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CONSTITUTIONALITY
Santos v. Mallare
Facts: Eduardo de los Santos was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16,
1946 by the President of the Philippines. His appointment was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd, he qualified for and
began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R.
Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same
position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public
Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public
Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office. The City Mayor
and the other city officials ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to
the position. Santos filed this quo warranto to question the legality of the
appointment of respondent Gil R. Mallare to the office of city engineer for the City of
Baguio which the petitioner occupied and claims to be still occupying.
Issue: WON the removal of Santos as city engineer as he was appointment,
confirmed and started to exercise his duties as such was legal
Held: No. It is illegal and he should remain as city engineer. The position of City
Engineer of Baguio belongs to the category of unclassified service. In Lacson v.
Romero, the Court held that officers or employees in the unclassified as well as
those in the classified service are protected by Article XII, Sec. 4 of the 1935
Constitution which states that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. However, Section
2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls under Chapter 61 entitled
"City of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the President) to remove at
pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein, one of whom is the city engineer. It
is obvious that the aforequoted constitutional provision is contrary to the provision
of the RAC. And Sec. 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution declares that all laws of
the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government
whose appointments are by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone.
The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor
highly technical. Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than
ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily
confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city
RULING:
1. In Mo ntilla v s. Pacifi c Co mmercial3 we h eld th at th e mo rato riu m laws
suspended the period of prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban
decision. It should be stated however, in fairness to appellant, that the Montilla
decision came down after he had submitted his brief. And in answer to his main
contention, the following portion is quoted from a resolution of this Court4
2. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil. 68) may be construed to mean that at the of the
decision the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the
prevailing circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule is that an
unconstitutional statute "confers no right, create no office, affords no protection
and justifies no acts performed under it." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.)
Judgment affirmed, without costs.
EFFECTS OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY
MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG vs. BENITO
Facts: The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del
Sur, while th e resp o n d en t Pan g an d ap u n Bo n ito is th e may o r, an d th e rest o f
th e resp o n d en ts are th e councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same
province. The municipality of Balabagan was created by EO 386 of President Garcia
out of barrios and sitios of Malabang. The petitioners seek to nullify the EO.
Petitioners relied on the Pelaez ruling that the Presidents power to create
municipalities under Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code is unconstitutional.
Respondents argued that the Pelaez ruling is inapplicable because Balabagan is a de
facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was
declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the
municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years
preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation,
its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly
in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual
like the petitioner.
Issu e: Wh ether the mu nicipality o f Balabag an is a d e facto co rp o ratio n , as
it was o rg an ized before the promulgation of the SC's decision in Pelaez. NO
Held: The following principles may be deduced. (1) The color of authority requisite to
a de facto municipal corporation may be an unconstitutional law, valid on its face,
which has either: (a) Been upheld for a time by the courts; or (b) Not yet been
declared void; provided that a warrant fo r its creatio n can b e fo u n d in so me
oth er valid law o r in th e reco g n itio n o f its p o ten tial ex isten ce in th e
gen eral co nstitution of th e state; (2 ) th ere can b e n o d e facto mu n icip al
corporation unless either directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation is
authorized by some legislative fiat; (3) there can be no color of authority in an
unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of which is apparent on its face; (4) there
can be no de facto corporation created to tak e th e p lace o f an ex istin g d e ju re
co rp o ratio n , as su ch o rg an izatio n wo u ld clearly b e a usurper.
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite
the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be
made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate
vitality to the organization. Hen ce, in th e case at b ar, th e mere fact th at
Balab ag an was o rg an ized at a time wh en th e statu te h ad n o t b een
in v alid ated can n o t co n ceiv ab ly mak e it a d e facto co rp o ratio n , as,
independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other
valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.
Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts
done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate
po wers are a nullity b ecau se th e executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed." The Act of Congress, having
been fo u nd to b e uncon stitu tio n al, was n o t a law; th at it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. It is quite clear, however, that the actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a d etermin atio n , is an o p erativ e fact an d may h av e
co n seq u en ces wh ich can n o t ju stly b e ignored.
There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the
executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act
done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Ord er 3 8 6 is d eclared v o id ,
an d th e resp o n d en ts are h ereb y p erman en tly restrain ed fro m performing the
duties and functions of their respective offices.
INVALIDITY DUE TO
CHANGE OF
CONDITIONS
RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN [93 PHIL 68; NO.L-3708;
18 MAY 1953]
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
PARTIAL INVALIDITY
10 Barrameda v. Moir
*take note of the following: (1) Use of the word all and exclusive (2) Statute void and
valid in part
Petitioner: Juan Barameda Respondent : Percy M. Moir et.al (Judge of First Instance)
FACTS:
1.Orig inal case: Petition er was a d efen d an t in a su it b ro u g h t b efo re a
Justice of Peace to try a title to a parcel of land, he lost.
