FACULTE DE DROIT ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE

Ecole ligeoise de Criminologie J. Constant

Dpartement de Science Politique

The Transformations
of the Welfare State
Is immigration to welfare states a burden?
Case study of anti-immigration sentiments in Belgium

Professeur : Dr. Geoffroy MATAGNE

Clara NOIRHOMME

Master en science politique

Anne acadmique 2013-2014

Table of contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 3
1.

Changes in immigration and changes in attitudes .................................................................... 3

2.

Why are people opposed to immigration? Theories ................................................................. 4

3.

Anti-immigration sentiments: trends .......................................................................................... 5

4.

Case study: Belgium ..................................................................................................................... 7

4.1.

The situation in Belgium .............................................................................................. 7

4.2.

(Sub)nationalism in Belgium ....................................................................................... 8

4.3.

Divergences between Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels ............................................. 9

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 12

Introduction
If immigration is not the first thing that comes in mind when thinking about the welfare state,
it does not mean either that it is at the margin of welfare states. Indeed, for most people, the
representation of the welfare state is linked with taxes and redistribution. To some extent, the
redistribution of income implies that money is given to the ones in need, including people that
dont work. Immigrants are often seen as lazy people coming to our countries to benefit
from this income redistribution system. Indeed, more and more these days, we can see a
discourse on immigration that incriminates it for being a burden for the welfare state.
However, the aim of this paper is not to try to establish if immigrants are a burden or not for
welfare states. If such considerations could be interesting in an economic perspective, it is not
the stance that we are taking, because we want this paper to be explicative and not normative.
What we will try to explain here is why such anti-immigration sentiments emerge. By
analysing the specific case of Belgium, the aim is indeed to show the indicators to which
these sentiments are linked. By looking at the case of Belgium, we will see that antiimmigration sentiments have different echoes in different parts of Belgium, and we will try to
understand why, using marginality theory and economic self-interest theory.
In order to do so, the paper will be divided in four parts. The first one will globally examine
the changes in immigration as well as the changes in attitudes. In the second one, we will look
at both theories previously mentioned in order to see how negative attitudes towards
immigration could be explained. In the third part, we will make an overview of the antiimmigration sentiments trends in Europe. Finally, the fourth part will consist in our case
study: Belgium. This part will be sub-divided in three: the situation in Belgium,
(sub)nationalism in Belgium and the divergences between Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels.

1.

Changes in immigration and changes in attitudes

Immigration to western have always existed, but it has definitely increased these last
decades1. Twenty years ago, net immigration to the European Union was six times less
important than it is today2. It is clear that Europe has become a continent of immigration.
But if this increase is quantitative, there is also a qualitative change as the purpose of
immigration has also changed. After the Second World War, European States needed
immigrants because they were a source of labour3. As economies were growing, the social

Meuleman, B. and Reeskens, T. (2008). The relation between integration policy and majority attitudes toward
immigration. An empirical test across European countries. Paper presented on the Dag van de Sociologie of
29th May 2008, Leuven, p. 1.
2
Ibid.
3
Hjerm, M. (2005). Integration into the Social Democratic Welfare State. Social Indicators Research, Vol. 70,
No. 2, p. 117.

rights arising from the welfare state also grew. However, after the crisis caused by the oil
shock of the 1970s, the European countries started to want to restrict immigration4.
Nowadays, immigration is more of an asylum type of immigration. This (not so) new type
of immigration is often considered to bring less than what it actually costs to the welfare state.
This first consideration shows how negative attitudes towards immigration have arisen.
Indeed, the indigenous populations negative view of immigrants is becoming more and more
common, driven by the idea that immigrants threaten certain prerogatives of the own social
group5.

2.

