Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181986
December 4, 2013
As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are imbued with
public interest.14
Hence, the CA reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muoz of the libel
charges due to the prosecutions failure to establish the existence of actual
malice.
The Petitioners Arguments
In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the
criminal aspect of the libel suits because that would violate Muoz right against
double jeopardy. Hence, he claims damages only on the basis of Section 2, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court (ROC), which states that the extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. He avers that this
principle applies in general whether the civil action is instituted with or
separately from the criminal action.15
He also claims that the civil liability of an accused may be appealed in case of
acquittal.16
Co further makes the following submissions:
First, the CA erred when it disregarded the presumption of malice under Article
35417 of the RPC. To overcome this presumption, Muoz should have presented
evidence on good or justifiable motive for his statements. 18
On the contrary, the context of Muozs radio interviews reflects his evident
motive to injure Cos reputation instead of a sincere call of public duty. 19
Second, the CA erred in declaring Co as a public figure based on the RTC
findings that he is known in his community. He claims this as a relatively limited
community comprising of his business associates.20
The Respondents Arguments
Muoz argues that Co misunderstood Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC because,
as its title suggests, the provision presupposes the filing of a civil action
separately from the criminal action. Thus, when there is no reservation of the
right to separately institute the civil action arising from the offense, the
extinction of the criminal action extinguishes the civil action.
Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising
from the offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the
present petition to enforce the civil liability.21
Muoz further posits that Co is not entitled to recover damages because there is
no wrongful act to speak of. Citing De la Rosa, et al. v. Maristela, 22 he argues
that if there is no libel due to the privileged character of the communication and
actual malice is not proved, there should be no award of moral damages. 23
Lastly, Muoz avers that Co is indirectly challenging the factual and legal issues
which the CA has already settled in acquitting him. Muoz explains that this
Court may no longer overturn the CAs findings as the doctrine of double
jeopardy has set in.24
The Issues
The parties arguments, properly joined, present to us the following issues:
1. whether a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he
seeks to enforce the accuseds civil liability; and
2. whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from the libelous
remarks despite his acquittal.
The Court's Ruling
We do not find the petition meritorious.
The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to
enforce the accuseds civil liability.
The parties have conflicting interpretations of the last paragraph of Section 2,
Rule 111 of the ROC, which states:
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil
action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there
is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (Emphasis ours)
Muoz claims that the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies
only if the civil liability ex delicto is separately instituted or when the right to file
it separately was properly reserved. In contrast, Co claims that Muoz acquittal
of the crime of libel did not extinguish the civil aspect of the case because
Muoz utterance of the libelous remarks remains undisputed. We reject Muoz
claim. The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies to civil
actions to claim civil liability arising from the offense charged, regardless if the
action is instituted with or filed separately from the criminal action.
Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs situations when the
offended party opts to institute the civil action separately from the criminal
action; hence, its title "When separate civil action is suspended." Despite this
wording, the last paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for civil liability ex
delicto.
This is based on Article 100 of the RPC which states that that "[e]very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Each criminal act gives rise to
two liabilities: one criminal and one civil. Reflecting this policy, our procedural
rules provide for two modes by which civil liability ex delicto may be enforced:
(1) through a civil action that is deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
action;25
(2) through a civil action that is filed separately, either before the criminal
action or after, upon reservation of the right to file it separately in the criminal
action.26
The offended party may also choose to waive the civil action. 27
This dual mode of enforcing civil liability ex delicto does not affect its nature, as
may be apparent from a reading of the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120
of the ROC, which states:
Section 2. Contents of the judgment. x x x In case the judgment is of acquittal,
it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.(Emphasis ours)
If, as Muoz suggests, the extinction of the penal action carries with it the
extinction of the civil action that was instituted with the criminal action, then
Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC becomes an irrelevant provision. There would be
no need for the judgment of the acquittal to determine whether "the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist." The Rules
precisely require the judgment to declare if there remains a basis to hold the
accused civilly liable despite acquittal so that the offended party may avail of
the proper remedies to enforce his claim for civil liability ex delicto.
In Ching v. Nicdao and CA,28 the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy
that a party whether the accused or the offended party may avail with
respect to the judgment:
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment
on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the
judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may
appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period
therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended
party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent
Nicdaos acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the
criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did
he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action. (Emphasis ours)
Moreover, an appeal is favored over the institution of a separate civil action
because the latter would only add to our clogged dockets.29
To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it
the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or
separately from the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil
liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence
has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accuseds acquittal,
the offended party may still claim civil liability
ex delicto:
(a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required;
(b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon
the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
We thus now proceed to determine if Cos claim falls under any of these three
situations.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.
The CA has acquitted Muoz of libel because his statement is a privileged
communication. In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element
of the crime.30
The law presumes that every imputation is malicious;31 this is referred to as
malice in law.
The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that the
imputations were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused
proved that the imputation is true and published with good intention and
justifiable motive.32
There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance,
Article 354 of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:
(1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance
of any legal, moral or social duty;33 and
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged.
The legal conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the
subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of
Munoz statements were fair comments. Consequently, malice is o longer
presumed and the prosecution has the burden of providing that Munoz acted
with malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed in this respect.
Co assails the CAs ruling by raising arguments that essentially require a review
of the CAs factual and legal findings. However, the Court cannot, through the
present petition, review these findings without going against the requirements
of Rule 45 with respect to factual matters, and without violating Munoz right
against double jeopardy given that the acquittal is essentially anchored on
question of fact.
In light of the priviledge nature of Munoz statements and the failure of the
prosectionto prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by
Munoz. Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co That
can be pursued in the present petition. There is no act from which civil liability
may arise that exists.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355 dated January 31, 2007 is
AFFIRMED.
(2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.34
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
In other words, our rulings in Borjal and Guingguing show that privileged
communication has the effect of destroying the presumption of malice or malice
in law and consequently requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of
malice in fact.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ESTELLA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusion in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Divisions
Chairperson Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191411
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari1 are the October 6,
20092 and February 10, 20103Resolutions of public respondent First Division of
Sandiganbayan (SB), denying the Motion to Quash4 dated July 8, 2009 filed by
petitioner Rafael L. Coscolluela (Coscolluela). The said motion was adopted by
petitioners Edwin N. Nacionales (Nacionales), Dr. Ernesto P. Malvas (Malvas),
and Jose Ma. G. Amugod (Amugod), praying for the dismissal of Crim. Case No.
SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases.
The Facts
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province)
for three (3) full terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure,
Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales
subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.5
On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Office of
the Ombudsman) received a letter-complaint6 dated November 7, 2001 from
Peoples Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous
purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount
of P20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela
stepped down from office.
Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the
Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final
Evaluation Report7 dated April 16, 2002 which upgraded the complaint into a
criminal case against petitioners.8 Consequently, petitioners filed their
respective counter-affidavits.9
On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Caares
(Caares) prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding probable
cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information. On even date, the
Information10 was prepared and signed by Caares and submitted to Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro (Miro) for recommendation. Miro
recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003. However, the
final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro), came only
on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB.
Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and
Information only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing
with the SB.11
The sole issue raised for the Courts resolution is whether the SB gravely abused
its discretion in finding that petitioners right to speedy disposition of cases was
not violated.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the
Constitution, mandated to be the "protector of the people" and as such,
required to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
officers and employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, in order to promote efficient service." 25 This great
responsibility cannot be simply brushed aside by ineptitude. Precisely, the Office
of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through the
particulars of case but also to resolve the same within the proper length of time.
