VI.

VALIDITY O F STATUTES

A. Presumption of Constitutionality
ALBA vsEVANGELISTA
FACTS: RA 603 created the City of Roxas. Sec 8 thereof provides that the vice
mayor shall be appointed by the president. Pursuant t the law, Alba was
appointed as the mayor. Later on, the president sent communication to Alba
telling him that he will be replaced by a new appointee, Alajar. Alajar was then
declared as the acting mayor. Alba refused to leave his post and he appealed his
case before the Judge Evangelista who ruled in favor of him. Alajar then
complained. Alba argued that section 2545 of the RAC w/c provides:
Appointment of City Officials. The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the
Philippines, the mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any
of the said officers . . ., has been declared incompatible with the constitutional
inhibition that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law, because the two provisions are
mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconciliable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alba can be removed by the president upon displeasure.
HELD: The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during
good behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in his office, of which
Congress could not deprive him. The question is not novel. There seems to be
but little difficulty in deciding that there was no such interest or right. Admittedly,
the act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and
fixing the term or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the
office as of right and the tenure or the term during which the incumbent
actually holds the office, is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power.
In the exercise of that power, Congress enacted RA 603 on April 11, 1951,
creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of ViceMayor and its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds
office at the pleasure of the President, so, the logical inference is that Congress
can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent
upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alba was appointed by the
pleasure of the resident and can also be removed when that pleasure ceases.

YU CONG ENG VS. TRINIDAD [47 PHIL 385; G.R. NO. 20479; 6 FEB 1925]
Facts:
The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first instance
of Manila, with a violation of Act 2972, which provides that (Section 1) it shall be
unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or corporation engaged in
commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine
Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account b o o k s in any
lan g u ag e o th er th an En g lish , Sp an ish o r an y lo cal d ialect. He was
arrested , h is b o o k s were seized , an d th e trial was ab o u t to p ro ceed , wh en
he an d the o th er petition er, Co Liam, o n th eir o wn b eh alf, an d o n b eh alf
of all th e oth er Ch inese merchan ts in th e Ph ilip p in es, filed the petition against
the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of Manila, and the collector of internal revenue
engaged in the prosecution, and against the judge presiding.
Issue:
Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its
taxpayers to keep proper records of their business transactions in English or Spanish
or Filipino dialect by which an adequate measure of what is due from them in meeting
the cost of government can be had. But we are clearly o f o p in io n th at it is n o t
with in the po lice p o wer o f th e Ph ilipp in e Leg islatu re, because it would be
oppressive and arbitrary, to prohibit all Chinese merchants from maintaining a set o f
bo o k s in the Ch inese langu ag e, an d in th e Ch in ese ch aracters, an d thu s
prev en t th em from keeping advised of the status of their business and directing its
conduct.

Drilon vsLim
GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on

appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794,
otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila
revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that
the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section
187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the
Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the
policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision
therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision
over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and
supervision, the first being the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter, while the second is the power of a superior
officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.
ISSUES:
The issues in this case are
(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and
(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than
supervision, over the local government
HELD:
The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187
of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower courts
finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code
have been observed.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these
grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he
did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed,
he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may
even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor
or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not
lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the
opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this,
and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and
agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed.
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission
does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.

Peralta et al vs Commission on
Elections et al
FACTS: Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang
Pambansa Elections. He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD
1269 or the 1978 Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of
the 1978 Election Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for individual
candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he
desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or
aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of
the political party, group or aggrupation (office-block ballot). Peralta was
vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of this
provision of the Constitution: Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and discrimination. He sought the shelter of
its protection for himself and other independent candidates who, according to
him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed provision is not nullified.
Essentially, in terms of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal
protection question. The main objection of Peralta against the optional straight
party voting provided for in the Code is that an independent candidate would be
discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a
political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an
advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is
contended that the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal
protection of the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of
Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection.
HELD: The SC ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares
his ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No
candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a

candidate of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the
individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his.
No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision
on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group
or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing his
certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law
accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself
of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so
by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his.
In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully
weighed and considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of either
alternative. So long as the application of the rule depends on his voluntary action
or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the
victim of discrimination.

