A.M.

No.
P-12-3070
March
11,
2014
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3327-P]
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION, Complainant,
vs.
NENITA C. LONGOS, Clerk II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Del CarmenNumancia-San Isidro-San Benito, Surigao del Norte, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
At bench is an administrative case involving respondent Nenita C. Longos, employed as
Clerk II of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Del Carmen-Numancia-San Isidro-San Benito,
Surigao del Norte. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found her guilty of
dishonesty for allowing another person to take her 1992 Civil Service Professional
Examination. The OCA recommends that respondent be dismissed from the service.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 25 October 2002, a letter from a concerned citizen 1 informed the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) of respondents spurious eligibility. The letter stated that on 29
November 1992, Longos asked someone else to take her Civil Service Professional
Examination under Examination No. 342620, which fraudulently resulted in her
attainment of an 86.10% rating.
In response, the CSC studied the Personal Data Sheet (PDS), 2 appointment papers,3 and
examination records of respondent. The latter included her Examinee Attendance
Sheet4 and Picture-Seat Plan (PSP).5 Comparing these documents, the CSC found a
patent dissimilarity between the pictures pasted in her PDS and in her purported PSP.
In view of this discrepancy, the CSC required Longos to submit sworn counter statements
and invited her to a conference. 6 But no hearing materialized as respondent failed to
appear despite several resettings.7 Eventually, the CSC formally charged her with the
administrative offense of dishonesty.8
Thereafter, on 21 January 2010, the CSC referred to the OCA this administrative case
involving a court employee, pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, 9 and
Ampong v. Civil Service Commission.10
In the proceedings before the OCA, the Court Administrator repeatedly required Longos
to file a comment, to no avail. 11 Consequently, on 5 March 2012, her case was deemed
submitted for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
In its Memorandum dated 30 March 2012, 12 the OCA found Longos guilty of dishonesty. It
noticed that the picture appearing in her PDS was different from that pasted in her PSP.
Without her filing any answer to explain the anomaly, the OCA construed the evidence
against her as unrefuted. It then recommended her dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits except accrued leave credits and with
perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government-owned or controlled
corporation.
RULING OF THE COURT
After a judicious examination of the records, we note and adopt the recommendation of
the OCA.
As shown by the documents on record, which were uncontested by respondent despite
an opportunity to do so, it is clear that the pictures in her PDS and PSP are starkly
different.13 Therefore, based on substantial evidence, 14this Court concludes that she
asked another person to take the 1992 Civil Service Professional Examination in her
stead.
It is beyond question that the act of fraudulently securing ones appointment constitutes
dishonesty.1wphi1 In Office of the Court Administrator v. Bermejo, 15 we squarely ruled
thus:
Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact, or
practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination,
appointment or registration. Dishonesty is a serious offense which reflects a persons
character and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys his honor, virtue and
integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the
government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee
than a position in the judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)
The case of Longos is not one of first impression. In numerous other cases, this Court has
dismissed erring personnel of the judiciary whose civil service eligibility was
unscrupulously obtained through the guise of another.

Twelve years ago, in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, 16 the CSC and the Court already
uncovered this type of mischief by comparing the pictures of civil servants in their PSP
and PDS. Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, 17In re: Alleged Illegal Acquisition of a
Career Service Eligibility by Ma. Aurora P Santos, 18 and most recently, Civil Service
Commission v. Hadji Ali,19 also utilized the same modus operandi decried by the Court.
This fraudulent act by an aspiring civil servant will not be countenanced by the Court,
much more so when committed by one who seeks to be employed in our fold. After all,
credibility undergirds the substance and process of the rendering of justice.
All public service must be founded on and sustained by character. With the right
character, the attitude of judiciary employees is set in the right direction. It is then of
utmost consequence that every employee of the judiciary exhibit the highest sense of
honesty and integrity to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. 20
In her act of dishonesty, respondent failed to take heed of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, which regards all court personnel as sentinels of justice expected to refrain
from any act of impropriety.21 Thus, applying the penalties under the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 22 we sanction her perfidy by imposing
upon her the penalty of dismissal from service with accessory penalties.
WHEREFORE, Nenita C. Longos is hereby found GUILTY of dishonesty. She is DISMISSED
from the service with forfeiture of all her retirement benefits, except the value of her
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government or
any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to her records with this
Court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180016
April 29, 2014
LITO
CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision 3 dated
July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business
of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces
of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and
offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant
agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k
diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's
bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date.
They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to
return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay
the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as
follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having
received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00;
one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies'
bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos
(P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused
to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said

accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated
obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or
the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and
refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos
(P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in
the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo
Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner,
which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is
engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every
collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he
was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May
2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the
subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised
Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to
vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of
liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4)
YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM,
to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum
period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount
of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and
affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of
the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on
the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of
prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7
years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the
present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND
APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS
EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE
ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]
JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF
05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S

FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR
REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
ALTHOUGH 1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND
LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the
following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation
of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more
weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that
the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. 4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the
CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court
raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in
evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings,
although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule.
However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private
complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even
admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party
failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the
period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when
the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant. This
argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was
substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and
substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that
the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of
the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of
the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA
ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows
compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was
stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the
prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of
the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The
gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the

prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission
thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the
prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto
defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accusedappellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as
testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules.
Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly
apprised of the charges proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there
is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended
party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private
complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months
from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items
with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have
been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline
came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the
items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. 10 Demand need not
even be formal; it may be verbal. 11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used
to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere

query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount
to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this
kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is
silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be
necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the
failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of
the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for
funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same
way, however, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar. 14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces
of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991
with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was
misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry
sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after
the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the
latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner,
the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of
witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the
witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the
records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. 16 Truth is established not
by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining
the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered. 17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving
property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the
money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the
members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are
of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration
and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give
their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean
Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate
President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard
on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as
counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court
finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the
courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However,
this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute
judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties
provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as
that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This,
however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be
appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had
anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are
not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable
by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,

through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that
said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department
of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution
of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in
the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a
case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy
is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of
any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need
to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar
to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in
the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the
Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be noncommensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief
Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined
that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it
believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege,"
that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically
provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it
necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be
entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence
on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause
excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the
matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification
of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon
C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in their book, The
Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice
must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom
or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law
upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe
enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is
the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly
appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel
and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief
Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based
on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it
would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite
imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if
the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the
penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the
framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it
included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the
present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to
conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the
same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those punishable acts which
have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the
legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal
laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00

plundered, the legislature lowered it to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature
lowered the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply,
from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not
seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding
penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the
value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if
the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50
pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5
pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of
the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the
provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value
of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the
impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision states
that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing
stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It
would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the
penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under
the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the
minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months
and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving
the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the
proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto
menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2
months) is not too far from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would
seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is
also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in
the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the
minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper
penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be
commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage
caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the
penalties are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punished by
prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).

2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished by

prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1
month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor
medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified
but the penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punishable
by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1
day to 8 years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punishable by
prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months
and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is
that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder
is that of reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on
substantial distinctions asP10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not
so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who
commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this
is no longer achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same
penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite;
and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing
conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing
subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses
more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the
appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their
inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional,
the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as
unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than
Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty
rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get
you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court
cannot fix the amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm, 30 Dean Diokno avers that the United
States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional
provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and

not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide
whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and
gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes
are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in
Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state
court of South Dakota after it took into account the latters recidivist statute and not the
original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment
for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine.
Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole under South Dakotas recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions.
Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable
penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher
penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the
helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus
entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the employers loved
ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the
necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on
the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious
implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on
the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. Any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation
or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than
twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand
pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to
the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due
to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount
malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now becomes P20,000.00 and
the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4
months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of
embezzlement ofP20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials
punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, specifically Section 3, 31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not
generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15
years)32under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case,
because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public
position to embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.

The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things
(inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of
unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief,
where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage
caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of
the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will
now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force
employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime
of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the
former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00
now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation,
which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force
upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12
years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not
merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that
can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1
day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the
proposal, the value of the damage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still
punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the
damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not
less than the value of the damage caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount
involved does not exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, P200.00
will now become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of P200.00 under the
existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will
now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is
categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the
RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on
the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or
impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be
affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a
penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the
property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real
property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or
landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor),
Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article
331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that
impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the
public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of
accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer
to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect
crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended. 34 The law treats cutting,
gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as
an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. 35 Under the law,
the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense
is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the offense.
Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of
Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because the
penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative
because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some
provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position

to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely
making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such
is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to
conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due
proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or
other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal
Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at
present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised
Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that
were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings
were far different from todays conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it
shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the
guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or
give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. 38 The Court should apply the
law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law
is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from
encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government;
otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine;
hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances.
In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case
be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of
his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291,
the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate
or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a
period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to
the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is
civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a
sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the
victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken
which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the
reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be
the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is
apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of
civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although
the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded
as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 39 of the Civil Code also does
not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court,
depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The
amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it
does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as
tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being
punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a

matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the
law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that
which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios opinions is that
the incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the
courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00,
regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however,
from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no
longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of
criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be
meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic
twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the
law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of
criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 40 in
December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably,
no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty
was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346, 41 the Court did not
impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment"
within the purview of Section 19 (1),42Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was
through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its
non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare
the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the
present action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the
concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is
settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally, 43 more so in the
present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine
and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has
been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community."45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and
adapt it to our modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into
consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be
accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and
weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be
made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and
lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to
validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and
appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to
wit:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso
you have to take into consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined
utilizing all of those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the
value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the
adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view
that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to
prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court
should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the
proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has
in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in
circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of
the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Courts adjustment of
indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of
current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code
mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of
being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the
Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should
refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated
before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on
penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money,
but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount

that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted
as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling
of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum.
However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus one (1) year for each additionalP10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v.
People48 is highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in
which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the
penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one
period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum,
medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional
maximum to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time
each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article
6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00, which
exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article
315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every
additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total
penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00
ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum
period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be
increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years,
plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the
estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of
making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut
by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited
judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner
Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and
Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San
Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are

hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN
DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation
to sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after
the expiration of 30 days.
The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.
When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned
and the date when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction
ISSUES and RULING
Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best
evidence rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection
to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered
as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
identified, marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecutions formal offer of evidence and even
admitted having signed the said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under
Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion
of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period
and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not
make the latter fatally defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:
1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of
offense was committed on or about the 5th of July 1991, such is not fatal to the
prosecutions cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of
the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or
on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not
even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word demand need not even be used to
show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query
as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a
demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
entrusted to the accused, the query was tantamount to a demand.
May a sole witness be considered credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC
gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity
to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an
opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence,
especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value
and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
A.M.
No.
P-13-3126
February
4,
2014
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3273-P)
VERONICA
F.
GALINDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ZOSIMA SUSBILLA-DE VERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A court stenographer who defrauded a litigant by soliciting money to supposedly
facilitate a legal proceeding in the court is guilty of the most serious administrative
offense of grave misconduct. Her dismissal from the service is fully warranted.
Antecedents
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit dated October 12, 2009
filed by Veronica F. Galindez (Galindez) against Court Stenographer Zosima Susbilla-De
Vera (Susbilla-De Vera) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, in Olongapo City.
In her complaint-affidavit,1 Galindez averred that sometime in July 2008, she had
approached Susbilla-De Vera, her school batchmate and a court employee, to inquire
where any petition for the adoption of her nephew and niece had already been filed,
pending, or approved by the Family Court, as she was interested in filing such a petition
herself; that after several follow-ups, Susbilla-De Vera had reported to her that she could
not locate any adoption petition involving the intended adoptees in the Family Court;
that Susbilla-De Vera had then volunteered that she could handle the adoption process
for her by coordinating with a lawyer, and that she could help in the fast-tracking of the
petition; that Susbilla-De Vera had even boasted that it would take only three months for
the entire process, and that there would be no need to follow up or to hire a lawyer to
handle the petition; that Susbilla-De Vera had told her that the cost for the adoption
process would be P130,000.00, half of which should be paid as down payment; that
Susbilla-De Vera had followed up with her on the proposal; that because she could raise
only P20,000.00 as down payment, Susbilla-De Vera had told her that the P20,000.00
would be acceptable, and that she would just talk to a certain Atty. Nini, the handling
lawyer; that she had paid theP20,000.00 to Susbilla-De Vera; that after a week, SusbillaDe Vera had called her to ask for the balance of the down payment; that she had
willingly given the balance on two separate occasions, the first the amount ofP30,000.00
and the second the amount of P15,000.00 a week later; that Susbilla-De Vera had
handed her a receipt for the full amount of P65,000.00, with the assurance that
everything would be handled well, and she had made follow-ups on the progress of the
adoption proceedings, and Susbilla-De Vera had informed her that publication had
already been done but that there would be other papers that needed to be located; that
because of her refusal to divulge the name of the lawyer she had visited Susbilla-De
Vera's office to ask the latter to facilitate a meeting with the engaged counsel; that
Susbilla-De Vera had instead brought her to the Family Court (Branch 73) to look into the
logbook to find out if the previous adoption had been in fact completely processed; that
by the actuations of Susbilla-De Vera had given her cause to doubt, and she had then
gone to the Farinas Law Office herself to inquire on the status of the adoption petition;
that the legal secretary of the law office had told her that the adoption had already been

completed with her brother as the petitioner; that because of that information, she had
demanded from Susbilla-De Vera to return the money but Susbilla-De Vera had replied
that the money had been delivered to the lawyer; that she had offered to personally see
the lawyer about the return of the down payment, but Susbilla-De Vera had insisted to do
it herself; that after a few days, Susbilla-De Vera had informed her that the lawyer would
be returning the money in two installments; and that she had not received any
reimbursement by Susbilla-De Vera as of the filing of the complaint-affdiavit. 2
On October 26, 2009, acting on the administrative complaint, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) directed Susbilla-De Vera to submit her comment within ten days
from receipt.3
When the OCA did not receive her comment thereafter, it sent another directive dated
January 22, 2010 to Susbilla-De Vera for her to comply with the previous order to submit
her comment.4
Upon the recommendation of Court Administrator Jose Midas P Marquez, the Court
directed Susbilla-De Vera to submit her comment within five days with a warning that the
Court would decide the administrative complaint on the basis of the record; and to show
cause within ten days why she should not be held administratively liable for not
complying with the two directives from the OCA.5
But Susbilla-De Vera still did not comply with the order for her to submit her comment.
Hence, the Court deemed the case submitted for decision based on the records on file;
and referred it to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation.6
Findings and Recommendations of the OCA
In the memorandum dated September 12, 2011, 7 the OCA rendered its findings, and
recommended dismissal from the service as the disciplinary action to be taken against
Susbilla-De Vera, to wit:
xxxx
Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that "court personnel shall
not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit on any or explicit or implicit understanding
that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official functions" while Section 1
thereof provides that "court personnel shall not use their official position to secure
unwarranted benefits, privileges or exemptions for themselves or for others."
In the case at bar, respondent violated these provisions as she took advantage of her
official position in receiving the amount of P65,000.00 from Complainant for the alleged
hiring of a counsel in the filing of a petition for adoption which did not materialize as the
minors to be adopted were already the subject in a decided adoption case and, thus,
committed grave misconduct. Moreover, she manifested her defiance with the directives
of the OCA.
xxxx
Grave Misconduct is punishable by dismissal from the service for the first offense with
disqualification from employment in any government office and forfeiture of benefits,
except for accrued leaves under Sec. 52 (A) (3) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws,
as amended by Section 52(A), paragraphs 1 and 3 of Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended, for approval of this Honorable
Court, that:
xxxx
2. For Grave Misconduct and Disrespect and Indifference to this Court's Resolutions, Ms.
Zosima R. Susbilla-de Vera be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and with perpetual and absolute
disqualification from re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government owned or controlled corporations.
Ruling of the Court
We find the findings of the OCA to be substantiated by the evidence on record, and the
recommendation of dismissal from the service to be conformable to the law and
pertinent jurisprudence.
Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution enshrines the principle that a public office is
a public trust.1wphi1 It mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants
of the people, must at all times be accountable to them, serve them with utmost

responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
To enforce this constitutional tenet, the Court has incessantly reminded officials and
employees involved in the administration of justice to faithfully adhere to their mandated
duties and responsibilities. Any act of impropriety -whether committed by the highest
judicial official or by the lowest member of the judicial workforce -can greatly erode the
people's confidence in the Judiciary. The image of a court of justice is necessarily
mirrored in the conduct of its personnel. It is the personnel's constant duty, therefore, to
maintain the good name and standing of the court as a true temple of justice.8
To deserve the trust and confidence of the people, Susbilla-De Vera was expected to
have her dealings with the public to be always sincere and above board. She should not
lead others to believe that despite her status as a minor court employee she had the
capacity to influence the outcomes of judicial matters. Her acts and actuations did not
live up to the expectation, for the records unquestionably showed how she had
deliberately and fraudulently misrepresented her ability to assist the complainant in the
adoption of her niece and nephew. For one, if there would be such a case, she could not
make such assurance to the complainant because the handling court would
independently and objectively handle and decide the case based on its merits. She was
also aware that her representations to the complainant about no other adoption petition
being yet filed in the Family Court, and about her working together with a lawyer to
advance the legal matter for the complainant were both false, for there had already been
another petition for adoption initiated by the complainant's own brother, and there had
been no lawyer working with her to assist the complainant.
Section 2,
Canon
1 of the Code of Conduct or Court Personnel has enjoined all court personnel from
soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding
that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions. Susbilla-De Vera thus
violated her sacred oath as a court employee to serve the Judiciary with utmost loyalty
and to preserve the integrity and reputation of the Judiciary as an institution dispensing
justice to all. Her violation was made worse by her committing it in exchange for easy
money. She was thereby guilty of corruption. She compounded her guilt by disobeying
the orders of the Court requiring her to explain herself.
Under the circumstances, she committed grave misconduct, which the Court has
described in Velasco v. Baterbonia9 as follows:
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must
be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an
official or employee who unlawfully or wrongfully uses her station or character to procure
some benefit for herself or for another, contrary to the rights of others. x x x
Grave misconduct is punishable by the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service.
This is pursuant to Section 46 A of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service Series of 2011 to wit:
Section 46. Classification of Offenses. -Administrative offenses with corresponding
penalties are classified into grave less grave or light depending on their gravity or
depravity and effects on the government service.
A The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:
1. Serious Dishonesty;
2. Gross Neglect of Duty;
3. Grave Misconduct;
xxxx
In Dela Cruz v. Malunao,10 we dismissed an erring employee of the R TC in Nueva Vizcaya
who had solicited money from litigants in exchange for favorable decisions. For sure the
acts of Susbilla-De Vera were of the same nature and gravity.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. FINDS Court Stenographer ZOSIMA SUSBILLA-DE VERA guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT;
and DISMISSES her from the service effective immediately with prejudice to her reemployment in the Government including government-owned or -controlled corporations
and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits;
2. DIRECTS the Employees Leave Division Office of the Administrative Services to
determine the balance of ZOSIMA SUSBILLA-DE VERA s earned leave credits; and

3. ORDER ZOSIMA SUSBILLA DE VERA to return to complainant Veronica F. Galindez the

amount of P65 000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168539
March 25, 2014
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution 1 of the Third
Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information
filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No.
3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision 3 in Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts
awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the
construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a
certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was
herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable
cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he
was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding
probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB
as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO
ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the
same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine
International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III)
was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III
under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the
provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the
liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b)
and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more
beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of
the Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause
why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo
Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case. 5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already
acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary
appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The
prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case,
even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public
officer.6

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash 7 the Information filed against him
on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense
under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also
contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with
whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was
capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read
thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it
appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his
alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was
filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the
Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and
dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090
ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT
GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE,
IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO
DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS
PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of
the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. 12 This is the
controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case
involving herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein
respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has
died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public
officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent
may not prosper.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer
with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean,
however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that
their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death
of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it
remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.
Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public
officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. 14 Were it not for his death, he should have been
charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person
must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist
where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where
the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them
pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they
are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any
of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to
have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the
actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. 17 The death of one of two
or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors. 18 Thus,
this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone.
The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not
follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or
death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one
defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed
against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to
Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A.
3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability
incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the
legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which
constitute graft or corrupt practices," 20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer
would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in
violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta 21 as to the
nature of and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine
jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime
except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and
sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense
in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the viewpoint of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in
furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and
the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two
or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of
conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to
commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless
the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital

importance, when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing
the existence, of the consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as coprincipals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation
in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is
anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a
criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally
or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is
in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."
Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or
more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of
the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court
held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator)
without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with
the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x.
The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed
between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them,
and they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in
the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators
attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even
investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at
the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs
of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be
proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter
were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of
the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in
this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a
rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable
as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring
nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their
common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences
of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring
with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in
nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against
respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent
can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion 24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to
Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy
with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly
entering into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the
Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to
quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a
minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no
reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on
January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919
should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's
ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he
even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with
petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion

for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled
that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a
warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the
jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the courts jurisdiction over his
person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files
any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his
person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly
or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must
do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court;
otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of
objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance
gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not
confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other
matters which called for respondent courts exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not
be heard now to deny said courts jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090
only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a
contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly,
the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in
P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as
co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case,
respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with
then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile
should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by
reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons
already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction
over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would
mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law
defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged
offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents
in the main case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years.
Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution
of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial
and a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June
2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189171
June 3, 2014
EDILBERTO
L.
BARCELONA, Petitioner,
vs.
DAN JOEL LIM and RICHARD TAN, Respondents.
DECISION

SERENO, CJ:
This case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, praying for the reversal of the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated 26 September 2008, and its subsequent Resolution 3 dated 26 August 2009.
Both dismissed the Petition for Review4 filed by Edilberto L. Barcelona (petitioner) for lack
of merit.
The CA affirmed the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolutions dated 18 December
20065 and 28 August 2007,6which in turn affirmed the Order dated 27September 2000
issued by the Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Roy V.
Seeres (Chairperson Seeres or simply Chairperson). The Order barred petitioner, who
was then the officer-in-charge of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC, from entering
its premises a month before the Efficiency and Integrity Board (Board) could investigate
the administrative case for dishonesty and grave misconduct filed against him.
The records disclose that on 14 August 2000, respondent businessman Dan Joel Lim
(Lim), the owner of Top Gun Billiards, filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (sworn statement)
with the Criminal Intelligence Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Lim
claimed as follows: (1) his employees, Arnel E.Ditan and Pilipino Ubante, were influenced
by petitioner to file a labor complaint against Lim; 7 and (2) petitioner, then an NLRC
officer, demanded 20,000 for the settlement of the labor case filed against Lim. On the
strength of this sworn statement, the NBI organized an entrapment operation against
petitioner.
On 16 August 2000, Lim informed the NBI that petitioner would drop by Top Gun Billiards
around seven oclock in the evening, expecting to receive the 20,000 petitioner was
demanding from him; otherwise, petitioner would order that Top Gun Billiards be closed.
After Lim handed him the marked bills, petitioner began counting them. The latter was
arrested by the NBI right when he was about to put the money in his bag.
After being duly informed of his constitutional rights, petitioner was brought to the NBI
office where he was booked, photographed, and fingerprinted. Thereafter, he underwent
ultraviolet light examination. The Certification dated 16 August 2000of the NBI-Forensic
Chemistry Division stated that his hands "showed the presence [of] Yellow Fluorescent
Specks and Smudges,"8 and that "[s]imilar examinations made on the money bills
showed the presence of yellow fluorescent specks and smudges x x x." 9
In a letter to the City Prosecutor of Manila, NBI Director Federico M. Opinion, Jr.
recommended the prosecution of petitioner for robbery under Article 293 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The NBI filed the Complaint. Finding probable cause, the City
Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on 18 August 2000 an
Information against petitioner for the crime of robbery.
It was further discovered that while the inquest papers were being prepared by the NBI,
Richard Tan (Tan), owner of Tai Hing Glass Supply, had filed a similar extortion Complaint
against petitioner. The latter supposedly asked him to pay P15,000 in exchange for the
settlement of a fabricated case.10
Reports of the circumstances leading to the arrest and filing of the Complaints against
petitioner were submitted by Tan and Lim to Chairperson Seeres. On17 August 2000,
copies of the documentary evidence11 against petitioner were likewise endorsed to the
Chairperson.12
Finding a prima facie case against petitioner, Chairperson Seeres issued Administrative
Order No. 9-02 Series of 2000 on 1 September 2000, formally charging him with
dishonesty and grave misconduct. The Order created a panel (the Board) to look into the
present case; require petitioner to file an answer to the charges; conduct an
investigation; and thereafter submit its report/recommendation. 13 The Order also placed
petitioner under a 90-day preventive suspension upon receipt thereof.
The Board issued a Summons dated 19 September 2000 directing petitioner to answer
the charges against him. Both the Order and the Summons were served on him, but he
refused to receive them.14 He never filed an Answer.
Lim, Tan, and the NBI agents involved in the entrapment operations appeared at the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Board on 28 September 2000 in order to
confirm their accusations against petitioner.
On 23 October 2000, the Board conducted a hearing attended by petitioner with three of
his lawyers. He manifested therein that he was not subjecting himself to its

jurisdiction.15 Thus, he left without receiving copies of the Order and other documents
pertinent to the case.16
The Board resolved the administrative case ex parte. It found that petitioner had been
caught red-handed in the entrapment operation. His guilt having been substantially
established,17 the Board in its 31 October 2000 Report/Recommendation18 found him
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Upon approval of this recommendation by
NLRC Chairperson Seeres on 14 November 2000, petitioner was dismissed from service.
A copy of the Boards Decision was received by petitioner on 22 November 2000. On 1
December 2000, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time Within Which to File the Proper
Responsive Pleading, but it was denied.19
Petitioner appealed to the CSC. In his Appeal Memorandum, 20 he presented his side of
the story. He claimed to have visited Lims establishment to play billiards every now and
then. Before going home, he would supposedly drop by the place, which was a mere 5to 10-minute tricycle ride away from where he lived. 21 When Lims employees discovered
that petitioner worked for the NLRC, they told him of their employers labor law
violations.22Thus, petitioner assisted them in filing a case against Lim and later
scheduled the case for a conference on 10 August 2000.
Two days before the scheduled conference, petitioner was informed by one of the
employees that Lim wanted to speak with him. Lim supposedly offered petitioner money
to drop the labor case filed against the former. According to petitioner, this offer was
"flatly rejected."23
The next day, when petitioner went to Lims establishment to play billiards, a billiard
hustler by the name of Abel Batirzal (hustler) informed him that Lim required everyone
playing in the establishment to lay a wager on the
games
they played.24 Since he "abhorred" gambling, petitioner decided to discourage the
hustler by raising the amount the latter proposed.25
Petitioner lost to the hustler. As the former was about to leave the establishment, he
discovered that his cellular phone and pack of Philip Morris cigarettes were no longer
where he left them. The security guard on duty informed him that a certain Ian Gumban
had stolen the items.26
Petitioner went straight to the Western Police District Station and filed a Complaint for
theft, billiard hustling, syndicated gambling, swindling, and violation of city ordinances
against Lim and three of the latters employees or friends.27
A day after the foregoing incident, or on 10August 2000, neither Lim nor his employees
appeared at the scheduled conference. On the evening of the same day, petitioner went
to Lims establishment to check on the employees. There they told him to consider their
Complaint withdrawn, since Lim had already decided to settle the case with them.
Accordingly, the case was dropped from the NLRCs calendar.28
Petitioner claims that on 16 August 2000, the day of the alleged entrapment, he received
a call from Lim. The person who had stolen petitioners cellphone was supposedly willing
to return it at seven that evening at Lims billiards hall.29
When petitioner arrived, he saw Lim and one of the latters employees. Lim approached
petitioner and informed him that the thief could no longer return the phone. The thief
had allegedly decided to just pay the value of the phone and entrust the money to Lim.
The latter tried to give the money to petitioner and urged him to count it, as the former
was not sure how much the thief had given. Petitioner supposedly refused to receive and
count the cash and, instead, insisted that Lim arrange a meeting with the thief.30
Because petitioner would not take the money, Lim inserted the wad of cash into the open
pocket of the formers shoulder bag.31Just when petitioner was about to pull out the
money and throw it back to Lim, the NBI agents appeared and arrested petitioner who
recalls the incident as follows:
x x x [W]hile trying to retrieve the unduly incriminating wad of money to throw it back to
Mr. Lim, aboutfive or seven burly men accosted petitioner without properly identifying
themselves and with strong-arm tactics, hand-cuffed him over his vehement
protestations. One of the burly men even pointed his gun at petitioners face as he and
his companions wrestled petitioner to a car. x x x.32
With respect to Tan, petitioner claims that the latter never demanded or received any
sum of money from him. Allegedly, Tan was only displeased with petitioners active
assistance to one of Tans aggrieved employees.33

Petitioner further claims that even before Chairperson Seeres formally charged him with
dishonesty and grave misconduct, the former had already filed an urgent request for an
emergency leave of absence because of the alarming threats being made against him
and the members of his family.34
Petitioner asked the CSC to nullify the 27 September 2000 Order of Chairperson Seeres.
The Order barred petitioner from entering the NLRC premises a month before the hearing
conducted by the Board. He then questioned its impartiality. As proof of his allegation, he
made much of the fact that the Board denied his Motion for Extension of Time Within
Which to File a Proper Responsive Pleading.35
Six years after petitioner had filed his Appeal Memorandum, the CSC dismissed it. The
dispositive portion of its Resolution36 dated 18 December 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Edilberto S. (sic) Barcelona is hereby DISMISSED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated November 14, 2000 of Roy R. Seneres, [Chairperson,]
(NLRC) finding him guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and imposing upon him
the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification
from re-entering government service, forfeiture of retirement benefits and bar from
taking any civil service examinations is hereby AFFIRMED.37
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 15 January 2007. 38 He questioned the
validity of his dismissal by asserting that before its implementation, the NLRC had the
legal duty of obtaining its confirmation by the Department of Labor and Employment
(Labor) Secretary.39
On 28 August 2007, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CSC
through a Resolution.40
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review, but it was dismissed by the CA in the assailed
Decision dated 26 September 2008.41
A Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of Honorable Justice
Vicente S.E. Veloso (Justice Veloso)42 was then filed by petitioner. The latter cited the
following reasons for the prayer for inhibition:
1) Honorable Justice Veloso was a Commissioner of public respondent NLRC at the time
of the subject incident; and
2) The undersigned counsel, eldest son of petitioner, just recently resigned from the law
firm where the daughter of Justice Veloso is working.43
Justice Veloso, in a Resolution44 dated 27 February 2009, stated that while the grounds
invoked by petitioner did not constitute valid bases for an inhibition, the former would
voluntarily inhibit "to assuage petitioner in whatever fears he may have" over the CAs
handling of the Motion for Reconsideration.
Thereafter, the CA issued the assailed Resolution 45 dated 26 August 2009 denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. In spite of his voluntary inhibition, Justice Veloso
still signed the herein questioned Resolution to signify his concurrence.
Hence, this Petition praying for the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the
appellate court and the dismissal of the administrative Complaint filed against
petitioner.46
This Court required respondents Lim and Tan to file their respective Comments, but
neither of them complied. Since copies of the Resolution ordering them to Comment
were personally served upon them, the Court resolved to consider them to have waived
their right to comment on the Petition.47
Petitioner comes before this Court raising the following arguments:
1. The CA decided a question of substance "not in accord with the applicable law and
jurisprudence" when it:
a. Denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration with the participation of Justice Veloso,
who had earlier voluntarily inhibited himself from the case.
b. Ruled that petitioner was not denied due process of law in spite of overwhelming proof
that the NLRC chairperson failed to act with impartiality in deciding petitioners case.
c. Ruled that petitioners appeal to the CSC had not been filed on time, even though the
commission itself did not question the timeliness of that.1wphi1
d. Ruled that the findings of the CSC were supported by evidence.
2. The CA, like the CSC, failed to address all the issues presented by petitioner when it
chose to keep silent on the following issues:
a. The denial of the right of petitioner to the speedy disposition of his case; and
b. The failure of the disciplining authority to obtain the confirmation by the Department
head of the formers decision to dismiss petitioner from service. 48