2.Appeal: Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. The case was dismissed
with directions to the justice ofpeace to execute judgment.
3.Curren t case: Original ap plicatio n for a writ o f man d amu s. Petitio n er
also req u ested fo r a p relimin ary in ju n ctio n b e issued to stay the execution of
judgment and that Moir be ordered to proceed the case on appeal.
ISSUE:
Was Moir correct in dismissing Barramedas case?
ARGUMENTS
Resp o n d en t (Ju d g e Mo ir) Complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action
Petitio n er (Baramed a) The basis of the demurrer is that Acts no. 2041 and 2131,
conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real estate,are
inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 therefore there
was no basis in dismissing the case.
Act No. 2041 Sec 3 Justice of Peace shall have
ex clu siv e ju risd ictio n to adjudicate questions of title to real estate or any
interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two
hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less
than six hundred pesos thejustice of peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent
with the Court of First instance
Act no. 2131, Sec1, amended Act No. 2041 by substituting exclusive original
jurisdiction for exclusive jurisdiction
Sec 9 of the Philippine Bill on jurisdiction of CFI all civil actions which
involve the title to or possession ofreal property, or of any interest therein
except in forcible entry and detainer cases
*demurrer- a claim by the defendant in a legal action that the plaintiff does not have
sufficient grounds to proceed
*Un d erstan d in g ART 2 04 1 and Sec 9
Sec 9 uses the word ALL
which means that there is no case involving real estate which Courts of First Instance
are not authorized to hear and determine under the Organic Law, and that being
supreme, any Act of the Philippine Legislature which attempts in any manner to
curtail such jurisdiction must be held void.
Art 2041 and 2131 three parts (1) confer original jurisdiction upon justices of the
peace to try title to real estate (2) it shall be ex clu siv e in cases where the value of the
property in litigation does not exceed 200 pesos (3) when more than two hundred but
less than 600 it shall have co n cu rren t ju risd ictio n with Court of First Instance
DECISION:
Writ denied, injunction made permanent The preliminary injunction granted by this court,
staying the execution of the judgment, will be made permanent, and the writ of
mandamus prayed for must be denied.
RATIO:
1 . J u r i s p r u d e n c e : I n Weigall v Shuster it was held that the Jurisdiction
of the SC and the Court of First Instance, as fixed by Section 9 of the Philippines
Bill,may be added to but not diminished by the Philippines Legislature. Therefore,
there will be sufficient reasons for declaring Acts No 2041 and 2131 contrary to the
Philippine Bill and void if they attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance where the title to realty is involved.
2.Acts 2 0 41 and 21 31 deprives CFI o f th eir o rig in al ju risd ictio n to try
cases wh ere th e title to realty v alu e at n o t mo re th an 2 0 0 is in v o lv ed .
Therefore, inconsistent with Sec9, Philippine bill
HOW?
ART 2041 grants Orig inal Ex clu siv e Ju risd ictio n to Justice of Peace.
Exclusivity means that all other courts must be barred from exercising jurisdiction in
such cases. In such a way that hold another court has jurisdiction also in such cases is
to destroy the grantof exclusive jurisdiction given to the other court. It is no longer
exclusive when shared by another court, but merely concurrent.
3 .Th e seco n d p art o f Art 2 0 4 1 is also v o id (th at p art o f
c o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n ) . W h y ? The second part was only supplemental and
ancillary to the exclusive jurisdiction over cases not exceeding P200. It is therefore
inseparable from and absolutely dependent upon the exercise of that exclusive
jurisdiction which has already been declared void. (Based on statcon principle
explained in next number)
4.
STATCON PRINCIPLE: The g eneral ru le is th at wh ere p art o f a statu te is
vo id , as repug nant to Org an ic Law, wh ile an o th er p art is v alid , th e v alid
po rtion , if sep arab le fro m the in v alid , may stan d an d b e en fo rced . But in
order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion
that it is fair to presumed that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they
had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. Independent means
that enoughmust remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute which
carries legislative intent and removal of void would not affect the effectiveness of the
valid part.
5.Th e ju dg ment of the ju stice o f th e p eace wh ich it is d esired to h av e th e
resp o nd entjudg e in this actio n rev iew is an absolute nullity. The respondent
judge acquired jurisdiction of the case only for the purpose of dismissing it and
directing justice of the peace to proceed with execution of the void judgment, Moir
was in error.