Animals and Ethics

What place should non-human animals have in an acceptable moral system?

These animals exist on the borderline of our moral concepts; the result is
that we sometimes find ourselves according them a strong moral status,
while at other times denying them any kind of moral status at all. For
example, public outrage is strong when knowledge of puppy mills is made
available; the thought here is that dogs deserve much more consideration
than the operators of such places give them. However, when it is pointed out
that the conditions in a factory farm are as bad as, if not much worse than,
the conditions in a puppy mill, the usual response is that those affected are
just animals after all, and do not merit our concern. Philosophical thinking
on the moral standing of animals is diverse and can be generally grouped
into three general categories: Indirect theories, direct but unequal theories,
and moral equality theories.
Indirect theories deny animals moral status or equal consideration with
humans due to a lack of consciousness, reason, or autonomy. Ultimately
denying moral status to animals, these theories may still require not
harming animals, but only because doing so causes harm to a human beings
morality. Arguments in this category have been formulated by philosophers
such as Immanuel Kant, Ren Descartes, Thomas Aquinas, Peter Carruthers,
and various religious theories.
Direct but unequal theories accord some moral consideration to animals, but
deny them a fuller moral status due to their inability to respect another
agents rights or display moral reciprocity within a community of equal
agents. Arguments in this category consider the sentience of the animal as
sufficient reason not to cause direct harm to animals. However, where the
interests of animals and humans conflict, the special properties of being
human such as rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness accord higher
consideration to the interests of human beings.
Moral equality theories extend equal consideration and moral status to
animals by refuting the supposed moral relevance of the aforementioned
special properties of human beings. Arguing by analogy, moral equality
theories often extend the concept of rights to animals on the grounds that
they have similar physiological and mental capacities as infants or disabled

human beings. Arguments in this category have been formulated by

philosophers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan.

Table of Contents
1.

Indirect Theories

a. Worldview/Religious Theories
b. Kantian Theories
c. Cartesian Theories
d. Contractualist Theories
e. Implications for the Treatment of Animals
f. Two Common Arguments Against Indirect Theories
i. The Argument From Marginal Cases
ii. Problems with Indirect Duties to Animals
2 Direct but Unequal Theories
a. Why Animals have Direct Moral Status
b. Why Animals are not Equal to Human Beings
i.

Only Human Beings Have Rights

ii. Only Human Beings are Rational, Autonomous, and Self-Conscious

iii. Only Human Beings Can Act Morally
iv. Only Human Beings are Part of the Moral Community
2 Moral Equality Theories
a. Singer and the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests

i. The Argument from Marginal Cases (Again)

ii. The Sophisticated Inegalitarian Argument
iii. Practical Implications
b. Regan and Animal Rights
2 References and Further Reading
a. Anthologies
b. Monographs
c. Articles

1. Indirect Theories
On indirect theories, animals do not warrant our moral concern on their
own, but may warrant concern only in so far as they are appropriately related
to human beings. The various kinds of indirect theories to be discussed are
Worldview/Religious Theories, Kantian Theories, Cartesian Theories, and
Contractualist Theories. The implications these sorts of theories have for the
proper treatment of animals will be explored after that. Finally, two common
methods of arguing against indirect theories will be discussed.

a. Worldview/Religious Theories
Some philosophers deny that animals warrant direct moral concern due to
religious or philosophical theories of the nature of the world and the proper
place of its inhabitants. One of the earliest and clearest expressions of this
kind of view comes to us from Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.). According to
Aristotle, there is a natural hierarchy of living beings. The different levels are
determined by the abilities present in the beings due to their natures. While
plants, animals, and human beings are all capable of taking in nutrition and
growing, only animals and human beings are capable of conscious
experience. This means that plants, being inferior to animals and human
beings, have the function of serving the needs of animals and human beings.

Likewise, human beings are superior to animals because human beings have
the capacity for using reason to guide their conduct, while animals lack this
ability and must instead rely on instinct. It follows, therefore, that the
function of animals is to serve the needs of human beings. This, according to
Aristotle, is natural and expedient (Regan and Singer, 1989: 4-5).
Following Aristotle, the Christian philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas (12251274) argues that since only beings that are rational are capable of
determining their actions, they are the only beings towards which we should
extend concern for their own sakes (Regan and Singer, 1989: 6-12).
Aquinas believes that if a being cannot direct its own actions then others
must do so; these sorts of beings are merely instruments. Instruments exist
for the sake of people that use them, not for their own sake. Since animals
cannot direct their own actions, they are merely instruments and exist for
the sake of the human beings that direct their actions. Aquinas believes that
his view follows from the fact that God is the last end of the universe, and
that it is only by using the human intellect that one can gain knowledge and
understanding of God. Since only human beings are capable of achieving this
final end, all other beings exist for the sake of human beings and their
achievement of this final end of the universe.
Remnants of these sorts of views remain in justifications for discounting the
interests of animals on the basis of the food chain. On this line of thought, if
one kind of being regularly eats another kind of being, then the first is said to
be higher on the food chain. If one being is higher than another on the food
chain, then it is natural for that being to use the other in the furtherance of
its interests. Since this sort of behavior is natural, it does not require any
further moral justification.