We reduce the issues to the following:

I
Whether petitioner was denied due process of law;
II
Whether the factual findings of the CSC are supported by evidence;
III
Whether the CA had the authority to review matters not assigned by the parties as
issues;
IV
Whether the right of petitioner to the speedy disposition of his case has been violated by
the CSC; and
V
Whether the NLRC violated the Civil Service Rules provision, which allows the execution
of a penalty of removal decreed by a bureau or office head, pending appeal thereof to
the CSC, only when the penalty has been confirmed by the Secretary of the department
concerned.
Petitioner
was
not
denied
due
process of law.
Petitioner claims he was denied due process of law due to the partiality of Chairperson
Seeres, the Board, the CSC, and the CA.
Considering the many complaints of petitioner, we deem it best to present an exhaustive
outline of his entire evidence therefor. Below are several circumstances he cites to prove
that he was not afforded the right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal.
According to petitioner, Chairperson Seeres served not only as the formers accuser,
but also as judge and executioner. 49 The Chairpersons partiality was supposedly
demonstrated by the following acts:
1. On 10 November 2000, petitioner and his two sons allegedly approached and asked
Chairperson Seeres why he was persecuting petitioner. The Chairperson supposedly
replied: "Wala akong pakialam. Pasensya kayo. Tapos na ang tatay ninyo!"50
2. Chairperson Seeres issued defamatory press releases to the media announcing the
preventive suspension of petitioner and depicting the latter as a corrupt government
official. The Chairperson allegedly took advantage of the situation of petitioner in support
of the formers then prospective political career, to wit:
x x x [A]t the expense of petitioner, [he] took advantage of the opportunity to project
himself as a graft buster to further his sagging political career and burning senatorial
ambitions by immediately issuing press releases and causing the malicious publication of
the petitioners preventive suspension without affording the latter due process of law.51
3. Lim never filed a written complaint against petitioner as required by Section 8 of the
Civil Service Rules and, consequently, the latter was not given the chance to file a
counter-affidavit or comment on the written Complaint as mandated by Section 11 of the
Civil Service Rules.
4. No preliminary investigation was conducted as required by Section 12 of the Civil
Service Rules.
5. Chairperson Seeres failed to serve the formal charge to petitioner in accordance with
Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service
Rules).52
6. The Order dated 1 September 2000, which immediately placed petitioner under a 90day preventive suspension, supposedly violated the requirement in Section 19 of the
Civil Service Rules that an order of preventive suspension be issued only upon service of
the formal charge.
7. The Board created by Seeres to investigate the case denied the Motion for Extension
of Time filed by petitioner, in order to ensure that the latter would no longer be able to
return to work.
As for the Board, its "lack of and glaring absence of impartiality and objectivity" was
supposedly shown by the following:53
1. A substantial portion of the Report/Recommendation of the Board shows that it delved
into petitioners expression of protest against the Chairpersons unfair treatment, and
thereby reinforced petitioners apprehension that the case would not be resolved on its
merits.
2. The denial of petitioners Motion for Extension of Time Within Which to File the Proper
Responsive Pleading dated 1 December 2000 was allegedly unjust and groundless.

With respect to the CSC, petitioner claims that it "curiously amended" Section 43(2) of
the Civil Service Rules only three weeks after he had filed his Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution denying his appeal.54
Lastly, petitioner bewails the supposed haphazard manner in which the CA disposed of
his claim that he had been denied due process of law. He claimed that it simply
dismissed the issue through a one-sentence ruling, which reads:
On the alleged failure of the NLRC to observe impartiality, suffice it to say that petitioner
failed to present proof to substantiate his self-serving allegations.55
In the eyes of petitioner, it would appear that every agency of the government that had
a hand in this case was, at his expense, either motivated by personal bias or driven by
the desire to advance its members political or professional careers in the government.
Petitioners claims are without merit.
Contrary to the assertions of petitioner, Chairperson Seeres did not act as the formers
accuser, judge and executioner.56 To be clear, the accusers of petitioner were Lim and
Tan, while his judge was an independent Board formed to investigate his case. This Court
is aware that the Board only had the power to recommend, and that that latters
recommendation was still subject to the approval of the Chairperson. Still, petitioner
cannot claim that he was denied due process on this basis alone, because the remedy to
appeal to the proper administrative bodythe CSC in this casewas still made available
to him.
Petitioner claims that Sections 8,11, 12, 16, and 19 of the Civil Service Rules were
violated by Chairperson Seeres. Petitioner misses the point that strict compliance with
the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law. Administrative rules
of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object as well as to
assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
respective claims and defenses.57
This Court finds that both Chairperson Seeres and the Board essentially complied with
the procedure laid down in the Civil Service Rules. Where due process is present, the
administrative decision is generally sustained.58
The claim of petitioner that he was denied due process is negated by the circumstances
of the case at bar.
The Report/Recommendation of the Board shows that both complainant and respondent
were given the opportunity to be heard by the Board and to adduce their respective sets
of evidence, which were duly considered and taken into account in its Decision.
Petitioner insists that Lim never filed a written complaint against him as required by
Section 8 of the Civil Service Rules. Petitioner further complains that he was not given
the chance to file a counter affidavit, a right provided by Section 11 of the Civil Service
Rules. The records disclose, however, that reports leading to his arrest and the filing of
the Complaint against him were submitted by Tan and Lim to the Chairperson of the
NLRC. On the basis of the sworn statements supporting the criminal Complaint against
petitioner, Chairperson Seeres found a prima facie case against him and issued the
Order formally charging him with dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Furthermore, the Board gave petitioner the chance to answer the charges against him
when it issued its 19 September 2000 Summons for that very purpose. He does not deny
that he was served a copy of the Summons, but that he refused to receive it. It was his
choice not to file an answer. After he decided to waive this right, we cannot now allow
him to claim that he has been deprived of the right to air his side through an answer or a
counter-affidavit.
Petitioner further claims that Chairperson Seeres violated Section 12 of the Civil Service
Rules when the latter dispensed with the requirement of conducting a preliminary
investigation. It is important to note that this preliminary investigation required by
Section 12 of the Civil Service Rules is not the same as that required in criminal cases.
Section 12 defines a preliminary investigation of administrative cases in the Civil Service
as an "ex parte examination of records and documents submitted by the complainant
and the person complained of, as well as documents readily available from other
government offices." Petitioner presents no evidence to prove that either Chairperson
Seeres or the Board failed to examine these records. In fact, the records show that, on
28 September 2000, Lim and Tan appeared in the preliminary investigation conducted by
the Board to confirm their sworn statements and the criminal cases they had filed
against petitioner. That he submitted no documents for consideration in the preliminary
investigation was his choice.

According to petitioner, no formal charge was ever filed against him as mandated by
Section 16 of the Civil Service Rules. He now claims that Chairperson Seeres had no
right to place him under preventive suspension, because Section 19 of the Civil Service
Rules requires that a formal charge be served on petitioner before an order of preventive
suspension may be issued. The provision reads:
SECTION 19. Preventive Suspension. Upon petition of the complainant or motu proprio,
the proper disciplining authority may issue an order of preventive suspension upon
service of the Formal Charge, or immediately thereafter to any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge involves:
a. dishonesty;
b. oppression;
c. grave misconduct;
d. neglect in the performance of duty; or
e. If there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would
warrant his removal from the service.
An order of preventive suspension may be issued to temporarily remove the respondent
from the scene of his misfeasance or malfeasance and to preclude the possibility of
exerting undue influence or pressure on the witnesses against him or tampering of
documentary evidence on file with his Office.
In lieu of preventive suspension, for the same purpose, the proper disciplining authority
or head of office, may reassign respondent to other units of the agency during the formal
hearings.
In this case, the Order was the formal charge. It was served on petitioner, but he refused
to receive it. He claims that on 27 September 2000, or a month before the hearing
conducted by the Board, Chairperson Seeres barred him from entering the NLRC
premises. Petitioner was thereby denied access to evidence and witnesses that could
support his case.59 But, as revealed by Section 19, Chairperson Seeres had the right to
issue an Order of preventive suspension pending investigation by the Board, because
petitioner was being charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Moreover, the Order of Chairperson Seeres preventing petitioner from entering the
latters office was also valid under Section 19. This Order was meant to preclude
petitioner from possibly exerting undue influence or pressure on the witnesses against
him or to prevent him from tampering with documentary evidence on file with his office.
This preventive measure is sanctioned by law.
As established by the facts, petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard and to
adduce his evidence. This opportunity was enough for one to comply with the
requirements of due process in an administrative case. The formalities usually attendant
in court hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation, as long as the
parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their respective sets of
evidence.60
As regards the charge of lack of impartiality, we agree with the CAs pronouncement that
petitioner failed to substantiate his self-serving allegations. Mere suspicion of partiality
does not suffice.61
Chairperson Seeres released statements to the media regarding the case of petitioner
and allegedly told him and his children that the Chairperson did not care about their
woes. Assuming this allegation to be true, it did not necessarily mean that Chairperson
Seeres was incapable of deciding the case without bias. These acts did not satisfactorily
prove the claim that in order to promote and further his political ambitions, he took
advantage of petitioners situation. As the NLRC Chairperson, he had the duty to answer
the questions of the media on the status of the cases against graft and corrupt practices
involving government officials under his commission. Furthermore, his statements to
petitioner and the latters family are not sufficient for this Court to believe that every one
of his acts, in relation to the case of petitioner, was meant to ensure the latters downfall
at whatever cost.
Similarly, the denial of petitioners Motion for Extension of Time, does not prove that the
tribunal failed to be impartial.
Petitioner is banking on one incident in which his Motion was denied. The denial in itself,
without any extrinsic evidence to establish bias, does not prove that he was denied his
right to be judged by an impartial and independent tribunal. While petitioner had the
right to file a Motion for Extension of Time, he did not have the right to expect that the
Motion would be granted. Absent any proof that the denial of this motion was made in

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court will not
interfere with the pronouncement of the quasi-judicial body.
Lastly, the CSC has the power and the authority to amend the Civil Service Rules
whenever it deems the amendment necessary. The insinuation of petitioner that this
change was made for the sole purpose of hurting his appeal is a mere product of his
imagination. The CSC is under no obligation to review all the cases before it and, on the
basis thereof, decide whether or not to amend its internal rules.
We note, though, that the authority of the CSC to amend the rules does not give it the
authority to apply the new provision retroactively. The consequence of an illegal
retroactive application of a provision is discussed below.
The
finding
of
the
CSC
that
petitioner
is
guilty
of
dishonesty
and
grave
misconduct
is
supported
by
the
evidence.
With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the factual findings of the CSC,
the CA ruled as follows:
Finally, it is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies such as the Civil
Service Commission are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court and
the Supreme Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise
on the specific matters under their consideration.62
Petitioner now claims that the CA did not even bother to discuss his allegation that the
findings of the CSC were not supported by evidence. 63 Unimpressed by the CA
Resolution, he is now asking this Court to review the factual findings of the CSC.
Believing that the CSC found him guilty based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by
Lim before the NBI, petitioner insists that this piece of evidence is insufficient to support
the CSCs conclusions.64 He claims that there is no specific allegation in the sworn
statement of Lim whether petitioner demanded money from the former; "who set the
alleged August 16, 2000 meeting at Mr. Lims billiard center; how it was agreed; and
what was the purpose of that meeting."65
Petitioner casts doubt on the veracity of the statements of Lim, who supposedly filed a
report against him with the NBI a few days after filing a theft Complaint against
him.66 According to petitioner, Lim should not be believed, because all of the latters
allegations are fueled only by vengefulness.
After claiming that Lims statement should not be trusted because of "illmotive,"67 petitioner now questions the motives of the CSC and the NBI.
Anent the reliance of the CSC on the Sinumpaang Salaysay, petitioner decries:
To an unprejudiced, reasonable mind, the statement of Mr. Lim is not sufficient evidence
to pin down petitioner for such a serious offense as Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
The NLRC read more into the document and put words into the mouth of Mr. Lim.
Unfortunately, the CSC blindly affirmed the NLRCs findings just to dispose of the case
after unreasonably sitting on it for more than six (6) long years.68
With respect to the NBI agents, petitioner harps on their eagerness to believe Lims
Complaint without even bothering to investigate. Petitioner explains his point:
[T]he NBI agents who conducted the alleged entrapment operation were motivated by
the desire to record an "accomplishment" and to obtain "commendatory results" due to
the highly competitive police function and law enforcement activities."69
We affirm the CAs findings.
First, except for his accusations, petitioner presents no proof that the CSC "blindly"
affirmed the NLRCs ruling just to get rid of the case. A reading of the Resolutions of the
CSC reveals otherwise. They thoroughly discussed the factual circumstances surrounding
this case, the evidence, and why and how the conclusion was reached. In order to
overcome the validity of these Resolutions, petitioner must present evidence to prove
that the evidence relied on by the CSC was unsubstantial.
In attempting to prove that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove his guilt,
petitioner asks this Court to focus on the inadequacy of Lims Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Contrary to these assertions, however, the following pieces of evidencein addition to
Lims sworn statementwere considered by the CSC in resolving petitioners appeal:
1. The sworn statement of Tan, who appeared in the preliminary investigation conducted
by the Board to confirm that he had filed a similar extortion Complaint against
petitioner;70

2. The Report and the evidence presented by NBI Special Investigator Marvin E. de Jemil,
who appeared before the Board to confirm the contents of his Report, findings, and
evidence against petitioner in support of the administrative charges filed against the
latter; and
3. The statement of the arresting officers who apprehended petitioner in the entrapment
operation, and who also appeared in the continuing investigation to affirm the contents
of their Joint Affidavit of Arrest.71
Factual findings of administrative bodies like the CSC are binding on this Court, unless
these findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 72 In this case, we rule that the
findings of fact and conclusions of the CSC have passed the test of substantiality. It is
sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by the evidence on record;
or, stated negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported
by evidence.73 The absence of substantial evidence is not shown by stressing that there
is contrary evidence on record, whether direct or circumstantial.74
All the pieces of evidence presented before the CSC point to the guilt of petitioner.
Several persons, both private individuals and law enforcers, came forward to testify and
present evidence to prove the allegations against him. In fact, each testimony
corroborated the testimonies of the others, effectively allowing the CSC to form a
complete picture of the incidents that led to the ultimate act of extortion.
As defined in the landmark case Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 75 all that is
needed to support an administrative finding of fact is substantial evidence, which is
defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." The evidence presented in the present case is more than enough
to support the conclusion reached.
Where the findings of fact of a quasi-judicial body are supported by substantial evidence,
these findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate court. 76 Thus, the CA did not
err in ruling that the CSC had committed no error in finding that petitioner was guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct.
In the case at bar, petitioner accuses the NBI agents of being driven by "ill-motive." In
the absence of credible evidence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties prevails over his unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions, to wit:
Between the naked assertions of accused-appellant and the story recounted by the
NARCOM agents, jurisprudence dictates that the latter is to be given more weight. Aside
from having in his favor the presumption of regular performance of duty, we find as the
court a quo did that the testimony of Lt. Cantos is more credible, being fully and
convincingly corroborated, as opposed to that of accused-appellant. Besides, no
improper motive to falsely accuse appellant could be imputed to him. In the absence of
proof of such motive to falsely impute a serious crime against appellant, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty as well as the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim
of having been "framed up."77
This rule holds true for the present case. Not only do the NBI agents have in their favor
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties; their statements are
credible and corroborated as well. After being caught red-handed, petitioner needs
extrinsic evidence to back up his allegations to prove that the NBI agents had an ulterior
motive to falsely impute the crime to him.
The
appellate
court
has
the
authority
to
review
matters
that
the
parties
have
not
specifically
raised
or
assigned as error.
Petitioner questions the propriety of the following pronouncement of the CA:
We likewise note that petitioners appeal to the CSC was made beyond the reglementary
period. Admittedly, petitioner received the Decision of the NLRC on 22 November 2000.
Petitioners motion for extension of time within which to file the proper responsive
pleading filed on 1 December 2000 did not stop the running of the period for its finality,
and the Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum were filed only on 27 December 2000
or one (1) month and five (5) days from receipt of the Decision. Petitioner erroneously
counted the period within which to appeal from the date he received the Order denying
his motion for extension to file his responsive pleading.78
While petitioner does not deny that his appeal to the CSC was filed beyond the
reglementary period, he argues that the timeliness of his appeal has never been an

issue. He thus claims that only the issues raised by the parties may be resolved by the
Court.
Petitioner is mistaken. An appeal throws the entire case open for review, viz:
[A]n appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and that
this Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error
by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the
case.79
Petitioner adds that the CA erred in applying technical rules strictly. According to him, if
its strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is
within this Courts power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their
operation.80
We agree with petitioners claim that rules of procedure are established to secure
substantial justice, and that technical requirements may be dispensed with in
meritorious cases. However, we do not see how the CA, in deciding the case at bar, could
have overlooked this policy. Although it took notice of the failure of petitioner to file his
appeal with the CSC on time, and perhaps used this failure as a supporting argument, it
did not dismiss the Petition on that sole ground. In fact, a perusal of the CA Decision now
in question will reveal that the appellate court took cognizance of the case and
adequately discussed the pertinent issues raised by petitioner.
No
violation
of
the
right
of
petitioner
to the speedy disposition of his case.
Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum with the CSC on 27
December 2000,81 but it only issued its Resolution on 18 December 2006.
According to petitioner, he sees no justifiable reason for the six-year delay in the
resolution of his appeal before the CSC.82 He is now asking this Court to "rectify" the
wrong committed against him and his family by absolving him of the administrative
charges.83
Section 16, Rule III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, reads:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept
of speedy disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the CSC six years to resolve the
appeal of petitioner does not, by itself, automatically prove that he was denied his right
to the speedy disposition of his case. After all, a mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient, as the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case must
also be considered.84
Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr.,85 laid down the guidelines for determining the applicability of
Section 16, Rule III, to wit:
In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated,
certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of
delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice
caused by the delay. x x x.
The CSC maintains that "[p]etitioner failed to assert such right before the proceedings in
the CSC and, even assuming that there was delay in resolution of his appeal before the
CSC, no prejudice was caused to him."86
Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that the fact that he made several telephone calls
to inquire about the status of his appeal87 and sent to the Commissioner of the CSC a
letter dated 2 March 2001, informing the latter that the case had been "forwarded to
CSC-Main without action of CSC-NCR,"88 sufficiently proves that he did not fail to assert
his right.
On this particular point, we have to agree with the CSC that "the alleged telephone calls
made by petitioner are self-serving and lack corroborative evidence." 89 Since there is no
way of ascertaining whether or not he actually made these phone calls, this allegation
cannot be given any probative value.
As to the letter petitioner allegedly sent to CSC Commissioner Jose Erestain, Jr., it is
apparent from the face of the letter that there is no indication at all that the intended
recipient actually received it.
The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or
statute, may be waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law. Ones right to
the speedy disposition of his case must therefore be asserted. 90 Due to the failure of
petitioner to assert this right, he is considered to have waived it.

The
NLRC
did
not
violate
the
rule
against
the
execution
of
a
penalty
of
removal pending appeal to the CSC.
According to petitioner, when he filed his Motion for Reconsideration with the CSC on 15
January 2007, Section 43 of Rule III of the Civil Service Rules provided that a penalty of
removal from government service could not be executed pending appeal, unless the
Department Secretary concerned confirmed the imposition of the penalty,91viz:
SECTION 43. Filing of Appeals. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies,
provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding
thirty (30)days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be
appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department head and finally to
the Commission Proper. Pending appeal, the same shall be executory except where the
penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by
the Secretary concerned.
A notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with the appellate
authority, copy furnished the disciplining office. The latter shall submit the records of the
case, which shall be systematically and chronologically arranged, paged and securely
bound to prevent loss, with its comment, within fifteen (15) days, to the appellate
authority. (Emphasis supplied)
However, on 7 February 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07-0244, 92 which amended
the aforementioned provision of the Civil Service Rules. The pertinent portion of the CSC
Resolution reads:
Section 43. Filing of Appeals. Decisions of heads of department, agencies, provinces,
cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty
(30)days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed
to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department head and finally to
the Commission Proper. Pending appeal, the same shall be executory except where the
penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by
the Secretary concerned.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the decision of the head of an attached agency
imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office is appealable directly to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof. Pending appeal, the penalty imposed shall be executory, including
the penalty of removal from the service without need for the confirmation by the
department secretary to which the agency is attached.
A notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with the appellate
authority, copy furnished the disciplining office. The later shall submit the records of the
case, which shall be systematically and chronologically arranged, paged and securely
bound to prevent loss, with its comment, within fifteen (15) days, to the appellate
authority. (Emphasis in the original)
It appears that Section 43 of the Civil Service Rules is self-contradicting. While the
second paragraph provides that a penalty of removal "shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned," the third paragraph states: "Pending appeal,
the penalty imposed shall be executory, including the penalty of removal from the
service without need for the confirmation by the department secretary to which the
agency is attached." The CSC should look into the implication and/or consequence of its
amendment of the rules and should clarify how the newly enacted paragraph can
operate, without conflict, with the reenacted provisions of the old Section 43.
In any case, even if we were to assume that the new rules now declare that a penalty of
removal shall be executory pending appeal, without need for confirmation by the
secretary of the Department to which the agency is attached, this rule cannot and should
not be applied to petitioners case.
Resolution No. 07-0244 became effective 15 days after 21 March 2007, the day it was
published, or a few months before the CSC denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. This Court cannot declare that the amendment of the Civil Service Rules

while the case of petitioner was pending proves the lack of impartiality on the CSCs part
as petitioner claims. However, it can and does now declare that the CSC had no right to
retroactively apply the amended provision to petitioners case.
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. 93 When petitioner
was dismissed, the old Section 43 of the Civil Service Rules was still in effect. The
aforecited provision clearly states that the penalty of removal is not executory, pending
appeal, unless the penalty is confirmed by Secretary of the Department where the
dismissed employee works.
Petitioner now claims that because the penalty of dismissal imposed by Commissioner
Seeres was never confirmed by the Secretary of Labor, it could not have been executed
while his appeal to the CSC was ongoing; thus, he should have been allowed to continue
to work and receive his salary.94
We agree.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, however, the Court is convinced that
petitioner was never actually barred from returning to work after the 90-day period
lapsed. The records disclose that he made no attempt to return to work after the
expiration of the suspension period. Thus, he was never prevented from returning to
workhe just chose not to go back.
There is no question that 90-day preventive suspension was issued in accordance with
law. The moment this period expired, petitioner was automatically reinstated in the
service. This rule is clear in Section 20 of the Civil Service Rules, which reads thus:
SECTION 20. Duration of Preventive Suspension. When the administrative case against
an officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the
disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of his
preventive suspension, unless otherwise provided by special law, he shall be
automatically reinstated in the service; provided that, when the delay in the disposition
of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of
delay should not be included in the counting of the 90 calendar days period of preventive
suspension. Provided further that should the respondent be on Maternity/Paternity leave,
said preventive suspension shall be deferred or interrupted until such time that said
leave has been fully enjoyed.
Petitioner refused to receive the Order dated 1 September 2001 implementing his 90-day
preventive suspension. He was allowed to go to work until 27 September 2000the day
he was supposedly barred from entering the office. Thus, his actual suspension from
work began on the latter date and expired 90 days thereafter, specifically on 25
December 2000.
By virtue of Section 20 of the Civil Service Rules, petitioner was automatically reinstated
on 26December 2000the day after the preventive suspension period expired. Since he
never attempted to resume the performance of his duties after the expiration of the
preventive suspension, he cannot now claim that the penalty of removal was executed,
pending his appeal to the CSC, without the confirmation of the Secretary of Labor. Had it
been shown that he was prevented from returning to his post after the expiration of the
legally sanctioned preventive suspension, he would have been entitled to the payment of
his back salaries from the moment the suspension expired up to the time his dismissal
would have been implemented.
That he has never rendered any service to government that would authorize him to
collect backwages is beyond cavil. He was never prevented from returning to work after
his suspension, thus he is not entitled to any back salary.
With respect the 90-day suspension period, the Civil Service Rules do not state whether
an employee placed under preventive suspension is entitled to back salaries for the
period of suspension. However, in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, 95 we ruled that an employee
has no right to compensation for preventive suspension pending investigation, even if
the employee is exonerated from the charges. Although a statutory provision was used
to justify the ruling therein, we also explained the principle behind the law, to wit:
The principle governing entitlement to salary during suspension is cogently stated in
Floyd R. Mechems A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers as follows:
Section 864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office. An officer
who has been lawfully suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the
period during which he was so suspended, even though it be subsequently determined
that the cause for which he was suspended was insufficient. The reason given is "that

salary and perquisites are the reward of express or implied services, and therefore
cannot belong to one who could not lawfully perform such services."
Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In
addition, his suspension must be unjustified. x x x.
The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law.
It cannot, therefore, be considered "unjustified," even if later the charges are dismissed
so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. It is one of those
sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. For this reason, it is
limited to ninety (90) days unless the delay in the conclusion of the investigation is due
to the employee concerned. After that period, even if the investigation is not finished,
the law provides that the employee shall be automatically reinstated. 96 (Emphasis in the
original)
The same logic applies to the present case.
As regards the participation of Justice Veloso in the CAs deliberation on the Motion for
Reconsideration after he had deliberately declared that he would voluntarily inhibit
himself from hearing the case, this Court is of the opinion that the propriety of his act is
best threshed out in an administrative case held for that purposeone in which he can
file his comment and explain his side.
Lastly, considering the gravity of the offense committed by petitioner, the Office of the
Ombudsman should be directed to immediately investigate the matter and, if it
thereafter finds it necessary, to file the appropriate criminal charges against him.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 26
September 2008 and its Resolution dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100595, as
well as the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated 18 December 2006 and
28August 2007 are AFFIRMED.
The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby DIRECTED to immediately investigate the
criminal allegations described in this Decision, and if it finds appropriate, to file the
necessary criminal charges against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151
March 11, 2014
OFFICE
OF
THE
COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE EDWIN C. LARIDA, JR., RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A mysterious early Sunday morning fire in the records room of a courthouse set off a
series of red flags pointing to anomalous acts allegedly committed by its inhabitants. It
led to the resignation of a clerk of court after he had formally denounced the Presiding
Judge for committing various anomalies and irregularities that are now the subjects of
this administrative case against the Presiding Judge.
Antecedents
At around 7:50 a.m. on October 12, 2008, a Sunday, a fire occurred at the records room
of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City. The fire, although
declared under control by 8:10 a.m., was extinguished only ten minutes later. Recovered
from the records room were a 1.5 liter plastic bottle containing gasoline, a container of
glue, and a candle.1 Atty. Stanlee D.C. Calma, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 18,
immediately reported the fire as a clear case of arson to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).2 On October 13, 2008, then Court Administrator Jose Portugal
Perez
, now a Member of the Court, formed and dispatched an investigative team consisting of
lawyers from the OCA to conduct an investigation upon the instructions of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno. The investigative team started interviewing the personnel of Branch 18,
including Atty. Calma, in the afternoon of October 13, 2008, and their declarations aided
the review starting on October 14, 2008 of the records of the cases decided and pending
in Branch 18.
In the course of its investigation, the investigative team uncovered anomalies
supposedly committed by Presiding Judge Edwin G. Larida (Judge Larida), namely:
1. violation of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, in authorizing the detail of locallyfunded employees to his court without obtaining permission from the Supreme Court,

