Border Security.

Current Status and Recommendations

Securitatea Frontierei. Situaia Actual i Recomandri
Erika A. WIKER
Specialist in Contemporary Criminal Justice
U.S.A.

Abstract: The Northern and Southern borders of the United States are comprised of
over 7.458 miles consisting upwards of over 109 official ports of entry, admitting
over 1.050.000 visitors a year (Wasem et.al, p. 2). The men and women of the United
States border patrol must meet the challenge of safeguarding our border from the
non-criminal illegal aliens, drugs, as well as the emergent threat of terrorism. Over
the past nine years, much has been done to increase the workload of the Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP); with little forethought to the need of increased man-power
and/or the development of a validated risk management strategy that supports the
abundance of dollars that has been spent on penetrable systems such as physical
fences.

Key words: drugs, border security, criminality

Abstract: Frontierele de nord i de sud a Statelor Unite sunt alcatuite din peste 7.458
mile constnd n peste 109 porturi oficiale de intrare, cu o prezen a peste 1.050.000
de vizitatori pe an (Wasem et.al, p. 2). Brbaii i femeile de patrulare la frontiera
Statelor Unite trebuie s rspund provocrii de a proteja frontiera noastr de
imigranii ilegali, droguri, precum i de ameninarea emergent a terorismului. n
ultimii nou ani, ceea ce s-a creionat, s-a focusat mai degrab pe cretea volumului
de munc a Vmilor i Patrulelor de Frontier (Customs and Border Patrol CBP);
fiind puin chibzuii la investirea n pregtirea acestor patrule i/sau la elaborarea
unei strategii validate de management al riscului. Aceast strategie sprijin
abundena de dolari, dolari cheltuii pe sisteme penetrabile, cum ar fi gardurile de
protecie.

27

Cuvinte cheie: droguri, securitatea frontierei, criminalitate

The Northern and Southern borders of the United States are comprised of
over 7.458 miles consisting upwards of over 109 official ports of entry, admitting
over 1.050.000 visitors a year (Wasem et.al, p. 2). The men and women of the United
States border patrol must meet the challenge of safeguarding our border from the
non-criminal illegal aliens, drugs, as well as the emergent threat of terrorism. Over
the past nine years, much has been done to increase the workload of the Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP); with little forethought to the need of increased man-power
and/or the development of a validated risk management strategy that supports the
abundance of dollars that has been spent on penetrable systems such as physical
fences.
The race to strengthen the borders of the United States came soon after the
attacks of September 11, 2001. Investigations found that the hijackers had been
living and moving freely within the United States without legitimacy. Congress and
the American people demanded changes in border controls and computer systems to
monitor and track foreign visitors as they seek to enter and leave the country by
developing a database which compares finger prints against known and or suspected
terrorist.
This paper will discuss the current status of Border Security nine-years post
September 11 and the various efforts instituted to strengthen our borders. It will
conclude with outlining recommendations on efforts that should be further supported,
both financially and politically.

Current Efforts
Efforts to strengthen border security were in effect long before the institution
of the Department of Homeland Security. In 1994, CBP implemented a program
titled Operation Gatekeeper, where tiers of agents were assigned to various points
within the San Diego Sector (Center for American Progress, p. 8). However, this
effort was isolated and expensive, resulting in Congress and the CBP realizing that a
more comprehensive approach to strengthening our border was necessary. Resulting

28

in 1996, the Illegal Reform and Illegal Immigrant Responsibility Act which gave the
government full authority to install additional physical security barriers. This method
of physical security has met substantial resistance as many contend that it does not
do an effective job of keeping illegal aliens out. As discussed in Securing Our
Borders, research conducted by the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies
shows that 97 percent of illegal immigrants are successful in penetrating the fences
on their second and/or third attempt.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 positioned the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) as the primary federal agency responsible for securing our borders.
Within DHS is the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (BTS), which
is charged with securing the borders, territorial waters, terminals, waterways, and air,
land, and sea transportation systems of the United States (Seghetti, p. 4). These
efforts are supported by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Immigration and Naturalization
Services (INS), the U.S. Border Patrol, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services
(APHIS), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA).
Current policies at the border can be separated into two major categories:
people related security and goods related border security (Seghetti, p. 4).