b. Kantian Theories
Closely related to Worldview/Religious theories are theories such as
Immanuel Kants (1724-1804). Kant developed a highly influential moral
theory according to which autonomy is a necessary property to be the kind of
being whose interests are to count direclty in the moral assessment of
actions (Kant, 1983, 1956). According to Kant, morally permissible actions
are those actions that could be willed by all rational individuals in the
circumstances. The important part of his conception for the moral status of

animals is his reliance on the notion of willing. While both animals and
human beings have desires that can compel them to action, only human
beings are capable of standing back from their desires and choosing which
course of action to take. This ability is manifested by our wills. Since animals
lack this ability, they lack a will, and therefore are not autonomous.
According to Kant, the only thing with any intrinsic value is a good will.
Since animals have no wills at all, they cannot have good wills; they therefore
do not have any intrinsic value.
Kants theory goes beyond the Worldview/Religious theories by relying on
more general philosophical arguments about the nature of morality. Rather
than simply relying on the fact that it is natural for rational and
autonomous beings to use non-rational beings as they see fit, Kant instead
provides an argument for the relevance of rationality and autonomy. A
theory is a Kantian theory, then, if it provides an account of the properties
that human beings have and animals lack that warrants our according
human beings a very strong moral status while denying animals any kind of
moral status at all. Kants own theory focused on the value of autonomy;
other Kantian theories focus on such properties as being a moral agent,
being able to exist in a reciprocal relation with other human beings, being
able to speak, or being self-aware.

c. Cartesian Theories
Another reason to deny that animals deserve direct concern arises from the
belief that animals are not conscious, and therefore have no interests or wellbeing to take into consideration when considering the effects of our actions.
Someone that holds this position might agree that if animals were conscious
then we would be required to consider their interests to be directly relevant
to the assessment of actions that affect them. However, since they lack a
welfare, there is nothing to take directly into account when acting.
One of the clearest and most forceful denials of animal consciousness is
developed by Rene Descartes (1596-1650), who argues that animals are
automata that might act as if they are conscious, but really are not so (Regan
and Singer, 1989: 13-19). Writing during the time when a mechanistic view
of the natural world was replacing the Aristotelian conception, Descartes
believed that all of animal behavior could be explained in purely mechanistic

terms, and that no reference to conscious episodes was required for such an
explanation. Relying on the principle of parsimony in scientific explanation
(commonly referred to as Occams Razor) Descartes preferred to explain
animal behavior by relying on the simplest possible explanation of their
behavior. Since it is possible to explain animal behavior without reference to
inner episodes of awareness, doing so is simpler than relying on the
assumption that animals are conscious, and is therefore the preferred
explanation.
Descartes anticipates the response that his reasoning, if applicable to animal
behavior, should apply equally well to human behavior. The mechanistic
explanation of behavior does not apply to human beings, according to
Descartes, for two reasons. First, human beings are capable of complex and
novel behavior. This behavior is not the result of simple responses to stimuli,
but is instead the result of our reasoning about the world as we perceive it.
Second, human beings are capable of the kind of speech that expresses
thoughts. Descartes was aware that some animals make sounds that might
be thought to constitute speech, such as a parrots request for food, but
argued that these utterances are mere mechanically induced behaviors. Only
human beings can engage in the kind of speech that is spontaneous and
expresses thoughts.
Descartes position on these matters was largely influenced by his philosophy
of mind and ontology. According to Descartes, there are two mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive kinds of entities or properties: material or
physical entities on the one hand, and mental entities on the other. Although
all people are closely associated with physical bodies, they are not identical
with their bodies. Rather, they are identical with their souls, or the
immaterial, mental substance that constitutes their consciousness. Descartes
believed that both the complexity of human behavior and human speech
requires the positing of such an immaterial substance in order to be
explained. However, animal behavior does not require this kind of
assumption; besides, Descartes argued, it is more probable that worms and
flies and caterpillars move mechanically than that they all have immortal
souls (Regan and Singer, 1989: 18).
More recently, arguments against animal consciousness have been
resurfacing. One method of arguing against the claim that animals are
conscious is to point to the flaws of arguments purporting to claim that

animals are conscious. For example, Peter Harrison has recently argued that
the Argument from Analogy, one of the most common arguments for the
claim that animals are conscious, is hopelessly flawed (Harrison, 1991). The
Argument from Analogy relies on the similarities between animals and
human beings in order to support the claim that animals are conscious. The
similarities usually cited by proponents of this argument are similarities in
behavior, similarities in physical structures, and similarities in relative
positions on the evolutionary scale. In other words, both human beings and
animals respond in the same way when confronted with pain stimuli; both
animals and human beings have brains, nerves, neurons, endorphins, and
other structures; and both human beings and animals are relatively close to
each other on the evolutionary scale. Since they are similar to each other in
these ways, we have good reason to believe that animals are conscious, just
as are human beings.
Harrison attacks these points one by one. He points out that so-called painbehavior is neither necessary nor sufficient for the experience of pain. It is
not necessary because the best policy in some instances might be to not show
that you are in pain. It is not sufficient since amoebas engage in pain
behavior, but we do not believe that they can feel pain. Likewise, we could
easily program robots to engage in pain-behavior, but we would not conclude
that they feel pain. The similarity of animal and human physical structures is
inconclusive because we have no idea how, or even if, the physical structure
of human beings gives rise to experiences in the first place. Evolutionary
considerations are not conclusive either, because it is only pain behavior,
and not the experience of pain itself, that would be advantageous in the
struggle for survival. Harrison concludes that since the strongest argument
for the claim that animals are conscious fails, we should not believe that they
are conscious.
Peter Carruthers has suggested that there is another reason to doubt that
animals are conscious Carruthers, 1989, 1992). Carruthers begins by noting
that not all human experiences are conscious experiences. For example, I
may be thinking of an upcoming conference while driving and not ever
consciously see the truck in the road that I swerve to avoid. Likewise,
patients that suffer from blindsight in part of their visual field have no
conscious experience of seeing anything in that part of the field. However,
there must be some kind of experience in both of these cases since I did
swerve to avoid the truck, and must have seen it, and because blindsight

