G.R. No.

95229 June 9, 1992

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222,
entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and
Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review, dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the court a quo is an
interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's
remedy.
In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D.
Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix
of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the
defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the real and
personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on
September 28, 1983;
3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which
time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a
consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent
desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;
4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on October 5,
1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for
being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to
herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder reproduced;
. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time.
As I have now I shall save my heart to you and to Chad.
. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Nio for our sake and for the child sake.
. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.
. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him and you. Let me bless him by
my name and let me entitle him to all what I am and what I've got.
. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.
. . . How is CHAD and you . . .
. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the whole world. After all
we love each other and CHAD is the product of our love.
5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate
estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;
6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal
property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with approximate value of
several millions of pesos;
7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance
of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertained;

8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito
O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose
behalf this instant complaint is filed;
9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and relatives for the
sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended
financial support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to grant Chad's lawful inheritance,
but despite said demands, defendant failed and refused and still fails and refused and still fails and refuses
to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo; 3
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an inventory and accounting of
the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the
estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987, disputing the material allegations in the
complaint. She maintained by way of affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the
action is premature; that the suit as barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to
bring the suit; that the lower court was no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder of causes
of action. 4
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses, the trial court issued the following
order on October 20, 1987:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further proceedings to adduce evidence on
the various claims of the parties so as to hear their respective sides
WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss
requiring additional evidence is in the meantime held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied
and the case as set for pre-trial . . . 5
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19, 1987, 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was
granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's
motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 7
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which
had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the said
motion in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court now resolves:
No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor of the plaintiff. A cause of
action being the "primary right to redress a wrong" (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently on
the face of the complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's protestation that
there is no sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.
No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It is exactly filed in order to
prove filiation, and then recognition. To go about the step by step procedure outlined by the defendant by
filing one action after another is definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of action.
No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It is (her) spurious child that she
represents as natural guardian that is instituting the action.
No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may file an action for recognition
within four years from his attainment of majority (New Civil Code. Art, 285, No. 2). Whether the letters of
the putative father, Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a hearing on the merits.

No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was done in this case. The defendant's
claim that there was a misjoinder is untenable.
No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special jurisdiction, such as a probate court
has capacity to entertain a complaint such as the one now before it.
The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not control the body of the complaint.
From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient' in form and substance and, therefore,
the motion to dismiss could not be granted until after trial on the merits in which it should be shown that the
allegations of the complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the action exists.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on January 30, 1990. 9 As a consequence,
another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with
respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24, 1989 and January 30, 1990
of the trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing the petition, and likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review
on certiorari.
In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:
a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
in UTTER DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT providing clear
exceptions to the general rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the special civil
action of certiorari;
b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
and before Respondent Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not theretofore
determined by this Honorable Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil Code
requiring judicial approval when the recognition of an illegitimate minor child does not take place in a
record of birth or in a will: of Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for
the prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate filiation; and of Art. 285 of the Civil
Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action for recognition of a natural child; and
c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional Trial Court from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings. 10
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad
Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause of action, she submits that the recognition of the minor child, either
voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must first be established before the former can invoke his right to
succeed and participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of such recognition in
the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and,
consequently, the complaint should be dismissed.
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action
against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos
Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for the
settlement of the deceased's estate had been commenced in court; and that the defendants had refused and failed to deliver
her share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid
share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that, even if
it does, the same is barred by prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of the filing of the complaint therein, the
petitioner in that case had already reached the age of majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor.
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed
parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father
had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the
right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot
be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of
action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private
respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for

inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further that the two causes
of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence.
As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
al., 12 wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can any event maintain a complex
action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character
of heir, is one which, in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that
the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In,
other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should
have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same
plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to
compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally
applicable in other cases. . .
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to
some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine
must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has
not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his co-heirs . . .; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the
estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that
in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before
the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed.
Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition, private respondent's cause of action has
prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate
minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering that the complaint
was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action has prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the
complaint. Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2,
Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter
provision of law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime
of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an
admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action
may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the
child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has
been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 13
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have been filed during the
lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent,
however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the
child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.

Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine
whether the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child bas been vested by the
filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14 We herein
adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15where we held that the fact of
filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new
law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that a
statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes
them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into
effective, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially
where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant
case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she
represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in
applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet
prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of the court below denying the motion to
dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner
and allegedly obtaining in the case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari [1] is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a decision [2] and resolution[3] upholding the resolution and order
of the trial court,[4] which denied petitioners motion to dismiss private respondents complaint for support and directed the
parties to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L.
Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.[5]
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34 th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on
abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical
Hospital in Quezon City. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the prenatal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial
capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot,
Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was
diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for
support.[6]
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in
1998, long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their
relationship started in 1993 but he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a
certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. As a result, theirs was a
stormy on-and-off affair. What started as a romantic liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case of
fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she
resorted to various devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family. Unable to bear the prospect of losing
his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential customers
to the car aircon repair shop [7] where she worked. Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May
2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe
was telling people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their last intimacy was
sometime in 1998.[8] Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could
not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no alternative but to move on but without bumping or
hitting any part of her body.[9] Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him
in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single
when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964.[10]
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to
consider any proposal to settle the case.[11]
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.[12]
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. [13] He also moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law,
an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father. [14] In his motion, Arnel manifested that he
had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for
cancellation of his name appearing in Martins birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached the
certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for
recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners
constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. [15]
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because the private respondents complaint on
its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs
primary right and the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by
which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but
by the facts alleged.[16]
In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the petitioner, as a result of which she
gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he

fathered Martin, claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the childs conception and birth. It is undisputed and
even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is
whether such sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged, then Martin should be
supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and
petitioner has no obligation to give support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth
certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. He also claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly
proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support and must first
establish his filiation in a separate suit under Article 283 [17] in relation to Article 265[18] of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule
105[19] of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the
respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary
evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel
recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,[20] we
allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed
parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father
had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the
right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which
cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause
of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private
respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two
causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not
new in our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of
this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct
causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action
to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action
in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the
action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in
other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported
by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a
natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may
maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of these
situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious
reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the
court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating
them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of
filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases
are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of proving
paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as
guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for determining paternity has actually
been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called
for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee[21] where the appellant was convicted of murder on the testimony of three
eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and
authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result (emphasis supplied).

Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals,
promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet
been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as
the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father.
[22]

In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court
of Appeals:[23]
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to
conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid
of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002
with our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained
clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an
association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson,[25] we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because doubts
persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were)
the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts!
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC[26] where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then presidential
candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,[27] we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide,
the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing
and the reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A persons DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA
found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most
importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples
were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA
print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of
appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that
he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen
taken from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample
given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice
system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth
of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically
valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion
over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one
such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR
analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically
valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as
evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims vagina were used to positively identify the
accused Joel Kawit Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as
well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right
against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the accused from
the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs,[28] hair,[29] and other bodily substances.[30] We have also declared as
constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery,
[31]
expulsion of morphine from ones mouth[32] and the tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.
[33]
In Jimenez v. Caizares,[34] we even authorized the examination of a womans genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by
her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures
were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our
ruling in Yatar,[35] are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v. Torres,[36] where we struck down the
proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is
not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions
into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, [37] and the infringement of privacy of
communication[38] where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as
already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal
case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil
case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded its first official results sometime in
1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general acceptance. [39] Several cases decided by various
State Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb[40] shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the
procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had
already acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that, under the
law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the
challenge, to order DNA tests:[41]
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k
of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law shall establish the paternity
of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed
pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law with the registrar of the district in which the
birth occurred and in which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative proceedings are required to
ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section
four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be rescinded by either signators filing of a petition with the
court to vacate the acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the acknowledgment or the date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a proceeding to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either
signator is a party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding" shall be the date by
which the respondent is required to answer the petition. After the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the
acknowledgment, either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary acknowledgment. Upon receiving a
partys challenge to an acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination
of the childs paternity and shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance with this article. Neither
signators legal obligations, including the obligation for child support arising from the acknowledgment, may be suspended
during the challenge to the acknowledgment except for good cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to rescind an
acknowledgment and if the court determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an
acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall
vacate the acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the registrar of the district in which
the childs birth certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry operated by the department of social services pursuant
to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law. In addition, if the mother of the child who is the subject of the

acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A of article three of the social services law, the court
shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support enforcement unit of the social services district that provides
the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity
or through an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment
meets the requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act: [42]
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of test results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic marker tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own
motion or the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic
marker or DNA tests of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the
federal department of health and human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and
by the commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged father is or is
not the father of the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the
best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child
born to a married woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this
section or pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law shall be received in evidence by the court
pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where no timely objection in
writing has been made thereto and that if such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived and shall not be
heard by the court. If the record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate at least
a ninety-five percent probability of paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a rebuttable
presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a child
pursuant to this article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this section, a report made as provided in subdivision
(a) of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if
offered by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving
party. If the moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court may direct any qualified public health officer to conduct
such test, if practicable; otherwise, the court may direct payment from the funds of the appropriate local social services district.
In its order of disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any such test be apportioned between the parties
according to their respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the issue of paternity,
unless such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,[43] a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were used to prove that H.W., previously
thought to be an offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at
the time of conception, maintained an adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G.,[44] the 4th Department of the New York
Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default, to have the said
judgment vacated, even after six years, once he had shown through a genetic marker test that he was not the childs father. In
this case, G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social Services, six years after G.G. had been adjudicated as
T.M.H.s father, sought an increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,[45] the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of law allowing
non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of
DNA testing that such support agreements were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has increased significantly since the parties in this
lawsuit entered into their support agreement(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to
99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity was
a very significant obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child support. The first reported results of modern DNApaternity
testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first reported results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed to 'general
acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of course, while prior blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the
possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the
settlement agreement between the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a far more difficult ordeal
than at present. Contested paternity actions at that time were often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every
contested paternity action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative father was, in fact, the child's
biological father, but rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only sexually involved with one
man--the putative father. Allowing parties the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated
the risk that the mother would be unable meet her burden of proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law have included the use of DNA testing: [46]

722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal
to submit to typing or identification profiling; qualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation
of expert; result of typing or identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility; presumption; burden of proof;
summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its
own motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father submit to blood or tissue typing determinations,
which may include, but are not limited to, determinations of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte
antigens, serum proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to determine whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is
not, the father of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling to be conducted
and a party refuses to submit to the typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any other remedies available,
the court may do either of the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless good cause is shown for not disclosing the
fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations
by a nationally recognized scientific organization, including, but not limited to, the American association of blood banks.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person described in subsection (2) conducting the blood
or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and the DNA identification profile and summary report
are admissible as provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the results of the analysis of genetic testing
material from 2 or more persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than 99%, the contracting laboratory shall
conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute
involves 2 or more putative fathers who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in subsection (5), either party may move for summary
disposition under the court rules. this section does not abrogate the right of either party to child support from the date of birth of
the child if applicable under section 7. (emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,[47] the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to
overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not
Justin's father based upon the 99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,[48] the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for genetic testing given by the Court
of Appeals, even after trial on the merits had concluded without such order being given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother,
first filed the case for paternity and support with the District Court, neither party requested genetic testing. It was only upon
appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the testing, which the North Dakota
Supreme Court upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson,[49] decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota, demonstrated that even default
judgments of paternity could be vacated after the adjudicated father had, through DNA testing, established non-paternity. In
this case, Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of Amundsons child through DNA testing, was able to have the default
judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from
his wages for child support. The Court said (w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of the child, she
submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson's position, the fact that a default
judgment was entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for the amount
withheld from his wages.
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,[50] another case decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was
held that even if paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could
still be vacated once DNA testing established someone other than the named individual to be the biological father. The
Mississippi High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. Williams.[51]
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent for upholding the
orders of the trial court which both denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing.
Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available when any tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [52] In Land Bank
of the Philippines v. the Court of Appeals [53] where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we discussed
at length the nature of such a petition and just what was meant by grave abuse of discretion:

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or,
in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
The raison detre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not
survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decisionnot the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decisionthe same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of
was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis
supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal hostility that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its
jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we
have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.

Epilogue

For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing
sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny.
We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a
perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore
take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated January 28,
2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor

CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ AQUINO,
represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA
CRUZ,

G.R. No. 177728

Present:

Petitioners,

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
PERALTA,* JJ.

versus
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as
City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
July 31, 2009
x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old
Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They
resided in the house of Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan,
Teresa, Rizal.

On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.[1] After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued
to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo
Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.

Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil
Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth,[2] Affidavit to Use the Surname of
the Father[3] (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father
Domingo Butch Aquino.[4] Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document
entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which
read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS
COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA,
RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO.
TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS NAME IS
RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR
HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE
WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS ALL. [6] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia
(respondent), denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name in this wise:
7.

Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9255 [An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father,
Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the Family
Code of the Philippines]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is
executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a
separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten instrument, the child
shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the
following documents:
a. AUSF[8]
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the
document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between the
father and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)

In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the
child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of
Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint [9] for injunction/registration of name against respondent before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The
complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his
deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,[10] which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children
may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document
or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a private handwritten
instrument within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law.