B. Requisites for the exercise of judicial power to

determine the consEtuEonality of a statute
* Justiceable Controversy
Political Question

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office
and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same
office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof)
providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is
class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan
Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a
taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the
elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for
crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao
invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.

Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or controversy
as a requisite for a review on certiorari?
Whether or not paragraph 1 Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is constitutional?

HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have
been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further,
this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There
are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by
the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed
upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled
however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office
and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither
well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class
can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees.
Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger
ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates
should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of
younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons
more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for
elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at
ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the
same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

PHILCONSA vsEnriquez
GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was

passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it
imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed
budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress
to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign
their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and
approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR
THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY
ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President
delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed
and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be
validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public
debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the
Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,
Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUCs),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the
Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which
requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific
Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
armored personnel carriers
5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment
pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and
CHR, the Congress
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi

2. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of
1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d)
Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional
3. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service
and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional.
HELD:
Locus Standi
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that
matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a
condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of
that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484
F. 2d 1307 [1973]).
Veto of the Provisions
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative
process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is,
therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden
shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt
payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be
done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when
the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other
government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income
and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as
exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm,
P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the
Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH
is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision
which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended
70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should

strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to and
inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the
special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item
(Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military
equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or
legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the
issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and
3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being
inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund
for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been
contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage
of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts
entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore
valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in
the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the
President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000
CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation
law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-inChief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to
appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the
DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures
shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution
Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into
execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the
ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

IBP vs. Zamora

Facts: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds
the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the
Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in
visibility patrols around the metropolis. Formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 1
(the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called
Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. 2 Task Force Tulungan was placed
under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila through a sustained street
patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those
perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are
well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.
Issue:
1. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement is in derogation of Article
2, Section 3 of the Constitution;
2. Whether the deployment constitutes incursion in a civilian function of law
enforcement;
3. Whether the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to
perform civilian functions of the government
4. Whether the deployment gives more power to the military than what it should be
under the Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal
standing; (2) Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review, and, (3) Whether or not the
calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP.

Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO

ORDERED.
Ratio: The question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny
since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of
police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one
Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.

In view of standing
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its
locus standi The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law
and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing
in this case.
National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal
board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. Indeed, none of its
members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a
result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.
Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual
constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution.
One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The
reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the
political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not
normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case
shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

In view of abuse of discretion

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.
President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the
power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. Calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it
involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the
review powers of this Court.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom.

In view of burden of proof on factual basis

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as
there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling
out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that
grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner
as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military.
The present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the
military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Indeed,
whether it is the calling out of the armed forces alone in order to suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law (in case of invasion or rebellion), the
exercise of the President's powers as commander-in-chief, requires proof not mere
assertion. 4 As has been pointed out, "Standing is not 'an ingenious academic
exercise in the conceivable' . . . but requires . . . a factual showing of perceptible
harm."
Because of the absence of such record evidence, we are left to guess or even
speculate on these questions. Thus, at one point, the majority opinion says that what
is involved here is not even the calling out of the armed forces but only the use of
marines for law enforcement. We need to have evidence on these questions because,
under the Constitution, the President's power to call out the armed forces in order to
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion is subject to the limitation that the
exercise of this power is required in the interest of public safety.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law,
two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2)
public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the
power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes
necessary," the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full
discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the
two other powers.

In view of the Courts concurrence

We do not doubt the veracity of the President's assessment of the situation, especially

in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent
bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and
other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI
2000. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use
of military assets for civilian law enforcement. Under the LOI, the police forces are
tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. 38 It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than
assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious
incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution.
Political questions are defined as "those questions which under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government." 2 They have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by
the people in their primary political capacity and (2) matters which have been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular office of the
government, with discretionary power to act. 3 The exercise of the discretionary
power of the legislative or executive branch of government was often the area where
the Court had to wrestle with the political question doctrine.