and in allowing them to take custody of court records and to draft court orders and
decisions for him;
2. knowingly allowing detailed employees Jason Marticio, Larry Laggui and Napoleon
Cabanizas to demand commissions from bonding companies in exchange for the
issuance of release orders;
3. extorting money from detained accused Raymund Wang, with the help of Jason
Marticio and Larry Laggui;
4. defying the directive of the Supreme Court in Administrative Order No. 132-2008,
dated 15 September 2008, to stop from trying and hearing cases and to instead, decide
cases already submitted for decision;
5. releasing the accused on bail in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 for Violation of Section
8, Article II, RA 9165 (Manufacturing or Engaging in the Manufacture of, in a Clandestine
Laboratory, Large Quantity of Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, Commonly Known as
Shabu) despite their positive identification as the perpetrators of the crime;
6. granting a motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06 without a
case record and without requiring a comment from the prosecutor; and
7. granting a petition for the issuance of owner's duplicate copies of various titles in LRC
case No. TG-06-1183 under questionable circumstances. 3
Upon recommendation of the OCA, and on the basis of the investigation report, the Court
resolved on November 18, 2008 to:
a) x x x
b) DIRECT Judge Larida to cease and desist from hearing and deciding cases at RTC,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City;
c) DESIGNATE Judge Larida as Assting Judge of RTC, Branch 74, Malabon City to decide
inherited cases submitted for decision and already beyond the reglementary period to
decide in the aforesaid court;
d) DIRECT Messrs. Jayson A. Marticio and Larry G. Laggui to report back to the City
Government of Tagaytay, effective immediately;
e) PROHIBIT Messrs. Marticio, Laggui and Napoleon Cabanizas, Jr., from entering the
premises of RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City;
xxxx
i) REVOKE the designation of Judge Emma S. Young, RTC, Branch 36, Manila, as Assisting
Judge of RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 132-2008
dated September 15, 2008, and instead, DESIGNATE Judge Young as Acting Presiding
Judge thereat effective immediately and to continue until further orders from the Court. x
xx
The Court further Resolved to REFER the instant administrative complaint against Judge
Larida to (a) the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE among the justices
thereat within five (5) days from notice hereof and (b) the Court of Appeals Justice to
whom the complaint will be raffled for INVESTIGATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
thereon within sixty (60) days from the date of the raffle.4
In the meantime, Jayson A. Marticio, a locally-funded employee formerly detailed in
Branch 18, and who was among those barred by the Court from entering the RTCs
premises in the aftermath of the arson incident, presented a letter-complaint dated
October 20, 20085 whereby he denounced the following anomalies and irregularities
committed by the RTC staff of Branch 18, to wit:
1. That the court staff are practicing the "duty system" wherein a court employee will be
assigned to report early in order to punch in their daily time cards;
2. That a certain "Rommel" and other court employees were asking commissions from
bondsmen, specifically, the Monarch Insurance Company which he avers has connections
with the Office of the Clerk of Court;
3. That Clerk of Court Stanlee Calma and Legal Researcher Diana Ruiz are soliciting
monetary considerations from litigants in exchange for fast and favorable decisions;
4. That Clerk of Court Calma received a huge amount of money and a Pajero from a
certain "Norma" in exchange for a favorable decision in an election protest; and
5. That there are court employees who seek his assistance in drafting decisions/orders
and use the same to ask for considerations from litigants.6
Marticios letter-complaint was consolidated with A.M. RTJ-08-2151, the case involving
Judge Larida.7 The consolidated cases were assigned to Associate Justice Ricardo R.
Rosario of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On February 20, 2009, Investigating Justice Rosario re-set the pre-trial of the cases to
March 5, 2009, with a specific order for Marticio to personally appear on that date. 8 On
March 5, 2009, Marticio did not appear at the pre-trial. The Process Servers Return
showed,9 however, that the order for Marticio to personally appear before the
Investigating Justice was not served on him because he had meanwhile ceased to be
connected with the City Government of Tagaytay City, and could not also be found at his
last known address. Whereupon, the staff members of Branch 18 whom Marticio had
denounced sought the immediate dismissal of his letter complaint. 10Deeming Marticios
failure to inform the Investigating Justice and the OCA of his whereabouts as a
manifestation of his lack of interest to pursue the matter, the Investigating Justice
recommended the dismissal of his letter-complaint.11
The representatives of the OCA and Judge Larida appeared before the Investigating
Justice and presented their evidence.
The Investigating Justice thereafter submitted a report on his findings to the Court, and
recommended as follows:
1. for failing to strictly comply with the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008,
it is recommended that respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. be STERNLY WARNED that
the commission of a similar act will be dealt with more severely;
2. for failing to supervise and control his subordinates diligently, it is recommended that
respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. be REPRIMANDED with warning that a commission
of a similar act will be dealt with more severely;
3. for immediately granting Jayson Espiritu's motion to quash in Criminal Case No. TG5307-06 without giving the prosecution a chance to comment thereon or file an
opposition thereto, it is recommended that respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. be
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act will warrant a more severe penalty.
There being no substantial evidence to support the charges of
a) extorting money from detained accused Raymund Wang;
b) defying the directive of Supreme Court in Administrative Order No. 132-2008;
c) improperly granting bail in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03;
d) receiving a bribe in exchange for granting Jayson Espiritu's motion to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06;
e) granting a petition for the issuance of owner's duplicate copies of various titles in LRC
Case No. TG-06-1183 under questionable circumstances; and
f) involvement in the fire that razed RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City;
it is recommended that the foregoing charges be DISMISSED and respondent Judge
Edwin G. Larida, Jr., be ABSOLVED of liability for the same.12
Ruling
The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice.
1.
Violation of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 by authorizing the detail of locallyfunded employees to Branch 18 without obtaining permission from the Court, and by
allowing them to take custody of court records and to draft court orders and rulings for
him Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 dated March 11, 2008 (Guidelines in the Detail
of Locally-Funded Employees to the Lower Courts)13 relevantly stated as follows:
The Presiding Judge/Executive Judge shall submit to the SC through the OCA, within one
(1) month from receipt of this administrative circular, an inventory of all locally-funded
employees detailed in their respective court branches including the OCC, specifying their
names, position titles, assigned duties and duration of the detail. In addition, the
Presiding Judge/Executive Judge shall regularly review the necessity for such details as
well as the performance of the locally-funded employees, and recommend to the SC
through the OCA the revocation of the detail for those whose services are no longer
necessary in the lower courts or those with unsatisfactory or poor performance.
As of October 14, 2008, the locally-funded employees detailed in Branch 18 were Ofelia
Parasdas, Myrna Lontoc, Jayson Marticio, Larry Laggui and Jaime Apaga. 14 However, Judge
Larida did not submit or cause to be submitted to the Court within one month from
receipt of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 an inventory of all locally-funded
employees detailed in Branch 18.
Atty. Calma claimed further that Judge Larida had allowed Marticio to draft orders and
decisions for Branch 18 in contravention of paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular No.
28-2008,15 viz:

Considering the confidentiality of court records and proceedings, locally-funded

employees shall simply assist in the performance of clerical works, such as receiving of
letters and other communications for the office concerned, typing of address in
envelopes for mailing, typing of certificate of appearance, and typing of monthly reports.
They shall not be given duties involving custody of court records, implementation of
judicial processes, and such other duties involving court proceedings. However, they
may perform functions appertaining to that of a messenger, janitor and driver, if these
positions are provided in the plantilla of the Local Government Unit (LGU). 16
To support Atty. Calmas claim, the OCA presented copies of the court orders drafted by
Marticio in the period from February 4 to February 15, 2008 bearing Marticios initials and
signatures on which Judge Larida had either written the word "Finalize" or signed in other
instances.17
Likewise, Atty. Calma attested that Judge Larida had allowed Laggui to handle
confidential court records in violation also of paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular No.
28-2008.18
In his judicial affidavit, Judge Larida asserted that he had tasked Atty. Calma to make and
send to the Court the inventory of the detailed locally-funded employees, but the latter
did not comply.19 He denied that Marticio had continued drafting court orders after the
effectivity of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 on March 11, 2008, because Marticio
had been limited to doing legal research afterwards. 20 He admitted that Laggui had
handled court records at his behest, but insisted that such handling had been limited to
the physical carrying of records between his chambers and the staff room for only a
fleeting moment.21
The Investigating Justice rendered the following evaluation of the charges and the
corresponding explanations of Judge Larida, to wit:
Based on the foregoing evidence, this Investigating Justice finds that although
respondent Judge failed to comply with the submission of an inventory of locally-funded
personnel detailed to his office, pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, it
cannot be said that such failure was entirely his fault.
In the first place, the preparation of such inventory is an administrative function that
properly pertains to the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Calma. Since it was Atty. Calma who
first read about Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 in the newspaper and even brought
the same to the attention of respondent Judge, he should have prepared the required
inventory for respondent Judge's signature. The record is bereft of any evidence or
allegation that despite a prepared inventory ready for his signature, respondent Judge
willfully refused to sign and submit the same to the Supreme Court.
Second, aside from the orders prepared by Jayson Marticio between 4 and 15 February
2008, there is no showing that he continued to draft court orders after the effectivity of
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 on 11 March 2008.
Third, Larry Lagguis act of physically carrying court records to and from respondent
Judges chambers and the staff room appears to be a messengerial activity allowed by
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008. Laggui can hardly be said to have exercised
"custody" over the court records since he had no participation in their safekeeping.
Nevertheless, respondent Judges act of not submitting the required inventory, allowing
detailed employees to draft court orders and/or have access to court records evinces
laxity in respondent Judges control and supervision over his office. A judge is tasked with
the administrative supervision over his personnel and he should always see to it that his
orders are promptly enforced and that case records are properly stored. It is, therefore,
incumbent upon the judge to see to it that the personnel of the court perform their
duties well and to call the attention of the clerk of court when they fail to do so.
Having failed to strictly comply with the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 282008, it is recommended that respondent Judge be STERNLY WARNED that the
commission of a similar act will be dealt with more severely.22
We find Judge Larida to have committed several lapses, specifically the non-submission
to the Court of the required inventory of locally-funded employees, and his allowing
Marticio to draft court orders. Such lapses manifested a wrong attitude towards
administrative rules and regulations issued for the governance and administration of the
lower courts, to the extent of disregarding them, as well as a laxity in the control of his
Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff.
The omission to submit the inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch
Clerk of Court.1avvphi1Although it was very likely that Judge Larida had tasked Atty.

Calma to do and submit the inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida as the Presiding Judge
himself remained to be the officer directly burdened with the responsibility for doing so.
The basis for saying so is the text of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 itself. Judge
Larida could neither shirk from, nor avoid, nor evade the responsibility of submitting the
inventory within one month from notice under any guise or reason. This meant that if
Atty. Calma did not comply with his instruction, Judge Larida should have himself
assumed the responsibility of compliance. With Administrative Circular No. 28-2008
being effective on March 11, 2008 yet, his failure to send the inventory as late as
October 2008 definitely established his non-compliance with its directive.
Paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 also confined the service of locallyfunded employees to giving assistance in the performance of clerical works, like
receiving letters and other communications for the Branch, typing of addresses on
envelopes for mailing, typing of certificates of appearance, and typing of monthly
reports. Such employees were not to have the custody of court records, or to have
anything to do with the implementation of judicial processes, or to discharge other duties
involving court proceedings beyond the merely clerical. The prohibition was intended to
preserve the confidentiality of court records and proceedings, because such employees
were not employed in the Judiciary.
Judge Larida admitted in his judicial affidavit that Marticio had drafted court orders and
had done legal research in Branch 18. Under the circumstances, his claim of
discontinuing Marticios drafting activities upon the effectivity of Administrative Circular
No. 28-2008 on March 11, 2008, assuming it to be true, did not diminish or excuse his
violation if he still permitted Marticio to do legal research work thereafter. Legal research
was an activity that was more than clerical. Clearly, Judge Larida did not comply with
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, which was a less serious charge under Section 9 of
Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended.23
Section 11 of Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended, delineates the sanctions to be
meted out for a less serious charge, as follows:
Section 11. Sanctions. x x x
xxxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall
be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
xxxx
However, Judge Laridas unrebutted explanation that he had instructed Atty. Calma to
prepare and send the inventory, while not entirely absolving him, evinced his intention to
comply. Trial judges have usually delegated various reporting tasks to their clerks of
court or other members of their staff in order to gain more time for their adjudications
and other important written work. We should presume, therefore, that malice had not
motivated his non-compliance with Administrative Circular No. 28-2008. His explanation
to that effect merited treating his lack of malice as a mitigating circumstance in his favor.
2.
Knowingly
allowing
detailed
employees
to solicit commissions from bonding companies
Regarding this charge, the Investigating Justice found thusly:
The OCA next charges respondent Judge with having allowed detailed employees, Jayson
Marticio and Larry Laggui, and respondent Judge's personal driver, Napoleon Cabanizas,
Jr., to solicit commissions from bonding and surety companies.
According to the judicial affidavit of former Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Stanlee D.C.
Calma, the manager of Monarch Insurance Company, Inc. complained to him that despite
the proper filing of the bail bond policy and the payment of legal fees, there would be a
delay of up to 3 days in the issuance of release orders for the accused unless the
bonding company gave the "commission" solicited by Jayson Marticio, Larry Laggui and
Napoleon Cabanizas, Jr. Monarch Insurance Insurance and other bonding companies
supposedly told Atty. Calma that Jayson Marticio, Larry Laggui and Napoleon Cabanizas,
Jr. solicited "commissions" ranging from P500.00 up to 2% of the amount of bail imposed.
By way of illustration, the OCA presented Criminal Case No. TG-5955-08 entitled People
vs. Benito Bobis. In said case, Monarch Insurance posted the bail bond on 17 June 2008,

respondent Judge signed the release order of the accused on 18 June 2008, but the
release order was issued only on 20 June 2008.
In accordance with his duties as Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Calma reported the improper
solicitation to respondent Judge, who allegedly remarked, "Sabi ko nga sa kanila mag 'lie
low muna."
Thereafter, respondent Judge confronted Jayson Marticio, Larry Laggui and Napoleon
Cabanizas, Jr. in the presence of the representative of Monarch Insurance and told them
to stop asking for commissions. However, according to Atty. Calma, what respondent
Judge really said was that Marticio et al. should refrain from demanding "commissions"
and it was up to the bonding companies to give them any amount.24
Based on the foregoing, Judge Larida was not unaware of the solicitations by Marticio,
Laggui and Cabanizas from the complaining bonding company. The solicitations were
surely irregular and improper activities undertaken by persons visibly working for the
courts. Considering that such activities were committed with his knowledge, Judge Larida
should have done more than merely confronting them in the presence of the
representative of the complaining bonding company, and then and there merely telling
them to stop the solicitations. He should have instead immediately caused or called for
their investigation and, if the evidence warranted, seen to their proper criminal
prosecution. The firmer action by him would have avoided the undesirable impression
that he had perversely acquiesced to their activities. He thus contravened the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which imposed on him the duty to take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which he
would have become aware, to wit:
Rule 3.10 A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against
lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have
become aware.
Accordingly, Judge Larida was guilty of unbecoming conduct, a light charge under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended.25
3.
Charge
of
soliciting
money
from
the
accused
in Criminal Case No. TG-2969-98.
On this charge, the Investigating Justice found and recommended as follows:
In Criminal Case No. TG-2969-98, the accused, Raymund Wang, was charged with selling
275.9665 grams of shabu. According to former Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Calma, a
certain Necita Ramos (kumare of Raymund Wang) called him up to ask if there was
already a decision in the case. Further, Necita Ramos informed Atty. Calma that a certain
"Jake" or "James" had visited Wang in the Trece Martirez Provincial Jail to ask P100,000.00
allegedly "pang birthday ni Judge." Wang gave "Jake" or "James" the cellphone number of
Necita Ramos and the two purportedly negotiated the amount down to P50,000.00.
However, Necita Ramos did not pay the amount solicited.
After receiving the information, Atty. Calma supposedly informed respondent Judge that
certain people might be using his name but the latter only said that the problem is that
people are accusing others but are afraid to show up.
Thereafter, Atty. Calma did his own investigation and found out that the cellphone
number calling Necita Ramos belonged to Jayson Marticio. Armed with this information,
Atty. Calma and Necita Ramos went to the Office of the City Prosecutor. However, no
statements were taken and no action was done. Upon verification by the audit team of
the OCA, the Office of the City Prosecutor opined that the suspicion of Atty. Calma and
Necita Ramos would not prosper since their bases were all hearsay.
For his part, respondent Judge denied that Atty. Calma informed him of this incident. In
his Judicial Affidavit, respondent Judge averred that he had asked his legal researcher,
Diana Ruiz, to prepare a digest of the case but she prepared, instead a decision
acquitting Wang. This allegedly triggered a suspicion in respondent Judge that Diana Ruiz
and Atty. Calma were selectively preparing decisions and placing them inside his
chambers, but before he could investigate, a fire gutted the court.
Based on the foregoing testimonies on record, it is apparent that the charge against
respondent Judge of soliciting money from accused Wang has not been proved. Apart
from the hearsay testimony of Atty. Calma, there is no legal or factual basis to conclude
that "James" or "Jake" is actually Jayson Marticio and that "James" or "Jake" solicited
money from Wang with the authority of respondent Judge. Therefore, it is recommended
that this charge against respondent Judge be DISMISSED.26

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Justice, and dismiss the
charge for lack of evidence proving that Judge Larida solicited a bribe from the accused
in Criminal Case No. TG-2969-98.
It is truly proper to emphasize at this point that a charge of bribery against a judge is
easy to concoct and difficult to disprove; hence, the Court always demands that the
complainant present a panoply of evidence in support of the accusation. 27 A mere
affidavit attesting that a judge demanded a bribe in exchange for the exoneration of an
accused being tried before him is not sufficient. In order that an accusation of this nature
is not to be considered a fairy tale, competent and reliable evidence other than the
testimony of a lone witness needs to be adduced. Every administrative complaint
levelled against a sitting judge must be examined with a discriminating eye, therefore,
because its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, to the extent that the
respondent judge may face the sanction of dismissal from the service. Indeed, no judge
should be disciplined for misconduct unless the evidence against him is competent and
sufficient.28 Accordingly, the Court rightfully rejects any imputation of judicial misconduct
in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain it.
4.
Defying Administrative Order No. 132-2008
In Administrative Order No. 132-2008, promulgated on September 15, 2008, the Court
directed Judge Larida: (1) to cease and desist from trying cases; (2) to concentrate on
deciding the cases submitted for decision, whether before him or before his
predecessors; and (3) to give priority to cases submitted for decision for more than five
years already. The administrative order designated Judge Emma S. Young as the Assisting
Judge for Branch 18, with authority to conduct hearings.
The OCA charged Judge Larida with wilfully violating Administrative Order No. 132-2008
by antedating several orders in order to anticipate or circumvent the effectivity of the
administrative order.
Anent this charge, the Investigating Justice has reported:
In his Judicial Affidavit, former Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Calma, accused respondent
Judge of continuing to issue interlocutory orders in certain cases even after the
effectivity of Administrative Order No. 132-2008 on 15 September 2008. Atty. Calmas
testimony is supported by the Judicial Affidavit of civil docket clerk, Anita Goboy.
Together, they enumerate the orders issued by respondent Judge allegedly in violation of
the Administrative Order, to wit:
1. Order dated 15 August 2008, granting the motions to consolidate and set for pre-trial
Civil Case Nos. TG-07-2588 entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp. vs. Sps.
Pascua, TG-07-2589 entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp. vs dela Vega; TG-072590 entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp. vs. Sps. Catolico; and TG-07-2592
entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp. vs. Sps. Mirandilla; but denying
consolidation of TG-07-2591 entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp. vs. Sps.
Lomerio, Sr. with said cases;
2. Order, dated 15 September 2008, granting Urgent Ex-Parte Motion (to resolve motion
to cancel notice of lis pendens) in Civil Case No. TG-08-2743 entitled Osato-Agro
Industrial Development Corporation vs. AB Capital & Investment Corporation;
3. Order, dated 18 September 2008, granting plaintiff's prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction in SP No. TG-05-2519 entitled Metro Alliance vs. Phil. Trust Co.;
and,
4. Order, dated 19 September 2008, denying defendant's motion to dismiss in SCA-TG08-2593 entitled Tagaytay Resort Development Corporation vs. Nazareno.
It is Atty. Calmas conclusion that said orders were intentionally ante-dated by
respondent Judge based on the fact that the latter, through Larry Laggui, gave such
orders to civil docket clerk Anita Goboy only on 26 September 2008 although they all
appear to have been signed or promulgated on earlier dates, as above-enumerated.
Since Administrative Order No. 132-2008 was already in effect by then, Atty. Calma
reasoned that the sole purpose of ante-dating the orders could only be the circumvention
of said Administrative Order.
For his part, respondent Judge declared that he signed the orders in question on the
dates indicated thereon and released them to the civil docket clerk on the same day.
Respondent Judge, thus, was surprised to find out that said orders were all uniformly
released by Larry Laggui to the civil docket clerk only on 26 September 2008. In any
event, respondent Judge pointed out that since the civil docket clerk had brought the

matter to Atty. Calma's attention, the latter-being aware of the effectivity of

Administrative Order No. 132-2008should have informed him about it and stopped the
promulgation on said date to avoid a violation of the Administrative Order. 29
We declare that the interlocutory orders concerned were signed on the dates indicated
therein. The claim of Atty. Calma and Anita Goboy to the effect that the foregoing orders
had been antedated to circumvent the mandate of Administrative Order No.132-200 was
improbable in light of the following relevant observations of the Investigating Justice, viz:
x x x. If it were true that Atty. Calma believed that their release on a date different from
the date of their signing amounted to an anomaly, then he should have immediately
brought the same to the attention of the presiding Judge. Atty. Calmas act of instructing
civil docket clerk Anita Goboy to merely indicate at the back of said orders the date when
she actually received them evinces a certain degree of malice incongruent with his key
and noble position in the court.30
It is worth noting that only two of the affected orders were issued after the effectivity of
Administrative Order No. 132-2008, to wit:
1. the Order, dated 18 September 2008, granting plaintiff's prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction in SP No. TG-05-2519 entitled Metro Alliance vs. Phil Trust
Co.; and
2. the Order, dated 19 September 2008, denying private defendant's motion to dismiss
in SCA-TG-08-2593 entitled Tagaytay Resort Development Corporation vs. Nazareno. 31
The two orders were issued by Judge Larida two and three days after the effectivity of
Administrative Order No. 132-2008. Even if the administrative order had taken effect
immediately, the time when he acquired actual notice of Administrative Order No. 1322008 was not shown. On the other hand, that our administrative circulars and issuances
take time to reach the lower courts is a matter proper for judicial notice. As such, his
intent to violate or circumvent Administrative Order No. 132-2008 was not proved.
Moreover, the Investigating Justices following observations are cogent, to wit:
According to the Memorandum submitted by the OCA to the Hon. Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno, "the administrative order was issued in view of the 139 cases submitted for
decision in RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City which are already beyond the reglementary
period to decide as reflected in the monthly report of cases submitted by the aforesaid
court for the month of April 2008."
Given the purpose of Administrative Order No. 132-2008, it would appear that the
mandate given to respondent Judge to "cease and desist from trying cases" was not
meant to penalize him but was given only as a remedial measure to ensure that he will
spend his time writing the decisions of the long-pending 139 undecided cases instead of
trying and hearing other cases.
Hence, respondent Judges issuance of the 2 orders in question, on 18 and 19 September
2008, respectively, while not in strict compliance with the letter of the Administrative
Order, also do not prevent the attainment of its purpose. Indeed, there is nothing on
record to even hint at an improper motive on the part of respondent Judge in issuing said
orders apart from the obvious reason that they were necessary in the disposition of
interlocutory matters in these cases.32
Hence, we dismiss the charge of circumventing Administrative Order No. 132-2008.
5.
Releasing
the
accused
in
Criminal
Case
No.
TG-432-03
on
bail
despite
their
being
positively identified as the perpetrators of the crime
The Investigating Justice found and recommended on this charge thuswise:
In Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03, the accused Leandro Go y Ling, Wen Li Chen, Daniel
Co, Wilson Li, Michael Fandag and Arnel Villaser were charged with Violation of Section 8,
Article II, RA 9165 (Manufacturing or Engaging in the Manufacture of, in a Clandestine
Laboratory, Large Quantity of Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, Commonly Known as
Shabu).
From the Memorandum of the OCA to the Hon. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, it appears
that arraignment proceeded on 7 December 2004; pre-trial commenced on 8 August
2005; and trial ensued on 19 October 2005. On 24 March 2006, the Chinese accused (Go,
Li Chen, Co and Li) filed a petition to fix bail for their provisional liberty. The prosecution
did not object thereto, and, instead filed a formal offer of evidence on 3 May 2007, as it
had, by then, finished with its presentation of evidence. On 1 June 2007, the Chinese

accused filed a memorandum in support of their petition for bail. On June 14, 2007,
respondent Judge granted the petition for bail of the accused.
In this administrative charge against respondent Judge, the OCA questions his grant of
bail to the accused for the reasons that: (1) the crime they are accused of is a capital
offense, and the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution indicates that 2 witnesses positively identified the accused
as the perpetrators of the crime; and (2) there are suspicious circumstances surrounding
the release of the resolution granting bail to the accused.33
xxxx
In this case, after the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, respondent Judge
came to the conclusion that the evidence of the accused's guilt was not strong and so
granted their petition for bail.
However, the OCA disputes respondent Judges assessment of the guilt of the accused
based on the evaluation made by Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Stanlee D.C. Calma of the
transcript of stenographic notes on the case that 2 witnesses for the prosecution had
positively identified the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.34
xxxx
On the other hand, respondent Judge defends his grant of bail in his Judicial Affidavit as
follows:
Q: OCA was faulting you for stating in your resolution that there was no positive
identification of the accused when the transcript of stenographic notes say otherwise.
What can you say to this?
A: The lack or the improper identification of the accused was just one of the grounds I
cited to grant the petition. My assessment of the evidence on this matter was arrived at
on two grounds: 1. failure of police officer Eusebio to positively identify the accused in
his direct testimony, and 2. the failure of another prosecution witness Mr. Basilio to
positively identify the accused taking his entire testimony into consideration, the direct
and cross.
xxxx
52. Q: What can you say to the allegations of Atty. Calma that you had a meeting
together with some concerned court personnel in your chamber purposely to discuss the
resolution specifically on the matter of positive identification?
A: Indeed it transpired but I stood pat on my decision.
The matter of determining whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion that remains with the judge. Such discretion must be sound and exercised
within reasonable bounds. In this case, it appears that respondent Judge gave a lot of
thought to the petition for bail before granting it, even going to the extent of consulting
with some of his court personnel on the matter after receiving the evidence of the
prosecution. After much cogitation, respondent Judge exercised his judicial discretion and
came to the conclusion that the evidence against the accused was not strong and they
were not positively identified as the perpetrators of the crime.
Respondent Judges appreciation of the evidence against the accused lies within his
sound discretion. This mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed on
the Branch Clerk of Court, who cannot be allowed to supplant his personal opinions for
that of the judge.
As long as there was no irregularity in the proceedings adopted in the grant of bail,
judicial discretion must be respected and considered to have been rendered within
reasonable bounds.
Respondent Judges lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the accused in Criminal
Case No. TG-4382-03 is underscored by the proceedings that transpired thereafter.
According to the Memorandum of the OCA to the Hon. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, on 2
July 2007, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration of the 14 June 2007
resolution granting bail. The motion was set for hearing and the accused were mandated
to appear before the court. Upon failure of the accused (except Li and Li Chen) to attend
the hearing, respondent Judge canceled their cash bail and issued warrants for their
arrest. Further, upon motion of the prosecution, respondent Judge issued a holddeparture order against the accused on 23 July 2007.35
We concur with the foregoing findings and recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
Verily, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused in
Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 was strong for purposes of resolving the petition for bail
was a matter of judicial discretion for Judge Larida as the trial judge. Only he could

competently resolve the matter of bail. His exercise of discretion must be sound and
reasonable. In the view of the Investigating Justice, Judge Larida, having given a lot of
thought to the petition for bail before granting it, soundly and reasonably exercised his
discretion thereon. Unless an appropriate judicial review would show him to have acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, or whimsically in doing so, his granting of the petition for bail
should be upheld and respected.
This administrative investigation could not be the occasion to review Judge Laridas
granting of bail. Only the proper superior court could say whether his exercise of
discretion in resolving the petition for bail was sound and reasonable. Thus, Atty. Calmas
adverse conclusion based on the transcript of the proceedings to the effect that the
Prosecutions witnesses had positively identified the accused could not effectively
contradict Judge Laridas determination of the issue of bail.
Whether the identification in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 was positively made or not
was a matter for the judicial perception of Judge Larida only. In these proceedings, he
explained his reasons for granting bail. We must respect his explanation. The accused in
Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 were charged with the manufacture of methamphetamine
hydrochloride. The relevant testimony of the Prosecutions witnesses was to the effect
that at the time the police arrested them on July 12, 2003 the accused were loading
boxes unto various trucks and vans, with the boxes being later on determined to contain
illegal substances.36 As such, the testimony did not establish the manufacture of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, the non-bailable offense charged, but a bailable lesser
offense. Judge Laridas June 14, 2007 resolution granting the petition for bail reflected
the distinction, viz:
In the ensuing enforcement of the search warrant issued by the Municipal Trial Court of
Silang, Cavite, several containers and sacks were found in the house described therein
which were suspected to be essential chemicals in the manufacture of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited drug. But there was no evidence to
establish that the accused had something to do with the presence of these alleged illegal
substances in the house subject of the search warrant. The accused were not caught
inside the house which the prosecution claims to be a clandestine shabu laboratory. But
the "Chinese-looking persons" were apprehended outside the clandestine laboratory,
outside its gates. They were arrested in flagrante delicto loading the containers of illegal
substances onto the vans/trucks outside the house. Loading them onto a motor vehicle
does not fall within the purview of the word "manufacture" of prohibited drugs otherwise,
we are stretching the meaning of the term a bit too far.37
Aside from assailing the resolution granting the petition for bail, Atty. Calma maintained
that the resolution had been released under suspicious circumstances considering that
the defense counsel, Atty. Albert T. Villaseca, had already gone to the RTC ready to post
the cash bail of P200,000.00 for each of the accused even prior to the release of the June
14, 2007 resolution granting bail.38
Anent this, Atty. Villaseca explained his presence in Branch 18 in the following manner:
2. Q: On June 18, 2007 at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, where were you?
A: I was at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite before the Honorable Judge
Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr. I just came from the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor,
Cavite as I initially attended the hearing of Criminal Case No. B-2002-623 titled "People
of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Benedicto Baraquilles Maliksi, Accused," for Homicide.
The case was postponed as the Prosecutor in said case was sick. I have with me a
"Certified True Copy" of the "Minutes" which I signed together with the "Order" of the
Honorable Judge Eduardo Israel Tanguangco both dated June 18, 2007.
3. Q: What were you doing at that time before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus,
Cavite at the sala of the Honorable Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr.?
A: I attended the hearing and appeared as counsel for both of the accused in the case of
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Guillermo Silla y Legaspi and Paulino Silla y
Purificacion, Accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 10242-02 for Homicide.
4. Q: What document or documents, if any, do you have to show before this Honorable
Court that on June 18, 2007 at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning you attended and
appeared before a criminal case at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite
before the sale (sic) of Honorable Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr.?
A: I have with me the "Original Copy" of the Honorable Court's "Order" dated June 18,
2007 together with a "Certified True Copy of my "Appearance" indicated by my two
signatures therein and the "Minutes of the Proceedings" in the case of People of the

Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Guillermo Silla y Legaspi and Paulino Silla y Purificacion,
Accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 10242-02 for Homicide.
5. Q: At about what time did you leave the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite
after you attended and appeared in the case you are handling?
A: I left the courtroom at around 10:30 oclock in the morning after my case was called.
6. Q: What did you [do] after you left the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite at
around 10:30 oclock in the morning of June 18, 2007?
A: I went to my office to get the records of another case I was handling that day in the
afternoon and briefly prepared for its afternoon hearing.
7. Q: what is this case all about?
A: It is a civil case for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Annulment of Title and Damages
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-2209 titled Benjamin Q. Diwa, et. al., Plaintiffs, versus,
Maxima R. Matias and International Exchange Bank, Defendants, pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City at the sala of the Honorable Judge Edwin
G. Larida, Jr. which is scheduled to be heard in the afternoon of June 18, 2007 at around
1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
8. Q: What happened next after you arrived at your office to get the records and
prepared (sic) for this other case that you are handling in the afternoon of June 18, 2007?
A: At around 11:30 o'clock in the morning, I left my office in Imus, Cavite and together
with my driver and one of my office personnel, proceeded [to] Tagaytay City to attend to
the hearing of my case.
9. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: I arrived at the parking ground of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City at
around 12:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
10. Q: Then, what happened next?
A: Upon arriving at the office of the personnel and staff of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City, I was informed by my clients and a court personnel that all the
cases scheduled in the afternoon would be rescheduled to another date as there was an
unusual incident which transpired inside the courtroom earlier.
11. Q: What is that unusual incident which transpired earlier in the courtroom of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City?
A: I was informed that one of the accused in a rape case from the Provincial Jail of the
Province of Cavite took hostage of one of the court employees and that is the reason why
all the cases scheduled to be heard in the afternoon were rescheduled to another date.
12: Q: What document, if any, do you have to show before this Honorable Court that
there was a hostage taking incident that transpired in the morning of June 18, 2007 in
side(sic) the courtroom of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City?
A: I have with me a "Certified True Copy" of the Police Blotter issued by SPO4 Samuel
Baybay of the Tagaytay City Police Station.
13. Q: What did you do after that?
A: I provided the court personnel with my available date, briefly talked to my clients and
knowing that our case was already postponed I inquired about the status of my other
cases pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City.
14. Q: What happened next, after that?
A: As I (was) browsing upon the records of Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 titled The
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Leandro Go y Lim, et al, Accused, for Violation
of Sec. 8, Art. 2, RA 9165, I came across the resolution of the Honorable Court in our
petition for bail.
15. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: I personally received a copy of the Honorable Court's Resolution and, thereafter,
immediately and excitedly informed the aunt of one of my clients as I know she would be
very happy about it as my clients have been innocently lingering in jail for almost four
years and have already lost faith and hope of ever having temporary liberty.
16. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: I informed the aunt of one of my clients the amount of the bond required to (be)
posted in cash and she told me to meet her at the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City,
Province of Cavite and give her a copy of the Honorable Court's Resolution and she
would provide for the amount of the cash bond required by the Honorable Court.
17. Q: What happened next, if any?

