Crimea going East A Clash of Great Power Strategies

By Mauro Mantovani, Daniel Rickenbacher*

* Dr. Mauro Mantovani is the Head of the Chair Strategic Studies, Military Academy at
ETH Zurich; M.A. Daniel Rickenbacher is a Scientific Assistant at the Chair. The text
has been completed on 12 December 2014.
Abstract:
This article recounts the economical, political, military events that led to the current
crisis in Ukraine. It analyzes the main moral, legal and historical arguments that were
put forward by Russia and the West in defense or condemnation of their actions in
Ukraine, especially with regard to the secession of Crimea which was either called
an (illegal) annexation or an (legal) incorporation. A strategic outlook assesses the
long-term effects this crisis will have on Moscows political and economic integration
concept in Eurasia aimed at countervailing US hegemony and on the relations
between East and West.
Keywords:
China, Crisis, Crimea, EU, NATO, Russia, Ukraine

1. The Ukraine Crisis: Roots and major developments until November 2014
The European Union (EU) and Ukraine concluded their negotiations on an Association
Agreement in March 2013. The bulk of the resulting document was dedicated to a Deep
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which provides a framework for the
development of Ukraines economy, laying the ground for its eventual integration into
the European Common Market.1 The move was vigorously opposed by Russia. This
hardly came as a surprise, as the Association Agreement was based on the EUs
Eastern Partnership whose aim it is to strengthen, both economically and politically,
non-EU countries in Eastern Europe, consisting entirely of former Soviet republics.
Moreover, it provides them with the long-term perspective of an EU membership. This
runs counter to the Kremlins vision that still considers these republics a part of
Russias sphere of influence and therefore only semi-sovereign. Moreover, the Eastern
Partnership conflicted with the Kremlins own plans to draw these former Soviet
republics closer to Moscow by means of economic and political integration projects.
Moscow had hoped that Ukraine would become a core member, only second to
Russia, in the most important of these, the Customs Union, which is the base of the
prospective Eurasian Economic Union, also known as Eurasian Union to be
established in 2015. But this Customs Union and the EUs Association Agreement
were mutually exclusive, and Ukraine opted for the latter. To force Ukraine to
1

European Commission, Overview of the key elements of the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area, 17 April 2014, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150981.pdf.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2537329

reconsider its choice, Russia embarked upon a trade war starting in July 2013 and
severely disrupting Ukraines fragile economy.2
In August 2013, the Kremlin heightened its rhetoric and warned of additional sanctions.
However, these threats backfired: In two speeches in late August and early September,
president Victor Yanukovych affirmed Ukraines pro-European course. The
Association Agreement was supposed to be signed at the Eastern Partnership Summit
in Vilnius, Lithuania, taking place on 28-29 November. During a secret meeting of
Presidents Yanukovych and Vladimir Putin in early November and a second meeting
between Prime Ministers Dmitry Medvedev and Mykola Azarov, the Russian side
warned there could be no discussion on trade and economic relations in case the
agreement was signed.3 On 20 November, the Ukrainian Parliament voted down a law
that would have allowed for the release of Yulia Tymochenko, the founder and former
leader of the opposition Fatherland Party, which the EU had set as a precondition for
the signing of the document. 4 Subsequently, the Ukrainian government also
announced that it would not sign the agreement, citing Russian pressure and
excessive reform demands by the IMF as reasons.5
The decision sparked massive protests all over the country, the largest taking place in
the independence square in central Kiev (Maidan Nezalezhnosti). The protests
therefore came to be known as the (Euro-)Maidan movement. The message of the
protests was distinctively pro-EU and anti-Yanukovych. At a later stage, control was
assumed by the leaders of the opposition: Arseniy Yatseniuk of the Fatherland Party,
Vitaly Klichko of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform, and Oleh Tyahnybok
of the Swoboda (engl. Freedom) Party. The core of the protestors belonged to the
latter, a far right party that is tied to neo-Nazi groups.6 The protests grew when the
police attempted to dissolve them. A deal struck by Putin and Yanukovych on 17
December, providing for a loan of 15 bn. US$ and a one-third discount on Russian gas,
but seemingly no Ukrainian obligations7, failed to placate the protestors. When the
(Verkhovna) Rada, the Ukrainian Parliament, passed anti-protest laws on 16 January
2014, severely curtailing freedom of speech and effectively banning the Maidan
movement, the protests turned violent, claiming the first dead.8 On 28 January, Prime
Minister Mykola Azarov and his government stepped down, leaving President
Yanukovych severely weakened. On the same day, the contested anti-protest laws
were repealed.9
Violence again erupted after 18 February, when dozens were killed during riots. On 20
February, after consulting with the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland,
2