patients can catch objects that are thrown at them in the blindsighted area
with a relatively high frequency. Carruthers then notes that the difference
between conscious and non-conscious experiences is that conscious
experiences are available to higher-order thoughts while non-conscious
experiences are not. (A higher-order thought is a thought that can take as its
object another thought.) He thus concludes that in order to have conscious
experiences one must be able to have higher-order thoughts. However, we
have no reason to believe that animals have higher-order thoughts, and thus
no reason to believe that they are conscious.

d. Contractualist Theories
Contractualist Theories of morality construe morality to be the set of rules
that rational individuals would choose under certain specified conditions to
govern their behavior in society. These theories have had a long and varied
history; however, the relationship between contractualism and animals was
not really explored until after John Rawls published his A Theory of Justice.
In that work, Rawls argues for a conception of justice as fairness. Arguing
against Utilitarian theories of justice, Rawls believes that the best conception
of a just society is one in which the rules governing that society are rules that
would be chosen by individuals from behind a veil of ignorance. The veil of
ignorance is a hypothetical situation in which individuals do not know any
particular details about themselves, such as their sex, age, race, intelligence,
abilities, etc. However, these individuals do know general facts about human
society, such as facts about psychology, economics, human motivation, etc.
Rawls has his imagined contractors be largely self-interested; each persons
goal is to select the rules that will benefit them the most. Since they do not
know who exactly they are, they will not choose rules that benefit any one
individual, or segment of society, over another (since they may find
themselves to be in the harmed group). Instead, they will choose rules that
protect, first and foremost, rational, autonomous individuals.
Although Rawls argues for this conception as a conception of justice, others
have tried to extend it to cover all of morality. For example, in The Animals
Issue, Peter Carruthers argues for a conception of morality that is based
largely on Rawlss work. Carruthers notes that if we do so extend Rawlss
conception, animals will have no direct moral standing. Since the contractors
are self-interested, but do not know who they are, they will accept rules that

protect rational individuals. However, the contractors know enough about

themselves to know that they are not animals. They will not adopt rules that
give special protection to animals, therefore, since this would not further
their self-interest. The result is that rational human beings will be directly
protected, while animals will not.

e. Implications for the Treatment of Animals

If indirect theories are correct, then we are not required to take the interests
of animals to be directly relevant to the assessment of our actions when we
are deciding how to act. This does not mean, however, that we are not
required to consider how our actions will affect animals at all. Just because
something is not directly morally considerable does not imply that we can do
whatever we want to it. For example, there are two straightforward ways in
which restrictions regarding the proper treatment of animals can come into
existence. Consider the duties we have towards private property. I cannot
destroy your car if I desire to do so because it is your property, and by
harming it I will thereby harm you. Also, I cannot go to the town square and
destroy an old tree for fun since this may upset many people that care for the
tree.
Likewise, duties with regard to animals can exist for these reasons. I cannot
harm your pets because they belong to you, and by harming them I will
thereby harm you. I also cannot harm animals in public simply for fun since
doing so will upset many people, and I have a duty to not cause people undue
distress. These are two straightforward ways in which indirect theories will
generate duties with regard to animals.
There are two other ways that even stronger restrictions regarding the
proper treatment of animals might be generated from indirect theories. First,
both Immanuel Kant and Peter Carruthers argue that there can be more
extensive indirect duties to animals. These duties extend not simply to the
duty to refrain from harming the property of others and the duty to not
offend animal lovers. Rather, we also have a duty to refrain from being cruel
to them. Kant argues:
Our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards humanity. Animal
nature has analogies to human nature, and by doing our duties to animals in

respect of manifestations of human nature, we indirectly do our duty to

humanity. We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals (Regan
and Singer, 1989: 23-24).

Likewise, Carruthers writes:

Such acts [as torturing a cat for fun] are wrong because they are cruel. They betray
an indifference to suffering that may manifest itselfwith that persons dealings
with other rational agents. So although the action may not infringe any rightsit
remains wrong independently of its effect on any animal lover (Carruthers, 1992:
153-54).

