The evolution of culture

From the early days of Darwinism analogies have been drawn between
biological evolution and the evolution of culture. Darwins contemporary
Herbert Spencer studied the evolution of civilisations, which he viewed as
progressing towards an ideal something like that of Victorian English society.
Lewis Morgans evolutionary theory of society included the three stages of
savagery, barbarism and civilisation. The historian Arnold Toynbee used
evolutionary ideas in identifying over thirty distinct civilisations some of which
were derived from others and some of which went extinct, and even Karl Marx
used evolutionary analogies in his analysis of society. Fifty years after Darwin,
the American psychologist James Baldwin said that natural selection was not
merely a law of biology but applied to all the sciences of life and mind, an early
version of Universal Darwinism (Baldwin 1909), and he coined the term social
heredity to describe the way individuals learn from society by imitation and
instruction (Baldwin 1896).
In some ways it is obvious that ideas and cultures evolve that is, changes
are gradual and build on what went before. Ideas spread from one place to
another and from one person to another (Sperber 1990). Inventions do not
spring out of nowhere but depend on previous inventions, and so on. However,
truly Darwinian explanations require more than just the idea of accumulating
changes over time. As we shall see, some theories of cultural evolution are little
more than this idea; others try to specify a mechanism but still come back to
biological evolution as the only driving force, while just a few involve the
concept of a second replicator as memetics does. This is what makes memetics
so distinctive and so powerful. The whole point of a memetic theory of cultural
evolution is to treat memes as replicators in their own right. This means that
memetic selection drives the evolution of ideas in the interests of replicating
memes, not the genes. This is the big difference that separates memetics from
most previous theories of cultural evolution.
Language provides a good example of cultural evolution. Darwin pointed
out the parallel between species and different languages: We find in distinct
languages striking homologies due to community of descent, and analogies due
to a similar process of formation . . . A language, like a species, when extinct,
never . . . reappears (Darwin 1859, p. 422). He also spoke of words competing
for survival. Darwin probably knew about the work of the British Judge Sir
William Jones who, in 1786, found remarkable similarities between Sanskrit,
Greek and Latin, and concluded that all three languages must have sprung from
a common source. But Darwin could not have seen many languages become
extinct in his own lifetime nor have known just how many are now threatened.
On a recent estimate, about 80 per cent of North American Indian languages are
spoken largely by adults only, and are therefore likely to become extinct when
those adults die. Similarly, about 90 per cent of Australian languages and
perhaps 50 per cent of languages worldwide are doomed (Pinker 1994).
Nowadays, comparative linguists analyse the minute details of similarities
and differences. They can often trace words back through many types of change
such as the dropping of syllables and shifts in pronunciation. Thus, the
evolutionary history of various languages can be accurately traced. Family trees
of languages have been constructed that are comparable with the genetic family
trees based on differences in DNA. Also, the migratory history of whole

peoples can be deduced from the languages that remain today. In Africa, for
example, the 1500 or more surviving languages fall into just give main language
groups, largely spoken by distinct racial group, and their distribution can reveal
which groups defeated others in the past. From a few remaining words it can be
deduced that the pygmies once had their own languages but were forced into
adopting those of neighbouring black farmers, and that Semitic languages, the
languages of the Bible and of Islam, came not from the Near East but from
Africa. The American physiologist and evolutionary biologist Jared Diamond
(1997) uses language analysis as just one part of his masterful history of
humanity over the past 13000 years. He explains how languages evolve along
with the people who speak them, but he does not consider the elements of
language as replicators in a new evolutionary process.
In his book The Language Instinct, Steven Pinker (1994) explicitly applies
evolutionary thinking to the development of languages, looking at heredity,
variation and the effects of isolation in allowing sets of variations to accumulate.
However, he does not use the idea of a selfish replicator to understand language
revolution and not does he explain why language evolved in the first place.
Perhaps the answer seems too obvious that it was biologically adaptive. But,
as we shall see, this is not necessarily the right answer, and memetics can
provide new twists to the argument.

