Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 14

RULE 62 INTERPLEADER

holder of the same certificate, an American corporation, SWAN,


CULBERTSON AND FRITZ.

1.

WACK-WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB


vs. WON

G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976

DOCTRINE: That Interpleader is a compulsory counterclaim.


Lee Wons basis of claim: BY VIRTUE OF A FINAL JUDGEMENT
Bienvenido Tanss basis of claim: DEED OF ASSIGNMENT

Thus, Wack Wack filed a complaint to interplead Won and Tan to


litigate their conflicting claims. But it did not progress because Wack
Wacks liability has already been determined. ( So that if this will be
brought once again anew, it will amount to a COLLATERAL ATTACK.)
Trial court also dismissed the complaint on the ground of laches
and res judicata by reason of the previous civil case that issued Won the
right to the certificate.

ISSUE: WON Wack Wack is barred to file an interpleader suit.

***COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM was not interposed due to


oversight or inadvertence may still be corrected by amendments (pero
ang palusot ditto ng Wack-Wack, magkaka dalawa na)

HELD:
Yes.
As to the subject matter (Membership fee certificate), there is no

***Whenever there are conflicting claims over the same subject matter,

question that such is proper for an interpleader suit. However, the instant

held by STAKEHOLDER, who has no interest or his interest is not

interpleader suit cannot prosper because Wack Wack had already been

disputed, who is not benefited nor injured by the judgment in the suit, or

made independently liable in the previous civil case wherein Won had

is not entitled to the avails of the suit, then interpleader partakes in.

established his rights to the certificate and, therefore, its present

STAKEHOLDER is only a means; he is only an avenue; he only

application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon

initiates the suit for the conflicting claimants to interplead between them,

the final judgment in the civil case. Being so, this interpleader suit, if

then the court decides who is entitled to the subject matter.

granted, would compel Won to establish his rights anew, and thereby
increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of

***Basic in RULE 3, SECTION 2, PARTIES-IN-INTEREST

an interpleader suit. And because Wack Wack allowed itself to be sued to

Section 2.

Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party

final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed

who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the

inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable

party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by

delay.

law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the


name of the real party in interest.
*** The interest of the Stakeholder is for him not to be charged or
subjected to damages later on if he gives it to someone then the court
later on decides, that someone is not entitled thereto but the other party =
this is precaution.

SC:

That when Lee Won filed the case against Wack-Wack,

Wack-Wack should have interposed already the interpleader as a


counterclaim, but it did not. That is why, Won has no more right, the
liability has already been determined, in effect, it is a compulsory
counterclaim.
***a COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM not brought is deemed

FACTS:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CLAIM: Membership Fee Certificate

waived; ( A defendants claim against a plaintiff must be brought in the


lawsuit or is forever barred; one that is based on the same subject or
transaction as the original claim).
- If a defendant has a claim against the plaintiff arising out of the same

There are two (2) claimants over the same Membership Fee
Certificate 201 issued by Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Lee Won
and Bienvenido Tan.
Won claims ownership of a membership fee certificate at Wack
Wack Golf & Country Club. That by virtue of a judgment in a civil case
rendered by the CFI of Manila, he was issued such certificate which is
entitled LEE WON alias RAMON LEE vs. WACK-WACK GOLF and
COUNTRY CLUB, INC..
But a certain Tan also claims ownership over such certificate
pursuant to an assignment made by the alleged original owner and

transaction as described in the complaint, that claim must usually be


asserted in a counterclaim or the right to make a claim is lost. For
example, if Marife claims that the plaintiff, Ron, caused the accident,
and she wanted to pursue a claim against him for the damage to to her
vehicle, she would need to to do this in a counterclaim. Moreover,
because such a claim must be asserted or be deemed waived, the
counterclaim need not satisfy the courts jurisdictional requirements. The
fact that the court has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim is sufficient.
Counterclaims that must be asserted or lost are known as
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS. A compulsory counterclaim that
is not included as part of the answer is thereafter barred.

(EXCEPTION/S occur when the assertion of the claim involves bringing


the third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, or

ISSUE:

when the defendants claim has already been asserted in another action.
Of course, if a defendant fails to assert a compulsory counterclaim in the
answer, under proper circumstances the responsive pleading can be
amended to add the counterclaim.

HELD:

***RULE 6, SECTION 7
Section 7.

Compulsory

counterclaim.

compulsory

counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of


justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within
the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof,
except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the
counter-claim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.