So although we need not consider how our actions affect animals themselves,
we do need to consider how our treatment of animals will affect our
treatment of other human beings. If being cruel to an animal will make us
more likely to be cruel to other human beings, we ought not be cruel to
animals; if being grateful to animal will help us in being grateful to human
beings then we ought to be grateful to animals.
Second, there may be an argument for vegetarianism that does not rely on
considerations of the welfare of animals at all. Consider that for every pound
of protein that we get from an animal source, we must feed the animals, on
average, twenty-three pounds of vegetable protein. Many people on the
planet today are dying of easily treatable diseases largely due to a diet that is
below starvation levels. If it is possible to demonstrate that we have a duty to
help alleviate the suffering of these human beings, then one possible way of
achieving this duty is by refraining from eating meat. The vegetable protein
that is used to feed the animals that wealthy countries eat could instead be
used to feed the human beings that live in such deplorable conditions.
Of course, not all indirect theorists accept these results. However, the point
to be stressed here is that even granting that animals have no direct moral
status, we may have (possibly demanding) duties regarding their treatment.

f. Two Common Arguments Against Indirect

Theories

Two common arguments against indirect theories have seemed compelling

to many people. The first argument is The Argument from Marginal Cases;
the second is an argument against the Kantian account of indirect duties to
animals.
i. The Argument From Marginal Cases
The Argument from Marginal Cases is an argument that attempts to
demonstrate that if animals do not have direct moral status, then neither do
such human beings as infants, the senile, the severely cognitively disabled,
and other such marginal cases of humanity. Since we believe that these
sorts of human beings do have direct moral status, there must be something
wrong with any theory that claims they do not. More formally, the argument
is structured as follows:
1.

If we are justified in denying direct moral status to animals then we

are justified in denying direct moral status to the marginal cases.

2.

We are not justified in denying direct moral status to the marginal

cases.

3.

Therefore we are not justified denying direct moral status to animals.

The defense of premise (1) usually goes something like this. If being rational
(or autonomous, or able to speak) is what permits us to deny direct moral
status to animals, then we can likewise deny that status to any human that is
not rational (or autonomous, able to speak, etc.). This line of reasoning
works for almost every property that has been thought to warrant our
denying direct moral status to animals. Since the marginal cases are beings
whose abilities are equal to, if not less than, the abilities of animals, any
reason to keep animals out of the class of beings with direct moral status will
keep the marginal cases out as well.
There is one property that is immune to this line of argument, namely, the
property of being human. Some who adhere to Worldview/Religious Views
might reject this argument and maintain instead that it is simply natural
for human beings to be above animals on any moral scale. However, if
someone does so they must give up the claim that human beings are above
animals due to the fact that human beings are more intelligent or rational

than animals. It must be claimed instead that being human is, in itself, a
morally relevant property. Few in recent times are willing to make that kind
of a claim.
Another way to escape this line of argument is to deny the second premise
(Cf. Frey, 1980; Francis and Norman, 1978). This may be done in a series of
steps. First, it may be noted that there are very few human beings that are
truly marginal. For example, infants, although not currently rational, have
the potential to become rational. Perhaps they should not be counted as
marginal for that reason. Likewise, the senile may have a direct moral status
due to the desires they had when they were younger and rational. Once the
actual number of marginal cases is appreciated, it is then claimed that it is
not counter-intuitive to conclude that the remaining individuals do not have
a direct moral status after all. Once again, however, few are willing to accept
that conclusion. The fact that a severely cognitively disabled infant can feel
pain seems to most to be a reason to refrain from harming the infant.
ii. Problems with Indirect Duties to Animals
Another argument against indirect theories begins with the intuition that
there are some things that simply cannot be done to animals. For example, I
am not permitted to torture my own cat for fun, even if no one else finds out
about it. This intuition is one that any acceptable moral theory must be able
to accommodate. The argument against indirect theories is that they cannot
accommodate this intuition in a satisfying way.
Both Kant and Carruthers agree that my torturing my own cat for fun would
be wrong. However, they believe it is wrong not because of the harm to the
cat, but rather because of the effect this act will have on me. Many people
have found this to be a very unsatisfying account of the duty. Robert Nozick
labels the bad effects of such an act moral spillover, and asks:
Why should there be such a spillover? If it is, in itself, perfectly all right to do
anything at all to animals for any reason whatsoever, then provided a person
realizes the clear line between animals and persons and keeps it in mind as he acts,
why should killing animals brutalize him and make him more likely to harm or kill
persons (Nozick, 1974: 36)?

In other words, unless it is wrong in itself to harm the animal, it is hard to

see why such an act would lead people to do other acts that are likewise
wrong. If the indirect theorist does not have a better explanation for why it is
wrong to torture a cat for fun, and as long as we firmly believe such actions
are wrong, then we will be forced to admit that indirect theories are not
acceptable.
Indirect theorists can, and have, responded to this line of argument in three
ways. First, they could reject the claim that the indirect theorists
explanation of the duty is unsatisfactory. Second, they could offer an
alternative explanation for why such actions as torturing a cat are wrong.
Third, they could reject the claim that those sorts of acts are necessarily
wrong.

2. Direct but Unequal Theories

Most people accept an account of the proper moral status of animals
according to which the interests of animals count directly in the assessment
of actions that affect them, but do not count for as much as the interests of
human beings. Their defense requires two parts: a defense of the claim that
the interests of animals count directly in the assessment of actions that affect
them, and a defense of the claim that the interests of animals do not count
for as much as the interests of human beings.

a. Why Animals have Direct Moral Status

The argument in support of the claim that animals have direct moral status
is rather simple. It goes as follows:
1.

If a being is sentient then it has direct moral status.

2.

(Most) animals are sentient

3.

Therefore (most) animals have direct moral status.