Inventions as memes
Another example is the spread of inventions. Probably the most important of all
inventions in human history was that of farming. Although there are still many
arguments over the details, archaeologists generally agree that before about
10000 years ago all humans lived by hunting and gathering. Dating from around
that time, finds in the Middle East include grains that are larger, and sheep and
cattle that are smaller than their wild relatives and presumably domesticated.
Farming then spread in a great wave, reaching places like Ireland and
Scandinavia by about 4500 years ago. Just how many times food production
arose independently is not known for sure although probably at least five times
and possible many more (Diamond 1997).
Diamond has explored the whole vexed question of why some peoples in
some parts of the world ended up with all the goods from food production to
guns, germs and steel while some have ended up still hunting and foraging,
and others were completely wiped out. His answer has little to do with
geography and climate. Food production and skills that went along with it,
could spread easily across Europe with its East-West axis, but could not spread
easily in the Americas with their North-South axis, dramatic climate variations,
deserts and mountain ranges. Australia had no suitable domesticable animals,
after the first humans who arrived obliterated the tame creatures they found
there, and other islands, like New Guinea, are so mountainous and variable that
techniques suitable in one place are unsuitable a few miles away. With this kind
of analysis Diamond has explained how farming spread, bringing more complex
societies in its wake.
But why did farming spread at all? The answer might seem to be obvious
for example, that farming makes life easier or happier, or that it provides a
genetic advantage to the people who practise it.

In fact, it seems that farming did not make life easier, nor did it improve
nutrition, or reduce disease. The British science writer Colin Tudge (1995)
describes farming as the end of Eden. Rather than being easier, the life of
early farmers was utter misery. Early Egyptian skeletons tell a story of a terrible
life. Their toes and backs are deformed by the way people had to grind corn to
make bread; they dhow signs of rickets and of terrible abscesses in their jaws.
Probably few lived beyond the age of thirty. Stories in the Old Testament
describe the arduous work of farmers and, after all, Adam was thrown out of
Eden and told In the sweat of thy face shalt though eat bread. By contrast,
THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 27
modern hunter-gatherers have been estimated to spend only about fifteen hours a
week hunting and have plenty of time for leisure. This is despite the fact that
they have been pushed into marginal environments far poorer than those in
which our ancient ancestors probably lived. Why would people the world over
have given up an easier life in favour of a life of toil and drudgery?
Tudge assumes that agriculture arose because it was favoured by natural
selection (1995, p. 274) and therefore looks for a genetic advantage. He
suggests that because farming produces more food from a given area of land,
farmers will produce more children who will encroach on neighbouring
huntergatherers
lands and so destroy their way of life. For this reason, once farming
arrives no one has the luxury of saying I want to keep the old way of life.
However, we know from the skeletons of early farmers that they were
malnourished and sickly. So was there really a genetic advantage?
Memetics allows us to ask a different question. That is, why were farming
practices successful as memes? In other words, how did these particular memes
get themselves copied? The answers might include their benefits to human
happiness or to human genes, but are not confined to those possibilities. Memes
can spread for other reasons too, including less benign ones. They might spread
because they appear to provide advantages even when they do not, because they
are especially easily imitated by human brains, because they change the selective
environment to the detriment of competing memes, and so on. With a memes
eye view we ask not how inventions benefit human happiness or human genes,
but how they benefit themselves.
Turning to more modern technology, from the invention of the wheel to the
design of cars, there is plenty of evidence that innovations evolve in the sense
that they arise from what went before. In The Evolution of Technology, George
Basalla (1988) develops an evolutionary account of the way in which hammers,
steam engines, trucks and transistors have come about. Playing down the
importance of heroic inventors he emphasises the gradual process of change
through imitation and variation. For example, many features of wooden
buildings were reproduced in stone by the Greeks, the first iron bridge built in
the late 1770s was modelled on woodworking practices, and even the humble
plastic bucket often still shows signs of its origins in metal. Transistors were
only gradually miniaturised and radio signals very gradually transmitted further
and further.
Basalla questions the idea of technology making progress towards any grand
goal such as the advancement of humanity or the overall betterment of the
28 THE MEME MACHINE
human race (Basalla 1988). In true Darwinian fashion he sees technology as