People Related Border Security

The attacks of September 11, showed that not only were we weak on
immigration control at our borders, we were significantly weak in visa controls.
Before the attacks, State Department visa focus on determining whether or not those
seeking entry into the United States intended to work or reside illegally in the United
States. The protocol for ensuring potential terrorist did not enter the United States
the State Department consular managed a look out system to check names with
numerous agencies to determine the probability of them being a terrorist.
Investigations after September 11 showed that 19 terrorists were aliens who entered
the United States legally despite provisions in immigration laws regulations that
could have barred their entrance (Seghetti, p. 5)5. Because of these findings the State
5

Investigations have found that the 9/11 terrorists entered the United States through the use of

29

Department has stepped up their security posture when issuing visas by doubling the
names and amount of information on the lookout system.

Programs Which Support People Related Border Security

Pre-Inspection. First authorized by Congress in 1996, the pre-inspection
program focuses on immigration inspections conducted at foreign ports of
embarkations by US authorities for passengers seeking entry. Under this program,
DHS details immigration officers to foreign ports. These officers are able to perform
general inspection functions. The original intent of the program was to limit the
number of inadmissible aliens entering the US, officials now view it as a useful
measure to better secure our borders while facilitating the flow of travel (Seghetti, p.
7).
Advance Passenger Manifest. Requires air carriers en route to the US from
foreign countries to submit passenger manifests in advance of their arrival to ports of
entry. The subsequent inspections are conducted on U.S. soil, the advance notice
allows for CBP officers to identify those travelers who many need additional
screening.
Computer Aided Passenger Pre-Screening System. Instituted in 1996, the
CAPPS system analyzes ticket purchasing behavior to identify air travelers who pose
a threat. Efforts are currently underway to develop the next generation CAPPS II
system which conducts passenger risk assessments and pre-screening have been
scrapped due to privacy concerns and operational issues.
No Fly and Selectee List. TSA is mandated by law to maintain a watch list of
individuals suspected of posing a risk of air piracy and/or terrorism, created in 1990.
Individuals on this list are subjected to additional security measures, with no fly
matching requiring individuals to be detained and questioned by federal law
enforcement and selectees requiring additional screening.
Federal Air Marshal Service6. Created as a direct result of September 11,
places plain clothed federal law enforcement agents aboard high risk flights either
originating and/or destined in the U.S.
fraudulent documents.
6
Per CRS Report: Border and Transportation Security: Selected Programs and Policies Federal Air
Marshalls over a two year period following the attacks responded to over 2.000 aviation security

30

U.S. VISIT Program. In 2004 to further meet the challenges of the new
asymmetrical threats posed by international and domestic terrorist alike the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) embarked on an ambitious journey to
institute a $10 billion dollar program titled US-VISIT. This program is intended to
create a virtual border that can screen the millions of foreign travelers who enter and
leave the U.S.
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. Requires U.S. and Canadian travelers
to present a passport and/or other form of document that denotes identity and
citizenship when entering the U.S., this program is a result of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The goal of WHTI is to
facilitate entry for U.S. citizens and legitimate foreign visitors, while strengthening
U.S. border security. Standard documents will enable the Department of Homeland
Security to quickly and reliably identify a traveler.
Immigration and Nationality Action Section 287 (g). The Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), effective September 30,
1996, added Section 287 (g), performance of immigration officer functions by state
and local officers and employees, to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Section 287 (g) authorizes the secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to enter into memorandums of understanding (MOU) to allow
designated officers to perform immigration law enforcement activities provided that
the officers and/or employees have received appropriate training and function under
the supervision of a sworn U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
officers. The program provides a flexible solution for ICE and state and local law
enforcement agencies to combat terrorism and criminal activities conducted by
illegal aliens.

Goods Related Border Security

The maritime system of the United States consists of more than 300 sea and
river ports with more than 3.700 cargo and passenger terminals, with most ships
being foreign owned (Seghetti, p. 5). In the recent years, focus has been placed on
container ship security as there has been infiltration of stowaways from both friendly
incidents, used non-lethal force 16 times, discharged their weapons on 3 occasions and were involved
in 28 arrests and/or detainments of individuals.