A. slund, Ukraines Choice: European Association Agreement or Eurasian Union? , Vol. 16 No. 22
Peterson Institute for International Relations Policy Brief 2013, p. 9.
3
O. Grytsenko & I. Traynor, Ukraine U-turn on Europe pact was agreed with Vladimir Putin, 26
November 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/26/ukraine-u-turn-eu-pact-putin.
4
Die Zeit, Ukraine stoppt geplantes Abkommen mit EU, 21 November 2013, http://www.zeit.de/
politik/ausland/2013-11/ukraine-eu-assoziierungsabkommen.
5
O. Grytsenko & I. Traynor (see fn. 3).
6
S. Dobbert, Die Nationalisten als Revolutionstreiber, 6 December 2013, http://www.zeit.de/politik/
ausland/ 2013-12/ukraine-protest-swoboda-maidan/seite-2.
7
D. Krasnolutska & O. Tanas & I. Arkhipov, Ukraine Protesters Want Answers on $15 Billion Russia
Aid, 18 December 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-17/russia-commits-15-billion-toukraine-bonds-as-gas-price-reduced.html.
8
A. Nemtsova, Death on the Maidan, 24 January 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2014/01/24/deaths-on-ukraine-s-maidan-signal-escalation-of-violence.html.
9
O. Grytsenko, Ukraine's PM tenders resignation as anti-protest laws repealed, 28 January 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/ukraine-prime-minister-mykola-azarov-resigns.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2537329

Yanukovych agreed on instating a new cabinet within ten days, returning to the
constitution of 2004 and early presidential elections by December 2014. 10 An
agreement was signed to this effect between opposition leaders and Yanukovych on
the following day.11 But the deal was rejected by the activists on the Maidan and, on
22 February, after Oleksandr Turchynov of the Fatherland party had been elected as
its president, the Parliament deposed Yanukovych as the president of Ukraine.
Meanwhile the latter fled to his power base Kharkiv in the East of the country. Only
one day after his deposition, new elections were scheduled for 25 May and Turchynov
was elected as interim president. On 27 February, Arseniy Yatseniuk was elected as
interim prime minister and was tasked with forming a new government.
Immediately after the ousting of President Yanukovych, the Rada took the fateful
decision to ban the Russian language. Although the bill was later vetoed by President
Turchynov, it had the effect of antagonizing the native Russian speakers, who make
up for a majority in some of Ukraines eastern provinces and accounted for even 77%
in Crimea according to a census in 2001.12 Moreover, it supported the official Russian
narrative of the events in Kiev, which portrayed the revolution as a fascist coup that
posed a threat to the Russian minority, providing legitimation for Russian
intervention. 13 Pro-Russian armed men who were widely identified as Russian
soldiers, even though their uniforms were lacking insignia14 started their operations
in Crimea on 26 February, cutting off access routes to Crimea, occupying key sites
and surrounding military bases of the Ukrainian armed forces. Many of the Ukrainian
soldiers surrendered, while some resisted for almost a month.15 On 27 February, these
armed men seized the parliamentary building in Simferopol. Under dubious
circumstances the MPs decided to schedule a referendum on the peninsulas legal
status for 25 May and to disband the government and replace it with one loyal to
Moscow under the leadership of Sergey Aksyonov, a long-time separatist, whose party
had mustered only 4% in the last election in 2010.16 After moving forward the date, the
referendum was held on 16 March. In a vote widely described as fraudulent allegedly
96% of the electorate in both Crimea and Sevastopol, constituting separate federal
entities, supported joining Russia. 17 Two days later, Crimea and Sevastopol were
officially incorporated into the Russian Federation by a qualified vote of the Duma, the
Lower House of the Russian Parliament. At a memorable ceremony in the Kremlin, the
accession treaty was signed by president Putin. In a now famous speech Putin
10