developing only from the present situation with very limited specific goals and
suggests we discard the entire illusion of technological progress. But I would
add here another word of caution concerning the word progress. The word can
be used in at least two different ways. One implies progress towards some goal
or objective; the other implies only increasing design, increasing complexity, or
any kind of continuous development without a particular goal or end point built
in. Basalla, like Gould, throws out both kinds of progress. I would throw out
only the first. Todays technology is far more sophisticated and complex than
that of 10000 years ago, and that is progress of the second kind. But, there is no
progress towards some predetermined or ultimate goal. We did not have to go
from stone axes to fax machines we did have to go from stone axes to
something more specialised, more designed and more improbable. In Dennetts
terminology, there has been ever more exploration of the Design Space of
possible artefacts. In Dawkinss terminology, technology has been slowly
climbing its own Mount Improbable. This is technological progress, if not
progress towards anything in particular.
So why do we have fax machines? Why Coca Cola cans and wheelybins?
Why Windows 98 and felt-tip pens? I want answers to these specific questions.
Because we want them is not a sufficient answer. Because we need them is
clearly untrue. If we want to understand how the fantastic complexity of our
technological world came about it is not enough just to say that technology
evolves, without providing a mechanism. In later chapters I shall explain how a
memetic approach can help.
Scientific ideas also evolve and there have been many theories that attempt to
explain them. The influential philosopher Karl Popper, in one of his best known
contributions to the philosophy of science, suggested that scientific knowledge is
gained by the falsification of hypotheses, not by accumulating proof or evidence
for theories. Science can then be seen as a competitive struggle between rival
hypotheses in which only some survive.
Popper also applied Darwinian thinking in this three cosmic evolutionary
stages: World 1 is the world of physical objects such as trees, tables and human
bodies; World 2 is the world of subjective experiences including feelings,
emotions and consciousness; and World 3 is the world of ideas; of language and
stories, works of art and technology, mathematics and science. World 3 is
largely autonomous, even though created by us (Popper 1972), and its contents
have effects on the other worlds by a kind of downward causation. So, for
example, scientific theories may appear as World 1 objects (the scientist, the
THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 29
journal papers, the experimental apparatus, and the so on). But they are more
than just physical objects. The ideas themselves influence those objects. The
problems, hypotheses, theories and intellectual struggles work through World 2
and into World 1. Scientific ideas really do change the world: once theories
exist, they being to have a life of their own (Popper and Eccles 1977, p. 40).
How can an idea change the physical world? Popper was struggling here
with a difficult and important problem, related to the value of reductionism in
science and the viability of materialism as a world view. I do not think he
solved it. His three worlds contain very different kinds of material and he has to
propose a tricky kind of interactionism to link them. Interestingly, he touches on
the role of imitation but without realising how it might help. For example, in
explaining how artistic ideas can have real effects, he says a sculptor may, by