A: I inquired from one of the court personnel that if we could post a cash bail bond that
afternoon, could my clients be ordered released, and what other documents the court
requires to immediately avail of the "order of Release."
18. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: After I was informed by one of the court personnel that since there are no cases to be
heard that afternoon and since all the cases will just be rescheduled to another date,
they have a lot of time to take care of the "Order of Release" of my clients as long as all
the other court requirements for the posting of the cash bail bond are complied with. I
wasted no time and hurriedly left the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City.
Proceeded to the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City, Province of Cavite to inform my
clients about the Honorable Court's Resolution and to meet the aunt of one of my clients
who will take care of the cash bail bond required. On my way, I informed the aunt of my
client about the other requirements for the posting of the cash bail bond and prepared
the Cash Bond Undertaking of my clients in my laptop computer.
19. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: I arrived at the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City, Province of Cavite before 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon. Delivered a copy of the Honorable Court's Resolution to the
Provincial Jail Warden and met the aunt of one of my clients who provided me with the
cash in the amount of P400,000.00 for the cash bail bond required, pictures of the
accused together with the other requirements for the cash bail bond. I explained the
consequences of a Cash Bond Undertaking to my clients, have (sic) them sign and
subscribe to it and then notarized it.
20. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: I wasted no time and hurriedly left for Tagaytay City. Thereafter, I posted the cash bail
bond and submitted all the requirements to secure an "Order of Release" for my clients.
21. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: All documents I submitted were found in order by the personnel in charge. I was able
to secure an "Order of Release" for my clients. Thereafter, I again proceeded to the
Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City, Province of Cavite and delivered to the Provincial Jail
Warden an copy of the "Order of Release."39
Atty. Calmas bare allegations, which were obviously based on surmise and speculation,
cannot be preferred because Atty. Villasecas foregoing explanation of his presence in
Branch 18 was supported by authentic documents. Accordingly, we dismiss the charge of
Judge Laridas having improperly granted bail in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03.
6.
Charge of granting the motion to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06
without a case record and without requiring a
comment from the public prosecutor
The Investigating Justice said regarding this charge:
In Criminal case No. TG-5307-06, Jayson Espiritu, among others, was charged with
Murder and was arrested on 6 August 2008 and detained at the Provincial Jail. On 22
August 2008, Jayson Espiritu filed a motion to quash/dismiss information on the ground
that he was a minor at the time of the commission of the offense.
In an Order, dated 5 September 2008, respondent Judge set the motion to quash for
hearing on October 3, 2008 and gave the prosecution 15 days to file its
comment/opposition thereto. However, without waiting for the 15-day period to expire,
respondent Judge granted Jayson Espiritu's motion to quash on 15 September 2008.
According to the Judicial Affidavit of former Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Stanlee D.C.
Calma, aside from not giving the prosecution a chance to oppose Jayson Espiritu's
motion to quash, respondent Judge personally drafted the Order granting said motion
without access to the records of the case. Moreover, respondent Judge allegedly gave an
advance copy of the Order granting the motion to quash to the father of Jayson Espiritu,
who, in turn, showed the same to the warden of the Provincial Jail even before the court
had personally served the same upon said warden on 26 September 2008. According to
Atty. Calma, he was informed by the widow of the victim in said criminal case that
respondent Judge had been paid off to quash the information against Jayson Espiritu.
In his defense, respondent Judge explained that he granted Jayson Espiritus motion to
quash pursuant to RA 9344 because Jayson Espiritu was only a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense, as proved by his birth certificate attached to the motion.
Respondent Judge denied having received a pay-off to quash the information against

Jayson Espiritu, and explained that he did not wait for the comment/opposition of the
prosecution because he followed the substance of the law and acted swiftly in the best
interests of the minor accused. Respondent Judge asserts that he personally prepared
the order on 15 September 2008.40
Jayson Espiritu, the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06, was a minor of 15 years
and 11 months at the time of the commission of the offense charged as borne out by the
copy of his birth certificate attached to the motion to quash. He was for that reason
entitled to the quashal of the information filed against him for being exempt from
criminal liability based on Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006), which states as follows:
Section 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20
of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless
he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis
supplied)
The foregoing notwithstanding, Judge Larida should not have acted on Espiritus motion
to quash without first giving the public prosecutor the opportunity to comment on the
motion. That opportunity was demanded by due process. 41 As a judge, he should exercise
patience and circumspection to ensure that the opposing sides are allowed the
opportunity to be present and to be heard.42 Only thereby could he preclude any
suspicion on the impartiality of his actuations. 43 But he cannot now be sanctioned
because it is a matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action although they are erroneous.44 Considering that there was no fraud, dishonesty or
corruption that attended the omission of prior notice, we simply caution him against a
repetition of the omission of prior notice.
The Investigating Justice found the charge of bribery against Judge Larida unsupported
by competent evidence.45We concur. The records are bereft of the evidence that would
establish the charge. Innuendo and hearsay will not establish the accusation. We insist
that any accusation of bribery against a judicial officer should be made upon hard and
firm evidence of it. Hence, we dismiss the charge of bribery.
7.
Charge
of
granting
under
questionable
circumstances
the
petition
for
the
issuance
of
owners
duplicate
copies
of various TCTs in LRC Case No. TG-06-1183
In its report, the investigating team from the OCA made the following observations with
respect to LRC Case No. TG-06-1183, to wit:
1. There was no hearing conducted to establish the jurisdiction of the court and
subsequent referral of the reception of evidence ex parte to Clerk of Court Desiree
Macaraeg as commissioner;
2. There was no proof to establish that the Register [of] Deeds of Tagaytay City, although
furnished with a copy of the petition, had actually received it;
3. There was no commissioner's report attached to the record relative to the reception of
evidence ex parte conducted on 5 & 10 May 2006;
4. The affidavit of loss of titles was presented by petitioner Santos to the Register of
Deeds only on 5 May 2006 at the same time the petition was allegedly heard by the
commissioner;
5. Per minutes dated 10 May 2006, there appears the name [of] Fiscal Manuel D. Noche,
for the government, yet the TSN state[s] that there was no appearance of Fiscal Noche
on 10 May 2006 or even the 5 May 2006 ex-parte hearing.
6. Petitioner's formal offer of evidence was admitted on 10 May 2007 when the same was
filed only on 11 May 2007. The order also made it appear that there is no objection
interposed by the City Prosecutor despite non-appearance thereof.

7. The comment of the Register of Deeds on petitioner's Urgent Manifestation alleging

that the Register of Deeds delivered the TCTs to Marie Cruz although stated 4
September 2006 was filed in court only on 4 December 2006.46
The Investigating Justice recommended the dismissal of the charge of irregularity for lack
of evidence and substantiation, thusly:
Although the Investigation Report details the legal proceedings in LRC Case No. TG-061183, and certain documents from the case were offered in evidence for the
complainant, the OCA did not fully elaborate on the exact nature of this charge against
respondent Judge. Moreover, during the cross-examination of Diana Ruiz, the latter
manifested a lack of knowledge over the events that transpired in said LRC case. No
other witnesses were presented to substantiate this charge. Therefore, it is
recommended that this charge against respondent Judge be DISMISSED.47
The finding and recommendation by the Investigating Justice are well-taken.1wphi1 The
mere specification of accusations against Judge Larida could not demonstrate the
veracity of the accusations notwithstanding the attachment of all the documents
allegedly in support of the accusations. Evidence that was relevant and competent must
have been adduced to support the accusation. Diana Ruizs judicial affidavit attesting
that the corresponding documents in support of the investigating teams accusations
were faithful reproductions of the originals that formed part of LRC Case No. TG-06-1183,
without more, did not suffice to establish the commission of irregularities in the
disposition of the case. It is important to stress that the proceedings upon administrative
charges made against judicial officers should be viewed with utmost care, and such
proceedings are governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases, with the
charges to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, by virtue of their nature as highly penal
in character.48
8.
Charge
of
liability
for
the
fire
that occurred on October 12, 2008
Anent the fire that occurred in the records room of Branch 18, we absolve Judge Larida
because no evidence directly linking him to the arson incident was presented. 49 It further
appears that at the time of the occurrence of the fire, Judge Larida was hospitalized for a
kidney injury that he had sustained from a fall on the night of October 9, 2008. 50
Nevertheless, the OCA insisted on Judge Laridas responsibility for the fire based on
certain circumstances, namely: (a) the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed
that access to the courthouse was through the rear entrance, 51 and he admitted that
such entrance was his access to the courthouse; 52 (b) despite his being the Presiding
Judge of Branch 18, he did not actively take part in the investigation of the arson
incident, thereby manifesting his lack of interest in or concern over the burning of the
courthouse;53 and (c) he had a motive to burn the courthouse in order to destroy the
courts case records that would reveal his wrongdoings.54
However, Atty. Calma disclosed that aside from Judge Larida, utility workers Ofelia
Parasdas and Romelito Fernando, Judge Young, and Marticio all had keys to the entrance
doors of the courthouse (i.e., two front doors and one back door), 55 and that he (Atty.
Calma), along with the clerk-in-charge of the civil docket Anita Goboy and criminal
docket clerk Romelito Fernando, were the only ones who had access to the records room
because only they knew the location of the key to the records room.56
Equally notable is that the forensic report denominated as Dactyloscopy Report No. F129-08 issued by the Philippine National Police Cavite Provincial Crime Laboratory Office
on November 21, 200857 showed that one of the latent prints lifted from the crime scene
belonged to Romelito Fernando, a personnel who had testified against Judge Larida
during the investigation.
Judge Larida denied his supposed lack of interest in the investigation of the arson
incident by reminding that he had immediately requested the NBI to investigate the
arson incident upon learning about it. 58 He explained that he had refrained from further
actively participating in the investigation because he had been barred by the OCA from
reporting for work;59 that unlike the staff members of RTC Branch 18 who had continued
to report for work and had been interviewed by the investigating team, he had not been
summoned for any interview; and that he also learned from the NBI agents themselves
that they had been ordered to cease from further investigating the fire upon the entry of
the OCA in the investigation.60

Imputing to Judge Larida the motive to burn the courthouse in order to destroy case
records that could expose his wrongdoings was baseless and speculative. We reject the
imputation. Before any judge should be disciplined for any offense, the evidence
presented against him must be competent and derived from personal knowledge. The
judge ought not to be sanctioned except upon a proper charge, and only after due
investigation and with competent proof.61
9.
Consolidated Penalty for Judge Larida
Judge Larida has been found guilty of a less serious charge for not complying with the
directive of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 to send an inventory of locally-funded
employees to the Supreme Court within one month from notice of the circular, and of
allowing locally funded employees to perform more than merely clerical tasks; and of a
light charge for unbecoming conduct for not causing the investigation of the solicitations
of commission from a bonding company committed by three employees assigned to his
court.
It is the sense of the Court to consolidate the imposable sanctions on Judge Larida into a
single penalty of suspension from office without pay for a period of two months, to be
effective immediately upon notice.
10.
Letter-complaint of Jayson Marticio
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Investigating Justice, we dismiss the letter
complaint of Marticio for lack of substantiation by him.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. IMPOSES ON Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. the penalty of SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE
WITHOUT PAY FOR A PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS, to be effective immediately upon notice,
with a warning that sterner sanctions will be meted out to him upon his commission of
similar acts or omissions;
2. DISMISSES the following charges against Judge Larida, Jr. for lack of evidence to
support them, namely: (a) Extorting money from detained accused Raymund Wang; (b)
Defying the directive of the Supreme Court in Administrative Order No. 132-2008; (c)
Improperly granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03; (d) Receiving a
bribe in exchange for granting Jayson Espiritu' s motion to quash the information in
Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06; (e) Granting under questionable circumstances the
petition for the issuance of owner's duplicate copies of various certificates of title in LRC
Case No. TG-06-1183; and (j) Involvement in the fire that razed the records room of
Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court in Tagaytay City; and
3. DISMISSES the letter-complaint of Jayson Marticio dated October 20, 2008 due to his
lack of interest to prosecute it.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 8108
July 15, 2014
DANTE
LA
JIMENEZ
&
LAURO
G.
VIZCONDE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
Adm. Case No. 10299
ATTY.
OLIVER
O.
LOZANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper and
inappropriate conduct tending to influence and/or giving the appearance of influence
upon a public official. The Joint Report and Recommendation submitted by Commissioner
Felimon C. Abelita III recommended that respondent beissued a warning not to repeat
the same nor any similar action, otherwise the Commission will impose a more severe
penalty. The Commission adopted the said ruling on 16 April 2013.2
The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro
G. Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the

time of the filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was representing his clients
Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the
"Alabang Boys") werethe accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. 3 In a Joint Inquest
Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges were dropped for lack of probable
cause.4
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during
the evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and
"cover-up" allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade.This prompted the
House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was
revealed during one such hearing that respondenthad prepared the release order for his
three clients using the letterhead ofthe Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of
then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They
stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby
committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no
authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a
member of the bar.6
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint on respondents alleged violation of
Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall upholdthe
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respectfor legal processes. 7 Atty.
Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in
drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the
latter was not a government prosecutor. 8 Atty. Lozanos verified ComplaintAffidavit was
filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP and docketed as CBD Case No. 092356.9
Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical
conduct of respondent and showing unqualified support for the VACCs filing of
disbarment proceedings.10 On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on
the ground that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez. 11 On 2 June 2009, the
Court referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as well as for investigation, report
and recommendation. RESPONDENTS VERSION
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges
against his clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the resolution also ordered the
immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high hopes of the
accused, together with their families, came crashing down when the PDEA still refused to
release his clients.12 Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause
prompted him to prepare and draft the release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he
was overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything may be
expedited."13 In any case, respondent continues, the drafted release order was not
signed by the Secretary and therefore remained "a mere scrap of paper with no effect at
all."14
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the
letter-complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence
was adduced to prove the charges.
However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment, respondent
drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of
"feeding" the draft order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to
influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of
violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he
be issued a warning not to repeat the same or any similar action.15
RULING OF THE COURT
We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may conduct its own investigation into
charges against members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints
brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the
case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. 16 By now, it is

basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.17
As to Atty. Lozanos withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in RayosOmbac v. Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant
does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters
is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have
in the proper administration of justice.Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)
After a careful review of the records,we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable grounds
to hold respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the
Investigating Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause
and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court." We believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to the regular
courts, but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where respect for the rule of law
is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline,
respondent stated that the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a direct
order from the DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take more serious
action, viz.:
ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see the
Secretary himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his [sic]
kasihe is very political also so he opens his office. If Im not mistaken that day because of
the timing we will afraid [sic] that Christmas time is coming and that baka nga sila maipit
sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw gawan
ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a lawyer
nowI prepared the staff to make it easy, to make it convenient for signing authority
that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and send it over to PDEA. So hinanda
ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office of the other Secretary si Blancaflor.
xxxx
So I think its a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first with
the parents of Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00
oclock or 1:30 in the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor. Andon ho
ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho
namin inexplain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on this, they will think
that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong Fifty
Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang
maki-usapsabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will study the matter, those
particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter of
fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not pushing us away, he was entertaining us, and
we were discussing the case.19
Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very
open;" and that "because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political
family, my father was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he
knows my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they weretogether in Congress. In
other words, I am not a complete stranger to him." 20 Upon questioning by Commissioner
Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that he was personally acquainted with the
Secretary; however, they were not that close.21
These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondents admission
that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was
still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft
release order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end
in view of "expediting the case."

The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special
treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of
improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar.
Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be
seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the peoples faith inthe judicial
process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of
justice.1wphi1 To that end, their clients success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a
member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to bythe lawyer,
even inthe pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.22
Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a
lawyershall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a clients cause must always be within the bounds of
the law.23 A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if
an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that
respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a
warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for
the offense.
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a sixmonth suspension against a judge who likewise committed acts of influence peddling
whenshe solicited P100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter asked for her
help in the case of her friend Emerita Muoz, who had a pendingcase with the Supreme
Court, because respondent judge was a former court attorney of the high court. 24 We find
that the same penalty is appropriate in the present case.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTYof
violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately. This also serves as an emphaticWARNING that repetition of any
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondents bar records. The Court
Administrator is hereby directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5581
January 14, 2014
ROSE
BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose
Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for
Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R.
Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified
xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted
another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City
Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and
in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the
first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his
marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file
a comment on the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy
of the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the
Court, in a Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file
his comment on the complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion 7 praying that
respondent's failure to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file
the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an
administrative case was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof
since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any
processes of this Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion
was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for
falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig and her husband. He also
explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause Order only when
he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project
3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's
Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger
sister's husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the
complaint to him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order
to prevent him from defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation
amounting to P2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further
claimed that he and his wife received death threats from unknown persons; thus, he
transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City.
He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to file his
answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish
respondent with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such
service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No.
238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry
Receipt No. 2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite
receipt of the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure. 10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation, 11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a
copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the
Court's Order, otherwise, he would have received the same already. He requested anew
that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a
copy of the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to
respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation, 13 lamented the dilatory tactics
allegedly undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt
of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his
deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the
complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the
complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles City as shown by
Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered
mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause
Order dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd.
under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig
to submit the correct and present address of respondent.15

On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated
in his correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision,
Angeles City as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said
address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in
Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1,
Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as counsel with mailing address to
be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City." 16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as
required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon
Atty. Celera a FINE of P1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of
five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply
with the Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to:
(1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER
the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the
Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the
Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M.
Banawa, Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent
cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao,
Quezon City cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address,
i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a
demolished building. Considering that the given address cannot be found or located and
there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest
cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's
Resolution, reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41
Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite
several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was
submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was received by
respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt. However, respondent failed to take
any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of
law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is
rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. 22 The issue to be
determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in
the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment
continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges
against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering
the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this
Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.23

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a

second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as
evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3,
2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent
Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan
at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as
evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4,
2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A.
Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary
the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that
respondent entered into a second marriage while the latters first marriage was still
subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from
his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still
subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,
its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second
marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two
marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the
full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment
proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent
and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to
continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon
7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondents
defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its
Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on
since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives
for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected only those he
will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several
resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this
day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy
of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically,
however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's
attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him,
he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is
pending before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude
towards this case; accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and
prayers to be given a copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced

by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more
than a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different
locations - both office and residential addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest
efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere
excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no longer feasible,
respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondents acts were
deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the
case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is
respondents deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this
Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient
cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly
ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have
repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondents obstinate
refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to
do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also
the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA,
guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.1wphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall
forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
Attorney; Gross Negligence. Respondent Villaseca was charged for gross and inexcusable
negligence in handling a criminal case, as a consequence of which the complainants
were convicted. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Villasecas failure to submit a
demurrer to evidence constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion
and zeal in preserving his clients cause. Furthermore, Atty. Villasecas failure to present
any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of
diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference
towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and livelihood of his clients
were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts to rebut the presented
prosecution evidence. The Court emphasized that while a lawyer has complete discretion
on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every
remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his clients cause.
- Mary Ann T. Mattus v. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013.
A.C. No. 7922

October 1, 2013

MARY
ANN
T.MATTUS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERT T. VILLASECA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Mary Ann T. Mattus against
Atty. Albert T. Villaseca for gross and inexcusable negligence in handling Criminal Case
No. 10309-02.
Background Facts
The complainant, German Bernardo D. Mattus and Dexter Aligan were the accused in
Criminal Case No. 10309-02 a case for estafa thru falsification of public document filed
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite. The complainant and her
husband, German, engaged the services of Atty. Villaseca to represent them in the
proceedings. The complainant maintained that she and German were convicted due to
Atty. Villasecas gross and inexcusable negligence in performing his duties as their
counsel.
In her complaint-affidavit,1 the complainant alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca:
(1) was often absent during court hearings but still collected appearance fees; (2)
frequently sought the postponement of trial when he was present; (3) failed to ask the
RTC to direct a National Bureau of Investigation expert to examine the signatures of the
spouses Leslie and Zuraida Porter2 in the special power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to file
a demurrer to evidence despite having been granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit
one; (5) failed to present evidence on behalf of the defense, and only filed a
memorandum; (6) did not inform her and German of the dates of the presentation of
defense evidence and the promulgation of judgment; and (7) erroneously indicated the
wrong case number in the notice of appeal. According to the complainant, Atty.
Villasecas negligence in handling the case resulted in her own and her husbands
conviction.
In the Courts Resolution3 of July 16, 2008, we required Atty. Villaseca to comment on the
complaint.
On September 10, 2008, Atty. Villaseca filed his comment, 4 refuting the allegations
against him. Atty. Villaseca explained that he made known to the complainant that the
testimony of a handwriting expert was necessary only if the prosecution would be able to
produce the original copy of the SPA. Atty. Villaseca also claimed that his absences
during the hearings, as well as his numerous motions for postponement, were justified
and were never intended for delay. He denied having collected appearance fees when he
did not attend the scheduled hearings, and maintained that the fees he received were
intended to compensate him for his services in the other cases filed by the complainant.
Atty. Villaseca further claimed that he immediately corrected the case number in the
notice of appeal when he discovered this error.
In a Resolution5dated October 15, 2008, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation6 dated September 16, 2009,Investigating
Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag recommended that Atty. Villaseca be suspended for
six (6) months from the practice of law.
Commissioner Hababag ruled that Atty. Villasecas reckless and gross negligence
deprived his clients of due process; his actuations in the criminal case showed utter
disregard for his clients life and liberty. Commissioner Hababag explained that Atty.
Villaseca failed to file a demurrer to evidence despite the sufficient length of time that
had been given to him by the RTC to submit this pleading, and waived his right to
present evidence for the defense, opting instead to file a memorandum only.
Commissioner Hababag concluded that Atty. Villasecas failure to properly attend to the
interests of his clients led to their conviction.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-2517 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, but increased Atty.
Villasecas period of suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1)
year.
Our Ruling

After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to
support the IBPs findings. We, however, increase Atty. Villasecas period of suspension
from the practice of law from one (1) year to five (5) years.
We stress at the outset that a lawyer "is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to
preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise
serves the ends of justice."8 Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by
the rules of law, legally applied. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does
honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.9
The records of the present case show that Atty. Villaseca had been grossly remiss in
handling Criminal Case No. 10309-02. To recall, Atty. Villaseca requested for time to file
demurrer to evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. In its order 10 of July 1,
2004, the RTC gave him 20 days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes
within which to file a demurrer to evidence. Atty. Villaseca, however, did not file a
demurrer to evidence, without offering any explanation why he failed to do so. As a
result, the RTC issued an order 11 stating that Atty. Villaseca "is deemed to have waived
his right to file the said pleading."
To our mind, Atty. Villasecas failure to submit a demurrer to evidence to explain such
omission constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in
preserving his clients cause. We point out that nine months had lapsed from the time
the RTC granted Atty. Villaseca 20 days to file the demurrer to the time it ruled that he
was deemed to have waived his right to file this pleading. Clearly, Atty. Villasecas
actuations violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that "a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for
his failure to do so."
The records further disclosed that after Atty. Villasecas failure to file a demurrer to
evidence, the RTC set the initial presentation of defense evidence on May 9, 2005.
However, this hearing was postponed thrice: the May 9, 2005 hearing was reset to
August 8, 2005 due to Atty. Villasecas failure to appear; 12 the August 8, 2005 hearing
was reset to November 17, 2005 upon Atty. Villasecas motion; 13 and the November 17,
2005 hearing was reset to March 1, 2006 because of Atty. Villasecas manifestation that
his intended first witness was unavailable. 14During the March 1, 2006hearing, the
respondent manifested that the defense would no longer present any evidence, and
moved that he be given time to file a memorandum.15
We point out that the prosecution rested its case on July 1, 2004; yet Atty. Villaseca
waited until March 1, 2006 only to manifest that he would no longer present any
evidence. We are at a loss why Atty. Villaseca chose not to present any evidence for the
defense, considering that the accused wanted and were ready to take the witness stand.
As a result, the testimony of the lone prosecution witness remained uncontroverted. To
make matters worse, Atty. Villaseca directed German to attend the hearing on June 6,
2007without informing him that it was already the date of the promulgation of
judgment.1wphi1
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." 16 It further
mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." 17 It also
states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."18
Atty. Villasecas failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for
the defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the
Court; it showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the
liberty and livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted
efforts tore but the presented prosecution evidence. He could have presented the
complainant and/or her husband to the witness stand, instead of just opting to file a
memorandum. Or, at the very least, the reason for this move should have been fully
explained to the clients, and later to the IBP and to this Court. But no such explanation

ever came. We are thus left with the stark reality that Atty. Villaseca failed to file, despite
the promise made to the lower court, a demurrer to evidence. After failing in this first line
of defense for his clients, it should have been incumbent upon Atty. Villaseca to present
evidence for the defense, but again, he unexplainably failed to do this, leaving the lower
court with no evidence to appreciate except that of the prosecution, to the detriment of
his clients cause.
We emphasize that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to
employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law to support his clients cause. A memorandum, no matter how
lengthy, should not be made a substitute for testimonial, object or documentary
evidence, more so in a criminal case where a conviction could lead to dire consequences.
In saying so, we are not insinuating that the RTC decision would have tilted in favor of
the defense had Atty. Villaseca presented evidence; we simply stress that utmost fidelity
and attention are demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client's
cause.
We again remind members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of
the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer engaged to represent a client bears the
responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with utmost diligence. It is his duty to
serve his client with competence and diligence, and he should exert his best efforts to
protect, within the bounds of the law, the interests of his client. 19 A lawyers diligence
and vigilance is more imperative in criminal cases, where the life and liberty of an
accused is at stake. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the
public. As we explained in Spouses Bautista v. Atty. Arturo Cefra:20
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts
and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
"The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts." 21 Under the circumstances, we find that the
IBPs recommended penalty of one years suspension from the practice of law is not
commensurate to Atty. Villasecas transgressions. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society indicate a high degree of
irresponsibility that casts dishonor on the legal profession.
The present case finds a close forerunner in Santeco v. Atty. Avance, 22 where we
suspended Atty. Luna B. Avance from the practice of law for five(5) years for being
grossly remiss in the performance of her duties as counsel. In this cited case, the civil
case entrusted to Atty. Avance was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During the
pendency of her motion for reconsideration (which she had filed way beyond the
reglementary period), she told her client that she would file a petition for certiorari
before the CA to assail the dismissal of the civil case. She did not file this petition, but
failed to inform her client of this omission. Moreover, Atty. Avance stopped appearing as
counsel for her client without notifying the latter.
Atty. Villasecas negligence in the present case had much graver implications, as the
legal matter entrusted to him involved not merely money or property, but the very
liberty and livelihood of his clients. We stress that the moment Atty. Villaseca agreed to
handle the complainants criminal case, he became duty-bound to serve his clients with
competence and diligence, and to champion their cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By
failing to afford his clients every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law, Atty.
Villaseca fell short of what is expected of him as an officer of the Court. We cannot
overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
All told, Atty. Villaseca showed a wanton and utter disregard to his clients cause; his
failure to exercise due diligence in attending to their interest in the criminal case caused
them grave prejudice. Under the circumstances, we find a five-year suspension from the
practice of law to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against him. The increased
penalty serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the Court, the legal profession
and the public.

WHEREFORE premises considered, we find Atty. Albert T. Villaseca guilty of negligence, in

violation of Rules 12.03 and 18.03 and
Canon
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for five (5) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9532
October 8, 2013
MARIA
CRISTINA
ZABALJAUREGUI
PITCHER, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court s resolution is an administrative complaint 1 filed by Maria Cristina
Zabaljauregui Pitcher (complainant) against Atty. Rustico B. Gagate (respondent), .
charging him for gross ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law.
The facts
Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David), 2 a British national
who passed away on June 18, 2004.3 Prior to his death, David was engaged in business in
the Philippines and owned, among others, 40% of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge,
Inc.4 (Consulting Edge), a domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her
deceased husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent.5
On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with Katherine Moscoso Bantegui
Bantegui),6 a major stockholder of Consulting Edge, 7 in order to discuss the settlement of
Davids interest in the company.8 They agreed to another meeting which was, however,
postponed by Bantegui. Suspecting that the latter was merely stalling for time in order to
hide something, respondent insisted that the appointment proceed as scheduled.9
Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company premises on June 28, 2004.
However, prior to the scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by
respondent to put a paper seal on the door of the said premises, assuring her that the
same was legal.10
On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of
complainant and respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for the court to
settle. She then asked them to leave, locked the office and refused to give them a
duplicate key.11
Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, caused the change
in the lock of the Consulting Edge office door, 12 which prevented the employees thereof
from entering and carrying on the operations of the company. This prompted Bantegui to
file before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati (Prosecutors Office) a complaint for
grave coercion against complainant and respondent. 13 In turn, respondent advised
complainant that criminal and civil cases should be initiated against Bantegui for the
recovery of David's personal records/business interests in Consulting Edge. 14 Thus, on
January 17, 2005, the two entered in Memorandum of Agreement, 15 whereby respondent
undertook the filing of the cases against Bantegui, for which complainant paid the
amount of P150,000.00 as acceptance fee and committed herself to pay
respondentP1,000.00 for every court hearing.16
On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutors Office issued a Resolution 17 dated October 13,
2004, finding probable cause to charge complainant and respondent for grave coercion.
The corresponding Information was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 63, docketed as Criminal Case No. 337985 (grave coercion case), and, as a
matter of course, warrants of arrest were issued against them. 18 Due to the foregoing,
respondent advised complainant to go into hiding until he had filed the necessary
motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent abandoned the grave coercion case
and stopped communicating with complainant.19Failing to reach respondent despite
diligent efforts,20 complainant filed the instant administrative case before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD Case
No. 06-1689.