2.

ETERNAL GARDENS vs. IAC

DOCTRINE: In an action for Interpleader, the court may order the parties to
deposit the subject matter in a reputable bank or to be delivered to the court.
And that the person who filed the interpleader should be ordered by the court
to do so, because by the very nature of an Interpleader , that the plaintiff has
no interest over the subject matter.

FACTS:
Eternal Gardens entered into a contract (A JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT) with private respondent North Philippine Union Mission
Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (MISSION for short) whereby the
Eternal Gardens undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense and
responsibility necessary improvements on the property owned by private
respondent into a MEMORIAL PARK.
AGREEMENT OF THE TERMS: Out of the proceeds from the sale,
MISSION is entitled to receive 40% of the net gross collection from the
project to be remitted monthly by Eternal Gardens to MISSION through a
designated depositary trustee bank.
All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over
the property.
Confronted with such conflicting claims, Eternal Gardens filed a
complaint for interpleader against MISSION and Maysilo Estate. And
corollarily, whoever is adjudged to be the owner will get the 40% of the net
proceeds of the sale.
When there was already a conflicting claims, Eternal Gardens stopped
remitting the 40% to MISSION and instead, deposited it to the bank in its own
name. Hence, it turns out that Eternal Gardens is earning out from the said
deposit.

3.

PASRICHA vs. DON LUIS DIZON REALTY


DOCTRINE: JUDICIAL CONSIGANTION

= the plaintiff here is a STAKEHOLDER:


***Whenever there are conflicting claims over the
same subject matter, held by STAKEHOLDER, who has no

FACTS:
Petitioners and Respondent entered into

interest or his interest is not disputed, who is not benefited nor

Contract of Lease.

injured by the judgment in the suit, or is not entitled to the avails of

Petitioners agreed to lease several unit of the respondent. While the contracts

the suit, then interpleader partakes in. STAKEHOLDER is only a

were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco, then General Manager

means; he is only an avenue; he only initiates the suit for the

of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda

conflicting claimants to interplead between them, then the court

Bautista. Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992.
After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously

decides who is entitled to the subject matter.


*** The interest of the Stakeholder is for him not to be

refused to pay the stipulated rent.

charged or subjected to damages later on if he gives it to someone

Consequently, respondent was constrained to refer the matter to its

then the court later on decides, that someone is not entitled thereto

lawyer who, in turn, made a final demand on petitioners for the payment of

but the other party = this is precaution

the accrued rentals. Because petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint

DOCTRINE : - it defines what is an INTERPLEADER

for ejectment was filed by private respondent through its representative, Ms.

When the court orders that the claimants litigate among

Bautista.

themselves, in reality a new action arises, where the claims of the

One of the arguments posited by petitioners was that their refusal

interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as

to pay was justified because of the internal squabble in respondent company

plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating the suit. In

as to the person authorized to receive payment.

short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely

The MTC dismissed the complaint but the RTC reversed and the

provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the

CA affirmed.

same subject matter to be threshed out in an action.


***JUSTICE BRION:

ISSUE:

- INTERPLEADER can be used as a counterclaim. It can even be

Whether petitioners refusal to pay the monthly rentals is justified?

used as a third-party complaint. It can also be used as a crossclaim.

HELD:

Q:

No. What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was

IS

IT

POSSIBLE

TO

HAVE

A COMPLAINT

INTERPLEADER?
A: Yes

petitioners non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they did not know to


whom payment should be made. However, this did not justify their failure to
pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They

Q: WHAT IS BEING INTERPLEADED HERE?


A:

should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on
the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader.
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who
claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole
or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several
claims among themselves.
Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the
lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him
against double vexation in respect of one liability.

RULE 63 - DECLARATORY RELIEF AND


SIMILAR REMEDIES

Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to


refrain from making payments.

4.

BANK OF COMMERCE vs. PLANTERS DEV.


BANK

1)

ALMEDA vs. BATHALA MARKETING IND.

IN

***JUSTICE NACHURA likened Declaratory Relief to Certiorari where the

Whether the action for declaratory relief is proper?

common requirement is that there is no plain, adequate, speedy remedy in the


ordinary course of law.