producing a new work, encourage other sculptors to copy it, or to produce

similar sculptures (Popper and Eccles 1977, p. 39). In his terms, the ideas in
the sculptors mind (World 3) affect the experiences of others (World 2) and
thus lead to new sculptures (World 1).
In memetic terms, all that happens whether in science or art is selective
imitation. The emotions, the intellectual struggles, the subjective experiences
these are all parts of the complex system that leads to some behaviours being
imitated and others not. And it is because imitation lets loose a second
replicator that ideas begin to have a life of their own. In this way, memetics
provides a mechanism for the evolution of scientific ideas that Poppers three
worlds cannot.
Although Popper did not use the idea of a replicator, his views directly gave
rise to the new field of evolutionary epistemology, which does. Evolutionary
epistemology began in 1974 with a critique of Popper by Campbell, and applies
Darwinian thinking to the evolution of knowledge (Hull 1988a, b; Plotkin 1982).
The American philosopher David Hull studies the way scientific ideas develop
over time in lineages rather as species do. He treats scientific ideas as the
replicators and scientists as the interactors (he prefers the term interactor to
Dawkinss vehicle because of its more active connotations). Plotkin considers
science as not only the product of a Darwin machine but a special form of
culture that is transformed in time by evolutionary processes (Plotkin 1993, pp.
69, 223). According to evolutionary epistemology, biological adaptations are
one form of knowledge, and science is another; both as produced by the
processes of blind variation and selective retention (Campbell 1975). This
approach is firmly based in Universal Darwinism and does not bring everything
back to genetic advantage.
Filozofia Nuantelor (selectiuni)
eseul a fost scris n 1969
(...) Pentru mine, filozofia nuanelor are un rost. mi plac oamenii care gndesc cu
rost. Nelinitile contiinei teoretice trebuie s duc undeva. i duc, pentru acela
care tie ce vrea. Vorbind despre Platon, Windelband l prezint n aceti termeni:
El nu este un cercettor linitit sau un gnditor fr nici un scop; el aparine acelora
care vor sa cunoasc adevrul, pentru a-1 realiza. [4] Acesta este smburele operei
vieii sale. tiina trebuie s fie conductoarea i stpna vieii: de aceea trebuie s
fie ptruns de cele mai nalte scopuri i valori ale vieii i s neleag lucrurile n
aceast perspectiv. Trebuie s existe o influen reciproc, adnc, ntre tiin i
via, aceasta gsind n Platon o impresionant ntrupare.
nuntrul acestei propoziii trebuie s reexaminm trecutul i prezentul i s
proiectm noi lumini asupra viitorului. Deja au nceput s se vad altfel oamenii i
popoarele, i face loc o nou viziune a ordinii universale, ntemeiat pe valoarea
mtii de om, pe speran i pe datele mbucurtoare ale tiinei i tehnicii. A
devenit posibil concentrarea de mari energii pe spaii mici, fapt care ne permite s
socotim false poziiile asa-ziilor mari i s privim cu ironie nfumurarea lor
neroad. Mai sntem nc obligai s asistm la ntlniri ale celor mari, fiindc
privilegiile lor mai funcioneaz, date fiind: avansul tehnic si tiinific, spaiul
stpnit, bogia, numrul i trecutul apropiat i ndeprtat, ncrcat cu valori ce se

