HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J.

BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W.

DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE
LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National
Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO
D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR.
and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO
ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. L-19550 || June 19, 1967 || CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS: Respondents are government officers and judges who
made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the
petitioners for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code." Such warrants allowed the search of Ps persons and/or
the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and
to seize and take possession of the following personal property
to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
On March 20, 1962, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original
action
for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Rs from using the things seized as evidence.
They also prayed that decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void
because:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books
and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
and

(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed
of in accordance with law.
R counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of
said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and
that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence
against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just
because the government blunders.
On March 22, 1962, the Court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for in the petition. However, on June 29, 1962,
the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers,
documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the
papers, documents and things found and seized in the
residences of petitioners.
ISSUE: W/N the search warrants are valid and therefore, the
objects seized may be validly admitted in court? NO
RATIO:
The documents, papers, and things seized may be divided into
two groups:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
RE: First Group of seized objects
SC held that Ps do not have a cause of action to assail the
validity of such warrants and seizures because said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from
the personality of Ps. The legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Re: Second Group of seized objects
The Constitution protects the rights of its citizens against
unreasonable search and seizure in that:(1) no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; (2) the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants.
Requirement # 1:
The search warrants were issued against Ps for "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no
1

specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The

averments with respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued
the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the
party
against
whom
it
is
sought
has
performed particular acts,
or
committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
Requirement # 2:
The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature,
thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described
as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.
The Court abandoned the Moncado ruling (that even if the
search warrants were unconstitutional, evidence seized may still
be admitted, on the theory that an action for damages or any
other remedy may be obtained against the erring officers).
Instead, the Court adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that
this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the
language of Judge Learned Hand: Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment
in the fundamental law of the land.
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the
letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against
whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find
that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the
issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not

justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence

of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable
cause.
________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ
y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant (2000; Quisumbing; G.R.
No. 129296)
FACTS: The RTC (Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya) found Abe Valdez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by
R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death
by lethal injection.
During the trial, a member of the police force (Tipay) testified
that at around 10:15 a.m. of Sept. 24, 1996, he received a tip
from an informer about a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned
by Valdez at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The
prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to his hut.
Subsequently, Police Inspector Parungao formed a reaction team
(Tipay was part of team) and he instructed them to uproot said
marijuana plants and arrest their cultivator.
At 5 A.M. the following day, said police team and informer went
to the said plantation. Upon their arrival, the police found Valdez
alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the
area where he had his kaingin and saw 7 five-ft. high, flowering
marijuana plants in 2 rows, approx. 25 m from his hut. PO2 Balut
asked him who owned the prohibited plants and, according to
Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted
the 7 marijuana plants. Also, they took photos of Valdez standing
beside the cannabis plants. He was then arrested.
On the other hand, the defense presented Valdez as its
witness. According to him, at 10 A.M., Sept. 25, 1996, he was
weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by a person he
didnt know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see
something." The person then brought him to the place where the
marijuana plants were found, approx. 100 m away from his nipa
hut. 5 armed policemen were present and they made him stand
in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew
anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied
any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and
2

told him to admit ownership of the plants. Valdez was so afraid

that he admitted owning the marijuana.
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of
the marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot 5 of the
cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo
was taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted
marijuana plants. The police team then brought him to the police
station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a
barangay peace officer of Brgy. Sawmill, accompanied the police
officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, threatened him
to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a
bad situation." At the police HQ, Valdez reiterated that he knew
nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.

1. There was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal

determination of the existence of probable cause. The police
officers had at least 1 day to obtain a warrant to search Valdez's
farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place
where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From
the information they have, they could have convinced a judge
that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and
apprehended the accused on the excuse that the 6-hour trip was
inconvenient to them.

On cross-examination, Valdez declared that there were other

houses around the vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest house
being 100 m away. The latter house belonged to one Carlito
Pascua who had a grudge against him. The spot where the
marijuana plants were found was located between his house and
Pascua's.

2. The "plain view" doctrine does not apply. For the doctrine to
apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.

The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness.

Tipay presented a sketch he made which showed the location of
marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of
Valdez, as well as the closest neighbor. According to Tipay, the
marijuana plot was located 40 m away from the old hut of Valdez
and 250 m distant from Pascuas hut. Tipay admitted that his
basis for claiming that Valdez was the owner or planter of the
seized plants was the information given him by the police
informer and the proximity of his hut to the location of said
plants.

PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants
before Valdez was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was
no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of the
latters premises. Also, the police team was dispatched to
Valdez's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited
flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where
the police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent.

The RTC held Valdez liable as charged for cultivation and

ownership of marijuana plants. The case before the SC for
automatic review.

The Court also notes the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon
arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area"
before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized
marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further
search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question
were not in "plain view."

ISSUE: WON the search and seizure of the marijuana plants are
lawful
RULING: NO.
The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and
seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant.
Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable."

3. The Court cannot sustain the trial court's conclusion that just
because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot,
Valdez could not invoke the constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable searches by agents of the State. The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of
3

one's person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other
possessions. The guarantee refers to "the right of personal
security" of the individual. What is sought to be protected
against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places.
Thus, said plants cannot be used as evidence against
appellant Valdez. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned
tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the
court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized
marijuana plants as evidence to convict Valdez.

KATZ v US
1967 || Stewart, J.
FACTS
The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the
Southern District of California under an eight-count indictment
charging him with transmitting wagering information by
telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of
a federal statute. Government was permitted, over the
petitioner's objection, to introduce evidence of the petitioner's
end of telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who
had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the
outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed
his calls. In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals
rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment regarding unlawful search
and seizure because "there was no physical entrance into the
area occupied by the petitioner."
ISSUE

1. WON a public telephone booth is a constitutionally

protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an
electronic listening recording device to the top of such a
booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the
user of the booth YES
2. WON government is guilty of unlawful search and seizure
YES
RULING

The petitioner argued that the booth was a "constitutionally

protected area." The Government has maintained that it was not.
But this deflects attention from the problem presented by this
case. Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in public area, may be
constitutionally protected. What petitioner sought to exclude
when he entered the phone booth was not the intruding eye -- it
was the uninvited ear.
The Government contends that its agents in this case should not
be tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the
surveillance technique involved no physical penetration of the
booth. The Court has since departed from this narrow view.
Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment
governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as
well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any
"technical trespass under . . . local property law."
The question remaining for decision, then, is whether the search
and seizure conducted complied with constitutional standards. In
that regard, the Government's position is that its agents acted in
an entirely defensible manner: they did not begin their electronic
surveillance until investigation of the petitioner's activities had
established a strong probability that he was using the telephone
in question to transmit gambling information to persons in other
States, in violation of federal law. It adds that agents took great
care to overhear only the conversations of the petitioner himself.
Accepting this account of the Government's actions as accurate,
it is clear that surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a
duly authorized magistrate could constitutionally have
authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search
and seizure that the Government asserts, in fact, took place. Yet
the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the
agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not
required, before commencing the search, to present their
estimate of probable cause. They were not compelled to observe
precise limits. Nor were they directed to notify the authorizing
magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of
such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon
the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find
evidence of a particular crime.
4

that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the

Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that
the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job
Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to
the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6,
1987).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI

G.R. 81561, January 18, 1991
FACTS:
-

On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the

appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to
the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in
the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the
proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to
them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was
sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti
wrote the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine
and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused,
assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In
view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer
insisted on inspecting the packages.
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs
and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and
husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom.
His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and
took several grams of the contents thereof.

Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment

to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.

He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment

to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages

were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened
the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the
cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana
leaves were found to have been contained inside the
cellophane wrappers

The package which allegedly contained books was likewise

opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package
contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The
package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was
also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were
neatly stocked underneath the cigars

The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the

box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects.

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for

violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

ISSUE:
-

Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting in evidence

the illegally searched and seized objects

HELD:
-

Following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio,

this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno, declared as inadmissible
any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and
seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier
adopted in Moncado v. People's Court wherein the
admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of
its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV)
constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up
to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
5

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted

to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the
State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other
authorized government agencies. On the other hand, the
case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the
evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in
a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation
of
State
authorities.
Hence,
the
accused/appellant cannot validly claim that his constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been
violated. An act of a private individual, allegedly in violation
of appellants constitutional rights CANNOT be invoked
against the State.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes,
the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part
of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts.

It must be recalled that after Reyes opened the box

containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to
the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of
business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the
rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody
thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no
search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the
postulate of accused/appellant.

if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the

proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention
of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search
and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion
by the government.

[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of respondent Alfredo
Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of
respondent, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and respondents secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between
respondent and his alleged paramours, greetings cards,
cancelled
checks,
diaries,
respondents
passport,
and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification
from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her respondent
Respondent brought an action for the recovery of the documents
and papers, and for damages against petitioner with the RTC of
Manila.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It declared
respondent the capital/exclusive owner of the properties
described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further
described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering
Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
damages. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was
made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives
were
enjoined
from
using
or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in
question.
CA affirmed RTC, hence this petition.
ISSUE
WON the Court's ruling in Alfredo Martin v Alfonso Felix, Jr.
applies to this case, making the said documents and papers
admissible in evidence
RULING
Not applicable. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr (Martin v Felix, Jr)
was for disbarment. Among other things, respondent, as
complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in
6

evidence (in the legal separation and disqualification from the

practice of medicine cases), Atty. Felix Jr committed malpractice
or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the TC.
The acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts
to no more than a declaration that his use of the documents and
papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to
their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of
the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the
decision in that case establish the admissibility of the
documents and papers in question.
If Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only
because, at the time he used the documents and papers,
enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily
restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was
eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
against the trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the
prohibition against the further use of the documents and
papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands
infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one
of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity
or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between
the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be

examined without the consent of the other as to any

communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.
PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

OSCAR VILLANUEVA vs. HON. JUDGE JOSE R. QUERUBIN,

Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-26177 December 27, 1972
FERNANDO, J.
Topic: Search and Seizure - Constitutional and statutory
boundaries; limitations on State action - Nature of right
protected; waiver of protected right
Facts: After due and appropriate proceedings, Judge Querubin
issued a search warrant which resulted into a raid of Villanuevas
house by the Philippine Constabulary. The raiding party was able
to arrest 8 participants in the game of "Monte" held in one of the
rooms of the house. Among the gambling paraphernalia seized
during the raid is cash in the amount of P10,570.00, which the
raiding party submitted to the court. The City Fiscal of Bacolod
City then filed an information for Violation of Art. 195 of the RPC
(Gambling) against the 8 apprehended persons. All the accused
pleaded guilty and were convicted by the City Court. Upon
recommendation of the Fiscal, however, only the amount of
P220.00 was ordered forfeited in favor of the government and
the amount of P10,350.00 was ordered to be returned to
Villanueva, the owner of the house, who issued the receipt for
the amount with the condition that he will return the money if
the higher authorities will require the return of the said amount.
Thereafter, Judge Querubin issued an order requiring Villanueva
"to return and deliver to the Provincial Commander, Bacolod
City, the amount of P10,350.00 and the wooden container,
relying on Philips vs. Municipal Mayor in saying that the Court of
First Instance that issued the search warrant has jurisdiction over
the seized items.
7

Villanueva contends that the lower court was without

jurisdiction, and that the matter had become moot and
academic, because the money was spent in good faith by him for
the payment of the wages of his laborers. He also relied on his
alleged rights as owner. He argued that while he agreed to return
the money by 'legal orders', this cannot be considered as a
limitation on his right of ownership, because when an agreement
conflicts with the provision of law, the latter must prevail. He
then issued a certiorari and prohibition proceeding before the SC
arguing that such order of return would violate his right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue: W/N there is a violation of petitioners right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure.
Ruling: There is NONE.
The validity of the search warrant and the subsequent raid was
never questioned. In his petition, he relied solely on his
ownership rights. He failed to recognize the search and seizure
rules in The Rules of Court, which made clear what is to be done
after the seizure of the property:
The officer must forthwith deliver the property to the municipal
judge or judge of the city court or of the Court of First Instance
which issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof
duly verified by oath. The legal custody was therefore
appropriately with respondent Judge, who did authorize the
issuance of such search warrant.
Had he entertained doubts as to the validity of the issuance of
the search warrant or the manner in which it was executed, he
would be called upon to establish such a claim in court. He could
rely on authoritative doctrines to seek a judicial declaration of
any illegal taint that he could, with plausibility, assert. He failed
to do such.
Moreover, in his assertion of mere ownership rights, what he
would conveniently ignore was the fact that the seizure thereof
was under a valid search warrant. The very constitutional
guarantee relied upon does not preclude a search in one's home
and the seizure of one's papers and effects as long as the
element of reasonableness is not lacking. It cannot be correctly
maintained then that just because the money seized did belong
to petitioner, its return to the court that issued the search
warrant could be avoided when precisely what the law requires is

that it be deposited therein. As a matter of fact, what lacks the

element of legality is the continued possession by petitioner.
Resort to a higher tribunal then to nullify what was done by
respondent Judge is futile and unavailing.
________________________________________________________
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO
and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC. v. THE CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
PRESIDENTIAL
SECURITY
COMMAND,
THE
JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL.
26 December 1984 | Escolin, J.
NATURE: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction to review the
validity of the issued search warrants by the judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City)
FACTS: Ps assail the validity of two search warrants issued by R
Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, which subjected the premises of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers to search of
office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in
the possession & control of P Jose Burgos, Jr. (publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper). They also pray for the return of the
seized articles and that Rs be enjoined from using such as
evidence in the Criminal Case against P Jose Burgos, Jr.
At the hearing on 7 July 1983, the OSG manifested that Rs "will
not use the aformentioned articles as evidence in the
aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the
seizure", thereby rendering the prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction moot and academic.
ISSUES:
1) W/N Ps should have sought the quashal of the warrant before
R judge prior to seeking relief from the SC
2) W/N Ps are barred by laches as it took them 6 months to file
this petition
8

3) W/N Ps are estopped from challenging the validity of the

warrants
4) W/N the search warrants were validly issued
5) W/N the search warrants may be annulled on the ground that
P did not own some of the property seized
HELD:
1) Yes, but the Court chose to take cognizance of the petition in
view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised, not to mention the public
interest generated by the search, which was televised in
Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this
Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules.
2) No, laches may not be imputed to a party who tried to
exhaust all extrajudicial efforts before going to court
to ask for quashal of search warrant. Laches is failure or
negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. The SC excused the 6month lapse of instituting the petition impugning the validity
of the search warrants as the extrajudicial efforts exerted by
them quite evidently negate the notion that they had
abandoned their right to the possession of the seized
property. As soon as they could, Ps sent a letter to President
Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet, asking the return
at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after
such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego,
Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential
Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope
that the latter would yield the desired results. After waiting in
vain for five months, petitioners finally decided to come to
Court.
3) The Court does not follow this logic. As the documents
lawfully belong to P, he can do whatever he pleases with
them within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them
as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the

validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in

this petition.
4) NO
a. Existence of Probable Cause
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search
warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher
or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish.
The Court ruled that the descriptions used in the two
warrants were mere generalizations that do not satisfy the
requirement of specificity.
The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that
petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and
other documents which were used and are all continuously
being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the existence
of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a
grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable
cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the
evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows
that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and
things above-described were used and are continuously
being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to
promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the
Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and
April 6 Movement."
9