Despite a directive21 from the IBP-CBD, respondent failed to file his answer to the
complaint. The case was set for mandatory conference on November 24, 2006, 22 which
was reset twice,23 on January 12, 2007 and February 2, 2007, due to the absence of
respondent. The last notice sent to respondent, however, was returned unserved for the
reason "moved out."24 In view thereof, Investigating Commissioner Tranquil S. Salvador III
declared the mandatory conference terminated and required the parties to submit their
position papers, supporting documents, and affidavits.25
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On March 18, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner
Magpayo) issued a Report and Recommendation, 26 observing that respondent failed to
safeguard complainant's legitimate interest and abandoned her in the grave coercion
case. Commissioner Magpayo pointed out that Bantegui is not legally obliged to honor
complainant as subrogee of David because complainant has yet to establish her kinship
with David and, consequently, her interest in Consulting Edge. 27 Hence, the actions taken
by respondent, such as the placing of paper seal on the door of the company premises
and the changing of its lock, were all uncalled for. Worse, when faced with the counter
legal measures to his actions, he abandoned his client's cause. 28Commissioner Magpayo
found that respondents acts evinced a lack of adequate preparation and mastery of the
applicable laws on his part, in violation of
Canon
529 of the Code of Professional Responsibity (Code), warranting his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six months.30
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforementioned Report and
Recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-261 dated November 19, 2011 (November
19, 2011 Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules.31
In a Resolution32 dated October 8, 2012, the Court noted the Notice of the IBPs
November 19, 2011 Resolution, and referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.33
The OBC's Report and Recommendation
On February 11, 2013, the OBC submitted a Report and Recommendation 34 dated
February 6, 2013, concluding that respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client
and failed to safeguard the latter's rights and interests in wanton disregard of his duties
as a lawyer.35 It deemed that the six-month suspension from the practice of law as
suggested by the IBP was an insufficient penalty and, in lieu thereof, recommended that
respondent be suspended for three years. 36 Likewise, it ordered respondent to return
the P150,000.00 he received from complainant as acceptance fee.37
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and
conclusions of the OBC.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his
client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to
expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected
to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.38 To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest
means to attain lawful objectives.39 These principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule
18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code which respectively state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxxx
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.

xxxx
Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the
required diligence in handling complainants cause since he: first, failed to represent her
competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the
proper bounds of law; and, second, abandoned his clients cause while the grave
coercion case against them was pending.
Anent the first infraction, it bears emphasis that complainant's right over the properties
of her deceased husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established. As such, the highhanded action taken by respondent to enforce complainant's claim of ownership over the
latters interest in Consulting Edge i.e., causing the change of the office door lock which
thereby prevented the free ingress and egress of the employees of the said company
was highly improper. Verily, a person cannot take the law into his own hands, regardless
of the merits of his theory. In the same light, respondent's act of advising complainant to
go into hiding in order to evade arrest in the criminal case can hardly be maintained as
proper legal advice since the same constitutes transgression of the ordinary processes of
law. By virtue of the foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty to his client to use
peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice, 40 in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code as above-quoted. To note further, since such courses of action were not only
improper but also erroneous, respondent equally failed to serve his client with
competence and diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the Code. In the same regard, he
also remained unmindful of his clients trust in him in particular, her trust that
respondent would only provide her with the proper legal advice in pursuing her interests
thereby violating Canon 17 of the Code.
With respect to the second infraction, records definitively bear out that respondent
completely abandoned complainant during the pendency of the grave coercion case
against them; this notwithstanding petitioners efforts to reach him as well as his receipt
of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee. It is hornbook principle that a lawyers duty of
competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care
or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before
any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing
the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and
urging their termination even without prodding from the client or the court. 41 Hence,
considering respondents gross and inexcusable neglect by leaving his client totally
unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be doubted that he violated Canon 17, Rule
18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code.
In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to file his answer to the
complaint despite due notice.1wphi1This demonstrates not only his lack of
responsibility but also his lack of interest in clearing his name, which, as case law directs,
is constitutive of an implied admission of the charges leveled against him. 42 In fine,
respondent should be held administratively liable for his infractions as herein discussed.
That said, the Court now proceeds to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed
against respondent.
Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for
infractions similar to those committed by respondent were suspended from the practice
of law for a period of two years. In Jinon v. Jiz, 43 a lawyer who neglected his client's case,
misappropriated the client's funds and disobeyed the IBPs directives to submit his
pleadings and attend the hearings was suspended from the practice of law for two years.
In Small v. Banares,44 the Court meted a similar penalty against a lawyer who failed to
render any legal service even after receiving money from the complainant; to return the
money and documents he received despite demand; to update his client on the status of
her case and respond to her requests for information; and to file an answer and attend
the mandatory conference before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Gonzales, 45 a lawyer who
neglected complainants cause; refused to immediately account for his clients money
and to return the documents received; failed to update his client on the status of her
case and to respond to her requests for information; and failed to submit his answer and
to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP was suspended from the practice of
law for two years. However, the Court observes that, in the present case, complainant
was subjected to a graver injury as she was prosecuted for the crime of grave coercion
largely due to the improper and erroneous advice of respondent. Were it not for
respondents imprudent counseling, not to mention his act of abandoning his client
during the proceedings, complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a

criminal prosecution. Thus, considering the superior degree of the prejudice caused to
complainant, the Court finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three years as recommended by the
OBC.
In the same light, the Court sustains the OBCs recommendation for the return of
the P150,000.00 acceptance fee received by respondent from complainant since the
same is intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. While the Court has
previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyers administrative and not his civil liability, 46 it
must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are
purely civil in nature for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the
lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to
his professional engagement (such as the acceptance fee in this case). Hence,
considering further that the fact of respondents receipt of the P150,000.00 acceptance
fee from complainant remains undisputed,47 the Court finds the return of the said fee, as
recommended by the OBC, to be in order.
WHEREFORE respondent Atty. Rustico B. Gagate is found guilty of violating Canon 17
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of three 3) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui
Pitcher the P150,000.00 acceptance fee he received from the latter within ninety (90)
days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will
warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts.
SO ORDERED.
Landmark Case: CHUA QUA vs. CLAVE G.R. No. L-49549 August 30, 1990 (Case Digest)
A truly remarkable case wherein the Supreme Court ruled in favor of love. The setting
of the case was in when marriage between minors was still legal, way before the Family
Code. In this case, a 30 year old teacher had married her student which prompted the
school to terminate her. And against odds the Supreme Court Ruled in favor of here,
hence, creating this Landmark Case. truism that the heart has reasons of its own which
reason does not know.
CHUA QUA vs. CLAVE G.R. No. L-49549 August 30, 1990
Digested Case
A

Landmark

Case

FACTS:
This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial
and unique situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to
her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school
authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.
The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua in Tay
Tung High School in Bacolod City to her 16 years old student. The petitioner teacher was
suspended without pay and was terminated of his employment for Abusive and
Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified School Teacher which was filed by a public
respondent
as
a
clearance
for
termination.
ISSUE:
Was
her
dismissal
valid?
Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which
culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality
and
or
grave
misconduct?

RULING:
The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying:
Private respondent [the school] utterly failed to show that petitioner [30-year old lady
teacher] took advantage of her position to court her student [16-year old]. If the two
eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only
lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does
not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so
casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage
from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary
social mores.
Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that
the alleged violation of Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis.
Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to
court her student. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual
societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
CHUA QUA vs. CLAVE
G.R. No. L-49549 August 30, 1990
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua in Tay
Tung High School in Bacolod City to her 16 years old student. The petitioner teacher was
suspended without pay and was terminated of his employment for Abusive and
Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified School Teacher which was filed by a public
respondent as a clearance for termination.
ISSUE:
Was her dismissal valid?
Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which
culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality
and or grave misconduct?
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying:
If the two eventually fell in love despite the disparity in their ages and academic level,
this only leads to the truism that the heart has reason of its own which reason does not
know.
Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that
the alleged violation of Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis.
Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to
court her student. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual
societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990
EVELYN
CHUA-QUA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG
HIGH SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for petitioner.
Laogan Law Offices for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial
and unique situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to
her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school
authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.

Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod
City. Petitioner had been employed therein as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when
this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was
enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to extend remedial instructions to its
students, Bobby Qua was imparted such instructions in school by petitioner. 1 In the
course thereof, the couple fell in love and on December 24, 1975, they got married in a
civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of
Iloilo. 2 Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16)
years old, consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs. Concepcion
Ong. 3 Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church
wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on January 10, 1976. 4
On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the
Department of Labor at Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate the
employment of petitioner on the following ground: "For abusive and unethical conduct
unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued employment is inimical
to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral values, of the school." 5
Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976. 6 Executive
Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City,
to whom the case was certified for resolution, required the parties to submit their
position papers and supporting evidence. Affidavits 7 were submitted by private
respondent to bolster its contention that petitioner, "defying all standards of decency,
recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under
her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation." 8 More
specifically, private respondent raised issues on the fact that petitioner stayed alone with
Bobby Qua in the classroom after school hours when everybody had gone home, with
one door allegedly locked and the other slightly open.
On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting
any formal hearing, rendered an "Award" in NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private
respondent granting the clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner. It was held
therein that
The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the respondent
pointed out that before the marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years
her junior and during her employment with petitioner, an amorous relationship existed
between them. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the undisputed written
testimonies of several witnesses convincingly picture the circumstances under which
such amorous relationship was manifested within the premises of the school, inside the
classroom, and within the sight of some employees. While no direct evidences have been
introduced to show that immoral acts were committed during these times, it is however
enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and took
place during these times. . . . 9
Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred to. 10
On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
claiming denial of due process for not having been furnished copies of the aforesaid
affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter. She further contended that there was nothing
immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school
teacher, for a teacher to enter into lawful wedlock with her student. 11
On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously reversed
the Labor Arbiter's decision and ordered petitioner's reinstatement with backwages, with
the following specific findings:
Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on the
student desk inside a classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chin
are of the same tenor. No statements whatever were sworn by them that they were
eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts.
xxx xxx xxx
Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the conclusion of
the Arbiter, we could not deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and a boy
talking inside a room after classes with lights on and with the door open.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was precipitated by
immoral acts which did not lend dignity to the position of appellant. Aside from such
gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct by herein appellant, no evidence to

support such claims was introduced by petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the the

sequence of events from the beginning of the relationship between appellant Evelyn
Chua and Bobby Qua up to the date of the filing of the present application for clearance
in search of evidence that could have proved detrimental to the image and dignity of the
school but none has come to our attention. . . . 12
The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on March 30,
1977, reversed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner
was, however, awarded six (6) months salary as financial assistance. 13
On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of
the Philippines. 14 After the corresponding exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office,
through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision reversing
the appealed decision. Private respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her
former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with full back
wages from the time she was not allowed to work until the date of her actual
reinstatement. 15
Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating reversals,
one would think that this decision of public respondent wrote finis to petitioner's calvary.
However, in a resolution dated December 6, 1978, public respondent, acting on a motion
for reconsideration 16 of herein private respondent and despite opposition
thereto, 17 reconsidered and modified the aforesaid decision, this time giving due course
to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner as
classroom teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months
salary. 18
In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in his
manifestation/comment filed on August 14, 1979 in this Court in the present case:
That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but went
further to view the matter from the standpoint of policy which involves the delicate task
of rearing and educating of children whose interest must be held paramount in the
school community, and on this basis, this Office deemed it wise to uphold the judgment
and action of the school authorities in terminating the services of a teacher whose
actuations and behavior, in the belief of the school authorities, had spawned ugly rumors
that had cast serious doubts on her integrity, a situation which was considered by them
as not healthy for a school campus, believing that a school teacher should at all times
act with utmost circumspection and conduct herself beyond reproach and above
suspicion; 19
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the reversal of
the aforesaid resolution of public respondent, viz.:
1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's claim to
the contrary, was actually based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore, illegal.
2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when the hearsay
affidavits of Laddy Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong Lee Bing, were
admitted and considered in evidence without presenting the affiants as witnesses and
affording the petitioner the right to confront and cross-examine them.
3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious
misconduct or breached the trust reposed on her by her employer or committed any of
the other grounds enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article 282) of the Labor Code which
will justify the termination of her employment. 20
We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated. We do
not agree. There is no denial of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity
to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues are resolved based on position
papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is recognized as not violative of such
right. Moreover, petitioner could have insisted on a hearing to confront and crossexamine the affiants but she did not do so, obviously because she was convinced that
the case involves a question of law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed
by her in the proceedings before the Ministry of Labor.
Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community
toward the teachers and to strengthen the educational system, private respondent
submits that petitioner's actuations as a teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not an
immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and
just ground to terminate her services. It argues that as a school teacher who exercises
substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus, petitioner had

moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority
and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly
violated the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a
"school official or teacher should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil
or student." 21
On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate her
services as there is nothing wrong with a teacher falling in love with her pupil and,
subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with him. She argued that she was
dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua This contention was sustained in the
aforesaid decision of the National Labor Relations Commission thus:
. . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for
clearance was filed only after more than one month elapsed from the date of appellant's
marriage to Bobby Qua Certainly, such belated application for clearance weakens instead
of strengthening the cause of petitioner-appellee. The alleged immoral acts transpired
before the marriage and if it is these alleged undignified conduct that triggered the
intended separation, then why was the present application for clearance not filed at that
time when the alleged demoralizing effect was still fresh and abrasive? 22
After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the
determination of the legality of the dismissal hinges on the issue of whether or not there
is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the
marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and/or grave
misconduct. To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be
holistically considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct and the
applicable law. Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is
before us is a factual question, the resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.
Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review
the factual conclusions arrived at by public respondent, and to nullify his decision
through the extraordinary writ of certiorari if the same is tainted by absence or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The findings of fact must be supported by
substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound thereby. 23
We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly and
forcefully observed by him in his original decision:
Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the records
referred to are the affidavits attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the position paper dated
August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the arbitration proceedings) in arriving at his
decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit, leaving many question unanswered by
a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of the day during off
school hours when appellant and her student were found together in one of the
classrooms of the school. But the records of the case present a ready answer: appellant
was giving remedial instruction to her student and the school was the most convenient
place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete absence of
specific immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another,
and very important at that, the alleged acts complained of invariably happened from
September to December, 1975, but the disciplinenary action imposed by appellee was
sought only in February, 1976, and what is more, the affidavits were executed only in
August, 1976 and from all indications, were prepared by appellee or its counsel. The
affidavits heavily relied upon by appellee are clearly the product of after-thought. . . . The
action pursued by appellee in dismissing appellant over one month after her marriage,
allegedly based on immoral acts committed even much earlier, is open to basis of the
action sought seriously doubted; on the question. The basis of the action sought is
seriously doubted; on the contrary, we are more inclined to believe that appellee had
certain selfish, ulterior and undisclosed motives known only to itself. 24
As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no
direct evidence to show that immoral acts were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a
patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that "it is however enough for a sane and
credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during those times." 25 In
reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations Commission observed that the
assertions of immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct
evidence to support such claim, 26 a finding which herein public respondent himself
shared.

We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte-face in the
questioned resolution, which we hereby reject, despite his prior trenchant observations
hereinbefore quoted. What is revealing however, is that the reversal of his original
decision is inexplicably based on unsubstantiated surmises and non sequiturs which he
incorporated in his assailed resolution in this wise:
. . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing immoral
acts inside the classroom it seems obvious and this Office is convinced that such a
happening indeed transpired within the solitude of the classrom after regular class hours.
The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the best proof which confirms the
suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations in that place during those times of
the day. . . . 27
With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it
follows that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would
have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of
her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in
their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart
has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle
and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of
the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered
as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and
educating children is being unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner.
This policy, however, is not at odds with and should not be capitalized on to defeat the
security of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the burden
of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his
failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as
unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between
petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe
that it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be
served by ordering her reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public
respondent, dated December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent
Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages equivalent to
three (3) years, without any deduction or qualification, and separation pay in the amount
of one (1) month for every year of service.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of
office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local
Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is
an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to
provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the
purpose of the three-term limit rule.
The present petition[1] seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In
September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively

suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court,
however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed
performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the
petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it
on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy
for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its
Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not
apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the
suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its October 7,
2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the followingISSUES:
1.
Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the
three-term limit rule; and
2.
Whether preventive suspension is
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160

considered

involuntary

renunciation

as

Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive suspension
constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
General Considerations
The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of the
Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an
elective officials term. To be sure, preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term
of an elective public official, has been mentioned as an example inBorja v. Commission
on Elections.[2] Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not deal with
preventive suspension, but with the application of the three-term rule on the term that
an elective official acquired by succession.

a.
The Three-term Limit Rule:
The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than threeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any
difference in wording does not assume any significance in this case.

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits
an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is
the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a term as a period of time three years during
which an official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,[3] a
Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a term
connotes, as follows:
The word term in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is
the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officers term,
unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public
officer must ipso factocease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent
method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for
which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,[4] reiterated that [T]he term means the
time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. This formulation no
more than three consecutive terms is a clear command suggesting the existence of an
inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to serve. . . three consecutive
terms exactly connotes, the meaning is clear reference is to the term, not to the
service that a public official may render. In other words, the limitation refers to the term.
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office;
it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected. This declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the first
branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect continuity of
service for a full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory
statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the
phrase voluntary renunciation, by itself, is not without significance in determining
constitutional intent.
The word renunciation carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is
to give up, abandon, decline, or resign.[5] It is an act that emanates from its author, as
contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read with the definition of a term
in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional
provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of
title to office. The descriptive word voluntary linked together with renunciation
signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderees own freely exercised will; in other
words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit
rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to
be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.
The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the
term voluntary renunciation shed further light on the extent of the term voluntary
renunciation:
MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? This term
voluntary renunciation does not appear in Section 3 [of Article VI]; it also appears in
Section 6 [of Article VI].

MR DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could the
Committee please enlighten us exactly what voluntary renunciation mean? Is this akin
to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent
the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation
is more general than abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.[6]
From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the term
voluntary renunciation, the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps that an
elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary
renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the three-term limit
rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision, we note further that
Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the negative formulation of the first
branch of the provision and the inflexible interpretation that it suggests.
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the
circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make
term limitation a high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly
construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal
constitutional worth. We view preventive suspension vis--vis term limitation with this
firm mindset.
b.
Relevant Jurisprudence on the
Three-term Limit Rule
Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the
concepts within the provisions contemplation, particularly on the interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term that it speaks of.
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections[7] presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public
official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his
supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We
ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms) were not
present. In so ruling, we said:
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be
exact, loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.

Ong v. Alegre[8] and Rivera v. COMELEC,[9] like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of
whether there had been a completed term for purposes of the three-term limit
disqualification. These cases, however, presented an interesting twist, as their final
judgments in the electoral contest came after the term of the contested office had
expired so that the elective officials in these cases were never effectively unseated.
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly
elected), the Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a
full term in contemplation of the three-term rule based on the following premises: (1) the
final decision that the third-termer lost the election was without practical and legal use
and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office had expired;
and (2) the official assumed and continuously exercised the functions of the office from
the start to the end of the term. The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the
deleterious effect of a contrary view that the official (referring to the winner in the
election protest) would, under the three-term rule, be considered to have served a term
by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually
served the term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. This
factual variation led the Court to rule differently from Lonzanida.
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost
the election contest was merely a caretaker of the office or a mere de facto
officer. The Court obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and
its purpose defeated when an official fully served in the same position for three
consecutive terms. Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercised the
powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him to stay on
indefinitely.
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because
of what they directly imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the
Court still gave full effect to the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent
to strictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court
signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach
us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its
exception.
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections [10] dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term
limit disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the disqualification
applies if the official lost in the regular election for the supposed third term, but was
elected in a recall election covering that term. The Court upheld the COMELECs ruling
that the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms. The Court reasoned out
that for nearly two years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the election for the third term.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections [11] also tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit
disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was
disqualified to run for a fourth term, he did not participate in the election that
immediately followed his third term. In this election, the petitioner Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates assumed the
functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated against him, leading to the call
for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall
election, but Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn) had
fully served three terms prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run
because of the three-term limit rule. We decided in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for
the
same
office
following
the
end
of
the
third
consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer
an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials,
the question asked was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or
whether there would be no immediate reelection after three terms.
x x x x
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after
the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the
third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the
third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to
run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the
Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.[12]
Latasa v. Commission on Elections[13] presented the novel question of whether
a municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run as city
mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the municipality into a city. During the
third term, the municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood charter provided that
the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to exercise
their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. The Court
ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the
municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor
the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality; the
inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3
consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor
held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow
petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the
framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for
a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by
the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.[14]
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that
no three-term limit violation results if a rest period or break in the service between terms
or tenure in a given elective post intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private
citizen with no title to any elective office for a few months before the next mayoral
elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as private
citizens for two years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that
the law contemplates a complete break from office during which the local elective
official steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on
Elections,[15] where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of
vice-mayor by operation of law. The question posed when he subsequently ran for
councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his term as
councilor that would place him outside the operation of the three-term limit rule. We
ruled that an interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This
result seemingly deviates from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since the

elective official continued to hold public office and did not become a private citizen
during the interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however,
is that the elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of
vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an
interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
c.

Conclusion Based on Law

and Jurisprudence

From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an elective
official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary
loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a
length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the
case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully
served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example and standard of what
does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other
hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post,
even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because
it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding
office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the
functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to
hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter
occurs during an office holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot
exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term failure to
serve cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to
serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by
structure and substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in
office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing
voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read
in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity
of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The voluntary renunciation it
speaks of refers only to the elective officials voluntary relinquishment of office and loss
of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary cessation of the exercise of
power or authority that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension
being only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:[16]
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps
down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. [Emphasis supplied].
Preventive Suspension and
the Three-Term Limit Rule
a. Nature of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code, [17] the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act,[18] or the Ombudsman Act[19] is an interim remedial
measure to address the situation of an official who have been charged administratively
or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for
eventual guilt or liability.

Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code when the evidence
of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information (that requires a finding of
probable cause) has been filed in court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed
when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the
charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but
does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only
results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closelycontrolled conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to
the interests of the individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes
only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the officials
office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive
suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results,
no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what
exactly happened to Asilo.
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the
exercise of all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and the laws. The
imposition of preventive suspension, however, is not an unlimited power; there are
limitations built into the laws [20] themselves that the courts can enforce when these
limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of discretion is present. In
light of this well-defined parameters in the imposition of preventive suspension, we
should not view preventive suspension from the extreme situation that it can totally
deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an effective
interruption of an election officials term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective
officials service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above,
preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people being served,
and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term
limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his three
terms in office without any break. Its companion concept interruption of a term on the
other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or
interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to the
discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run
parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a
temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term
limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.
b. Preventive Suspension and
the Intent of the Three-Term
Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay
in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is
barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension
period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of

apermanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy
exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term
is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry
by equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the
interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many
reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of them personal and some of them by
operation of law that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising
the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious
extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as
a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from
exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to
office. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service
for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to
determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the
possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions
when actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The
standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and
possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
c.
Preventive Suspension and
Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a
voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he
may have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against
him. From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of
voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element
of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to
perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension
is by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and
temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the
office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and noncomparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important
consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render
service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is
therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term
and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a
threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption
of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than
voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the
briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be
dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense,
recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a
circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution
expressly disallows as an interruption.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayanimposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an
elective officials term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos certificate of

candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its
action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution
and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.[21]
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
we GRANT the
petition
and
accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F.
Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City
for a prohibited fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 154117 : October 2, 2009]
ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR., Petitioner, v. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, MARIANO Z. VELARDE, FRANKLIN M. VELARDE, ROBERT C.
NACIANCENO, REY DIVINO S. DAVAL-SANTOS, SOLEDAD S. MEDINA-CUE, PATRICK B.
GATAN, LUIS V. MEDINA-CUE, SILVESTRE A. DE LEON, RAMON V. DUMAUAL, RUBEN A. DE
OCAMPO, MARIANO A. BENEDICTO II, GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, LUIS JUAN L. VIRATA, CESAR
E. A. VIRATA, MANUEL B. ZAMORA, JR., RONALDO B. ZAMORA, FRISCO F. SAN JUAN and
ARSENIO B. YULO Respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure to review and set aside the Resolution 1 issued by the Office of
the Ombudsman dated November 16, 2001 dismissing, for lack of evidence, the case
filed by petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (hereinafter, petitioner); and the
Order,2 likewise issued by said Office, dated June 24, 2002 denying, for lack of merit,
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS.
On 16 April 2001, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-01-0577 with
the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging that the following respondents, by their individual
acts and/or by conspiring and confederating with one another, have committed the
offenses/acts enumerated hereunder:
a) For violation of Republic Act No. 7080, otherwise known as an Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, specifically Section 2, in relation to Section 1, subparagraph d(1), (3) and (6), as amended, by Republic Act No. 7659[:]
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada - former President of the Republic of the Philippines
2. Mariano "Bro. Mike" Z. Velarde
3. Franklin M. Velarde
4. Gregorio R. Vigilar - former Secretary of [Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH)] and Chairman, [Toll Regulatory Board (TRB)]
5. Mariano E. Benedicto II - Executive Director, TRB
6. Ramon V. Dumaual - former Officer-in-Charge, TRB
7. Frisco San Juan - former Chairman, [Public Estates Authority (PEA)]
8. John Does and Jane Does
b) For violation of Section 3(a) of [Republic Act No. 3019:]
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
2. Gregorio R. Vigilar
3. Mariano E. Benedicto
4. Ramon V. Dumaual
5. Frisco San Juan
6. John Does and Jane Does
c) For violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019:
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
2. Mariano "Brother Mike" Z. Velarde
3. Franklin M. Velarde
4. Gregorio R. Vigilar
5. Mariano E. Benedicto II
6. Ramon V. Dumaual
7. Ruben de Ocampo

8. Frisco San Juan

9. Arsenio B. Yulo - former Chairman and [General] Manager, PEA
10. Robert Nacianceno - former [Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA)] Manager
and Chairman, Paraaque City Appraisal Committee (PCAC)
11. Patrick B. Gatan - DPWH Representative, PCAC Member
12. Luis V. Medina-Cue - Pasay City Assessor, PCAC Member
13. Soledad V. Medina-Cue - Paraaque City Assessor, PCAC Member
14. Rey Divino Daval-Santos - OIC Paraaque City Engineer's Office, PCAC Member
15. Silvestre de Leon - Paraaque City Treasurer, PCAC Member
16. Ronaldo B. Zamora - former Executive Secretary
17. Luis J. L. Virata
18. Manuel B. Zamora, Jr.
19. Cesar E.A. Virata
20. John Does and Jane Does
d) For violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019;
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
2. Mariano "Brother Mike" Z. Velarde
3. Franklin M. Velarde
4. Gregorio R. Vigilar
5. Mariano E. Benedicto, II
6. Ramon V. Dumaual
7. Ruben de Ocampo
8. Frisco San Juan
9. Ronaldo B. Zamora
10. Luis J. L. Virata
11. Manuel B. Zamora, Jr.
12. Cesar E.A. Virata
13. John Does and Jane Does
e) For violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019;
1. Ronaldo B. Zamora
f) For violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. 3019;
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
2. Mariano "Brother Mike" Z. Velarde
3. Franklin M. Velarde
2. Gregorio R. Vigilar
3. Mariano E. Benedicto, II
4. Frisco San Juan
5. Ronaldo B. Zamora
6. Luis J. L. Virata
7. Manuel B. Zamora, Jr.
8. Cesar E.A. Virata
9. John Does and Jane Does
[g] For violation of Section 7(a) and (d) of R.A. 6713;
1. Ronaldo B. Zamora3
On May 31, 1990, during the administration of President Corazon Aquino, the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), 4 granted the Public Estates
Authority (PEA) a Toll Operation Certificate to construct, rehabilitate, maintain and
operate a toll expressway, namely, (a) Seaside Drive at Paraaque to C-6 at Bacoor,
Cavite; and (b) Expressway Extension to Noveleta/Kawit.
On February 3, 1994, during the administration of President Fidel Ramos, Renong Berhad,
Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), and the PEA entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding to jointly undertake the implementation of the tollway project.5
On December 27, 1994, also during the administration of President Ramos, Renong
Berhad, MARA and the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement to develop and
operate as a toll road the R-1 Expressway Extension. The entire project became known
as the "MCTE Project."6
On August 17, 1995, Renong Berhad, MARA, PEA and United Engineers (Malaysia) Berhad
entered into a Novation Agreement whereby Renong Berhad assigned to United
Engineers (Malaysia) Berhad (UEM) its rights, liabilities and obligations under the Joint
Venture Agreement.7

On July 26, 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the TRB, PEA and UEMMARA Philippines Corporation (UMPC) entered into a Toll Operations Agreement
(TOA)8 for the design, construction, operation and maintenance of the MCTE project,
which covered the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway, the R-1 Expressway, the C-5 Link
Expressway, and the R-1 Expressway Extension. President Fidel Ramos approved the TOA
on the same day, July 26, 1996. Under the terms of the TOA:
1. UEM-MARA shall design and construct the expressways covered by the TOA;
2. TRB shall ensure the availability and assume responsibility for the acquisition of the
lands required for the right of way including the costs for procuring the area for the right
of way;
3. PEA shall operate and maintain the expressways; andcralawlibrary
4. PEA shall advance the funds necessary for the acquisition of the Right of Way subject
to reimbursement by the Republic of the Philippines.9
On August 9, 1997, the TRB approved the original alignment for the C-5 link. On the
basis of this alignment, the TRB issued notices to the owners of all properties affected,
some of which either belonged to AMVEL Land Corporation (AMVEL) or were part of joint
venture agreements between AMVEL and the property owners. Private respondent
Mariano Z. Velarde is the Chairman of AMVEL while private respondent Franklin M.
Velarde is the Executive Vice President.
Among those property owners to whom TRB sent notices were the following:
A. Mariano Z. Velarde;
b. Asuncion de Jugo;
c. Cornelia Medina;
d. Rosario Medina; andcralawlibrary
e. Silvestre Medina.10
Under the Memorandum of Agreement11 (MOA) between PEA and the Republic of the
Philippines through the TRB and the DPWH, the obligations of PEA and TRB/DPWH with
respect to the acquisition of the right-of-way were set forth. Under the MOA, the parties
agreed that PEA shall have the following obligations:
1. To pay the purchase price of the lots to be expropriated for right of way as determined
and requested by TRB/DPWH, x x x
2. To pay the expenses incurred in the relocation or eviction of squatters for the right-ofway requirements, subject to TRB/DPWH's repayment x x x;
3. The total amount to be disbursed in the acquisition of right-of-way and the additional
expenses incurred in the relocation and eviction of squatters shall not exceed the
amount borrowed under the loan agreement.12
On the other hand, TRB shall have the following obligations:
1. To identify and locate the lots to be acquired for the right-of-way;
2. To negotiate with individual owners of the lands their purchase price in accordance
with Executive Order No. 329 dated July 11, 1988, Executive Order No. 368 dated August
24, 1989 and Executive Order No. 369 dated September 14, 1989;
3. To cause the removal and/or relocation of the squatters that may hinder the
construction of the expressway;
4. To prepare the necessary documents between the TRB/DPWH and the lot owners and
owners of improvements;
5. To cause the cancellation of the Certificate of Title in the name of individual lot
owners; [and]
6. To certify to the PEA that the lots for payment are free from all encumbrances and
liens in accordance with the TOA.
It was pursuant to this MOA that the TRB identified and negotiated with the owners of
the properties affected by the construction of the Tollway Project C-5 Link Expressway.
Among the properties affected by the Tollway Project were properties owned or held by
AMVEL Land Development Corporation (AMVEL), namely:
Land No
Landowner
TCT No. Affected
Area
(sq m)
Lot 1-A

Corazon & Cornelia Medina

33989

1,520

Lot 1-B

AMVEL Land Development Corp. (AMVEL)

33989

6,583

Lot 2-A

AMVEL

33988

6,062

Lot B-3-1

ADV Realty Corp.