Why are people opposed to immigration? Theories

In order to explain public opposition to immigration, Fetzer chooses to articulate two theories,
namely economic self-interest and marginality. Before trying to apply these theories to our
Walloon case, we will examine both theories and look at Fetzers major findings.
The well-known economic self-interest theory argues that peoples political attitudes
primarily reflect their narrow, material self-interest6. According to authors like Harwood, the
lower classes would thus excessively oppose legal and illegal immigration because of
economic concerns. Indeed, the CIRES states that these social groups are the ones most
affected by immigration process, whether in its labour aspects (greater competition in the
search for work) or in everyday coexistence (housing and schools)7.
The alternative theory, i.e. marginality theory, maintains that marginalised groups tend to
express sympathy for other oppressed groups. Following Allport, lower classes would stand
for the other marginalised groups, since These people are victims exactly as [we are]
victim[s]. Better stand with them, not against them8.
The implications of these two theories on anti-immigrations attitudes are thus really different.
Indeed, following the first one, being marginalized would induce that people oppose
immigration because it is against their self-interest. However, according to the second one,
marginality would on the contrary reduce such sentiments.
At first sight, economic self-interest theory may seem more likely. But using public-opinion
surveys and polls conducted in France, Germany and the United States, Fetzer actually

Hjerm (2005), op. cit., p. 117.

Blumer, H. (1958). Race prejudice as a sense of group position. The Pacific Sociological Review, No. 1, in
Meuleman and Reeskens (2008), op. cit., p. 1.
6
Fetzer, J. S. (2000). Economic self-interest or cultural marginality? Anti-immigration sentiment and nativist
political movements in France, Germany and the USA. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1,
p. 7.
7
CIRES [Centro de Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social]. (1991). La Realidad Social en Espaa, 1990-91,
Bilbao: Fundacin BBV, Bilbao Bizcaia Kutxa and Caja de Madrid, p. 399, in Fetzer (2000), op. cit., p. 7.
8
Allport, G. (1979). The Nature of Prejudice, 25th anniversary edition, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, p. 155,
in Fetzer (2000), op. cit., p. 7.
5

demonstrates that economic self-interest theory is weak in explaining people comportments.

According to him, being unemployed, suffering from declining personal finances or working
as a manual labourer had statistically no major effect on anti-immigration sentiments in the
three countries analysed. However, marginality theory in its cultural forms if not economic
is generally confirmed by multivariate analysis9.
Nevertheless, on education, income and occupation, the data are not really favourable to
marginality theory, but Fetzer try to give explanations about those divergences, that are
sometimes weak. As an example, he explains that people with higher level of education tend
to have more positive views on immigration by the fact that a vast literature finds that higher
education socialises student into pro-egalitarian norms10. However, this does not account for
the fact people with lower level of education still have negative opinions towards immigrants.
If the economic form of marginality theory is thus not really confirmed, the cultural one still
have credence. Indeed, in the three countries, having origins in a foreign country decrease
anti-immigration attitudes, as well as belonging to religious minorities11.
To be able to apply these findings to our case, we choose to underline some characteristic of
the respondents that are particularly evocative, which are: employment status, level of
income, occupation, level of education and foreign origin. We will thus come back to these
variables in our analysis of Belgium.

3.

Anti-immigration sentiments: trends

When it comes to anti-immigration sentiments/attitudes, we can distinguish two categories of

sentiments12. The first ones are related to national identity, i.e. they are linked to the feeling
that immigrants are posing a threat to cultural identity. The second category involves
economic interest and includes the sentiments that are welfare state related, which means that
they are linked with the services the welfare state provides, like social security.
Graph 1 provides us with significant data over the welfare state related sentiments, namely the
ones we are most interested in, by showing that the presumed negative effect of immigrants
over the reduction of natives job perspectives (blue) and over social security (red) constitutes
a negative image of immigration in public opinion.

Fetzer (2000), op. cit., p. 5.