Sentience refers to the capacity to experience episodes of positively or
negatively valenced awareness. Examples of positively valenced episodes of

awareness are pleasure, joy, elation, and contentment. Examples of

negatively valenced episodes of awareness are pain, suffering, depression,
and anxiety.
In support of premise (1), many argue that pain and pleasure are directly
morally relevant, and that there is no reason to discount completely the
pleasure or pain of any being. The argument from analogy is often used in
support of premise (2) (see the discussion of this argument in section I, part
C above). The argument from analogy is also used in answering the difficult
question of exactly which animals are sentient. The general idea is that the
justification for attributing sentience to a being grows stronger the more
analogous it is to human beings.
People also commonly use the flaws of indirect theories as a reason to
support the claim that animals have direct moral status. Those that believe
both that the marginal cases have direct moral status and that indirect
theories cannot answer the challenge of the Argument from Marginal Cases
are led to support direct theories; those that believe both that such actions as
the torture of ones own cat for fun are wrong and that indirect theories
cannot explain why they are wrong are also led to direct theories.

b. Why Animals are not Equal to Human

Beings
The usual manner of justifying the claim that animals are not equal to
human beings is to point out that only humans have some property, and then
argue that that property is what confers a full and equal moral status to
human beings. Some philosophers have used the following claims on this
strategy: (1) only human beings have rights; (2) only human beings are
rational, autonomous, and self-conscious; (3) only human beings are able to
act morally; and (4) only human beings are part of the moral community.
i. Only Human Beings Have Rights
On one common understanding of rights, only human beings have rights. On
this conception of rights, if a being has a right then others have a duty to
refrain from infringing that right; rights entail duties. An individual that has

a right to something must be able to claim that thing for himself, where this
entails being able to represent himself in his pursuit of the thing as a being
that is legitimately pursuing the furtherance of his interests (Cf. McCloskey,
1979). Since animals are not capable of representing themselves in this way,
they cannot have rights.
However, lacking rights does not entail lacking direct moral status; although
rights entail duties it does not follow that duties entail rights. So although
animals may have no rights, we may still have duties to them. The
significance of having a right, however, is that rights act as trumps against
the pursuit of utility. In other words, if an individual has a right to
something, we are not permitted to infringe on that right simply because
doing so will have better overall results. Our duties to those without rights
can be trumped by considerations of the overall good. Although I have a duty
to refrain from destroying your property, that duty can be trumped if I must
destroy the property in order to save a life. Likewise, I am not permitted to
harm animals without good reason; however, if greater overall results will
come about from such harm, then it is justified to harm animals. This sort of
reasoning has been used to justify such practices as experimentation that
uses animals, raising animals for food, and using animals for our
entertainment in such places as rodeos and zoos.
There are two points of contention with the above account of rights. First, it
has been claimed that if human beings have rights, then animals will likewise
have rights. For example, Joel Feinberg has argued that all is required in
order for a being to have a right is that the being be capable of being
represented as legitimately pursuing the furtherance of its interests
(Feinberg, 1974). The claim that the being must be able to represent itself is
too strong, thinks Feinberg, for such a requirement will exclude infants, the
senile, and other marginal cases from the class of beings with rights. In other
words, Feinberg invokes yet another instance of the Argument from
Marginal Cases in order to support his position.
Second, it has been claimed that the very idea of rights needs to be
jettisoned. There are two reasons for this. First, philosophers such as R. G.
Frey have questioned the legitimacy of the very idea of rights, echoing
Benthams famous claim that rights are nonsense on stilts (Frey, 1980).
Second, philosophers have argued that whether or not a being will have
rights will depend essentially on whether or not it has some other lower-

order property. For example, on the above conception of rights, whether a

being will have a right or not will depend on whether it is able to represent
itself as a being that is legitimately pursuing the furtherance of its interests.
If that is what grounds rights, then what is needed is a discussion of the
moral importance of that ability, along with a defense of the claim that it is
an ability that animals lack. More generally, it has been argued that if we
wish to deny animals rights and claim that only human beings have them,
then we must focus not so much on rights, but rather on what grounds them.
For this reason, much of the recent literature concerning animals and ethics
focuses not so much on rights, but rather on whether or not animals have
certain other properties, and whether the possession of those properties is a
necessary condition for equal consideration (Cf. DeGrazia, 1999).
ii. Only Human Beings are Rational, Autonomous, and SelfConscious
Some people argue that only rational, autonomous, and self-conscious
beings deserve full and equal moral status; since only human beings are
rational, autonomous, and self-conscious, it follows that only human beings
deserve full and equal moral status. Once again, it is not claimed that we can
do whatever we like to animals; rather, the fact that animals are sentient
gives us reason to avoid causing them unnecessary pain and suffering.
However, when the interests of animals and human beings conflict we are
required to give greater weight to the interests of human beings. This also
has been used to justify such practices as experimentation on animals,
raising animals for food, and using animals in such places as zoos and
rodeos.
The attributes of rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness confer a full
and equal moral status to those that possess them because these beings are
the only ones capable of attaining certain values and goods; these values and
goods are of a kind that outweigh the kinds of values and goods that nonrational, non-autonomous, and non-self-conscious beings are capable of
attaining. For example, in order to achieve the kind of dignity and selfrespect that human beings have, a being must be able to conceive of itself as
one among many, and must be able to choose his actions rather than be led
by blind instinct (Cf. Francis and Norman, 1978; Steinbock, 1978).
Furthermore, the values of appreciating art, literature, and the goods that

