Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 5

VOID MARRIAGES

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY vs. ISABEL COJUANGCOSUNTAY


THE FACTS:
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were
born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed
Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel CojuangcoSuntay filed a criminal case against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation,
Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance a complaint for legal separation
against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and
care of their children who were living with their mother.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void
and of no effect as between the parties for finding that the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia is considered to be a ground for annulling the marriage under Art.
95 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after
(sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or
wife.

Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay.
The latter is respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990
without leaving a will.
Five years later respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the
Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. She alleged among
others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be
appointed as administratrix of the estate. Petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the
surviving spouse of the decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal properties even
while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate
than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have been alienated from the decedent and
the Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration
be issued instead to him.
Almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss the special
proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as
administratrix of the decedent's estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article
992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation
the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of

the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is
"null and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of
her paternal grandmother the decedent.
On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order denying petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss. When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated
January 9, 1998, petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.
THE ISSUE:
Whether Isabel is an illegitimate child because of the declared null and void marriage of her
parents?
THE RULING:
No. Petitioner strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has
categorically declared that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void" and
that the legal effect of such declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the
children born out of said marriage are illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained.
Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while
Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled.
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to
property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article
89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad
faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects,
until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been
entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from
being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the
second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall


be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also
called natural children by legal fiction. (Emphasis supplied).

Stated otherwise, the annulment of "the marriage by the court abolishes the legal
character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the
juridical consequences which the marital union produced during its continuance."

Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal connotations and
implications, Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with whereas null and void is something that does not
exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later
ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a
marriage, the court simply declares a status or condition which already exists from the very
beginning.
Petition is DISIMISSED.

Ninal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 March 14, 2000


Fact of the Case: Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa on September 26, 1974. On April 24,
1985 he shot and killed her. After 20 months he remarried Norma Badayog, the respondent
herewith. After Pepito died, his heirs by his first marriage filed a petition for declaration of
nullity on the marriage of their father with Norma Badayog on the ground of lack of marriage
license. Norma Badayog contends that the ground have no legal basis for her marriage to
Pepito according to Article 34 of the Family Code no marriage license is necessary for
person who have cohabited for atleast five years. The respondent also contends that
petitioners are not among those allowed by the law to file a suit for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Pepito. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent on the ground that
indeed the Family Code is silent as to situation. The Petition should have been filed before
the death of Pepito and not after his death. Thus, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the respondent is right to contend that no need of marriage license
was necessary for Pepito and her have cohabited for at least five years. (2) Whether or not
the second marriage of Pepito valid.
Held: Pepito and Norma could not have possibly be legally cohabited for atleast five years
since Pepito was still married to Teodulfa counting backwards from the time he and Norma
celebrated their marriage. A period of cohabitation is characterized by exclusivity and
continuity. There should be no legal impediment on either party to marry. Pepitos previous
marriage to Teodulfa is a legal impediment disqualifying him to the exception of a marriage
license. Thus, his second marriage should have a marriage license to be valid. In this case,
the marriage of Pepito and Norma lacking the formal requisite of a marriage licese is
therefore void.

Ofelia Ty vs CA and EdgardoReyes


FACTS: In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had a
church wedding in the same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of QC declared their marriage as null and void; the civil one for lack of marriage
license and the subsequent church wedding due to the lack of consent of the parties. In
1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an
action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a
marriage license at the time of the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration yet

as to the nullity of his previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence proving the
existence of a valid marriage license including the specific license number designated. The
lower court however ruled that Ofelias marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was
affirmed by the CA applying the provisions of the Art 40 of the FC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes can be
invoked in the case at bar.
HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he
must first require a judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage and such
declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage as void. For purposes other than remarriage, other evidences may be presented
and the declaration can be passed upon by the courts. In the case at bar, the lower court
and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by Reyes were
solemnized prior to the FC. The old CC did not have any provision that states that there
must be such a declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelias marriage with
Reyes is valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect in 87) cannot be applied retroactively
especially because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia under the CC which was
operational during her marriage with Reyes.

Case Digest on TERRE V. TERRE (Voidable


Marriage)
FACTS: Dorothy Terre first met Jordan Terre when they were 4th year high school classmates in
Cadiz City High School. She was then married to Merlito Bercenilla. Jordan courted her and this
continued when they moved to Manila to pursue their education. Jordan, then a freshman law
student, told Dorothy that her marriage with Bercenilla was void ab initio because they are first
cousins. Believing in Jordan and with the consent of her mother and ex-in-laws, she married Jordan
on June 14, 1977. Jordan wrote single as Dorothys civil status despite latters protests. Jordan
said it didnt matter because marriage was void to begin with. After their marriage, Dorothy
supported Jordan because he was still studying then. They had a son, Jason, who was born on
June 25, 1981. Shortly after she gave birth, Jordan disappeared. She learned that he married Vilma
Malicdem. Dorothy filed charges for abandonment of minor, bigamy and grossly immoral conduct.
Jordan was already a member of the Bar then.
Jordan claimed that he was unaware of Dorothys first marriage and that she sent her out of the
house when he confronted her about it. He contracted the second marriage, believing that his
marriage to Dorothy was void ab initio because of her prior subsisting marriage.
ISSUE: WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage?
HELD: Yes. Jordan Terre disbarred.

RATIO:
1. Jordan failed to rebut evidence presented by Dorothy.
2. As a law student, he should have known that even if Dorothys first marriage was void ab initio,
she still needed a judicial declaration before she can contract another marriage. (GOMEZ V.
LIPANA; FC ART. 40)
3. Jordan has displayed a deeply flawed moral character. Dorothy supported him, he got her
pregnant then he abandoned her. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage. Thus, not
worthy to be a member of the Bar.

Вам также может понравиться