HELD:

- this simply means, that one who files an action for declaratory relief must

Yes. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person

consider it as a last recourse. So that if there are other remedies, avoid

interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order

declaratory relief.

or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising


from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a

FACTS:

declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be
Respondent leased the lot of petitioners located at Pasong Tamo,

Makati City. Their contract states in part:

raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of


provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such

SIXTH - It is expressly understood by the parties hereto


that the rental rate stipulated is based on the present rate of

an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available


under the circumstances.

assessment on the property, and that in case the assessment should


hereafter be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be
imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased
premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein
provided

becomes

due,

the

additional

rental

or

charge

corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however,

***Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an


action for declaratory relief, as follows:
1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or

that in the event that the present assessment or tax on said property

regulation, or ordinance;

should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the

2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are

stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the portion leased by

doubtful and require judicial construction;

him;

3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question;


SEVENTH - In case an extraordinary inflation or

devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of


Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation
shall be the basis of payment;
Ponciano, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner
Romel Almeda, died. As a result, respondents had to deal with Eufemia and

4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the


"ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are
adverse;
5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other
forms of action or proceeding.

Romel. In a letter, petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess
and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals. In response,

It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the

respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals fixed in the

instant case, except that petitioners insist that respondent was already in

contract of lease were supposed to include the VAT therein, considering that

breach of the contract when the petition was filed.

their contract was executed on May 1, 1997 when the VAT law had long been
We do not agree.

in effect. Respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the


former that its monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to
condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code.

After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the

Respondent opposed petitioners' demand and insisted that there was no

months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set

extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the

forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein.

pronouncement of this Court in various cases.

Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the

Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes

pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed

of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease

an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent

contract to prevent damage and prejudice. Petitioners later moved for the

is not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory

dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an improper remedy

relief.

considering that respondent was already in breach of the obligation and that
the case would not end the litigation and settle the rights of the parties. The

2) REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO

trial court, however, was not persuaded, and consequently, denied the motion.
The RTC ruled in favour of the respondent. The CA affirmed the
decision but deleted the order as to the return of the balance of the rental
deposits and of the amounts representing the 10% VAT and rental adjustment.

ISSUE:

3) MALANA vs. TAPPA

action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in


THRUST: that Declaratory Relief has 2 different parts:
1)
2)

a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar

FIRST PART Declaratory Relief


SECOND PART - Similar Remedies (which is not a
Declaratory Relief)

to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal
rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions

***WHAT SHOULD BE APPLIED IS 7691 RATHER THAN Rule 63

identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,


said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary

FACTS:

Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.


Petitioners

filed

before

the

RTC

their

Complaint

for

Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against respondents.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court


does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the

Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio Danao

RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" that an action for quieting of title

(Anastacio), who died intestate During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had

"may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a

allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to

person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an

build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property.

action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in

Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the
said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it. Petitioners

a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option.

claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members, continued to occupy

In

contrast,

the

mandatory

provision

of

the

Judiciary

the subject property even after her death, already building their residences

Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly

thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents

requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil

were claiming ownership over the subject property.

actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the

Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that

assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:

respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

petitioners demand.

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.Metropolitan Trial

Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall

Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners Complaint on the ground of

exercise:

lack of jurisdiction.

xxxx

The RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691, amending Batas

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to,

Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of

possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of

1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the

the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos

assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00.

(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value

It found that the subject property had a value of less than

does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,

P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the same was outside the

damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x

jurisdiction of the RTC.

(Emphasis ours.)

Petitioners filed a MR but was denied.

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in

But the other party is filing for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63.

Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners

And Rule 63 accordingly is cognizable by the RTC.

Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:

No.
The court ruled that that the 1st paragraph and the 2nd paragraph
are not the same.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument,
recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to
quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an

4) CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

6) REPUBLIC vs. ROQUE IN RELATION TO


5) SABITSANA vs. MUERTEGUI

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE CASE

RULE 64 - REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND

RULE 65

FINAL ORDERS OF THE COMELEC AND


COA
1) ALLIANCE

FOR

CERTIORARI
NATIONALISM

DEMOCRACY vs. COMELEC

AND

1) AMPIL vs. OMBUDSMAN

3) MAGLALANG vs. PAGCOR


2) A.L. ANG NETWORK , INC. vs. MONDEJAR

4) PEOPLE vs. CASTANEDA

5) UP BOARD OF REGENTS vs. LIGOT-TEYLAN


Q: DOCTRINE OF UP BOARD OF REGEANTS CASE
A: In mandamus rights must be very, very clear so that if the right is doubtful,
mandamus will not lie.
Q: DISTINGUISH MANDAMUS FROM QUO WARRANTO. FOR
EXAMPLE: MAYOR ATIENZA HAS A CITY ATTORNEY WHICH IS
ATTY. X WHOM HE REPLACED WITH ATTY. Y WITH NO VALID