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon

probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution
requires no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which
the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said
joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the
test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
b. Examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses (as mandated by
Section IV, Article 3 of the 1973 Constitution
and Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court)
This issue has been rendered moot and academic as P
already conceded during the 9 August 1983 hearing that an
examination has indeed been conducted by R judge of Col.
Abadilla and his witnesses.
c. On the second search warrant, which allegedly
pinpointed the same place described in the first
search warrant
This defect is obviously a typographical error as two
search warrants were applied for and issued. The purpose
and intent were to search two distinct premises. It
would be absurd and illogical for R judge to have
issued two warrants intended for one and the same
place. The addresses were specifically set forth in the
application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who
headed the team which executed the search warrants, the
ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typo error
is more apparent than real.
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes
the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it

has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge

as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This
would seem to be especially true where the executing officer
is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and
when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the
affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the
warrant as to the place to be searched."
5) No. Ownership is not essential to the validity of search
and seizure. Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court does not
require that the property to be seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or
may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the
above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be
seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be
owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may
be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is
of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized
under the warrants.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and
20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are
hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside.
The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of
the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized
thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

Kyllo vs US
Facts: Suspicious that marijuana was being grown in petitioner
Kyllo's home in a triplex, agents used a thermal-imaging device
to scan the triplex to determine if the amount of heat emanating
from it was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically
used for indoor marijuana growth. Thermal imagers detect
infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is
not visible to the naked eye.
The scan of Kyllo's home took only a few minutes and was
performed from the passenger seat of Agent Elliott's vehicle
10

across the street. The scan showed that the roof over the garage
and a side wall of petitioner's home were relatively hot
compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than
neighboring homes in the triplex. Agent Elliott concluded that
petitioner was using halide lights to grow marijuana in his house,
which indeed he was. Based on tips from informants, utility bills,
and the thermal imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a
warrant authorizing a search of petitioner's home, and the
agents found an indoor growing operation involving more than
100 plants. Petitioner was indicted on one count of
manufacturing marijuana. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress
the evidence seized from his home and then entered a
conditional guilty plea.
The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed, upholding the thermal
imaging on the ground that Kyllo had shown no subjective
expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to
conceal the heat escaping from his home. Even if he had, ruled
the court, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy because the thermal imager did not expose any
intimate details of Kyllo's life, only amorphous hot spots on his
home's exterior.
Issue: WoN the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of
heat within the home constitutes a "search" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.

privacy against government that existed when the Fourth

Amendment was adopted.
Based on this criterion, the information obtained by the thermal
imager in this case was the product of a search. The Court
rejects the Government's argument that the thermal imaging
must be upheld because it detected only heat radiating from the
home's external surface. Such a mechanical interpretation of the
Fourth
Amendment
was
rejected
in Katz, where
the
eavesdropping device in question picked up only sound waves
that reached the exterior of the phone booth to which it was
attached. Reversing that approach would leave the homeowner
at the mercy of advancing technology-including imaging
technology that could discern all human activity in the home.
Also rejected is the Government's contention that the thermal
imaging was constitutional because it did not detect "intimate
details." Such an approach would be wrong in principle because,
in the sanctity of the home, all details are intimate details. It
would also be impractical in application, failing to provide a
workable accommodation between law enforcement needs and
Fourth Amendment interests.
Since the Thermovision imaging was an unlawful search, it will
remain for the District Court to determine whether, without the
evidence it provided, the search warrant issued in this case was
supported by probable cause.
________________________________________________________

Held/Ratio: Yes.
Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in
general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a "search" and is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant.
In the case, the criterion is re the minimal expectation of privacy
that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To
withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to
permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the home's interior that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
"intrusion into a constitutionally protected area," constitutes a
search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not
in general public use. This assures preservation of that degree of

CALIFORNIA V CIRAOLO
FACTS: The Santa Clara, Cal., police received an anonymous
telephone tip that marijuana was growing in respondent's
backyard, which was enclosed by a 6-foot outer fence and a 10foot inner fence and shielded from view at ground level. Officers
who were trained in marijuana identification secured a private
airplane, flew over respondent's house at an altitude of 1,000
feet within navigable airspace, and readily identified marijuana
plants growing in the yard. A search warrant was later obtained
on the basis of one of the officer's naked-eye observations; a
photograph of the surrounding area taken from the airplane was
attached as an exhibit. The warrant was executed, and
marijuana plants were seized.
11

Defense: the flyover "was not the result of a routine patrol

conducted for any other legitimate law enforcement or public
safety objective, but was undertaken for the specific purpose of
observing this particular enclosure within respondents
CURTILAGE. At common law, the curtilage is the area to which
extends the intimate activity associated with the `sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life.
After the California trial court denied respondent's motion to
suppress the evidence of the search, he pleaded guilty to a
charge of cultivation of marijuana. The California Court of Appeal
reversed on the ground that the warrantless aerial observation of
respondent's yard violated the Fourth Amendment.
ISSUE: W/N an aerial naked-eye observation violates the Fourth
Amendment
HELD: The Fourth Amendment was not violated by the naked-eye
aerial observation of respondent's backyard.
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a
person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation
of privacy, which involves the two inquiries of 1) whether the
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search, and 2) whether society is willing
to recognize that expectation as reasonable (Katz v. United
States). In pursuing the second inquiry, the test of
legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to
conceal assertedly "private activity," BUT whether the
government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and
societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.
1st test
Clearly - and understandably - respondent has met the test of
manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain
privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits.
2nd test
On the record here, respondent's expectation of privacy from all
observations of his backyard was unreasonable. That the
backyard and its crop were within the "curtilage" of respondent's
home did not itself bar all police observation.
The mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict
some views of his activities does not preclude an officer's

observation from a public vantage point where he has a right to

be and which renders the activities clearly visible. The police
observations here took place within public navigable airspace, in
a physically nonintrusive manner. The police were able to
observe plants readily discernible to the naked eye as marijuana,
and it was irrelevant that the observation from the airplane was
directed at identifying the plants and that the officers were
trained to recognize marijuana. Any member of the public flying
in this airspace who cared to glance down could have seen
everything that the officers observed. The Fourth Amendment
simply does not require police traveling in the public airways at
1,000 feet to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible
to the naked eye.
________________________________________________________
Dow Chemical v United States
Note: For right to privacy, the test employed is the reasonable
expectation to privacy test: 1) the individual must have
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy; and 2) the
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.
FACTS: Petitioner operates a 2,000-acre chemical plant
consisting of numerous covered buildings, with outdoor
manufacturing equipment and piping conduits located between
the various buildings exposed to visual observation from the air.
Petitioner maintains elaborate security around the perimeter of
the complex, barring ground-level public views of the area. One
day, petitioner denied a request by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for an on-site inspection of the plant. The EPA did
not seek an administrative search warrant, but instead employed
a commercial aerial photographer, using a standard precision
aerial mapping camera, to take photographs of the facility from
various altitudes, all of which were within lawful navigable
airspace.
The EPA did not inform Dow of the aerial photography. Thus,
upon becoming aware of the same, petitioner brought suit i
Federal District Court, alleging that EPA's action violated the
Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search and seizure) and
beyond the EPA's statutory investigative authority. It claimed
that the EPA has no authority to use Aerial Photography to
implement its authority for site inspection.
The District Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It limited the
12

issue to whether EPA's "quest for evidence" amounted to a

search and whether the same was unreasonable. It ruled that
the petitioner had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" as it
seeks protect its trade secrets. Thus, the employment of aerial
cameras were violative of the petitioner's right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful search.

activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter

from governmental interference or surveillance; curtilage
doctrine- the area immediately surrounding a private house has
long been given protection as a place where the occupants have
a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy that society
is prepared to accept).

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that EPA's aerial

observation did not exceed its investigatory authority and
that the aerial photography of petitioner's plant complex without
a warrant was not a search prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment. It held that although Dow indeed had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the same is only limited to ground-level
intrusions. Dow did not take precautions that would show that it
reasonably expected privacy from aerial surveillance.

The curtilage doctrine does not apply. The intimate activities

associated with family privacy and the home and its curtilage
simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between
structures and buildings of a manufacturing plant.

ISSUE: WON the search of the EPA was valid and does not
exceed its statutory authority?
HELD: Yes.
On the issue of EPAs statutory authority- Congress has vested in
EPA certain investigatory and enforcement authority, without
spelling out precisely how this authority was to be exercised in
all the myriad circumstances that might arise in monitoring
matters relating to air and water standards. When Congress
invests an agency with enforcement and investigatory authority,
it is not necessary to identify explicitly each and every technique
that may be used in the course of executing the statutory
mission. EPA, as a regulatory and enforcement agency, needs no
explicit statutory provision to employ methods of observation
commonly available to the public at large: we hold that the use
of aerial observation and photography is within EPA's statutory
authority.
On the issue of unreasonable searchDow argues that the plant complex falls within the curtilage
doctrine and not in the open fields doctrine as held in Oliver v
United States. Thus its "industrial curtilage" have constitutional
protection equivalent to that of the curtilage of a private home.
Dow further contends that any aerial photography of this
"industrial curtilage" intrudes upon its reasonable expectations
of privacy. (open fields doctrine- no protection of those intimate

The narrow issue raised by Dow's claim of search and seizure,

concerns aerial observation of a 2,000-acre outdoor
manufacturing facility without physical entry. It has been held
that the Government has "greater latitude to conduct
warrantless inspections of commercial property" because
"the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial
property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the
sanctity accorded an individual's home."
Unlike a homeowner's interest in his dwelling, "[t]he interest of
the owner of commercial property is not one in being free from
any inspections." And with regard to regulatory inspections, we
have held that "[w]hat is observable by the public is observable,
without a warrant, by the Government inspector as well."
In Oliver it was recognized that, in the open field context, "the
public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air." Here,
EPA was not employing some unique sensory device that,
for example, could penetrate the walls of buildings and record
conversations in Dow's plants, offices, or laboratories, but
rather a conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera
commonly used in mapmaking. We conclude that the open
areas of an industrial plant complex with numerous plant
structures spread over an area of 2,000 acres are not analogous
to the "curtilage" of a dwelling for purposes of aerial surveillance
such an industrial complex is more comparable to an open
field, and, as such, it is open to the view and observation
of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public airspace
immediately above or sufficiently near the area for the reach of
cameras.
The photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as
13

to raise constitutional concerns. Although they undoubtedly give

EPA more detailed information than naked-eye views, they
remain limited to an outline of the facility's buildings and
equipment. The mere fact that human vision is enhanced
somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise to
constitutional problems.
We hold that the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial
plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited
by the Fourth Amendment.
Obiter: Take into account all of the facts when you recite the
case. The ruling solely applies to cases where there is 1) an
industrial plant/ building with an open area outside and
within its perimeter; 2) the government uses a conventional or
commercial camera for aerial surveillance.
If you change any of the above variables the ruling would be
different. For example, if the EPA used a highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public,
such as satellite technology, what the EPA did would amount to
unlawful search. Another instance would be if one government
agency employs an aerial camera for surveillance of a home,
that would amount to unlawful search because the curtilage
doctrine applies.
Hoffa vs United States 385 US 293 (1966)
Brief Fact Summary.
Petitioners were convicted for
endeavoring to bribe members of a jury in a previous trial of
petitioner Hoffa, for violating the Taft-Hartley Act, which resulted
in a hung jury. Substantial information and evidence were given
in the prosecution by Partin, a paid government informer, who,
throughout the Taft-Hartley trial, was repeatedly in Hoffa's
company -- in Hoffa's hotel suite, the hotel lobby, and elsewhere.
The defendant (Hoffa) often conferred with his attorneys in the
room. The informant was there in order to obtain information
from the defendant to be used during a second trial for witness
tampering. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, and
this Court granted certiorari on the question whether the use of
evidence furnished by the informer rendered the convictions
invalid.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The conduct by the Government by

means of deceptively placing a secret informer in the quarters
and councils of a defendant during one criminal trial [does not]
violate the defendants Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights that suppression of such evidence is
required in a subsequent trial of the same defendant on a
different charge.
Facts:

James Hoffa (Hoffa) was charged with violating a provision

of the Taft-Hartley Act. He was tried in the autumn of 1962
(the Test Fleet trial). The Test Fleet trial ended with a hung
jury.

Hoffa and various others were convicted in 1964 of bribing

members of the jury during the Test Fleet trial. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the convictions.

A substantial element in the Government's, proof that led to

the convictions of these four petitioners (Hoffa, King, Parks,
and Campbell) was contributed by a witness named Edward
Partin, who testified to several incriminating statements
which he said petitioners Hoffa and King had made in his
presence during the course of the Test Fleet trial.

James Hoffa was president of the International Brotherhood of

Teamsters. During the course of the trial, he occupied a
three-room suite in the Andrew Jackson Hotel in Nashville.
Also, Hoffas attorneys were in the room. One of his constant
companions throughout the trial was the petitioner King,
president of the Nashville local of the Teamsters Union.
Edward Partin, a resident of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and a
local Teamsters Union official there, made repeated visits to
Nashville during the period of the trial. On these visits he
frequented the Hoffa hotel suite, and was continually in the
company of Hoffa and his associates, including King, in and
around the hotel suite, the hotel lobby, the courthouse, and
elsewhere in Nashville. During this period, Partin made
frequent reports to a federal agent named Sheridan
concerning conversations he said Hoffa and King had had
with him and with each other, disclosing endeavors to bribe
members of the Test Fleet jury. Partin's reports and his
subsequent testimony at the petitioners' trial unquestionably
contributed, directly or indirectly, to the convictions of all
14

four of the petitioners. Partin made various reports to a

federal agents about conversations he said Hoffa and
King had had with him and with each other, disclosing
endeavors to bribe members of the Test Fleet jury.
Federal agents asked Partin to look out for Hoffa attempting
to tamper with the Test Fleet jury.

The chain of circumstances which led Partin to be in Nashville

during the Test Fleet trial extended back at least to
September of 1962. At that time, Partin was in jail in Baton
Rouge on a state criminal charge. He was also under a
federal indictment for embezzling union funds, and other
indictments for state offenses were pending against him.
Between that time and Partin's initial visit to Nashville on
October 22, he was released on bail on the state criminal
charge, and proceedings under the federal indictment were
postponed. On October 8, Partin telephoned Hoffa in
Washington, D.C., to discuss local union matters and Partin's
difficulties with the authorities. In the course of this
conversation, Partin asked if he could see Hoffa to confer
about these problems, and Hoffa acquiesced. Partin again
called Hoffa on October 18, and arranged to meet him in
Nashville. During this period, Partin also consulted on several
occasions with federal law enforcement agents, who told him
that Hoffa might attempt to tamper with the Test Fleet jury
and asked him to be on the lookout in Nashville for such
attempts, and to report to the federal authorities any
evidence of wrongdoing that he discovered. Partin agreed to
do so.

refusing to concede that it "placed' the informer anywhere,

much less that it did so `deceptively.'"
Held.