dezgolesc ncet de coninut, de semnificaiile cu care ne-au obinuit aa-zisele

prioriti istorice. tiina, arta i filozofia snt chemate s anuleze orgoliile nocive pe
plan etico-social i politic i sterile pe plan spiritual. Am aflat c Heidegger a afirmat
c poporul romn va juca un rol important, aceast convingere a ilustrului gnditor
pornind din informaiile sale privind nceputurile promitoare, pe plan spiritual,
acestea fiind proiecii ale unei mari puteri interioare a neamului nostru, care se va
manifesta i n viitor, n mari creaii produse de geniul lui nestvilit, ntr-un climat de
perfect libertate.
Totui, nu putem beneficia de privilegiile rezultate din creaiile pur spirituale, fiindc
oamenii i popoarele au nc tendina de a se mica n jos, predominnd nc fora
brutal. Spaiul, numrul, mijloacele materiale i de lupt i trecutul fals interpretat
ne apas nc cu suprtoarea lui tutel. Pentru a pune capt acestei stri de
lucruri, pentru a nlocui prioritile istorice ngheate cu prioritile logice i
sufleteti, vii, pentru a nu mai aeza cu tristeea metafizic a cronicarului, bietul
om sub vremi, este necesar dezvoltarea nelimitat a tiinei i tehnicii romneti.
Creaiile spiritului trebuie sprijinite pe o mare for material, ntemeiat pe cele
mai noi cuceriri ale tiinei si tehnicii. O cultur spiritual strlucit, lipsit de o baz
material, ne umple de tristeea neputinei si face regimul tutelar mult mai
suprtor, dect dac ne-am gsi pe o treapt spiritual inferioar. La baza marilor
noastre creaii spirituale trebuie s stea revoluia tiinific i tehnic modern, n
aceast revoluie gsim rdcina nivelrii raporturilor dintre oameni i popoare. Ea
anuleaz privilegiile ntemeiate pe spaiu, numr i pe cantitatea i calitatea
mijloacelor de lupt. Un general englez a afirmat c tiina modern poate pune
capt ideii de mare putere - un popor, mic ca numr, putnd ine n ah, prin geniul
su tiinific si tehnic, un popor orict de numeros, ntins pe un spaiu imens, sau
chiar mai multe popoare. Aadar, marul istoric al popoarelor libere este asigurat de
nivelul constiinei lor teoretice i tehnice. Aceast concepie trebuie transformat
ntr-un articol de credin. Numai aa poate deveni eficace. Dac n art, pesimismul
face creaia mai subtil si mai mtsoas, n tiin, tehnic i mai ales n politic
constituie, cum spune un francez, o prostie absolut. Aceasta este motivarea
major a gndirii n nuane.
[5] Cnd este vorba de filosofia nuanelor, trebuie reinui termenii: raiune, gust,
micare, schimbare, actualitate heraclitic, limit i nuan. Se nelege c nu orice
nelinite interioar a omului duce la creaii spirituale. Un om necjit, pur i simplu,
nu are dect dou ieiri: scparea de necazuri sau jocul pe loc, otrvit de
amrciune. La nivel psihologic, raiunea se confund cu inteligena, acea facultate
a omului de a cunoate, de a se orienta n timp i spaiu, de a fabrica unelte si de a
pune ordine interioar i exterioar n viaa omului. Filosofic privit, ea este socotit
facultatea cunoaterii adevrurilor absolute, a principiilor invariabile. Dup Kant,
facultatea cunoaterii principiilor supreme care fac posibile unitatea contiinei i a
conceptelor, trecerea de la condiionat la necondiionat, n sperana cunoaterii
exhaustive a naturii fr posibilitatea de a-i depi vreodat graniele. Dar
curiozitatea i ndrzneala nu mprumut acestor principii caracterul constitutiv al
realitii, ci regulativ. Absolutul gndit n marginile experienei posibile, n sens
imanent kantian, este un paradox. Misticii cred c pot iei din impas deschiznd o
fereastr spre absolutul adevrat, prin extaz. n sensul celor spuse mai nainte
despre concepia imanentist a vieii i a lumii trebuie nelese cele trei ntrebri
fundamentale ale lui Kant: 1. Ce pot s tiu? 2. Ce trebuie s fac? 3. Ce pot spera?

