THE SYNERGY OF ANTI-TANK AND TANK GUNS: Many armies used the same weapon

(with a different mount) as both a tank gun and anti-tank gun. The German 37-mm
, 50-mm, and 75-mm; British 2-pounder, 6-pounder, 17-pounder; the Soviet 76-mm,
85-mm, etc.; the Japanese 37-mm, 47-mm, and 57-mm; the French 47-mm; Italian 47mm; and so on - those weapons were used as both tank guns and towed anti-tank gu
ns.
In my world: The USA was an exception because they adopted no real dedic
ated anti-tank gun. In the real world, the USA did adopt the 37-mm, 57-mm and 3inch as towed anti-tank guns and battlefield experiences left them dissatisfied
with all three; they played with towed version of the 75-mm M-3, 76-mm M-1, and
90-mm M-3 but saw little use in them, having been disapponted by any towed gun t
hey tried.
Not all vehicle weapons were intended for anti-tank use, though.
Early in the war, tanks tended to be light and primitive: they were spli
t between anti-tank types using 37-mm/2-pounder/47-mm guns with light (or no) hi
gh explosive shells, and support tanks with 75-mm/3-inch howitzers that fired he
avy but low velocity high explosive shells. Some types even mounted one of each,
like the French Char B and British Churchill. The 75-mm/3-inch howitzers were e
ither discarded or quickly replaced by a longer barreled weapon. Example: The sh
ort 75-mm howitzer of the Pzkw IV was replaced by a long barreled 75-mm used in
later Pzk IVs (and other armored vehicles), which was also used as the PAK-40 an
ti-tank gun. Example: The British discarded the 3-inch howitzer on their Churchi
ll.
Another exception is the "assault gun," where an unusually heavy high ex
plosive shell was desired. A standard infantry howitzer (such as a 105-mm or 152
-mm) would be fitted to some vehicles. These were based on towed artillery piece
s, so there was no need nor desire for an anti-tank gun/tank gun synergy.
A third exception concerned large caliber weapons. Towed anti-tank guns
of 75-mm caliber or higher were usually so heavy that (unless there were a lot o
f troops on hand) vehicles were needed to move them about. If the gunners lost a
battle, they typically left them behind and fled as fast as they could. As such
, armies shied away from making a towed anti-tank gun version of large caliber w
eapons. After all, most of them had to field large caliber anti-aircraft guns (8
5-mm, 88-mm, 90-mm, 3.7-inch, etc.) in large numbers to defend the army and henc
e there was less need for two weapons of much the same caliber.
The 88-mm anti-aircraft gun that was used as the 88-mm gun in the first
version of the German Tiger tank was never converted to a towed anti-tank gun. G
ermany did, though, make a towed version of the more potent 88-mm Kwk-43 used in
the King Tiger (and assorted vehicles; it was also used as an anti-aircraft gun
).
In the real world: the USA preferred to use a motorized 3-inch gun (the
M-10 tank destroyer) for the same reason, at least early in the war. Later in th
e war, adherents of the tank destroyer doctrine decided to the field a large num
ber of towed 3-inch guns (even replacing some M-10 units with them) under the mi
sguided theory that such guns, placed in large numbers, would crush enemy armor
attacks. As long as they did not have to play a decisive role in a battle, they
were handy as a field gun. But, when it came to fighting tanks, many were lost b
ecause they lacked the mobility needed to move and shoot, and (if the battle was
lost) the crews left them behind. The Battle of the Bulge is a perfect example,
where the successes of the towed weapons were outdone by their many failures. T
he Army decided to revert back to motorized units; or more properly, eventually
they gave up on anti-tank guns altogether and stuck to tanks themselves.
The British made a towed 17-pounder anti-tank gun, but preferred a motor
ized version. They failed to design a home grown tank or vehicle to use it that
they could produce in large numbers, so they finally motorized the 17-pounder by
fitting it to lend lease M-10s and Shermans, which they had a plentiful supply
of.
The Soviets did make towed versions of most of their main tank guns (47mm, 76-mm, 85-mm, 100-mm, and even 122-mm). Often this was done simply because t

hey did not have a plentiful supply of armored vehicles, and because they wanted
a heavy anti-armor weapon in the field. And because they were often on the defe
nse against massed German armor. Once their industry go into gear, they often re
lied more on motorized weapons.