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To cite this article: Terence Ball (1999) From core to sore concepts: Ideological
innovation and conceptual change, Journal of Political Ideologies, 4:3, 391-396, DOI:
10.1080/13569319908420804
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569319908420804
'Ideology' remains a hotly contested concept. Few analysts agree on any single
definition; indeed, there are many rival and competing conceptions of ideology
in the social sciences.1 But on one point there is virtually unanimous agreement.
Ideologies are action-oriented; they move or motivate people to act in one way
or another.2 As the unhappy history of the twentieth century attests all too
clearly, these actions are often violent and sometimes genocidal. But before
ideologies inspire or motivate people to do things with weapons, they must first
do things with words. Or, rather, in political struggles words are incorporated
into ideologies, where they become weapons. These weapons may be crude or
complex, simple or sophisticated; but they are wielded by members of one group
or party against those whom they perceive to be enemies.3 As my fellow
symposiast Michael Freeden notes, ideologies are, as it were, community
property and are deployed by the members of one ideological community against
those of other, rival communities.4
Just what sort of things an ideology motivates the members of an ideological
community to do depends on what wordsor concepts5are central to the
ideology in question. We can, for convenience's sake, divide these into two
categories. The first, following Freeden, I shall call core concepts;6 the second
I shall, for want of a better term, call sore concepts. A core concept is one that
is both central to, and constitutive of, a particular ideology and therefore of the
* An earlier version of this debate took place at the round table on ideological communities and political contexts
at the 1998 meeting of the American Political Science Association, chaired by Terence Ball. The four contributors
wish to thank each other, and several members of the audience, for criticism and commentary.
1356-9317/99/030391-06 1999 Taylor & Francis Ltd
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as it defends its own favoured ideology from criticism. To the degree that such
criticism is deemed justifiable, it calls for adjustment within the conceptually
constituted framework of its favoured ideology and thus of the ideological
community of which it is a defining part.
Such philosophical analysis and criticism is the elan vital of any ideology.
And any ideological community which eschews philosophy and embraces
contradiction and thus the threat of ideological incoherence is already well on its
way to becoming moribund. We see this quite clearly in Stalin's infamous
embrace of internal contradictions in Marxism-Leninism:
We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the
strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest
state power that has ever existed ... Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is contradictory. But this
contradiction is bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics.18
Notably missing from this startling assertion is any recognition that Marx in
good philosophical fashion always advocated exposing contradictions as a
prelude to overcoming, not accepting (much less celebrating), them. There could
have been no clearer announcement than Stalin's statement of the intellectual
bankruptcy of his brand of Marxism-Leninism.
Such admissions are relatively rare, however. Most ideologists, most of the
time, are acutely sensitive to charges of contradictoriness or incoherence and are
prepared to make the necessary adjustments in arguments and the concepts that
figure in them. These adjustments often take the form of altered meanings of
core (and/or sore) concepts. Ideological debates, internal and external, are apt to
result in challenges toand alterations ofsuch concepts as 'revolution' or
'liberty' or 'gender'. Which is another way of saying that ideologies contribute
to and are in turn affected by conceptual change.19 The history of the concepts
constitutive of political discourseliberty, justice, equality, authority, obligation, etc.is also the history of the ideologies that have rallied to, relied upon,
redefined, and sometimes rejected these very concepts. Ideologiesor, more
precisely, ideological debates and disputesare the engines of conceptual
change. The history of these concepts is therefore in important ways the history
of ideological disputation and philosophical argumentation.
As Andrew Vincent observes, the social sciencesand the academic discipline of political science in particularhave not attended very well (if at all) to
the part played by ideologies in inspiring and motivating the members of
ideological communities.20 Ideologies have largely been viewed as rationalisations of, or post hoc justifications for, the pursuit and promotion of non-ideological interests (although this appears to be changing, albeit slowly).21 The
centrality and importance of this legitimating function has been gravely underestimated, as Quentin Skinner's seminal studies have shown.22 For the need to
present one's programme of policies as legitimate imposes constraints upon the
course of action that actors can rationally pursue. Not just any course of action
is open to a rational actor at any given time. S/he must operate within the
conceptual constraints imposed by the concepts available to him or her. And
394
typically these will prove to be sore concepts whose meanings have changed
over time and in the course of ideological disputation and debate.
One particularly sore conceptthat of rightsis absent from my preceding list
of political concepts. The omission is intentional, however, for I now want to turn
the discussion over to Richard Dagger, who will discuss 'rights' as an illustration
of themes to which I have alluded in an all too abstract and schematic way.
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21. There is a small but growing literature on the explanatory primacy of 'ideas' (and thus presumably of those
systems of ideas that we call ideologies) over 'interests'. See, inter alia, Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests,
and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
22. Vide Quentin Skinner, 'Some problems in the analysis of political thought and action', in James Tully
(Ed.), Meaning and Context (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), ch. 5.
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