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a. POLICE POWER
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS.
DRILON
G.R. NO. L-81958
JUNE 30, 1988
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance
in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is
more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a
battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the
dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of
social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution
affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private
property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits."
Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and
implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant
from the bondage of the soil."
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these
sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social
Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere
provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the
following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform
program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of
other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this
end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect
the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives
for voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles.
This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27,
which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to
provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners.
On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27
and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the
decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July
22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229,
providing the mechanics for its implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the
Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its
own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the
improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of
spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President
Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing
the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 is
unconstitutional and violates individual rights to equal protection clause
and due process.
HELD: The court in upholding the constitutionality of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 discussed the issues.
the
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest. As aptly stated:
The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he
shakes the pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of
judgment to place him in the same category with the honest man who is
unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition
against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was intended as a
shield and not a sword.
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police
power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.
As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state
to meet the exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the
police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For
example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional
provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power
of the state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to
address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross
it.
We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt.
We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs
freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally
protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind
that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial
instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore
not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question
denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes
the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee
is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since
without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of
the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to
saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the
swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the wellaccepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause
does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no
unreasonable or arbitrary.
It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation
of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by
the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of
the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment
but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument
stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power."
What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make
laws which means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the
offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch
of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime
and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to
the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be
construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive
power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its
enforcement to the offended party is far fetched.
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to
those better prepared.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection
clause is not well-taken. There would be unequal protection if some
applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have
also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal
protection requires is equality among equals.
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT,
THE
STATION
COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY,
REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated
by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of
Executive Order No. 626-A which provides that the carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed
to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of
the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained
the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us
in this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional
due misapplication of police power, violation of due process, and undue
delegation of legislative power?
HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of
the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process.
The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to
regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. It
is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive
Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626,
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. To
justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that
there is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except
where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if
female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful
subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty
that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful
method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive
Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
Page 7 of 11
under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for
public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote
the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or
the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.
SILVESTRE
refuse to lay down a general rule defining it, but decide each
specific case on its merits
who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes
of liquidation.
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
resident,s corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a
judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly
city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law.
Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in the present case,
the court would be unable to impose the punishment provided for by
law, because it does not show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen
of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he
was not under 18years of age nor over 55 [50]; nor (d) that conditions
existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon
him for the services mentioned in the law
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by
Republic
Act
No.
1180,
petitioner, vs. JAIME
HERNANDEZ, Secretary
of
Finance,
and MARCELINO
SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of
the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations
the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception
from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged
therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law,
until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and
for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in
case of juridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of citizens
and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the
forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or
opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional
stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens
actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the
proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses,
giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and
liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7)
a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws
and due process?
HELD: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the
constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violate the
equal protection of laws and due process.
We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of
the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and
control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future.
The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers
of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on
occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country
isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what
we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the
distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big
centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and
the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the
national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of
his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no
special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for
aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of
American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between
citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power.
DUE PROCESS
The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that
the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us
to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate
but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
Judicial department of the Government may not interfere.
The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained.
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence
of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare,
and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts
are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared
by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. . . .
To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public,
it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
Page 10 of 11
and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by
petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but
this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate
and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore
engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in
question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired
legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and
dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private
rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect
(Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely
reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have
infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
February 2, 1979
Facts: President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which
states that all owners, users or drivers shall have at all times one pair of
early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any source
depending on the owners choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed
by petitioner Leovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee
of due process against Hon Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner,
Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio,
Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and Hon.
Aquino, Minister of Public Highways. Because of such contentions, the
Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a
period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary
because vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be
use as a warning device. Also petitioner contest that the letter of
instruction violates the delegation of police power because it is deemed
harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of
EWD will become instant millionaires because of such law.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioners contentions possess merit.
Held: Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of
police power may interfere with personal liberty or property to ensure
and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Also, such
letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a
rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with
such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present the factual
foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In
cases where there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be
presumed that constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other
hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the
implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna
Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with the
standards given as stated in our Constitution that the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of International Law as part of the law of
the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also requires the use
of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can
personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the
specifications provided by law. Petitioners allegation against the
manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an unfounded
speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order
regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the
said law immediately executory.
the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to
give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of such
ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is
dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen
members operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate
businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities and
regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on
June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio
Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set
forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate
motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or
in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being provided
that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of
Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The lower court on July
6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent
Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after
July 8, 1963.
Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
unconstitutional, therefore, null and void.
Held: A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a
sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot
be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted
standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any
evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a
challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice
Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of
the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice
that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity,
the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or
ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has
been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman &
Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court
through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the
scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground
that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and
hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions
of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character,
the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding
the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption
of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.