For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons, respondent was declared in default.

Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of her common-law relationship
with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his yet unborn child.

[11]

She offered Dominiques handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit A) as her documentary evidence-in-chief. [12] Dominiques lone

brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenies declarations. [13]

By Decision[14] of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action as the
Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) ofAdministrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series
of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines private handwritten
document through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father
and duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)

The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any
express recognition of paternity.

Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED
FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF
PATERNITY IN A PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF
ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID
MINOR TO USE HIS FATHERS SURNAME.[15] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that the private
handwritten instrument containing the putative fathers admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add that the
deceaseds handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted
paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be duly signed by the father is void as it
unduly expanded the earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.[16]

Petitioners

further

contend

that

the

trial

court

erred

in

not

Autobiography contains a clear and unmistakable recognition of the childs paternity.

finding

that Dominiques handwritten

[17]

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondents position, as affirmed by the trial
court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the petition. It further submits that Dominiques
Autobiography merely acknowledged Jenies pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her womb. [18]

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her
father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through therecord of birth appearing in the civil
register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these
documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial
approval is necessary.[19]

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument
acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction
with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is
clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such
requirement; it did not unduly expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned
by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography,
unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.
[20]

Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and

testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned
recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.

In Herrera v. Alba,[21] the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in
relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172.

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
SEC. 40.
Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may
be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family
portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still
has to be resolved by suchconventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written
acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent
shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the
writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation
is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be
a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions,
together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be
taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient
to establish filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have been made
and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie
were living together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan,
Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie
gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission
of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1)

Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should

be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2)

Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices

that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration in resolving questions affecting
him.[22] Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly
emphatic:

Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.[23] (Underscoring supplied)

It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.[24] Too, (t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children
from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.[25]

In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor childs
best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to
immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as thesurname of petitioner minor Christian
dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181258

March 18, 2010

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner,

vs.
ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint 1 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno (petitioner).
Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that
petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999,
petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of
each month beginning August 15, 1999.
Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to:
(1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and (3) give her
adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the
handwritten note on account of threats coming from the National Peoples Army.2
By Order of July 4, 2001,3 Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on the basis of petitioners handwritten note which it treated as
"contractual support" since the issue of Arhbencels filiation had yet to be determined during the hearing on the merits, granted
Arhbencels prayer for support pendente lite in the amount of P3,000 a month.
After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted by Order dated June 7,
2006,4 whereupon the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencels Certificate of Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to
petitioner as it did not bear petitioners signature; that petitioners handwritten undertaking to provide support did not contain a
categorical acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no showing that petitioner performed any overt act
of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the execution of the note.
On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 20, 2007,5 reversed the trial courts decision, declared
Arhbencel to be petitioners illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to give Arhbencel financial support in the
increased amount of P4,000 every 15th and 30th days of the month, or a total of P8,000 a month.
The appellate court found that from petitioners payment of Aracelis hospital bills when she gave birth to Arhbencel and his
subsequent commitment to provide monthly financial support, the only logical conclusion to be drawn was that he was
Arhbencels father; that petitioner merely acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of paternity in his handwritten undertaking to
provide financial support; and that the amount of P8,000 a month was reasonable for Arhbencels subsistence and not
burdensome for petitioner in view of his income.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 3, 2008,6 petitioner comes before this Court
through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.7
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by Araceli is an explicit statement made by him that
he is the father of Arhbencel; that absent recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled to support from
the putative parent; that the supposed payment made by him of Aracelis hospital bills was neither alleged in the complaint nor
proven during the trial; and that Arhbencels claim of paternity and filiation was not established by clear and convincing
evidence.
Arhbencel avers in her Comment that petitioner raises questions of fact which the appellate court had already addressed, along
with the issues raised in the present petition.8
The petition is impressed with merit.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code9 that treat of the right to support are Articles 194 to 196, thus:
Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.1awph!1

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or
training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going
to and from school, or to and from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole
extent set forth in the preceding article:
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each
other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due
to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Arhbencels demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article
195(4). As such, her entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation.
Herrera v. Alba10 summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as follows:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to
the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon
be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a
case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by suchconventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary
recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of
the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered
acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling
the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a
written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the amount of P1,500.00 every fifteen
and thirtieth day of each month for a total of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in
the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs
of the child and my income.
The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not
within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate
filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it
is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative fathers
admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation
through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth,11 has no probative value to
establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioners handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without
more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity
and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the
privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The Order dated June
7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the Caloocan City RTC dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002]

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL
MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. C.V. No. 45394[1] which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in
declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao,
Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a
compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943
before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the
late William Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao.[2] The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner was in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner having been recognized and acknowledged as such child
by the decedent during his lifetime."[3]
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time
of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams
untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2) children from her subsisting
marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in Quezon City and Manila. This was with
the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting
marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of
which Corazon and William were then vice president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo,
to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the
necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision
was registered under the name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3)
day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and
hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential
secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank
account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company[4] and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. [5] William
Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together.[6]
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon
together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. [7] Corazon
also presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various social
gatherings and other important meetings. [8] During the occasion of William Liyaos last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at
the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion
and other friends and said, Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking son." [9] Since birth, Billy had been in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters
direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after
William Liyaos death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills.
William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White
Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who were
godparents to her children. She used to visit Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her
marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids lived with Corazon and
William Liyao as one family. On some occasions like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couples
residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When
Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a
week in Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she
was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White Plains and knew
that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of grocery supplies, money for household
expenses and matriculation fees for the two (2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on
November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his
two (2) daughters from his legal marriage, Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy.[10] He then talked about his plan for
the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to make it engrande and make the bells of San Sebastian Church
ring.[11] Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyaos
funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and gray [12] which Mr. Liyao

wore in a photograph[13] as well as another shirt of lime green[14] as belonging to the deceased. A note was also presented with
the following inscriptions: To Cora, Love From William.[15] Maurita remembered having invited the couple during her mothers
birthday where the couple had their pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that
Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her
said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo
or any other man in the house when she usually visited Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors,
William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazons house in Scout
Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even
more so when the couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr.
Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong
and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had
mahjong sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the
maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is separated from
Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon
lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned
and separated from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of
the latters death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified
several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques testimony was corroborated by
his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been
superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.
Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents
were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation
proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town
business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father would change his clothes at home because of his
personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other peoples homes. Linda described him as very
conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a home. As a
businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes
before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May
1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and
acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose
Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their lawyers. William
Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He was not active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also
suffered a milder stroke during the latter part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days and
went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the office unlike before
and tried to spend more time with his family.
[16]

Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her
husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment [17] of their
marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Immediately
after the death of Lindas father, Corazon went to Lindas office for the return of the formers alleged investments with the Far
East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a
Vice-President of the company, was able to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from
the office. There was one instance when she was told by the guards, Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things again.[18] Linda
then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go.
Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases
full of mens clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been separated. They resided at No. 21
Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her fathers death on December 2, 1975. [19] Her father suffered
two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack sometime between April and May
1974, his speech and hands were affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict medication,
taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level
control.[20] Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family
never received any formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William
Liyao. After assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her late
father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the
laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were displayed at the
latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962
to 1974, who said that he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the
morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night shift driver.
Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office.
Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from
another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which
was buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr.
Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to carry and

bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first
to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic Supermarket. People
in the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr.
Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale,
represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. He freely relayed the information that
he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the
latters law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that he remembered having driven the group
of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the lawyers
wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or
for activities like shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to
recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao,
entitled to all succesional rights as such; and
(d) Costs of suit.[21]
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that the deceased
William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the
deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a
child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his
confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance
and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than
the illegitimacy of the child and the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital
intimacy between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the
Civil Code. The appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and
Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured legal separation, were seen in each others company during
the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth
certificate and the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish
proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said
certificates and considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that neither do family
pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the
appellate court observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or
Corazon Garcia since William Liyaos signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues which relate solely to
the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately,
both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to
claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. [22] The
presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[23]
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence
to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code[24] provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon
Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations
with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled,
Contract of Separation,[25] executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any
property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.[26]
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was
conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is
one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of
the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. [27] Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the
husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose
it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. [28] It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.
[29]

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein
petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao
cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. [30] We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his
present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs,
could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation.
If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and
the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is
overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. [31]
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for
herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the
legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the
birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner
himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of
the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by
law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the
petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence
presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001]

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE
JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS
DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP.,
QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION &
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the
illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latters estate under the rules on
succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the
latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his
own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind
considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his
notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the
Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of
which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated
as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration on,
respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of
Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the trial
considering that the birth certificates presented by respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners allegation
of illegitimacy.
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions, respondents filed an
omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to
compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought
was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able to establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in
fine, that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an
issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack
of cause of action and for being improper. [1] It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special
proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners
maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself
sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine
enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.[2]
In their comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is inapplicable to the case
because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of
the complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,[3] which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy
cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in a direct action frontally
addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. [4] The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required .[5] In
fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does
not require a separate action for judicial approval. [6] Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other
evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record
or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the
childs acknowledgment.[7]

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of
live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. [8] This presumption indeed
becomesconclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. [9] Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, [10] and in proper cases Article 171,[11] of the Family Code
(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the
status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.[12]
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would
impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly
done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The
presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, [13] or in exceptional
instances the latters heirs,[14] can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is
only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an
acknowledged spurious child by virtue of a private document, signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such
recognition. It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody elses illegitimate children. Petitioners totally
ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare that they could not have
been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether
petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action
having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally,[15] one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
[16]
Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.[17]
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000]

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that
the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor
by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper
party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Courts consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as follows:
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista
Guinto."[4]
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the Court, judgment is hereby
rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void 'ab initio';
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan
City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel for
private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
"Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera
(herafter referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3046.
"From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted 'that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that
on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the house of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and
a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of
birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and
Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her
signature x x x; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora
Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by 'hilot'; that the birth certificate x x x of
Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it
contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature of Hermogena Cariosa, the
mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and unlawful
and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and
her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent
Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically
and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena
Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year
petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of

Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of cancelled and
declared void and theretofore she prays that after publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed]
declaring x x x the certificate of birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective
and ordering the respondent local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City
BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.
"Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof 'in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan
City, the office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
"TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that 'the petition states no cause of action, it being an
attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the
Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of
the Family Code.' The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
"Subsequently, 'Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an answer/opposition in behalf of
private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private
respondent.'
"In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred 'that she was always known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista
Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C.
Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista
Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, x x
x Certificate of Baptism, x x x Student's Report Card x x x all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent
testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative defenses, defendant/respondent contended
that the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the
child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Carioza Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity
to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is
barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code." [5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the biological child of
Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further
observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA
noted that the supposed birth took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant
medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature
therein, which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which stated that only the father could impugn the
child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation
wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation
of the childs Birth Certificate for being void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or the
mother.
Hence, this appeal.[6]
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
"1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal capacity to file the special
proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 subject matter of this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is improper and is barred by [the] statute
of limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to hold, that the ancient public record
of petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral testimony of respondent."[7]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Subject of the Present Action

Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 [8] of the Family Code states that the child's
filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not
subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit."[9] The interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for
partition which the latter filed against the former.[10] The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her
parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it
applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision, however, presupposes that the
child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish
that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio
and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court ruled thus:
"Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case
at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant
case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather,
these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus,
under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was
physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the
prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these
articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not
born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451,
457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family
Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It
is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs
of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim
is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at all.
Being neither [a] legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child
by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased."[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed.
She cites Article 170 of the Family Code which provides the prescriptive period for such action:
"Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his
heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
"If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first
paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines;
and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband
or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the
fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier."
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioners Birth Certificate; it does not impugn
her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify
the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.[13]

Third Issue: Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate

Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogenas testimony that petitioner was not her real child,
cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioners Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific
facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such
presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
registrar.[14] More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mothers signature therein was different from her signatures
in other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's real mother. For one,
there is no evidence of Hermogenas pregnancy, such as medical records and doctors prescriptions, other than the Birth
Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the
time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a
late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care
normally available only in a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give
birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenios. The deposition reads in part:
"q.....Who are your children?
a.....Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q.....Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with your husband Eugenio Babiera,
what can you say about that?
a.....She is not our child.
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
q.....Do you recall where she was born?
a.....In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q.....Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you in your residence?
a.....Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.
q.....Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your daughter with your husband?
a.....No, sir."[15]
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has presented no other evidence other than the
said document to show that she is really Hermogenas child. Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother
would make a deposition stating that the former was not the latter's child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the appellate courts that petitioner was not
the child of respondents parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 141273. May 17, 2005]

JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVERO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MARY JANE DY CHIAO *DE GUZMAN, and BENITO DY CHIAO, JR., represented by his uncle HENRY S. DY CHIAO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 44261 annulling
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 19, in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612.

