G.R. No.

162734 August 29, 2006

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C.
SALIENTES,
Petitioners,
vs. LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The instant petition assails the Decision 1dated November 10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 75680, which dismissed the petition for certiorari against the orders of the Regional Trial Court in
Special Proceedings No. 03-004. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals Resolution 2dated March 19,
2004 denying reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents
of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents, petitioners Orlando
B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife
that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the
Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.
Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus and Custody, 3 docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-004 before the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa City. On January 23, 2003, the trial court issued the following order:
Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioners, the Respondents Marie Antonette Abigail
C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce and bring before
this Court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 oclock in
the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint.
Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any authorized representative of this Court, who is directed to
immediately make a return.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.

Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed on November 10, 2003. The appellate court affirmed the February 24, 2003 Order of the trial
court holding that its January 23, 2003 Order did not award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one
but was simply the standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The appellate court held
that the trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of the
minors detention and the matter of his custody. The Court of Appeals ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.
Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion,
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an order for the petitioner-mother to first show
cause why her own three-year old child in her custody should not be discharged from a so-called
"restraint" despite no evidence at all of restraint and no evidence of compelling reasons of maternal
unfitness to deprive the petitioner-mother of her minor son of tender years. The assailed orders,
resolutions and decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals are clearly void;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
in issuing a writ of habeas corpus which clearly is not warranted considering that there is no unlawful
restraint by the mother and considering further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother, thereby
negating any notion of such mother illegally restraining or confining her very own son of tender years. The
petition is not even sufficient in substance to warrant the writ. The assailed orders are clearly void.
3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, the "Sombong vs. CA" case supports rather than negates the
position of the petitioners.

4. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, summary proceeding does violence to the tender-years-rule
5. The Court of Appeals failed to consider that the private respondent failed to present prima facie proof of
any compelling reason of the unfitness of the petitioner-mother;
6. The Court of Appeals failed to see that the New Rules on Custody SUFFICES AS REMEDY.

Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against
the trial courts orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003?
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 7 of the Family Code, which provides that no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any
compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private
respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus
is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist
there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the
mother to show cause and explain the custody of her very own child.
Private respondent counters that petitioners argument based on Article 213 of the Family Code applies
only to the second part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part,
which pertains to his right as the father to see his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is
available against any person who restrains the minors right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that
the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the
court in accordance with the new rules on custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates
specified in the January 23, 2003 and the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.
Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody
and parental authority over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of
the country as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody
of their son and not the maternal grandparents.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did
not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in
court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order
precedent to the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it.
Under Rule 41, Section 1 8 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. 9 Under Article 211 10 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have
joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial
grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present
case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his
petition. 11 Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth
Welfare Code 12 unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others,
of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. 13
Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely
directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from
seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 14 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC 15 that within fifteen
days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an
order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly
what the court did.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for
private respondents petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child.
Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.
In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003.
Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial
court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decisiondated November 10, 2003 and the Resolutiondated
March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 170924

July 4, 2007

In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA
ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, petitioner, vs. Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, and GEN.
ERNESTO DE LEON, in his capacity as the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and
all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 which dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner Roberto
Rafael Pulido (Pulido) in behalf of Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, and imposed on petitioner the penalty
of censure, and its Resolution2 dated 6 January 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are not disputed.
At around one oclock in the morning of 27 July 2003, three hundred twenty-one (321) junior officers and
enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) entered and took over the premises of the
Oakwood Premiere Luxury Apartments (Oakwood) located at the Glorietta Complex, Ayala Avenue, Makati
City. They disarmed the security guards of said establishment and planted explosives in its immediate
surroundings.
The soldiers publicly announced that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). They declared their withdrawal of
support from the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP President Arroyo and demanded her resignation and
that of the members of her cabinet and top officers of both the AFP and the Philippine National Police
(PNP).
At about one oclock in the afternoon, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring the country
to be under a "state of rebellion." Consequently, she issued General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and the
PNP to carry out all reasonable measures, giving due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and quell
the "rebellion."
After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the government negotiators, the former agreed to
return to barracks, thus ending the occupation of Oakwood.
Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood were Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, both enlisted
personnel of the Philippine Navy. It is in their behalf that the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed before
the Court of Appeals.
On 2 August 2003, then AFP Chief of Staff Narciso L. Abaya issued a directive 3 to all Major Service
Commanders and to the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP)
regarding the Custody of Military Personnel Involved in the 27 July 2003 Mutiny. On the strength thereof,
Gonzales and Mesa were taken into custody by their Service Commander.
Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial with violation of the Articles of War. They were,
however, among the soldiers charged before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
with the crime of Coup Detat as defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. Said case entitled,
"People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al." was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. On 18
November 2003, a Commitment Order was issued by the RTC committing custody of the persons of
Gonzales and Mesa to the Commanding Officer of Fort San Felipe Naval Base, Cavite City. 4
On 8 December 2003, Gonzales and Mesa were discharged 5 from military service.
On 16 December 2003, per order of the RTC, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was consolidated with Criminal
Case No. 03-2678 entitled, "People v. Ramon B. Cardenas" pending before Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati
City, on the ground that the cases are founded on the same facts and/or formed part of a series of offenses
of similar character. 6