Ibid., p. 16.
11
Ibid., p. 13.
12
Ciftci, S. and Smith, D. L. (2008). The Determinants of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe: The Impact of
Existing Immigrant Populations and National Political Parties. Boston: Annual Meetings of the American
Political Science Association, p. 2.
10

Graph 1: Threat posing by immigrants on the balance of accounts of social security and on natives employment prospects.13

According to the EVS (European Values Study)14, globally, in the European Union, 56% of
respondents agree on the idea that immigrants are a burden to social security. In Belgium,
people are even more concerned about this same issue (59%), Belgium being the 10th country
in descending order15. However, it is in Malta (92%), Cyprus (73%), Germany (71%), UnitedKingdom (71%) and Ireland (70%) that respondents provide the most over settled opinion
regarding immigrants contribution to the maladjustment of social security16. Moreover, 40%
of Belgians also consider that immigrants are taking away natives job.
On another statement, i.e. whether legal immigrants contribute more in taxes than they
benefit from health and welfare services, the findings of the Eurobarometer 71 (2009)17 are
the following: 45% of the general sample disagree with the idea (compared to 28% who agree
with it). However, when we look at the trends country by country, Belgium appears to be one
of the countries where the figures are the highest, with 63% disagreeing with the statement18.
Figures are also high in France (64%) and Malta (70%), compared to 26% recorded in
Sweden, 28% in Portugal and 29% in both Poland and Romania19.

13

Marfouk, A. (2013). Prjugs et fausses ides sur limmigration et les immigrs, vecteurs de discrimination en
matire daccs lemploi. Working Paper de lIWEPS (Institut Wallon de lEvaluation, de la Prospective et de
la Statistique), No. 14, p. 6. Source of the graph: EVS (2008) and calculations of the author.
14
EVS (European Values Study) is an international survey that aims to examine changes in values, attitudes and
beliefs. This survey has been conducted over four period of time: 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001 and 20082010. One of the modules of the survey is very helpful because it is based on how immigration and immigrants
are perceived. In this paper, we will use data from the last wave of the survey (2008-2010), which is also the
period analysed by Marfouk (2013) in his paper.
15
Marfouk (2013), op.cit., p. 6.
16
Ibid.
17
European Commission (2010). Future of Europe. Eurobarometer 71 (2009), p. 61, available on:
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb713_future_europe.pdf
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.

4.

Case study: Belgium

4.1.

The situation in Belgium

As we have seen with the Eurobarometer and the EVS, many Belgians have anti-immigration
attitudes, often because they believe immigrants are taking advantage of Belgiums social
security. But what they forget is that the integration process cannot occur if the host society
is not open to immigration20. Indeed, for immigrants to socially and culturally integrate, they
first need to be economically integrated, namely to be able to access the labour market.
However, immigrants are confronted to discrimination when it comes to enter this market in
Belgium21.
In order to examine what creates these anti-immigration sentiments and why do they have
such a big echo, it is interesting to have a look at the differences between both main parts of
Belgium: Flanders and Wallonia. Indeed, the differences (mainly economic but also related to
identity) between both regions may help us to put some light on key factors that might
influence the populations view.
Belgian media often talks about the expansion of Flanders nationalist parties and the great
popularity of their leaders22. This vision of an ultra-nationalist Flanders is reinforced by the
conclusion of various studies, which underline the fact that extreme right-wing parties get
higher scores in Flanders than they do in Wallonia at Belgian elections23. When we look at
facts, the nationalistic parties are indeed overrepresented in Flanders compared to Wallonia.
Today in the Belgian Parliament, i.e. la Chambre des reprsentants, on 150 members, 11 are
coming from the Vlaams Belang24, far-right wing party that is known for its
anticulticulturalism agenda (even if the position over immigrants is less strong than it was
when the party was known as the Vlaams Blok a few years ago)25. However, Wallonian farright wing parties are not represented in the Parliament. These differences are even more
obvious in the Regions Parliaments. In the Flemish Parliament, the Vlaams Belang obtained
21 seats in 200926, i.e. 16.9% of the seats. As in the national Parliament, far-right wing parties
are not represented in the Walloon Parliament27.

20

Marfouk (2013), op. cit., p. 3.