Its dutiful performance should not only be gauged by the quality of the
assessment but also by the reasonable promptness of its dispensation. Thus,
barring any extraordinary complication, such as the degree of difficulty of the
questions involved in the case or any event external thereto that effectively
stymied its normal work activity any of which have not been adequately
proven by the prosecution in the case at bar there appears to be no justifiable
basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not have earlier resolved
the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners.
Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged
failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases.
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case
because they were unaware that the investigation against them was still ongoing. They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and
Information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they
received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009. 26 In this
regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them
have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why
petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether. Instructive on this point is
the Courts observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,27 to wit:
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of
their case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against
them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that
petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which
is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their
explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally,
had reason to assume that the charges against them had already been
dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible,
special or even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in
terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay the many layers of
review that the case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail
has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in the
Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve complicated factual and
legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that the subject computerization
contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the
Anti-Graft League filed its complaint. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not
the petitioners duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it
was the Office of the Ombudsmans responsibility to expedite the same within
the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on
all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo: 28
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well
as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.
Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by
the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely
hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of
justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to
speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be
free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his
guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may
interpose.30 This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by
the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the
individual. In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan31 (Corpuz) illumined:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc
basis.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant
that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive
pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial;
and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare
his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the
defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past.
Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by
restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and
damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what
gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone
to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act
or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
punishable by law."(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on the violation of petitioners right to speedy disposition of cases as
herein discussed, the present case stands to be dismissed even before either
the prosecution or the defense has been given the chance to present any
evidence. Thus, the Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement as to
whether petitioners indeed committed the acts or omissions from which any
civil liability on their part might arise as prescribed under Section 2, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court.36 Consequently, absent this pronouncement, the Province is
not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on the delict if only
to recover the amount of P20,000,000.00 in public funds attributable to
petitioners alleged malfeasance.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
October 6, 2009 and February 10, 2010 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is likewise
ordered to DISMISS Crim. Case No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation of the
Constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases of petitioners Rafael L.
Coscolluela, Edwin N. Nacionales, Dr. Ernesto P. Malvas, and Jose Ma. G.
Amugod, without prejudice to any civil action which the Province of Negros
Occidental may file against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division .
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178947
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 assailing the
November 8, 2006 Decision2and July 19, 2007 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88285, upholding the validity of the trial courts
dismissal of separate criminal informations for estafa against private
respondent Timothy J. Desmond (Desmond) due to lack of probable cause.
The Facts
In 2001, petitioner Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio), the majority stockholder of
H.S. Equities, Ltd. (HS Equities) and authorized representative of Westdale
Assets, Ltd. (Westdale),4 was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI),
and the authorized representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China,
Inc. (JV China), the majority shareholder of SBMEI.5After some discussion on
possible business ventures, Dio, on behalf of HS Equities, decided to invest a
total of US$1,150,000.006 in SBMEIs Ocean Adventure Marine Park (Ocean
Adventure), a theme park to be constructed at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone
which, when operational, would showcase live performances of false-killer
whales and sea lions. In this relation, Dio claimed that Desmond led her to
believe that SBMEI had a capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value of
the marine mammals to be used in Ocean Adventure,7 and also guaranteed
substantial returns on investment.8 Desmond even presented a Business Plan,
indicating that: (a) Ocean Adventures "attendance will rise from 271,192 in
2001 to just over 386,728 in 2006, with revenues rising from US$4,420,000.00
million to US$7,290,000.00 million in the same time frame"; (b) "early investors
are expected to reap an annual return of 23% in 2001, rising to 51% in 2006";
and (c) "fully priced shares would yield a 19% return] in 2001, rising to 42% in
2006."9 Thus, on January 18, 2002, a Subscription Agreement 10 was executed by
Desmond, as representative of SBMEI and JV China, and Dio, as representative
of HS Equities.
While no Certificate of Stock was issued either to HS Equities or to Dio, HS
Equities was expressly granted minority protection rights in a subsequent
Subscription and Shareholders Agreement11 dated March 12, 2002, stating that
there shall be "a nominee of the Subscriber to be elected as Treasurer/Chief
Financial Officer, who may not be removed by the Board of Directors without the
affirmative vote of the Subscriber."12 Accordingly, Dio was elected as a member
of SBMEIs Board of Directors and further appointed as its Treasurer.13 The
parties later executed two (2) Investors Convertible Promissory Notes one
dated April 4, 200114 and another dated May 8, 200115 covering HS Equities
That in or about and sometime in early 2001, in Olongapo City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being
the officer of Subic Bay Marine Exploration, Inc. (SBMEI), acting as a syndicate
and by means of deceit, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud H.S. EQUITIES LIMITED, represented in this case by Virginia S. Delos
Santos-Dio in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which he made to said Virginia S.
Delos Santos-Dio to the effect that he had the expertise and qualifications, as
well as the resources, influence, credit and business transaction with the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and other financing institutions to ensure the
viability of the Subic Bay Marine Exploration Ocean Adventure Project
(SBMEOA), which he represented to be a qualified and legally existing
investment enterprise with capacity to solicit investment from the general
public, by submitting documents for the purpose, which representations he
knew to be false and fraudulent and the supporting documents are similarly
spurious and were only made in order to induce said Virginia S. Delos SantosDio to invest and deliver as in fact she invested and delivered a total amount of
One Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand US Dollars ($1,150,000.00) to the said
accused on the strength of said manifestations and representations and
supporting documents, and said accused, once in possession of the said
amount, misapplied, converted and misappropriated the same to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of H.S. Equities Limited
in the amount of US $1,150,000.00 or Php57,500,000.00 Pesos, the dollar
computed at the rate of Php 50.00 to [US]$1.00 which was the prevailing rate of
exchange of a dollar to peso at the time of the commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 515-200434
That in or about and sometime during the period from June 2002 to July 2002, in
Olongapo City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Westdale Assets, Limited represented in this case by Virginia
S. Delos Santos-Dio in the following manner to wit: the said accused received in
trust and for administration from the said Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio the
amount of One Million US Dollars ($1,000,000.00) under the express obligation
of using the same to pay the loan facility of the Subic Bay Marine Exploration,
Inc. (SBMEI) with First Metro Investment Corporation and to fund the
construction and development of the Miracle Beach Project but the said
accused, once in possession of the said amount, with grave abuse of confidence
and with intent to defraud, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the
same for his own use and benefit by devoting it to a purpose or use different
from that agreed upon and despite repeated demands made upon him to
account for and to return the said amount, he failed and refused and still fails
and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Westdale Assets,
Limited in the amount of US $1,000,000.00 or its equivalent to FIFTY MILLION
(Php 50,000,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, the dollar being computed at
the rate of Php50.00 to $ 1.00 which was the prevailing rate of exchange at the
commission of the offense, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Aggrieved, Desmond filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 35 as well as a Motion to
Withdraw Filed Informations.36He also filed before the RTC a Motion to Defer
Further Proceedings and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest37but
subsequently withdrew the same and filed, instead, a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause.38
The RTC Ruling
In an Order39 dated October 21, 2004, the RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and
declared that no probable cause exists for the crimes charged against him since
the elements of estafa were not all present, to wit:
First, the element of misrepresentation or deceit found in par. 2 (a) Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code is absent. It must be emphasized that the promises
allegedly made to the complainant by the accused that her companys
investment will significantly increase, clearly appeared in the Subic Bay Marine
Exploration, Inc.s ("SBMEI", for brevity) printed business plan dated January 12,
2001 (Annex "A", Complaint-Affidavit dated 19 April 2004). Verily, this is SBMEIs
representation or "come on" to would-be investors and not a personal assurance
of the accused. The fact that accused was the companys Chief Executive
Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors is of no moment in the absence
of any evidence to show that accused personally prepared the business plan
thereby making the alleged "rosy picture" his own personal enticements to the
complainant. Therefore, there being a dearth of evidence pointing to the
accused as author of the SBMEIs business plan, any misrepresentation or deceit
committed cannot be personally attributed to him.