The use of a secret informer is not per se unconstitutional,

and the use of Partin in this case did not violate due process
requirements, his veracity having been fully subject to the
safeguards of cross-examination and the trial court's
instructions to the jury.

The majority first observed that Partin was a government

informant as soon as he arrived in Nashville and that the
government compensated him for his services as such.

RE FOURTH AMENDMENT: No rights under the Fourth

Amendment were violated by the failure of Partin to disclose
his role as a government informer. When Hoffa made
incriminating statements to or in the presence of Partin, his
invitee, he relied not on the security of the hotel room, but
on his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his
wrongdoing.

Hoffa: only by violating the petitioner's rights under the

Fourth Amendment was Partin able to hear the petitioner's
incriminating statements in the hotel suite, and that Partin's
testimony was therefore inadmissible under the exclusionary
rule of Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383. The argument is
that Partin's failure to disclose his role as a government
informer vitiated the consent that the petitioner gave to
Partin's repeated entries into the suite, and that, by listening
to the petitioner's statements Partin conducted an illegal
"search" for verbal evidence.

SC: Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the

fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the
security a man relies upon when he places himself or his
property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his
home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There,
he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion.
And when he puts something in his filing cabinet, in his desk
drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be
secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable
seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not

After the Test Fleet trial, Partins wife received money

from the government and all charges against Partin
were dropped.

Issue. (grant of certiorari was limited to single issue) WON Gov't

use, in this case, of evidence supplied by Partin operated to
invalidate these convictions OR Whether evidence obtained by
the Government by means of deceptively placing a secret
informer in the quarters and councils of a defendant during one
criminal trial so violates the defendants Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights that suppression of such evidence is required
in a subsequent trial of the same defendant on a different
charge[?] latter phrased by defendants; At the threshold, the
Government takes issue with the way this question is worded,

15

tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room

in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers
in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveillance
in Silverman. In the present case, however, it is evident that
no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment
is involved. It is obvious that the petitioner was not relying on
the security of his hotel suite when he made the
incriminating statements to Partin or in Partin's presence.
Partin did not enter the suite by force or by stealth. He was
not a surreptitious eavesdropper. Partin was in the suite by
invitation, and every conversation which he heard was either
directed to him or knowingly carried on in his presence. The
petitioner, in a word, was not relying on the security of the
hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence
that Partin would not reveal his wrongdoing. As counsel for
the
petitioner himself points
out,
some
of
the
communications with Partin did not take place in the suite at
all, but in the "hall of the hotel," in the "Andrew Jackson Hotel
lobby," and "at the courthouse."Neither this Court nor any
member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth
Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a
person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will
not reveal it. Indeed, the Court unanimously rejected that
very contention less than four years ago in Lopez v. United
States. As such, no right protected by the Fourth
Amendment was violated.

RE FIFTH AMENDMENT: Hoffas Fifth Amendment claim that

he was compelled to be a witness against himself was also
without merit. There was no type of compulsion or coercion.
No claim has been or could be made that the petitioner's
incriminating statements were the product of any sort of
coercion, legal or factual. The petitioner's conversations with
Partin and in Partin's presence were wholly voluntary. For that
reason, if for no other, it is clear that no right protected by
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination was violated in this case.
RE SIXTH AMENDMENT: There was no violation of any Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in this case. (a) A Sixth
Amendment violation resulting from Partin's reporting to the
Government on the activities of Hoffa's counsel in preparing
the defense of the Taft-Hartley trial might have invalidated
any conviction in that trial. But the conviction in the
subsequent trial for the different offense of endeavoring to

bribe jurors was not rendered invalid by the admission of

Hoffa's incriminating statements heard by Partin, none of
which were made in the presence of counsel or in connection
with the legitimate defense of the Taft-Hartley trial. (b) The
Government was not obliged to arrest Hoffa when it first had
probable cause to do so, though his admissions without
counsel after arrest might have been barred, since law
enforcement officers have no duty to halt a crime
investigation when they have minimum evidence to establish
probable cause.

Hoffa also made two Sixth Amendment arguments found to

be without merit.
o First, Hoffa argued that his lawyers used his suite as
a place to confer with him and with each other, to
interview witnesses, and to plan the following days
trial strategy. Accordingly, he argued that Partins
presence in and around the suite violated the
petitioners Sixth Amendment right to counsel
because an essential ingredient thereof is the
right of a defendant and his counsel to prepare
for
trial
without
intrusion
upon
their
confidential relationship by an agent of the
Government, the defendants trial adversary. In
discounting this argument, the majority observed it
is far from clear to what extent Partin was
present at conversations or conferences of the
petitioners counsel.
o Also, the majority distinguished two cases by
observing [Hoffa's] statements related to the
commission of a quite separate offense

CALIFORNIA vs GREENWOOD
486 U.S. 35 May 16, 1988

J. White

FACTS:

Investigator Stracner learned that a criminal suspect had

informed a federal drug enforcement agent in February
1984 that a truck filled with illegal drugs was en route to
the Laguna Beach address at which Greenwood resided.

16

In addition, a neighbor complained of heavy vehicular

traffic late at night in front of Greenwood's single-family
home. The neighbor reported that the vehicles remained
at Greenwood's house for only a few minutes. Stracner
investigated and did notice the heavy vehicular traffic
and a truck suspected to contain narcotics pass by
Greenwoods house.

On
April
6,
1984,
Stracner
asked
the
neighborhood's regular trash collector to pick up
the plastic garbage bags that Greenwood had left
on the curb in front of his house and to turn the
bags over to her without mixing their contents
with garbage from other houses. The trash
collector cleaned his truck bin of other refuse,
collected the garbage bags from the street in front
of Greenwood's house, and turned the bags over to
Stracner. The officer searched through the rubbish
and found items indicative of narcotics use. She
recited the information that she had gleaned from
the trash search in an affidavit in support of a
warrant to search Greenwood's home.

Police officers encountered both respondents at the

house later that day when they arrived to execute the
warrant. The police discovered quantities of cocaine and
hashish during their search of the house. Respondents
were arrested on felony narcotics charges. They
subsequently posted bail.

Investigator Raheuser continued to receive reports of

many late-night visitors at Greenwoods house so the
former again obtained Greenwoods trash the same way
Stracner did before. There was evidence of narcotics use
again so he procured another search warrant and found
more narcotics and evidence of narcotics trafficking.
Greenwood was arrested again.

The Superior Court and Court of Appeal both dismissed

the charges against Greenwood because warrantless
trash searches violate the Fourth Amendment. They
would not have found probable cause for a search
warrant for his house if they had not searched his trash.

ISSUE: WON warrantless search and seizure of garbage bags

would violate the Fourth Amendment No. The Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure
of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home.The
investigators were validly able to search and seize the garbage
bags left behind.
HELD:

We observed that "a person has no legitimate

expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties." The third person in
this case, the garbage collector, had the free use of
the trash once in it was left at the curb.

The warrantless search and seizure of the garbage bags

left at the curb outside the Greenwood house would
violate the Fourth Amendment only if respondents
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their
garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable.

Here, we conclude that respondents exposed their

garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to
Fourth Amendment protection. It is common knowledge
that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public
street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.

Accordingly, having deposited their garbage "in an

area particularly suited for public inspection and,
in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for
the express purpose of having strangers take it,",
respondents could have had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that
they discarded.

The police cannot reasonably be expected to avert

their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that
could have been observed by any member of the
public.

The reasonableness of a search for Fourth Amendment

purposes does not depend upon privacy concepts
embodied in the law of the particular State in which the
17

search occurred; rather, it turns upon the understanding

of society as a whole that certain areas deserve the most
scrupulous protection from government invasion. There is
no such understanding with respect to garbage left for
collection at the side of a public street.

Greenwood also anchored his argument on the fact that

California state law should stay separate from the federal
law but the Court negated this and said the Fourth
Amendment
does not cover protection
against
warrantless trash searches.

The Fourth Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.

The State of Washington vs. Bradley M. Boland

115 Wn.2d 571 (1990) 800 P.2d 1112; J. Dolliver
FACTS
Sometime in September 1986, both the office of the Prosecuting
Attorney for Jefferson County and the Port Townsend City Police
Department received anonymous letters alleging defendant
Bradley Boland was distributing legend drugs. Legend drugs are
drugs of which federal law prohibits distribution without a
prescription from a physician. The anonymous letter was
accompanied by a brochure containing the names of Health West
Products and Boland. Shortly after receiving the letter, the
investigating officer attempted to order legend drugs from the
defendant through the mail. When defendant received the letter,
he responded with a letter stating he did not understand the
inquiry. The letter, however, was returned to defendant with a
notation stating the addressee did not live at the address given.
The investigating officer applied for a search warrant (based on
the letter and brochure) in order to gain access to defendant's

power records for the purpose of verifying his address. The

warrant was served on November 6, 1986, and defendant's
address was subsequently verified.
The police began a series of four warrantless searches of
defendant's garbage hoping to locate sufficient evidence to
obtain a warrant to search his residence. The other three
searches occurred on March 25, April 1, and April 8. Before each
of the searches, police officers would observe defendant take his
trash out to the corner for collection where he would place his
trash can in approximately the same location. The lid of
defendant's trash container fit securely on the can, and each
time defendant took the can out, he would place a heavy piece
of wood on top of the lid. On each occasion, the officers returned
to defendant's residence during the night, emptied the contents
of the trash can into a plastic bag and transported it to the police
station. Once there, the trash was made available to state and
federal agents who would examine its contents for evidence of
drugrelated activities. On at least three of these occasions, such
evidence was uncovered.
After inquiring with the Washington State Board of Pharmacy in
order to verify defendant did not hold a license to dispense
legend drugs, the investigating officer applied for a warrant to
search defendant's home. The warrant was issued based on the
evidence obtained from defendant's trash and the letter and
brochure received from the informant. The police searched
defendant's house and seized a large quantity of legend drugs as
well as a card of tablets and a bottle containing controlled
substances. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of
legend drugs and two counts of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered
during the search of his house. Defendant argued the evidence
was the fruit of the warrantless search of his garbage which
violated the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
and Const. art. 1, 7.
NOTE: Fourth amendment of US Constitution is the
federal counterpart of Const. art. 1, 7
TC granted the motion, stating that in light of Const. art. 1, 7,
it is clear that a law enforcement officer's examination of the
contents of a garbage container placed curbside for collection is
18

an unconstitutional intrusion into a person's private affairs,

particularly when the city ordinance requires the container to be
removed from the person's property and placed at the side of
the street for ease of collection. The trial court also ordered
suppression of the evidence seized in defendant's home since,
without the evidence taken from the garbage, no probable cause
existed upon which to base the search warrant. The trial court
subsequently ordered the charges against defendant be
dropped.
CA revered TC decision.
ISSUE
WON a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in garbage
HELD
YES.
1) Defendant cites one local ordinance, the Port Townsend
Ordinance, which requires him to place his trash cans in a
location "where they will be convenient for the collector."
Although the Court of Appeals correctly points out the Port
Townsend Ordinance was intended to protect the health of the
general public rather than individual privacy interests in
garbage, we find this irrelevant. One can reasonably infer from
this ordinance that only trash collectors and not others will
handle one's trash. It would be improper to require that in order
to maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's trash
that the owner must forgo use of ordinary methods of trash
collection.
2) Const. art. 1, 7 provides: No person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.
Violation of a right of privacy under this provision turns on
whether the State has unreasonably intruded into a person's
"private affairs. The difference between the right of privacy
under Const. art. 1, 7 and the Fourth Amendment has been
explained as follows: Const. art. 1, 7 analysis encompasses
those legitimate privacy expectations protected by the Fourth
Amendment, but is not confined to the subjective privacy
expectations of modern citizens who, due to well publicized
advances in surveillance technology, are learning to expect
diminished privacy in many aspects of their lives. Rather, it
focuses on those privacy interests which citizens of this state

have held, and should be entitled to hold,

governmental trespass absent a warrant.

safe

from

Certain governmental intrusion does constitute a violation of an

individual's private affairs under Const. art. 1, 7.
3) We find under the facts of this case that defendant Boland's
private affairs were unreasonably intruded upon by law
enforcement officers when they removed the garbage from his
trash can and transported it to the police station in order to
make it available to state and federal narcotics agents. Boland's
trash was in his can and sitting on the curb in expectation that it
would be picked up by a licensed garbage collector. This leads us
to the conclusion that it falls squarely within the contemplated
meaning of a "private affair". While it may be true an
expectation that children, scavengers, or snoops will not sift
through one's garbage is unreasonable, average persons would
find it reasonable to believe the garbage they place in their trash
cans will be protected from warrantless governmental intrusion.
4) In rendering our opinion, we acknowledge that the United
States Supreme Court has held to the contrary under the Fourth
Amendment in California vs. Greenwood. We also recognize that
the opinions of the Supreme Court, while not controlling on state
courts construing their own constitutions, are nevertheless
important guides on the subjects they squarely address.
However, we decline to follow federal precedent for two reasons.
a) Greenwood is based in part on the fact that the court felt
society is unwilling to accept as objectively reasonable a
privacy expectation in garbage left outside the curtilage
of the home for collection. This court has previously held
the location of a search is indeterminative when inquiring
into whether the State has unreasonably intruded into an
individual's private affairs. Thus, the fact defendant
placed his garbage at the curb rather than in his backyard
has no bearing on whether an unreasonable intrusion into
his private affairs occurred.
b) The reasoning upon which Greenwood is based conflicts
directly with this court's interpretation of Const. art. 1,
7.
5) The proper and regulated collection of garbage, as evidenced
by ordinances such as Port Townsend's is necessary to the
proper functioning of modern society. While a person must
reasonably expect a licensed trash collector will remove the
19

contents of his trash can, this expectation does not also infer an
expectation of governmental intrusion.
6) The violation of a constitutional immunity automatically
implies exclusion of the evidence seized.
DISPOSITION
CA decision REVERSED.
Florida vs. Jardines
No. 11-564 | March 26, 2013 | J. Scalia
Doctrine: The investigation of Jardines home with the help of a
drug-sniffing dog was a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. At the Fourth Amendments very core
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreason-able governmental intrusion. The
porch is part of the home. Furthermore, the officers entry into
the porch was not consented to.
Nature: Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida
Facts: In 2006, Detective Pedraja of the Miami Police received a
tip that marijuana was being grown in the home of respondent
Joelis Jardines so together with the Drug Enforcement
Administration, a joint surveillance team was sent. No one was
home so Pedraja approached the house with Detective Bartelt, a
trained canine handler who arrived with his drug-sniffing dog.
As the dog approached Jardines front porch, he apparently
sensed one of the odors he had been trained to detect, and
began energetically exploring the area for the strongest point
source of that odor. After sniffing the base of the front door, the
dog sat, which is the trained behavior upon discovering the
odors strongest point. Detective Bartelt then pulled the dog
away from the door and left the scene after informing Detective
Pedraja that there had been a positive alert for narcotics.
On the basis of what he had learned at the home, Detective
Pedraja applied for and received a warrant to search the
residence. When the warrant was executed later that day,
Jardines attempted to flee and was arrested; the search revealed
marijuana plants, and he was charged with trafficking in
cannabis.