REASON. AGAINST WHOM MAY ATTY. X FILE MANDAMUS AND

completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which

AGAINST WHOM MAY HE FILE QUO WARRANTO?

provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary

A: Atty. X can file mandamus against Mayor Atienza because by the latter's

sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning.

act he was excluded from the enjoyment of his office. Atty. X can file quo

From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have

warranto against Atty. Y because he is a usurper of Atty. X's office.

restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal.
Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain

FACTS:

right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an


Private respondent Ramon Nadal, was a student of the UP College

of Law. He was one of the beneficiaries of the Universitys Socialized Tuition

official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion


or judgment.

Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP). To further insure the integrity of the
program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a
student's application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for
STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was private respondent. A committee

6) TUAZON vs. RD OF CALOOCAN


***usurpation of judicial power by an executive body.

conducted a home investigation. The report showed that Nadal was not
disclosing true and honest information in his application form ( THERE WAS

FACTS:

A MISREPRESENTATION). Upon the committees directive he was required


"to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on
current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the
suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and
transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the
Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. He was eventually
found guilty by the Board of Regents with the penalties of suspension for one
(1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good
moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not
reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum
from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of records until
he has settled his financial obligations with the university.
Nadal filed with the RTC (IT WAS RAFFLED BEFORE JUDGE
LIGOT-TELAN) a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and
prayer for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the BOR from implementing
its decision. JUDGE LIGOT-TELAN awarded the petition, The RTC issued
the TRO and preliminary injunction. The petitioners dispensed with the filing
of the motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or
temporary restraining order with the SC. And so the UP BOR went up.

Petitioner spouses were retired school teachers. They used their


retirement benefits to purchase a piece of land in Caloocan City from Carmel
Farms Inc. Carmel Farms purchased said land from the government as part of
the Tala Estate. Under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, ownership shall remain
with the government until the purchase price has been fully satisfied and upon
default in payment of any instalment, the government may foreclose the
property.
After the proclamation of Martial Law, P.D. 293 was issued by
Pres. Marcos. P.D. 293 declared that Carmel had failed to complete payment
of the price. It adjudged that according to the records of the Bureau of Lands,
neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full
payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots
claimed by the Carmel Farms, Inc. Hence, title to said land has remained with
the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said
association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of
the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to
segregate it from the said property of the Republic of the Philippines being
therefore null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy.
Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel
Farms, Inc. and all those derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the
members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona

ISSUE:

fide occupants" of the lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to


Whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial

judge in issuing the preliminary injunction?

them for "disposition and sale ... pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as
amended."
On the basis of such P.D., the RD of Caloocan City declared as null
and void the TCT of the petitioners. The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with
this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary

HELD:

measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in


Yes. On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court

violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent

finds that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of

domain but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the

preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was

indefeasibility of Torrens titles; and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be

based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary

directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its

sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it

efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the

would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent

Assurance Fund. The Solicitor general argued in his comment to the petition

and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of

that, the questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the

Nadal without taking into account the circumstances clearly of his own

petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as

making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has

judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their


jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether the remedy of certiorari was proper action since Certiorari
is applicable only against judicial function and considering that Marcos was
exercising Executive function and Certiorari will not apply?

HELD:
Yes. The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that
the extraodinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial
or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed
against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of
the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the
petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an
unlawful exercise of judicial power.
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial
function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts,
declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts
essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction
which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a
cause. He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original
purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all
installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel
Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the)
Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the law to that situation,
he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained with the
Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association
has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the
Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to
segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab
initio as against the law and public policy.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of
certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is
a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never
vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in
the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law
the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably
perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office
as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative
power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime.

PROHIBITION
1) VIVAS vs. MONTEREY BOARD OF BSP

2) CORALES vs. REPUBLIC

MANDAMUS
3) TAN vs. CA

1) HIPOS SR. vs. BAY

2) SANCHEZ vs. LASTIMOSA

3)

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. ATIENZA

4) FUNA

vs.

MANILAECONOMIC

CULTURAL OFFICE

AND

Вам также может понравиться