Furthermore, the court cannot find any sufficient evidence that the accused
personally assured the complainant about his so-called power, influence and
credit with the SBMA and other financial institutions that would supposedly
insure the viability and profitability of the project. Note that nowhere in the
Complaint-Affidavit of the private complainant are there specific factual
allegations that would show that the accused had personal business meetings
with the SBMA and said financial institutions. As to how and in what manner and
scope accused exercised such alleged power, influence and credit over these
juridical entities remain a bare and self-serving averment in the absence of any
factual detail or account.
Finally, it cannot be gainsaid [sic] that accused was the one who personally
valuated the marine mammals contributed by JV China Incorporated to the
Subic Bay Marine Exploration, Inc. as capital amounting to US$3.724 Million.
Evidence clearly point to an independent valuation done by a third party namely
Beijing Landa Aquarium that valued the marine mammals under the Buy-Out
Agreement dated September 9, 1998. Needless to state, the onus is on
complainant to controvert this valuation. Again, however, no adequate proof
was adduced along this line.
Second, the element of personal misappropriation by the accused under par.
1(b) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is likewise not present. While it may
be conceded that there was money utilized to pay salaries of expatriates and
staff as well as the cost of utilities amounting to US$72,272.00 complainant
failed to show that said money was taken from her companies investments in
SBMEI. It must be pointed out that other than complainants bare allegation,
there was no document presented categorically stating that the investment of
complainants companies were earmark for a particular payment or project.
Hence, when the investment entered SBMEIs financial coffers, the same
presumably were co-mingled with other monies of the corporation.
Moreover and more revealing, is the fact that again there was no showing that it
was accused who personally caused the payment of these expenses allegedly in
violation of the objective of the investment. It must be noted that SBMEI is a
corporation and not a single proprietorship. Being a corporation, expenses paid
of such a kind as utilities and salaries are not authorized personally and solely
by the President nor the Chief Executive Officer nor even by the Chairman of the
Board for that matter. These are corporate acts that are passed through board
resolutions. Hence, these corporate acts can in no way be considered personal
acts of the accused. Yet, he was singled out among all 5 members of the Board
of Directors who presumably, in the ordinary course of business, approved by
resolution the payments of such utilities and salaries. Consequently, there is
again insufficiency of evidence that the accused alone caused the payment of
these salaries and utilities for the sole purpose of pocketing the money thereby
using the same for personal gain.40
Consequently, the RTC denied the issuance of a warrant of arrest and hold
departure order against Desmond and ordered the dismissal of the cases
against him:
show that it was private respondent himself who made such representation.
Notably, the SBMEIs Business Plan dated January 12, 2001 to which private
complainants anchor such allegation does not indicate that the representations
made therein came personally from Desmond. In addition, neither does it
appear from such document that the statements therein were used as a form of
a personal assurance coming from Desmond that private complainants would
indeed double the amount they had invested with SBMEI. If at all, we agree with
the trial court that statements made in the said business plan were merely a
form of enticement to encourage would-be investors from [sic] investing in such
kind of business undertaking.
Moreover, we likewise agree with the trial court that no factual allegations were
made by private complainants as to how such false pretense of power and
influence was made upon them by Desmond and which convinced private
complainants to part with their money. It bears stressing that the allegations of
false pretense of power and influence in a case of estafa are mere conclusions
of law which must be substantiated at the very least by circumstances which
would show that the person accused of committing estafa did indeed commit
acts of false representations. As the records show, there was no
misrepresentation on the part of Desmond that he is the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMEI which is a corporation engaged in the business of
developing marine parks. Significantly, the records likewise show that SBMEI did
indeed build and develop a marine park in Subic Bay (Ocean Adventure) for the
purposes stated in its business plan and had entered into a long-term lease
agreement with SBMA. Documentary evidence in the form of the Report of
Independent Auditors to SBMEI shows the amount of investment the corporation
had invested in the said business undertaking. For instance, the corporation had
invested the amount of P106,788,219.00 in buildings and equipment alone. It
has also assets consisting of marine mammals which are necessary for the
operation of the marine park. In this respect, we cannot subscribe to private
complainants contention that there was misrepresentation on the part of
private respondent that he had overvalued the worth of the marine mammals it
had purchased from Beijing Landa Aquarium Co., Ltd. of the Republic of China.
This claim of private complainants of the deceitful acts employed by Desmond
in overpricing the value of the marine animals for US$3.724 Million when in fact
the sea animals were only valued for one U.S. dollar was not corroborated by
the evidence on hand.
xxxx
In the same manner, the facts in the case at bar that would allegedly constitute
a criminal charge of estafa under par. 1(b) are wanting. Be it noted that under
the said paragraph, estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through
misappropriation or conversion of the money, goods or any other personal
On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of
the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must
himself ascertain from the latters findings and supporting documents whether
probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. This
prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that "no
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce."52
While a judges determination of probable cause is generally confined to the
limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a),53 Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may
immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause,54 viz:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court.
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge
shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already
been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within
five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutors authority, it must
be stressed that the judges dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut
cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause
that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established
facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime
charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than
not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the
parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of
action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence. 55
In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge
proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may
either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately
dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he
doubts the existence of probable cause.56
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTCs immediate dismissal, as
affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable
cause was not observed. In this case, records show that certain essential facts
namely, (a) whether or not Desmond committed false representations that
induced Dio to invest in Ocean Adventure; and (b) whether or not Desmond
utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for the Miracle Beach Project for
purposes different from what was agreed upon remain controverted. As such,
it cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of estafa under
Article 315(2)(a)57 and 315(1) (b)58of the RPC had already been established,
thereby rendering the RTCs immediate dismissal of the case highly improper.
Lest it be misconceived, trial judges will do well to remember that when a
perceived gap in the evidence leads to a "neither this nor that" conclusion, a
purposeful resolution of the ambiguity is preferable over a doubtful dismissal of
the case. Verily, a judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the
filing of the information in court is appropriate only when the failure to establish
probable cause can be clearly inferred from the evidence presented and not
when its existence is simply doubtful. After all, it cannot be expected that upon
the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would have already
presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused, the
objective of a previously-conducted preliminary investigation being merely to
determine whether there is sufficient ground, to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.59 In this light, given that the lack of probable
cause had not been clearly established in this case, the CA erred, and the RTC
gravely abused its discretion, by ruling to dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004
and 516-2004. Indeed, these cases must stand the muster of a full-blown trial
where the parties could be given, as they should be given, the opportunity to
ventilate their respective claims and defenses, on the basis of which the court a
quo can properly resolve the factual disputes therein.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The November 8, 2006 Decision and
July 19, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 88285 which
affirmed the October 21, 2004 Order of Dismissal issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74 are SET ASIDE. The two (2) criminal
informations for estafa against respondent Timothy J. Desmond in Criminal Case
Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004 are hereby REINSTATED. Accordingly, the trial
court is directed to proceed with the arraignment of the accused and the trial of
the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house
even when they heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the
house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through
its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.
Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:
Q By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the
open door, how was the door open? Was it totally open, or was it partially open?
A It was partially open Your Honor.
Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
A More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.
Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if
the door was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?
A We pushed the door, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door
and peeped inside it, as a police officer?
A Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may
Q Are you not allowed to Are you not required to get a search warrant before
you can search the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before
searching the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to
investigate the house, considering your admission that you suspected that there
was something wrong inside the house?
A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.
Q But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open
to peep through its opening because you did not know what was
happening inside?
A Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the abovementioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure
that resulted from it was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized
are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since
the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused. 17
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his
arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. 18
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
September 21, 2007 and Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937 and ACQUITS the accused George
Antiquera y Codes of the crime of which he is charged for lack of evidence
sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.1wphi1 The Court
further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail bond he posted for his
provisional liberty.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the
charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of
nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant
criminal case.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183805
July 3, 2013
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City,
in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the
voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the
husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to
Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against
him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private
respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioners
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as
a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla
Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for
declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated,
among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or
intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the
resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the
parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to
dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage between
James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the
same was denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging
that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL
COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE
CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF
THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE
CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO
CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING
AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT,
AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES
OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES
WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS
HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy
as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been
legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy
were present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a
valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on
September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage
for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the
crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be
charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy
ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the
subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared
null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already
been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that
action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence
or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time
the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case,
even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was
void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case
and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender
upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to
him until extinguished as provided by law. 13 It is clear then that the crime of
bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second
marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of
nullity of petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him.
Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2007
Decision2 and the January 31, 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 81510. The CA affirmed the Orders4 dated August 15, 2003 and
November 5, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila denying (a)
the Omnibus Motion5 for the exclusion of a private prosecutor in the two
criminal cases for perjury pending before the MeTC, and (b) the Motion for
Reconsideration6 of the said order denying the Omnibus Motion, respectively.
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on ___July 3, 2013___ a Decision, copy attached
herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on July 16, 2013 at 2:30 a.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181658
August 7, 2013
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings,
Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group)
which includes the pioneer company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The
CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and his
siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority stockholder
and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioners siblings including respondent and some
unidentified persons took over and barricaded themselves inside the premises
of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and other factory employees were unable
to enter the factory premises. This incident led to the filing of Criminal Case
Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against Nixon Lee and 972-V-99 against Nixon
Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and respondent, which are now
pending in different courts in Valenzuela City. 7
On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretarys
Certificate8 issued by Virginia Lee on even date) caused the filing of a verified
Petition9 for the Issuance of an Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 23223810 which covers a property owned by CHI. The case was
docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the said court an Affidavit of Loss 11 stating
that: (1) by virtue of his position as President of CHI, he had in his custody and
possession the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238 issued by the Register
of Deeds for Manila; (2) that said owners copy of TCT No. 232238 was
inadvertently lost or misplaced from his files and he discovered such loss in May
1999; (3) he exerted diligent efforts in locating the said title but it had not been
found and is already beyond recovery; and (4) said title had not been the
subject of mortgage or used as collateral for the payment of any obligation with
any person, credit or banking institution. Petitioner likewise testified in support
of the foregoing averments during an ex-parte proceeding. In its Order12 dated
September 17, 1999, the RTC granted the petition and directed the Register of
Deeds of Manila to issue a new Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in
lieu of the lost one.
Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying,
among others, that the September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that
petitioner knew fully well that respondent was in possession of the said Owners
Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital
documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have
another copy of the title because he planned to mortgage the same with the
Planters Development Bank. Respondent even produced the Owners Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. 232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC
recalled and set aside its September 17, 1999 Order. 13
8. I and my brother Nixon Lee opposed the petition of Paul Lee and even
produced in open court the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238.
Such fact was contained in the Order of Branch 4, RTC, Manila, dated
November 12, 1999, x x x.
At the trial, Atty. Augusto M. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as
private prosecutor with the consent and under the control and supervision of
the public prosecutor. After the prosecutions presentation of its first witness in
the person of Atty. Ronaldo Viesca, Jr.,20 a lawyer from the Land Registration
Authority, petitioners counsel moved in open court that respondent and her
lawyer in this case should be excluded from participating in the case since
perjury is a public offense. Said motion was vehemently opposed by Atty.
Macam.21 In its Order22 dated May 7, 2003, the MeTC gave both the defense and
the prosecution the opportunity to submit their motion and comment
respectively as regards the issue raised by petitioners counsel.
Complying with the MeTCs directive, petitioner filed the aforementioned
Omnibus Motion23 asserting that in the crime of perjury punishable under Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of any private
offended party. As such, a private prosecutor cannot intervene for the
prosecution in this case. Petitioner argued that perjury is a crime against public
interest as provided under Section 2, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, where the offended party is the State alone. Petitioner
posited that there being no allegation of damage to private interests, a private
prosecutor is not needed. On the other hand, the Prosecution filed its
Opposition24 to petitioners Omnibus Motion.
The MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion in the Order25 dated August 15, 2003, as
follows:
[W]hile criminal actions, as a rule, are prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor, however, an offended party may intervene in
the proceeding, personally or by attorney, especially in cases of offenses which
cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party. The only
exception to this rule is when the offended party waives his right to [file the]
civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of
the case, in which case he loses his right to intervene upon the theory that he is
deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. And, in any event, whenever
an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his
intervention must always be subject to the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. (Lim Tek Goan vs. Yatco, 94 Phil. 197).
Apparently, the law makes no distinction between cases that are public in
nature and those that can only be prosecuted at the instance of the offended
party. In either case, the law gives to the offended party the right to intervene,
personally or by counsel, and he is deprived of such right only when he waives
the civil action or reserves his right to institute one. Such is not the situation in
this case. The case at bar involves a public crime and the private prosecution
has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, subject to the direction
and control of the public prosecutor.26
The MeTC also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. 27
Petitioner sought relief from the CA via a petition28 for certiorari with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Petitioner prayed, among others, for the CA to enjoin the MeTC and
respondent from enforcing the MeTC Orders dated August 15, 2003 and
November 5, 2003, and likewise to enjoin the MeTC and respondent from further
allowing the private prosecutor to participate in the proceedings below while the
instant case is pending.
By Decision29 dated May 31, 2007, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, holding
that the presence of the private prosecutor who was under the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor during the criminal proceedings of the two
perjury cases is not proscribed by the rules. The CA ratiocinated that
respondent is no stranger to the perjury cases as she is the private complainant
therein, hence, an aggrieved party.30 Reiterating the MeTCs invocation of our
ruling in Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco31 as cited by former Supreme Court Associate
Justice Florenz D. Regalado in his Remedial Law Compendium, 32 the CA ruled
that "the offended party, who has neither reserved, waived, nor instituted the
civil action may intervene, and such right to intervene exists even when no civil
liability is involved."33
Without passing upon the merits of the perjury cases, the CA declared that
respondents property rights and interests as the treasurer and a stockholder of
CHI were disturbed and/or threatened by the alleged acts of petitioner. Further,
the CA opined that petitioners right to a fair trial is not violated because the
presence of the private prosecutor in these cases does not exclude the
presence of the public prosecutor who remains to have the prosecuting
authority, subjecting the private prosecutor to his control and supervision.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 but the CA denied it under
Resolution35 dated January 31, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED
stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer
and the treasurer of CHI and the private complainant. Thus, she submits that
pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to intervene even if no
civil liability exists in this case.41
The petition has no merit.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that "[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly
liable."42 Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a
person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has
violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right,
honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the
same punishable act or omission.43
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a
private prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.Where the civil
action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to
Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
defines an offended party as "the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed." In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 44 this Court
rejected petitioners theory that it is only the State which is the offended party
in public offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language of Section
12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended
party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the
offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the
offender is civilly liable is the offended party.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,45 we also held that Under Section 16,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may
also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was
actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the
accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual
acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial
interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under
the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the
legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction
of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate
or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one
based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
unrelated party.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No.
