DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
General Rule:
Recourse through court cannot prosper until all remedies have been
exhausted at the administrative level. When an adequate remedy has been
provided within the executive department of the government, but nevertheless, a
litigant fails or refuses to avail of himself of the same, the court will decline to
interfere.
Within the administrative forum the law may provide for review of decisions by
higher authorities. Before a party can be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the
courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative
redress afforded him. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for
administrative review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or
reconsideration, the courts for reason of law, comity and convenience, will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted
to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct
the errors committed in the administrative forum.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling
under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice
for review. The aggrieved party must not merely initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief, but must also pursue it to its appropriate
conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give that administrative
agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

Corollary Principles:
1. Doctrine of Prior Resort, also known as the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction: Where there is competence or jurisdiction vested upon an
administrative body to act upon a matter, no resort to the courts may be made
before such administrative body shall have acted upon the matter.
a) In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 426, it was held
that inasmuch as the memorandum of agreement between IEI and MMIC was
derived from the coal-operating contract and intrinsically tied up with the right to
develop coal-bearing lands, lEIs cause of action was not merely rescission of
contract but the reversion of the operation of the coal blocks. Accordingly, the
case should have been filed with the Board of Energy Development, not with the

Regional Trial Court. See also Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro, 77 SCRA

264; Almendras Mining v. Office of the Insurance Commissioner, 160 SCRA 656;
PCGG v. Pena, 159 SCRA 556.
b) The enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations fall within the primary
and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources; thus, the assumption by the RTC of jurisdiction over the suit filed by
respondents constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency [Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167]. Thus, in Sy v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 121587, March 9, 1999, the Supreme Court said that the
lumber forfeited under RD. 705 which the petitioner sought to recover came
under the custody of the DENR, and all actions seeking to recover possession
thereof should be directed to that agency, before any resort to the courts may be
made.
c) In Prosecutor Tabao v. Judge Lilagan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651, September 4,
2001, since the complaint for replevin stated that the shipment of tanbark, as well
as the vessel on which it was loaded, was seized by the NBI for verification of
supporting documents, and that the NBI had turned over the seized items to the
DENR for official disposition and appropriate action, these allegations should
have been sufficient to alert the respondent judge that the DENR had custody of
the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been
commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies of special competence. Besides, it was clear that
the plaintiff in the replevin suit had not exhausted administrative remedies
available to him. Respondent judges act of taking cognizance of the replevin suit
clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law.
d) Sec. 50, RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) vests the
Department of Agrarian Reform with quasi-judicial powers. Since the law does
not distinguish, the jurisdiction of DARAB should, therefore, include all
agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP, including private lands
devoted to or suitable for agriculture, as defined in Sec. 4 of the law. Accordingly,
it was held that DARAB may properly take cognizance of this case involving a
complaint for redemption, it being a case concerning the rights of respondents as
tenants on agricultural land [Same v. Maquiling, G.R. No. 138839, May 9 2002] .
e) The Pollution Adjudication Board is the agency of government tasked with
determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply
with or violates applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. It
also has the power to issue, ex parte, cease and desist orders. Thus, the
premature invocation of the courts intervention renders the complaint without
cause of action and dismissible on such ground [Estrada v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 137862, November 11, 2004].