31

and non-friendly countries7. In an effort to focus limited inspection resources the

CBP has launch multiple initiatives to target high risk shipments and attempt to
secure the supply chain.
Advance Electronic Cargo Manifest Requirement. As discussed in CRS
Report Border and Transportation Security: Selected Programs and Policies (2005)
cargo inspections are dependent on receiving accurate information in a timely
manner. To provide inspectors with adequate time to perform risk assessments on
arriving cargo what has been known as the 24-hour rule was implemented. CBP
published the following regulations:
Vessel - 24 hours prior to lading in the foreign port
Air - Wheels up for four hours prior to departure for the U.S.
Rail - Two hours prior to arrival in the U.S.
Truck - One hour prior to arrival for shipments entering through the PreArrival Processing System8 or Automated Broker Interface9 and 30 minutes prior to
arrival for shipments entered through FAST10.
Container Security Initiative (CSI). Initiated by CBP in January 2002 to
prevent terrorists from exploiting containers entering the U.S. CSI is made up of four
elements a) developing criteria to identify high risk containers, b) prescreening high
risk containers at the earliest possible point in the supply chain, c) using technology
to pre-screen high risk containers quickly, and d) developing and using smart11 and
7

11 stowaways were found on a containers ship originating from the Caribbean entering the US. The
individuals aboard were said to be seeking a better life here in the U.S. While these individuals were
not focused on nefarious acts, this shows the ease in which stowaways can enter the US aboard
container ships.
8
Pre-arrival Processing System (PAPS) is a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) system
designed to provide CBP with advance information on goods entering the U.S. It expedites
clearances, reduces traffic congestion at ports of entry and enables CBP to perform risk assessment
and clearance in advance of goods arriving at the border. Shipments entering the U.S. at overland
ports of entry along the Canada - U.S. border must utilize the Pre-Arrival Processing System (PAPS),
the Border Release and Selectivity System (BRASS) or the FAST National Customs Automation
Program (FAST/NCAP) procedures.
9
The Automated Broker Interface (ABI) is a component of the U.S. Customs Service's Automated
Commercial System that permits qualified participants to electronically file required import data with
Customs. ABI is a voluntary program available to brokers, importers, carriers, port authorities, and
independent service centers. Currently, over 96% of all entries filed with Customs are filed through
ABI.
10
FAST is a joint program between Canada and the United States to enhance security at the border
while keeping the shared border open to the free flow of identified low risk shipments. The FAST
program relies on the integrity of the supply chain, technology and in identifying shipments that are
low risk.
11
CBP provides sensors to selected importers to be secured inside a container. The sensors can detect

32

secure containers. Under this program officers are sent to participating ports to
collaborate with host nations to identify and pre-screen high risk cargo.
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. Initiated in April 2002 and
offers importers expedited processing of cargo if they comply with CBP
requirements for securing their entire supply chain. This program is a self assessment
that is reviewed by CBP officials so that they gain and understanding of the
companys security policy and posture. Based on the review the company and CBP
official will work together to address any security concerns and/or further reduce the
companys risk score.

Recommendations
As with any issue there must be direct documentation and information
available to all persons who have a vested interest in border security. This is not
limited to border States and federal agencies who play an active role in securing our
border; but each and every state and federal agency who have critical infrastructure
and key resources that can be targets to those intent on executing nefarious acts
within the United States. Iessence border security is a National issue that impacts
each and every State and local, federal, and private sector partners alike. Since the
attacks of September 11, policy doctrine such as the Target Capability List (TCL)12
and the National Response Framework13 has articulated what needs to be
strengthened in order to safeguard the Homeland from another attack. The key
elements of the TCL such as Planning, Risk Management, and Information Sharing
and Dissemination all have direct feeds into the Border Security. By strengthening
these areas and developing a formulated and comprehensive risk management
strategy that has governmental and private sector support, would limit the vast
whether the container has been tampered with prior to entry into the US.
12
The Target Capabilities List identifies the thirty six capabilities required to prevent, protect against,
respond to, and recover from incidents of national significance. The list also establishes the plans,
procedures, system relationships, training/exercises, and mutual aid agreements required to do so. The
list partitions the thirty six target capabilities into five broad categories: Common Target Capabilities,
Prevent Mission Area Target Capabilities, Protect Mission Area Target Capabilities, Respond Mission
Area Target Capabilities, and Recover Mission Area Target Capabilities.
13
The National Response Framework presents the guiding principles that enable all response partners
to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies - from the smallest
incident to the largest catastrophe. The Framework establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards
approach to domestic incident response.