Aceste ntrebri au ceva din splendoarea ngheat a coloanelor de marmur. Dar

micarea spiritului modern nuntrul lor devine clisoas sau chiar imposibil. Punem
fa n fa dou poziii: Cu ajutorul raiunii, omul discerne adevrul de eroare,
justul de injust, pune ordine n pasiuni, i ntinde afeciunile, pentru c le face
sociale i universale (Marcus Aurelius). S nu livrezi viaa ta ntreag somnului
raiunii tale (J.J. Rousseau). Am vzut ce prere are Planck despre tabla categoriilor
lui Kant. mi amintesc de prerea unui istoric (Huizinga) suprat pe Spengler, care-i
considera pe istorici arhivari, asupra sistemului de filosofie istoric al acestuia:
Privit de departe pare o catedral impuntoare. Curiozitatea te mpinge spre ea,
pentru a-i cunoate frumuseile dinuntru. Cnd intri, afli c este goal. Se pare c
marile sisteme au nceput s-si piard influena, fiindc alunec steril peste univers.
Natura este interpretat din ce n ce mai just i mai subtil. Omul i schimb treptat
poziia lui n univers, certitudinile topindu-se sub paii spiritului cuceritor si nnoitor.
Trecutul ncepe s fie vzut prin viitor. Trezirea din somnul dogmatic al sistemelor si
stilurilor impuntoare, folosind cunoscuta formul a lui Kant, scparea de privilegiile
invocate de posesorii lor snt posibile prin jocul nesfrit de nuane al gndirii
moderne. Am spus odat c psihologic este tot, afar de eternitate. i eternitatea
poate fi gndit psihologic. La data cnd am fcut afirmaia de mai sus am fost
influenat de splendida formul pesimist a lui Eminescu:
Timpul mort i-ntinde trupul i devine venicie.
n zona raional, nfurat ntr-un imens necunoscut, spaiul, timpul si numrul i
pierd treptat importana si devin simple simboluri orientatoare, expresii ale
contiinei teoretice, tehnice si practice. Dar, ceea ce pare mai tulburtor, n vastul
proces de nivelare a raporturilor dintre oameni i popoare, este misterul care
nfoar nceputul i sfritul lucrurilor. [6] Oamenii devin mai modeti cnd, odat
cu pierderea privilegiilor legate de puterea material, snt pui n faa neputinei de
a cunoate cauzele lucrurilor sau cauza lor unic. Fiindc acestea nu pot fi situate
nuntrul lor, ci n afara lor. Ce plcut ar fi dac ne-am cunoate pe noi nine i
toate fenomenele n desfurarea lor, ca derivnd unele din altele, cum a vzut
Thales! Ne-am juca cu treptele desvririi noastre. Apoi lanul cauzelor i
ntrebrilor scepticilor nu poate lua sfrit dect prin acceptarea principiului raiunii
suficiente, situat n mod necesar n misterul nceputului. Cnd se citete cu modestie
n cartea mare a naturii se realizeaz un progres real i acea linite interioar a lui
Spinoza rezultat din mpcarea cu noi nine, cu semenii, cu natura i cu absolutul,
care nseamn mister i necuprindere.
Gustul are rdcini n noi si n afara noastr. Iraional, subtil i suprtor, el merge
de la materialitatea fiziologic pn-n zona ideal a valorilor spirituale. Cineva, dintro generaie mai veche, vroia s scrie o logic a proverbelor n scopul de a descoperi
smburele nelepciunii i adevrului cuprinse n ele. Observm c proverbul nu
discuta despre gusturi nu are valoarea unei maxime absolute, din moment ce
exist gusturi, sigure, fine, bune, rele, stricate etc. Aadar, ne micm de la
Fiziologia gustului a lui Brillat-Savarin, pn la Templul gustului a lui Voltaire. n
Dicionarul naional al limbii franceze al lui Bescherelle ntlnim aspectele eseniale
ale gustului, att cele senzoriale ct i cele spirituale sau afective. Gustul se ntinde
i peste stilurile de epoc. El cuprinde toate treptele: bunul sim, tactul i geniul.
Dac ne gndim la lipsa de gust, atunci cuprinde i stupiditatea. Dar, pentru a nu