2. Doctrine of finality of administrative action: No resort to the courts will be

allowed unless the administrative action has been completed and there is nothing
left to be done in the administrative structure. See Sta. Rosa Mining v. Leido, 156
SCRA 1. Because the petitioner did not take an appeal from the order of the
Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, to the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
but went directly to court, it was held that the court action was made prematurely
and the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
a. A party aggrieved must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative
procedure to obtain relief, but must also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion
before seeking judicial intervention in order to give that administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the courts [Zabat v. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 551],
Effect of failure to Exhaust Remedies
The failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of non-compliance with the
rule is that it will deprive the complainant of the cause of action, which is a
ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is
deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it. If the
motion to dismiss on such ground is filed at the last stage of the proceedings
where the remaining task left for the party who invoked it was to file its written
offer of evidence, it came too late and the same is deemed waived.
Non- exhaustion of administrative remedies is a ground for a motion to dismiss or
is a defense which may be raised in the answer. If such ground has not been
raised on a motion to dismiss or in the answer to the complaint, it is deemed
waived. (Factora, Jr. Vs CA, 320 SCRA 530)
Illustration:
Where the question as to the legality of the seizure of forest products by
personnel of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is
pending before sid department, a suit for replevin to secure delivery of said
product is premature and violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The assumption by the trial court of the replevin suit constitutes an
unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys
prerogative.
Note: Where the law provides that resolutions of the Insurance Commissioner on
regulatory, non-judicial matters are appealable to the Secretary of Finance, a
petition for certiorari to challenge said resolution without the petitioner appealing
first to the Secretary of Finance is neither a proper nor appropriate substitute for
such appeal.

Where the rules of administrative agency allow an aggrieved party to file a

motion for reconsideration of its ruling or decision, the latter should, as rule, file
such motion before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, such motion being an adequate remedy, in accordance with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE:

In Paat vs Court (266 SCRA 167) , the court re- stated the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the exception thereto, as follows:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party
is allowed to seek intervention of the court, it is pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction that such remedy should exhausted first before
courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts
intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was no without its
practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
It is no less true to state that the court of justice for reasons of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct is error and to dispose of the
case. HOWEVER, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies XXX is
not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and flexibility is called upon by
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.
Hence, it is disregarded:
1. When here is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involve is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President hears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of claim;

9. when the subject matter is private land in land cases or proceedings;

10. when the rule does not provide a plain speedy and adequate remedy;
and
11. there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Additional:
-when no administrative review is provided
-when the rule of qualified political agency applies when the issue of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot (province of
Zamboanga del norte vs CA, 342 SCRA 549
- failure of high government official from whom relief is sought to act on the
matter( ampil, Jr VS Co=OMELEC, 344 SCRA 358
NOTE: the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only
where the agency concerned exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it does
not apply in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative power.

-Not applicable where public interest requires immediate court resolution.

In ATC vs. BOT, the Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative Remedies may be overlooked where public interest requires
immediate court resolution of the issue raised. It Said:
the question of whether the controversy is ripe for judicial determination
was likewise argued by the parties. For it is undeniable that at the time the
petition as filed, there was pending with the respondent Board a motion for
reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. Prior thereto, n
objection grounded on prematurity can be raised. Nonetheless, counsel for
petitioner would stress that certiorari lies as the failure to observe procedural due
process ousted respondent Board of whatever jurisdiction it could it could have
had in the premises. This Court was impelled to go into the merits of the
controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the issue raised
but also because of the strong public interest having the matter settled. x x x
-Not applicable where administrative act is a nullity.
When the acts of quasi judicial agency re patently illegal, the doctrine of
axhaustion of administrative remedies does not come into play.
Case: Azul vs. Provincial Board (27 SCRA 50) Finally, the contention of
appelles that appellants have not exhausted available administrative remedies, is
as groundless as all their other previously discusses claims. It is settled that the
invoked rule of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule; it admits of
exceptions. Admitting the truth of appellants allegations in the complaint to the
effect that they were separated from the service in patent violation of Civil
Service Law, which contentions we are upholding on the hypothetical assumption