At trial, Jardines moved to suppress the marijuana plants on the

ground that the canine investigation was an unreasonable
search.
Trial court: granted the motion
Florida Third District Court of Appeal: reversed
Florida Supreme Court: quashed the decision of the Third District
Court of Appeal and approved the trial courts decision to
suppress, holding that the use of the trained narcotics dog to
investigate Jardines home was a Fourth Amendment search
unsupported by probable cause, rendering invalid the warrant
based upon information gathered in that search.
Issues:
1. WON using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowners porch
to investigate the contents of the home is a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
2. WON the search violated Jardines right
Held:
1. Yes. When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home
is first among equals. At the Amendments very core
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.
The area immediately surrounding and associated with
the home is treated as part of the home itself for Fourth
Amendment purposes. This area around the home is
intimately linked to the home, both physically and
psychologically, and is where privacy expectations are
most heightened. The front porch is the classic exemplar
of an area adjacent to the home and to which the activity
of home life extends.
2. Yes. The general rule clearly states: Our law holds the
property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his
foot upon his neighbors close without his leave. In
instant case, no one was home; hence, there was no
permission given to the police to conduct the search.
A police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a
home and knock, precisely because that is no more than
any private citizen might do. But introducing a trained
20

police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes

of discovering incriminating evidence is something else.
The State argues that investigation by a forensic
narcotics dog by definition cannot implicate any
legitimate privacy interest. The State cites jurisprudence
which held, respectively, that canine inspection of
luggage in an airport, chemical testing of a substance
that had fallen from a parcel in transit, and canine
inspection of an automobile during a lawful traffic stop,
do not violate the reasonable expectation of privacy
concept elucidated in Katz vs. US.
But the Court says that the Katz reasonable-expectations
test has been added to, not substituted for, the
traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, and so is unnecessary to consider when the
government gains evidence by physically intruding on
constitutionally protected areas.
That the officers learned what they learned only by
physically intruding on Jardines property to gather
evidence is enough to establish that a search occurred.
The governments use of trained police dogs to
investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore
affirmed.

the scene with his narcotics-detection dog. When they arrived,

respondents car was on the shoulder of the road and
respondent was in Gillettes vehicle. While Gillette was in the
process of writing a warning ticket, Graham walked his dog
around respondents car. The dog alerted at the trunk. Based on
that alert, the officers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and
arrested respondent. The entire incident lasted less than 10
minutes.
Respondent was convicted of a narcotics offense and sentenced
to 12 years imprisonment and a $256,136 fine. The trial judge
denied his motion to suppress the seized evidence and to quash
his arrest. He held that the officers had not unnecessarily
prolonged the stop and that the dog alert was sufficiently
reliable to provide probable cause to conduct the search.
Although the Appellate Court affirmed, the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed, concluding that because the canine sniff was
performed without any specific and articulable facts to
suggest drug activity, the use of the dog unjustifiably
enlarg[ed] the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug
investigation.
Issues:
Whether or not police can expand a routine traffic stop into a
drug investigation by using a drug-sniffing dog in the absence of
individualized suspicion.
Whether or not the use of a drug-sniffing dog in routine traffic
stop is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable
suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle
during a legitimate traffic stop.

ILLINOIS v. ROY I. CABALLES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
ILLINOIS
J. Stevens; January 24, 2005

Held:
No. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop
that reveals no information other than the location of a
substance that no individual has any right to possess does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.

Illinois State Trooper Daniel Gillette stopped respondent for

speeding on an interstate highway. When Gillette radioed the
police dispatcher to report the stop, a second trooper, Craig
Graham, a member of the Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction
Team, overheard the transmission and immediately headed for

Conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a

traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed
in a reasonable manner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed
respondents constitutionally protected interest in privacy.
21

Official conduct that does not compromise any legitimate

interest in privacy is not a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment. It has been held that any interest in possessing
contraband cannot be deemed legitimate, and thus,
governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of
contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interest. This is
because the expectation that certain facts will not come to the
attention of the authorities is not the same as an interest in
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.
The use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dogone that "does
not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain
hidden from public view," during a lawful traffic stop, generally
does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. In this case, the
dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondents car while
he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on
respondents privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a
constitutionally cognizable infringement.

UNITED STATES v. JONES

Argued November 8, 2011; Decided January 23, 2012
On Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia circuit
J. Scalia
In 2004 respondent Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a
nightclub in the District of Columbia, came under suspicion of
trafficking in narcotics and was made the target of an
investigation by a joint FBI and Metropolitan Police Department
task force. Officers employed various investigative techniques,
including visual surveillance of the nightclub, installation of a
camera focused on the front door of the club, and a pen register
and wiretap covering Joness cellular phone.
Based in part on information gathered from these sources, in
2005 the Government applied to the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for a warrant authorizing the use of
an electronic tracking device on the Jeep Grand Cherokee
registered to Joness wife. A warrant issued, authorizing
installation of the de-vice in the District of Columbia and within
10 days.

On the 11th day, and not in the District of Columbia but in

Maryland, agents installed a GPS tracking device on the
undercarriage of the Jeep while it was parked in a public parking
lot. Over the next 28 days, the Government used the device to
track the vehicles movements, and once had to replace the
devices battery when the vehicle was parked in a different
public lot in Maryland. By means of signals from multiple
satellites, the device established the vehicles location within 50
to 100 feet, and communicated that location by cellular phone to
a Government computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages of
data over the 4-week period.
It subsequently secured an indictment of Jones and others on
drug trafficking conspiracy charges. The District Court
suppressed the GPS data obtained while the vehicle was parked
at Joness residence, but held the remaining data admissible
because Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy when
the vehicle was on public streets. Jones was convicted. The D. C.
Circuit reversed, concluding that admission of the evidence
obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device violated the
Fourth Amendment.
Issues:
Whether or not installing a Global Positioning System (GPS)
tracking device on a vehicle and using the device to monitor the
vehicle's movements constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment.
Held:
Yes. The Governments attachment of the GPS device to the
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicles
movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment
(a) The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Here, the Governments
physical intrusion on an effect for the purpose of obtaining
information constitutes a search. This type of encroachment on
an area enumerated in the Amendment would have been
considered a search within the meaning of the Amendment at
the time it was adopted.
(b) This conclusion is consistent with this Courts Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, which until the latter half of the 20th
century was tied to common-law trespass. Later cases, which
22

have deviated from that exclusively property-based approach,

have applied the analysis of Justice Harlans concurrence in Katz
v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, which said that the Fourth
Amendment protects a persons reasonable expectation of
privacy. Here, the Court need not address the Governments
contention that Jones had no reasonable expectation of
privacy, because Joness Fourth Amendment rights do not rise
or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, the Court must
assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted. (Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27). Katz did not
repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment
embodies a particular concern for government trespass upon the
areas it enumerates. The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test. Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165;
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56. United States v. Knotts, 460
U. S. 276, and United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, post-Katz
cases rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to beepers,
electronic tracking devices representing another form of
electronic monitoring, do not foreclose the conclusion that a
search occurred here. New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, and
Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, also do not support the
Governments position.
(c) The Government argues in the alternative that even if the
attachment and use of the device was a search, it was
reasonableand thus lawfulunder the Fourth Amendment
because officers had reasonable suspicion, and in-deed
probable cause, to believe that [Jones] was a leader in a largescale cocaine distribution conspiracy. The Supreme Court had
no occasion to consider this argument. The Government did not
raise it below, and the D. C. Circuit therefore did not address it,
therefore the argument is deemed forfeited.
;
PEOPLE, appellee, vs. SUSAN CANTON, appellant
G.R. No. 148825; December 27, 2002
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 110
Doctrine: RA 6235 Sec. 9 is another exception to the proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures. The provision clearly
states that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to

weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited

materials or substances.
February 12, 1998 Susan Canton was at the NAIA, being a
departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she
passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was
emitted. Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National
Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the
frisker on duty at that time, called her attention and asked her if
she (Cabunoc) could search her (Canton). Upon frisking Canton,
Cabunoc felt something bulging at her abdominal area, and
similar packages in front of her genital area and thighs.
According to Cabunoc, she noticed that the package contained
what felt like rice granules. Cabunoc asked Canton to bring out
the packages but Canton refused, saying: Money, money only.
Cabunoc reported the matter to her supervisor on duty, SPO4
Victorio de los Reyes.
SPO4 de los Reyes instructed Cabunoc to call Customs Examiner
Lorna Jalac and to bring Canton to a comfort room for a thorough
physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies room,
Cabunoc touched something in front of Cantons sex organ and
she directed Canton to remove her skirt, girdles and panty.
Canton obliged and Cabunoc and Jalac discovered three
packages (abdominal area, in front of her genital area, and right
thigh) individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing
tape, which Canton voluntarily handed to them.
Cabunoc turned over the packages to SPO4 de los Reyes who
then informed Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the
incident. Together with Canton, they brought the gray plastic
packs to the customs examination table, opened them, and
found white crystalline substances inside, which after
laboratory
examination
yielded
positive
results
for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug.
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause testified that no
investigation was ever conducted on Canton. However, Canton
signed a receipt of the following articles seized from her: (1) 3
bags
of
methamphetamine
hydrochloride
or
shabu
approximately 1,100 grams; (2) 1 American passport; (3) 1
Continental Micronesia plane ticket; and (4) two panty girdles.
SPO2 Cause said that he informed Canton of her rights but
admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the
receipt.
23

RTC: found Canton guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating

Section 16 Article III of RA 6425, and sentencing her to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Php1million.

Issues:
Whether or not the warrantless search made on Canton was
valid. YES
Held:
Cantons contentions
TC erred in justifying the
warrantless search against
her based on the alleged
existence of probable cause

TC erred in holding that she

was caught in flagrante
delicto and that the
warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest

The arrest could not be

said to have been made
before the search because
at the time of the strip
search,
the
arresting
officers could not have
known what was inside
the
plastic
containers

hidden in her body, which

were wrapped and sealed.
They could not have
determined
whether
Canton
was
actually
committing a crime; the
strip search was therefore
nothing but a fishing
expedition

Supreme Court
The search conducted on Canton
was not incidental to a lawful
arrest

Cantons arrest did not

precede the search. When
the metal detector alarmed
while Canton was passing
through it, the lady frisker on
duty made a pat down
search on her. In the process,
Cabunoc felt a bulge on
Cantons abdomen. The strip
search that followed was for
the purpose of ascertaining
what were the packages
concealed on Cantons body.
Canton, having been flagrante
delicto, was lawfully arrested
without a warrant

Section 5, Rule 113 ROC

provides that a peace officer
or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an
offense...

TC erred in not ruling that the

frisker went beyond the limits
of the Terry search doctrine

The stop and frisk search

should have been limited
to the patting of her outer
garments in order to
determine whether she
was armed or dangerous.

The present case falls

under paragraph (a) of
Section 5, Rule 113. The
search conducted on Canton
resulted in the discovery of
shabu.
Armed
with the
knowledge that Canton was
committing a crime, the
airport security personnel
and
police
authorities
were
duty-bound
to
arrest her. Her subsequent
arrest without a warrant was
justified,
since
it
was
effected upon the discovery
and recovery of shabu in her
person flagrante delicto.
The scope of a search
pursuant to airport security
procedure is not confined
only to search for weapons
under the Terry search
doctrine

The Terry search or stop and

frisk situation refers to a
case where a police officer
approaches a person who is
acting
suspiciously
for
purposes of investigating
possibly criminal behavior in
line with the general interest
of effective crime prevention
and detection. He could
validly conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer
clothing of such person to
discover
weapons
which
might be used to assault
him.
In the present case, the
search
was
made
pursuant
to
routine
airport
security
24

TC erred in not ruling that

Canton was under custodial
investigation without counsel

Canton alleges that from

the
moment
frisker
Cabunoc felt a package at
her
abdominal
area,
started inquiring about its
contents, detained her,

procedure.
RA
6235
Section 9 provides: Every
ticket issued to a passenger
by the airline or air carrier
concerned
shall
contain
among others the following
condition printed thereon:
Holder hereof and his
hand-carried
luggage(s)
are subject to search for,
and seizure of, prohibited
materials or substances.
Holder refusing to be
searched shall not be
allowed to board the
aircraft,
which
shall
constitute a part of the
contract
between
the
passenger and the air carrier.
RA 6235 Sec. 9 is another
exception
to
the
proscription
against
warrantless searches and
seizures.
The
provision
clearly
states
that
the
search, unlike in the Terry
search, is not limited to
weapons. Passengers are
also subject to search for
prohibited
materials
or
substances.
The strip search in the ladies
room was justified under the
circumstances.
The constitutional right to
counsel afforded an accused
under custodial investigation
was not violated

In this case, no custodial

investigation
was
conducted after Cantons
arrest. She affixed her
signature to the receipt of

and stripped search her in

the ladies room, she was
under
custodial
investigation
without
counsel.

TC erred in admitting to the

records of the case the report
of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena,
which was not testified on or
offered in evidence, and
using the same in
determining her guilt

the articles seized from her,

but before she did so, she
was told that she had the
option to sign or not to sign
it. Aside from this, no
statement was taken from
her during her detention and
used in evidence against her.
The admission of the medical
report was erroneous.

TC erred in applying the

ruling in People v. Johnson

Canton assails the validity of

the
medical
report
as
evidence on the ground that
it violates the hearsay rule.
The medical report contained
the following: This is the
first time I carried shabu. I
need the money.
SC held that this contention
is meritorious. The admission
of the questioned document
was erroneous because it
was not properly identified.
The ruling in People v. Johnson is
applicable to the instant case

Canton
questions
the
applicability
of
the
doctrine in the Johnson
case
because
of
its
sweeping
statement
allowing searches and
seizures
of
departing
passengers in airports in
view of the gravity of the
safety interests involved.
She argues that the
applicable case should
have been Katz v. United
States which upholds the
4th
Amendment
that
protects people and not
places.

The Johnson case, which

involves similar facts and
issues, finds application to
the present case. The court
ruled that the packs of
methamphetamine
hydrochloride seized during
the routine frisk at the
airport
was
acquired
legitimately pursuant to
airport
security
procedures
and
are
therefore
admissible
in
evidence against Johnson.
Cantons reliance on Katz v.
United States is misplaced.
The facts and circumstances
25

of that case are entirely

different from the case at
bar.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA
ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998
J. Romero
On 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received
information from an informant named Benjie that a certain
Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988
and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying
with her a large volume of marijuana.
On 14 Dec 1988, when Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner
Bus carrying a travelling bag, the informant pointed her out to
the law enforcement officers. NARCOM officers approached her
and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When asked by
one of the officers about the contents of her travelling bag, Aruta
gave the same to the officer. When they opened the bag, they
found dried marijuana leaves. Aruta was then brought to the
NARCOM office for investigation and later charged with violating
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issue and Holding:

1. Whether or not there is probable cause to the arrest. NO

2. Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is
lawful. NO

Ratio:
Issue #1: On Probable Cause
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is
necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any probable
cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as
evidence against the person arrested.
In the present case, the warrantless search and seizure
could only be legitimized under Section 5(a) of Rule 113 which
states that:
26

 A peace officermay without a warrant, arrest a person

when in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense
Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither
was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a
crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting
in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM
agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the
furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by
the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for
them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime,
except for the pointing finger of the informant.
Issue #2: On Warrantless Search and Seizure
As such, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents
to effect a warrantless search of Arutas bag, there being no
probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently
illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was
similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest.
RTC decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant
ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
from confinement unless for some other legal grounds.