122510

2,153

Lot 1

AMVEL

33550

6,643

Lot 2-B

AMVEL

31446

3,908

Lot 2-C-1

AMVEL

31460

3,813

Lot 2-D-1

Ma. Asuncion de Jugo

113793

753

Lot 2-F-1

Rona Agustines

113796

2,973

Lot 1

Julieta Evangelista, et al.

122378

5,229

Lot 3-A E.

Tirona, et al.

133990

16,543

Lot 2-B

AMVEL

31988

16,313

Lot 4-A

Tirona, et al.

133991

7,075

Total
79,568
Pursuant to the MOA, the TRB requested the Paraaque City Appraisal Committee (PCAC)
of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to appraise the affected
properties. This Appraisal Committee was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 329
dated July 11, 1988 as amended by Executive Order No. 369 dated August 24, 1989
specifically for the purpose of determining the fair valuation of properties to be
purchased or acquired for development and infrastructure projects for public use. 13
On April 21, 1998, PCAC issued Resolution Nos. 98-5, 14 98-615 and 98-716 appraising
properties along Dr. A. Santos Avenue as follows:
1. All lots abutting Dr. A. Santos Avenue at TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00)
per sq. m.;
2. All lots interior of Dr. A. Santos Avenue particularly along Palasan and CalangCalangan, Bgy. San Dionisio at TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) per sq. m.;
3. All untitled lots abutting Dr. A. Santos Avenue at SEVENTEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P17,500.00) per sq. m.; andcralawlibrary
4. All untitled lots interior of Dr. A. Santos Avenue along Palasan and Calang-Calangan at
FOURTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P14,000.00) per sq. m.17
On May 6, 1998, the PCAC transmitted copies of Resolution Nos. 98-5, 98-6, 98-7 to the
TRB.18
On May 7, 1998, the TRB, through its Resolution No. 98-26, approved the acquisition of
properties affected by the C-5 Link in accordance with the PCAC appraisals.19
On May 8, 1998, the TRB, through Ramon V. Dumaual, made Payment Instructions 20 to
PEA to pay AMVEL's property at P20,000.00 per sq. m. pursuant to the PCAC
Recommendation.
On April 28, 1998, PEA received a copy of the Memorandum from then President Fidel
Ramos, dated April 27, 1998, regarding the "Request of Bro. Mike Velarde Re: DPWH
Road Right of Way Payments/Settlement on C-5 (PEA-Renong Berhad)." The
Memorandum contained the handwritten marginal note of then President Fidel V. Ramos
directing the DPWH to "Fast-Track the remaining issues NLT April 30, 1998 re the C5Coastal Road Project in order to alleviate heavy traffic congestion in the area." At that
time, one of the remaining issues was the payment of the purchase price of AMVEL lands
for the right of way, which was then fixed atP20,000.00 per sq. m.21
To determine further the fair market value of the affected lands, the matter was referred
to three independent appraisers, namely: Asian Appraisal, Inc.; Royal Asia Appraisal
Corporation, and Cuervo Appraisal, Inc.
On October 6, 1998, Asian Appraisal, Inc. submitted its Appraisal Report 22 on the affected
lands. It determined the fair market value at P422,622,000.00 for 130,848 sq. m.,
or P3,229.87 per sq. m.
In its letters dated October 19 and 20, 1998, AMVEL questioned the valuation and sought
a reconsideration of said appraisal. In reply thereto, the TRB, in its letter dated October
20, 1998, informed AMVEL that it would commission another private appraisal company
to determine the true market value of the properties in the area.
On December 28, 1998, Royal Asia Appraisal Corporation submitted its Appraisal
Report23 on the affected lands. It determined the fair market value at P4,395,179,000.00
for 319,398 sq. m., or P13,760.82 per sq. m.
In a letter24 dated November 8, 1998, AMVEL also questioned the valuation of Royal Asia
and claimed that it was "not realistically indicative of the prevailing market value of the

properties." To break the impasse, AMVEL proposed that a third appraisal be conducted
to which then Secretary of the DPWH, respondent Gregorio Vigilar, agreed. For this
purpose, Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. was engaged to conduct a third appraisal.
On December 9, 1998, AMVEL complained of the "long-delayed payment" for its lands
while "other landowners adjoining [their] property also affected by the C-5 road right-ofway have already been paid at a price of P25,000.00 per sq. m."25
In his reply dated December 29, 1998, respondent Vigilar took exception to the claim of
AMVEL that there was "long-delayed payment," considering that several appraisals of the
affected properties were made. In the same letter, he proposed that the average of the
three (3) private appraisals be used as a final valuation.
On January 11, 1999, Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. submitted its Fair Market Value
Appraisal26 of the affected lands. It determined the fair market value at P4,531,752,000
for 251,764 sq. m., or P18,000 per sq. m.
Further negotiations ensued between the parties. Finally, a consensus was reached to fix
the price by averaging the four appraisals done by MMDA, Royal Asia, Asian Appraisal,
and Cuervo.
On January 15, 1999, the TRB, through its Resolution No. 99-02, 27 approved the purchase
price ofP1,221,799,804.00 for the acquisition of a total area of 79,598 sq. m. The
average price per sq. m., as approved by the TRB, was P15,350.00.
On February 17, 1999, respondent Joseph E. Estrada, then President of the Republic of
the Philippines, issued Administrative Order No. 50 entitled "Prescribing the Guidelines
for the Acquisition of Certain Parcels of Private Land for Public Use including the Right of
Way, Easement of Several Public Infrastructure Projects."
On March 30, 1999, respondent Estrada issued two (2) Memoranda to respondent
Benedicto, the Executive Director of TRB. The first Memorandum 28 states:
"You are hereby directed to proceed with right of way acquisition of properties covered
by the TRB Resolution #99-02 dated January 15, 1999, subject to existing laws, rules and
regulations."
The second Memorandum29 states:
"The contracts for acquisition of the right of way at the C-5 Link of the Manila-Cavite Toll
Expressway, stated in Resolution No. 99-02 of the Toll Regulatory Board, is hereby
approved, subject to compliance with existing laws, rules and regulations.
"Further, you are directed to submit to this office a certification, stating that the said
contracts are above board, that due diligence has been complied with, that these
contracts are free from all defects and that the terms of the contract are the most
advantageous to the government."
On March 30, 1999, TRB transmitted to PEA the Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by TRB
and AMVEL as well as the other parties represented by AMVEL. TRB advised PEA that it
shall immediately inform PEA of the approval by the President, and that, in the
meantime, PEA should take note of the Deed of Sale and prepare for the eventual
payment of the properties in accordance with the TOA and the MOA.30
On April 5, 1999, the TRB, in compliance with the Memorandum of the President dated
March 30, 1999 and pursuant to its express obligations under the MOA to certify to PEA
that the lots to be acquired were free from all liens and encumbrances, issued its
Compliance and Certification31 stating that the Deed of Sale between the Republic of the
Philippines and AMVEL Land Development Corp., dated March 30, 1999 "was aboveboard; that due diligence had been complied with in the negotiation and execution
thereof; that to the best of our knowledge, the same are free from defects and that the
terms thereof are not disadvantageous to the Government."
Based on such Compliance and Certification issued by the TRB, PEA paid fifty percent
(50%) of the purchase price to AMVEL.32
On April 8, 1999, respondent Benedicto sent a memorandum 33 to the TRB informing it
that:
A. The parties executed three (3) deeds of sale on [March 30, 1999];
b. The amounts for the right of way acquisition were those stated in the TRB's Resolution
No. 99-02;
c. Total amount payable of P1,221,766,640 actually lower by 33,244 from the Board
approved amount of P1,221,799,884.34
On April 29, 1999, or after nearly a year of negotiations for the purchase of the
properties subject of the Right of Way and upon receipt of the required documentation,
PEA released the balance of the purchase price for the AMVEL properties.35

II. PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS

Petitioner, in his complaint-affidavit 36 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, alleges
irregularities in the above-mentioned transactions. In particular, petitioner contends that
the government acquisition of the AMVEL lands took place in just two and a half working
days, considering that it was Holy Tuesday on March 30, 1999, the date that respondent
Estrada issued the Memorandum to TRB and PEA to proceed with the acquisition of lands
for the right-of-way of the C-5 Link of the MCTE Project, and PEA immediately released on
April 5, 1999 fifty percent (50%) of the total purchase price. He points out that Holy
Wednesday was a half-working day, and what followed was a long holiday, commencing
on Holy Thursday and ending on Easter Sunday.37 Petitioner alleges that it was due to the
personal intervention of respondent Estrada and his close association with respondent
Mariano Velarde that AMVEL was able to close this deal. In his 183-page petition, he
alleges:
65. Respondent Mike Velarde received a P685,892,495.00 windfall from the government
for a property which he acquired for almost nothing! His only capital was his closeness to
respondent Estrada and the tremendous amount of influence he wielded in the latter's
administration. Of course, all of these he owes to his mostly impoverished flock who
voted for respondent Estrada after "Brother Mike" endorsed him as "tiyak yon."38
Petitioner claims that the nine (9) parcels of land sold by AMVEL to the government,
subject of his complaint, were outrageously overpriced. He alleges that the Transfer
Certificates of Title covering said parcels of land and their corresponding areas, declared
market values, assessed values and selling prices are as follows:39
Transfer
Area
Declared
Assessed
Selling Price
Certificat (sq.
Market
Value
(Pesos)
e of Title meters Value
(Pesos)
)
(Pesos)
140389

2,153

1,507,100

301,420

33,059,315

140388

6,643

4,650,100

930,020

102,003,265

131446

3,908

1,914,920

382,980

60,007,340

140402

3,813

1,868,370

373,670

58,548,615

140396

9,427

6,598,900

1,319,780

144,751,585

140397

44,669 31,268,300

6,253,660

685,892,495

140404

753

368,970

73,790

11,562,315

140405

2,973

1,456,770

291,350

45,650,415

140408

5,299

2,562,210

512,440

81,366,145

Total

79,638 52,195,640

10,439,11 1,222,841,4
0
90
Petitioner likewise claims that based on the 1999 tax declarations, AMVEL sold parcels of
land, which were "undeveloped agricultural lands and salt-making beds (salinar) but
which had been reclassified as 'residential,' to the government at a price which was more
than 2,300% percent of their total declared market value and 11,700% percent of their
total assessed value."40
Petitioner asserts that the purchase price for right-of-way acquisition "should be the
equivalent of the zonal value plus ten (10%) percent thereof," based on Administrative
Order No. 50,41 which respondent Estrada issued on February 17, 1999 and was made
effective immediately. Since the zonal value of the subject parcels of land was set the
year before at Four Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P4,500.00) per sq. m. by the
Department of Finance,42 the purchase price should have been Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P4,950.00) only, for a total purchase price of Three Hundred NinetyFour Million Two Hundred-Eight Thousand and One Hundred Pesos only
(P394,208,100.00). He claims that the price that the government paid (P15,355.00 per
sq. m.) was 310% of the zonal value.43
Petitioner argues that "[by] not following the guidelines set by Administrative Order No.
50, the government was defrauded of the staggering amount of [P828,633,390.00]" and
burdened with the payment of interest. The government was made to pay in full when

the guidelines set by said Administrative Order provided that, should the landowner
refuse to accept the purchase price, the government would be mandated to initiate
expropriation proceedings and deposit only ten (10%) percent of the offered amount. 44
Petitioner notes that even respondent Estrada chose not to follow the guidelines
prescribed by Administrative Order No. 50 by "directing TRB to proceed with the
acquisition and approving [AMVEL's] Deeds of Sale." He alleges that there was no legal
impediment to its application because the Deeds of Sale for the AMVEL acquisitions were
executed long after the effectivity date of Administrative Order No. 50.45
Petitioner questions the findings of the government appraisal body, MMDA-PCAC, that the
subject parcels of land "have already been developed," and that these were classified as
commercial lands. He relies on "a document found among the records of the Legal Office
of the Presidential Management Staff" 46 that states that the lands were "formerly saltmaking beds (SALINAR) which are not suitable for residential or commercial purposes;"
that "AMVEL merely covered these salt factories with trash and other low-grade filling
materials;" that the properties "did not even have access to the highway .. [until] AMVEL
built a bridge from said properties to Dr. A. Santos Avenue - when it was already
negotiating with the government;" and that AMVEL knew beforehand about the proposed
highway when it acquired the properties at a purchase price of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) per sq. m., properties that were later sold to the government at Fifteen
Thousand Three Hundred Fifty-Five Pesos (P15,355.00) per sq. m.47
The rest of petitioner's allegations were summarized by respondent Office of the
Ombudsman in the questioned Resolution,48 which summary we find to be succinct and
hereby quote in part below:
The complainant points out that much earlier, in March 1996, the heirs of a certain
Andres Buenaventura filed an action for annulment of title and reconveyance against the
Tirona-Medina families before the RTC-Paranaque, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0141.
The Buenaventura heirs claimed that they were rightful owners of the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 14729. The Buenaventura heirs caused the annotation of a Notice of
Lis Pendens on TCT No. 14729. This notice of Lis Pendens was carried over to the
subdivided lots covered by TCT Nos. 133988, 133990 and 133991.
On 06 November 1998, AMVEL submitted to the TRB what it claimed to be a Decision
dated 29 October 1998 of the Court of Appeals First Division in CA-G.R. No. 54402, which
supposedly affirmed the Decision of the RTC-Paranaque dismissing the case filed by the
Buenaventura heirs. The purported Court of Appeals Decision was signed by Associate
Justices Oswaldo Agcaoili, Fidel Purisima and Corona Ibay-Somera.
The complainant alleges that the supposed 28 October 1998 Decision was falsified and
non-existent. In fact, the records of the Court of Appeals show that, on 22 February 1999,
"its Docket was instructed to (a)wait result of the investigation of NBI as per instructions
of J. Valdez." However, based on the same records, nothing was heard or mentioned
again about the result of the said NBI investigation.
Notwithstanding the attempt to defraud the government with the submission of the
falsified and non-existent Court of Appeals Decision, TRB did not charge AMVEL and,
instead, proceeded with the execution of the Deeds of Sale on 30 March 1999.
The complainant further alleges that the original projected cost of the right-of-way for
the MCTE Project at the time the Toll Operation Agreement between the government and
the foreign investor, Renong Berhad, was being deliberated in late 1995, was P900
million only. However, by the time the Toll Operation Agreement was approved by the
Office of the President on 26 July 1996, the cost of the right-of-way acquisition had
already risen to P1.7 billion.
The Toll Operation Agreement dated 26 July 1996 itself, in paragraph 5.04 thereof,
likewise provides that "the Grantee (PEA) shall advance the funds necessary for the
acquisition of the Right of Way except land to be reclaimed subject to a limit of [P1.7
million] and such funds shall be reimbursed by the Grantor to the Grantee."
As late as October 1998, UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation ("UMPC"), the local
subsidiary of UEM Berhad and a signatory to the Toll Operation Agreement, in a report to
the Board of Investments entitled "Manila Cavite Toll Expressway Project-Project
Description October 1998," reported in its Summary of Project Costs that the total rightof-way cost is only P1.7 billion. This is broken down as follows: C-5 Link Expressway,
P1.356 billion; and R-1 Extension Expressway, P344 million. UMPC further reported that
"TRB on the other hand will be responsible for the acquisition of the right-of-way which

will be financed by PEA in accordance to the terms and conditions of NEDA as stipulated
in the TOA."
Also, under the aforesaid NEDA Board Resolution No. 2, the Malaysian government
agency, Majilis Amanah Rakyat ("MARA") and Renong Berhad's construction affiliate,
United Engineers Berhad (UEB), were supposed to advance P900 million of the P1.7
billion cost of right-of-way acquisition to be guaranteed by the national government.
Further, MARA and UEB would secure foreign currency denominated loans for the P900
million that they were willing to advance.
It appears that the project proponents did not even comply with the aforesaid condition
for NEDA's approval of the project. The Malaysian firms were no longer made to advance
the sum of P900 million.
Instead, on 5 December 1997, a Loan Agreement was executed among PEA, as borrower,
the Republic of the Philippines, as guarantor, and a syndicate of local and foreign banks,
namely, Solidbank Corporation, Far East Bank and Trust Company (now part of the Bank
of the Philippine Islands), Asianbank Corporation, Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank
Corporation, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, Standard Chartered
Bank, The Bank of Nova Scotia (Manila Offshore Branch), The Development [Bank] of
Singapore Ltd., and Bank of America (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "lender
banks").
The Lead Arranger for the loan was Exchange Capital Corporation, which is majorityowned by respondents Luis J. L. Virata and Manuel B. Zamora, Jr. [The] Co-Lead Arrangers
were FEB Investments, Inc. and SolidBank.
As earlier mentioned, TRB sent notices of acquisition to the landowners of the parcels of
land that would be affected by the C-5 Link sometime in 1997. Thereafter, the TRB
Officer-in-Charge requested the Paranaque City Appraisal Committee to appraise the said
parcels of land. Thus, the City Appraisal Committee came out with Resolution No. 98-5
dated 21 April 1998 with bloated appraisals of said properties.
Complainant asseverates that in what appears to be an attempt to "legitimize" the
bloated appraisal made by the Paraaque City Appraisal Committee on 21 April 1998, on
7 May 1998, TRB and PEA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement which, among
others, explicitly provides that TRB shall "identify and locate the lots of land sought to be
acquired for the right-of-way" and "negotiate with the individual owners of the land the
purchase price in accordance with Executive Order No. 329 dated July 11, 1998,
Executive Order No. 368 dated August 24, 1989 and Executive Order NO. 269 dated
September 4, 1989." These Executive Orders were even made part of the Memorandum
of Agreement.
The complainant points out that seven (7) months after respondent Mike Velarde got his
P1,222,841,490.00, on 23 November 1999, respondent Estrada, together with
respondents Ronaldo B. Zamora, then Executive Secretary, Gregorio R. Vigilar, then
Public Works and Highways Secretary, and Frisco San Juan, then PEA Chairman, gave his
imprimatur and approval to the proposal of a four (4) month-old, P15 million company,
the Coastal Road Corporation ("CRC"), to take over UMPC and the P7.73 billion MCTE
Project (including the 800-hectare reclamation project along Manila Bay going towards
Cavite). This is now the subject of a separate case before the Ombudsman entitled
"Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.," docketed as OMB Case NO. 000-1758.
Complainant Francisco further points out that the beneficial owners of CRC are
respondents Luis J. L. Virata and Manuel B. Zamora, Jr. Respondent Luis J. L. Virata is also
CRC's President and Chief Executive Officer, while respondent Cesar E.A. Virata is CRC's
Chairman of the Board and is also a beneficial owner of CRC to the extent of ten (10%)
[percent] of its equity.
Also, on 23 November 1999, respondent Estrada, in the presence of respondents Ronaldo
B. Zamora, Gregorio R. Vigilar and Frisco San Juan, gave his imprimatur and approval to
CRC's proposal to de-prioritize the construction of the C-5 Link Expressway, on the one
hand, and to prioritize the R-1 Expressway Extension, on the other. This was done
despite the lack of the requisite evaluation and approval of the TRB Board and the fact
that CRC does not have the requisite financial and technical capability and track record
to take over the MCTE Project. Worse, the de-prioritization of the C-5 Link despite the
P1.85 billion already spent for right-of-way acquisitions caused the government
tremendous losses in terms of the interest on the dollar-denominated loan used to fund
the said acquisitions.

Respondents LUIS J. L. VIRATA and MANUEL B. ZAMORA, JR. had another reason for
pushing the prioritization of the R-1 Expressway Extension. Respondents wanted to
expedite the development of the Caylabne Bay Resort in Ternate, Cavite. In the words of
respondent Luis J. L. Virata, the Caylabne Bay Resort will be developed into a "top-quality
resort . . . with a whole bunch of a Mediterranean-looking buildings" and with "a firstclass resort operation." In an interview with Mr. Philip Cu-Unjieng, which appeared in the
7 February 1999 issue of the Philippine Star, respondent Virata himself had categorically
admitted how critical is the R-1 Expressway Extension to the development of the
Caylabne Bay Resort.
The real problem is that under UMPC's project timetable, the construction schedule of
the C-5 Link Expressway was set from March 1997 to September 1999, while that of the
R-1 Extension was set almost near the same period, from October 1997 to September
1999. Thus, the idea is for both expressways to be constructed and finished almost at
the same time. However, by October 1998, both were already delayed by eighteen (18)
months and fourteen (14) months, respectively. Instead of correcting the problem, the
government allowed respondent Luis J. L. Virata and Manuel B. Zamora, J. to take over
the project despite their lack of financial and technical capability to do so. They even
tried to borrow from public funds from the Development Bank of the Philippines to
finance their acquisition of UEM Berhad's share in UMPC.
Respondents Mariano Z. Velarde, Franklin M. Velarde, Luis Juan L. Virata, Cesar E.A.
Virata, Manuel Zamora, Jr., Ronaldo Zamora, Mariano E. Benedicto II, Frisco F. San Juan,
Ruben A. de Ocampo, and Ramon V. Dumaual filed individual Counter-Affidavits; while
respondents Robert C. Nacianceno, Reydivino Bernabe Daval-Santos, Soledad Samonte
Medina-Cue, Patrick Beltran Gatan, Luis Vicente Medina-Cue, and Silvestre San Agustin
de Leon, all members of PCAC, filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit. Respondents Joseph Estrada
and Arsenio Yulo were ordered to file their counter-affidavits, but they did not file any.
Based on its findings of fact, the Office of the Ombudsman resolved to dismiss the case
for lack of evidence.49
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 50 on January 14, 2002, alleging that serious
errors of law and/or irregularities had been committed prejudicial to his interest, as
follows:
1. The Ombudsman did not conduct fact-finding in the instant case and pursue
investigation requested by the complainant.
2. The Ombudsman did not issue the subpoena duces tecum requested by the
complainant as would afford the complainant the chance to file a reply-affidavit.
3. The inhibition of Desierto came too late since he had already prejudged the case.
4. The Ombudsman did not act on the motion for the inhibition of Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. At any rate, Gervacio, out of delicadeza or sense of
decency, should have voluntarily inhibited himself.
5. The Overall Deputy Ombudsman does not have authority to approve the dismissal of
the instant case.
6. The Ombudsman took at their face value the arguments of, and interpretation of the
law by, the respondents, on the one hand, and totally disregarded the evidence of
complainant, on the other.
7. In their haste to dismiss the instant case, Desierto and Gervacio did not consider
additional evidence submitted by the complainant.51
Respondent Office of the Ombudsman denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in
an Order52 dated June 24, 2002.
III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors against the questioned Resolution
and Order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman:
I
The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law in ruling that "the
transaction/negotiation for the purchase of affected lands was consummated as early as
May 1998" and that "Administrative Order No. 50 finds no application to the already
perfected contract between TRB and AMVEL.
II
The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, in concluding, without basis in fact,
"that respondents complied with the prescribed procedure in determining a fair and

reasonable valuation of the properties in question" and in not finding that respondents
committed plunder and/or graft.
III
The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding that respondents
committed plunder and/or graft when they changed the original alignment of the Sucat
Interchange which increased the affected land area of Amvel from 63,629 sq. mtrs. to
80,256 sq. mtrs. or a difference of 16,897 sq. mtrs. which was sold to the government for
about P259,115,495.00.
IV
The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding that respondents
committed plunder and/or graft when respondent Mike Velarde made a billion-peso killing
from the transaction.
V
The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding that respondents
committed graft when they proceeded with the transaction despite the fact that 44,699
sq. mtrs. of land sold to the government did not have a clean title at the time of sale.
VI
The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding that respondents
committed plunder and graft when they bloated the cost of the road-right-of-way and
depleted the proceeds of the US$68.6 Million loan for right-of-way acquisition.
VII
The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding that respondents
committed graft when they de-prioritized the R-1 Expressway Extension over that of the
C-5 Link Expressway.
VIII
The respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he deliberately did not conduct fact-finding to gather more
evidence in the case below despite repeated requests by the complainant.
IX
The respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he deliberately failed to act on motions to issue subpoena
duces tecum and ad testificandum to further strengthen the case.
X
The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he failed to act on the motion for the inhibition of Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. Likewise, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Gervacio
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he failed to
voluntarily inhibit himself out of delicadeza or a sense of decency.
IV. THEORY OF RESPONDENTS
A. COMMENT OF RESPONDENTS ROBERT C. NACIANCENO, REYDIVINO B. DAVAL-SANTOS,
SILVESTRE S.A. DE LEON, PATRICK B. GATAN, SOLEDAD S. MEDINA-CUE, AND LUIS V.
MEDINA-CUE
The case docketed as OMB-0-01-0577 is "primarily an action to hold them accountable
for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on
account of their approval, in 1998, of PCAC Resolution No. 9805 ... as the same resolution
had been allegedly used to justify the alleged over-pricing and related graft and corrupt
practices of other respondents in connection with the acquisition of lands by the national
government, in 1999, for the right of way of the C-5 Link of the Manila-Cavite Toll
Expressway Project".
Respondents were "charged in their respective [capacities] as the Chairman and
members of the [PCAC] created under [Executive] Order No. 329, as amended by
Executive Order No. 369, primarily for the determination of the reasonable compensation
to be paid to properties that will be affected by public works and projects in Paraaque
City."53
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, under which respondents are charged, provides:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. (Underscoring supplied by respondents.)
Respondents claim that they are neither alleged nor shown to be, as they in fact are not,
"officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions."54
Respondents assert that PCAC Resolution No. 98-5 is recommendatory in nature, and
that the adoption of the recommendations was within the prerogative and discretion of
the implementing officers, most of all Fidel V. Ramos, then the President of the Republic
at the time of issuance of said resolution.
Respondents note that the alleged acts of plunder and graft and corrupt practices
attributed to the other respondents have been shown to have transpired during the
incumbency of respondent Joseph E. Estrada as President of the Republic, and after the
issuance of said PCAC Resolution No. 98-5.55
Respondents further argue as follows:
[PCAC] had undertaken diligently and carefully the study and evaluation of the properties
that will be affected by the C-5 Link Expressway in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque
City, taking cognizance of the sale of comparable property, the applicable BIR Zonal
Value, the opinion solicited from the residents of the properties near the subject parcels
of land, the condition or status of the parcels of land, the presence of other buildings and
structure near the vicinity of the properties, and the consequential damages to the
owners of the affected properties. And, contrary to the allegation of petitioner, the BIR
Zonal Value (6th Revision) which took effect on February 2, 1998 provides for P20,000.00
per sq. m. value for commercial land along Dr. A. Santos Avenue; and P30,000.00 per sq.
m. value for Commercial land along Ninoy Aquino Avenue;furthermore, while the
allegations of the complainant that the zonal value of the residential regular (RR) lands in
Dr. A. Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paraaque City, was fixed by the Department of
Finance at P4,500.00 per sq. m. just a year before the AMVEL sale, the same department
has fixed the zonal value of commercial land along Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Brgy. San
Dionisio, Paraaque City at P20,000.00 and along Ninoy Aquino Avenue at P30,000.00
per sq. m. Paraaque City Ordinance No. 97-08, prescribes the land use plan and the
zoning of the Municipality of Paraaque, [and] provides that the lands along Dr. A. Santos
Avenue is classified as within C-3 high intensity commercial zone.56 (Emphasis added)
[The] valuation of the subject properties is justified, and shown to be consonant and
consistent with existing accepted appraisal practice and procedures in the appraisal of
properties, considering that:
a) The appraisal of the properties was based on such factors as location, accessibility,
selling prices of comparable properties, opinion of people living within the vicinity of the
subject properties, the amenities present like water, electricity, transportation and
communication with the vicinity of the property and the status or condition of the parcels
of land. The Committee has noted that the parcels of land have been developed to mean
a great change in its former condition as salt beds or Salinas and the complainant has
acknowledged this truth in his complaint when he stated that the former salt beds are
filled up or covered by filling materials;
b) During the ocular inspection conducted by the technical committee tasked to inspect
the subject properties, these parcels of land were already filled and developed.
c) Ordinance No. 98-08, which prescribed the land use plan and zoning of the
Municipality of Paraaque, provides that Barangay San Dionisio where subject properties
are located, is within C-3 high intensity commercial zone.57
B. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MARIANO Z. VELARDE AND FRANKLIN M.
VELARDE
Private respondents Velarde allege that the transactions involving the purchase of the
subject nine (9) parcels of land were perfected before Administrative Order No. 50 came
into effect. The sale was perfected on May 8, 1998, almost a year before the issuance of
Administrative Order No. 50, when the TRB sent a letter to the PEA instructing the latter
to prepare the checks representing payments for the subject properties.58
Private respondents Velarde aver that Amvel never questioned the amount of the
purchase price, gave its imprimatur to the purchase price set by TRB, and the last thing