come with deep personal relationships all require one to be rational,

autonomous, and self-conscious. These values, and others like them, are the
highest values to us; they are what make our lives worth living. As John
Stuart Mill wrote, Few human creatures would consent to be changed into
any of the lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beasts
pleasures (Mill, 1979). We find the lives of beings that can experience these
goods to be more valuable, and hence deserving of more protection, than the
lives of beings that cannot.
iii. Only Human Beings Can Act Morally
Another reason for giving stronger preference to the interests of human
beings is that only human beings can act morally. This is considered to be
important because beings that can act morally are required to sacrifice their
interests for the sake of others. It follows that those that do sacrifice their
good for the sake of others are owed greater concern from those that benefit
from such sacrifices. Since animals cannot act morally, they will not sacrifice
their own good for the sake of others, but will rather pursue their good even
at the expense of others. That is why human beings should give the interests
of other human beings greater weight than they do the interests of animals.
iv. Only Human Beings are Part of the Moral Community
Finally, some claim that membership in the moral community is necessary
for full and equal moral status. The moral community is not defined in terms
of the intrinsic properties that beings have, but is defined rather in terms of
the important social relations that exist between beings. For example,
human beings can communicate with each other in meaningful ways, can
engage in economic, political, and familial relationships with each other, and
can also develop deep personal relationships with each other. These kinds of
relationships require the members of such relationships to extend greater
concern to other members of these relationships than they do to others in
order for the relationships to continue. Since these relationships are what
constitute our lives and the value contained in them, we are required to give
greater weight to the interests of human beings than we do to animals.

3. Moral Equality Theories

The final theories to discuss are the moral equality theories. On these
theories, not only do animals have direct moral status, but they also have the
same moral status as human beings. According to theorists of this kind, there
can be no legitimate reason to place human beings and animals in different
moral categories, and so whatever grounds our duties to human beings will
likewise ground duties to animals.

a. Singer and the Principle of Equal

Consideration of Interests
Peter Singer has been very influential in the debate concerning animals and
ethics. The publication of his Animal Liberation marked the beginning of a
growing and increasingly powerful movement in both the United States and
Europe.
Singer attacks the views of those who wish to give the interests of animals
less weight than the interests of human beings. He argues that if we attempt
to extend such unequal consideration to the interests of animals, we will be
forced to give unequal consideration to the interests of different human
beings. However, doing this goes against the intuitively plausible and
commonly accepted claim that all human beings are equal. Singer concludes
that we must instead extend a principle of equal consideration of interests to
animals as well. Singer describes that principle as follows:
The essence of the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests is that we give
equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by
our actions (Singer, 1993: 21).

Singer defends this principle with two arguments. The first is a version of the
Argument from Marginal Cases; the second is the Sophisticated Inegalitarian
Argument.
i. The Argument from Marginal Cases (Again)
Singers version of the Argument from Marginal Cases is slightly different
from the version listed above. It runs as follows:

1.

In order to conclude that all and only human beings deserve a full and
equal moral status (and therefore that no animals deserve a full and equal
moral status), there must be some property P that all and only human beings
have that can ground such a claim.

2.

Any P that only human beings have is a property that (some) human
beings lack (e.g., the marginal cases).

3.

Any P that all human beings have is a property that (most) animals
have as well.

4.

Therefore, there is no way to defend the claim that all and only human
beings deserve a full and equal moral status.
Singer does not defend his first premise, but does not need to; the
proponents of the view that all and only humans deserve a full and equal
moral status rely on it themselves (see the discussion of Direct but Unequal
Theories above). In support of the second premise, Singer asks us to consider
exactly what properties only humans have that can ground such a strong
moral status. Certain properties, such as being human, having human DNA,
or walking upright do not seem to be the kind of properties that can ground
this kind of status. For example, if we were to encounter alien life forms that
did not have human DNA, but lived lives much like our own, we would not
be justified in according these beings a weaker moral status simply because
they were not human.
However, there are some properties which only human beings have which
have seemed to many to be able to ground a full and equal moral status; for
example, being rational, autonomous, or able to act morally have all been
used to justify giving a stronger status to human beings than we do to
animals. The problem with such a suggestion is that not all human beings
have these properties. So if this is what grounds a full and equal moral
status, it follows that not all human beings are equal after all.
If we try to ensure that we choose a property that all human beings do have
that will be sufficient to ground a full and equal moral status, we seemed to
be pushed towards choosing something such as being sentient, or being
capable of experiencing pleasure and pain. Since the marginal cases have this
property, they would be granted a full and equal moral status on this