aluneca n absurd, capriciu sau bizar, pentru a obine, cum se spune, un gust
obiectiv, general, subiectul consumator de valori trebuie s se ntlneasc cu
obiectele purttoare de valori, altfel alunec n gol.
Fiziologic, gustul este unul din cele cinci simuri prin care se discern valorile i al
crui organ este limba. Figurat, gustul este facultatea de a simi, de a discerne
frumuseile i defectele care se gsesc n operele spiritului i n creaiile artei. Este
un discernmnt prompt, ca i cel al limbii i al cerului gurii i care previne, ca i
acesta, reflecia. Este ca i el, sensibil i voluptos n privina lucrului bun i simte
grea fa de cel ru sau urt. El este adesea, ca i el, nesigur i rtcit, netiind
dac ceea ce i se prezint trebuie s-i plac i avnd nevoie ca i el de timp pentru a
se forma... Aa se pot obine: sigurana, fineea si delicateea gustului
(Bescherelle). Autorul nostru, pentru a arta natura iraional, spontan a gustului,
citeaz aceast interesant formulare a lui Rousseau: Dintre toate nsuirile
naturale, gustul este acela care se simte cel mai bine i se explic cel mai puin. El
n-ar fi ceea ce este dac s-ar putea defini, fiindc el judec obiecte asupra crora
raiunea n-are priz i servete, dac pot spune astfel, de lunet raiunii.
Un lung exerciiu individual i colectiv nu numai c-l dezvolt, dar l prezerv de
depravare. Este vorba de planul etico-social i cel estetic. Dar se pune o problem
foarte delicat, de natur gnoseologic: relaia dintre gust i adevr. Dac pe plan
material, forma sub care se prezint obiectele consumate este legat indisolubil de
substana lor, n planul valorilor ideale acest lucru nu mai pare aa de sigur. [7]
Poate fi descoperit n acest mod armonia dintre form i coninut, dintre realitatea
obiectului contemplat i expresia lui, dar certitudinea astfel obinut nu se
confund cu evidena i cu adevrul (Goblot). Ea poate fi fructul credinei i deci
expresie personal a instinctelor, deprinderilor i nclinaiilor subiectului
cunosctor (acelai). Gustul poate identifica adevrul, dac admitem existena
intuiiei pure, adic dac sensibilitatea poate trece de sfera faptelor i permite
formularea ideilor, sau legilor, acea regularitate raional care face posibile
definiiile. Dac intuitiv putem nelege, nu putem defini obiectele contemplate, prin
predicatele lor negative sau pozitive, cu toate c i intuiia discerne calitile lor
specifice. Noi afirmm i negm, micndu-ne raional nuntrul legii contrariilor.
Deocamdat nu putem formula adevrul n sensul unei tiine imediate i pure
deci, spre neconsolarea noastr, trirea si inspiraia, orict de subtile ar fi, nu ne pot
scoate din anticamera cunoaterii. S-ar putea ca evoluia s permit gustului nu
numai intrarea iraional n sfera adevrului, a binelui i frumosului, ci i contopirea
lui cu raiunea, ale crei simboluri nesigure i arbitrare s se topeasc n nelegere,
ca depire a cunoaterii exterioare i indirecte. Ar fi o contopire a mediatului i
imediatului. Este mai plcut s trieti nuntrul lucrurilor dect n afara lor. Bucuria
tririi nuanelor, prezente n natur i n spirit, adic n lucruri i n expresia lor n
sisteme, stiluri i opere de art este mereu actual. Ocolurile proceselor dialectice
au aceast finalitate ideal: realizarea tririi ntregurilor i elementelor lor
componente, adic contopirea termenilor: certitudine, credin, eviden i adevr.
Fat ctre fa, i nu ca n ghicitur i oglind, cum spune Sf. Ap. Pavel i cum
termin Faust:
Tot ce-i vremelnic
E numai simbol.

Inaccesibilul
Fapt devine-n ocol.
Inefabil deplinul
Izbnd-i aci.
Etern-femininul
Ne-nal-n trii.
(trad. de Lucian Blaga)
Fiziologia, psihologia i filozofia gustului ne arat aceste fenomene, n ordinea
material i spiritual a lucrurilor, asupra crora raiunea nu are priz, cum spune
Rousseau: saturaia, dezgustul, devalorizarea i slbirea gustului consumatorului de
valori sau dispariia lui, pentru unele din ele sau pentru toate. Uneori se ntoarce
spatele pmntului iar n disperare, cu rdcini n neant, i cerului. Snt ciudenii
ale omului fizic i spiritual. n ceea ce privete arta, imaginaia creeaz, iar gustul
respinge, adopt sau rectific (Grtry, cit. de Lucien Arrat).
(...)
Petre uea