In a Manifestation and Motion dated 3 March 2004, Commodore Normando Naval, Commander of Naval
Base Cavite, asked the Makati RTC, Branch 148, to relieve him of his duty as custodian of Gonzales and
Mesa and that the latter be transferred to the Makati City Jail. 7 In an Order dated 29 April 2004, the RTC
relieved him of his duty but ordered the transfer of Gonzales and Mesa from the Naval Base Cavite in
Sangley Point, Cavite City, to the Philippine Marine Brigade Headquarters, Philippine Marine, Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig, Metro Manila, under the custody of the Commander of the Marine Brigade of the Philippine Marines,
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.8
In an Order dated 8 July 2004, the RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed by the accused-soldiers. It
admitted Gonzales and Mesa, and twenty-five other co-accused to bail pegging the amount thereof at
P100,000.00 each.9
On 19 July 2004, both Gonzales and Mesa posted bail. 10 On 20 July 2004, the RTC issued orders directing
the Commanding Officer of Philippine Marine Corps, Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, to release Gonzales and
Mesa from his custody. 11 Despite said orders and their service to the marines, Gonzales and Mesa were not
released.
On 21 July 2004, the People of the Philippines moved for partial reconsideration 12 of the order granting bail.
Prior to the resolution of said motion, Jovencito R. Zuo, Chief State Prosecutor, advised Brig. Gen. Manuel
F. Llena, Judge Advocate General, to defer action on the provisional release of Gonzales and Mesa "until the
Motion for Reconsideration shall have been resolved and attained finality." 13 On 26 October 2004, the RTC
denied the motion for partial reconsideration.
With the denial of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the People filed with the Court of Appeals on 4
February 2005 a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with urgent prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, asking for the nullification and
setting aside of the orders dated 8 July 2004 and 26 October 2004 of Judge Oscar B. Pimentel for having
been issued without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The Petition for Certiorari was raffled to the Seventh Division and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 88440 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Hon. Oscar B. Pimentel, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 148." The Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) did not issue a TRO and/or
preliminary injunction.
Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas Corpus14 was filed by
petitioner Pulido on their behalf on 22 July 2005. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 and
raffled to the Third Division. In support thereof, it was argued that since Gonzales and Mesa are no longer
subject to Military Law as they had been discharged from the service on 8 December 2003, and since they
are not charged before a court martial, the military authorities have no jurisdiction to detain them, and
there is no legal ground to detain them further because a court order for their release had already been
issued.
On 10 August 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing
respondents Gen. Efren Abu, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and all persons acting in
his stead and under his authority, and Gen. Ernesto de Leon, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine
Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, to produce the bodies of Gonzales and
Mesa before the Court and to appear and show the cause and validity of their detention. 15
On 18 August 2005, a return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was made.16 Respondents prayed that the
Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales
and Mesa is justified because of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8
July 2004 of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the 7 th Division of the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440; and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to
state in the petition that the order granting bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending
before its 7th Division.
On 9 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (7 th Division) rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 88440
dismissing the petition that questioned the propriety of the granting of bail to Gonzales, Mesa, and twentyfive of their co-accused.17
On 12 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (3 rd Division) dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus for
violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. It ratiocinated:
A reading of the parties submissions reveals a threshold issue the charge of forum shopping and
the related falsity in the certification supporting the petition. We must initially resolve these issues
because a finding that the petitioner violated Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court can lead to the
outright dismissal of the present petition. x x x
xxxx
The records show that the present petition contained the following certificate of non-forum
shopping:

"I, ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, with office address at Unit 1601, 16 th Floor 139 Corporate
Center Valero Street, Makati City, after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, do
hereby state that:
1. I am the petitioner in the above-captioned case;
2. I have read the Petition and caused it to be prepared. All the contents thereof are true to
my own personal knowledge and the record;
3. I have not heretofore commenced any action or proceeding involving the same issues, in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency and to the best of
my knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; except for the related cases of "Eugene Gonzales
et al. vs. Gen. Narciso Abaya, et al., G.R. No. 164007 and "Humabono Adaza et al., vs. Gen.
Pedro Cabuay et al., G.R. No. 160792, both awaiting the resolution of the Supreme Court.
5. (sic, should be 4) If I should learn of any similar action or proceeding filed or is pending in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to
report such fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Court.
The present petition and its accompanying certification likewise show that the petitioner never
mentioned the pendency before the Seventh Division of this Court of the certiorari case, SP 88440,
for the annulment of the lower courts order granting the soldiers-accuseds petition for bail, when
this same lower court order is cited as basis for the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa in the
present petition. All that the certification mentioned were the related cases pending before the
Honorable Supreme Court. Neither did the petitioner comply with his undertaking under his
certification to inform this Court within five (5) days of the pendency of any similar action or
proceeding filed or is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, as in fact the certiorari case was already pending with this Court when the present petition
was filed. The certiorari case was only brought to our attention after the respondents filed their
Return of the Writ.
To be sure, the petitioner, who is also the counsel for the accused Gonzales and Mesa in the
criminal case before Branch 148 RTC Makati City and who represents Gonzales and Mesa as private
respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 88440, cannot feign ignorance of the pendency of the certiorari case.
Why he deliberately kept the pendency of the certiorari case hidden from us, has not been
sufficiently explained. We have no doubt, however, that his deliberate act of withholding
information on a material fact directly required to be disclosed by the Rules of Court cannot but
have legal consequences.
The primary basis of the present petition is the bail granted to and posted by Gonzales and Mesa.
This is very clear from the petitioners argument that "The continued detention of the enlisted
personnel constitutes violation of the lawful orders of the civilian court." He cited in support of this
argument the grant and the posting of the bail, and the issuance of the release orders by the lower
court. He did not disclose, however, what subsequently happened to the order granting bail. He
deliberately omitted in his narration the fact that the People moved to reconsider this order. Thus,
he gave the impression that the order granting bail immediately became enforceable and that
Gonzales and Mesas continued detention is illegal because their constitutional rights to bail, which
have received judicial imprimatur, were continuously being violated by the respondents.
The petitioner next omitted the fact that after the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the
order granting bail, the People filed the certiorari case before this Court, seeking to annul the lower
courts order. While we are aware of the rule that the mere pendency of a petition for certiorari
will not prevent the implementation of the assailed order unless the court where the petition was
filed issues either a temporary restraining order or a writ or preliminary injunction the filing of a
petition for habeas corpus while the order granting bail is being questioned on a petition for
certiorari raises issues beyond the immediate execution of the lower courts bail and release orders.
They raise questions on the propriety of filing the habeas corpus petition to seek the release of
persons under detention, at the same time that a petition regarding their continued detention and
release are pending. Apparently, the petitioner wanted to avoid these questions, prompting him to
actively conceal the subsequent motion for reconsideration of the bail order and the petition for
certiorari directly questioning this same order. In short, the petitioner conveniently omitted in
his narration of facts the material factual antecedents detrimental to his cause; he
chose to narrate only the factual antecedents favorable to his cause.
That the present petition has direct and intimate links with the certiorari case is beyond doubt as
they involve two sides of the same coin. The certiorari case filed by the People seeks to prevent the
release of Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the lower courts grant of bail. The present petition, on
the other hand, was filed in behalf of Gonzales and Mesa to secure their immediate release because
the order granting bail is already executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks to implement through a
petition for habeas corpus the provisional release from detention that the lower court has ordered.
The question this immediately raises is: can this be done through a petition for habeas corpus when