33

amount of dollars spent on failed systems such as the CAPP II. However, prior to
spending down of dollars on physical and virtual systems that are able to be
circumvented by the technological savvy and well funded/connected terrorist,
spending the money on information sharing networks and man-power would equally
enhance border security.
Over the past nine years information sharing has increased, however it is
nowhere near the levels needed to counter the shadowy threat of terrorism. What
makes terrorist cells hard to counter is that they are able to operate with little to no
chatter/intelligence until the time of the looming attack. In many cases, any
information found that is shared with all stakeholder agencies provides the impacted
area needed information to possibility counter the attack. I recommend that key
stakeholder work in concert to build an information sharing matrix that identifies a
single system, with redundancies, to disseminate pertinent information with each
other. The current argument is that the information supports an active investigation,
however, the reality is that traditional and non-traditional response agencies alike on
the lookout for nefarious activity have a better chance of mitigating a threat than law
enforcement on its own.
The FY2011 budgetary constraints have resulted in drastic cuts in CBP and
USCG personnel; however their mission has been increased. These two entities work
in tandem to safeguard our borders, a cut in man-power, but an increased in mission
focus will result in less time being spent on forward thinking and planning to
continue to enhance our border security posture.
To further enhance border security posture we must be able to expand our
screening and immigration control mechanisms. I contend that continued support and
direct funding for the 287 (g) program as a Freedom of Information Act request
dated 12 July 2005 Judicial Watch.org reveals that since its first implementation by
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement in 2002 and subsequent implementation
programs by Alabama Department of Public Safety, Arizona Department of
Corrections, Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department and the San Bernardino
County Sheriffs Department; each agency have been able to track the success of 287
(g)s implementation based on their specific needs. The documents show that there is
between a 1.3-1.9 percent difference between Federal indictments and Federal

34

convictions and less than a 0 and 2.5% percent difference between state arrests and
state convictions

from states law enforcement agencies utilizing 287 (g) to

supplement their immigration control programs. When we apply Schneiers Model to

the program we are able to see not only a decrease in risk but a cost benefit in
continuing to apply and support the program.
What assets are you attempting to protect and how well does this security
solution mitigate the risk? Support for 287 will work to protect all critical
infrastructure and key resource assets throughout the United States as it allows for
local law enforcements to work as immigration officers, given them the authority to
stop and questions those who are suspected illegal aliens. It is a well known fact that
enhanced local, state, and federal cooperation is essential to improving our homeland
security and preparedness. Local and state law enforcement agents and employees
are the first line of defense when it comes to arresting and processing criminals and
potential terrorists. The state of Florida understand this very well post 9/11 after
finding that many of the hijackers either entered through Florida or had operated in
Florida while preparing for the attack. Further investigations found that four
members of the hijackers were stopped by state and local law enforcement in the
U.S. for routine traffic violations - in all four instances they were illegally present in
the U.S. This provides us with a clear view that state and local law enforcement
officers are more often than not in the best position to come across and identify alien
terrorist and/or criminals operating in the U.S. Thus, supporting that addition and
implementation of Section 287 (g) can significantly increase law enforcement efforts
in the war against terror and violent crime (Koback, 2005). 287 (g) delegates
authority that is much broader than the simple arrest of an illegal alien its authorities
include not only the power to collect, arrest, and transfer; but also the power to
investigate immigration violations, the power to collect evidence, and assemble an
immigration case for prosecution or removal, the power to take custody of aliens on
behalf of the federal government. Authorizing this authority to local and state law
enforcement agencies is a win-win situation for both local/state and federal law
enforcement agencies. Take for instance the state of Alabama which had experienced
widespread and increased violations of feral immigration laws by aliens in its
jurisdiction; at times there were fewer than three interior enforcement officers