to be done was the actual receipt of the checks in payment thereof by Amvel.
Unfortunately, however, Amvel was not paid. Instead, TRB conducted a series of
appraisals of the subject property.
As of December 9, 1998, Amvel wrote to the DPWH Secretary, asking that it be paid the
purchase price set by the PCAC as directed by TRB. 59 In a letter dated January 20, 1999,
TRB informed Amvel that it was willing to purchase the latter's properties at a price
arrived at by adopting a formula close to averaging all four (4) appraisals obtained from
the PCAC, as well as the three (3) private appraisal companies. 60 Thereafter, TRB issued
Resolution No. 99-02 on January 15, 1999 approving the purchase of the subject
properties in the aggregate amount of P1,221,799,804.00.61
On April 22, 1999, Amvel was able to receive full payment of the agreed purchase price,
but the amount received was P1,221,766,640.00.62
Private respondents argue that the subject properties were not overpriced. The
properties were zoned and classified as commercial areas, not agricultural or residential.
Massive development and improvement works were immediately carried out and
introduced after these properties were acquired by Amvel through purchase or joint
venture agreements.63
Private respondents cited several factors why a higher appraisal value than the one
eventually used should be adopted, and these are:
A. The PCAC, as early as April 21, 1998 (way before the election of respondent Estrada to
the presidency in the May 10, 1998 elections), had already fixed the price of the
properties on the site, along with those found in the area: between P20,000.00
and P25,000.00 per sq. m.
b. In 1997, the site was appraised at P18,000.00 per sq. m., and a portion of the same
with an area of 49,316 sq. m. covered by TCT No. 133550 was given a development loan
accommodation by Metrobank in the amount of P550,000,000.00.
c. The current Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal valuation appraised the vicinity
atP25,000.00 per sq. m.
Private respondents claim that the other properties affected by the C-5 Link Project
adjacent to and near the vicinity of the site were acquired and paid for by the
government at P25,000.00 per sq. m. in accordance with the MMDA appraisal.64 For the
subject properties, the government was able to save P4,645.00 per sq. m.65
The private appraisal companies were engaged by TRB and not Amvel. The final
purchase price was imposed upon Amvel by the government, and respondents Velarde
had no hand in fixing the said amount. Private respondents Velarde merely acted within
the bounds of their duties and powers as officers of Amvel. It was only natural that they
would negotiate for an amount most advantageous to the said company. The fact that
the purchase price of the subject properties considerably plummeted would certainly
negate the allegation that respondent Mariano Z. Velarde exerted influence on
respondent Estrada or any other public officer for that matter.
Furthermore, private respondents aver that, except for a small portion, Amvel acquired
the properties at prices ranging from not less than P7,500.00 per sq. m. to as high
as P9,000.00 per sq. m. Petitioner thus failed to take into consideration the significant
incidental expenses for the acquisition, consolidation, improvement and development of
the subject properties.
Private respondents claim that the re-alignment of the C-5 Link Project has actually
resulted in the significant reduction and decrease of the affected areas, that is, from the
original 12 hectares to 7.9 hectares. Hence, petitioner completely erred in claiming that
the realignment had actually resulted in a greater profit to Amvel. The subject property,
measuring 79,568 sq. m., was just 34.28% of the total area of the site, which was
232,078 sq. m.
To provide a background of the transactions leading to the purchase by the government
of the subject properties, private respondents gave its version of the antecedent facts,
as follows:
A. As early as June 1994, a company by the name of "ADV Realty" had set its sights in
developing [a] large expanse of undeveloped parcels of raw lands around the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City into a
commercial and business park by entering into various joint venture agreements with
several landowners, particularly the Medina-Tirona family.66
b. A large amphitheater would also be constructed to serve as a multi-purpose complex
that would principally serve as the venue for the weekly prayer meetings and healing

sessions of the members of the El Shaddai Movement of which herein respondent

Mariano Z. Velarde is the Servant Leader.
c. In order to consolidate the whole area, joint ventures were likewise forged with the
other landowners of the adjacent properties who were all prominent families of
Paraaque City (e.g., Medina-Evangelista, Balinghasay and Santos). More importantly, for
those properties that were not available for joint venture, ADV Realty acquired them by
purchase.
d. In 1996, development efforts were immediately poured and instituted into the
properties in accordance with the master plan and the business development concepts
for the area. In 1997, ADV Realty was able to consolidate a 23-hectare property and predevelopment operations thereon were in full blast. ADV Realty's name was then changed
into Amvel Land Development Corporation.
e. However, Amvel was notified by the government, through the TRB, in the last quarter
of 1997 that the site will be affected by the C-5 Link Project. Ex-president Fidel V. Ramos
was still the incumbent president at that time.
f. Upon examining the proposed alignment of the aforesaid project, Amvel was surprised
to find out that it would cut across right at the center of the site. This would render the
whole property unattractive to prospective investors as the C-5 Link Project would block
all possible ingress to and egress from the property, making accessibility a major
concern.
g. This would entail a re-evaluation and a radical change in the master plan of the
commercial and business park. Once the C-5 Link Project would be constructed, the
remaining property of Amvel would be divided into two (2) portions. Both portions would
be enclosed by the proposed C-5 Link Project and the rivers found on the north and west
side of the property.
h. Even other property owners in the area, most notably the SM Holdings Property and
ADELFA Property, Inc., also raised objections to the C-5 link Project as the original plan of
the said Project posed serious threat to their respective developmental plans for their
properties.
i. As a result, Amvel, along with SM Holdings Property and ADELFA Property, Inc.,
negotiated for the re-alignment of the C-5 Link Project.
j. As a consequence thereof, Amvel was constrained to construct another bridge as a
passageway for the portion located at the southern side of the property. To accomplish
such a task, Amvel was forced to purchase the property where the bridge would be
constructed.
k. The final re-alignment plan that was jointly prepared by Amvel, SM Prime Holdings and
ADELFA Properties, Inc. and duly approved by the TRB, had actually and in reality
resulted in the substantial reduction of the portion of the site that would be affected by
the C-5 Link Project. From the original area of TWELVE (12) hectares, it was reduced to
only 7.9 hectares.
l. Had Amvel really intended to capitalize on the business opportunity brought about by
the C-5 Link Project, as wrongfully alleged by petitioner, it could have proposed a realignment plan that would consume a larger portion of the site.
Private respondents argue that the subject properties were not bought by Amvel for the
purpose of selling them to the government, in the light of the proposed construction of
the C-5 Link Project. After Amvel and TRB finally agreed on the terms of the sale, all the
portions of the site that were caught along the path of the C-5 Link Project were sold to
the government.67 These properties are described in the following table:
TCT
Original
Previous owner
Date of JVA/ Size
No.
Size
(sq
Purchase
sold to
m)
gov't .
14039 122,694
7
10,099
14039
6

Emmanuel
Tirona,
Ma.
Aurora
T.
Mercado, Rosario T.
Medina and Corazon
T. Medina

(JVA with ADV 44,669

Realty)
9,427
November 16,
1994

14038 49,316
8

Josefina, Adelaida,
Jose and Teofilo, all
surnamed
Balinghasay

Purchased by 6,643
ADV realty on
January
23
1998.

14038 15,721
9

Balinghasays

Purchased, by 2,153
ADV Realty on
January
21,
1997

14040 3,813
2

Arcadio C. Santos

Purchased by 3,813
ADV realty on
September 12,
1997

13144 3,908
6

Victor B. Santos

Purchased by 3,908
ADV Realty in
1997

14040 2 parcels
4
19,543 sq
14040 m
5

Ma. Asuncion Jugo, JVA with ADV 753

Jose
Ramon
L. Realty on May 2,973
Santos and Rona S. 27, 1997
Agustines

14040 62,448
8

Leonor Crisostomo,
Julieta,
Amelia,
Elizabeth,
Angela
Katrina and Kristina
Isabela,
all
surnamed Medina

Land
5,229
Development
Agreement
with
ADV
Realty
on
December 19,
1996
The properties acquired by the government that were previously owned by (1)
Emmanuel Tirona, Ma. Aurora T. Mercado, Rosario T. Medina and Corazon T. Medina; (2)
Ma. Asuncion Jugo, Jose Ramon L. Santos and Rona S. Agustines; and (3) Leonor
Crisostomo, Julieta, Amelia, Elizabeth, Angela Katrina and Kristina Isabela, all surnamed
Medina, were all part and parcel of larger tracts of land that were subject of several joint
venture agreements. The remaining portions were developed in accordance with the
undertaking of Amvel under said agreements.
In a Memorandum of Agreement68 dated February 2, 2000 entered into by Emmanuel
Tirona, Ma. Aurora T. Mercado, Rosario T. Medina and Corazon T. Medina, and Amvel, the
latter paid the former the amount ofP320,000,000.00 as their share of the purchase price
paid by the government in acquiring the portion of the property subject of the
Development Joint Venture Agreement (with a Lease Clause) entered into by the same
parties.
Private concrete roads were already constructed within the vicinity and modern drainage
systems were already installed therein. More than one (1) million cubic meters of soil
were deposited on the site to raise its elevation above the highest flood level recorded in
the area, appropriately compacted with the use of heavy equipment as required in a
business/commercial land use.
If Amvel had an advance information that the C-5 Link Project would traverse a portion of
the site way back in 1996, then it should have only focused its sight and poured its
resources on the 79,568 sq. m. of land affected by the said Project by simply purchasing
only to the extent of the same. Because of the intrusion of the C-5 Link Project into its
property, Amvel had to re-evaluate and change the master plan to conform to the
significant changes in the shape and configuration of the site, which was destructively
broken into two parts by the C-5 Link Project. That the C-5 Link Project greatly reduced
the viability and marketability of the intended commercial and business park is beyond
cavil, as the construction of the C-5 Link Project would leave Amvel with a property
enclosed or bounded by a highway and rivers without any access, thereby forcing it to
incur major additional costs and expenses to build the necessary bridges and access
roads to connect the remaining portions to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue.
Amvel, as a consequence of the Project, likewise incurred delays in introducing the
needed developments it undertook to infuse into the property, subject of the Land
Development Agreement it entered into with the Medina family. The amount
of P10,000,000.00 was paid by Amvel to the Medina family as penalty for the
aforementioned delay.69
Respondents Velarde allege that they had no participation whatsoever in the preparation
of the fabricated CA Decision70 dated October 29, 1998 in Buenaventura-Santiago, et al.

v. Sps. Medina, et al., docketed as CA G.R. No. CV 54402. Amvel received a copy of said
decision on November 25, 1998. After receiving the same, Amvel immediately furnished
a copy to the TRB and the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City, to have the same
annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title covering the parcels of land subject of the
aforesaid case. When Amvel tried to secure a certified true copy of the said decision from
the CA, as required by the Register of Deeds and the TRB, it discovered that the case
was still pending for resolution and no such decision had been promulgated. Amvel sent
a letter dated February 8, 1999 to the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City to explain
what happened and request that the annotations already made on the titles be
immediately canceled.71 On the same date, Amvel sent a letter to the TRB informing the
latter of its discovery that the alleged decision was spurious. 72 Amvel requested that the
CA conduct a full-blown investigation regarding the matter.
C. COMMENT OF RESPONDENT DUMAUAL73
Respondent Dumaual was Officer-in-Charge of the TRB from November 28, 1997 to
September 8, 1998.
In his statement of the facts, he pointed out that the alignment of the C-5 Link
Expressway project was revised on April 1998 because, during the discussion with AMVEL
on the acquisition of right-of-way ("ROW") for the revised alignment, it was found that an
area between the south slip road and the main C-5 Link would not be acquired for ROW,
which in effect would have produced a pocket with limited use.74
On September 16, 1998, a Memorandum was sent by respondent to the Board
suggesting that "the south slip road be located nearer to the main C-5 Link to maximize
use of real estate." As of that date, TRB was still unable to formalize the transaction with
AMVEL and to pay the latter. Respondent Dumaual, despite due diligence, was unable to
determine the veracity of the relevant titles submitted for payment. He wrote to the TRB
about the problems with the titles and recommended that said properties be
expropriated. He was relieved as OIC of TRB on September 8, 1998 and had no more
personal knowledge regarding the other allegations of petitioner.75
D. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT VIGILAR
Private respondent Vigilar raises the following grounds for the dismissal of the petition:
1. The petition is not the proper remedy. Petitioner cannot invoke Rule 45 to question the
subject resolution and order of the Ombudsman.
2. The petition fails to raise any question of law.
3. In any case, the Office of the Ombudsman acted correctly, on the basis of evidence
presented, in dismissing the complaint considering that '
A. Private respondent Vigilar, being the ex-officio chairman of the TRB during the
relevant period, was in no position to be legally responsible for the TRB's acquisition of
AMVEL's properties.
b. The transaction between the TRB and AMVEL concerning the right-of-way for the C-5
Link was perfected before the promulgation of Administrative Order No. 50.
c. The transaction between the TRB and AMVEL concerning the right-of-way for the C-5
Link is valid, regular, and complies faithfully with Executive Order No. 132, the law
governing at the time the contract of sale was perfected. The said purchase was not
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
d. The evidence does not support a finding of probable cause for the crime of plunder
against private respondent Vigilar.
e. The evidence does not support a finding of probable cause for violation of Section 3
(A), (E), (G) and (J) of Republic Act 3019 against private respondent Vigilar.
f. The petition, like petitioner's complaint before the Ombudsman, is built on malicious
half-truths, hearsay and even fabricated evidence.
Private respondent Vigilar avers that he only exercised administrative supervision over
the TRB under the provisions of Sec. 38, Ch. 7, Book IV of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987; and that he acted in good faith, relying on the recommendation of the
technical officers of the TRB, and cites Arias v. Sandiganbayan76to support this averment.
He asserts that as early as May 7, 1998, the TRB had already approved the properties to
be affected by the C-5 Link based on the PCAC recommendation of P20,000 per sq. m.,
and such approval was made in accordance with Executive Order No. 132, the law then
prevailing. Unfortunately, the TRB had limited funds, so, hoping for a lower price, it
started negotiations with the property owners, including AMVEL. The TRB and AMVEL
agreed subsequently that the price should be adjusted by hiring independent appraisers
and getting the average of the values to be determined by these independent appraisers

and the values stated in the PCAC resolutions. Later, on January 15, 1999, in keeping
with that agreement, the TRB approved the new, substantially reduced purchase price
of P15,350.00 per sq. m. More than a month later, on February 17, 1999, Administrative
Order No. 50 was promulgated setting new standards for the determination of the fair
and reasonable value of private lands that would be expropriated for government
infrastructure projects. This Administrative Order was intended to supplant Executive
Order No. 132.
Private respondent alleges that it is a basic fact that a "contract of sale is perfected at
the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price" (Article 1475 [1], Civil Code). Therefore, at the time TRB
and AMVEL agreed as to the process for determining the purchase price, the contract of
sale was already perfected.
The requisites for a valid price in a contract of sale are: (1) it must be real; (2) it must be
in money or its equivalent; and (3) it must be certain or ascertainable at the time of the
perfection of the contract (Articles 1471, 1458, 1468, 1469 and 1473, Civil
Code).77 Under Article 1469, price is considered certain if "it be so with reference to
another thing certain, or that the determination thereof be left to the judgment of a
specified person or persons." Said article further provides: "Even before the fixing of the
price by the designated third party, a contract of sale is deemed to be perfected and
existing."
Private respondent Vigilar avers that from the time AMVEL agreed sometime in the
middle of 1998 that the price would be the average of the values stated in the
independent appraisers' reports and the PCAC resolutions, the government could no
longer re-negotiate for a lower price. Thus, even before the TRB approved the price
at P15,350.00 per sq.m. on January 15, 1999, the price had already become certain. It
was immaterial that the Deeds of Sale were signed later. The execution of these Deeds of
Sale was a mere formality; it was meant to document a contract that had been perfected
earlier.78
Private respondent claims that applying Administrative Order No. 50 retroactively to the
contract between the TRB and AMVEL violates Article 4 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "[l]aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided."
Administrative Order No. 50 does not state that it is exempt from this rule; it does not
provide for retroactive effect.
Petitioner has not shown that private respondent Vigilar, as Secretary of the DPWH and
concurrent TRB chairman, amassed any ill-gotten wealth to warrant a charge of plunder.
Petitioner does not allege that private respondent Vigilar received any money or derived
any benefit, of any kind, from the right-of-way acquisition of the affected lands.
Regarding the allegation that he violated Sec. 3 (a) of R.A. No. 3019, private respondent
points out that it is not clear whether he was accused of being the public official who
persuaded, induced, or influenced another public officer to perform an act in violation of
rules and regulations; or the one who was so persuaded, induced, or influenced.
Petitioner likewise failed to prove that the elements of violation of Section 3 (a), (e), (g)
and (j) of Rep. Act No. 3019 have been committed by private respondent Vigilar. Thus,
petitioner's case against him is inadequate.
Private respondent argues that petitioner likewise failed to prove conspiracy. He states
that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 79 He cites the "well-settled rule" that
"conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the commission of the offense itself."80
Petitioner alleges that respondents Estrada, Ronaldo Zamora, and Vigilar gave their
imprimatur to the takeover by the Coastal Road Corporation of the UMPC, as well as the
de-prioritization of the construction of the C-5 Link when, on November 23, 1999, they
were present in a "photo-op" that took place in Malacaang. Private respondent avers
that the "photo-op" was staged by Cavite government officials to show their constituents
that the MCTE Project was being fast-tracked. Respondents merely graced the occasion
in response to requests made by these local officials. They could not be taken to court
simply because of this; otherwise, it would be "guilt by photograph," which was contrary
to plain and common sense.81
Private respondent points out petitioner's reliance on a certain "executive summary" 82 to
support the latter's allegation that the subject transaction was grossly anomalous. This
document, according to private respondent, has absolutely no evidentiary value, as its
origin is unknown, and it is unsigned. As regards petitioner's submission of a Special

Report dated August 16, 2000 from the Philippine Daily Inquirer as evidence, private
respondent points out that newspaper and magazine articles are "hearsay twice
removed and have no evidentiary value whatsoever." Private respondent Vigilar cites in
support of this contention the decision laid down by this Court in People v. Woolcock, et
al.83
E. COMMENT OF RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Public respondent raises the following grounds for the denial of the instant petition:
1. The assailed resolution and order of the public respondent are not appealable under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2. Petitioner has not adduced sufficient evidence to show that the transactions involving
the purchase of the AMVEL lands under Executive Order No. 132, Series of 1937 are
unlawful or irregular.
3. Whether under Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1999 or Executive Order No.
132, Series of 1937, respondents substantially complied with the prescribed procedure in
determining a fair and reasonable valuation of the properties in question while exercising
the power of eminent domain.
4. There is no law or particular rule that prohibits the re-alignment of the C-5 Link Project.
5. There is nothing unlawful or irregular in getting a reasonable return on investment;
neither is there evidence of bloating of prices.
6. Petitioner's assertion that TCT No. 140397 (formerly TCT No. (S-14729) 876474)
comprising fifty-six (56%) percent of the total area sold by AMVEL to the government
was not a clean title is rendered moot and academic by the Court of Appeals' Decision
dated 21 April 1999 and the Memorandum of Agreement executed by and between the
contending parties.
7. The public respondent cannot act on complaints based on mere speculations and
conjectures.
8. Matters that are left to the exercise of wisdom and discretion of the Office of the
Ombudsman are not appealable under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
absent any jurisdictional infirmity, the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause, or
the lack of it, deserves great respect and finality.
According to public respondent, the law on sales contemplates the consummation of the
sales transaction at the moment there is a meeting of minds of the parties thereto, upon
the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. 84 In the case at bar, the
meeting of the minds for the purchase of AMVEL properties occurred on May 8, 1998, the
date TRB instructed PEA to pay the checks for the properties expropriated through the
mode of voluntary sales. Public respondent alleges:
Significantly, the purchase transactions over the subject properties are negotiated ones.
On 9 August 1997, notices of acquisition were sent by TRB to the affected landowners. In
view of the acceptance by AMVEL of the amount offered by the government during the
negotiation process, no expropriation proceeding was initiated in court. Upon appraisal
by the [PCAC], the parties successfully arrived into an agreement as to the value or
purchase price of the affected properties on or before 08 May 1998, as evidenced by a
letter sent by respondent Ramon V. Dumaual, Officer-in-Charge, Toll Regulatory Board, to
the Public Estates Authority, instructing the latter to prepare the checks representing
payments for the subject properties. It is therefore clear that the governing law at that
given time was still Executive Order No. 132, Series of 1937, and not Administrative
Order No. 50, which took effect on 17 February 1999.85
Public respondent Ombudsman contends that in claiming that the subject properties
were overpriced, petitioner failed to consider that the transactions were entered into by
the State in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, which necessarily involves a
derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. Public respondent asserts that
"[the] appraisal or assessment of the property subject of the taking is not based solely
on the market value or zonal valuation made thereof by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR)."86
Administrative Order No. 50, which petitioner believes should have been followed,
provides the following standards for the assessment of the value of the land:
SECTION 3.Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of
Expropriation Proceeding. x x x
(a) The classification and use for which the property is suited;
(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;
(c) The value declared by the owners;

(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;

(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of
certain improvements on the land and for the value of improvements thereon;
(f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land;
(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as
documentary evidence presented; andcralawlibrary
(h) Such facts and events so as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient
funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those required from
them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.
Executive Order No. 132 issued on December 27, 1937, on the other hand, laid down the
following procedure:
(i) The Director of the Bureau of Public Works, City or District Engineer or other officials
concerned shall make the necessary negotiations with [the] owner of the property
needed for public use with a view to having it donated, or sold to the government at not
to exceed the assessed valuation prior to the investigation and survey of the project.
(j) If the negotiation fails, the officials concerned shall forthwith and by formal
notification submit the matter to an Appraisal Committee which is hereby created and
which shall be composed of the Provincial Treasurer, as Chairman, and the District
Engineer and the District Auditor, as members, of the province where the land is located.
If the property is situated in a chartered city the Appraisal Committee shall be composed
of the City Treasurer, as Chairman and the City Engineer and City Auditor, as members
thereof. x x x
Public respondent contends that there was sufficient compliance with the guidelines and
prescribed procedure set forth in both issuances. The referral to PCAC for the
determination of the fair market value of the properties was in order. PCAC's appraisal
of P20,000.00 per sq. m. was a result of several factors: assessing the location
accessibility; selling prices of comparable properties; the amenities present like water,
electricity, transportation and communication within the vicinity; and the status or
condition of the parcels of land. TRB's act of subjecting the properties to another round
of appraisal by independent appraisal companies was but a manifestation that it was
protecting the government's interests by ensuring that it would not be put to a
disadvantageous position by the appraisal recommended by PCAC. The result of the
appraisals conducted by the three independent appraisal companies led TRB to come up
with an average appraisal in the amount ofP15,355.00 per sq. m. in purchasing AMVEL's
properties. The amount was below the original recommendation of PCAC to purchase
AMVEL's properties at P20,000.00 per sq. m. The determination of this just compensation
price was fair and reasonable.
The Zonal Valuation (6th Revision) that took effect on February 2, 1997 fixed the amount
of P4,500.00 per sq. m. as valuation of the residential regular (RR) lands situated on Dr.
A. Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Commercial land along the same place
was fixed at P20,000.00 per sq. m. and along Ninoy Aquino International Airport
at P30,000.00 per sq. m. The affected AMVEL properties were classified by Ordinance No.
97-08 as within the C-3 high-intensity commercial zone.
Public respondent claims that the Appraisal Committees created under E.O. 132 are
endowed with special technical knowledge, skills, expertise and training on the subject of
appraisal; that the discretion given to the authorities on this matter is of such wide
latitude that the Court will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that it is being
used as a shield to a fraudulent transaction; and that government agencies or bodies
dealing with basically technical matters deserve to be disentangled from undue
interference from the courts, and so from the Ombudsman as well (Concerned Officials of
the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System [MWSS] v. Vasquez, 87 citing Felipe
Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary88 ).89
Public respondent further contends:
[The] final re-alignment plan duly approved by the TRB resulted in the substantial
reduction of the area traversed by the C-5 Link Project from the original area of twelve
(12) hectares to only 7.9 hectares, and only after averaging the appraisals of
government and private appraisers. This factual circumstance indicated prudence on the
part of private respondent PEA and TRB officials in effecting the power of eminent
domain, as they gave due regard to the rights of the landowners thereof. Again, the
reduction in the expropriated private lands upon consideration of the rights of the
landowners may not be criminally actionable absent any showing of irregularity aliunde.

xxx
There are well-observed rules in the field of real estate. Judicial notice may be taken of a
cardinal rule, which is likewise of common knowledge, that the value of real property
appreciates over time and at a rate which depends on the extent of development of the
area where the land is situated. Thus, the price sold at any given time does not mean
that the same price would be utilized for a subsequent sale thereof, especially where the
property has undergone development or has been converted into land for commercial
purposes. [Even] petitioner concedes that AMVEL developed the lands which were sold to
the government. Thus, it was but reasonable for the price of the lands to have
appreciated. Besides, private respondents Velarde and/or AMVEL being engaged in real
estate business, it is only natural for them to ensure that profits are obtained on top of
their investments, or even speculate, for that matter. As declared by this Honorable
Court in the case of Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., "in all cases where a party enters into a contract
with the government, he does so, not out [of] charity and not to lose money, but to gain
pecuniarily."90
xxx
In relation to petitioner's allegation that the bloated cost of right-of-way (ROW) project
depleted the proceeds of the US $68.6 Million loan for the right of way acquisition, the
public respondent finds the said allegation vague and without factual basis. The amount
of loan proceeds was not a factor that should be considered in appraising the value of
the subject properties.91 (Emphasis ours)
F. COMMENT OF RESPONDENTS RONALDO B. ZAMORA, MANUEL B. ZAMORA, JR., CESAR
E.A. VIRATA, AND LUIS L. VIRATA
1. Petition should be dismissed as Petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping
Private respondents allege that petitioner admits that he previously filed a
complaint92 with respondent Office of the Ombudsman against respondents Ronaldo B.
Zamora, Manual B. Zamora, Jr., and Luis J. L. Virata (OMB Case No. 0-00-1758); however,
he did not attach a copy of said complaint to his petition filed before this Court. Said
complaint was dismissed by the Ombudsman. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in
said case was still pending as of the time of the filing of the Comment. Private
respondents conclude that petitioner had filed multiple suits involving the very same
issues against respondents, and he merely rehashed the very same charges and
allegations in the second complaint. This, according to private respondents, was forum
shopping, defined by this Court in Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals, 93 as "the institution of
two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition."
Both complaints filed by petitioner are grounded on the same causes and allegations
surrounding the purported illegality of the "transfer" of the Coastal Road Project to the
Coastal Road Corporation. Respondents contend further:
[Petitioner] simultaneously and successively availed himself of several judicial remedies
by filing two (2) separate complaints against herein respondents, all substantially
founded on the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues. Petitioner obviously did this to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable
decision if not in one case or one court or tribunal, then in another.94
2. Petition does not raise any question of law.
Private respondents submit that a question of law "exists when there is a doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of
fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts." They
further submit that "[one] test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question of law;
otherwise it will be a question of fact. The question must not involve the examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented."95
3. Petition, on its face, does not raise any credible factual issue in respect to the
dismissal of the complaint against respondents.
Petitioner failed to controvert the findings of fact and law made by the Ombudsman in
his assailed Resolution. Furthermore, the Ombudsman, in its Resolution dated July 16,
2001 in OMB Case No. 00-00-1758, comprehensively passed upon the very same
allegations of petitioner in OMB Case No. 0-001-00577.
Petitioner's allegations in his complaint are contradictory. On the one hand, he claims
that the de-prioritization of the C-5 Link Expressway and the prioritization of the R-1
Expressway Extension would benefit Caylabne Bay Resort. On the other hand,

complainant himself alleges that the de-prioritization of the C-5 Link Expressway will
result in a minimal increase in vehicle volume along the R-1 Expressway. Clearly then, no
appreciable benefit would result if Coastal Road Corporation indeed pushed for the deprioritization of the C-5 Link Expressway because the alleged benefit to Caylabne Bay
Resort would be negated by the revenue loss due to minimal increase in the vehicular
volume along the entire expressway.96
4. The petition, like petitioner's complaint before the Ombudsman, is anchored on
hearsay evidence twice removed.
Private respondents allege that in building a case against them regarding the purported
de-prioritization of the C-5 Link Expressway, petitioner
quotes
extensively from the February 7, 1999 article from the Philippine Star newspaper. They
contend that "[it] is elementary that newspaper and magazine articles are hearsay twice
removed and have no evidentiary value whatsoever.97
G. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT RUBEN A. DE OCAMPO98
Private respondent Ruben de Ocampo (de Ocampo) argues that the dismissal by the
public respondent of the complaint in the proceedings a quo should be sustained
in toto because:
1. Petitioner fails to raise distinct and pure questions of law in the instant petition which
omission is fatal to his appeal by certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2. The petitioner has no legal standing to institute the charges with the Office of the
Ombudsman for alleged violations of Sec.2 in relation to Sec. 1 sub-paragraph d(1), (3)
and (6) of R.A. 7080, and Sec. 3 sub-paragraph (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.
3. The facts as alleged in the complaint-affidavit and herein Petition for Review do not
constitute the commission of any offense on the part of respondent De Ocampo and no
evidence whatsoever was presented against respondent De Ocampo to support the
allegations in petitioner's complaint-affidavit.
De Ocampo avers that he held the position of Public Utility Regulation Officer II at the Toll
Regulatory Board, a position rated at Salary Grade-15, and one that was neither
managerial nor supervisorial in nature. As such, he neither had recommendatory nor
decision-making powers or functions as regards the TRB.
De Ocampo contends that petitioner lacks the required personal knowledge of facts
constitutive of the charges in the latter's Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner failed to allege the means by which he supposedly came to be acquainted with
the material facts stated in his Complaint. According to him:
It is patent and undeniable that Petitioner was never privy to the contracts and
communications alleged in his Complaint and in this Petition for Review. Nowhere in the
records does it appear that Petitioner ever participated in any of the transactions
referred to. Petitioner's conclusions are merely hearsay and should therefore be
disregarded. x x x 99
De Ocampo cites Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 6770, "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which
states:
SECTION 20.Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary
investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;
(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman;
(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;
(4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the
grievance; or
(5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of.
In this case, de Ocampo alleges that petitioner failed to show any interest in or show
proof of personal knowledge of the transactions as investigated by the Office of the
Ombudsman, and has neither alleged nor proven that his rights have been violated or
that he has been put at a disadvantage by the consummation of the assailed
transactions through any act or omission of de Ocampo.100
Furthermore, private respondent contends:
[The] acts complained of by Petitioner occurred more than one (1) year prior to the
institution of the original Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on 16 April