that the facts alleged in the complaint are true, immediate recourse to the courts
of justice by appellants is not objectionable. One of the well-known exceptions to
the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is when the controverted act is
patently illegal.
-Not applicable where administrative remedy is not adequate.
The fact that the law is silent as to the remedy of appeal from e decision of
a department secretary on a specific matter to the President does not mean that
the President may not review the action of the secretary. His power to do so is
implicit in his constitutional power of control of all executive departments. But
whether an aggrieved party should exhaust administrative remedy of appealing
to the Office of the President before seeking judicial relief depends upon whether
such appeal is effective, adequate and expeditious. Where the decision of the
department secretary is, by law, executory after a certain fixed period, the
aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative remedy as an appeal to the
president will not be as sufficient, adequate and expeditious to grant him relief as
a judicial relief, such as a writ of preliminary injunction.
-Not applicable where judicial relief is required to prevent violence.
Where during the pendency of a case before the Bureau of Forestry
involving conflict of boundaries between two concessionaries, problems of public
order whereby one party had resorted to violence to prevent the other from
cutting and hauling logs, the aggrieved party can immediately resort to court
action by seeking injunctive relief without awaiting the outcome of the
administrative case, for intertwined with the issue of boundary are the questions
of public order and the determination of contractual relations which only the
courts of justice have jurisdiction. Considerations of public order must transcend
the administrative issue of conflict of boundaries, and only the courts have the
weapon to compel the parties, temporarily or perpetually by means of injunction,
to maintain peace.
-Not applicable apply where agency acted with no jurisdiction.
Where the law then applicable provides that e decision of an administrative
agency is appealable to the department secretary and then to the Office of the
President, exhausting such administrative remedies of appeal is not necessary
where the agency acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance of a belated appeal from decision of a lower level
administrative body which had become final and thereafter reversing it.
-Not applicable where there is yet no administrative order.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies rests upon the

assumption that the administrative body, board or officer, if given the chance to
correct its/his mistake or error, may amend its/his decision on a given matter. It
follows that there has to be some sort of decision, order or act, more or less final
in character, that is ripe for review and properly the subject of an appeal to a high
administrative body or officer, for the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies to operate. If thee is none, and at issue is whether or not the
investigation to be conducted by an administrative office is within his
competence, then a suit for prohibition may lie against said administrative officer.
-Not applicable where there is estoppel.
Exhaustion is not necessary where there is estoppel on the pat of the
party invoking the doctrine or on the part of the administrative agency concerned.
Thus, where an administrative agency in its questioned order ruled or implied
that the aggrieved party may either accept its ruling or question it in court, the
agency in a court suit to challenge the same is estopped from invoking non
exhaustion of administrative remedy to defeat the court suit, as it led the
aggrieved party to believe that only court ruling would be accepted by it.
-Not applicable where there is urgency or irreparable damage.
One of the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the urgency of judicial intervention, as when a writ of preliminary
injunction is sought in which the petitioner has shown that there is substantial
controversy between the parties and the respondent is committing an act or
threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury
or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on
the merits of the case, which relief may not be available in the administrative
proceedings.
Where resort to administrative remedies will be fruitless and irreparable
damage or injury will cause petitioner arising from the immediate implementation
of the administrative action sought to be nullified the doctrine of exhaust
administrative remedies will not apply.
-Not applicable where qualified political agency doctrine applies.
Under the doctrine of qualified agency, department secretaries are alter
egos or assistants of the President and their acts re presumed to be those of the
latter, unless disapproved or reprobated by him. Pursuant to this doctrine, it has
been held that a party aggrieved by an order are decision of department

secretary may directly file the appropriate action against the department
secretarys action without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies because his action, as the Presidents alter ego, deemed to be that of
the President. The court held that the rule is well-settled that this requirement
does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as
an alter ego of the President, bear te implied approval of the latter, unless
actually disapprove by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures
speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then to
appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could be
had immediately.
The rule must be qualified, to avoid confusion. Pursuant to Rule 43, final
orders or decisions of the Office of the President in the exercise of a quasijudicial powers are appealable to the court of Appeals by petition for review on
questions of fact, of law or of mixed questions of la and fact. The premise of the
remedy of appeal by petition for review is that the petitioner has exhausted all
administrative remedies, which means that the petitioner had appealed the
decision of the departments secretary to the Office of the President whose
decision on the appeal can be the subject of the petition for review. If he did not
appeal the secretarys decision to the Office of the President and instead filed
immediately a court suit on the excuse that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply because of the doctrine of qualified
political agency, he may do so only by petition for certiorari under RULE 65 of the
Rules of Court by showing that the department secretary has act without or in
excess of jurisdiction o with grave abuse of discretion amount lack of jurisdiction
and there is no plain, speed, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
other than said petition for certiorari. Thus, it has been held that an aggrieved
party affected by a decision of cabinet secretary need not appeal to the Office of
the President, and he may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, without exhausting administrative remedy of appeal to the office of the
President because the cabinets secretary is the alter ego of the President. In
short, not every department secretarys action may immediately be challenged in
court, without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
-Not applicable where issue is purely legal.
The question as to whether the abolition of a position is in accordance with
law is a legal question, and the public officer removed therefrom need not file the
appropriate action with the civil Service Commission, without violating the rule on
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. Similarly, whether or not the delegation
by the Movie and Television review and classification Board to Its chairman to
downgrade or upgrade the classification of a movie already reviewed by
committee or the declaration by it of voting slips as strictly confidential is legal is
a question of law, which may immediately be challenged in court without
exhausting administrative remedy to the office of the President, where appeals
from the Board are brought.