the validity of the grant of bail and the release under bail are live questions before another Division
of this Court?
We believe and so hold that his cannot and should not be done as this is precisely the reason why
the rule against forum shopping has been put in place. The remedies sought being two sides of the
same coin (i.e., the release of Gonzales and Mesa), they cannot be secured through separately-filed
cases where issues of jurisdiction may arise and whose rulings may conflict with one another. To be
sure, we clearly heard the petitioner say that there can be no conflict because the effectiveness of
our ruling in this petition will depend on the nature and tenor of the ruling in the certiorari case;
there is no basis for a release on habeas corpus if this same Court will rule in the certiorari case
that the grant of bail is improper. For this very same reason, we should not entertain the present
petition as the matter before us is already before another co-equal body whose ruling will be finally
determinative of the issue of Gonzales and Mesas release. The Decision of the Seventh Division of
this Court, heretofore footnoted, ordering the release on bail of Gonzales and Mesa drives home this
point.
To be strictly accurate, the issues of detention and immediate release that are now before the two
Divisions of this Court are likewise properly within the jurisdiction of the lower court who has
original jurisdiction over the criminal case and who has issued the order granting bail in the
exercise of this jurisdiction. If indeed there is a question relating to the immediate release of
Gonzales and Mesa pursuant to the lower courts order pending the determination of the certiorari
issues, such question should be brought before the lower court as the tribunal that has ordered the
release, or before the Seventh Division of this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers over
the lower court. The Decision recently promulgated by the Seventh Division of this Court ordering
the release on bail of the soldiers-accused effectively demonstrates this point.
The inter-relationships among the criminal case below, the certiorari case and the present petition,
as well as among the courts where these cases are pending, show beyond doubt that the petitioner
committed forum shopping in the strict sense of that term i.e., the attempt by a party, after an
adverse opinion in one forum, to seek a favorable opinion in another forum other that through an
appeal or certiorari. The "adverse" aspect for the petitioner, while not an opinion, is no less adverse
as he has failed to secure the release of Gonzales and Mesa before the lower court and before this
Court in the certiorari case (as of the time of the filing of the present petition); thus, he came to us
in the present petition. That the Seventh Division of this Court has ordered the release on bail of the
soldiers-accused, thus rendering the present petition moot and academic after the finality of the 7 th
Division Decision, plainly demonstrates this legal reality. 18
The Court further imposed on petitioner the penalty of censure for the aforesaid violation. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for violation of and pursuant to
Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner, Atty. Roberto Rafael Pulido, is hereby
CENSURED for these violations. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Honorable Supreme
Court, to be attached to the petitioners record as a member of the Bar, as a RECORD OF
CENSURE that may be referred to and considered in any future similar act. 19
On 5 September 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 which the Court of Appeals (Special
Former Third Division) denied in its resolution21 dated 6 January 2006.
Petitioner is now before us raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING.
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE NATURE OF THE ACTION AND LIMITED ITSELF TO THE ISSUE OF FORUM SHOPPING.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON
PETITIONER THE PENALTY OF CENSURE.
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON
THE EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF VALID GROUNDS TO DETAIN JULIUS MESA AND CEZARI
GONZALES.
Petitioner prays that the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside,
and an order be issued ordering respondents to immediately release Gonzales and Mesa. He further prays
that the censure against him be also reversed and set aside.
Before respondents could comment on the petition, petitioner filed, with leave of court, a Motion to
Withdraw the Prayer for the Immediate Release of Julius Mesa and Cezari Gonzales. 22 Petitioner informed
the Court that the Commanding General of the Philippine Marines had ordered the release of Gonzales and

Mesa and surrendered their persons to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148. Thus, Mesa and Gonzales are
now enjoying temporary liberty by virtue of the release orders dated 20 July 2004 issued by the RTC.
Petitioner asks that the prayer for the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa be dismissed but asks that
the other prayers in the petition be granted.
In its comment, the Solicitor General stressed that the habeas corpus petition has been rendered moot and
academic by reason of the release of Mesa and Gonzales from detention and, in the absence of an actual
case or controversy, it is impractical to consider and resolve issues involving the validity or legality of their
detention, including the alleged refusal of the Court of Appeals to resolve said issues.
When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is
effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 23 With the release of both
Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice
constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are
involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question. Where the issues have
become moot and academic, there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution
of the same of no practical value.24 This Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case
where no legal relief is needed or called for. 25
The only remaining issues to be resolved are: (1) Is petitioner guilty of forum shopping? (2) Should
petitioner be penalized when he failed to inform the 3 rd Division of the Court of Appeals of the pendency of
the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents before the 7th Division of the same court which asked for the
annulment of the RTCs order granting Gonzales and Mesas petition for bail?
To support his contention that there was no forum shopping, petitioner asserts that the issues in the
petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus are not similar/identical. As to his non-disclosure of respondents
filing of the motion for reconsideration and the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner claims that the same has
no legal relevance to the Petition for Habeas Corpus because at the time he filed said petition, the order
granting bail subsisted and has not been reversed or modified; and no TRO or injunction has been issued
that would affect the efficacy or validity of the order granting the bail and the order directing the release of
Mesa and Gonzales.
For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari that questioned
the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.
It has been held that forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping (1) when, as a result of an adverse
decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another;
OR (2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files a motion before the Court of
Appeals, since in such a case, he deliberately splits appeals in the hope that even in one case in which a
particular allowable remedy sought for is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be
open; OR (3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to
obtain the same from the original court.26
The Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping, as where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other. Stated differently, there must be between the two cases: (a) identity of
parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.27
As lucidly explained by the Court of Appeals, the ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both the certiorari
and habeas corpus cases is the release of Gonzales and Mesa. Petitioner should not have filed the Petition
for Habeas Corpus because the relief he is seeking therein is the same relief he is asking for in the
certiorari case. Moreover, the main issue in both cases boils down to whether Gonzales and Mesa should
be released on bail. Because of the presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue
are substantially the same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be binding
on the habeas corpus case petitioner is thus guilty of forum shopping.
For his failure to inform the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the certiorari case, petitioner clearly
violated his obligation to disclose within five days the pendency of the same or a similar action or claim as
mandated in Section 5(c), Rule 728 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 dated
12 September 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 154598