suggestion. However, if we choose a property of this kind, animals will

likewise have a full and equal moral status since they too are sentient.
The attempt to grant all and only human beings a full and equal moral status
does not work according to Singer. We must either conclude that not all
human beings are equal, or we must conclude that not only human beings
are equal. Singer suggests that the first option is too counter-intuitive to be
acceptable; so we are forced to conclude that all animals are equal, human or
otherwise.
ii. The Sophisticated Inegalitarian Argument
Another argument Singer employs to refute the claim that all and only
human beings deserve a full and equal moral status focuses on the supposed
moral relevance of such properties as rationality, autonomy, the ability to act
morally, etc. Singer argues that if we were to rely on these sorts of properties
as the basis of determining moral status, then we would justify a kind of
discrimination against certain human beings that is structurally analogous to
such practices as racism and sexism.
For example, the racist believes that all members of his race are more
intelligent and rational than all of the members of other races, and thus
assigns a greater moral status to the members of his race than he does do the
members of other races. However, the racist is wrong in this factual
judgment; it is not true that all members of any one race are smarter than all
members of any other. Notice, however, that the mistake the racist is making
is merely a factual mistake. His moral principle that assigns moral status on
the basis of intelligence or rationality is not what has led him astray. Rather,
it is simply his assessment of how intelligence or rationality is distributed
among human beings that is mistaken.
If that were all that is wrong with racism and sexism, then a moral theory
according to which we give extra consideration to the very smart and rational
would be justified. In other words, we would be justified in becoming, not
racists, but sophisticated inegalitarians. However, the sophisticated
inegalitarian is just as morally suspect as the racist is. Therefore, it follows
that the racist is not morally objectionable merely because of his views on
how rationality and intelligence are distributed among human beings; rather

he is morally objectionable because of the basis he uses to weigh the interests

of different individuals. How intelligent, rational, etc., a being is cannot be
the basis of his moral status; if it were, then the sophisticated inegalitarian
would be on secure ground.
Notice that in order for this argument to succeed, it must target properties
that admit of degrees. If someone argued that the basis of human equality
rested on the possession of a property that did not admit of degrees, it would
not follow that some human beings have that property to a stronger degree
than others, and the sophisticated inegalitarian would not be justified.
However, most of the properties that are used in order to support the claim
that all and only human beings deserve a full and equal moral status are
properties that do admit of degrees. Such properties as being human or
having human DNA do not admit of degrees, but, as already mentioned,
these properties do not seem to be capable of supporting such a moral status.
iii. Practical Implications
In order to implement the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests in
the practical sphere, we must be able to determine the interests of the beings
that will be affected by our actions, and we must give similar interests similar
weight. Singer concludes that animals can experience pain and suffering by
relying on the argument from analogy (see the discussion of Cartesian
Theories above). Since animals can experience pain and suffering, they have
an interest in avoiding pain.
These facts require the immediate end to many of our practices according to
Singer. For example, animals that are raised for food in factory farms live
lives that are full of unimaginable pain and suffering (Singer devotes an
entire chapter of his book to documenting these facts. He relies mainly on
magazines published by the factory farm business for these facts). Although
human beings do satisfy their interests by eating meat, Singer argues that the
interests the animals have in avoiding this unimaginable pain and suffering
is greater than the interests we have in eating food that tastes good. If we are
to apply the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests, we will be forced
to cease raising animals in factory farms for food. A failure to do so is
nothing other than speciesism, or giving preference to the interests of our
own species merely because of they are of our species.

Singer does not unequivocally claim that we must not eat animals if we are to
correctly apply the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. Whether we
are required to refrain from painlessly killing animals will depend on
whether animals have an interest in continuing to exist in the future. In
order to have this interest, Singer believes that a being must be able to
conceive of itself as existing into the future, and this requires a being to be
self-conscious. Non-self-conscious beings are not harmed by their deaths,
according to Singer, for they do not have an interest in continuing to exist
into the future.
Singer argues that we might be able to justify killing these sorts of beings
with The Replaceability Argument. On this line of thought, if we kill a nonself-conscious being that was living a good life, then we have lessened the
overall amount of good in the world. This can be made up, however, by
bringing another being into existence that can experience similar goods. In
other words, non-self-conscious beings are replaceable: killing one can be
justified if doing so is necessary to bring about the existence of another.
Since the animals we rear for food would not exist if we did not eat them, it
follows that killing these animals can be justified if the animals we rear for
food live good lives. However, in order for this line of argumentation to
justify killing animals, the animals must not only be non-self-conscious, but
they must also live lives that are worth living, and their deaths must be
painless. Singer expresses doubts that all of these conditions could be met,
and unequivocally claims that they are not met by such places as factory
farms.
Singer also condemns most experimentation in which animals are used. He
first points out that many of the experiments performed using animal
subjects do not have benefits for human beings that would outweigh the pain
caused to the animals. For example, experiments used to test cosmetics or
other non-necessary products for human beings cannot be justified if we use
the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. Singer also condemns
experiments that are aimed at preventing or curing human diseases. If we
are prepared to use animal subjects for such experiments, then it would
actually be better from a scientific point of view to use human subjects
instead, for there would be no question of cross-species comparisons when
interpreting the data. If we believe the benefits outweigh the harms, then
instead of using animals we should instead use orphaned infants that are
severely cognitively disabled. If we believe that such a suggestion is morally

repugnant when human beings are to be used, but morally innocuous when
animals are to be used, then we are guilty of speciesism.
Likewise, hunting for sport, using animals in rodeos, keeping animals
confined in zoos wherein they are not able to engage in their natural
activities are all condemned by the use of the Principle of the Equal
Consideration of Interests.