232238 covering CHIs property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be
perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondents personal credibility and
reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities
of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation
itself is likewise undeniable as the court-ordered issuance of a new owners
duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by respondents timely discovery
of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case
being tried in the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v.
Yatco,47 cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public or private crimes are
involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the
offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the
private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that
right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party
is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of
the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such
intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the
public prosecutor.48
In Chua v. Court of Appeals,49 as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by
private respondent who is also the corporations Treasurer, four counts of
falsification of public documents (Minutes of Annual Stockholders Meeting) was
instituted by the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private
respondents testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude
her counsels as private prosecutors on the ground that she failed to allege and
prove any civil liability in the case. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered
the exclusion of said private prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court
reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the private prosecutors in the
prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA which dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC
ruling.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the
private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the
nature of the offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense
charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not
intervene in the prosecution of the offense.
Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising
from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also
civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1)
the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law
he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person,
right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is
felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so
much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the
moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another
by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the
penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action
involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes
restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted
in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene
by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to
institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the
offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the
trial of the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondents testimony in the inferior court did
not establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of
petitioners alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal
damages were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private
prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is
not necessary and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be
taken of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are the
persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may
be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive
to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil
action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of
civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries
suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor
did the offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence
should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability
arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has the right
to intervene through the private prosecutors.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted.)
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the
MeTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners
motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos. 35227071 CR.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated
May 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 31, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510 are hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135053
March 6, 2002
The Case
For automatic review is the July 30, 1998 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (Branch 27) in Criminal Case No. 3299,
convicting Benjamin Galvez of qualified rape and sentencing him to death. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused Benjamin Galvez y Domingo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of committing rape against his own daughter,
16 years old at the time of the rape, he is hereby sentenced to die by
lethal injection; to pay the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and to pay the costs of the suit."2
The Facts
In its Brief,3 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the following narration of
facts:
"Cristina Galvez was born on May 10, 1981. She, her father, Benjamin
Galvez, the appellant herein, together with her five (5) siblings, resided
at Tuao South, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.
"Sometime in the third week of April 1997, about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening, Cristina, who was then sixteen (16) years old, and her youngest
sister, Melowin, were sleeping beside each other on the bed. Their bed
was beside an aparador and Cristina slept on the side nearest to the
aparador. Appellant's bed was beside the door and was just near the bed
where Cristina and Melowin were sleeping. Three (3) of their brothers
were also asleep in the house, namely, Melchor, 13 years old, Alvin, 12
years old, and Jesus, 9 years old, while their 19 year-old brother was at a
neighbor's house watching television. Their mother, Marilyn Galvez, was
not with them as she was in Hongkong at that time.
"That night, appellant, who was drunk, arrived and then ate. After eating,
he went to lie down on his bed. After a lapse of thirty (30) minutes,
appellant went to lie down on the bed where Cristina and Melowin were
sleeping. He positioned himself on the right side of Cristina, slowly lifting
and moving Melowin, who was asleep beside Cristina, away from her
sister's side. Then, he slowly removed Cristina's shorts and shirt and
began touching her on all parts of her body. He positioned himself on top
of her but she kicked him, causing him to be thrown against the
aparador. Apparently hurt and angered, he pulled his samurai from under
his mat and pointed it towards the left front portion between her breast
and her armpit. Scared, she was immobilized. She knew of her father's
capacity to kill her because she had previously witnessed how he almost
killed their mother when the latter was still with them before she left for
Hongkong. Appellant completely undressed himself, started to kiss her,
and forcibly inserted his sexual organ into hers and did a pumping
motion. Before leaving her to sleep on his bed, he threatened to kill her if
she would report what he did to her, warning that he would also include
the one whom she would report to. She felt pain on her body, including
her private parts. She also saw a small quantity of blood coming from
her vagina.1wphi1.nt
"On April 28, 1997, appellant repeated the dastardly act on his daughter,
Cristina. This time, he already held the samurai, pointing it towards her
neck when he went near her. Afraid, she had to allow appellant to
undress her without a struggle and he successfully had sexual
intercourse with her. He thereafter regularly raped her about 3 to 4 times
a week, usually after a one (1) day interval. This went on until Cristina
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy on January 23, 1998. The
baby boy was named Christian."4(Citations omitted)
In an Information dated February 20, 1998, appellant was charged with multiple
rape, defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 8353. He allegedly
committed the crime as follows:
"That sometime in the third week of April, 1997, in the evening and
several times thereafter, in Barangay Tuao South, Municipality of
Bagabag, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, with the use of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his
daughter Cristina Galvez y Tomboc, 16 years old at the time, against the
latter's will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice
including her parents."5
(3) The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in
his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires."18
Moreover, as prescribed in Aranzado, the searching inquiry to be conducted by
the trial court should consist of the following:
"(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the
custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c)
under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility
that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress
either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or
avenging quarters.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning
and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as
his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused [of] the exact length of imprisonment or nature of
the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express
remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not
labor under these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the
charges against him or make him reenact the manner in which he
perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply missing details of
significance."19
COURT:
I would like to ask the accused if he understands from his
counsel, the circumstances in this case because the victim here is
his own daughter and she is below 18 years of age. In accordance
with the heinous offense law, the Court will have to impose on
him the penalty of death. Is this clear to the accused? At any rate
we will conduct a trial to find out if there is sufficient evidence to
convict you so that your rights will be protected you are given a
chance to prove your innocence latter to refute the evidence of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt."20
It is clear from the foregoing that the trial judge did not conduct a "searching
inquiry" into the voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilt and full
In the instant case, the Court also notes that "guilty" was not the original plea of
appellant; hence, careful effort should have been exerted by the court below to
inquire into why he changed his plea. In addition, he refused to present
evidence in his defense. This should have again prompted the trial judge to
probe more deeply, following the guidelines in Aranzado.
A plea of guilt is improvidently accepted where no effort is made to explain to
the accused that, in a case involving a capital offense, such plea may result in
the imposition of the death penalty.26 The same is true when the requirements
in Aranzado are not satisfied.27 Recently, in People v. Bernas,28 the Court set
aside a death sentence and remanded the case to the trial court, because
the Aranzado guidelines on how to conduct a "searching inquiry" had not been
followed.
WHEREFORE, the automatically appealed Decision is SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case No. 3299 is REMANDED to the court of origin for re-arraignment and
further proceedings to be conducted with all deliberate speed, in accordance
with this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 159450
Although a waiver of the right to present evidence by the accused is not a trivial
matter to be lightly regarded by the trial court, the filing of the demurrer to
evidence without express leave of court operates as a waiver that binds the
accused pursuant to the express provision of the Rules of Court.