The Antecedents

On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint [2] against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.,
and Benson Dy Chiao, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of
their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27,
1995. Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo, filed the complaint on his behalf.
Concepcion, Benito Sr.s wife, was not impleaded as she had died on July 7, 1995. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
RTC 96-3612 and raffled to Branch 19 of the court.[3]
Benedick, whose counsel was Atty. Amador L. Simando, made the following allegations in his complaint:
During his lifetime, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. was engaged in business, under the business name Benito Commercial in Naga
City. He courted Shirley Arevalo (Benedicks mother) in 1991, assuring her of his sincere love, likewise promising that her
college education would be financed and that she would be provided with a better life. Blinded by his promises and assurances
of his love for her, Shirley agreed to an amorous relationship with Benito, Sr. True to his word, Benito, Sr. then provided her with
a residential house and lot located in Canaman, Camarines Sur, where they cohabited and resided; he also financed her
college education in midwifery. On October 5, 1995, Benedick Arevalo Dy Chiao, Jr., the plaintiff, was born, the product of the
amorous relationship, whom Benito, Sr. acknowledged as his son. He also continued to give Shirley and their son financial and
moral support.
It was also alleged that the Dy Chiao siblings recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father. Moreover, when
he died intestate, Benito, Sr. left behind residential lands and commercial buildings worthP100,000,000.00, more or less; as
such, there was a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate to preserve his (Benedicks) rights over the same
before its partition. It was prayed that upon the filing of the complaint, Benedicks mother be appointed as his guardian ad
litem, that an administrator of the estate of the deceased be appointed, and that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered
in favor of Benedick, as follows:
a.

declaring the Plaintiff as the illegitimate son of the late Benito Dy Chiao.

b.
ordering herein Defendants to recognize and acknowledge the Plaintiff as the illegitimate son of the late Benito Dy
Chiao.
c.
ordering the Partition of the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao and distributing the same in favor of the Defendants and herein
Plaintiff in a manner provided for by law.
d.

granting the Plaintiff such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the law.[4]

In an answer to the complaint, Mary Jane, through counsel, for herself, and purportedly in behalf of her brothers, denied
the allegations that Shirley and her father had an amorous relationship and that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father
for want of knowledge or information; the allegation that they had recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father
was, likewise, specifically denied. Finally, she alleged that the plaintiffs action was for a claim against the estate of their father,
which should be filed in an action for the settlement of the estate of their deceased parents. [5]
On October 28, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion, [6] praying that the court order a mental examination of the Dy Chiao
brothers, who were patients at the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital, and for the appointment of their sister as their
guardian ad litem in the case. It was, likewise, prayed that the director of the hospital be summoned to appear before the court
to inform it of the mental condition of the Dy Chiao brothers.
On December 6, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion [7] set for hearing on December 9, 1996, reiterating his plea for the
appointment of Mary Jane as guardian ad litem of her brothers. That same day, however, the plaintiff, through counsel, filed a
Compromise Agreement dated November 24, 1996, with the following signatories to the agreement: Shirley Arevalo, for the
plaintiff and assisted by counsel, Atty. Amador L. Simando; and Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, assisted by counsel, Atty.
Adan Marcelo B. Botor, purportedly for and in behalf of her brothers.

Appended to the agreement was a photocopy of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) [8] dated September 20, 1995,
notarized and certified by Atty. Edmundo L. Simando, purportedly signed by the Dy Chiao brothers, who were then still confined
in the hospital. Mary Jane was therein appointed to be their attorney-in-fact, with the following powers:
1. To represent us in negotiations and be our representative with power to sign Agreements or Contracts of Lease involving
property and/or assets belonging to the estate of our late father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. while said estate is not yet settled
between (sic) all heirs; as well as to collect rentals and other money due to the estate by reason of said agreements or
contracts;
2. To file or cause to be filed the necessary proceedings for the settlement of the estate of our late father, and to ask for letters
of administration in her favor as a next of kin or as someone selected by us, next of kin, to be the administrator.
On December 13, 1996, the trial court approved the agreement and rendered judgment on the basis thereof, quoted as
follows:
Before this Court is a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT entered into by and between the parties in this case which is herein below
quoted, thus:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
Plaintiff and defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman duly assisted by their respective counsels hereby submit the following
Compromise Agreement:
1.
That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the plaintiff as the illegitimate son of her
deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.;
2.
That in full satisfaction and settlement of plaintiffs claim from the estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., defendant
Maryjane Dy Chiao De Guzman for herself and in behalf of her brothers, who are likewise defendants in this case, hereby
agree and bind herself to pay the plaintiff the amount of P6,000,000.00 which shall be taken from the estate of the late Benito
Dy Chiao, Sr., which amount shall be payable under the following terms and conditions:
a.

The amount of P1,500,000.00 shall be payable upon signing of this Compromise Agreement;

b.
The balance of P4,500,000.00 shall be payable within the period of one year from the date of signing of this
Compromise Agreement and for which the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman shall issue twelve (12) checks
corresponding to the said balance in the amount of P375,000.00 per check;
3.

That the parties hereby waive other claims and counterclaims against each other;

4.

That any violation of this Compromise Agreement shall render the same to be immediately executory.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the foregoing Compromise Agreement be approved and a
decision be rendered in accordance therewith.
Naga City, Philippines, November 24, 1996.
(SGD.)
BENEDICK AREVALO
MARYJANE DY CHIAO-DE GUZMAN
Plaintiff
Defendant
represented by:
(SGD.)
SHIRLEY AREVALO
Natural Guardian & Guardian
Ad Litem
Assisted by:
(SGD.)
(SGD.)
AMADOR L. SIMANDO
ADAN MARCELO BOTOR
Counsel for the Plaintiff
Counsel for the Defendants
WHEREFORE, finding the foregoing Compromise Agreement to be the law between the parties, not being tainted with
infirmities, irregularities, fraud and illegalities, and the same not being contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals and
good customs, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered APPROVING the same.
Parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully abide by the terms and conditions of the foregoing Compromise Agreement.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
It appears that a copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the Dy Chiao brothers to the Benito Commercial
Building, Naga City.
On December 17, 1996, Mary Jane, through Atty. Simando, (the counsel for Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612),
filed a petition with the RTC for the settlement of the estate of her father and for her appointment as administrator thereto. The
case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. RTC96-684 and raffled to Branch 20 of the court; it was later transferred to
Branch 19.
On April 3, 1997, Benedick filed a Motion for Execution, [10] of the Decision dated November 24, 1996, on the allegation
that the defendants had failed to comply with their obligations under the compromise agreement. The trial court granted the
motion in an Order[11] dated April 7, 1997. Conformably, it issued a Writ of Execution[12] for the enforcement of the said decision.
On April 18, 1997, Benedick terminated the services of Atty. Simando since he was Mary Janes counsel in Special
Proceedings No. 96-684.
On April 28, 1997, the sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property [13] over five parcels of land titled
under Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., including the improvements thereon.
The Dy Chiao brothers, represented by their uncle, Henry S. Dy Chiao, then filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order dated May 27, 1997, assailing the decision of
the RTC in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612, as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto. The petition alleged that the
Dy Chiao brothers had no legal capacity to be sued because they were of unsound mind, which impelled their uncle Henry to
file a petition for guardianship over their person and property, now pending in the RTC of Naga City, Branch 61, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. RTC97-695. They did not authorize their sister Mary Jane to execute any compromise agreement for
and in their behalf; yet, in confabulation with Benedicks counsel, she was able to secure a judgment based on a void
compromise agreement. It was further alleged that the Dy Chiao brothers were unaware of the complaint against them and that
they did not engage the services of the law firm of Botor, Hidalgo & Fernando Associates to represent them as counsel in said
cases. As such, the said counsel had no authority to file the answer to the complaint for and in their behalf. It was further
pointed out that less than a month before the said compromise agreement was executed by their sister, she filed purportedly in
their behalf, on November 22, 1996, a petition for the settlement of the estate of their parents in the RTC of Naga City, with the
assistance of Atty. Simando (Benedicks counsel), as well as for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, docketed
as Special Proceedings No. RTC96-684.[14] There was thus collusion between Mary Jane and Atty. Simando.
The Dy Chiao brothers, likewise, opposed the appointment of their sister as the administrator of their parents estate.
The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the petition was signed by their uncle Henry as their
representative.
[15]