August 16, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE
FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner, vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution 1 of the Court of
Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion 2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in
substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic
Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl
whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return
to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In
fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving
her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On
December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her
husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan,
Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was
dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to
Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them
there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification 3 that respondent was no
longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills showing calls from
different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed
another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas
corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction
over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction
of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx

xxx

xxx

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the

latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of
this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer
is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute the
Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also

possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent
and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus
involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus
on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ
has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of
a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by
expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court or any court for
that matter to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of
the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the
courts but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ
of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has
rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in
the Supreme Court,4 Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. 5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court
which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be
construed any other way.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like
petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the
whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being
transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus
case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the
lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect the rights and
promote the welfare of children." The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing
three major issues regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the
deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original
jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater
sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to
guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369
did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a
minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations
that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte
nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs privacy and
emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil
sought to be avoided by the legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing resort to another
jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the heirs
of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the
Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over
such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:

While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports petitioners
submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic
foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the
same manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of
habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where
the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the
Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in
Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof,
on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the
instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before
a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may
also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time,
and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis
supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioners "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for
damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil
Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter,
of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans
survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit
giveth life."
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making,
but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing
legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense.
Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a
statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or
contradiction.7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice
and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" 8 under the Constitution
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal
technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought
into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the
legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have
enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject." 9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said
that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129
that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC
Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of
the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within
its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may
be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner
resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an
unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the
petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:10
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult
than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise
enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 180906

October 7, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
petitioners,
vs. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls,
they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an
overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and
security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 1 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the
Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo
and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines, respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) 2 filed
before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners
(therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and
other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders,
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) 3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In
our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense
and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including
but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2)
enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging,
or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III,
Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution. 5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as
Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They
prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo
Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the
period provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim
reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the
Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 18 7 of the Amparo Rule; and
(5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the
Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:

WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA
(Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We
REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to
conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the
petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein
respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby
REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision
all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their
case, except those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of
any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to
include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them
from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP
Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent
on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several
uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of
their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed
of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their
house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was
Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He
was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked
on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his
mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay. 12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la
Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the
CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and
Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his
house two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed
men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded,
he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names.
The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of
age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall,
thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, whiteskinned and about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside
Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as
his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw
several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the
butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it
was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of
the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was
questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he
had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15

In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up
would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by
the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed
that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials
was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog
and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the
respondents' abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once
they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled
respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food. 17
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him
up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead
twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood.
When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected
Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they
would come back the next day and kill him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made
noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him,
he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a
helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After
walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some
women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was
in Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The
soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what
he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They
poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to
see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort
Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.20
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the
wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk. 21
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel
bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including
urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people 22 had been
detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a
small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the
firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also
sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine
samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time
urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in
white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and
mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink
plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines
were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were
kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen.
Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them. 25
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other
armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents
were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While
there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men. 26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo.
They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months.
When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a
basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting,
seated. He was about two arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt
well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond
lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan.
Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil
man.27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"

Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin
n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa
hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa
bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno." 28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about
3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought
them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo
because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his
parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened
Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children
again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang. 29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four
"masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse. 30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he
called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him
to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said
the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should
prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance. 31
During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture. 32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine,
named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and
instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The
"Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up. 33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed
Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya,
Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from
his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians. 34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24 th Infantry
Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond
was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he
was kept in the barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was
then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them
were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met
Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and
was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped.
She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed
and she was made to do the laundry. 36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose
name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24 th
Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and
Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but
were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed. 37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be
thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of
November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the
hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp
Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed
to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with
soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit. 38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp
of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that
camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers
whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn
and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in
raising livestock.39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought
him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay
Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he

was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his
house.40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house
where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They
spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes. 41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse
near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the
house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales
from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were
tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and
experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos
ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o
marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na
dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6
x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang
mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo,
piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya
ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit
sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula
sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong
sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na
dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni
Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga
sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni
Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas.
Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel
sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil
magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy
namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena. 43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry
for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take
care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and
sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for
Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna. 44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They
helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their
earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular
phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him,
but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between
them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their
guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards.
Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a
radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00
a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice,
Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking
dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity. 45

Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to
matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February
14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the
soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape
from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the
NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the
face until he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated
from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of
Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a
military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One
time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while
Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in
different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in
Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed
by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson." 46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr.
Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization
handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested
by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them
about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne
by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The
examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results
thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed
the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination. 47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the
October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the
abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted,
detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled
issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of
the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7 th Infantry Division in
Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela
Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The
respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped
as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding
General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva
Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the
taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario
aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the
disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were
illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter. 48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of
National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of
the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations,
neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way
micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense
is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies)
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have
directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the
Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also
dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that
the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a
competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible;

(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as
any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance;
and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. 49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ,
attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and
that acting on this directive, he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to
be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher
headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the
concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the
Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of
the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the
concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose
favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher
headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the
Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and
Empeo pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the
surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible,
including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission
of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent
evidence that may be gathered in the process. 50
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier
filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which
averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 th Infantry Batallion detachment
as detention area, I immediately went to the 24 th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no
untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo
and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine
National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that
none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1 st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged
beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen
Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was
used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and
Merino.51
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S.
Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners
could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted. 52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost
Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The
territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a
portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54

On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry Division,
Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the
respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz,
aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning;
and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the
administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any. 57 Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was
initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news
about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was
happening within his territorial jurisdiction. 58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements
and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006. 59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and
finished at 10:00 in the evening. 60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the
individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken,
not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated 61 as according
to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons. 62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. 63 The six persons were not known to
Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them. 64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a
subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the
six persons.65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was
interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of
their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006. 66 When the Sworn Statements were
turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of
May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006. 67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of
Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the
report is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly
taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February
2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident,
relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects:
Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states
that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete
building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims
that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the
abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of
the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they
claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU.
Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C")
states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a
CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also
knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province.
That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of
the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete
chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know
about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo
Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed
that they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that
he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at
Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of
the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and
he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in
the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their place.
He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother

has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA
Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their
brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he
is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are
familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since
childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in
Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident
lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged
members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was
because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary
execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He
claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness
to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the
Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he
is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former
CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are
familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA
and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he
claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the
two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates.
He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and
Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that
he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy.
Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims
that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having
been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or
sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA
leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was
helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the
incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in
the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly
innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything
fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a
CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking
them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired
on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is
unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful,
hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of
the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to
establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also
stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active
sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place,
they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's,
they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence
inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so
far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered
committed by the above
it lacks merit to indict
therefore concluded that

surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction

named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence,
them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is
they are innocent of the charge.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two
(2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.