2001. The last assailed transaction, more specifically, the act of then President Estrada in
granting his imprimatur and approval to CRC's proposal to deprioritize the construction of
the C-5 Link Expressway and to prioritize the R-1 Expressway Extension, was
consummated on 23 November 1999 or at least one (1) year and four (4) months prior to
the filing of the Complaint. The above-quoted Sec. 20 par. 5 of R.A. 6770 clearly states
that "The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission of if it believes that - The complaint was filed after one
year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of." Considering the length
of time which elapsed between the act complained of and the filing of the Complaint, the
Office of the Ombudsman should not have even considered the charges put - forth by
Petitioner. In any event, the Complaint was correctly and cogently dismissed by the
Ombudsman for utter lack of merit. x x x 101
H. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT FRISCO F. SAN JUAN
Private respondent Frisco F. San Juan (San Juan) raises the following arguments in his
Comment:
I. The petition must be dismissed outright as it does not raise pure questions of law or
cite any special and important reasons for its allowance under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
II. In any case, respondent Ombudsman did not commit any reversible error or grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's complaint a quo, in that:
A. Petitioner completely failed to establish the existence of any of the elements of
plunder in order for the complaint to prosper as against respondent San Juan or any of
his co-respondents.
b. Nor was petitioner able to establish any violation by respondent San Juan of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. On the contrary, the acquisition of the AMVEL Properties
for the government's tollway project was neither disadvantageous to the government nor
did it give any unwarranted benefits, advantages or preference to any party.
c. Petitioner failed to otherwise specify any act or behavior on the part of Respondent
San Juan which constitutes a breach of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Behavior for
public officials and employees.
d. Petitioner's other imputations and insinuations of anomalies in respect of the subject
expressway construction are equally baseless and purely speculative accusations of
wrongdoing on respondent's part.
e. Given the patently baseless and utterly deficient complaint for "plunder", "graft", etc.,
the additional "fact-finding" proceedings which petitioner sought to have in the case
would have added nothing to petitioner's cause against respondents.102
San Juan, the Chairman of the PEA from July 1998 to February 2001, submits that a
Petition for Review onCertiorari, under the mode of appeal provided by Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is required to raise "only questions of law" which shall be
distinctly set forth in the petition, the Honorable Court not being a trier of facts. Thus,
in certiorari proceedings under Rule 45, the findings of fact below as well as the
conclusions on the credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed, the question
before the court being limited to questions of law.103
According to San Juan, Rule 45 likewise provides that for the petitions to be filed under it
to be allowed, there must be special and important reasons therefor, as when the court a
quo has decided a question of substance not heretofore determined by the Honorable
Court, or has decided it in any way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions thereof; or when the court a quo has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to
call for the exercise of the power of supervision of this Court.
San Juan contends that at the heart of all the purported "serious errors of law" raised by
petitioner are essentially factual questions, which petitioner would have the Honorable
Court resolve. Thus, San Juan avers that petitioner asks that this Honorable Court
determine:
'if based on the appraisals of the properties involved, the right-of-way acquisitions were
"overpriced";
'if the purchase of the subject properties "had been consummated on 7 May 1998";
'if there was "compliance with the procedure for the valuation of the properties
involved";
'if respondents "amassed wealth" from the subject transaction as to be liable for plunder;

'if President Estrada "intervened" in the purchase of the right-of-way and the payment
thereof;
'if the titles transferred to the Republic were clean;
'and so on.
San Juan concludes from the above that all these questions require an appreciation of
the evidence and an examination of the probative value of the proofs presented to
determine the truth or falsity of the factual claims of the parties below; these are thus
factual questions.
As regards petitioner's allegations of plunder, San Juan notes that "nowhere in the
complaint was it alleged that respondent San Juan or any of his co-respondents received
any art of the purchase price for the lands purchased by the Government from AMVEL
from the right of way."104 The initiative of the TRB not only in renegotiating the purchase
price and in causing the re-appraisal of the properties by three (3) appraisers but also in
successfully reducing the purchase price cannot be the product of, and is in fact
inconsistent with, respondents' supposed "connivance" or "collusion" with AMVEL.
San Juan further alleges that the negotiation, perfection and execution of the Deed of
Sale of the lands in question between TRB and Amvel were all done without the
participation or involvement of PEA, as it was never involved in the renegotiation efforts.
This is consistent with the terms of the TOA and the MOA, where the "responsibility for
acquiring the lands," "the negotiation with its individual owners" and "the preparation of
the necessary documents" including the "cancellation of the titles in the name of the
individual lot owners" and the "transfer thereof in the name of the government" were all
vested in TRB without the intervention of PEA.
San Juan alleges that the following steps were taken to ensure the regularity of the
questioned transaction:
1. Prior to the full payment of the purchase price to the sellers, TRB ensured that the
Deeds of Sale were executed by authorized signatories, with the required Board
resolutions and Special Powers of Attorney and duly notarized.
2. TRB likewise made certain that the real estate taxes covering the remaining quarters
of the year and the documentary stamp taxes due on the transactions equivalent to
1.5% of the purchase price were shouldered and paid for by AMVEL with the
corresponding tax clearance duly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and that all
titles to the properties were clean and transferred in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines before the balance of the purchase price was fully paid.
3. Other than paying the purchase price for the properties, the Government did not pay
any expenses for notarization, taxes and transfer fees, registration and processing of the
transfer of titles to the Republic of the Philippines and clearing the properties of
occupants and their relocation.
San Juan concludes that contrary to petitioner's claims, AMVEL never received a "windfall
from the government for which it acquired for almost nothing." In truth, apart from
receiving a purchase price reduced to the extent of P370 million, AMVEL was required to
pay, as it did, expenses normally shouldered by a seller - all these on top of what
petitioner himself recognized as developments undertaken by AMVEL on the properties
prior to their acquisition by the government.105
San Juan contends that tax declarations, which petitioner presented as evidence of the
alleged overpriced purchase price of the properties, are neither proof of the true market
value of properties nor conclusive evidence of their value, but only enable the assessor
to identify the same for their assessment levels.106
Furthermore, San Juan alleges that the acquisition cost of a property cannot be the sole
basis for determining its fair value; the current value of similar properties and their
actual or potential uses must be considered together with other factors.107
Regarding petitioner's insistence that Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 50 should have
been applied, San Juan's averments are summarized below:
1. A.O. No. 50 would have no application to the contract between TRB and AMVEL which
had been priorly perfected on May 7, 1998.
2. The Zonal valuation (6th Division) which took effect on February 2, 1997, fixing the
amount of P4,500/sq m as valuation of the affected properties, refers to residential
regular (RR) lands situated in Dr. A. Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paranaque City. The
commercial lands along same place was fixed at P20,000.00/ sq m and along Ninoy
Aquino International Airport atP30,000/00 per sq m. The affected AMVEL properties were
classified by Ordinance No. 97-08 as within the C-3 high intensity commercial zone.

3. A.O. No. 50 does not in any way prohibit the conduct of a negotiated sale which is
more expeditious and less expensive for the Government than engaging in a protracted
expropriation proceedings over the properties with the owners thereof. The purported
costs in terms of time, resources and money will not necessarily result in savings for the
Government.
4. Even in expropriation proceedings, just compensation for the properties must be
determined. And by "just compensation" is meant "a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity x x x the market value of the land
taken x x x being the sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy,
and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given
and received for such property." Thus, to determine just compensation, the parties must
add to the market value, the consequential damages. (Tuason v. LTA, 31 SCRA 413) In the
present case, the final valuation agreed upon by the TRB and AMVEL, upon consideration
of the market value as determined by four (4) independent appraisers, constitutes such
just compensation that is not only fair to the seller but to the Government as well.
5. The Honorable Court itself had occasion to observe that protracted expropriation
proceedings do not only mean delay and difficulty for the Government, it also results in
the citizen losing faith in the Government and in its readiness to pay for what it
appropriates. x x x
In this case, the properties affected by the right-of-way involve numerous owners. Thus,
in pursuing a negotiated sale instead of opting for expropriation proceedings and arriving
at a mutually acceptable acquisition price in consideration for the transfer of clean and
unencumbered titles to the Republic, the Government did not suffer any losses, contrary
to petitioner's claims.108
San Juan claims that neither the TRB nor PEA could have aborted the purchase of the
AMVEL properties based on the alleged falsification of the Court of Appeals Decision
dated October 29, 1998. These properties were essential for the Tollway Project - a fact
which petitioner himself concedes is a reasonable, necessary and urgent public work.
Thus, the TRB, more so PEA, could not have simply re-arranged the project plans and
decided not to acquire the AMVEL properties. In fact, it is absurd to even suggest that
PEA could override the decision to build a cheaper and faster expressway traversing the
AMVEL properties. Not only did the AMVEL properties have the most advantageous
access to the NAIA, their development was the easiest to implement, because they had
already been cleared of squatters and other occupants.109
As for San Juan's purported "approval" of the take-over of the Tollway Project by the
Coastal Road Corporation (CRC), San Juan states that there is simply no basis for this
claim, for the following reasons:
A. At the end of 1999, the Malaysian counterpart could no longer fund the project due to
currency regulations. After CRC offered to take over the interest of Renong-Berhad, PEA
in fact required it so show proof of its financial and technical capability. When respondent
San Juan's term as PEA chairman ended, CRC had not yet submitted the PEA
requirements. Consequently, respondent San Juan could not have given my approval to
de-prioritize the C-5 project and to prioritize the R-1 Expressway extension as allegedly
proposed by CRC. Other than his bare allegations, petitioner has not presented any proof
to show that respondent San Juan and the other respondents have turned-over the
project to CRC and acceded to its proposal to de-prioritize C-5 project and to prioritize
the R-1 Expressway Extensions.
b. x x x [The] Ombudsman had already dismissed a related complaint by the same
petitioner when he similarly questioned the transfer and takeover of the Project to CRC.
Thus, in a Resolution dated 16 July 2001, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for
plunder and violation of RA 3019 filed by the herein petitioner against Joseph Estrada
and other respondents for the transfer and take-over of the MCTE Project to CRC.110
San Juan also claims that in asserting that the acquisition price arrived at for the
questioned transaction exceeded the limit of P1.7 billion for the right-of-way purchase,
petitioner ignores that the landowners of the affected properties are entitled to just
compensation for the taking of their properties. San Juan contends that such just
compensation is not based on the budget of the government for the project, but is "the
fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity x x
x the market value of the land taken x x x being the sum of money which a person
desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, wiling, but not compelled to sell,
would agree on as a price to be given and received for such property." San Juan further

contends that petitioner has not otherwise shown how the entire MCTE Project could be
achieved within the said limit of P1.7 billion.111
V. ISSUES
The following issues were raised in the petition as well as in respondents' respective
Comments:
A. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for using the wrong mode of appeal
and for raising questions of fact
B. Whether or not public respondent Office of the Ombudsman committed serious errors
of law as well as grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the questioned Resolution and Order
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Whether or not petition should be dismissed for using the wrong mode of appeal and
for raising questions of fact
Respondents Office of the Ombudsman, Mariano Z. Velarde, Franklin M. Velarde, Gregorio
R. Vigilar, Ronaldo B. Zamora, Manuel B. Zamora Jr., Cesar E.A. Virata, Luis L. Virata, and
Frisco F. San Juan contend that a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before this Honorable Court is not the proper mode of
appeal in questioning any final order or resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman; thus,
the instant petition should be outrightly dismissed motu proprio.
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified Petition for Review on Certiorari . The petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Private respondents Velarde aver that the "courts" referred to in the provision quoted
above are "the courts that compose the integrated judicial system and do not include
quasi-judicial bodies or agencies such as the Office of the Ombudsman." 112 They claim
that the proper mode of appeal in questioning the final judgment, order, or resolution of
quasi-judicial bodies or agencies is provided under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 1 of said Rule states:
Section 1. Scope.. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the
Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian
Reform under Republic Act No. 6557, Government Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission,
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law."
To support their contention that Rule 43 applies to this case, private respondents rely on
the Court's ruling in Fabian v. Desierto,113 which provides:
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a Petition for Review
on Certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in
Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are
now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified Petition for Review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary"
quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high
constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should
be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the
Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an
independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a
constitutionally-mandated but statutorily-created body. (Emphasis ours.)
Public respondent Ombudsman likewise argues that petitioner has taken the wrong mode
of appeal, citing the rule as laid down by this Court in Tirol v. del Rosario,114 which states:

Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 provides that orders, directives and decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases are appealable to the Supreme Court via Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. However, in Fabian v. Desierto, we declared that Section 27 is
unconstitutional since it expanded the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, without its advice
and consent, in violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. Hence, all appeals
from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to
the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
True, the law is silent on the remedy of an aggrieved party in case the Ombudsman
found sufficient cause to indict him in criminal or non-administrative cases. We cannot
supply such deficiency if none has been provided in the law. We have held that the right
to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. Hence, there must be a law
expressly granting such privilege. The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the
remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. As we ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party is given the
right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not granted to parties
aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding
probable cause to indict accused persons.
Public respondent avers that no information has been filed with either the
Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court; and not only did petitioner resort to the
wrong mode of appeal, he also raised factual issues in his petition, which are not proper
grounds for appeal under the rule. Public respondent further avers that an error in the
choice or mode of appeal is one of the grounds for the dismissal of the appeal under
Section 5, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 115 This, aggravated by improper
grounds raised on appeal, has rendered the instant petition dismissible.
Although we agree with private respondents Velarde that a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy for parties seeking relief from final
judgments, orders, or resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies like the Office of the
Ombudsman, as has been repeatedly held by this Court, 116 we find that the remedy of
appeal under Rule 43 posited by private respondents Velarde is not proper either. This
Court subsequently held that under the ruling in Fabian, "all appeals from decisions of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure." 117 Said remedy, therefore, is
not applicable to cases involving criminal or non-administrative charges filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, which is the situation in the case before us now. As we further
stated in Tirol v. Del Rosario:
[An] aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman as to
the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Fabian v. Desierto,118 the case was dismissed and remanded to the Court of Appeals.
This case being criminal and not administrative in nature, however, the conclusion in
Fabian is not applicable.
Thus, due to the nature of this case and the allegations involving grave abuse of
discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman, it should have been filed under
Rule 65, and not Rule 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This Court had already provided this remedy in Nava v. Commission on Audit, 119 wherein
we held:
The remedy availed of by petitioner is erroneous. Instead of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner filed with this Court the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to the provisions of
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only judgments or final orders or resolutions
of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court and other courts,
whenever authorized by law, may be the subject of an appeal by certiorari to this Court.
It does not include resolutions of the Ombudsman on preliminary investigations in
criminal cases. Petitioner's reliance on Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 is misplaced. Section
27 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a
decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where
an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial
review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. In other words, the right to appeal

is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in

criminal cases, like the case at bar. Such right is granted only from orders or decisions of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases.
An aggrieved party is not left without any recourse. Where the findings of the
Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis ours.)
Again, in Flores v. Office of Ombudsman,120 we ruled as follows:
x x x The instant petition was captioned as a Petition for Review by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. However, the arguments raised refer to alleged grave abuse of
discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman. In determining the nature of an
action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the petition and the character of the
relief sought, that are controlling. Accordingly, we are compelled to consider the instant
petition as one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
This case involves a significant amount of money that was already released by the
government to a private institution, AMVEL, as purchase price for the road right-of-way in
a major infrastructure project that was undertaken by the former and that naturally
affected the general public. Therefore, even if this case was erroneously filed as shown
above, and may be dismissed outright under the rules, the Court deems it appropriate to
brush aside technicalities of procedure, as this involves matters of transcendental
importance to the public;121 and to consider the petition as one for certiorari filed under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.122
Respondents argue further that the petition should be instantly dismissed for failing to
raise purely questions of law. As may be gleaned from petitioner's assignment of errors,
this Court is being asked to determine the following, which involve questions of fact:
1. Whether or not Administrative Order No. 50, s. 1999 is applicable to the sale of the
subject properties in this case;
2. Whether or not private respondents complied with the prescribed procedure in
determining a fair and reasonable valuation of the subject properties;
3. Whether or not respondents bloated the purchase price;
4. Whether or not respondents changed the original alignment of the Sucat Interchange,
which resulted in an increase in the size of the AMVEL property sold to the government;
5. Whether or not respondent Mariano Z. Velarde "made a killing" in the sale of the
subject properties;
6. Whether or not a portion of the subject properties did not have a clean title at the time
they were sold to the government;
7. Whether or not the cost of the right-of-way was bloated, which led to the depletion of
the proceeds of the US$68.6 Million loan for the right-of-way acquisition;
andcralawlibrary
8. Whether or not respondents de-prioritized the R-1 Expressway Extension over the C-5
Link Expressway.
It is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts 123 and its jurisdiction is limited to errors of
law. As we held in Tirol v. Commission on Audit, "There is a question of law in any given
case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.
A question of fact arises when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of alleged facts."124
Moreover, in Medina v. City Sheriff, Manila,125 we have stated:
For this petition to be granted, it must be shown that the respondent appellate court
committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack of jurisdiction and not mere
errors of judgment, for certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are
correctible by appeal.
B. Whether or not public respondent Office of the Ombudsman committed serious errors
of law as well as grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the questioned Resolution and Order
In the case now before us, petitioner wants this Court to review the evidence that was
already thoroughly studied by public respondent Ombudsman and passed upon in the
questioned Resolution.126 Thus, public respondent found that:
The uncontroverted facts clearly show that Administrative Order No. 50 was issued on
February 17, 1999, while the transaction/ negotiation for the purchase of affected lands
was consummated as early as May 1998. As correctly pointed out by respondents, the

governing law is Executive Order No. 132, (E.O. No. 132) issued on December 27, 1937,
which laid down the following procedure:
a) The Director of the Bureau of Public Works, City or District Engineer or other officials
concerned shall make the necessary negotiations with owner of the property needed for
public use with a view to having it donated, or sold to the government at not to exceed
the assessed valuation prior to the investigation and survey of the project.
b) If the negotiation fails, the officials concerned shall forthwith and by formal notification
submit the matter to an Appraisal Committee which is hereby created and which shall be
composed of the Provincial Treasurer, as Chairman, and the District Engineer and the
District Auditor, as members, of the province where the land is located. If the property is
situated in a chartered city the Appraisal Committee shall composed (sic) of the City
Treasurer, as Chairman and the City Engineer and City Auditor, as members. x x x
A perusal of the guidelines as well as the documentary evidence on the transaction
reveals that respondents complied with the prescribed procedure in determining a fair
and reasonable valuation of the properties in question. The referral for the determination
of the fair market value of the properties to [the] Paranaque City Appraisal Committee
which recommended the payment of P20,000.00 per sq. m. thereof was in order. The
appraisal was a result of several [factors] ranging from assessing the location
accessibility, selling prices of comparable properties, the amenities present like water,
electricity, transportation and communication within the vicinity and the status or
condition of the parcels of land. TRB's act of subjecting the properties to another round
of appraisal, this time, by three independent appraisal companies is a manifestation that
TRB had made sure that the Government would not be put in a disadvantageous position
in view of a very high appraisal recommended by PCAC. Clearly, the result of the
appraisals conducted by the three (3) independent appraiser companies led TRB to come
up with an average appraisal in the amount of P15,355.00 per square [meter] in
purchasing AMVEL's property. The amount is far below the original recommendation of
PCAC to purchase AMVEL's property at P20,000.00 per sq. m.
Complainant merely relied on - Administrative Order No. 50 issued by respondent
Estrada and on the fact that the valuation must be based on zonal valuation fixed by BIR
at P4,000.00 per sq. m. a year prior to the sale.
As earlier stated, Administrative Order No. 50 finds no application to the already
perfected contract between TRB and AMVEL. On the Zonal Valuation (6th Revision) that
took effect on February 2, 1997 whereby it fixed the amount of P4,500.00 per sq. m. as
valuation of the affected properties however refers to residential regular (RR) lands
situated in Dr. A. Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paranaque City. The commercial lands
along same place was fixed at P20,000.00 per sq. m. and along Ninoy Aquino
International Airport at P30,000.00 per sq. m. The affected AMVEL properties were
classified by Ordinance No. 97-08, pages 32, 33, 34 as within the C-3 high intensity
commercial zone. The properties in question being within commercial zone, PCAC
properly recommended valuation of P20,000.00 is justified (sic). We agree with the PCAC
that the appraisal of a property is not limited only to the zonal valuation by the BIR. As
correctly pointed out by respondents Nacianceno, Daval-Santos, Medina-Cue and de
Leon, the appraisal of properties are also based on location, accessibility, selling prices of
comparable properties, the amenities present like water, electricity, transportation and
communication, etc. In fact, in Administrative Order No. 50, zonal valuation is only one of
the many factors being considered in the payment of just compensation.
Complainant also anchored his complaint on two (2) Memoranda dated March 30, 1999,
from then President Estrada x x x.
xxx
We find no circumstance to consider the two (2) Memoranda anomalous or irregular. The
approval of the Deeds of Sale between TRB and AMVEL by respondent Estrada was in
pursuance to the provisions of P.D. 1112.
It may not be amiss to state that the transaction between TRB and AMVEL was
consummated as early as May 1998 during the administration of former President Fidel V.
Ramos. The payment of the purchase price was only delayed as the TRB conducted a reappraisal of the property until the new administration of respondent Estrada in June
1998. It was only in January 1999 that TRB, then having come out with a new price per
sq. m. after averaging the appraisal of the three (3) independent appraisers and of PCAC,
approved the purchase price of P1,221,799,806.00 for the acquisition of AMVEL's
property totaling 79,598 per sq. m. at P15,350.00. This delay in the determination of the

consideration did not affect the already perfected contract as the consideration thereof
was already determined or determinable. The events negate complainant's claim that
the transaction was concluded in just 2 - working days. The insinuation that respondent
Estrada favored AMVEL in approving the purchase of subject properties . . . has no basis.
If indeed AMVEL persuaded respondent Estrada to act on its favor, then AMVEL could
have pushed for the acquisition of the properties not at P15,350.00 but at P20,000.00
per sq. m. Besides, the valuation of P15,355.00 per sq. m. paid to AMVEL is much lower
than the advertised price of the properties adjacent to AMVEL pegged at least
P19,000.00to P55,000.00 per sq. m. x x x Further, [with] respondents Velarde and/or
AMVEL, being engaged in business, it is natural that they engage in profit scheme (sic)
which in this case appears justified.
While there was a complete payment in favor of AMVEL of the purchase price of
P1,221,766,640.00 within one (1) month from the time respondent Estrada approved the
transaction, we find the same not anomalous. The several [Deeds] of Sale executed by
the parties, TRB and AMVEL, stipulate that fifty (50%) percent of the purchase price shall
be paid upon execution of the contract. The other fifty (50%) percent upon issuance by
the Register of Deeds of the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title covering the
properties in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
In the crime of Plunder, the following elements must exist:
2. A public officer acquires wealth by himself or in connivance with another person;
3. The acquisition of the wealth was obtained through the means described in Section 1
(d).
In the instant case, the alleged ill-gotten wealth consisting of the overpriced purchase
price of the properties affected by C-5 Link, was allegedly obtained by respondents by
taking undue advantage of their official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino People.
We find no evidence to support complainant's claim of the existence of ill-gotten wealth.
The purchase price of P1,221,799,804 paid to AMVEL could not be considered as illgotten wealth as said amount is a consideration of a legally entered Deeds (sic) of Sale.
There is no evidence that public respondents benefited/profited or had taken shares with
private respondents in the transaction.
Complainant contends that public and private [respondents'] acts constitute also
violation of Section 3(a), (e), (g), (h) and (j) of Republic Act 3019, as amended.
We find no evidence to support said allegation.
In reference to Section 3(a), there is no sufficient evidence showing that respondents,
especially respondent Estrada, induced or influenced anybody to perform an act in
violation of rules and regulation (sic). Neither was there proof of a violation of any rules
or regulations promulgated by competent authority. Administrative Order No. 50 cannot
be considered as the rule violated since it finds no applications (sic) on the questioned
transaction.
Insofar as Section 3(e) is concerned, there was no showing that the government suffered
undue injury when the AMVEL properties were purchased at P15,355.00 per sq. m. As
earlier pointed out, complainant relied on the valuation of P4,500.00 per sq. m. fixed by
the BIR when the said valuation applies to regular residential land and not to commercial
lots fixed at least P20,000.00 per sq. m. The P15,355.00 per square meter [price] is
relatively low compared to that recommended by PCAC and contained at BIR Zonal
Valuation which was P20,000.00 per sq. m.
Referring to Section 3(g), there was no basis to conclude that the contract was grossly
disadvantageous to the government. On the contrary, the government was able to save
money when it decided to purchase the questioned properties at P15,355.00 per sq. m.
and not at P20,000.00.
Section 3(j) has no application in the instant case as it pertains to the granting of a
license, permit or benefit. Assuming as it does, it established a record that the affected
properties were purchased from persons or [entities] who were legally authorized to sell
or own the same in accordance with the applicable laws, rules and regulations.
We find no evidence that the elements of Section 3(h) exist. The provision requires that
there must be an actual intervention in the transaction for financial or pecuniary interest
by public respondent. While there was an intervention by public respondents the same
were in pursuance to the exercise official duties. Neither public respondents have direct
or indirect financial or pecuniary interest with AMVEL.

Considering that the crimes imputed against the respondents were not shown to exist,
conspiracy could not likewise be appreciated. It is a well settled ruled that conspiracy
must be proven as clearly as the commission of the offense itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
SO RESOLVED.127
Upon Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, respondent Office of the Ombudsman
issued an Order,128 the pertinent portions of which are quoted below:
There is no truth to the allegation that the Ombudsman deliberately failed to order the
conduct of fact-finding investigation. To conduct a fact-finding investigation is a question
addressed to the sound discretion of the Ombudsman and not therefore as a matter of
right. When the instant complaint was filed complainant attached voluminous documents
which when evaluated was sufficient in form and substance to conduct preliminary
investigation. To that matter, there is no need to conduct fact-finding activities as the
compliant already reached the formal stage of investigation to determine whether or not
probable cause exists to charge respondents. In the same manner, the request for
subpoena duces tecum cannot be demanded as a matter of policy for every [case] filed
before this Office. From the very beginning it is the duty of the complainant to present
complete and ample evidence to support his allegation and not to rely on the coercive
processes of this Office lest to be accused of being a tool for every complainant's
crusade and be labeled as engaged in fishing evidence.
[Complainant] questions the inhibition of the Honorable Ombudsman. We view however
the same inhibition a prudent exercise of impartiality. Prudence dictates that the
Honorable Ombudsman himself should inhibit to clear any suspicion that he would
engage in any retaliatory [act] against the complainant in view of the impeachment case
filed by the latter. Far from the accusation that the Honorable Ombudsman prejudged the
case as well as the members of the Panel, we submit that the resolution was arrived [at]
after a painstaking appreciation of the available evidence of the complainant and
respondents.
As a consequence of the inhibition of the Honorable Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman, Hon. Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. had to perform the duties of the
Ombudsman and assumed and took charge of the disposition of the case. This finds
support under Section 8 of R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "Ombudsman Act of 1989". On
the contrary, complainant failed to cite the particular provision of law allegedly violated
when the Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved the dismissal of the case. In the same
manner we find the insinuations of the complainant against the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman baseless much more sufficient to affect or disturb whatever findings we
have in our resolution.
Complainant alleges that his evidence were totally disregarded. He forgot however, that
respondents have evidence too. Notwithstanding with the voluminous documents
complainant submitted, this Office has to weigh the evidentiary value and credibility of
the evidence as well as the arguments of both parties. It so happened that in the
appreciation thereof, we gave credence to the evidence of the other parties. That
judgment cannot be put as an issue that would warrant the reversal of our decision.
In general, the Motion for Reconsideration failed to advance new arguments that would
warrant the reversal of the questioned Resolution. There was no new evidence submitted
by the complainant to warrant a second look of our resolution. The supposed documents
he attached in the Motion were already passed upon and examined by this Office. Lastly,
complainant miserably failed to point out specifically the findings or conclusion of the
resolution which was contrary to law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration of the complainant is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
We find no cogent reason to weigh all over again the evidence in this case and to reverse
the findings of the public respondent quoted above. This is because, as we held in Tirol v.
COA:
[This] Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. This rule is based not only upon
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise the functions of the

courts will be grievously hampered by immeasurable petitions assailing the dismissal of

investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the of the Ombudsman with regard
to complaints filed before it, in as much the same way that the courts would be
extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on
the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 129
More recently, we had occasion to pass upon a similar case, the core issue of which was
whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners'
complaint against the respondents. In that case, we ruled in the negative and,
accordingly, dismissed the petition.130 Thus, we held:
We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty
bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." The raison d 'etre for its creation and endowment
of broad investigative authority is to insulate it from the long tentacles of officialdom that
are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution
of erring public officials, and through the execution of official pressure and influence,
quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed
by public officers.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto, we dwelt on the
powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested primarily in the Office
of the Ombudsman. It bears emphasis that the Office has been given a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory powers under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770
(The Ombudsman Act of 1989). This discretion is all but free from legislative, executive
or judicial intervention to ensure that the Office is insulated from any outside pressure
and improper influence.
Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts. The Ombudsman may thus conduct an investigation if the complaint filed is found
to be in the proper form and substance. Conversely, the Ombudsman may also dismiss
the complaint should it be found insufficient in form or substance.
Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from
interfering with the exercise of the Ombudsman's powers, and respect the initiative and
independence inherent in the latter who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of
the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.
The pragmatic basis for the general rule was explained in Ocampo v. Ombudsman:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as
well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file
an information in court or dismiss a complaint by private complainants.
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that we do not interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers vested by the Constitution. In short,
we do not review the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint except when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.131 ???r?bl?
ALDOVINO VS COMELEC AND ASILO
G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009
FACTS: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is
an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete
service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit
rule. The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was

elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then
faced.
This Court,
however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing
the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny
due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected
and had served for three terms; his candidacy for afourth term therefore violated the three-term limit
rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b)of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution
of November 28,2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to
render complete service for the2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had
ordered.
ISSUE: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term
limit rule; and .Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
HELD: NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a
local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms
. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers
to a "term" as a period of time

three years during which an official has title tooffice and can serveThe word "term" in a legal sense
means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer mayhold an office.,
preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections
7
presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if
the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public
official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment.
We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that
he has fully served three consecutive terms The petitioner vacated his post a few months before
the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of
writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term.(EXCEPTION)
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves
no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his
office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case
if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective
officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary
renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption. Strict
adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues
to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office
within the suspension period.
The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists
Rose Bunagan-Bansig
vs.
Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera
Facts:

Rose Bunagan-Bansig filed a complaint against Atty. Rogelio Juan Celera for Gross Immoral
Conduct. She avers that the respondent lawyer contracted a second marriage with a certain Cielo
Alba, while his marriage to the formers sister, Gracemarie Bunagan, was still valid and in full
legal existence.
In the span of more than 10 years, the Court issued numerous directives to file his answer to the
complaint, but respondent failed, alleging that he did not receive a copy thereof. As such, the
Court resolved to dispense with his comment and to order his arrest, but the Return Warrant
showed that he cannot be located. The given address was, in fact, a vacant lot.
Meanwhile, his failure to appear before the mandatory conference set by the IBP-CBD warranted
a two-year suspension.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera should be disbarred on the ground of Gross Immoral
Conduct?
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera should be disbarred. His act of contracting a second marriage
while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and is a ground for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable
lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar by making a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
Furthermore, under the same rule, Atty. Celera wilfully disobeyed lawful orders of the court as
evidenced by his nonchalant attitude. He disregarded and, as a result, disrespected the judicial
institution. Canons violated:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
NB:
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined is
whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of
justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of
a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of
respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.