Ibid.
22
Ibid., p. 8.
23
De Witte, H. and Scheepers, P. (1998). Origin, Evolution and Future of the Vlaams Blok and Its Electors in
Flanders. Pouvoirs, No. 87, in Marfouk (2013), op. cit., p. 8.
24
La Chambre.be, Dputs actuels par groupe politique, avaible on :
http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/depute&language=fr&rightmenu=right_depute&cfm
=cvlist53.cfm?sorttype=group&legis=53
25
Barker, L. (2007). Immigration and Belgiums Far-Right Parties. Migration Information Source, available on :
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=606
26
IBZ, rsultats officiels (2009). Parlement Flamand : Rpartition des siges, available on:
http://elections2009.belgium.be/fr/vla/seat/seat_VLR00000.html
27
Le Parlement Wallon, Composition - Les dputs, available on:
http://parlement.wallonie.be/content/default.php?p=01-01
21

Moreover, in their analysis of Flemish anti-immigration sentiments, Billiet and Swyngedouw

emphasize on the fact that negative attitudes of Flemish people towards ethnic minorities are
among the highest of all European countries28. More generally, as we have seen, nationalist
parties in Flanders are more visible in Flanders compared to Wallonia, what may suggest
Flemish people are more hostile to immigration than the rest of Belgians.

4.2.

(Sub)nationalism in Belgium

In order to understand negatives attitudes towards immigration in the Belgian context, it is

important not to forget that there are two kinds of identities: national and sub-national.
In their analysis of Belgians attitude towards immigration, Maddens, Billiet and Beerten state
that there is a link between the fact that citizens identify either with the official Belgian
identity or with sub-national identities (Flanders and Wallonia) and their attitudes towards
foreigners. What is really interesting about this research is that it shows that both attitudes
are inversely related in Flanders and Wallonia29.
In Wallonia, citizens with a strong Walloon identity tend to have a positive attitude towards
foreigners, while those with a strong Belgian identification are more negative. In Flanders, it
is the opposite: people with a stronger Flemish identity tend to be more opposed to
immigrants/foreigners, while those with a strong Belgian identification are more positive.30
This means that the relationship between both variables (national identity and attitudes
towards immigration) is not intrinsic, but is determined to some extent by the social
representation of the national identity in the social and political context 31. Indeed, the history
of Wallonia and Flanders is not the same; neither is the political landscape and discourse32.
First of all, sub-nationalism in Flanders is akin to separatism, which is historically right-wing,
while it resembles regionalism in Wallonia and is traditionally left-wing33. Moreover, if
extreme-right parties in Flanders are strong nationalist/separatist parties, in Wallonia, the
extreme-right emphasises on belgicism34.
If these findings are not new (the paper was written in 2000), according to Billiet, who draws
upon the ISPO35 rapports of 1995, 1999, 1993 and 2007, they are stable over time36.

28

Billiet, J. and Swyngedouw, M. (2009). Ethische minderhedenen de Vlaamse kiezers. Een analyse op basis
van de postelectorale verkiezingsonderzoeken 1991-1995-1999-2003-2007. Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek
Opinieonderzoek (ISPO) K.U.Leuven, p. 22.
29
Maddens, B., Billiet, J. and Beerten, R. (2000). National identity and the attitude towards foreigners in multinational states: the case of Belgium. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 45.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Billiet, J. (2011). (Sub)nationalism and attitude towards immigrants. CeSO K.U. Leuven, PowerPoint
presentated at Re-Bel event Right-wing Flanders, left-wing Wallonia? Should the obligation to vote be
abolished?, available on: http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-files/events/fifth-public-event-rightwing-flanders-left-wing-wallonia-and-obligation-vote/Billiet.pdf
33
Maddens, Billiet and Beerten (2000), op. cit., p. 52 and Billiet (2011), op. cit.
34
Billiet (2011), op. cit.
35
Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek Opinieonderzoek.

Why is this interesting? Because it shows that both parts of Belgium are very different and
that the findings are not always what we could have guessed. Indeed, as we will see, antiimmigration sentiments in Flanders may be high, but they are not as high as in Wallonia.
Brussels also have its particularities: those sentiments are less high than anywhere in
Belgium. We will thus try to explain the reasons of these trends, and in which way they are
related to the theory of economic self-interest or the one of marginality.

4.3.