b. Regan and Animal Rights

Tom Regans seminal work, The Case for Animal Rights, is one of the most
influential works on the topic of animals and ethics. Regan argues for the
claim that animals have rights in just the same way that human beings do.
Regan believes it is a mistake to claim that animals have an indirect moral
status or an unequal status, and to then infer that animals cannot have any
rights. He also thinks it is a mistake to ground an equal moral status on
Utilitarian grounds, as Singer attempts to do. According to Regan, we must
conclude that animals have the same moral status as human beings;
furthermore, that moral status is grounded on rights, not on Utilitarian
principles.
Regan argues for his case by relying on the concept of inherent value.
According to Regan, any being that is a subject-of-a-life is a being that has
inherent value. A being that has inherent value is a being towards which we
must show respect; in order to show respect to such a being, we cannot use it
merely as a means to our ends. Instead, each such being must be treated as
an end in itself. In other words, a being with inherent value has rights, and
these rights act as trumps against the promotion of the overall good.
Regan relies on a version of the Argument from Marginal Cases in arguing
for this conclusion. He begins by asking what grounds human rights. He
rejects robust views that claim that a being must be capable of representing
itself as legitimately pursuing the furtherance of its interests on the grounds
that this conception of rights implies that the marginal cases of humanity do
not have rights. However, since we think that these beings do have moral
rights there must be some other property that grounds these rights.
According to Regan, the only property that is common to both normal adult

human beings and the marginal cases is the property of being a subject-of-alife. A being that is a subject-of-a-life will:
have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including
their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain;
preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their
desires and goals; a psychological identity over time; and an individual welfare in
the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically
independently of their utility for others, and logically independently of their being
the object of anyone elses interests (Regan, 1983: 243).

This property is one that all of the human beings that we think deserve rights
have; however, it is a property that many animals (especially mammals) have
as well. So if these marginal cases of humanity deserve rights, then so do
these animals.
Although this position may seem quite similar to Singers position (see
section III, part A above), Regan is careful to point to what he perceives to be
the flaws of Singers Utilitarian theory. According to Singer, we are required
to count every similar interest equally in our deliberation. However, by doing
this we are focusing on the wrong thing, Regan claims. What matters is the
individual that has the interest, not the interest itself. By focusing on
interests themselves, Utilitarianism will license the most horrendous actions.
For example, if it were possible to satisfy more interests by performing
experiments on human beings, then that is what we should do on Utilitarian
grounds. However, Regan believes this is clearly unacceptable: any being
with inherent value cannot be used merely as a means.
This does not mean that Regan takes rights to be absolute. When the rights
of different individuals conflict, then someones rights must be overriden.
Regan argues that in these sorts of cases we must try to minimize the rights
that are overriden. However, we are not permitted to override someones
rights just because doing so will make everyone better off; in this kind of case
we are sacrificing rights for utility, which is never permissible on Regans
view.
Given these considerations, Regan concludes that we must radically alter the
ways in which we treat animals. When we raise animals for food, regardless
of how they are treated and how they are killed, we are using them as a

means to our ends and not treating them as ends in themselves. Thus, we
may not raise animals for food. Likewise, when we experiment on animals in
order to advance human science, we are using animals merely as a means to
our ends. Similar thoughts apply to the use of animals in rodeos and the
hunting of animals.

4. Bibliography
a. Anthologies

Miller, H. and W. Miller, eds. Ethics and Animals (Clifton, NJ:

Humana Press, 1983).

Regan, T. and P. Singer, eds. Animal Rights and Human Obligations

2/e (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989).

Walters, K and Lisa Portmess, eds. Ethical Vegetarianism: From

Pythagoras to Peter Singer(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1999).

b. Monographs

Carruthers, Peter. The Animals Issue: Morality in

Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Clark, Stephen. The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1977).

DeGrazia, David. Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral

Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Dombrowski, Daniel. Babies and Beasts: The Argument from

Marginal Cases. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1997).

Fox, Michael A. The Case for Animal Experimentation: An

Evolutionary and Ethical Perspective(Berkeley: The University of California
Press, 1986).

Frey, R. G. Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1980).

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason (Upper Saddle River,

NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), originally published 1788.

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (New

York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956), originally published 1785.

Midgley, Mary. Animals and Why They Matter (Athens, GA: The
University of Georgia Press, 1983).

Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishers,

1979), originally published 1861.

Noddings, Nell. Caring: A Feminist Approach to Ethics and Moral

Education (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1984).
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1974).

Pluhar, Evelyn. Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human

and Nonhuman Animals(Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).

Rachels, James. Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of

Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: The University of
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Rodd, Rosemary. Biology, Ethics, and Animals (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1990).

Rollin, Bernard. The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal

Pain, and Science(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

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Warren, Mary Anne. Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other

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Philosophy 86(1989): 258-69.

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Diamond, Cora. Eating Meat and Eating

People, Philosophy 53(1978): 465-79.

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Fox, Michael A. Animal Experimentation: A Philosophers Changing

Views, Between the Species3(1987): 55-82.

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More Equal than Others,Philosophy 53(1978): 507-27.

Goodpaster, Kenneth. On Being Morally Considerable, The Journal

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Harrison, Peter. Do Animals Feel Pain?, Philosophy 66(1991): 25-40.

McCloskey, H. J. Moral Rights and Animals, Inquiry 22(1979): 2354.

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Interest?, Environmental Ethics5(1983): 319-33.

Narveson, Jan. Animal Rights, Canadian Journal of

Philosophy 7(1977): 161-78.

Steinbock, Bonnie. Speciesism and the Idea of

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Warren, Mary Anne. Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights

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Equality, Environmental Ethics 2(1980): 149-61.

Wilson, Scott. Carruthers and the Argument From Marginal

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Wilson, Scott. Indirect Duties to Animals, The Journal of Value

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