On May 29, 1997, the CA issued a status quo order. However, before the said order was served on Benedick, several
lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16931 in the name of Benito, Sr. had already been sold at public auction:
Lot No. 3, to Jose Rivero for P6,400,000.00; Lot No. 4 to Jessie Rivero for P7,600,000.00 and Lot No. 5, for P7,000,000.00, to
Amalia Rivero. Another property covered by TCT No. 5299 had also been sold to Consuelo Dy for P310,000.00.[16] The buyers
at public auction had already remitted the amounts of P15,319,364.00 and P162,836.00 to the executing sheriffs,[17] who later
remitted P5,711,164.00 to Benedick through his mother, Shirley, in satisfaction of the decision, [18] and the remainder given to
the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
On June 3, 1997, Sheriffs Arthur S. Cledera and Arnel Jose A. Rubio executed a Provisional Certificate of Sale [19] over the
property to the buyers at public auction.
The Dy Chiao brothers, through their uncle Henry, then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, informing the CA of the recent developments in
the case below. In a Resolution [20] dated July 14, 1997, the appellate court granted their plea for a writ of preliminary injunction
upon the filing of a P500,000.00 bond, directing as follows:
(a) the private respondents and/or the sheriffs of the respondent court to deposit before the Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Naga City, the proceeds of the public auction sale held on June 3, 1997 and to submit to this
Court within five (5) days from notice, proof of compliance therewith;
(b) Sheriffs Arnel Jose Rubio and Arthur Cledera, through the respondent court, to refrain from issuing any certificate of sale
over the properties sold at the public auction sale conducted on the aforementioned date;
(c) the respondent court to issue a notice of lis pendens on all the properties affected by [the] public auction sale conducted
on June 3, 1997 and cause its registration with the Register of Deeds concerned within five (5) days from notice.
The sheriff was, likewise, directed to refrain and/or cease and desist from issuing/effecting any further certificate of sale
over the affected properties.[21] On August 15, 1997, the RTC issued an Order[22] directing the Register of Deeds of Naga City to
comply with the CA resolution.
Meantime, Benson died intestate on June 25, 1997. [23] His brother, Benito, Jr. then filed a Notice of Death and
Substitution, and thereafter, a Motion to Admit an Amended Petition to drop Benson as petitioner, and the inclusion of his sister

Mary Jane, as party respondent, as well as those who participated in the public auction, namely, Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero,
Amalia Rivero and Consuelo Dy. The CA granted the motion in a Resolution [24] dated January 14, 1998.
Thereafter, Atty. Botor, Mary Janes new counsel, filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion to Dismiss, [25] alleging, inter
alia, that an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs of the spouses Dy Chiao had already been executed. Benito, Jr.,
represented by his uncle Henry, opposed the motion, [26] alleging that a dismissal grounded on the extrajudicial settlement alone
was improper, since what was being assailed was a decision of a court based on a compromise agreement involving one who
is not a party thereto, with third-party bidders acting in bad faith. In a Resolution [27] dated February 27, 1998, the CA directed
Mary Jane to submit her reply to the opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by Henry on behalf of Benito, Jr.
In her compliance and comment/manifestation, [28] Mary Jane declared that there appeared to be a sound basis for the
nullification of the assailed decision since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise
agreement. She further alleged that the parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in
fact she and the petitioners were exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement. [29]
Benedick, represented by his mother Shirley, presented before the appellate court an SPA dated October 31, 1996
executed by Benito, Jr., prepared by Atty. Simando, authorizing Atty. Botor to enter into a compromise agreement in the RTC. [30]
On March 31, 1999, the CA rendered judgment in favor of Benito, Jr., granting the petition and nullifying the assailed
decision and writ of execution issued by the RTC, including the sale at public auction of the property of the deceased. The
appellate court ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Benedicks action for recognition as the illegitimate son of Benito, Sr.
and for the partition of his estate. It further held that the filiation of a person could not be the subject of a compromise
agreement; hence, the RTC acted without jurisdiction in rendering judgment based thereon. It concluded that the said
compromise agreement was procured through extrinsic fraud.
The CA ordered the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Naga City to deliver to the trial court within ten days from finality of said
judgment, the amount of P15,482,200.00, together with all interests earned therefrom, and to thereafter distribute the aggregate
amount to the buyers of the said properties, in proportion to the amounts they had paid. It also ordered Benedick, through his
mother Shirley, to turn over to the trial court, within ten days from finality of judgment, the amount of P5,711,164.00 received
from Sheriffs Rubio and Cledera, together with all other amounts that she might have been paid pursuant to the compromise
agreement. This was, however, without prejudice to the buyers right of recourse against Mary Jane, who was declared
subsidiarily liable therefor. The RTC was, likewise, directed to return to the buyers the aggregate amount in the same
proportion as above stated; thereafter, the properties would be delivered to the intestate estate of Benito, Sr. for proper
disposition by the intestate court.[31]
Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero and Amalia Rivero filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, on the following
grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS INVALID DUE
TO EXTRINSIC FRAUD;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE;
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PUBLIC AUCTION SALE CONDUCTED ON
JUNE 2, 1997 WAS VOID; AND
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS JOSE, JESSIE AND
AMALIA, ALL SURNAMED RIVERO COULD NOT HAVE LEGALLY BECOME THE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTIES SOLD
AT THE PUBLIC AUCTION SALE.[32]
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration thereof, they filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