Divergences between Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels

When we look at facts, the first clear difference is that people from Brussels are relatively
more open to immigration than the rest of the Belgian population. This could actually support
marginality theory, because the immigrant population is larger in Brussels than in other parts
of Belgium (see table). The cultural version of marginality theory implies that the most
diversity, the less the anti-immigration sentiment. With no certainty, it seems to be the case in
Brussels... but not in Wallonia. Indeed, even if the immigration population is larger in
Wallonia than it is in Flanders, this is, as we will see, not correlated with the level of antiimmigration sentiment. Marginality theory can thus not be applied to Belgium, at least not to
the country as a whole.
Foreigners and
Belgians
772.864
1.154.635
Region of Brussels-Cap. 381.771
467.882
5.913.977 6.381.859
Flemish Region
345.469
3.217.591 3.563.060
Walloon Region
1.195.122
9.904.432 11.099.554
Belgium
[Population on 1st January 2013. Source: be.STAT37]
Foreigners Belgians

% of foreigners
33 %
7,3 %
9,7 %
10,8 %

Contrary to what we could have thought, Walloons tend in fact to be the most opposed to
immigration, with a significant half of respondents thinking that to be truly Belgian, people
must have Belgian origins, compared to 39% in Flanders (Tableau 2)38. Indeed, Walloons,
more than other Belgians, share the clich of the myth of invasion by immigrants: 60% of
respondents believe that there are too many immigrants in Belgium nowadays, compared to
56% in Flanders (Tableau 1)39. Moreover, 41% of Walloons agree with the statement
because of the number of immigrants in Belgium, I sometimes feel like a foreigner, in
comparison to 35% in Flanders, and 30% in Brussels (Tableau 1).

36

Billiet (2011), op. cit.

Statistics Belgium, Population par sexe et nationalit pour la Belgique et les rgions, 2003 et 2013, available
on: http://statbel.fgov.be/fr/statistiques/chiffres/population/structure/natact/beletr/#.UswMM_TuJ_Q
38
Marfouk (2013), op. cit.
39
Ibid.
37

In fact, on most issues (the rise of criminality excluded) Walloons tend to be more negative
than Flemish40, what make us think that contrary to given ideas, anti-immigration sentiments
are higher in Wallonia compared to Flanders.
In order to see why Walloons are so reluctant to immigrants and immigration we need to
examine the profile of the people that express those anti-immigration sentiments. In the
meantime, that will allow us to see if either the economic self-interest theory or the
marginality theory can be applied to our Walloon case.
The latest social barometer of Wallonia, survey conducted by the IWEPS41, permits to do so.
In correlation with the findings of the IWEPS working paper based on the EVS, 40.3% of
Walloons think that foreigners take away jobs from natives (for 42% in 2008 for the EVS).
However, one of the most significant findings of the survey is that 66.8% of the people
interrogated think that foreigners are a burden for the countrys social security42. Building

40

Marfouk (2013), op. cit., p. 10.

Institut Wallon de lEvaluation, de la Prospective et de la Statistique.
42
Cardelli, R. and Bornand, T. (2013). Attitudes des Wallons vis--vis des immigrs et de limmigration :
Analyse des donnes du Baromtre social de la Wallonie 2012-2013. IWEPS, available on:
http://socialsante.wallonie.be/sites/all/modules/DGO5_MoteurRecherche/
41

10

from the responses to this specific question, respondents profiles are being analysed, using
variables such as nationality, level of education, location of residence, employment status,
occupation and income.
Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement: Immigrants are a burden for the
countrys social security.