Under challenge in this appeal is the decision promulgated on July 31, 2003 in
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 24556, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
conviction for qualified theft of the accused, a teller of complainant Prudential
Bank, and punished her with reclusion perpetua,1 thereby modifying the
decision dated May 26, 2000 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, in
Angeles City (RTC),2 imposing an indeterminate sentence from ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
Antecedents
The information charged the accused with qualified theft, alleging:
That on or about the 2nd of January, 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL, being then the teller of Prudential Bank,
Angeles Main Branch, Sto. Rosario Street, Angeles City, and as such is entrusted
with cash and other accountabilities, with grave abuse of trust and confidence
reposed upon her by her employer, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to
$10,000.00, belonging to the Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch,
represented by its Branch Manager, EDGARDO PANLILIO, to the damage and
prejudice of Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch, in the aforementioned
amount of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) or its equivalent of TWO
HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P260,000.00), Philippine Currency and
parity rate.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.3
After the accused pleaded not guilty at arraignment, the State presented four
witnesses, namely: Prudential Bank Branch Manager Edgardo Panlilio, Sr., Bank
Auditor Virgilio Frias, Bank Cashier Noel Cunanan, and account holder Apolinario
Tayag.
The summary of the evidence of the State rendered in the assailed decision of
the CA follows:4
xxx
Among the six tellers in the Angeles City main branch of Prudential Bank,
accused-appellant (hereafter "appellant") was the only teller assigned to handle
dollar deposits and withdrawals.
On January 2, 1996, an internal spot-audit team headed by Prudential Banks
senior audit examiner Virgilio Frias ("Frias"), inventoried the cash
accountabilities of the said branch by manually counting the money in each of
the tellers cash boxes. While the books of the branch showed that appellant
had a cash accountability of $15,040.52, the money in her cash box was only
$5,040.52.
Asked about the shortage of $10,000.00, appellant explained that there was a
withdrawal of $10,000.00 on December 29, 1995 after the cut-off time which
would be treated as a withdrawal on January 2, 1996. Appellant then presented
to Frias a withdrawal memo dated January 2, 1996 showing a withdrawal of
$10,000.00 from Dollar Savings Account No. FX-836 ("FX-836") of Adoracion
Tayag and her co-signatory, Apolinario Tayag.
On January 3, 1996, appellant showed the aforesaid withdrawal memo to the
branch cashier, Noel Cunanan ("Cunanan"). Noticing that the said withdrawal
memo did not contain the required signatures of two bank officers, Cunanan
asked appellant what the nature of the transaction was. Appellant replied that
the depositor, Apolinario Tayag, had instructed her to withdraw $10,000.00 from
his account on January 3, 1996, through his driver whom he had sent to the
bank. Cunanan, however, did not notice that while the withdrawal was supposed
to have been made on January 3, 1996, the withdrawal memo was dated
January 2, 1996. Cunanan then instructed appellant to have the withdrawal
posted in the corresponding ledger and to bring the withdrawal memo back to
him so he and the branch manager, Edgardo Panlilio, could affix their
signatures.
Meanwhile, Frias checked the account ledger of FX-836, and found a "hold
jacket" indicating that no withdrawal from the said account should be allowed to
reduce its balance below $35,000.00. The supposed withdrawal of $10,000.00
had reduced the account balance of FX-836 to $26,077.51.
From the account ledger, Frias also discovered that a deposit of $10,000.00 was
made on January 2, 1996. He found the deposit memo on file. Thereafter, Frias
compared the signature on the withdrawal memo with the specimen signatures
of the depositors in their signature card. Finding a "big difference" in the
signatures, he referred the matter to the branch manager, Edgardo Panlilio
("Panlilio").
Asked by Panlilio to explain, appellant reiterated that the withdrawal was made
after the cut-off time on December 29, 1995. Doubting her explanation, Frias
conducted another cash count. At that time, appellants accountability based on
the books of the bank was $21,778.86, but the money in her cash box was only
$11,778.86, thus, short of US$10,000.00. When Panlilio again asked appellant to
explain, the latter started to cry and said she would explain to the bank
president.
The next day, January 4, 1996, appellant told Panlilio that she gave the
$10,000.00 to a person on December 29, 1995 because her family was being
threatened.
In her letter to the bank president dated January 4, 1996, appellant apologized
and explained her shortage of $10,000.00 and another shortage of P2.2 Million
which the audit team had also discovered. She wrote:
Sometime in the month of September, a man approached me at my counter
and handed me a note demanding me (sic) to give him a big amount of money
of P600,000. I looked at him and told him I dont have any. He told me to get at
my drawer and not to tell anybody because their companions are at the nearby
of my house (sic) and threatened me that something will happened (sic) to my
kids. That time he looked back and I also saw another man w/ radio at his waist,
who stood up and went out. I nervously handed him the money. While doing
this, I tried to pull the alarm at my counter but it was out of order. This alarm
was out of order for quite sometime but I was still hoping it might work. Since
that day, time and again, he kept on coming back and I couldnt do anything but
to give in to his request. His second, he demanded for (sic) another P600,000
but I gave him only P530,000. The 3rd & 4th was P550,000 each. Last
December 29, 1995 at around 3:00 pm, I was surprised to see him at my
counter, again, he was asking for money. I was balancing my dollar transaction.
But that time, I had delivered my peso cash box to our cashier. He saw the
bundle of $10,000 which was on top of my desk because I was writing the
breakdown on my cash count. He wanted me to give it to him & this time he
pointed a gun at me and I got so nervous & gave him the dollars.
During this time, in order for me to be balance with (sic) my transactions, I cash
out checks (suppose to be for late deposit) & included them in todays clearing.
The following day, I validated the deposit slips as cash deposit. . .
Apolinario Tayag denied withdrawing $10,000.00 from FX-836 either on
December 29, 1995 or on January 2, 1996 when he was in Baguio City. He said
he was not familiar with the withdrawal and deposit memos showing the
withdrawal of $10,000.00 from the said account and the subsequent deposit of
the same amount therein. He also denied the signatures thereon as his or his
mothers.
xxx
Upon the State resting its case against the accused, her counsel filed
a Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence,5 praying for the
dismissal of the charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did not
suffice to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer
Defense Evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis that
her filing her demurrer to evidence without express leave of court as required
by Section 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court had waived her right to present
evidence, viz: 6
WHEREFORE, the Demurer to Evidence filed by the accused is hereby denied for
lack of merit.
Reviewing further the records of this case, there is evidence and proof that the
Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused Cristobal is without express leave of
court hence, under Section 15 par. 2 of Rule 119, accused Cristobal has waived
her right to present evidence and submit the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution.
In view thereof, this case filed against accused Cristobal is hereby submitted for
decision.
SO ORDERED.
On May 26, 2000, therefore, the RTC rendered its decision finding and
pronouncing the accused guilty of qualified theft, 7 disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Olivia Aleth Cristobal guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft and hereby sentences her to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused Cristobal is also ordered to pay Prudential Bank, the amount of US
$10,000.00, representing the amount that was lost, plus interest.
SO ORDERED.