The Present Petition

The petitioners raise the following issues: (1) whether or not Henry Dy Chiao had the authority to file the amended
petition for Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.; (2) whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for recognition
as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., as well as the action for partition and distribution of the latters
estate; and (3) whether the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement is null and void for extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction.[33]
On the first issue, the petitioners aver that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping contained in the petition
with the CA was executed by Henry; hence, it was he and not Benson or Benito, Jr. who filed the petition. Moreover, Henry had
no proof of his authority to file the petition for and in behalf of the brothers. The petitioners assert that there was no need for
Henry to file the petition with the CA, since the Dy Chiao brothers had the legal capacity to do so, as admitted by their counsel,
and Henry himself. Moreover, there was no law mandating Henry to represent his nephews in all actions which may redound to
their benefit.
The petitioners point out that although Henry sought to remedy the situation by filing an amended petition praying that he
be appointed as guardian ad litem for the Dy Chiao brothers, the CA did not take cognizance of the allegations in the petition.
The CA was correct in so doing, since the matter of whether one is incompetent should be threshed out in the guardianship

proceedings, Special Proceedings No. RTC97-695, and not in the CA via a petition to annul the judgment of the RTC, where
Benito, Jr. is also a party respondent.
On the other issues, the petitioners maintain that the CA erred in annulling the decision of the RTC based on the
compromise agreement on the ground of extrinsic fraud; the alleged fraud was committed by Mary Jane as an incident to the
trial. What the CA should have done was to dismiss the petition, without prejudice to the rights of the Dy Chiao brothers to file
an action against their sister. The latter was herself a party to the compromise agreement and also a principal party to the
case; hence, was bound by it. As a matter of fact, the petitioners aver, Mary Jane was appointed by her brothers as their
attorney-in-fact to negotiate for and execute the compromise agreement in their behalf.
The petitioners further assert that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition filed by Benedick in the RTC, and that the
latters recourse was based on paragraph 1, Article 172 of the Family Code, although his putative father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.,
was already dead when the complaint was filed.
The petitioners thus insist that the public auction sale conducted by the sheriff on the subject properties was valid.
In her comment on the petition, Mary Jane avers that the decision of the CA holding that the compromise agreement was
vitiated by extrinsic fraud is correct. She claims that she was made to sign the agreement, but was not informed of its
intricacies. She insists that she does not have any liability to Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612, despite her being a
signatory to the said agreement.
For his part, respondent Benito, Jr., through his uncle Henry, avers that the latters authority to file the amended petition
before the CA in their behalf was never questioned by the petitioners. He asserts that the CA admitted the amended petition
containing the prayer that his uncle Henry be appointed as his guardian ad litem. Besides, the CA found that he and his
brothers were not of sound and disposing minds; hence, the need for a guardian ad litem in the person of his uncle. He further
alleges that the compromise agreement was the product of connivance between his sister and Benedick, and their respective
counsels. He further points out that Atty. Simando, Benedicks counsel in the RTC, was likewise the counsel for Mary Jane
when she filed her petition for letters of administration in the RTC of Naga City on December 17, 1996. He further insists that
the ruling of the CA on the issues of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction of the RTC is in accord with law, and that the decision
based on the compromise agreement was null and void for lack of jurisdiction. [34]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

On the first issue, we reject the petitioners contention that Henry was the petitioner who filed the amended petition before
the CA. As gleaned from said petition, the petitioners were Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and Benson Dy Chiao, represented by their
uncle Henry S. Dy Chiao. Moreover, Henry had the authority to file the amended petition and sign the requisite certification on
non-forum shopping when the CA admitted the amended petition and appointed him as guardian ad litem of his nephews. This
was in the January 14, 1998 Resolution of the CA, where the following findings were made:
x x x We find the opposition to be devoid of merit, firstly because there is an obvious necessity to amend the petition; and
secondly, because the representation of an incompetent need not be by a duly appointed judicial guardian. A guardian ad
litem may be appointed by the court. In the instant case, the members of this Court who conducted the several hearings herein,
are convinced from an observation of the petitioners that they are not of a sound or disposing mind. x x x[35]
In resolving whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent, the appellate court needed only to determine
whether the individual for whom a guardian was proposed was so incapable of handling personal and financial affairs as to
warrant the need for the appointment of a temporary guardian. It only needed to make a finding that, based on clear and
convincing evidence, the respondent is incompetent and that it is more likely than not that his welfare requires the immediate
appointment of a temporary guardian.[36] A finding that the person for whom a guardian ad litem is proposed is incapable of
managing his own personal and financial affairs by reason of his mental illness is enough.[37]
Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense, and the office of such guardian is to represent
the interest of the incompetent or the minor.[38] Whether or not to appoint a guardian ad litem for the petitioners is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court where the petition was filed, taking into account the best interest of the incompetent or the
minor.[39] The court has discretion in appointing a guardian ad litemthat will best promote the interest of justice.[40] The
appointment of a guardian ad litem is designed to assist the court in its determination of the incompetents best interest.[41]
The records will show that no less than Benedick Arevalo sought the appointment of Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman
as guardian ad litem for respondent Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and his brother, Benson Dy Chiao, before the RTC in Civil Case No.
RTC96-3612.
It must be stressed that the appellate court was not proscribed from appointing Henry as guardian ad litem for the
respondents, merely because of the pendency of his petition for appointment as guardian over their person and property before
Branch 61 of the RTC. Time was of the essence; the RTC had issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of its decision
based on the compromise agreement; the plaintiff therein, Benedick Arevalo, was bent on enforcing the same, and had in fact
caused the sale of five parcels of land belonging to the estate of Benito, Sr. worth millions of pesos. Indeed, the sheriff was
able to sell at public auction prime real property of the estate of the deceased for P20,000,000.00 before the status quo order of
the CA reached him.
It goes without saying that the finding of the CA on the mental capacity of the respondents is without prejudice to the
outcome of the petition in Special Proceedings No. RTC97-695.