The question as to whether as statute or ordinance, pursuant to which a public

officer has been dismissed is unconstitutional is purely legal one, which warrants
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as nothing of an administrative nature
is to be or can be done.
Where the issue is whether or not the assessor has the authority, acting solely
and independently, to impose an assessment, the issue is only one of law which
a tax payer can question before the courts, without taking any appeal to the
Board of Assessment Appeals, of appeals thereto may be taken where the issue
is one of fact or the reasonableness of the amount assessed.
Where pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply because issues of law cannot be
resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative
officer of orders involving questions of law would be an exercise in futility since
administrative officers cannot decide such issues with finality; only the courts
can. Although administrative determination of law is persuasive on courts and
carries it a strong presumption of correctness, nonetheless, the interpretation and
application of laws is the courts prerogative.
-Not applicable where administrative remedy is permissive.
The doctrine does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the
statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only,
warranting the conclusion that the legislature attended to allow the judicial
remedy even though the administrative remedy has not been exhausted. Thus,
where a special law applicable to a particular government agency prescribes the
procedure for the disciplinary action against its officer or employees, the
aggrieved officer dismissed from the service need not exhaust remedies
available by the civil service law, a general law before the civil service
commission, and he may, instead, file the appropriate court action to question his
dismissal.
-Not applicable where doctrine will result in nullification of claim.
The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply
where insistence on its observance will result in nullification of the claim
asserted; or where the administrative agency has no power to grant the relief
sought in civil action, such as the claim for damages.
-Not applicable in quo warranto cases.

Where a public officer has been removed in favor of another appointee,

the protest against his removal and the appointment of another person in his
place which he filed with his superior officer need not await its final outcome
before filing a suit for quo warranto because the 1 year period to institute it in
court is not suspended by the pendency of the administrative case, so that to
await the administrative disposition which may last for more than 1 year, will
result in the prescription of his claim to the office. Similarly, a public officer or
employee of the civil service, who has been unlawfully excluded fro his position
in favor of another person, need not resort to administrative remedies but may
instead file an action for quo warranto because the law does not require it and
the pendency of such administrative remedies does not suspend the 1 year
period ouster within which the action can be filed. While it may be desirable that
administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do
so; and as said remedies neither prerequisites to not bar the institution of quo
warranto proceedings. It follows that he who claims the right to hold a public
office usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts should
file the proper judicial action within the reglamentary period. For public interest
requires that the right to a public office should be determined as speedily as
practicable.
-Not applicable where there is no law requiring remedies.
Where there is no law or regulation requiring that administrative steps be taken
against an administrative action as a condition precedent to the filing of an action
in court, the facts that an appeal therefrom has been taken by the aggrieved
party to the office of the president does not preclude him from withdrawing the
appeal and filing a court action to question the administrative action. His court
action shoukd , however, be a petition for certiorari under RULE 65 of the Rules
of Court, instead of an appeal by petition for review and under Rule 43 thereof.
-Not applicable where agency has no jurisdiction.
The Bureau of Land has jurisdiction at the first instance over controversies
involving public Lands where the Land in dispute has already been titled as a
private Land, the Bureau of Land no Longer has Jurisdiction over subject matter
and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies before Bureau of Land
and from its decision to Department Secretary and ultimately to the Office of the
President, no longer applies.