Yau vs Silverio GR 158848; Macapagal vs Yau, et.

al GR 171994
R39 S6 Execution by motion or independent action
Facts:
1. Yau bought from Philfinance a promissory note, paying the amount of 1.6M. Philfinance
promised a return of investment plus 29k+. In line with this, they issued postdated
checks totaling the capital plus promised earnings.
2. When Yau deposited it when it was due, it was dishonored. He tried claiming from
Philfinance, but they denied selling him the promissory note.
3. Yau then filed a complaint before the RTC for a sum of money against Philfinance, and
its board of Directors Silverio, Carlos, Jr., Macapagal, Biagan, Jr., and Cano.
a. All defendants except Carlos, Jr. failed to file an answer, and were declared in
default. Yau presented evidence ex-parte, but Carlos, Jr. did not present evidence
to his defense even though he was present.
i. Defendants assailed by certiorari before the CA the order of default, but
was dismissed, holding that the summons were valid.
b. RTC then ruled IFO Yau. Awarded Yau:
i. Principal amount of 1.6M
ii. 10m+ for the earnings that Yau could have earned
iii. Moral, exemplary, attorneys fees, and cost of suit must be paid by
defendants, totaling about 300k
c. Defendants interposed an appeal to CA, but Silverio, Macapagal, Biagan, and
Cano failed to pay the docket fees, so their petition was dismissed. CA decision
became final on 12/20/1991, and entry of judgment made on 4/24/1992
4. RTC, upon Yaus motion, issued an order directing the execution of its decision and
issued a writ of execution
a. Defendants bank deposits were garnished, and Silverios shares in Manila Golf
Club were sold at a public auction for 2m.
b. Silverio and Macapagal filed separate petitions for certiorari questioning the
validity of the execution. Both petitions were ultimately dismissed by the SC,
and MRs were denied with finality on 10/8/1998.
5. Given that the judgment is not yet fully satisfied, the sheriff resumed the implementation
of the writ. Bank accounts of Macapagal were garnished in 1999.
a. Macapagal filed with the RTC a motion to quash the writ of execution, saying
that the judgment which it was based upon has already expired. The judgment
was on 1992, and may only be enforced within 5 years or until 1997. Beyond 5
years but within 10 years, the judgment may only be enforced by an independent
civil action.
b. RTC denied the motion. RTC said that there was effective interruption or delay in
the implementation of the writ of execution because of the petitions filed by the
defendants.
c. Macapagal appealed to CA, but was denied. Hence, this petition (GR 171994)

6. Meanwhile, in the appeal of Philfinance and Carlos, Jr., the CA removed the 10m+ loss
of income award. That decision became final and executory on 3/21/2001
7. Afterwards, sometime in 2001, the sheriff (apparently still trying to enforce the writ of
execution), found three properties belonging to Silverio in Forbes Park and Bel-Air.
Sheriff levied on the Forbes Park house and sold it at an auction where Yau is the highest
bidder at 11m+.
8. Silverio filed an omnibus motion in the RTC praying that the levy and auction sale be null
and void because the writ of execution has become functus officio after the lapse of 5
years.
a. RTC denied omnibus motion
b. CA reversed that RTC and set aside the levy and auction sale
c. Hence, this petition by Yau GR 158848
Issue: w/n the RTCs writ of execution may still be enforced because more than 5 years has
lapsed.
Held: Yes, there were interruptions in enforcing the decision.
Ratio:
The CA here seems to have rendered conflicting decisions. The CA in GR 171994 held that there
was delay in the execution due to the filing of petition by the defendants, while the CA in GR
158848 held that there is no delay and that 5 years has already lapsed
While R39 S6 says that a judgment may only be enforced within 5 years, there are instances
when the court allowed execution by motion even beyond 5 years. The general rule is that the
time during which the execution is stayed either by:
1. Agreement of parties for a period of time
2. By injunction
3. An appeal or writ of error that operates as supersedes
4. By the death of a party
Any interruption or delay by the losing party should generally extend the time the writ of
execution may be issued without scire facias (letting them/him know); and the time should be
extended by any delay caused by the losing party. Usually, the time is extended it its due to the
losing partys actions
In this case, the final judgment in Dec 1991 and writ of execution in Sep 1992 could not be
enforced due to the petitions filed by defendants that challenged the judgments and writ of
executions. The court held that such petitions suspended or interrupted the enforcement of the
writ.
Moreover, due to the immutability of judgments, the final decision of the SC in 1998 upholding
the writ of execution (which included the 10m+ money award) is no longer subject to change,
revision, amendment, or reversal, except for correction of clerical errors.

Ruling: Reversed CA in 158848, affirmed CA in 171994, ordered sheriff to proceed with the
execution