The petitioners claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate courts finding that the respondents were
incompetent cannot prevail. It must be stressed that the CA conducted a hearing before arriving at the conclusion that
respondent Benito, Jr. was incompetent. More importantly, such claim involves a factual issue which cannot be raised before
this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On the issue of jurisdiction, case law has it that the jurisdiction of the tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an
action is to be determined by the allegations of the complaint, the law in effect when the complaint was filed and the character
of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. If a court is
authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only and undertakes to exercise jurisdiction in a particular
case to which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a particular
judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.[42]
The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of
a compromise, and that Mary Jane had no authority to execute the compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers.
The petitioners, for their part, maintain that Mary Janes recognition of Benedick as the illegitimate son of her father was
not a compromise, but an affirmation of the allegations in the complaint that the Dy Chiao siblings had, in effect, recognized him
as the illegitimate son of their deceased father. The petitioners posit that the admissions in the compromise agreement are
likewise binding on the Dy Chiao siblings.
The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court finds and so holds that the decision of the RTC based on
the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null and void.
Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As
such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to
determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.[43]
A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.[44] Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
(a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the
obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. [45] Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or
public policy is null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to any party. It produces no legal effect at all.
[46]
Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion than that the decision of the RTC on the basis of a compromise
agreement where Benedick was recognized as the illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is null and void.
Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that an SPA is required for a compromise. Furthermore, the power of
attorney should expressly mention the action for which it is drawn; as such, a compromise agreement executed by one in
behalf of another, who is not duly authorized to do so by the principal, is void and has no legal effect, and the judgment based
on such compromise agreement is null and void. [47] The judgment may thus be impugned and its execution may be enjoined in
any proceeding by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced. [48] A compromise must be strictly construed and can
include only those expressly or impliedly included therein.[49]
As previously stated, the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by Mary Jane and Benedick was a
compromise relating to the latters filiation. Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father, the
consideration for which was the amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims from the
estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their counterclaims against Benedick. This is readily
apparent, considering that the compromise agreement was executed despite the siblings unequivocal allegations in their
answer to the complaint filed only two months earlier, that Benedick was merely an impostor:
11. That paragraph 11 is DENIED for the truth of the matter is that they have not recognized any person or impostor who
pretends having a filial relation with their deceased father by reason of herein Defendants fathers incapacity to bear children or
to engage in any carnal act considering the age and physical state of their father at that time alluded to by the Plaintiff . [50]
To stress, the compromise agreement executed by Benedick and Mary Jane is null and void; as such, the decision of the
RTC based thereon is also without force and effect.
It is, likewise, plain as day that only Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father
1.
That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the plaintiff as the illegitimate son of her
deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.[51]
Such recognition, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the
putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.[52]
It is conceded that Mary Jane, in her behalf, and purportedly in behalf of her brothers, agreed and bound herself to pay
Benedick the amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate of their deceased father. However, a cursory reading of the
SPA on record will show that the Dy Chiao brothers did not authorize their sister to recognize Benedick as the illegitimate son of
their father. They could not have agreed to payP6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, because they had denied that
Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father in their answer to the complaint.
On the assumption that the Dy Chiao brothers had signed the SPA on September 20, 1995, a cursory reading of the
compromise agreement will show that they did not specifically empower their sister to enter into a compromise agreement with
Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612. It bears stressing that the SPA was executed as early as September 20, 1995, while
the complaint was filed with the RTC almost a year thereafter, or on August 27, 1996.

The trial court acted with precipitate and inordinate speed in approving the compromise agreement. The records show
that at about the time when it was executed by Mary Jane, her brothers were patients at the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental
Hospital, and Benedick had accused her of being a spendthrift by reason of her alleged addiction to drugs. [53]
On his belief that the Dy Chiao brothers were incompetent, Benedick even filed a motion for the appointment of
a guardian ad litem for them, and for the examination of Mary Jane for drug addiction, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after hearing, an order be issued, as follows:
1.

Appointing a Special Administrator and/or Receiver over the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao [Sr.];

2.

Appointing Guardian Ad Litem over the person of Defendants Benito, Jr. and Benson Dy-Chiao;

3.
Ordering defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao to submit a medical examination by a medical expert on drugs to be
commissioned by the Honorable Court to determine whether or not said defendant is a drug dependent. [54]
Indeed, Benedick filed a Motion on November 14, 1996, for the Dy Chiao siblings to appear before the RTC at 8:30 a.m.
of November 18, 1996. He, likewise, prayed that the Director of the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital be directed to
bring the clinical records of the brothers, which the trial court granted per its Order dated November 12, 1996. [55]
Upon Mary Janes failure to appear for the hearing, Benedick even sought to have her cited in contempt of court. Despite
his charge that Mary Jane was a drug addict and a spendthrift, he, nevertheless, prayed in his Motion dated December 5, 1996,
that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of Benito, Sr. and the guardian ad litem of her brothers, thus:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that Maryjane
Dy Chiao- De Guzman be appointed as Special Administrator over the Estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and as Guardian
Ad Litem of defendants Benito, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao.[56]
Barely two weeks earlier, or on November 24, 1996, Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman (whom Benedick branded as a
spendthrift and a drug addict), executed the compromise agreement, not only in her behalf, but also in behalf of her brothers,
who were confined in the hospital and whom Benedick considered as mentally incompetent, and needed a guardian ad litem.
The trial court ignored all the foregoing proceedings and approved the compromise agreement without bothering to resolve the
issue of whether the Dy Chiao brothers were indeed incompetent, and whether there was a need to appoint a guardian ad
litem for them.
What is so worrisome is that the counsel of the Dy Chiao siblings, Atty. Botor, did not even bother to file any pleading in
his clients behalf, relative to the motions filed by Benedick. Despite the allegations that the Dy Chiao brothers were in the
mental hospital and needed a guardian ad litem, and that Mary Jane was a spendthrift and a drug addict, Atty. Botor still
proceeded to sign the compromise agreement as their counsel. More ominously, the said counsel knew that it was he who had
been empowered by the Dy Chiao brothers to compromise Civil Case No. RTC96-3612 (based on the SPA dated October 31,
1996); yet, he still allowed Mary Jane to execute the same based on an SPA dated September 20, 1995 notarized by no less
than Benedicks counsel, Atty. Amador Simando.
The Court is convinced that the compromise agreement was the handiwork of Atty. Simando, because it was he who
notarized the SPA dated September 20, 1995 purportedly executed by the Dy Chiao brothers. He later became the counsel of
Benedick against the Dy Chiao siblings in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612. He signed the compromise agreement as Benedicks
counsel, despite his incessant claim that the brothers were incompetent and needed a guardian ad litem. Barely 11 days after
the execution of the compromise agreement, Atty. Simando filed a Petition for the Settlement of the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao,
Sr., this time as counsel of Mary Jane. It bears stressing that Mary Jane was the defendant in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612, and
that as counsel of Benedick, the plaintiff in the said civil case, Atty. Simando had accused her of being a drug addict and a
spendthrift. By then of course, his client (Benedick) had already received P6,000,000.00 from the estate of his alleged putative
father.
Since the decision of the RTC is null and void, the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto and the subsequent sale at
public auction of the properties belonging to the estate of Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. are null and void.
Considering our foregoing disquisitions, the Court no longer finds the need to still resolve the other issues that were
raised.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.