35

operating in the state (Koback, 2005); to mitigate this that the state of Alabama
addressed the man-power shortfall by adding and implementing section 287 (g) and
committing its own officers.
What costs and tradeoffs does the security solution impose? The addition and
implementation of 287 (g) by state and local law enforcement agencies does not
require that their effort be placed strictly on the identification and processing of
undocumented aliens, instead it also provides a manner in which to combat violent
gang sects. This effort can be seen in Los Angeles area. Mara Savatrucha-13 (MS13) is one of the most violent, notorious, and fastest growing alien gang in the
country. It currently operates in over 33 states in the U.S., ranging from metropolitan
areas such as Los Angeles, CA to rural towns such as Wauchula, FL. Because the
number of the gang members are illegal aliens a robust and effective enforcement of
immigration laws would substantially mitigate the number of gang members thus,
violent crimes committed. Operation Community Shield in Las Angeles is a picture
of success resulting in over 103 MS-13 member arrests with approximately half
having prior arrest records for violent crimes (Kobach, 2005).
The average costs to support cross-discipline training of local and state law
enforcement officers and employees on average is $519.58 [287 (g) FOIA response].
This cost supports the student attending the 5-week 287 (g) Delegation of Authority
training, travel, student handouts, workbooks, training material, and law books; the
owning agency will pay for salary costs during the 5-week period. Information
Technology support and expenses needed to access the ICE database are funded by
ICE. Support and administration of designated law enforcement agents and
employees are administered by ICE. These cost savings are far greater than the
incarceration and re-incarceration of illegal aliens.
What are the risks? As with any security program there are inherit risks.
However, the risks for the 287 (g) program are lessened by the overall increase in
security posture that the program provides.
1.

Inability to adequately train in short timeframe: Unfortunately, all

that you need to learn about immigration and naturalization issues
cannot be learned in a 5-week training period and mentorship;
however, what the training and mentorship provides is a baseline

36

and a direct point of contact for questions. The lack of adequate

training could result in an increase in arbitrary cases being brought
forth that will clog the system and place increase pressure of the
community and agencies.
2.

Shifting from optional to an unfunded mandate. With federal, state,

and local governments in budget crisis there is a distinct fear that
this program will shift from optional to and unfunded mandate. We
see this in many other programs initiated by the Department of
Homeland

Security

with

respect

to

Homeland

Security

Preparedness, for example the identification and mapping of

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources and the implementation
of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Although,
these programs make sense for security preparedness, the fact that
all budgets are tight, there is a possibility that the 287 (g) program
will turn into an unfunded mandate and hurt state and local
governments more than help them.
3.

Shifting of priority for local law enforcement: The implementation

of 287 (g) at the state and local level has a select and designated
group of officers and employees who focus on this program.
However, in smaller agencies and/or those with a large illegal alien
issue will become inundated with immigration control issues and
place policing/law enforcement activities as secondary priorities.

What other risks does the security solution cause? Although I would contend
that there are minimal risks with supporting this security solution, the reality is that if
the aforementioned risks are realized, the focus of local law enforcement lends to
terrorist and criminals alike exasperating the vulnerability of law enforcement manpower; thus enhancing local threat levels.

37

References
Carafoano, J., (March) 2006, Heritage Foundation, Retrieved February 3, 2009.
Available

at:

http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/upload/94536_1.pdf,
25.11.2010.
Center for American Progress, (April) 2010, Securing Our Borders, Retrieved 1
April,

2010.

Available

at:

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/secure_borders.html,
18.10.2010.
Hanley, R., (September) 1994, 11 Stowaways Found on Ship in Container,
Retrieved

April,

2010.

Available

at:

http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/02/nyregion/11-stowaways-found-on-shipin- container.html?pagewanted=1, 12.11.2010.

Judicial Watch, 287 (g) FOIA request, Retrieved February 3, 2009. Available at:
http://www.judicialwatch.org/foia/2006/287g.pdf, 12.11.2010.
Kobach, K., (July) 2005, Testimony on The 287 (g) Program:

Ensuring the

Integrity of Americas Border Security System through Federal-State

Partnerships,

Retrieved

February

4,

2009.

Available

at:

http://www.cairco.org/articles/art2005jul27_testimony_kobach.pdf,
18.10.2010.
Office of Pubic Affairs, Department of Homeland Security, (August 16) 2006,
Section 287 (g) Immigration and Nationality Action. A Law enforcement
Partnership,

Retrieved

February

1,

2009.

Available

at:

http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheets/060816dc287gfactsheet.pdf,
25.11.2010.
Neto, B., (May) 2005, Border Security: Key Agencies and Their Missions, Library of
Congress, Washington D.C.
Seghetti, L., Lake, J., Robinson, W., (March) 2005, Border and Transportation
Security: Selected Programs and Policies, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.

38

U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security

(August 18) 2008, Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g)
Immigration and Nationality Act, Retrieved February 1, 2009. Available at:
http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287_g.htm, 25.11.2010.
Wasem, R. E., Monke, J., and Vina, S., (May) 2004, Border Security: Inspections
Practices, Policies and Issues, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

39