Miranda vs Arizona

The Court further held that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so freely. Therefore, a
defendant must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

People vs judge ayson

the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character,
is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not
give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the
court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a
witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the
accused include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.

People vs ordono

whether the accused's confessions should be inadmissible as evidence against

them.
YES, insofar as they were not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation.
Although the Parish Priest, Municipal Mayor and Chief of Police were present when
the accused made their admission, this did not cure the defect in the custodial
investigation particularly the deprivation of their right to competent and
independent counsel. RA 7438, which defines the rights of persons under custodial
investigation, allows certain exceptions to the right to counsel as long as they meet
the following conditions: (1) counsel of the accused must be absent and (2) a valid
waiver must be executed. In this case, there was no lawyer available but there was
no valid waiver executed. Even if they were brought to a PAO lawyer days later, it
still did not remedy this omission.

People vs Molina
Applicable Laws: Article III, Sec. 2Article III, Sec. 3Rationale: The law mandates that
searches be carried out with a search warrant upon the existence of probable cause.
Likewise, the law protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and holds
evidence taken from such incidents as inadmissible as evidence. There are
exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted incidental to a lawful arrest For
this, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. It doesn't
work the other way around. Likewise, as a rule, an arrest is legitimate if it's with a
valid warrant of arrest. However, a police officer may conduct warrantless arrests:

People vs tulin
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside
Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And
such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the
vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the
pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence,
the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a

violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy
must be committed on the high seas byany person not a member of its complement
nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659,
thecoverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed
"in Philippine waters." On the other hand,under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued
in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embracesany person including
"apassenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters."
Hence, passenger or not, a member of thecomplement or not, any person is
covered by the law.

People vs Endino

Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarins confession is admissible as

evidence.
Held: The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his
guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession
does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers
but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.
Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought
succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with
him. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium
for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it
is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in
further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the
connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced
extra-judicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to
the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. It
is not suggested that videotaped confessions given before media men by an
accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and
conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is
essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given
under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of counsel then to
lower courts: "we should never presume that all media confessions described as
voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect

and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced

confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It
requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from
untainted ones.

Luz vs People
There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is
the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the
other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary. There being no valid arrest, the
warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

People vs Nicandro
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it
would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not
only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must
also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under
interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands.
(See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312: People VS. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other
words, the right of a person under interrogation to be informed implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is
conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that
the person has been informed of his rights. Now, since the right to be informed
implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary,
depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal
circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and
more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.

People vs amestuzo
The guarantees of sec. 12 (1) of the Bill of Rights or the so-called Miranda rights of
the accused may only be invoked while he is under custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation begins from the time when the police no longer ask general
questions about the crime, but start focusing on the suspect and attempt to elicit
incriminating questions in the course of the investigation. The object of the Miranda
rights is to ensure that the accused is protected from possible intimidation or
coercion from law enforcement officers who may force him to admit to a crime that
he did not commit. The police line-up is not yet included in the custodial
investigation as it is the witnesses who are asked questions during the line-up. In
this regard, the inquiry has not yet shifted from investigatory to accusatory.
Moreover, during the line-up, there was no evidence that the accused was
interrogated by the police, nor were there any incriminating statements elicited
from him.

People vs piedad

The claim by the defense that Piedads pre-trial identification was suggestive due to
the absence of a police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out
that even before the incident, Luz Lactawan knew the accused. Fidel, on the other
hand, knew Piedad because they played basketball together. Hence, the witnesses
were not identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar with, where arguably,
improper suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused were presented
before the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the
ones responsible for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the
accused simply because they were the only ones presented by the police, rather,
the witnesses were certain they recognized the perpetrators of the crime. Besides,
there is no law which requires a police lineup before a suspect can be identified as
the culprit of a crime. What is important is that the prosecution witnesses positively
identify the persons charged as the malefactors. In this regard, the Court finds no
reason to doubt the veracity of Luzs and Fidels testimony.

People vs bandula

Bandula and Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no
counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial

investigation with respect to Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to
Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben
Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that
violence was used against Bandua. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the
Constitution which mandates in Section 12, Art. III.

The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be

a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal
attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty.
Zerna assisted Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective
extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence
considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal
officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor
and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people,
including the maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether
he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into
conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent
the accused during custodial investigations.

People vs januario

Saunar was not the choice of Januario as his custodial investigation counsel.
Arguendo that Saunar's competence as a lawyer is beyond question, under the
circumstances described by the prosecution however, he could not have been the
independent counsel solemnly spoken of by the Constitution. He was an applicant
for a position in the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the
confessants. In fact, he was actually employed by the NBI a few months after.
Further, although Saunar might have really been around to properly apprise Januario
of his constitutional right as reflected in the written sworn statement itself, the
same cannot be said about Canape. Canape was not properly informed of his
constitutional rights. Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights,
asking him if he wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he
could ask for counsel if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his
request, are simply not in compliance with the constitutional mandate.