Nationality

Level of education
Location of residence
Employment status
Occupation
Income43

71,5% Belgians
55,7% Belgians with foreign origin
38,1% Foreigners
77,6% High school to age 15
48,8% University degree
94,1% Farm or isolated house
62,4% Big city
71,8% Unemployed
65,2% Employed
74,4% Manual workers
46,9% Chief executive
71,1% With big difficulties
62,7% Very easily

While looking at this table it is hard to support marginality theory. On cultural aspects, it is
true that foreigners, who are supposedly at the margin of the society44, are more positive
about immigration. However, all the other data are opposed to the economic marginality
theory and clearly hold up more for the economic self-interest theory. High level of
education and high-ranking occupation highly influence people view on immigration, as
well as level of income and employment status (even if divergences are less strong).
Not only economic self interest theory explains the situation in Wallonia, but it can also
explain the differences between Wallonia and Flanders. Indeed, if we make the assumption
that attitudes towards immigration are globally related to indicators such as income,
employment status, occupation or level of education, then it is explains why Wallonia gets
higher figures than Flanders. Indeed, poverty and unemployment rate are higher in Wallonia
than they are in Flanders. To establish those facts in statistics, in 2010, the risk rate of
poverty45 is 19.2% in Wallonia, compared to 9.8% in Flanders46. As for the unemployment

download.php?download_file=Attitudes%20des%20Wallons%20vis%20a%20vis%20des%20immigres%20et%
20de%20immigration.pdf
43
Question asked: Are you able to make ends meet with your income?
44
It is important not to forget that within Belgian immigrants, 68% are coming from within the European Union
[see Direction gnrale Emploi. (2009). Limmigration en Belgique: Effectifs, mouvements et march du travail,
Rapport 2009, available on: http://www.emploi.belgique.be/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=28772].
45
The threshold of poverty for an isolated person established at 1.000
46
Taux de risque de pauvret par rgion et en Belgique, revenus 2004-2010. Observatoire de la Sant et du
Social de Bruxelles-Capitale, available on: http://www.observatbru.be/documents/indicateurs/pauvrete/2013decembre/fr/01_seuil-de-risque-de-pauvrete-par-region-revenus_2004-2010.pdf

11

rate, in 2012, in the active population aged from 15 to 64 years old, 10.1% were unemployed
in Wallonia, while the rate was more than half big in Flanders (4.6%)47.

Conclusion
With this paper, we have been able to make the assumption that motives for anti-immigration
sentiments can be found in economic self-interest. Since it is clearly the case in Wallonia, it
gives us an explanation about the reason why negative attitudes towards immigration tend to
be more common in this part of Belgium than it is in Flanders. Indeed, Flanders appears to
suffer less from unemployment, as well as from poverty.
If this was not the aim of the paper, an analysis of what is really happening in terms of
immigration could also be an opportunity for reflection. Indeed, as we have mentioned
briefly, 68% of the immigrants living in Belgium are coming from countries within the
European Union. However, the ones immigrants that are often discriminated against are the
32 remaining percents, and if everyone realised this, it may be less easy to fall for the whole
invasion myth. Moreover, what people often do not know is that immigration remains a
small proportion of the spending of the welfare state. Indeed, following a study conducted by
the OECD in 2013, the fiscal impacts of immigration in Belgium only represent 0.76% of the
gross domestic product48.
A more extensive study could also have enlightened more the ambiguous links that exist
between the dominant parties and negative sentiments towards immigration in Belgium.
Indeed, if economic self-interest theory helps us understand why Walloons have such
sentiments, it can be seen as contradictory with the fact that Wallonia is on the left side of the
political spectrum. This brings us to the idea that in certain situations, individual
comportments should be maybe examined out of the sphere of the parties, but in a broader
historical and societal context.

47

Conseil Suprieur de lEmploi (2013). Rapport 2013 : Les personnes faiblement qualifies sur le march du
travail. Service public fdral Emploi, Travail et Concertation sociale, p. 51, available on:
http://www.emploi.belgique.be/publicationDefault.aspx?id=39096.
48
OCDE (2013). Perspectives des migrations internationales 2013, Editions OCDE, p. 171, available on:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2013-fr

12

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Web sites
La Chambre.be, http://www.lachambre.be/
IBZ, rsultats officiels, http://elections2009.belgium.be/
Le Parlement Wallon, http://parlement.wallonie.be/
Statistics Belgium, http://statbel.fgov.be/
Observatoire de la Sant et du Social de Bruxelles-Capitale, http://www.observatbru.be/

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