The accused appealed, but the CA affirmed her conviction on July 31, 2003,
albeit modifying the penalty,8 finding and ruling as follows:
The following circumstances as established by the prosecutions evidence, show
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant stole US$10,000.00 from Prudential
Bank:
1. Appellant was the only teller in the Angeles City main branch of
Prudential Bank assigned to handle dollar transactions. Thus, it was only
she who had access to the subject account for purposes of dollar
deposits and withdrawals;
2. She admitted having transacted or processed the supposed
withdrawal of US$10,000.00 from dollar savings account no. FX-836;
3. It was she who presented to the head auditor, Rolando Frias, the
withdrawal memo for US$10,000.00 supposedly withdrawn from dollar
savings account no. FX-836, saying that it was withdrawn on December
29, 1995 after the cut-off time and would be considered a withdrawal on
January 2, 1996;
4. The said withdrawal memo did not contain the required signatures of
two bank officers;
5. The supposed withdrawal of $10,000.00 from dollar savings account
no. FX-836 reduced the balance thereof to P26,077.51, violating the
"hold jacket" or instruction in the account ledger which disallowed any
withdrawal from the said account that would reduce the balance thereof
below P35,000.00;
6. The discrepancy in the signature on the withdrawal memo and the
specimen signatures in the depositors signature card;
7. Asked to explain the shortage of $10,000.00 revealed by the second
cash count, following the discovery of the aforesaid "hold jacket" in the
account ledger and discrepancy in the signatures, appellant began to
cry, saying she would just explain to the bank president;
8. The depositor, Apolinario Tayag, denied withdrawing money from
dollar savings account no. FX-836 either on December 29, 1995, when
appellant claimed the withdrawal was made, or on January 2, 1996, the
date of the withdrawal memo, at which time he was in Baguio City. He
was not familiar with the withdrawal and deposit memos showing the
Issues
In her appeal, the accused submits that the CA gravely erred:
1. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused on the basis of an
information for qualified theft that charges the accused to have taken
$10,000.00 on January 2, 1996 when the evidence on record based on
various admissions of the prosecution's witnesses reveal that the
accused did not and cannot take away $10,000.00 on January 2, 1996.
2. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused based on an extrajudicial admission that was made without assistance of counsel and
hearsay evidence as testified by the next most possible suspects to the
loss.
3. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused when the facts and
evidence on record do not satisfy the elements of the crime as charged.
4. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused when the very
procedure employed by the trial court in the case at bench showed
leniency to the prosecution and strictness to the defense in violation of
the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused.
5. xxx in affirming the ruling of the trial court that the accused had
waived her right to present evidence-in-chief despite the expressed
We deny the petition for review and affirm the CAs decision.
1.
Findings of CA and RTC are affirmed
due to being based on the evidence
There is no question about the findings of fact being based on the evidence
adduced by the Prosecution. The decisions of both lower courts are remarkable
for their thoroughness and completeness. In fact, the accused did not impugn
the findings of fact, and confined herself only to the validity of the information
and the legality of her letter due to its being held admissible as evidence
against her. Although she decried her failure to present her evidence on account
of her having demurred without express leave of court, that, too, was not an
obstacle to the correctness of the findings of fact against her. Thus, we sustain
the findings of fact, for findings of the CA upon factual matters are conclusive
and ought not to be disturbed unless they are shown to be contrary to the
evidence on record.10
2.
Information was sufficient and valid
The petitioner submits that the information charged her with qualified theft that
allegedly transpired on December 29, 1995, but the evidence at trial could not
be the basis of her conviction because it actually proved that the taking had
transpired on January 2, 1996; and that the discrepancy would unduly prejudice
her rights as an accused to be informed of the charges as to enable her to
prepare for her defense. To bolster her submission, she cites the testimony of
Virgilio Frias11 to the effect that she was cleared of her accountability upon her
turning her cash box over to the bank cashier on December 29, 1995, thereby
negating the accusation that she had taken the money on December 29, 1995.
3.
CA and RTC did not err in deeming petitioner
to have waived her right to present evidence
The accused contended that:
xxx
(2) The trial court denied accused (sic) Demurrer To Evidence and Motion To
Defer Defense Evidence and ruled that the accused is considered to have
waived her evidence (for alleged lack of leave of court). Although the accused is
not principally relying on this error (because the prosecutions own evidence
show that she is not guilty), still it was error for the trial court to deprive the
accused of her day in court because the demurrer was at the same time, as
stated in the title thereof, also a motion to defer defense evidence. 15
The CA rejected her contention in the following manner: 16
As to whether or not the Trial Court correctly ruled that appellant waived the
presentation of her evidence when she filed her "Demurrer To Evidence and
Motion to Defer Evidence" without prior leave of court, We rule in the
affirmative.
Appellants theory that prior leave of court had been requested because her
demurrer was, at the same time, also a motion to defer defense evidence,
cannot be sustained. A motion to defer evidence does not constitute a request
for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In fact, such motion indicates that
appellant wanted the Trial Court to consider the demurrer before proceeding to
hear her evidence. Furthermore, there is nothing in appellants Demurrer from
which it can be inferred that appellant was asking the Trial Court permission to
move for the dismissal of the case.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 15. Demurrer to Evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case, the
court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its
own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on
motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence
in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without
express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, when the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of
court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. In such a case, the
waiver of the right to present defense evidence is unqualified.
Unavoidably, Our attention is drawn to the apparent negligence of appellants
counsel in failing to secure prior leave of court before filing her Demurrer to
Evidence. However, We cannot lose sight of the fact that in law, the negligence
of appellants counsel binds her. Indeed, jurisprudence teems with
pronouncements that a client is bound by the conduct, negligence and mistakes
of his counsel.
The CA did not thereby err.
The rule in point is Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court, viz:
Section 15. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case,
the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1)
on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or
(2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence
in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express
leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (n)
Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have waived her right
to present evidence because she did not obtain the express leave of court for
her demurrer to evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary and knowing waiver
of her right to present evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire into the
voluntariness and intelligence of the waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer
to evidence without first obtaining express leave of court effectively waived her
right to present her evidence.
It is true that the Court has frequently deemed the failure of the trial courts to
conduct an inquiry into the voluntariness and intelligence of the waiver to be a
sufficient cause to remand cases to the trial courts for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the accused truly intended to waive their constitutional
right to be heard, and whether they understood the consequences of their
waivers.17 In People v. Bodoso,18 a prosecution for a capital offense, we leaned
towards the protection of the accuseds constitutional right to due process by
outlining the proper steps to be taken before deeming the right to present
evidence as waived, thus:
Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused
in a capital offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be
taken when a trial court comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who
wants to waive his clients right to present evidence and be heard, it shall be
the unequivocal duty of the trial court to observe, as a prerequisite to the
validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a "searching inquiry" as specified
in People v. Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty, particularly
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with
their respective counsel on the desire or manifestation of the accused to
waive the right to present evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and
especially the accused with their respective counsel in the hearing which
must be recorded. Their presence must be duly entered in the minutes of
the proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to
a. ask the defense counsel a series of question to determine
whether he had conferred with and completely explained to the
accused that he had the right to present evidence and be heard
as well as its meaning and consequences, together with the
significance and outcome of the waiver of such right. If the lawyer
for the accused has not done so, the trial court shall give the
latter enough time to fulfill this professional obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the
accused whether he wants to present evidence or submit a
memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency
considering that the Sandiganbayan itself had told him to file the demurrer to
evidence. Thus, after the demurrer to evidence was denied, the accused was
held to be still entitled to present his evidence.
The accused and her counsel should not have ignored the potentially prejudicial
consequence of the filing of a demurrer to evidence without the leave of court
required in Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court. 20They were well
aware of the risk of a denial of the demurrer being high, for by demurring the
accused impliedly admitted the facts adduced by the State and the proper
inferences therefrom.21 We cannot step in now to alleviate her self-inflicted
plight, for which she had no one to blame but herself; otherwise, we may unduly
diminish the essence of the rule that gave her the alternative option to waive
presenting her own evidence.
4.