People vs Barasina

The phrase "competent and independent" and "preferably of his own choice" were
explicit details which were added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission who pointed out cases where, during the
martial law period, the lawyers made available to the detainee would be one
appointed by the military and therefore beholden to the military. Yet, the
apprehension of the human rights advocates then along this line hardly inspires
belief in the present inasmuch as there was no indication below that Barasina did in
fact choose Atty. Romeo Mendoza to assist him while in the process of offering the
inculpatory statements, to the exclusion of other lawyers (The hiring of Atty. Romeo
Mendoza as counsel by Barasina after the custodial investigation appears to be an
afterthought). Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12 [1], Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then,
the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who
can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting
lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This
absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter.

People vs albofera
Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused
Albofera sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by
prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his
declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead.
Later the accused were convicted of murder.
ISSUE: Whether the Alboferas letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in
light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accuseds privacy?
HELD: No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an
unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion
into Alboferas privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its
recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the
course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in
the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit
and testify in his (Alboferas) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas tated in his letter
is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.

People vs samolde

Extrajudicial confession of accused is not admissible in evidence. He was not

informed of his constitutional right before his statements were taken. However, his
open court testimony is enough to convict him. His subsequent allegation that he
was given money to accept culpability deserves scant consideration. Judicial
confession constitutes evidence of a high order. The presumption is that no sane
person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to
do so by truth and conscience. Further, accused went into hiding. Flight has been
held to be an indication of guilt.

People vs raus

Whether Laygos and Rous extra-judicial confessions, signed in the presence of the
counsel, are admissible as evidence even if the counsel arrived shortly after the
custodial investigation has started and left before the last 3 questions were asked.

Held: The record shows that the investigating officer fully informed Laygo of his
right to counsel and categorically asked Laygo whether he wanted the assistance of
counsel, to which inquiry, Laygo expressed his desire to be so assisted by counsel.
Thereupon, the investigating officer, Sgt. Robert Gaddi, brought him to the office of
Atty. Abraham Datlag. Laygo and Atty. Datlag conferred for a while; thereafter, Sgt.
Gaddi and Laygo returned to the CIS Office of Sgt. Gaddi and Sgt. Gaddi started the
investigation. Atty. Datlag arrived soon after the investigation started and left before
the last three questions were asked, instructing them to follow him to his office.
After the extra-judicial statement of Laygo was finished, Gaddi and Laygo went to
the office of Atty. Datlag, after which, Atty. Datlag conferred with Laygo and then
advised Laygo to sign. Laygo did so and Atty. Datlag thereupon likewise signed.
Thus, there was more than substantial compliance with the constitutional
requirement that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should
be provided with counsel, (Section 12 (1), Article III, The Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines). The very purpose of said constitutional requirement is to prevent
the use of coercion in extracting a confession from a suspect. Nowhere in the
evidence is it shown that coercion was ever employed by the investigating officer in
obtaining the confession of Laygo. The investigation was even witnessed by the
relatives of Laygo. The fact that Atty. Datlag arrived shortly after the investigation of
Laygo had begun and left before the confession was concluded does not negate the
validity and admissibility of said confession for the reason that after the confession
was put down in writing, Laygo and the investigating officer proceeded to the office
of Atty. Datlag and the latter then read the confession, conferred with Laygo and
then advised Laygo to sign the confession

People vs morial

Whether Leonardo Morilas extra-judicial confession was valid, inasmuch as the

material points were tackled when the counsel, Atty. Aguilar Tobias, was present.

Held: Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively

deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation. An accused under
custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the
very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming
that when the lawyer left, he knew very well that the suspect had already admitted
that Leonardo and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar
rationalize his abandoning his client by saying that he left only after the latter had
admitted the "material points," referring to the three accused's respective
participation in the crime. For even as the person under custodial investigation
enjoys the right to counsel from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its
termination indeed, "in every phase of the investigation." An effective and
vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and
able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first
question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession.

People vs maqueda

It was wrong for the trial court to hold that the the rights to counsel and against
self-incriminationare limited to custodial investigation and do not apply to a person
against whom a criminal com-plaint or information has already been filed.
The trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession --the
SinumpaangSalaysay--and an extrajudicial admision--the verbal admissions to
Prosecutor Zarate andRay Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay
shows that it is an extrajudicial ladmission.
-

The distinction is made clear in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules ofCourt:
Sec. 26:
Admission of a party -The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.
Sec 33.
Confession -The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilty of the offense charged , or
of any offense necessarily included there-in, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is acknowledgement of guilt. The term admission is usually
applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly
involve an acknowledgement of his guilty or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged.
A confession is an acknowledgement in express terms, by a party in a criminal case,
of his guilty of the crime charged while an admission is a statement by the accused,
direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with
proof of other facts, to prove his guilty. An admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgement of some fact or circumstance which, in
itself is sufficient to authorize a conviction.
TC: At the time the Sinumpaang Salaysay was made, Maqueda was already
facingcharges in court and no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel
but he had aright to refuse to be a witness. And still, he confessed. Thus, the
admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should be tested not under the
Constitution (Section 12, Article III)but on the voluntariness of its execution.
Voluntariness is presumed so Maqueda has theburden of proving otherwise.
SC: DISAGREE. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
in-formed are not confined to that period prior to filing of a criminal complaint or

information but available at that stage when a person is under investigation for the
commission of an offense. Thus, procedural safeguards still need to be used.
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term custodial by inserting it between the words under and investigation proves that our
Constitution did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. The second paragraph of Section 20 broadened the application of Miranda by making it
applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person and in
custody