Amarga vs Abbas

Facts: The respondent Judge, Macapanton Abbas, after receiving An information with a certification stating that
the petitioner fiscal, Amarga has conducted a sufficient preliminary investigation pursuant to the provision of RA
732, and2) One supporting affidavit of one witness (Jubair) stating that he saw the deceased Dugusan Paspasan
was shot and killed by three gunmen, Dismissed the criminal handled by the petitioner against Appang et. al on
the ground that;
1. The affidavit of Jubair is hearsay and does not possess gravity for the establishment of the existence of
probable cause.
2. So as the certification of the petitioner fiscal wont warrant the existence of probable cause. Therefore, there
can be no prima facie evidence as to necessity for the issuance of warrant of arrest against the accused. Thus,
the petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari and mandamus contending that petitioner has already conducted a
preliminary examination and thus it is ministerial function for the respondent to issue arrest warrants. Upon the
other hand, the respondent judge argues that the issuance of a warrant of arrest involves a judicial power which
necessarily imposes upon him the legal duty of first satisfying himself that there is probable cause,
independently of and notwithstanding the preliminary investigation made by the provincial fiscal under Republic
Act No. 732; and to that end he may require the fiscal to submit such evidence as may be sufficient to show at
least a prima facie case.
Issue: Whether or not the certification of a prosecutor is sufficient to issue a warrant of arrest.
Held: No. The constitution mandates that the determination of probable cause depends upon the judgment
and discretion of the judge or magistrate in issuing warrant of arrest. It simply means that sufficient facts must
be presented to the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant to convince him, not that the particular person has
committed the crime, but that there is probable cause for believing that the person whose arrest is sought
committed the crime charged. In the case at bar, the petitioners certification that he had already conducted a
preliminary investigation in the case does not sufficiently warrant the existence of probable cause. Nor the
single affidavit submitted to the respondent as it is not enough for the respondent judge to exercise his judicial
function to determine the existence of probable cause. However, the petition is granted to continue the hearing
of the case in the ground of lack of prosecution and that refusal of the prosecution to submit additional affidavit
is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a case.
Amarga v. Abbas 98 Phil. 739 (1956)
Facts: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation of Arangale upon
acomplaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay
from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangales land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted
the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that there is prima facie
evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge
Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was premature because Judge
Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sentthe
records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed, he
did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against
Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the
fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be required
of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Nevertheless, Judge
Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in
view of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused
committed the crime charged.
Ruling: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOTCONTEMPLATE THE
ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OROFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC,
a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground
to hold the accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should issue, the investigating
judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by
searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there
must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue
a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not

to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should,
instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest
of the accused.
20th Century Fox vs CA
I.
THE FACTS
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting
searches and seizures in connection with the NBIs anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged
that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and
renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).
The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and
subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by
the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI,
accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described
in the three warrants.
Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized
properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.
II.

THE ISSUE

Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the
CA.]
YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.
The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause
that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the
application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their
testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the private
respondents. Only the petitioners counsel who was also a witness during the application stated
that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents
were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted the
warrants, declaring that the testimony of petitioners counsel did not have much credence
because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the
application.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in
their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of
the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify
the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate
or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court
the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This

linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Quintero vs. NBI (Marcos manipulation)
Facts: After the expose of the petitioner, Eduardo Quintero of the 1st district of Leyte in the 1971 Con-con
alleging that some delegates, including him, in the Con-con are under the payroll of the first lady and then
President Marcos, NBI agents raided the houses of the petitioner by virtue of the search warrant issued by the
respondent Judge Elias Asuncion. The raid confiscated an amount of money amounting to 379K.The said search
warrant was base from the application of two persons. One is from the affidavit of Congressman Artemio Mate,
also from 1st
district of Leyte and an NBI Agent Samuel Castro, alleging that the petitioner committed the crime of bribery.
The affidavit of the latter applicant however showed that he has no personal knowledge about the allegations
against the petitioner. The affidavit of the statements of the Congressman also shows that his allegations are
anchored upon speculations. No sufficient evidence is presented to the respondent judge.
Issue: Was there an establishment of the existence of a probable cause?
Held: No. The allegations and the statements of the applicants are merely anchored on hearsay and
speculations. As ingrained under jurisprudence (Roan vs.Gonzales as cited), in application for a search warrant,
if based on hearsay, cannot, standing alone justify the issuance of search warrant. Thus, it is indispensable that
the applicants should have personal knowledge of the crime committed. In the case at bar, the deposition of the
NBI agent is based on hearsay in which only and anchored on the information given by Cong. Mata. Moreover,
the deposition of Cong. Mata cannot establish that he has a direct personal knowledge of the alleged bribery of
the petitioner since his affidavit shows that it is only based on speculation. The element of directness and
definiteness is wanting so as to establish his personal knowledge. Not to mention, there is no concrete evidence
that would support their accusation, so as to validly establish probable cause.
Irregularities:
1.Moreover, there is also irregularity in the printing of the search warrant, wherein the crime of bribery Art210
of RPC was superimposed by ink, which was originally Art. 28
2.In the case at bar, the search warrant presented was in the case of grave threats directed against the nephew
of the petitioner (nephew), thus, the confiscation of he money is not related to the articlesseized.2) The search
team also violated statutory guidelines for a lawful search since there is no members of the household present
while others are searching the premises. Thus it is planted and orchestratedsearch.3) Also the respondents also
violated the statutory guidelines that they should issue a detailed receipt of articles seized. The lifting of the
respondent judge of the search warrant are null and void.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA
Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc, together with other enterprises, were subjected to search by
virtue of 6 search warrants, having been applied for by a particular Atty. Gatmaytan. PADS Task
Force issued said search warrants.
Facts: 1. The PADS Task Force through State Prosecutor Jose Rosales issued 6 search warrants
against Karamfil Import-Export Co, Inc., P&B Enterprise Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation,
Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation,
Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-Trade Development, Amelili U. Malaquiok
Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises. Said search warrants were issued upon application
by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs and a deputized member of the PADS
Task Force, together with the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro, an operative and investigator of the
PADS Task Force.
2. Respondents questioned whether the PADS Task Force is such other responsible officer
allowed/countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizures. The
RTC, therefore, declared the said search warrants as null and void and eventually denied
reconsideration. In disposing of the petition, the said court found the material issues to include:

(a) competency of RTC to act on petition filed by the petitioners, (b) validity of the search
warrants issued by the respondent State Prosecutor, and (c) whether the petition has become
moot and academic because all the search warrants sought to be quashed had already been
implemented and executed.
3. On appeal, PADS was upheld. The CA declared that the PADS Task Force is a quasi- judicial
body, making it co-equal with the RTC. However, on motion for reconsideration by Karamfil, the
CA reversed itself.
Ruling: 1. The PADS, as stated in the task forces organic act PD 1936 as amended by PD 2002,
was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions to try and decide claims and execute its
judgment. It is the Presidents arm called upon to combat the vie of dollar salting or the
blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange. It is rather tasked by the PD to handle the
prosecution of such activities but nothing more. Thus, not being a quasi-judicial body, it cannot
be considered co-equal or coordinate with RTC.
2. Under the 1887 Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are exclusive upon judges. The
incident, which happened during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, had become moot and
academic.
3. When the 1973 Constitution spoke of responsible officer to whom the authority to issue
arrest and search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with
the license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter
qualified that the officer himself must be responsible. The Court takes responsibility, as used
by the Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and
independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. Thus, a prosecutor
falls short to be considered having possessed the latter qualities. The implied exclusion of
prosecutors under the 1973 Constitution was founded on the requirements of due process,
specifically the assurance to the respondent of an unbiased inquiry of the charges against him
prior to the arrest of his person or seizure of his property.
4. The Court agreed that the PADS Task Force is meant to exercise prosecutorial powers, and on
that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached judge to determine the existence
of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search.
Soliven vs. Makasiar (A controversial case)
This case softens the doctrine laid down by the BACHE case where the court states that the judge
should personally depose the complainants and witnesses under oath and in writing in determining the
existence of probable cause. This is a responsibility that should not be delegated to clerk of court or other
authority.
Facts: This is a consolidated petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the
respondent Judge Ramon Makasiar. In the case filed by Beltran, he alleged that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the respondent judge
issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner for the crime of libel, without the respondent judge personally
examining the complainant and witnesses for the determination of probable cause. The petitioner contend that
the constitution requires that the judge should personally examine the complainant and/or witness for the
determination of probable cause and therefore issue an arrest warrant.
Issue: Was the contention correct?
Held: No. (Sadly)What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)) Personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis

thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would
be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court
unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The
procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution. It has not been shown that respondent
judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a
finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.