Petitioners handwritten letter
is admissible in evidence
The next issue concerns the admissibility of the accuseds letter dated January
4, 1996 to Prudential Banks President explaining the shortage of her dollar
collection as bank teller,22 the relevant portion of which follows:
xxx Sometime in the month of September, a man approached me at my counter
and handed me a note demanding me (sic) to give him a big amount of money
of P600,000. I looked at him and told him I dont have any. He told me to get at
my drawer and not to tell anybody because their companions are at the nearby
of my house (sic) and threatened me that something will happened (sic) to my
kids. That time he looked back and I also saw another man w/ radio at his waist,
who stood up and went out. I nervously handed him the money. While doing
this, I tried to pull the alarm at my counter but it was out of order. This alarm
was out of order for quite sometime but I was still hoping it might work. Since
that day, time and again, he kept on coming back and I couldnt do anything but
to give in to his request. His second, he demanded for (sic) another P600,000
but I gave him only P530,000. The 3rd & 4th was P550,000 each. Last
December 29, 1995 at around 3:00 pm, I was surprised to see him at my
counter, again, he was asking for money. I was balancing my dollar transaction.
But that time, I had delivered my peso cash box to our cashier. He saw the
bundle of $10,000 which was on top of my desk because I was writing the
breakdown on my cash count. He wanted me to give it to him & this time he
pointed a gun at me and I got so nervous & gave him the dollars.
During this time, in order for me to be balance with (sic) my transactions, I cash
out checks (suppose to be for late deposit) & included them in todays clearing.
The following day, I validated the deposit slips as cash deposit xxx.
The accused submits that the letter was inadmissible for being in reality an
uncounselled extrajudicial confession, and for not being executed under oath.
The submission lacks persuasion.
The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its
being executed with the assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a
voluntary party admission under Section 26,23 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
that was admissible against her. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible
against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to presume that the admission
corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitters fault if the admission does
not.24 By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is
competent primary evidence against the admitter.25
Worth pointing out is that the letter was not a confession due to its not
expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft. Under
Section 30,26 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an
accused acknowledging guilt for the offense charged, or for any offense
necessarily included therein.
Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused
when she wrote the letter because she spontaneously made it while not under
custodial investigation. Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be
valid and better appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest, or
during custodial investigation, or under coercion by the investigating authorities
of the Government. The distinction of her situation from that of a person
arrested or detained and under custodial investigation for the commission of an
offense derived from the clear intent of insulating the latter from police coercion
or intimidation underlying Section 12 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail
pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of
that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle
that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity
but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the
accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. 10
The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste
was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of
homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one
day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal
as maximum.11
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight
on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. 13 It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to
extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised "with grave caution
and only for strong reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that
bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing
medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner
failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued
confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in
danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent
him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he clearly
preferred to be attended by his personal physician.14
For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be
allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of
petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and
made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough
to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. 15
Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his
application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital
offense was strong.
We disagree.
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent
court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are
not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution
without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in
a case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively
lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for admission to
bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners application for bail pending
appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgmentbut
it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction.18Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 19 It must be so
patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In
other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear
showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. 20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal,
the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No
capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to
the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or imputation be inferred. As
observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of
its discretion. The denial of petitioners application for bail pending appeal was
not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners
claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case
for the purpose of granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal
was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate
court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal
rulings of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application
and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and
conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition
only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of
allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not
only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the
courts.23 (emphasis supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts
Petitioners Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding
six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the
said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or
commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense
while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating
the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not
present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the
said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the
commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority
in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may
be summarized in the following rules:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending
appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine
whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise
sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail
pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the
appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other
than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice;27 on the basis thereof, it may either allow or
disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the
appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be
primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of
the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so
because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to
deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of
bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two
different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the
import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the
grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it
interprets the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all
situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant
of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is,
one restricted to the determination of whether any of the five bailnegating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any
such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be
granted pending appeal.
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding
body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists.
This unduly constricts its "discretion" into merely filling out the checklist of
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely
curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular
factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice." 28 Choice occurs
where, between "two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of
options)," there is "more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the
outcome left to the decision maker."29 On the other hand, the establishment of a
clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. 30 Thus, by severely
clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere
fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where
the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the
provision that "upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission
to bail is discretionary."
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this
case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve
the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed
reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the
facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter. 31 In view of the
grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all
circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his
conviction is affirmed.32 It should also give due regard to any other pertinent
matters beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record, character
and reputation of the applicant,33 among other things. More importantly, the
discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal
necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is
not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be
determined by the appellate court.34 In other words, a threshold requirement for
the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely
intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.35 This must be so;
otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting
appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail
pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong
presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power
was sound,36specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no
judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for
substantial error.37
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as
pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following
policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law
existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
for bail is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is
out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense
charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or
information, he may be allowed to remain free on his original bail
pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the proper court directs
otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as
amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail,
and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that
charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the
preceding paragraph shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail
and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his
bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement
pending resolution of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now
pending appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty,
the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within
ten (10) days from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman
thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after which,
the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National
Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall
remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period
of ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall
be issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be
dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he
shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated
August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as
follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a) before or
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this
Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional
liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not
more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance
of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole,
under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the
accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on
motion and with notice to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in
these Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe
punished with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were
thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more
restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to
the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with
leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a
non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional
Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail
pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction
in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion
perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right
at any stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was
not punished by reclusion perpetua.39
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail
pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the
matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly
identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending
appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
DECISION
WE CONCUR:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
24167-24170, 24195-24196,1questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his
plea bargaining proposal.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
March 25, 2004, as follows:
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 163972-77
Said accused,2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before
this Court for three counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums
of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly
tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making
it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal
hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when,
in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for
malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three counts
of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not
guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating
circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable,
said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the
crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a
plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a
private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused
offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but
to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as
acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of
falsification of public document by a private individual. The prosecution
explained:
"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act
of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by a private
individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will
strengthen our cases against the principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto
Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts."
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise
amenable to the offer of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of
failure of an accountable officer to render accounts because:
"x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount
of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of
Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government
has already been restituted x x x.3
4
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution, dated March 25, 2004,
denied petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation
by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to
justify its approval.5
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution dated May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying his plea bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is
not an accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on
a "routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved
is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted. 6
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser
offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in
return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.7
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several
witnesses.9
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon
which plea bargaining may be made,i.e., that it should be with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor,10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules
however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an
exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to
make such plea.11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty
for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as
a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused. 12
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,13 the Court ruled that the acceptance of
an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as
a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court,14 viz:
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office
of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly
exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437,
450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does
not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his
concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980,
96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely
the rationale or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which
the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change
his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide
could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The
reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under
which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been
intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining.15 (Emphasis
supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already
rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the
trial court's exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it
amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are
sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for
Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser
offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear
that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the
timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with
regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while the Informations
contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation against petitioner,
nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may
still be held liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is
shown that the failure to render account was in violation of a law or regulation
that requires him to render such an accounting within the prescribed period.
WE CONCUR:
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this
case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to
such lesser offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in
that the nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require
possession or custody of local government funds, 29 not to mention that
petitioner has already restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in this case.
Unlike Estradawhich involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death,30 and a whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case
tremendously pales in comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will
result in a discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to
intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004
and May 31, 2004 are SETASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to
grant petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance
with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA*
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice