Conceptual Foundations of Field Theories in Physics

Author(s): Andrew Wayne

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings
of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers (Sep., 2000), pp. S516-S522
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188691 .
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Discussion: Conceptual Foundations

of Field Theories in Physics
AndrewWaynett
ConcordiaUniversity

This discussion provides a brief commentaryon each of the papers presentedin the
symposium on the conceptual foundations of field theories in physics. In Section 2 I
suggest an alternativeto Paul Teller's (1999) readingof the gauge argumentthat may
help to solve, or dissolve, its puzzling aspects. In Section 3 I contend that Sunny Auyang's (1999) argumentsagainst substantivalismand for "objectivism"in the context
of gauge field theories face serious worries. Finally, in Section 4 I claim that Gordon
Fleming's (1999) proposal for hyperplane-dependentNewton-Wignerfieldsdiffersimportantlyfrom his previousargumentsabout hyperplane-dependent
propertiesin quantum mechanics.

1. Introduction. One of the main aims of science is to develop theories

which enable us to explain and predict observable phenomena by appeal
to unobservable underlying mechanisms. Many of the most powerful and
successful contemporary theories in physics fall under a field-theoretic paradigm, in which fields (electromagnetic, gravitational, quantum, etc.) play
crucial explanatory and ontological roles. Despite their paramount importance in contemporary physics, field theories have, until recently, been
the subject of little interpretive work by philosophers of science. Early
work by Mary Hesse (1962) and Howard Stein (1970) raised several important interpretive questions about field theories, as has work on the
structure and ontological status of spacetime (Friedman 1983, Earman
1989). In the last fifteen years there has been increasing interest in interpretive problems of quantum field theory (e.g., Redhead 1983, Brown and
Harre 1988, Huggett and Weingard 1994, Teller 1995, Auyang 1995,
tSend requestsfor reprintsto the author, Departmentof Philosophy, ConcordiaUniversity, 1455 de MaisonneuveBlvd. West, Montreal, H3G 1M8, Canada.
I1 would like to thank Sunny Auyang, Gordon Fleming, and Paul Teller for useful
commentson earlierdrafts of this paper.
Philosophy of Science, 67 (Proceedings) pp. S516-S522. 0031-8248/2000/67supp-0039$0.00
Copyright 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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Fleming 1996). Nonetheless, interest in the conceptual foundations of field

theories remains limited to a relatively small group of philosophers of
physics and philosophically-minded physicists. The goal of the present
symposium is to broaden this interest by presenting a sample of current
work in the conceptual foundations of field theories. Paul Teller (1999)
attempts to unravel the mystery of "the gauge argument" used to introduce gauge fields into quantum field theory. Sunny Auyang (1999) makes
an argument for the existence of absolute (yet non-substantial) spacetime
based on the fiber bundle formalism of gauge fields. Gordon Fleming
(1999) defends a hyperplane-dependent formulation of quantum field theory using Newton-Wigner localized fields. This discussion provides a brief
commentary on each paper.
2. Geometry, Conventionalism,and the Gauge Argument. The stated aim
of Teller's paper (1999) is to lay out the gauge argument as clearly as
possible. Teller's focus is the question: given the element of conventionality in the requirement of invariance of the characterization of the state
function under a local phase transformation, how can apparently substantive conclusions about the possible existence and properties of gauge
fields follow from such a requirement?As part of the explicatory project,
Teller presents a particular account of what precisely this "element of
conventionality" consists of in the case of the electromagnetic field. The
fact that the local phase transformation must be made to all state functions
and the fortuitous cancellation of the local phase term from the expressions for A(x) and xg(x) should have something to do with the conventionality of the theoretical formalism. On Teller's account, choosing a 0(x)
in the gauge transformation of A(x) and the local phase transformation
of xg(x)is purely a matter of notation; to change the local phase is simply
to adopt new coordinative definitions (as Reichenbach called them) for
the terms A(x) and xV(x).Invariance under a local phase transformation
applied to all state functions is to be expected, simply because this transformation amounts to changing notation. So how can empirical facts
about the possible existence and properties of gauge fields follow from
these formal facts about notation? They cannot, according to Teller, and
the gauge argument shouldn't be read as making any such claim. Teller
rejects the reading of the gauge argument as providing an argument from
a premise about local phase transformations to a conclusion about the
possible existence of a gauge field. Rather, the argument plays an "epistemic" role, one of alerting us to the assumptions in gauge theories that do
underwrite the possible existence and properties of gauge fields.
What are these assumptions? How do they embody the possibility of a
physical gauge field? In the final section of the paper Teller sketches a
"geometrization" of gauge fields, where the local phase is interpreted as

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ANDREW WAYNE

a sort of geometrical connection. Teller suggests that if the geometrization

project were successful it would help answer these questions. In geometry,
the connection F describes the curvature of space, in the sense that it
describes the influence of geometry on vectors free from manifest local
disturbance. In the geometrized electromagnetic gauge field, the "phase
connection" A(x) describes another kind of curvature of space: it describes
the influence of "another kind of geometry" (as Teller puts it) on phases
free from manifest local disturbance. The gauge field is an interaction field,
the interaction is produced by a curvature of a phase "connection," and
the connection at a point can be understood as the limit of the change of
phase around a loop as that loop is shrunk to a point. Hence we have
substantive conclusions about the possible existence and properties of
gauge fields based on understanding gauge fields as a kind of geometry.
Teller canvasses several worries about the geometrization program, and
I would like to suggest one more. On Teller's approach to the gauge argument, the element of conventionality is a purely notational one, limited
to how we characterize the state function under a local phase transformation. Consider taking a more robust conventionalist line about gauge
fields, in the spirit of Poincare's conventionalism. On this approach, we
have a number of alternative total theories of the world (with all the same
experimental consequences, of course) that differ in the extent to which
observable phenomena are produced by the gauge "geometry" and by
non-geometrical forces. These theories are incompatible, but they are constructed so that any evidence supporting one equally supports all the others. For the Poincare conventionalist, the geometrization of gauge fields
is not an all-or-nothing affair; there are many ways of splitting up the
account of gauge interactions between geometry and non-geometrical
forces and no principled way to choose among them. We may go even
further, with the Reichenbach empiricist, and deny that these various theories are genuine alternatives at all. The mystery of the-gauge argument
is solved, or rather dissolved: properly understood, gauge field theory involves no claims (except perhaps conventional ones) about the possible
existence or properties of gauge fields.
3. DesubstantializingSubstantivalism.The moral of Auyang's paper (1999)
is an oft-repeated but important one: we should not infer metaphysical
claims naively from a scientific theory's formal characteristics. Auyang
applies this moral to the case of a substantivalist interpretation of spacetime in the context of contemporary gauge field theories, and she reaches
two conclusions. First, the argument for substantivalism about spacetime
is based on a naive interpretation of certain formal considerations in differential geometry that Auyang labels "the constructivist approach." Second, an alternative, "analytic" approach to gauge field theories naturally

CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIELD THEORIES IN PHYSICS

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leads to an alternative interpretation on which spacetime is absolute and

objective but not substantial.
The substantivalist might object that Auyang's account of the argument
for substantivalism is incomplete. According to Auyang, the source of a
substantival interpretation of spacetime can be traced to the constructivist
approach to physical theory exemplified by many textbooks in differential
geometry. On this approach, we begin by positing a differentiable manifold and then introduce various constructions on the manifold. One such
construction is a fiber, a complex mathematical object of which a tangent
space is a simple example. Fibers indexed by points in the manifold make
up a fiber bundle, a powerful way to characterize the content of a gauge
field theory. The manifold functions as a sort of mathematical substratum
for geometry, and, absent any distinction between mathematical and
physical fields, this naturally leads us to interpret the manifold as representing a physical substratum for our physical theories (an interpretation
of spacetime known as manifold substantivalism). The substantivalist
would agree with Auyang that this cannot possibly constitute an argument
for substantivalism. The main arguments for substantivalism are variants
on Newton's argument: only the substantivalist can explain the distinction
between particles in genuine inertial motion and those that are absolutely
accelerated. Interestingly, the argument from inertial effects doesn't apply
in any obvious way to systems composed exclusively of gauge fields. Auyang contends that there is no good argument for any kind of substantivalism in the context of physical systems containing gauge fields alone.
The substantivalist might object, however, that no substantivalist has ever
claimed that there is.
Auyang presents an alternative, "analytic" approach to gauge field theories that, she claims, supports an interpretation on which spacetime is
absolute and objective but not substantial. On the analytic approach, we
begin with facts about various properties at different points in a system
and then analyze these in terms of individuals and the relations they bear.
In the context of the fiber bundle approach to gauge field theories, we
begin by postulating that the entities that make up a gauge field all share
the same set of possible properties related by a gauge group G. We posit
a set of gauge orbits, each comprised of an arbitraryquality and its equivalence class of possible qualities. So far, gauge orbits are all identical and
lack any principle of individuation. The function of the spatiotemporal
parameter x is one of individuation and identification of the gauge orbits
into fibers Gx that make up the fiber bundle. As well, the parameter x
describes a spacetime manifold. Here, the spacetime manifold is an objective structure, indispensable and absolute, in precisely Newton's sense, but
not a physical substance. Call this position manifold objectivism:when a
gauge field is posited, an objective spacetime manifold is posited and con-

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versely, when no entity or local field is posited there is no independentlyexisting manifold.