8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69

In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing
evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED,
REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND
MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN
PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH
THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE
PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD
CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS,
RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND
MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL
PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL
AUGUST 12, 2007.70
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let
us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted
from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances
sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and factbased perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances," 71 hence
"representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the
justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal
killing and enforced disappearances." 73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power
to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the
1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. 74 As the Amparo Rule
was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings"
are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." 75
On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law." 76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish. 77 In 1837, de
Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description
of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. 78 One of them, Manuel
Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, 79 which granted judges
the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was
incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of
those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against
attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting
themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration
concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation. 80
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. 81 If, after hearing, the
judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the
official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to
the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived
from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in
Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but
prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation. 82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various
forms, in response to the particular needs of each country. 83 It became, in the words of a justice of the

Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's
legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived." 84
What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional
rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom,
equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality
of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial
decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo
agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process. 85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect
against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these
countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including
socio-economic rights.86 Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen
to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental
rights.87
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of
the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section
1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to
human rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo.
Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987
Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its
roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.89
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction
or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these
remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through
summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo
Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and
Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. 91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the
preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of
their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007, 93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo
Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII,
Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule
came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as
it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced
disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in
disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to
the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving
affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo. 94
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of
action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof
required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence,
the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The
abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond
Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of
respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and
etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita
kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di
nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel." 97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila
ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas." 98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan
ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena." 99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako
makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar." 100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's
affidavit and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners
(herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six
armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their
attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of
Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU
members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military
men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George.
Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion
of the participation of the elements of the 7 th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU
auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were
either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka
Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely
superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7 th Infantry Division focused on the onesided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that
the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the
Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he
perfunctorily investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware
of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or
any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan)
met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their
parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not
have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long
captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable
command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians
without due process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon,
chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear
and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction
or the detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline

Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried
following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the
petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that
Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was
when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a
detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a
house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them
to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of
Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there
where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the
petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was
presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On
that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join
any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also
among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen.
Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines
for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that
Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of
the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata,
Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We
also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming. 101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by
other independent and credible pieces of evidence. 102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were
corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared
by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on
respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention.
Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as
shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit," 104 firms up
respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the
Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was
abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped
and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the
consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. 106 These
statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being
driven out of the military installation where she was detained. 107 She was also examined by a medical
doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her
cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention. 108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the
victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in
their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as
physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they
were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and
testify against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel
that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as
they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in
detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word" 109 as their
"movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and
testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way.
These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to
threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim
that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which
constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often
associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture
and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and from

incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to
security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive
recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987
Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person,
respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more
meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty" 114 such as a
requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty" 115 or
being put under "monitoring and surveillance."116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and
liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as
respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge...
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over
a person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch
IX, Quezon City, viz: 118
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of
the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy
against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76
Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness
and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons
and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]).
The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and
seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of
his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only
be for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive 121 - upon
which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of
the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that
his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and
property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every
aspect of man's existence."122 In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes
the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a
deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the
nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." 123
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this
right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear"
is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. 124 It is the
"right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." 125 Article 3 of the
UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the
rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is
a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to wellfounded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the
variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus.
Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom
from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the
provision.127
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. 128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It
may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the
free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an
invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the
exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and
psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not
involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the
sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the
commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation
should all the more be protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the
claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison,
thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases
supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged illtreatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time
when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security
and to investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural
obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations. 131 (emphasis
supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that
the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and
fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions
is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and
security of person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right
to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of

person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III,
Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
"guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. 133 As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life,
liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these
rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez
Rodriguez Case,134 viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be
assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that
depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government. 135
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been
interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee 136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of
the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under
Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of
the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to
security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a
religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the
Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of
paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest
and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did
indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right
to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in
the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of
person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow
the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At
the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the
Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known
threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not
arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9
which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of nondetained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees
of the Covenant.139 (emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and prisoner of
conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his
release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import:
Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of
opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the
complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving
the murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered
because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia, 144 involving an assassination
attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as
prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford
protection of the right to liberty. 145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1)
of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v.
Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen
since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The
claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive
and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article
5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual
it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5
must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard
against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into
an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen
since.147 (emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine
whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty
and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including
them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was
caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who
wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It
should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a
lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their
ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents'
captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent
Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas.
Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With
their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and
implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of
other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino,
among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private
citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are
forced to limit their movements or activities. 149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the
perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as
face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the
circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion
that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed.
These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of
Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the
failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction,
detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents'
abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben
Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely
relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in
the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was
taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their
statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six
implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated
October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should
adopt rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members
of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and
preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them;
determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and
apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the
suspected offenders before a competent court. 150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and
that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the
purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of
the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to respondents. 151 To this day,
however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on
October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now
seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation
of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.