Manalili vs. CA
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997
J. Panganiban

Manalili was charged of violating Section 8, Article II of RA 6425

or Illegal possession of marijuana residue.
Version of Prosecution:
2pm April 11, 1988 Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas from the
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were
conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City,
in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. They received
information that drug addicts were roaming that area.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen
alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male
person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. He
was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and introduced
themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the
male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person
tried to resist. Patrolman Espiritu asked the male person if he
could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter
showed the wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it. Espiritu
took the wallet and found suspected crushed marijuana residue
inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. NBI
confirmed that it was marijuana.
Version of Defense:
Manalili was aboard a tricycle on the way to his boarding house
when 3 policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop
because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were under
the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the accused
and the tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen
were riding in. After searching the accused and the tricycle
driver, nothing was found on the persons. The policemen allowed
the tricycle driver to go while they brought the accused to the
police headquarters where they said they would again search.
On the way to headquarters, Manalili saw a neighbor and
signaled him to follow. Once there, policemen asked Manalili to
remove his pants in the presence of the neighbor and a
27

companion. Nothing was found except dirt and dust. Manalili was
brought to a cell. Police later told Manalili that they found
marijuana inside the pockets of the pants.
In the afternoon, the policemen told Manalili to call his parents to
settle the case (aka extortion). He refused, saying that his
parents didnt have a telephone. During the case, the driver and
neighbor both corroborated Manalilis version.
RTC: accused is guilty based on testimony of policemen (neutral
and disinterested witnesses). Manalili did not even move for
reinvestigation or take action against the allegedly erring
policemen.

CA affirmed: Discrepancies in policemens testimonies are minor

and insubstantial inconsistencies. No proof that the decision of
the trial court was based on speculations, surmises or
conjectures.
Issue:
1. WON the evidence is admissible YES; search was valid
(stop-and-frisk)
2. WON the prosecutions version is credible
3. WON the prosecutions evidence is sufficient to sustain the
conviction
Ratio:
Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During a Stop-and-Frisk
-

Manalili: protests the admission of the marijuana leaves

found in his possession (products of an illegal search)
Sol-Gen: (1) waived because petitioner never raised this
issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their
admissibility; (2) search was lawful under Section 5(a) Rule
113
Court revisited Terry v. Ohio and the stop-and-frisk rule.
o Terry vs Ohio did not abandon the rule that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure
o In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a
search and seizure must be validated by a previously

secured judicial warrant. Any evidence obtained in

violation of the mentioned provision is legally
inadmissible in evidence.
o However, there are exceptions to the rule against
warrantless search and seizure: "(1) search incidental
to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3)
seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5)
waiver by the accused themselves of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure" with
probable cause as the essential requirement
Many instances where a search and seizure could be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of
which was stop-and-frisk.
Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling
like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of
drug addicts.
o From his experience as a member of the AntiNarcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such
suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts
who were "high." sufficient reason to stop
petitioner to investigate; found marijuana
Manalili effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence
illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to
object thereto during the trial. Issues not raised below
cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.

Assessment of Evidence affirmed CA ruling

-

Trial courts assessment of policemens credibility (which was

affirmed by CA) holds great weight
Evidence justifies Espiritus testimony
Question of whether the marijuana was found inside
petitioner's wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial
Manalili did not deny possession of said substance
Failure to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that
marijuana was found in petitioner's possession.

Sufficiency of Evidence
-

Elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the

accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not
28

authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously

possessed the said drug.
The substance found in petitioner's possession was identified
by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be crushed
marijuana leaves. Manalilis lack of authority to possess
these leaves was established. His awareness thereof was
undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs
when stopped by the policemen and that he resisted when
asked to show and identify the thing he was holding.
Manalilis claim of planting the marijuana and extortion can
be easily fabricated. Manalili did not file any administrative or
criminal case against the arresting officers or present any
evidence other than his bare claim.

5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape

recording machines, video machines and tapes

Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced

to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to
TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of SIX
THOUSAND PESOS.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition stating

that probable cause exists justifying the issuance of a search
warrant, the articles seized were adequately described in the
search warrant, a search was conducted I n an orderly manner
and the padlocking of the searched premises was with the
consent of petitioner's wife.

Corro vs. Lising

ROMMEL CORRO, petitioner, vs. HON. ESTEBAN LISING
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
XCV HON. REMIGIO ZARI Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 98; CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE, Quezon City; LT.
COL. BERLIN A. CASTILLO and 1ST LT. GODOFREDO M.
IGNACIO, respondents
G.R. No. L-69899 July 15, 1985
J. Relova
Respondent RTC Judge Esteban Lising, upon application filed by
Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service, issued a search warrant authorizing the
search and seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in
committing the crime of inciting to sedition.
1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;
2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine
Times;
3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;
4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills,
leaflets, banners;

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return

documents/personal properties alleging among others that the
properties seized are typewriters, duplicating machines,
mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines
and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things as
they are, connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.
Respondent Judge Lising denied the motion. Hence, this petition
praying that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab initio that the
padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times be reopened.

Held:
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:
SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons,
supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a
29

cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the

means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper
(Burton vs. St. Paul, M & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S.
vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566)."
An application for search warrant must state with particularly
the alleged subversive materials published or intended to
be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine
Times, Rommel Corro. As We have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs.
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 133 SCRA
800, "mere generalization will not suffice."
A search warrant should particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. "The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed,
that abuses may not be committed.
The affidavit of Col. Castillo states that in several issues of the
Philippine Times:
... we found that the said publication in fact
foments distrust and hatred against the
government of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities, defined and penalized by
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1835; (p. 22, Rollo)
and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others
... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro,
contains articles tending to incite distrust and
hatred for the Government of the Philippines or
any of its duly constituted authorities. (p. 23,
Rollo)
The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will
not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. They
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant,
absent of the existence of probable cause.
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent
judge allowed seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times,
manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper
dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and even

typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape

recording machines.
Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include
all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The
search warrant under consideration was in the nature of
a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable.
Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent judge on
September 29, 1983 declared null and void and SET ASIDE. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the
seized articles GRANTED and all properties seized thereunder
are hereby ordered RELEASED to petitioner. Respondents Lt. Col.
Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo M. Ignacio are ordered to
RE-OPEN the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times
at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita,
Manila.

Kho vs. Makalintal

BENJAMIN
V.
KHO
and
ELIZABETH
ALINDOGAN,
petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, respondents
G.R. No. 94902-06, April 21, 1999
J. Purisima
Synopsis:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the order of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque which denied petitioners
Motion to Quash Search Warrants emanating from the same
court. Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) from using the objects seized by
virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed
against them and to return immediately the said items, including
firearms, ammunition and explosives, radio communication
equipment, handsets, transceivers, two units of vehicles and
motorcycle. Petitioners questioned the issuance of subject
search warrants, theorizing upon absence of any probable cause
therefor. They contended that the surveillance and investigation
conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to
the application for the search warrants under controversy, were
not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances showing or indicating the commission of
a crime by the petitioners.
30

The Court ruled as untenable petitioners contention. The

application for the questioned search warrants was based on the
personal knowledge of the applicants and their mistresses. The
warrants in question complied with the Constitutional and
statutory requirements. The law does not require that the things
to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities.
Considering that cases in court had been instituted against the
petitioners, the petition herein to return all objects seized and to
restrain respondent NBI from using the said objects as evidence,
has become moot and academic. Herein petitioner was therefore
dismissed.
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the
issuance of search warrants by the respondent Judge against
Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb.
Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the same
day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the
same court for the issuance of search warrants against the said
petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk,
Paranaque. The search warrants were applied for after teams of
NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and
investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of
confidential information they received that the said places were
being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and chopchop vehicles. On the same day, the respondent Judge
conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their
witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 9012, 90-13, 90-14, and 90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, NBI conducted the
simultaneous searches on the said residences of the petitioner
(Kho) and they were able to confiscate the above mention
objects stated in the warrant and the simultaneous searches also
resulted
in
the
confiscation
of
various
radio
and
telecommunication equipment. The confiscated items were
verified in Camp Crame and were proven that all of them are
unlicensed.
Petitioner (Kho) question the validity of the warrant and filed a
Motion to Quash the previous decision.

1. Whether or not the issuance of the search warrant by the

respondent Judge valid.
2. Whether or not the Motion to Quash filed by the petitioner
(Kho) alleging that there was an abuse enforcement of the
challenge search warrant valid.
3. Whether or not the Petitioners sought to restrain the
respondent National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) from using the
objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases
filed or to be filed against them and to return immediately the
said items valid.
Held:
The Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants comply
with Constitutional and statutory requirements. The law does not
require that the things to be seized must be described in precise
and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of
the searching authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually
impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would
not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since
the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort
and time spent in researching on the details to be embodied in
the warrant would render the purpose of the search nugatory.
The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcement of
the challenged search warrants is not within the scope of a
Motion to Quash. In a Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the
validity of the issuance of the warrant. The manner of serving
the warrant and of effecting the search are not an issue to be
resolved here. As aptly opined and ruled by the respondent
Judge, petitioners have remedies under pertinent penal, civil and
administrative laws for their problem at hand, which cannot be
solved by their present motion to quash.
Considering that cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Explosives and Violation of Section 3 in relation to Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972, have been instituted against the petitioners, the
petition for mandamus with preliminary and mandatory
injunction to return all objects seized and to restrain respondent
NBI from using the said objects as evidence, has become moot
and academic.

Issues:
31

WHEREFORE, for want of merit and on the ground that it has

become moot and academic, the petition at bar is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.

Microsoft vs. Maxicorp

MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
MAXICORP,
INC.,
respondent
G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004
J. Carpio
On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent
Dominador Samiano, Jr. (NBI Agent Samiano) filed several
applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for
alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the
RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant
and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search
Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25
July 1996, against Maxicorp.
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25
July 1996 a search of Maxicorps premises and seized property
fitting the description stated in the search warrants.
On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the
search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for
their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of general
warrants. The RTC denied Maxicorps motion on 22 January
1997.
The RTC also denied Maxicorps motion for reconsideration. The
RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after
examining NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz (Sacriz),
and computer technician Felixberto Pante (Pante). The three
testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to
Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications from
petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform
the witnessed activities using petitioners products.
On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTCs order. On 23
December 1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs order
denying Maxicorps motion to quash the search warrants.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals

denied petitioners motion on 29 November 1999.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to
present during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence
that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The
Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent
Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products
from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1) Whether or not there was probable cause to issue the search
warrants.
2) Whether or not the search warrants are general warrants.
Held:
1) Probable cause means such reasons, supported by facts and
circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that
his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just
and proper. Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires
such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the
place to be searched.
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after
personally examining under oath the complainant and his
witnesses. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking
the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
The applicant must have personal knowledge of the
circumstances. Reliable information is insufficient. Mere
affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing
the complainant and his witnesses.
The Court of Appeals reversal of the findings of the RTC centers
on the fact that the two witnesses for petitioners during the
preliminary examination failed to prove conclusively that they
bought counterfeit software from Maxicorp. The Court of Appeals
ruled that this amounted to a failure to prove the existence of a
connection between the offense charged and the place
searched.
32

The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement

under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article
189 of the RPC. To support these charges, petitioners presented
the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician
Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners
charged Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of
counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they personally saw
Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.
During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the
testimonies of the witnesses to the requisite examination. NBI
Agent Samiano testified that he saw Maxicorp display and offer
for sale counterfeit software in its premises. He also saw how the
counterfeit software were produced and packaged within
Maxicorps premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated
that he was certain the products were counterfeit because
Maxicorp sold them to its customers without giving the
accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements and
certificates of authenticity. Sacriz testified that during his visits
to Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances when Maxicorp
installed petitioners software into computers it had assembled.
Sacriz also testified that he saw the sale of petitioners software
within Maxicorps premises. Petitioners never authorized
Maxicorp to install or sell their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object
and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to
establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have
witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in
copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of
petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and
insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed
and sold within Maxicorps premises, they were also produced,
packaged and in some cases, installed there.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind
of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists.
Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining
in a given situation. Thus, it was improper for the Court of
Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings simply because the sales
receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit
goods is not in his name.

For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is

not the only proof that the sale of petitioners software occurred.
During the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent
Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit that he
purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had
pre-installed petitioners software. Sacriz, who was present when
NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit, affirmed that
NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit. Pante, the
computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of
petitioners software on the same computer unit. There was a
comparison between petitioners genuine software and
Maxicorps software pre-installed in the computer unit that NBI
Agent Sambiano purchased. Even if we disregard the sales
receipt issued in the name of Joel Diaz, which petitioners
explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the
operation, there still remains more than sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals ruling on Sacrizs
testimony. The fact that Sacriz did not actually purchase
counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not eliminate the
existence of probable cause. Copyright infringement and unfair
competition are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit
goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying,
assembling, packaging to marketing, including the mere offering
for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm testimonies
of petitioners witnesses on such other acts stand untarnished.
The Constitution and the Rules of Court only require that the
judge examine personally and thoroughly the applicant for the
warrant and his witnesses to determine probable cause. The RTC
complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court.
2) A search warrant must state particularly the place to be
searched and the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for
this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those
particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection
against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be
committed.
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a search warrant shall issue in connection with one
33

specific offense. The articles described must bear a direct

relation to the offense for which the warrant is issued.
Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must state that the
articles subject of the search and seizure are used or intended
for use in the commission of a specific offense.
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too
broad in scope and lack the specificity required with respect to
the objects to be seized. After examining the wording of the
warrants issued, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp
and reversed the RTCs Order.
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived infirmity
of paragraph (e) of the search warrants the RTC issued. The
appellate court found that similarly worded warrants, all of which
noticeably employ the phrase used or intended to be used,
were previously held void by this Court.
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow. The description of the
property to be seized need not be technically accurate or
precise. The nature of the description should vary according to
whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter
of concern.
Measured against this standard we find that paragraph (e) is not
a general warrant. The articles to be seized were not only
sufficiently identified physically, they were also specifically
identified by stating their relation to the offense charged.
Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles used or
intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of
petitioners software. This language meets the test of specificity.
However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in
particularity:
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other
paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers
property used for personal or other purposes not related to
copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the
description covers property that Maxicorp may have bought

legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors. Paragraph

(c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft
logo, whether legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit
the seizure to products used in copyright infringement or unfair
competition. Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a
warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to
be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should
be nullified as a whole.
A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the
items specifically described in the warrant. A search
warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently described may be
cut off without destroying the whole warrant. The exclusionary
rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders
inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through
unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under
paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under
paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.
WHEREFORE, petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. Court of Appeals
decision dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29
November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777 REVERSED and SET
ASIDE except with respect to articles seized under paragraph (c)
of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454. All
articles seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not
falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, ordered returned to
Maxicorp, Inc. immediately.