What of Auyang's claim that the analytic approach provides support
for manifold objectivism? Here Auyang would seem to be disregarding
the main moral of her paper, for manifold objectivism can be no more
read off the fiber bundle formulation of gauge field theories than can manifold substantivalism. For one thing, a relationalist reinterpretation of this
talk of an absolute, objective spacetime manifold in terms of actual and
possible spacetime relations is available and tempting. For another, the
hole argument would seem to present as big a challenge to manifold objectivism as it does to manifold substantivalism. Recall that for the hole
argument to get off the ground all that is needed are objective spacetime
locations in the manifold not any claim that spacetime is a material substance-and these objective spacetime locations are equally present in the
ontology of manifold objectivism.
4. A Hyperplane-Dependent Ontology for Quantum Field Theory? The
Reeh-Schlieder theorem implies a surprising quantum entanglement on a
large scale, recently dubbed "superentanglement" by Rob Clifton et al.
(1998). Interestingly, Newton-Wigner fields-that is, quantum fields in the
Newton-Wigner position basis-avoid the Reeh-Schlieder theorem and its
counterintuitive consequences. Fleming (1999) shows that relative to a
Newton-Wigner scalar field superentanglement disappears, and the
vacuum state has the same structure as does the non-relativistic vacuum.
As he points out, Michael Redhead recognized this fact several years ago
but argued that the Newton-Wigner basis ought not count as a bona fide,
physically significant position representation, and for two reasons (Redhead 1995). First, Newton-Wigner position is not an objective fact about
a particle across reference frames. This is expressed by the fact that
Newton-Wigner localized states are not covariant under any transformation involving a Lorentz boost. Second, even within a reference frame,
Newton-Wigner "localization" is not what we would want to admit as
physical localization at all: a Newton-Wigner field "localized" at a point
in space and time is not incompatible with the localization of the same
field at a different time at a spacelike separate point!
Fleming defends the use of Newton-Wigner fields to avoid the ReehSchlieder theorem, and he does so by replying to the two charges in turn.
The first step is to construct Newton-Wigner fields that are covariant.
These fields turn out to be hyperplane-dependent: the Newton-Wigner
field is indexed by a Newton-Wigner position and a hyperplane. This covariant construction is a significant achievement, but Fleming recognizes from long experience explaining hyperplane-dependence to philosophers, no doubt that it is only a small part of the battle. Localization

CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIELD THEORIES IN PHYSICS

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on a hyperplane is an extremely counterintuitive form of localization, for

reasons well explained by Fleming, and it isn't clear that we are any farther
ahead than we were with local fields, traditional Minkowski coordinates,
and the Reeh-Schlieder theorem.
Fleming tries to resolve this dilemma by arguing that we have an independent reason to suppose that Newton-Wigner localization has physical
significance. Fleming uses the term "physically significant"interchangeably
with "physically meaningful," "not a mere formal construction," and "represents a physical property." By these terms he means any quantity "that
can play an important role in the description and analysis of the structure
and behavior of physical systems." These physical properties are to be distinguished from fundamental physical properties, and on a realist approach
that distinction is made in the following way. Fundamental properties are
what David Lewis (1986) calls natural properties, they carve nature at its
joints. Fixing the fundamental physical properties of a system fixes all the
properties of the system. All other physical properties supervene upon and
reduce to the fundamental physical properties. Physically significant quantities, then, refer ultimately to facts about fundamental physical properties.
Hyperplane-dependent Newton-Wigner fields refer to non-fundamental
physical properties. Fleming constructs an operator, the position-ofcenter-of-energy operator, whose eigenvectors are the Newton-Wigner
field position eigenvectors. Newton-Wigner fields are thus fields which
create and annihilate quanta and anti-quanta in states with specific, welldefined hyperplane-dependent center-of-energy values, and this, Fleming
claims, is their physical significance. I am sympathetic to Fleming's proposal, although we clearly need both more philosophical and technical
work before we can confidently conclude that the Minkowski coordinate
for hyperplane-dependent Newton-Wigner fields is physically meaningful,
in the sense of helping us describe and explain measurable properties of
quantum fields.
What of the ontological status of these hyperplane-dependent fields? I
contend that Fleming's present proposal differs importantly from his wellknown work on hyperplane dependence in quantum mechanics (1965,1966,
1988, 1992, 1996). Fleming has argued in the past that photons in the singlet
state in an EPR-Bell type experiment have a fundamental physical property-their spin state-which is hyperplane-dependent. Facts about the
spin state of the photon pair are hyperplane-dependent and do not reduce
to any non-hyperplane-dependent facts about the system. This claim opens
up worries about the ontology of hyperplane-dependent properties which
have so bothered philosophers of physics and are well articulated, for example, by Tim Maudlin (1994; cf. Wayne 1997). The present proposal engenders no such worries because it is no part of Fleming's claim that the
world contains, at bottom, any hyperplane-dependent physical prop-

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ANDREW WAYNE

erties at all! The hyperplane-dependentcenter-of-energy position operator

is analogous to the center of energy of a classical relativistic system. In some
classical relativistic systems, the center of energy of the system is a hyperplane-dependent quantity (recall the rotating sphere example). And the center of energy position 4-vector is a physically significant-although not fundamental-hyperplane-dependent property of classical relativistic systems.
The position of the center of energy of a classical relativistic system is
defined in terms of, supervenes upon, and reduces entirely to, non-hyperplane-dependent facts about the system. Analogously, the position-ofcenter-of-energy operator in quantum field theory reduces to non-hyperplane-dependent physical facts about the quantum field.
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