There can be only one answer: his first

statement

indispensable for the proper understanding of his

ultimate
statement his ultimate statement is as remote from the
generally
accepted doctrine as is his first statement. If he had
identified
from the outset the desired way of life with the truly
virtuous
is

way of life, he would have created the impression that the

difference between the truly virtuous way of life
and the virtuous
way of life "which is famous in the cities'*, is identical with the
difference between the highest morality and a lower
morality.
Actually however he holds the view that only the
virtuous way
,i
..Or '?. i a. thc ordinary sense of the .term is moraUtrictly speaking.

For the moral life consists of the submission to the

demands of
honour and duty without reasoning why; it consists of
choosing,
and doing, the just and noble for no reason other than
because

it is

just

and noble. The choice of the

and noble as such is

The difference between moral
just

the specifically moral purpose.

choice and a choice which is not moral, is essentially
a difference
of purpose, and not a difference of knowledge.
On the other
hand, the difference between the truly virtuous way
of life and

The Subject Matter of Philosophy

designates the theoretical art which supplies

essence of each of all the beings as well as both
the
the science of
of things which leads to that science
investigation
the actual
science of the essence of all beings
The
itself.
and that science

"Philosophy

is

( 12 (10. 10-11, 3)
(15,

and

17-18.

15-17); 23 (16,

12

beings" or "that

"Being"

is

17,

4); 24

(17,

15-20); 32

(22.

and

25.

(sc.

(sc.

that specific) science of the

that specific) science of

not identical with "thing";

all

all

the beings".*'

"beings" are "things",

concern the philosopher precisely because they are not "beings".

The perfection of a "being" is a "thing", but being the perfection
4
"thing",
of a "being", it is not itself a "being".* A way of life is a
is fundabeings
the
of
science
the
hence
"being";
a
not
but
85

mentally distinguished from the science of the ways of life.

The iivayKaZa, JCpSaXca, cvfjupepovra, icaXd and so on are,
as such, "things", but not "beings"." Since all "things" other
than "beings" are essentially dependent on "beings", being their
since
qualities, relations, actions, products, and so on, and

ii 19-21

called "that

which
but not all "things" are "beings". There are "things"
subjects
the
not
hence
arc not the subjects of any science, and
8
adequately
of philosophy in particular. * Other "things" are
do not
but
dealt with by other sciences, by grammar e. g.,

and

'

sometimes simply

and 15); 16 (12, 11).

(4, 13): 6 (6. 14); 8 (7, 12); 12 (9, 12
10(8, 14-16). Cf, J 22 (16, 7 f.).
al-'ulilm ch. 4, section on metaphysics, in pnnc.
I 1 in pnnc. Cf. Ifad
15
f.); 8 (7, 13 f. and 16 f.); 9 (8, 2 f.).
6
(6.
12-14);
1
(3,
5

H4

M{

$j 22
11

IV.

Cf.

12-13.

STRAUSS

390

[34]

therefore the full understanding of the essence of all these

391

FARABl'S PLATO

[35]

We

the essence of the things."* v

observed already the deep silence

as well as
of the Plato about the vol, the substatdiac separatae,
on
treatise
his
about the "ideas". We have to add that in
Firabi
Plato,
Aristotle's philosophy, which is tue sequel to his

In one passage, F&r&bl calls the science of the beings the

"science of the natural beings"." By doing so, he certainly

interdoes not discuss Aristotle's metaphysics. * The second

course
pretation of the tiirjo passages under consideration is of

implies that the beings par excellence are the natural beings as

irreconcilable with the teaching

"things"

ultimately

essence of

all

presupposes

teaching of

the

understanding of

the

"beings", philosophy can be called "the science of

distinguished from the

artificial beings. If

supernatural, the incorporeal beings?

But what about the

In another passage, he

calls the science of the beings with special reference to the subject

matter of the Timaeus the science of "the divine and the natural
beings".** There are two ways of reconciling the two divergent
In the first place, one may
statement "natural" is used in a broad sense and designates all
beings which do not owe their existence to human art: "ad

say that in the

statements.

first

philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem rerum

qucm ratio hum an a considerat sed non facit, ita quod sub
1

metaphysical^"'
Since the explicit reference to "the divine beings" occurs in a
summary of the Timaeus, the manner in which Plato uses the
terms designating divine things in the Timaeus cannot be completely disregarded. In the Timaeus, Plato applies such terms
to the maker of the universe, the gods who manifest themselves
phslosophia

naturali

comprehendamus

ct

so far as they wish (Zeus, Hera, and so on), the visible universe,

*-tteiteavenrthe *tarsrthe ^arth.-Hence.-onewuld also *aythat

the divine beings referred to by Fftrabl are simply the most
outstanding group of natural beings in the sense of beings "which
are todies or in bodies",

i.

of the heavenlv bodies with

f*(7

Cf.

e.

the heavens.*

God

is

The

identification

said to have been the esoteric

speaking in his

which

Fftribi sets forth

when

own name.

But does he not

explicitly mention,

if

only once, "spiritual

of
things", thus admitting quite unequivocally the existence
spiritual
substantias separatae? Our first answer has to be that

there
things are not spiritual beings. Yet, someone might retort,
just
cannot be spiritual things, if there are no spiritual beings,

as there cannoV lie a

However this may be,

ia^viop,
it

if

there are no iaiMOief."

suffices to state that F&r&bi's

only

popular
mention of spiritual things occurs in a summary of
Plato,
than
other
men
of
opinions
of
opinions, or at any rate
times
four
uses
he
context,
same
about a certain subject. In the
he
cases,
four
the
of
out
three
the term "divine things".* In
The
Plato.
than
other
people
attributes the use of the term to
relating
only remark in which he mentions "divine things" while

which is
Plato's views, refers to the desire for divine things
what
explain
not
does
distinguished from bestial desire. He
thsy are
these divine things are. I am inclined to believe that
of life:
way
right
identical with the science of the beings and the
love,
divine
and
He mentions in the same context divine desires
evidently understanding

by them passions or

qualities of

human

calls these passions or qualities

somewhat later, he
does
"praiseworthy and divine", thus indicating that "divine"
passion e. g.,
not necessarily refer to the superhuman origin of a
7
rate, in the
any
At
excellence.*
its
designate
simply
but may

beings;

13f.).