Maryland vs. King

MARYLAND v. KING
12-207 June 3, 2013
J. Kennedy
After his 2009 arrest on first- and second-degree assault
charges, respondent King was processed through a Wicomico
County, Maryland, facility, where booking personnel used a
cheek swab to take a DNA sample pursuant to the Maryland DNA
Collection Act (Act). The swab was matched to an unsolved 2003
rape, and King was charged with that crime. He moved to
suppress the DNA match, arguing that the Act violated the
Fourth Amendment , but the Circuit Court Judge found the law
constitutional. King was convicted of rape. The Maryland Court of
Appeals set aside the conviction, finding unconstitutional the
34

portions of the Act authorizing DNA collection from felony

arrestees.
Held:
When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to
hold for a serious offense and bring the suspect to the station to
be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of
the arrestee's DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a
legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
(a) DNA testing may "significantly improve both the criminal
justice system and police investigative practices,"District
Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S.
52 , 55, by making it "possible to determine whether a biological
tissue matches a suspect with near certainty," id ., at 62.
Maryland's Act authorizes law enforcement authorities to collect
DNA samples from, as relevant here, persons charged with
violent crimes, including first-degree assault. A sample may not
be added to a database before an individual is arraigned, and it
must be destroyed if, e.g., he is not convicted. Only identity
information may be added to the database. Here, the officer
collected a DNA sample using the common "buccal swab"
procedure, which is quick and painless, [*1963] requires no
"surgical intrusio[n] beneath the skin," Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753 , 760, and poses no threat to the arrestee's "health or
safety," id., at 763 . Respondent's identification as the rapist
resulted in part through the operation of the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS), which connects DNA laboratories at the
local, state, and national level, and which standardizes the
points of comparison, i.e.,loci, used in DNA analysis.
(b) The framework for deciding the issue presented is well
established. Using a buccal swab inside a person's cheek to
obtain a DNA sample is a search under the Fourth Amendment.
And the fact that the intrusion is negligible is of central
relevance to determining whether the search is reasonable, "the
ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental
search," Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 , 652.
Because the need for a warrant is greatly diminished here, where
the arrestee was already in valid police custody for a serious
offense supported by probable cause, the search is analyzed by
reference
to
"reasonableness,
not
individualized
suspicion," Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 855, n. 4, and
reasonableness is determined by weighing "the promotion of

legitimate governmental interests" against "the degree to which

[the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy," Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 , 300.
(c) In this balance of reasonableness, great weight is given to
both the significant government interest at stake in the
identification of arrestees and DNA identification's unmatched
potential to serve that interest.
(1) The Act serves a well-established, legitimate government
interest: the need of law enforcement officers in a safe and
accurate way to process and identify persons and
possessions taken into custody. "[P]robable cause provides
legal justification for arresting a [suspect], and for a brief
period of detention to take the administrative steps incident
to arrest," Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 113- 114; and
the "validity of the search of a person incident to a lawful
arrest" is settled, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 ,
224. Individual suspicion is not necessary. The "routine
administrative procedure[s] at a police station house incident
to booking and jailing the suspect" have different origins and
different constitutional justifications than, say, the search of
a place not incident to arrest, Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S.
640 , 643, which depends on the "fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 238. And
when probable cause exists to remove an individual from the
normal channels of society and hold him in legal custody,
DNA identification plays a critical role in serving those
interests. First, the government has an interest in properly
identifying "who has been arrested and who is being
tried." Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt
Cty., 542 U.S. 177 , 191. Criminal history is critical to
officers who are processing a suspect for detention. They
already seek identity information through routine and
accepted means: comparing booking photographs to sketch
artists' depictions, showing mugshots to potential witnesses,
and comparing fingerprints against electronic databases of
known criminals and unsolved crimes. The only difference
between DNA analysis and fingerprint [*1964] databases is
the unparalleled accuracy DNA provides. DNA is another
metric of identification used to connect the arrestee with his
or her public persona, as reflected in records of his or her
actions that are available to the police. Second, officers must
ensure that the custody of an arrestee does not create
35

inordinate "risks for facility staff, for the existing detainee

population, and for a new detainee." Florence v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U.S. ___ ,
___. DNA allows officers to know the type of person being
detained. Third, "the Government has a substantial interest
in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are available for
trials." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 , 534. An arrestee may
be more inclined to flee if he thinks that continued contact
with the criminal justice system may expose another serious
offense. Fourth, an arrestee's past conduct is essential to
assessing the danger he poses to the public, which will
inform a court's bail determination. Knowing that the
defendant is wanted for a previous violent crime based on
DNA identification may be especially probative in this regard.
Finally, in the interests of justice, identifying an arrestee as
the perpetrator of some heinous crime may have the
salutary effect of freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned.

individual's
legitimate
privacy
expectations,
which
necessarily diminish when he is taken into police
custody. Bell, supra , at 557. Such searches thus differ from
the so-called special needs searches of,e.g., otherwise lawabiding motorists at checkpoints. See Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 . The reasonableness inquiry considers
two other circumstances in which particularized suspicion is
not categorically required: "diminished expectations of
privacy [and a] minimal intrusion." Illinois v. McArthur, 531
U.S. 326 , 330. An invasive surgery may raise privacy
concerns weighty enough for the search to require a warrant,
notwithstanding
the
arrestee's
diminished
privacy
expectations, but a buccal swab, which involves a brief and
minimal intrusion with "virtually no risk, trauma, or
pain," Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 771, does not
increase the indignity already attendant to normal incidents
of arrest.

(2) DNA identification is an important advance in the

techniques long used by law enforcement to serve legitimate
police concerns. Police routinely have used scientific
advancements as standard procedures for identifying
arrestees. Fingerprinting, perhaps the most direct historical
analogue to DNA technology, has, from its advent, been
viewed as a natural part of "the administrative steps incident
to arrest." County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 ,
58. However, DNA identification is far superior. The additional
intrusion upon the arrestee's privacy beyond that associated
with fingerprinting is not significant, and DNA identification is
markedly more accurate. It may not be as fast as
fingerprinting, but rapid fingerprint analysis is itself of recent
vintage, and the question of how long it takes to process
identifying information goes to the efficacy of the search for
its purpose of prompt identification, not the constitutionality
of the search. Rapid technical advances are also reducing
DNA processing times.

(2) The processing of respondent's DNA sample's CODIS loci

also did not intrude on his privacy in a way that would make
his DNA identification unconstitutional. Those loci came from
noncoding DNA parts that do not reveal an arrestee's genetic
traits and are unlikely to reveal any private medical
information. Even if they could provide such information,
they are not in fact tested for that end. Finally, the Act
provides statutory protections to guard against such
invasions of privacy.

(d) The government interest is not outweighed by respondent's

privacy interests.
(1) By comparison to the substantial government interest and
the unique effectiveness of DNA identification, the intrusion
of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample is minimal.
Reasonableness must be considered in the context of an

(Another version/digest; with discussion and analysis)

Does the Fourth Amendment allow the States to collect and
analyze DNA from people arrested and charged with serious
crimes?
Maryland police arrested Alonzo Jay King, Jr., in 2009 for firstand second-degree assault. Under Marylands DNA
Collection Act (the DNA Act), the police were authorized
to collect Kings DNA. When the DNA data was added to
the states database, it matched a prior set of DNA data
collected in a separate 2003 rape case that remained
unsolved. Using the 2009 DNA match as evidence, a
Maryland trial court convicted King of the 2003 rape. The
states highest court reversed Kings conviction, finding
that the DNA evidence was improperly obtained during an
unreasonable search. The court deemed the search
unreasonable and thus unconstitutional under the Fourth
36

Amendment because Kings right to the expectation of

privacy was greater than Marylands interest in using his
DNA to identify him. Still, the court upheld the
constitutionality of the DNA Act overall. How the Supreme
Court decides this case will reflect its view on the correct
balance between the governments interest in solving
violent crimes using DNA evidence and an individuals
interest in retaining his Fourth Amendment right against
warrantless, suspicionless searches.
Issue
When state officials collect and analyze a DNA sample taken
from a person who has been arrested for, but not convicted of, a
criminal offense, is there a violation of the persons right against
unreasonable searches as guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment?
Marylands DNA Collection Act (the DNA Act) authorizes law
enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from a person who
is arrested, but not yet convicted, for violent crimes or
burglary. In 2009, Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested in Maryland
on first- and second-degree assault charges. The DNA Act
authorized collection of a DNA sample from King because assault
is a violent crime. On the day of Kings arrest, personnel at the
booking facility swabbed Kings mouth to collect his DNA sample
and sent it for processing. When Kings DNA record was
uploaded to the Maryland DNA database, it matched a DNA
sample collected in an unrelated, unsolved 2003 rape case. The
police had collected the 2003 DNA sample from the rape victim
who underwent a sexual assault forensic exam. After a police
detective presented the matching 2009 and 2003 DNA to
a grand jury, the grand jury indicted King for first-degree
rape. Later in 2009, the detective obtained a search warrant and
collected a second DNA sample from King that also matched the
2003 sample.
King sought to suppress the DNA evidence, arguing that his
arrest and indictment for rape were invalid as an unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. He claimed
that the DNA Act was unconstitutional. Alternatively, he claimed
that even if the court decided the DNA Act was constitutional,
the State failed to follow the DNA Acts procedures when it
collected his DNA because the State could not show that an
approved person completed the collection or that it provided
King with the required notice of the Acts expungement

provisions. The Circuit Court for Wicomico County denied

Kings motion to suppress, upholding the constitutionality of the
DNA Act and finding that King failed to show evidence that the
warrant for his second DNA sample was invalid or improperly
obtained. King was convicted of rape and sentenced to life in
prison.
Before King could proceed with an appeal, the states highest
court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, issued a writ of
certiorari to consider whether the trial court improperly denied
Kings motion to suppress the DNA evidence. It determined that
the DNA Act, as it applied to King in this case, was
unconstitutional because when the court weighed Kings right to
theexpectation of privacy against warrantless, suspicionless
searches against the States interest in using his DNA to identify
him for purposes of his 2009 arrest on assault charges, Kings
privacy right was greater. According to the court, the State
undertook two separate biological searches, first when it
swabbed the inside of Kings mouth and second when it analyzed
the DNA sample obtained from the swab. The court reversed the
trial courts decision and determined that the improperlyacquired DNA evidence should have been suppressed at trial. It
also decided that the DNA Act was constitutional because even
though it was inappropriately applied to King, there were
conceivable circumstances in which a state would need to use
DNA samples to identify but not investigate an individual
arrested for a violent crime.
The Supreme Court granted Marylands petition for a writ of
certiorari to determine whether the Fourth Amendment permits
states to obtain and analyze the DNA of people arrested for but
not yet convicted of violent crimes.
Discussion
Maryland advocates for the Supreme Court to reverse the Court
of Appeals of Maryland and affirm its decision that the DNA Act
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Maryland asserts that
taking Kings DNA sample was a reasonable search because
important governmental interests outweighed the minimal
intrusiveness of DNA collection. In opposition, King argues that
the lower court correctly found that Maryland performed an
unreasonable search, in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
when it collected and analyzed his DNA after his 2009 arrest for
assault. King argues that the search was invalid because
Maryland used his DNA not to link him to the crime for which he
was arrested, but instead to investigate his connection to the
37

2003 rape, even though it had no reason to suspect his

involvement.

successful investigations and convictions, the evidence boosts

public confidence in law enforcement.

DNA Evidence to Solve Crimes

In support of Maryland, California and other states note that
allowing DNA collection and analysis will resolve unsolved crimes
and improve public safety. The States reason that one challenge
in law enforcement is solving crimes committed by unknown
offenders. Because statistics show that arrestees are more
likely than the general public to be repeat criminal offenders,
the States note that collecting DNA samples from arrestees will
give police officers a reliable method for connecting the
identities of new arrestees with evidence in unsolved
crimes. Further, DNA Saves, a group that educates and
fundraises in support of laws authorizing forensic DNA sampling,
notes that a DNA database offers an investigation tool by which
the police may not only solve crimes but also identify and
remove violent offenders from the general population, thereby
preventing future crimes by repeat offenders.
In opposition, King notes that when Maryland reasons that DNA
collection is beneficial because arrestees are more likely than
the general public to have committed other crimes, there is a
risk of extending such reasoning too far. King hypothesizes that
the same could be said for other subgroups, for instance young
men, residents of particular neighborhoods, or individuals from
particular socioeconomic or educational backgroundsas long as
it could be shown that those groups have a higher incidence of
criminal activity. King concedes that while it may be tempting to
allow DNA testing in his case because the DNA match helped
solve a horrible rape, the Court should not permit Maryland to
enforce
its
DNA
Act
for
suspicionless,
warrantless
searches. Enforcing the DNA Act, argues King, enables intrusion
into individual privacy.

In response, King argues that Marylands DNA Act gives

considerable discretion to an arresting officer, giving him the
option whether to charge defendants with offenses that qualify
for DNA collection. King notes, for instance, that had he been
charged with only second-degree and not first-degree assault, he
would not have been subject to DNA testing under the DNA
Act.Finding for Maryland, King contends, would give to law
enforcement too much power to choose which people to search
for involvement in unrelated crimes.

DNA Evidence to Enhance Law Enforcement

The Maryland Chiefs of Police Association argues that police
officers with access to DNA data will more accurately manage
detainees in their custody. The Maryland Chiefs note that when
an officer knows that an individual is suspected of committing
another offense, the officer may more knowledgably determine
whether to order detention pending trial or to segregate the
suspect from other prisoners. Further, the Maryland Chiefs
contend that because DNA evidence helps police pursue

Analysis
The Supreme Court will determine whether the Fourth
Amendment allows the States to collect and analyze DNA from
people arrested and charged with serious crimes, but not yet
convicted. The parties disagree about how the court must
determine the constitutionality of a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Maryland argues that the court must evaluate a
search by balancing an individual's privacy interests with the
government's interests. King argues that the court must begin
with the presumption that warrantless, suspicionless searches
violate the Fourth Amendment.
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Maryland asserts argues that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
unreasonable searches, but that its practice of collecting and
analyzing DNA is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The
State argues that a search is reasonable if the government's
interest in conducting the search outweighs the individual's
privacy interests. The court must determine a search's
reasonableness by balancing how much it intrudes on an
individual's privacy interest with how much it advances
government
interests. Beyond
this
balancing,
Maryland
contends that the Fourth Amendment does not require the
government to suspect an arrestee of having committed a
particular crime. The State claims that a search may be
reasonable without a warrant orprobable cause. Moreover,
Maryland contends that the Constitution does not require
individualized suspicion before the government can conduct a
search. The State argues that a search may still be reasonable
without these requirements if the individual is still safeguarded
by other protections. Indeed, the State contends that the court
recognized this principle in Samson v. California, permitting the
38

warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee because the

State's interest in reducing recidivism outweighed the parolee's
lowered privacy expectations.Here, Maryland claims that the
balancing test permits the searches authorized by the DNA
Collection Act, and that King had reduced privacy expectations
because of his status as an arrestee.
King argues that Maryland's Fourth Amendment analysis is
backwards. King asserts that the court must presume that the
state cannot conduct a search without individualized
suspicion.Only if the government justifies an exception to the
rule,
King
argues,
should
the
court
engage
in
balancing. Otherwise, King claims, the Fourth Amendment would
be reduced to an after-the-fact protection for individual
liberties. Here, King asserts that Maryland conducted a search
by obtaining and analyzing a cheek swab from King. The search
triggered Fourth Amendment protection, King argues, and the
search was presumptively unreasonable because Maryland did
not have a warrant and or probable cause. King contends that
the state had no reason to believe that its DNA analysis would
link him to the sexual assault for which he was later
charged. Thus, he claims that Maryland also failed to meet the
Court's lower standard of reasonable suspicion.
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
Maryland argues that its practice of collecting and analyzing DNA
minimally intrudes on arrestees' privacy interests. The State
claims that a cheek swab is a minor physical intrusion, and more
importantly, that once an individual is arrested and in the state's
custody, he has reduced privacy expectations. Thus, Maryland
asserts that its searches under the DNA Collection Act are valid
because they only reveal an arrestee's identity as expressed by
a
short
and
essentially
random
sequence
of
numbers. Moreover, the State contends that arrest eliminates a
person's expectation of remaining anonymous. The State claims
that the court has denied the right to anonymity for people
stopped by police on the street and subpoenaed by a grand jury,
so the right cannot exist for someone lawfully arrested for
committing a serious crime.
King responds that conviction, not arrest, transforms a person's
expectation of privacy. King argues that in Samson, the court
recognized an exception to the individualized suspicion
requirement because parolees have a reduced expectation of
privacy. King asserts that the reduced expectation of privacy

applies to those who have been imprisoned or released but still

under state supervision. To the contrary, King notes that he was
merely arrested. He concedes that court has permitted various
searches incident to arrest, but that this doctrine has never
justified suspicionless searches for unrelated offenses.
BALANCING PRIVACY AND GOVERNMENT INTERESTS
Maryland argues that its searches under the DNA Collection Act
are justified by important government interests. The State claims
that DNA analysis advances the state's interest in accurately
identifying the individuals in its custody. To that end, the State
asserts that DNA analysis is simply the gold standard of forensic
identification. Maryland also claims that DNA analysis enables it
to solve crimes more efficiently. The State argues that DNA
analysis saves the state resources by narrowing the field of
suspects, and allows the state to identify suspects more
accurately and reduce the risk of letting a criminal go
free. Moreover, the state contends that expanding DNA
collection to arrestees is a reasonable choice because a small
fraction of the population is responsible for an overwhelming
majority of crimes. Thus, Maryland argues that collecting DNA
from arrestees is reasonable because they are more likely to be
repeat offenders. Lastly, the State points to the facts of this
case to justify its DNA collection practice. The State claims that
without the DNA Collection Act, which authorized the cheek swab
from King, the police would not have connected King to the
sexual assault for which he was ultimately charged.
King maintains that the court should not determine
reasonableness by balancing interests. Still, King argues that
his privacy interests outweigh the governments interests. King
asserts intrusions into the body are at least as significant as
other realms protected by the Fourth Amendment, including the
home. Moreover, King contends that DNA analysis implicates
serious privacy concerns. He argues that DNA analysis can lead
to information about a persons medical history and even their
age, ethnicity, intelligence, and propensity for violence and
addiction. King acknowledges the states interest in solving and
preventing crimes, but argues that the government may only
collect and analyze DNA of arrestees under two circumstances:
(i) once they are convicted; and (ii) where the collection would
aid law enforcement in connecting the arrestee to the crime of
arrest. King argues that his case falls outside these two
categories and that the state has not otherwise shown how DNA
collection aids its interest in solving crimes.
39

Conclusion
In this case, the Court will determine whether states may collect
and analyze DNA from arrestees after they have been charged
with a serious crime, but not yet convicted. The Courts decision
will turn on its interpretation of the Fourth Amendments
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. While
Marylands DNA Collection Act previously survived Fourth
Amendment scrutiny when the law authorized DNA collection of
convicted felons, the Court now evaluates the practice when
applied to arrestees. This case has important consequences for
understanding the nature of Fourth Amendment protection, and
the relationship between individual liberties and the use of
modern technology to aid law enforcement.

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY
11-1425 April 17, 2013
J. Sotomayor
Doctrine:
A law enforcement officer must generally obtain a warrant from
a neutral magistrate before ordering a blood test of a person
detained for a suspected DUI, as the mere dissipation of bloodalcohol levels over time does not constitute exigent
circumstances under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
Respondent McNeely was stopped by a Missouri police officer for
speeding and crossing the centerline. After declining to take a
breath test to measure his blood alcohol concentration (BAC), he
was arrested and taken to a nearby hospital for blood testing.
The officer never attempted to secure a search warrant. McNeely
refused to consent to the blood test, but the officer directed a
lab technician to take a sample. McNeely's BAC tested well
above the legal limit, and he was charged with driving while
intoxicated (DWI). He moved to suppress the blood test result,
arguing that taking his blood without a warrant violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court agreed, concluding that
the exigency exception to the warrant requirement did not apply
because, apart from the fact that McNeely's blood alcohol was
dissipating, no circumstances suggested that the officer faced an
emergency. The State Supreme Court affirmed, relying on
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , in which this Court upheld
a DWI suspect's warrantless blood test where the officer "might
reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an

emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant,

under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of
evidence,'" id., at 770. This case, the state court found, involved
a routine DWI investigation where no factors other than the
natural dissipation of blood alcohol suggested that there was an
emergency, and, thus, the nonconsensual warrantless test
violated McNeely's right to be free from unreasonable searches
of his person.
Held:
The judgment is affirmed. In drunk-driving investigations, the
natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not
constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify
conducting a blood test without a warrant.
(a) The principle that a warrantless search of the person is
reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception, see, e.g.,
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 224, applies here,
where the search involved a compelled physical intrusion
beneath McNeely's skin and into his veins to obtain a blood
sample to use as evidence in a criminal investigation. One
recognized exception "applies when '"the exigencies of the
situation" make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that
[a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable.'" Kentucky v.
King, 563 U.S. ___, ___. This Court looks to the totality of
circumstances in determining whether an exigency exits. See
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 , 406. Applying this
approach in Schmerber, the Court found a warrantless blood test
reasonable after considering all of the facts and circumstances of
that case and carefully basing its holding on those specific facts,
including that alcohol levels decline after drinking stops and that
testing was delayed while officers transported the injured
suspect to the hospital and investigated the accident scene.
(b) The State nonetheless seeks a per se rule, contending that
exigent circumstances necessarily exist when an officer has
probable cause to believe a person has been driving under the
influence of alcohol because BAC evidence is inherently
evanescent. Though a person's blood alcohol level declines until
the alcohol is eliminated, it does not follow that the Court should
depart from careful case-by-case assessment of exigency. When
officers in drunk-driving investigations can reasonably obtain a
warrant before having a blood sample drawn without
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth
Amendment mandates that they do so. See McDonald v. United
40

States, 335 U.S. 451, 456. Circumstances may make obtaining a

warrant impractical such that the alcohol's dissipation will
support an exigency, but that is a reason to decide each case on
its facts, as in Schmerber, not to accept the "considerable
overgeneralization" that a per se rule would reflect, Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 393. Blood testing is different in critical
respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases. Unlike a
situation where, e.g., a suspect has control over easily
disposable evidence, see Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 , 296,
BAC evidence naturally dissipates in a gradual and relatively
predictable manner. Moreover, because an officer must typically
take a DWI suspect to a medical facility and obtain a trained
medical professional's assistance before having a blood test
conducted, some delay between the time of the arrest or
accident and time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether
a warrant is obtained. The State's rule also fails to account for
advances in the 47 years since Schmerber was decided that
allow for the more expeditious processing of warrant
applications, particularly in contexts like drunk-driving
investigations where the evidence supporting probable cause is
simple. The natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may
support an exigency finding in a specific case, as it did in
Schmerber, but it does not do so categorically.
(c) Because the State sought a per se rule here, it did not argue
that there were exigent circumstances in this particular case.
The arguments and the record thus do not provide the Court with
an adequate framework for a detailed discussion of all the
relevant factors that can be taken into account in determining
the reasonableness of acting without a warrant. It suffices to say
that the metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream and the
ensuing loss of evidence are among the factors that must be
considered in deciding whether a warrant is required.
Other arguments advanced by the State and amici in support of
a per se rule are unpersuasive. Their concern that a case-bycase approach to exigency will not provide adequate guidance to
law enforcement officers may make the desire for a bright-line
rule understandable, but the Fourth Amendment will not tolerate
adoption of an overly broad categorical approach in this context.
A fact-intensive, totality of the circumstances, approach is hardly
unique within this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-125. They also
contend that the privacy interest implicated here is minimal. But
motorists' diminished expectation of privacy does not diminish

their privacy interest in preventing a government agent from

piercing their skin. And though a blood test conducted in a
medical setting by trained personnel is less intrusive than other
bodily invasions, this Court has never retreated from its
recognition that any compelled intrusion into the human body
implicates
significant,
constitutionally
protected
privacy
interests. Finally, the government's general interest in combating
drunk driving does not justify departing from the warrant
requirement without showing exigent circumstances that make
securing a warrant impractical in a particular case.

People vs. Racho

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. JACK RACHO y
RAQUERO, Appellant
G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010
J. Nachura
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted
through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu.
The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The
team members posted themselves along the national highway in
Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a
Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the
bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he
transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a
tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police
station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled
out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped
there from which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant
to the police station for investigation and the confiscated
specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test
and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated
sachet
yielded
positive
results
for
methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering;
and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing,
dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, appellant pleaded
"Not Guilty" to both charges. On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a
Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5,
Article II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation
41

of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed

the RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing
for the first time he legality of his arrest and the validity of the
subsequent warrantless search.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity
of his arrest.
Held:
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable
information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest.
The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some
overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. There is no
cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an
offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted
from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant
was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude
that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it
not for the information given by the informant, appellant would
not have been apprehended and no search would have been
made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have
been confiscated.
Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that
would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As
testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the
arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on
May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only
the appellants physical description but also his name. Although
it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day
(May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the
following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals
Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho

ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

Chimel v. California
395 U.S. 752 (1969)
J. Stewart
Late in the afternoon of September 13, 1965, three police
officers arrived at the Santa Ana, California, home of the
petitioner with a warrant authorizing his arrest for the burglary of
a coin shop. The officers knocked on the door, identified
themselves to the petitioner's wife, and asked if they might
come inside. She ushered them into the house, where they
waited 10 or 15 minutes until the petitioner returned home from
work. When the petitioner entered the house, one of the officers
handed him the arrest warrant and asked for permission to "look
around." The petitioner objected, but was advised that, "on the
basis of the lawful arrest," the officers would nonetheless
conduct a search. No search warrant had been issued.
Accompanied by the petitioner's wife, the officers then looked
through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the
garage, and a small workshop. In some rooms, the search was
relatively cursory. In the master bedroom and sewing room,
however, the officers directed the petitioner's wife to open
drawers and "to physically move contents of the drawers from
side to side so that [they] might view any items that would have
come from [the] burglary." After completing the search, they
seized numerous items -- primarily coins, but also several
medals, tokens, and a few other objects. The entire search took
between 45 minutes and an hour.
Police officers, armed with an arrest warrant but not a search
warrant, were admitted to petitioner's home by his wife, where
they awaited petitioner's arrival. When he entered, he was
served with the warrant. Although he denied the officers' request
to "look around," they conducted a search of the entire house
"on the basis of the lawful arrest." At petitioner's trial on burglary
charges, items taken from his home were admitted over
objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. His
conviction was affirmed by the California appellate courts, which
held, despite their acceptance of petitioner's contention that the
arrest warrant was invalid, that, since the arresting officers had
procured the warrant "in good faith," and since, in any event,
they had had sufficient information to constitute probable cause
42

for the arrest, the arrest was lawful. The courts also held that the
search was justified as incident to a valid arrest.

justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for extending

the search beyond that area.

Issue:
Where a defendant is lawfully arrested inside his home, is a
warrantless search of the area beyond the defendants
immediate control constitutional?

Contemporaneous searches incident to a lawful arrest are

reasonable to seize weapons as well as prevent the destruction
or concealment of evidence. Searches beyond the scope of these
justifications are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution.

Held:
Any search in an arrestees home beyond arrestees person and
the area within his immediate control is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Assuming the arrest was
valid, the warrantless search of petitioner's house cannot be
constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest.
(a) An arresting officer may search the arrestee's person to
discover and remove weapons and to seize evidence to prevent
its concealment or destruction, and may search the area "within
the immediate control" of the person arrested, meaning the area
from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.
(b) For the routine search of rooms other than that in which an
arrest occurs, or for searching desk drawers or other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself, absent well recognized
exceptions, a search warrant is required.
(c) While the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest
depends upon "the facts and circumstances -- the total
atmosphere of the case," those facts and circumstances must be
viewed in the light of established Fourth Amendment principles,
and the only reasoned distinction is one between (1) a search of
the person arrested and the area within his reach, and (2) more
extensive searches.
(d) United Ste v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, and Harris v. United
States,331 U. S. 145, on their facts, and insofar as the principles
they stand for are inconsistent with this decision, are no longer
to be followed.
(e) The scope of the search here was unreasonable under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as it went beyond
petitioner's person and the area from within which he might
have obtained a weapon or something that could have been
used as evidence against him, and there was no constitutional

Dissent. Where there is probable cause to search and there is a

clear danger that the items which are the subject of the search
may be removed prior to police obtaining a search warrant, a
warrantless search of the area beyond an arrestees immediate
control is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution.
Concurrence. Given the variety of circumstances which police
encounter, this decision will create additional burdens on law
enforcement. Whether or not the warrant requirement will
protect individual rights in each and every local situation is
uncertain.

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE
C. TOLENTINO, petitioners, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City;
HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F.
APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS ALTUNA,
respondents
G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
J. Melencio-Herrera
Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia
Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had
been wanted as a high-ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took
place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day,
her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable
typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant to be
served at Aguilar-Roques leased residence allegedly an
underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the
43

documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the

CSG were filed by but the fiscals office merely charged her and
Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. AguilarRoque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that
it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void
because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently
describe with particularity the things subject of the search and
seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly
established for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicants witness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
HELD:
NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no
Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant
authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described
and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party
of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not
specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make
them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of
rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching
team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the
officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should
seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the
things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search
warrants of similar description were considered null and void for
being too general.

Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by

respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pao annulled and set
aside.

Anonymous
Letter-Complaint
against
Atty.
Miguel
Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
A.M. No. P-08-2519 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P
and
Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Clerk of Court Atty.
Henry P. Favorito of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Clerk
of Court Atty. Miguel Morales of Branch 17, Clerk of Court
Amie Grace Arreola of Branch 4, Administrative Officer III
William Calda of the Office of the Clerk of Court and
Stenographer Isabel Siwa of Branch 16, all of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila. A.M. No. P-08-2520
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P)
November 19, 2008
J. Austria Martinez
In Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Atty. Miguel Morales,
Clerk of Court, MeTCof Manila 19 November 2008 AustriaMartinez, J.Note: This is a consolidation of two administrative
cases, but I believe it is only the first one(which deals with
privacy) that is relevant for our purposes, and so it is the only
one Iveincluded in this digest.FACTS: The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) received an unsigned, undated letter of
complaint regarding Atty. Miguel Morales of the Office of the
Clerk of Court (OCC). Theletter alleged that Atty. Morales was
consuming his work hours filing and attending topersonal cases,
and was using office supplies, equipment and utilities. Deputy
Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben Dela Cruz conducted a spot
investigationand gained access to Morales personal computer.
Pleadings to two of Atty. Moralespersonal cases were found
among the computer files. The computer was seized andtaken to
the custody of the OCA. Morales filed a motion for the release
of his computer. The Court granted his motion butordered that
the files be retrieved first. Morales filed a letter-complaint
addressed to then CJ Davide against DCA Dela Cruz for alleged
conspiracy and culpable violation of the Consti. Morales asserted
that the raidconducted by DCA Dela Cruz without search and
seizure orders violated his right toprivacy and the articles seized
should therefore be considered inadmissible.
44

Issue:
Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales personal computer
admissible in the administrative case against him? No.
Held:
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. Article III Section 2 of
the Constitution enshrines the inviolable right of the people to be
secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Additionally, Article III Section 3(2) bars
the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.
Any violation of this right renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
One of the exceptions to the rule is consented warrantless
search. DCA Dela Cruz claims that they were able to obtain the
pleadings with Atty. Morales consent.
However, the Court finds his assertion insufficient to make the
present case fall under the exception. Consent to a search must
be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion. It must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.
To constitute a valid consent, it must be shown that:
(1) The right exists,
(2) That the persons involved had the knowledge, either actual
or constructive, of the existence of the right, and
(3) That the person had actual intention to relinquish the right.
In this case, it was not shown that Atty. Morales had an actual
intention to relinquish his right. He may have agreed to opening
his computer and printing the files during the spot investigation,
but he immediately filed an administrative case against the DCA
and his team, specifically invoking his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Isabel Siwa, Court Stenographer of
Branch 16, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is FINED in the
amount of P30,000.00 to be deducted from the money value of
her leave credits which was set aside per Resolution dated
October 12, 2005 in A.M No. 12096-Ret. entitled Application for
Retirement Benefits under Section 13-A of R.A. No. 8291 of Ms.
Isabel A. Siwa, Court Stenographer II, MeTC, Manila, Branch 16.

Atty. Henry P. Favorito, Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of

Court is REPRIMANDED for his failure to supervise the lending
and rediscounting activites of Siwa which took place in the
court's premises. The extortion charges against him are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The charges against Atty. Miguel Morales, former Branch Clerk of
Court, Branch 17, are DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Deputy Court Administrator Reuben de la Cruz is advised to be
more circumspect in the performance of his duties.
The charges against William Calda, Administrative Officer of the
Office of the Clerk of Court, and Amie Grace Arreola, formerly
Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 4 now Clerk of Court of Branch
30, both of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, are DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to conduct an
audit investigation on Isabel Siwa's transcription of stenographic
notes in view of the finding of Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C.
Gomez-Estoesta in her Investigation Report dated September 1,
2006 in A.M. No. P-08-2519 and A.M. P-08-2520 (formerly A.M.
OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P and A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P) that Siwa
has not submitted a complete transcription of stenographic
notes in several cases assigned to her. Said matter shall be
treated as a separate case, to be given a new docket number
and assigned to a new ponente for final resolution.

Polo vs. David

Briccio Ricky A. Pollo v. Karina Constantino-David
G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011
J. Villarama, Jr.
Nature of case:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a
government employee who was then charged administratively
and was eventually dismissed from the service. The employees
personal files stored in the computer were used by the
government employer as evidence of his misconduct.
A search by a government employer of an employees office is
justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct.
45

Pursuant to a letter-complaint anonymously sent by a concerned

government employee about an employee of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) who has been helping accused government
employees with a pending case in the CSC, Chairperson David of
the CSC issued a memo directing a team to conduct an
investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in the
computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal
divisions."
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioners
personal files, Chairperson David observed that the draft
pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in
the CSC and other tribunals obtained from the computer
assigned to Petitioner Briccio Pollo invariably raises the
presumption that he was the one responsible or had a hand in
their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was
within his direct control and disposition.
Petitioner Pollo denied that he is the person referred to in the
anonymous letter-complaint because he is not a lawyer and
neither is he "lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He
pointed out that though government property, the temporary
use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum
of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all
attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes.
In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his
computer without his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence,
being "fruits of a poisonous tree."
The CSC issued a Resolution finding Pollo guilty of Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. In its Resolution, the
CSC relied on American jurisprudence, citing the leading case of
OConnor v. Ortega as authority for the view that government
agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law
enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the
governmental workplace without meeting the "probable cause"
or warrant requirement for search and seizure, and the ruling in
United States v. Mark L. Simons which declared that the federal
agencys computer use policy foreclosed any inference of
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its employees.
Though the Court therein recognized that such policy did not, at
the same time, erode the respondents legitimate expectation of
privacy in the office in which the computer was installed, still,
the warrantless search of the employees office was upheld as

valid because a government employer is entitled to conduct a

warrantless search pursuant to an investigation of work-related
misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its inception
and scope.
HELD:
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to
consider include (1) the employees relationship to the item
seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the
employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee
took actions to maintain his privacy in the item. These factors
are relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of the
reasonableness inquiry, and the two questions together must be
considered together.
The Court answers the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to
prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
either in his office or government-issued computer which
contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had
a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone,
or that his office was always locked and not open to other
employees or visitors. Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in
the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective
expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is
negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office
computers, as in Simons.
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy
in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human
means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done
to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes.
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the
search conducted on petitioners computer, the Court answers in
the affirmative.
A search by a government employer of an employees office is
justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct.
46

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners

computer was justified at its inception and scope.
Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy
must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of
communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article
III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the
recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the
privacy of employees in the government workplace under the
aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his
contention that OConnor and Simons are not relevant because
the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child
pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioners
computer was justified there being reasonable ground for
suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating
evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC
as government employer of such misconduct subject of the
anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the
exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative
searches defined in OConnor.
No error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA
in affirming the CSCs ruling that petitioner is guilty of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of
these offenses justified the imposition on petitioner of the
ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties,
pursuant to existing rules and regulations. WHEREFORE, the
petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

RILEY v. CALIFORNIA
Certiorari to the court of appeal of California, fourth
appellate district, division one
No. 13132
Argued April 29, 2014Decided June 25, 2014
C.J., Roberts
In No. 13132, petitioner Riley was stopped for a traffic violation,
which eventually led to his arrest on weapons charges. An officer
searching Riley incident to the arrest seized a cell phone from
Rileys pants pocket. The officer accessed information on the
phone and noticed the repeated use of a term associated with a
street gang. At the police station two hours later, a detective

specializing in gangs further examined the phones digital

contents. Based in part on photographs and videos that the
detective found, the State charged Riley in connection with a
shooting that had occurred a few weeks earlier and sought an
enhanced sentence based on Rileys gang membership. Riley
moved to suppress all evidence that the police had obtained
from his cell phone. The trial court denied the motion, and Riley
was convicted. The California Court of Appeal affirmed.
In No. 13212, respondent Wurie was arrested after police
observed him participate in an apparent drug sale. At the police
station, the officers seized a cell phone from Wuries person and
noticed that the phone was receiving multiple calls from a source
identified as my house on its external screen. The officers
opened the phone, accessed its call log, determined the number
associated with the my house label, and traced that number to
what they suspected was Wuries apartment. They secured a
search warrant and found drugs, a firearm and ammunition, and
cash in the ensuing search. Wurie was then charged with drug
and firearm offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence
obtained from the search of the apartment. The District Court
denied the motion, and Wurie was convicted. The First Circuit
reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and vacated the
relevant convictions.
Held:
The police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has
been arrested. Pp. 528.
(a) A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within a
specific exception to the Fourth Amendments warrant
requirement. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___. The wellestablished exception at issue here applies when a warrantless
search is conducted incident to a lawful arrest.
Three related precedents govern the extent to which officers
may search property found on or near an arrestee. Chimel v.
California, 395 U. S. 752 , requires that a search incident to
arrest be limited to the area within the arrestees immediate
control, where it is justified by the interests in officer safety and
in preventing evidence destruction. In United States v. Robinson,
414 U. S. 218 , the Court applied the Chimel analysis to a search
of a cigarette pack found on the arrestees person. It held that
the risks identified in Chimel are present in all custodial arrests,
47

414 U. S., at 235, even when there is no specific concern about

the loss of evidence or the threat to officers in a particular case,
id., at 236. The trilogy concludes with Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S.
332 , which permits searches of a car where the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment, or where it is reasonable to believe that evidence
of the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle, id., at 343.
(b) The Court declines to extend Robinsons categorical rule
to searches of data stored on cell phones. Absent more precise
guidance from the founding era, the Court generally determines
whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant
requirement by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individuals privacy and, on the other,
the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295 .
That balance of interests supported the search incident to arrest
exception in Robinson. But a search of digital information on a
cell phone does not further the government interests identified
in Chimel, and implicates substantially greater individual privacy
interests than a brief physical search.
(1) The digital data stored on cell phones does not present
either Chimel risk.
(i) Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be
used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate
the arrestees escape. Officers may examine the phones
physical aspects to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon,
but the data on the phone can endanger no one. To the extent
that a search of cell phone data might warn officers of an
impending danger, e.g., that the arrestees confederates are
headed to the scene, such a concern is better addressed through
consideration of case-specific exceptions to the warrant
requirement, such as exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Warden,
Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 299.
(ii) The United States and California raise concerns
about the destruction of evidence, arguing that, even if the cell
phone is physically secure, information on the cell phone
remains vulnerable to remote wiping and data encryption. As an
initial matter, those broad concerns are distinct from Chimels
focus on a defendant who responds to arrest by trying to conceal
or destroy evidence within his reach. The briefing also gives little
indication that either problem is prevalent or that the

opportunity to perform a search incident to arrest would be an

effective solution. And, at least as to remote wiping, law
enforcement currently has some technologies of its own for
combatting the loss of evidence. Finally, law enforcements
remaining concerns in a particular case might be addressed by
responding in a targeted manner to urgent threats of remote
wiping, see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. ___, ___, or by taking
action to disable a phones locking mechanism in order to secure
the scene, see Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U. S. 326 333.
(2) A conclusion that inspecting the contents of an
arrestees pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on
privacy beyond the arrest itself may make sense as applied to
physical items, but more substantial privacy interests are at
stake when digital data is involved.
(i) Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a
qualitative sense from other objects that might be carried on an
arrestees person. Notably, modern cell phones have an
immense storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a
person was limited by physical realities and generally
constituted only a narrow intrusion on privacy. But cell phones
can store millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or
hundreds of videos. This has several interrelated privacy
consequences. First, a cell phone collects in one place many
distinct types of information that reveal much more in
combination than any isolated record. Second, the phones
capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far
more than previously possible. Third, data on the phone can date
back for years. In addition, an element of pervasiveness
characterizes cell phones but not physical records. A decade ago
officers might have occasionally stumbled across a highly
personal item such as a diary, but today many of the more than
90% of American adults who own cell phones keep on their
person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives..
(ii) The scope of the privacy interests at stake is further
complicated by the fact that the data viewed on many modern
cell phones may in fact be stored on a remote server. Thus, a
search may extend well beyond papers and effects in the
physical proximity of an arrestee, a concern that the United
States recognizes but cannot definitively foreclose.
(c) Fallback options offered by the United States and
California are flawed and contravene this Courts general
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preference to provide clear guidance to law enforcement through

categorical rules. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, n. 19.
One possible rule is to import the Gant standard from the vehicle
context and allow a warrantless search of an arrestees cell
phone whenever it is reasonable to believe that the phone
contains evidence of the crime of arrest. That proposal is not
appropriate in this context, and would prove no practical limit at
all when it comes to cell phone searches. Another possible rule is
to restrict the scope of a cell phone search to information
relevant to the crime, the arrestees identity, or officer safety.
That proposal would again impose few meaningful constraints on
officers. Finally, California suggests an analogue rule, under
which officers could search cell phone data if they could have
obtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart.
That proposal would allow law enforcement to search a broad
range of items contained on a phone even though people would
be unlikely to carry such a variety of information in physical
form, and would launch courts on a difficult line-drawing
expedition to determine which digital files are comparable to
physical records.
(d) It is true that this decision will have some impact on the
ability of law enforcement to combat crime. But the Courts
holding is not that the information on a cell phone is immune
from search; it is that a warrant is generally required before a
search. The warrant requirement is an important component of
the Courts Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and warrants may
be obtained with increasing efficiency. In addition, although the
search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones,
the continued availability of the exigent circumstances exception
may give law enforcement a justification for a warrantless search
in particular cases.
No. 13132, reversed and remanded; No. 13212, affirmed.

ARREST
People vs Yadao
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. DELA TORREYADAO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 162144-54 ; 13 November 2012
49

Abad, J.
FACTS:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the
Philippine National Polices Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat, then
headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed
11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2
Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told
the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out
between the police and those who were slain. After investigation,
the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all
the police officers involved. On review, however, the Office of the
Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder
against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan.
On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the
provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause to
hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the
principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private
complainants.
The case was reopened in March 27, 2001 but the CA rendered a
Decision, granting Lacsons petition on the ground of double
jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to
try the case. It was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by Judge
Yadao. Yadao in 2003 junked the murder case against Lacson
and other police officials for lack of probable cause. On March 3,
2004 the prosecution filed the present special civil action of
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when
she dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of
probable cause

prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by

substantial evidence. But here, the prosecution conceded that
their own witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits the
inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office
of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for
Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause
based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the
inconsistent statements and related documents that the
witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records.
The SC held that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause against the respondents.
The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal
action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of
prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section
6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the
filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2)
issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days
from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable
cause. But the option to order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence is not mandatory. The courts first option
under the above is for it to immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause against the respondents.
In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for
the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
Court DISMISSED petition and AFFIRMED assailed RTC orders.

HELD:

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused

her discretion when she set the motions for determination of
probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of
arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue
its case. The general rule of course is that the judge is not
required, when determining probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only
needs to personally review the initial determination of the
50