In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the
part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation
undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and
charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any,
to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who
attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by
respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1)
the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense;
and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 152 In the case at bar, however,
petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent
Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be
produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that
the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case
as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be
confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the
government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is
pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers,
books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in
his possession, custody or control...
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of
Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and
papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the
ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that
the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable
searches prohibited by the Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the
investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as
the same has been furnished Higher headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present
places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a
list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the
petition for a writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of
official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to
threat of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and
detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial
jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices

and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The
list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of
respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out
from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives
voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 167569

September 4, 2009

CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner, vs. LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167570
JIMMY T. GO, Petitioner, vs. LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171946
HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION; ATTY. FAISAL HUSSIN and ANSARI M. MACAAYAN, in their capacity as
Intelligence Officers of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners, vs. JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T.
GAISANO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us are three petitions. G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are petitions for review on certiorari to set
aside the October 25, 2004 Decision 1 and February 16, 2005 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 85143 that affirmed the Decision 3 dated January 6, 2004 and Order 4 dated May 3, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167 in SCA No. 2218 upholding the preparation and filing of
deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go, the corresponding Charge Sheet 5 dated July 3, 2001, and the
deportation proceedings thereunder conducted.
On the other hand, G.R. No. 171946, also a petition for review on certiorari, seeks to set aside the
December 8, 2005 Decision6 and March 13, 2006 Resolution 7 of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.
88277.
Considering that the three cases arose from the same factual milieu, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R.
Nos. 167570 and 167569 with G.R. No. 171946 per Resolution 8 dated February 26, 2007.
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit 9 for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the
latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino
citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his
contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as "FChinese." Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys
birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be
tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were
typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination
and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and
untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, 10 averring that the complaint for deportation initiated
by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings.
Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a
natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina
mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 11 of the 1935
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 62512 (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the

Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on
July 12, 1950. Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason
behind such late registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even
voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. 13 He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an
undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the
complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks
fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.14
With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is "FChinese," he maintained that such
was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrars Office who
might have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted that the said
office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his fathers citizenship appears to be handwritten, it
may have been changed when the employees of that office realized that his father has already taken his
oath as a Filipino.15 As regards the entry in his siblings certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos
Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made
without prior consultation with his father. 16
In a Resolution17 dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the
complaint for deportation against Jimmy. Associate Commissioner Hornilla affirmed the findings of the
National Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmys father elected Filipino
citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law,
therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.
On March 8, 2001,18 the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos
election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmys claim to Philippine citizenship in
serious doubt by reason of his fathers questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation
and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating Section
37(a)(9)19 in relation to Section 45(c)20 of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940,21 as amended, committed as follows:
xxxx
1. That Respondent was born on October 25, 1952 in Iloilo City, as evidenced by a copy of his birth
certificate wherein his citizenship was recorded as "Chinese";
2. That Respondent through some stealth machinations was able to subsequently cover up his true
and actual citizenship as Chinese and illegally acquired a Philippine Passport under the name JAIME
T. GAISANO, with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, in violation of the
above-cited provisions of the Immigration Act[;]
3. That [R]espondent being an alien, has formally and officially represent[ed] and introduce[d]
himself as a citizen of the Philippines, for fraudulent purposes and in order to evade any
requirements of the immigration laws, also in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.22
On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition 23 with application for
injunctive reliefs before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and
set aside the March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the
proceedings had therein. In essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the
deportation proceedings.
In the interim, the Board issued a Decision 24 dated April 17, 2002, in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117, ordering the
apprehension and deportation of Jimmy. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby Orders the apprehension of
respondent JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME T. GAISANO and that he be then deported to CHINA of which he is a
citizen, without prejudice, however, to the continuation of any and all criminal and other proceedings that
are pending in court or before the prosecution arm of the Philippine Government, if any. And that upon
expulsion, he is thereby ordered barred from entry into the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.25
In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a supplemental petition for certiorari
and prohibition26 before the trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court
issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the
Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision. 27 Later, however, the trial court dissolved the writ in a
Decision28 dated January 6, 2004 as a consequence of the dismissal of the petition.

Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied. 29
Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of deportation 30 which
led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was
eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail. 31
Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the Resolution denying their
motion for reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 85143. They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their
citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the March 8,
2001 Resolution and the charge sheet.
The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition.32 It did not find merit in their argument that the issue of
citizenship should proceed only before the proper court in an independent action, and that neither the
Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines and have exercised
the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that they enjoy the
presumption of being Filipino citizens.
The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases
against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine their citizenship.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of jus soli was never extended to the
Philippines; hence, could not be made a ground to ones claim of Philippine citizenship. Like the trial court,
the appellate tribunal found that Carlos failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of
three years upon reaching the age of majority. Furthermore, it held that the belated submission to the local
civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance in September 1956 was defective because
the affidavit of election was executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several years before
their filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily explained.
The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by the appellate tribunal. The Court of
Appeals stated that the trial court necessarily had to rule on the substantial and legal bases warranting the
deportation proceeding in order to determine whether the Board acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the appellate court found that due process was properly
observed in the proceedings before the Board, contrary to the claim of Jimmy.
Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been denied, 33 Carlos
and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, respectively docketed as G.R.
Nos. 167569 and 167570.
Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143, Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Alipio F.
Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation No. AFF-04-003 34 dated November 16, 2004 to carry out the
April 17, 2002 Decision in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117. This resulted in the apprehension and detention of
Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China. 35
On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus 36 before the RTC of Pasig
City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and detention despite the
pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance.
In an Order37 dated December 6, 2004, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of
habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already
been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied by the
trial court in an Order38 dated December 28, 2004.
Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the appellate
court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 88277. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the
deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court. The Court of
Appeals held as follows:
xxxx
the issuance of a warrant to arrest and deport the petitioner without any proof whatsoever of his
violation of the bail conditions [that he was previously granted] is arbitrary, inequitable and unjust, for the
policies governing the grant of his bail should likewise apply in the cancellation of the said bail. Although a
deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, yet considering that it is such a
harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person who all
his life has always lived in the Philippines, where he has established his family and business interests, one
who appears to be not completely devoid of any claim to Filipino citizenship, being the son of a Filipina,
whose father is alleged to also have elected to be a Filipino, the constitutional right of such person to due
process cannot be peremptorily dismissed or ignored altogether, and indeed should not be denied. If it
later turns out that the petitioner is a Filipino after all, then the overly eager Immigration authorities would
have expelled and relegated to statelessness one who might in fact be a Filipino by blood.

xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition with reference to the Warrant of Deportation issued by
the BID is hereby GRANTED. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, through Commissioner Alipio F.
Fernandez, Jr., Atty. Faizal Hussin and Ansari Maca Ayan, and any of their deputized agents, are ENJOINED
from deporting petitioner Jimmy T. Go, a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, until the issue of petitioners citizenship is
finally settled by the courts of justice.
SO ORDERED.39
Their motion for reconsideration40 having been denied on March 13, 2006, Hon. Alipio Fernandez, in his
capacity as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration, and Atty. Faisal Hussin and Ansari M.
Macaayan, in their capacity as Intelligence Officers of the Bureau of Immigration, are before this Court as
petitioners in G.R. No. 171946.
The parties have raised the following grounds for their respective petitions:
G.R. No. 167569
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND
VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONER CARLOS GO,
SR.
II.
GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONER CARLOS GO SR.S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT
THROUGH MERE "SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D. AS WELL AS IN THE
COURT A QUO.
III.
A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
IV.
ASSUMING CARLOS GO, SR. STILL NEEDS TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP, HE HAD COMPLIED WITH ALL
THE REQUIREMENTS OF COM. ACT NO. 625.
V.
PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR. ENJOYS THE "PRESUMPTION OF CITIZENSHIP."
VI.
RESPONDENTS "CAUSE OF ACTION" HAD LONG PRESCRIBED. 41
G.R. No. 167570
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND
VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONERS FATHER,
CARLOS GO, SR.
II.
THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE B.I.D. ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO OBSERVE
DUE PROCESS.
III.
THE B.I.D.S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER JIMMY T. GO HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
IV.

 GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONERS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL
BLOWN TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE
"SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D.42
G.R. No. 171946
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ENJOINING RESPONDENTS DEPORTATION. 43
Succinctly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (a) whether the cause of action of the Bureau against
Carlos and Jimmy had prescribed; (b) whether the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to
implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein; (c) whether the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy
to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction
from continuing with the deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass
upon the issue of alienage; (d) whether due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the
Board; and (e) whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
The arguments raised by Carlos and Jimmy in their respective petitions are merely a rehash of the
arguments they adduced before the appellate tribunal and the trial court. Once again, they raised the
same argument of prescription. As to Carlos, it is his position that being recognized by the government to
have acquired Philippine citizenship, evidenced by the Certificate of Election issued to him on September
11, 1956, his citizenship could no longer be questioned at this late date. As for Jimmy, he contends that
the Boards cause of action to deport him has prescribed for the simple reason that his arrest was not
made within five (5) years from the time the cause of action arose, which according to him commenced in
1989 when he was alleged to have illegally acquired a Philippine passport.
In any event, they argue that the deportation proceeding should be nullified altogether for failure to
implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein. Jimmy posits that the deportation case against him was
made to depend upon the citizenship of his father, Carlos, in that the Board found justification to order his
deportation by declaring that his father is a Chinese citizen even though the latter was never made a party
in the deportation proceedings. They argue that the Board could not simply strip Carlos of his citizenship
just so they could question the citizenship of Jimmy. To do so without affording Carlos the opportunity to
adduce evidence to prove his claim to Philippine citizenship would be the height of injustice. For failing to
accord him the requisite due process, the whole proceeding should perforce be stuck down.
While they concede that the Board has jurisdiction to hear cases against an alleged alien, they insist that
judicial intervention may be resorted to when the claim to citizenship is so substantial that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct, like in this case. Their claim to Philippine
citizenship, they said, is clearly shown by the fact that they were born, had been raised and had lived in
this country all their lives; they speak fluent Tagalog and Ilonggo; they engage in businesses reserved
solely for Filipinos; they exercise their right to suffrage; they enjoy the rights and privileges accorded only
to citizens; and they have no record of any Alien Certificate of Registration. More importantly, they contend
that they were validly issued Philippine passports. They further posit that the judicial intervention required
is not merely a judicial review of the proceedings below, but a full-blown, adversarial, trial-type
proceedings where the rules of evidence are strictly observed.
Considering that his citizenship affects that of his son, Carlos opted to present controverting arguments to
sustain his claim to Philippine citizenship, notwithstanding the fact that according to him, he was never
impleaded in the deportation proceedings.
Carlos takes exception to the ruling of the appellate court that the doctrine of jus soli failed to accord him
Philippine citizenship for the reason that the same was never extended to the Philippines. He insists that if
his Philippine citizenship is not recognized by said doctrine, it is nonetheless recognized by the laws
enforced prior to the 1935 Constitution, particularly the Philippine Bill of 1902 44 and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law of 1916).45
According to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 deemed all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands as well as their children born after the passage of said laws to be citizens of the
Philippines. Because his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of
the Jones Law of 1916, he (Carlos) undoubtedly acquired his fathers citizenship. Article IV, first paragraph,
of the 1935 Constitution therefore applies to him. Said constitutional provision reads:
ARTICLE IV. Citizenship
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
xxxx

Even assuming that his father remained as a Chinese, Carlos also claims that he followed the citizenship of
his Filipina mother, being an illegitimate son, and that he even validly elected Philippine citizenship when
he complied with all the requirements of Com. Act No. 625. He submits that what is being disputed is not
whether he complied with Com. Act No. 625, but rather, the timeliness of his compliance. He stresses that
the 3-year compliance period following the interpretation given by Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice 46 to
Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 when election must be made, is not
an inflexible rule. He reasoned that the same decision held that such period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino, like in his
case.47
We deny the appeal of Carlos and Jimmy for lack of merit.
Carlos and Jimmys claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has prescribed is untenable. Cases
involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it
necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 48
we said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future
status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. 49 Indeed, if the issue of ones
citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then
there is more reason why the government should not be precluded from questioning ones claim to
Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same has never been threshed out by any tribunal.
Jimmys invocation of prescription also does not persuade us. Section 37 (b) of Com. Act No. 613 states:
Section 37.
xxxx
(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of this section at any time after entry,
but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made
within five years after the cause of deportation arises.
xxxx
As shown in the Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for violation of Section 37(a)(9), 50 in relation to Section
45(e)51 of Com. Act No. 613. From the foregoing provision, his deportation may be effected only if his arrest
is made within 5 years from the time the cause for deportation arose. The court a quo is correct when it
ruled that the 5-year period should be counted only from July 18, 2000, the time when Luis filed his
complaint for deportation. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting
point for the computation of the period of prescription. 52 Additionally, Section 2 of Act No. 3326, 53 as
amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
xxxx
The counting could not logically start in 1989 when his passport was issued because the government was
unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen. Had the government been aware at such time that he was not a
Filipino citizen or there were certain anomalies attending his application for such passport, it would have
denied his application.
As to the issue of whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we reiterate that an indispensable party is a
party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined
either as plaintiff or defendant. 54 To be indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest, that is,
one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit.55 Carlos clearly is not an indispensable party as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by
the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien.
Hence, the principal issue that will be decided on is the propriety of his deportation. To recall, Jimmy claims
that he is a Filipino under Section 1(3), 56 Article IV of the 1935 Constitution because Carlos, his father, is
allegedly a citizen.57 Since his citizenship hinges on that of his fathers, it becomes necessary to pass upon
the citizenship of the latter. However, whatever will be the findings as to Carlos citizenship will in no way
prejudice him.
Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does
not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship
of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res

judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. 58 Res judicata
may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur:
1. a persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof;
and
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.59
In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his deportation sought, the same has to be
ascertained once again as the decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect
upon his citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit will redound upon Carlos, he cannot be said to be an
indispensable party in this case.
There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine the deportation case
against a deportee and in the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by him. 60 However,
this Court, following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed
by the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board 61 wherein we stressed that judicial
determination is permitted in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence
supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the
claim is correct.62 Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship,
the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the
deportation proceedings.63
While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be allowed only in the sound
discretion of a competent court in proper proceedings. 64 After all, the Boards jurisdiction is not divested by
the mere claim of citizenship. 65 Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and not therefore subject
to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation
proceedings.66 The decision of the Board on the question is, of course, not final but subject to review by the
courts.671avvphi1
After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same was
sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings considering that
what were presented particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go
and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore, like the Board, it found the election
of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was offered as additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not
made on time.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal. The question of whether
substantial evidence had been presented to allow immediate recourse to the regular courts is a question of
fact which is beyond this Courts power of review for it is not a trier of facts. 68 None of the exceptions69 in
which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their
arguments and the evidence they presented once again, the same conclusion will still be reached.
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or
the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. We agree. The doctrine of
jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship. 70 However, the Supreme
Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. 71 Since then, said
doctrine only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final
court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.72
Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 73 nor the Jones Law of 1916 74 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines.
His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the
said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate
children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. 75 Moreover, we have also
ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and
privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. 76 However, it
is our considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a
Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship,
we find that the appellate court correctly found that it did not.
Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by

expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines."77
However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should
be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21
years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court
prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the
age of majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. 78
It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when
the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a
single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that
Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering that
the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he was
able to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a
voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter
his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the
rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may
misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country. 79
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he
is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and
any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.80
As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented substantial proof of
the same, we have no choice but to sustain the Boards jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. This
is not to say that we are ruling that they are not Filipinos, for that is not what we are called upon to do.
This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings
may be enjoined in order to give way to a judicial determination of the same. And we are of the opinion
that said proceedings should not be enjoined.
In our considered view, the allegation of Jimmy that due process was not observed in the deportation
proceedings must likewise fail.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted
strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings. 81 The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 82 As long as the parties
are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are
sufficiently met.83 Although Jimmy was not furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge
Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found that he was given ample opportunity to explain his side and
present controverting evidence, thus:
x x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order dated September 11, 2001 signed by BSI Chief
Ronaldo P. Ledesma on October 4, 2001, petitioner Jimmy T. Go admitted that when his representative
went to the B.I.D. to inquire about the said Order, the latter chanced upon the Resolution dated February
14, 2001 and March 8, 2001 as well as the Charge Sheet dated July 3, 2001. Hence on October 5, 2001, he
filed a "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum" and as such, was allowed by Ronaldo P.
Ledesma an extension of ten (10) days to submit his required memorandum. x x x 84
This circumstance satisfies the demands of administrative due process.
As regards the petition in G.R. No. 171946, petitioners contend that the appellate tribunal erred in
enjoining Jimmys deportation.85
Petitioners question the remedy availed of by Jimmy. They argue that the existence of the remedy of an
ordinary appeal proscribes the filing of the petition for certiorari as was done in this case. They point out
that the appeal period in habeas corpus cases is only 48 hours, compared to a special civil action under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which is 60 days. This clearly shows that an ordinary appeal is the more plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; hence, it must be the one availed of. 86 Since the decision of the trial court
was not properly appealed, the same may be said to have attained finality, and may no longer be
disturbed.87

They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial court was proper. A petition
for habeas corpus has for its purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a lawful ground for
Jimmys apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of the Board dated April 17,
2002 that ordered Jimmys deportation has already attained finality by reason of the belated appeal taken
by Jimmy from the said decision on April 2, 2004 before the Office of the President, or after almost two
years from the time the decision was rendered. Said decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful ground
that sanctions Jimmys apprehension and detention. 88
Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on recognizance he was
previously granted to question his subsequent apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under
investigation, and not when the order of deportation had already been issued by the Board. 89 Hence, the
bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis. Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus
necessarily has to be dismissed because the same is no longer proper once the applicant thereof has been
charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy. 90 Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas corpus
case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is no longer being detained. 91
On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is the most
appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal considering that
what is involved in this case is his cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the petitioners
in ordering his arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the avails of the extraordinary writ. 92
Contrary to the petitioners stand, Jimmy argues that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not
attained finality owing to the availability of various remedies, one of which is an appeal, and in fact is
actually void because it was rendered without due process. 93 He also insists that the bail issued to him is
valid and effective until the final determination of his citizenship before the proper courts. 94 Moreover, he
maintains that the petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire into the legality of
ones detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee. 95 As in his petition in G.R. No.
167570, Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void for failure to implead therein
his father, and that he should have been given a full blown trial before a regular court where he can prove
his citizenship.96
Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition in G.R. No. 171946
meritorious.a1f
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
are available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate
remedy is available for the correction of the error. 97
The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more plain,
speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no
unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is
valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the
detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 498 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. 99
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a
petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the
warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be
released had been charged before any court. The term "court" in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies
of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of the
Bureau of Immigration.100 Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas
corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of
deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail
even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it. 101
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his
deportation, coupled by this Courts pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to
continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.
This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced by respondents regarding
the same subject.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are DENIED. The Decision dated October 25,
2004 and Resolution dated February 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 are
AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 171946 is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 8, 2005 and
Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The December 6, 2004 and December 28, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 167 are hereby REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.