TIJAM

vs.
SIBONGHANOY
FACTS :
Petitioner filed for recovery of a sum of money from respondent Sibongahanoy.
Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Judgment was in
favor of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant.
Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety
moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue
on lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the
effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for
recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions
for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier
decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all
cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
ISSUE :
Whether or not surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court for the first time upon appeal.
HELD :
The Court believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this
plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising
the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. A party may be estopped or
barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. : Other merits on the appeal.
The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the
writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing. In the
case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and
of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the
surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon
his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file
an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection.

The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court
The orders appealed from are affirmed.

EUSTACIO ATWEL
Vs
CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE ASSOC., INC
FACTS:
Emiliano Melgazo founded and organized Concepcion Progressive Association. As
CPAI president, he bought a parcel of land in behalf of the association. The property
was later on converted into a wet market where agricultural, livestock and other
farm products were sold. It also housed a cockpit and an area for various forms of
amusement. The income generated from the property, mostly rentals from the wet
market, was paid to CPAI. When Emiliano Melgazo died, his son, petitioner Manuel
Melgazo, succeeded him as CPAI president and administrator of the property. On the
other hand, petitioners Atwel and Pilpil were elected as CPAI vice-president and
treasurer, respectively. Other elected officers and members formed their own group
and registered themselves in the Securities and Exchange Commission as officers
and members of respondent CPAI. However, petitioners not listed as members. CPAI
alleged that it was the owner of the property and petitioners, without authority,
were collecting rentals from the wet market vendors. Petitioners filed a case in the
SEC for mandatory injunction where they contended that since the property was
purchased using the money of petitioner Manuel Melgazo's father, it belonged to the
deceased and it was impossible for the CPAI to have acquired ownership over the
property in 1968 when it was only in 1997 that it was incorporated and registered
with the SEC. It ruled that CPA to be one and the same as CPAI, CPA as the owner of
poperty and not Melgazo. It ruled in favor of CPAI. Petitioners went to the CA and
contested the jurisdiction of the SEC special commercial court over the case. CA
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the petitioners are estopped from questioning jurisdiction after
participating in the proceeding.
HELD:
The Court agreed with the petitioners that estoppel cannot apply because a court's
jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by the Constitution or by law, not by the parties'
agreement or by estoppel. The jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate
controversies and other cases enumerated in Section 5 of PD
902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the elements of an intra-corporate controversy are not present. The
records reveal that petitioners were never officers nor members of CPAI. CPAI itself
admitted this in its pleadings. In fact, petitioners were the only remaining members of
CPA which, obviously, was not the CPAI that was registered in the SEC. The
determination as to who is the true owner of the disputed property entitled to the
income generated therefrom is civil in nature and should be threshed out in a regular
court - conflict among the parties here was outside the jurisdiction of the special
commercial court
The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has
none over the cause of action or subject matter of the case. Unfortunately for CPAI,
no exceptional circumstance appears in this case to warrant divergence from the
rule. Jurisdiction by estoppel is not available here.