Metaphysics 991b 6

f.

with the

passages indicated

in

note

20

above.

Avicenna"

Cf. Averroes, Tahdfut

al4aUJui

(ed.

by M. Bouyges, Beyrouth

1930.

421).

26 (20, 15

* Thomas Aquinas' commentary on

Eth. Nic.,

1,

lect.

1.

Cf.

Summa

2 2, qu. 48.
* Timaeus 30 a 2; 34 a 7-b 9; 40 b5-c2 and d4; 69c2-4: 92 c5-9. Cf. Eth.

tkeolotica,

Sic. 1141 bl-2.

FMbl Plato XVIII.

Cf. Plato, Apology of Socrates 27b3-c3.

f 22 (14. 16; 15, 6

"

lb. (15,

4-6.

( 22 (IS, 2).

(Cf.

3 L and 7

Lewing. Von

and 12 and

13).

O. Eth. Nic.
Adam Neusern i

f.).

1099 b!4-18, and Plato. Laws 631 d

14 vers, fin.)

392

136]

whole passage under consideration "divine" is used as part of

the dichotomy "divine-human" or "divine-bestial". Now, in

what

is

best described as the "repetition" of that passage, Firibt

fl
replaces that dichotomy by the dichotomy "human-bestial" :

what he called "divine"

by him "human"/"

in

the

first

statement,

is finally

called

the
the acceptance of such substances. For him, philosophy is
concept
his
attempt to know the essence of each of all beings:
opinion as to
of philosophy is not based on any preconceived
M
what allegedly real things are truly real thin^V Hc has infinitely
in

common

with a philosophic materialist than with any

however well-intentioned. For him,

iton* philosophic believer

philosophy

is essentially

and purely theoretical.

{ 24.

15. 12)

For the understanding of the

one has to consider the

"first

the

It is

leading to the science of the beings as distinguished

leading to that science

science of the ways' of life. It is the way
rather than the
investigation
the
itself:
rather than that science

Philosophy thus understood is identical with the

ff*u/ in the original sense of
scientific spirit "in action", with
for truth which is animated
quest
the term. i. e. with the actual
makes life worth living,
alone
by the conviction that that quest
natural propensity
man's
of
is fortified by the distrust
result."*

and which

would be rash to maintain that the foregoing observations

regards any
suffice for establishing what F&rSbi believed as
justifying
for
however
substantiae separator They do suffice
fall with
and
stand
not
the assertion that his philosophy does
It

more

393

FARABl'S PLATO

137]

STRAUSS

statement"

way

from the

or unproven. conto rest satisfied with satisfying, if unevident

definite convichad
doubtless
man such as Farabi
victions.

number of important points, although it is

as the compilers
not as easv to say what these convictions were
But what
think.
to
of textbooks and of most monographs seem
philosophy,
made him a philosopher, according to his own view of
tions concerning a

which they were

were not those convictions, but the spirit in
which they were
acquired, in which they were maintained and in
Only by
house-tops.
the
from
preached
intimated rather than
philosophy
of
background
the
against
reading Maimonidcs' Guide
its unexplored
thus understood, can we hope eventually to fathom
depths.

22 (14, 4-

fact that FarabI avoids there the expressions

frequently
"he made dear" and "it became clear to him" while he speaks fairly
Fftr&bf's
regards
As
53-54
above.
notes
Cf.
"mentioned".
of what Plato
Grabmann ("Der
silence about God, cf. the following remark of Martin
der Bayeriscken
latemische Averroismus des 13. Jabrhundcrts". SUtungsberichte
2,*9): VBotihm*
** k*im*4er Wtt*ids^.*A*l^^
von Dacien
von Dacien gebraucht Ihnlich wie Siger von.Brabant, Martinus
Gott die
viele andcrc Professorcn der Artistenfakultat far

und fibcrbaupt

vielfach reden die

ausgesprochen meuphystsche Bezcichnung ens primum
den Theologen
Qberiatst
und
prindpium
oder
primum
Artisten nur vom
drn Namcn Deus." Cf. notes 41 and 58 above.

the
topic "homo" or "humanus" is indicated from
as the
by the densitv of "homo" in | 1. Almost equally important
the distinctions
distinctions homo-D^us (I 22) and homo-bestia (S 24) are
be noted that
should
(It
homo-vulgus.
or
homo-civis
and
(cf.
14)
homo-vir
%
"natio",
vitas",
"ci
of
the densities of "homo" on the one hand, and those
In the
distinguished).
clearly
fairly
arc
other
the
Vulguji" and "lex" on

" The importance of the

outsit

section dealing with the theoretical arts

- 6-11

(6.

10-9. 10)

-"homo

frequently
avoided in the passage dealing with religion, while it occurs most
avoided in the
passage dealing with poetry. It is true, "homo" is also
"nos".
passage dealing with rhetoric: but there it is replaced by a repeated
above.
48
and
27,
41
nous
Cf.

is

in the

which
Not without good reasons does he introduce philosophy as the art
Consider
itself.
science
that
as
not
and
s.
bein
E
supplies the science of the

also 5 26.