Die Welt, Janukowitsch bereit zu vorgezogenen Neuwahlen, 21 February 2014, http://www.welt.de/

politik/ausland/article125065596/Janukowitsch-bereit-zu-vorgezogenen-Neuwahlen.html.
11
Agreement on the Settlement of the Crisis in Ukraine, Kyiv, 21 February 2014 (in a German
version): http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/671348/publicationFile/190025/
140221-UKR_Erklaerung.pdf.
12
State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, About number and composition of population of Autonomous
Republic of Crimea by All-Ukrainian population census 2001 data, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/
results/general/language/Crimea.
13
W. Burke-White, Crimea and the International Legal Order, Vol. 56 No. 4 Survival 2014, p. 70.
14
For a discussion of Russias legal responsibility for the armed intervention, see also ibid. (fn. 13), p.
68.
15
D. Herszenhor & P. Reevell & N. Sneider, Russian Forces Take Over One of the Last Ukrainian
Bases in Crimea, 22 March 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/europe/ukraine.html
16
France 24, Russian flag flies over occupied parliament in Ukraines Crimea, 27 February 2014,
http://www.france24.com/en/20140227-ukraine-crimea-armed-men-seize-building/, A. de Carbonnel,
How the separatists delivered Crimea to Moscow, 13 March 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/
2014/03/13/ukraine-crisis-russia-aksyonov-idINL6N0M93AH20140313.
17
I. Somin, The dubious Crimean referendum on annexation by Russia 17 March 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost. com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/17/the-dubious-crimeanreferendum-on-annexation-by-russia/.

defended and vindicated Russian actions in Crimea (see section 2, below). In a vote
in the UN General Assembly, only ten states besides Russia opposed a resolution
condemning the referendum in Crimea: Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, North Korea,
Nicaragua, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.18 Apparently, though, no state
has formally recognized the accession of Crimea to Russia so far.
Already in late March, Russia had amassed troops on its frontier with Ukraine, causing
Supreme Allied Commander Europe Philip Breedlove to publicly warn of the danger of
a Russian incursion. 19 Meanwhile, the situation in eastern Ukraine continuously
deteriorated, with armed men occupying security facilities. In response to this, the
interim government in Kiev launched an anti-terrorist operation on 13 April to remove
the separatists.20 Four days later, the efforts to calm the situation led to the Geneva
Agreement between the US, Russia, the EU and Ukraine, calling for non-violence, the
disarmament of the pro-Russian armed men and the return of occupied buildings. The
situation was to be monitored by the OSCE, 21 but the fighting in eastern Ukraine
continued with both sides accusing each other of disregarding the agreement, paving
the way for further escalation. Nonetheless, referendums held by the separatists in
Donetsk and Luhansk on 11 May were recognized neither by Russia nor the West.
Russian troops despite promises to withdraw continued to be stationed along the
border.22
The election of Petro Poroshenko as president of Ukraine on 25 May produced a
government whose legitimacy was again acknowledged by Russia. However, the new
government reaffirmed the pro-European stance of the interim government and
achieved one of its major goals when it signed the Association Agreement with the EU
on 27 June. This event, at the same time, increased efforts to solve the conflict in the
east. On 20 June, President Poroshenko declared a one-week ceasefire , which was
later extended by three days, and called on the separatists to lay down their arms. The
declaration was followed by a peace plan providing for increased autonomy of the
provinces and guarantees for the use of the Russian language.23 Russia equally took
a step to deescalate the situation, when Putin asked Parliament to rescind a resolution
allowing for an intervention of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine.24
Ukraine ended the unilateral ceasefire on 1July and embarked on an offensive in the
countrys east, capturing the rebel strongholds Slovyansk and Kramatorsk within days
and making steady advances towards Luhansk and Donetsk as well.
On 17 July, pro-Russian rebels shot down a Malaysian Airlines airplane, killing 298
passengers and crew members. The event constituted a turning point for the EU in

18

http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-un-passes-crimea-resolution/25312158.html.
Die Welt, Nato-General warnt vor russischer Ukraine-Invasion, 2 April 2014, http://www.welt.de/
politik/ausland/article126474162/Nato-General-warnt-vor-russischer-Ukraine-Invasion.html.
20
H. Alexander, Ukrainian forces launch 'anti-terrorist' operation in Slaviansk, 13 April 2014,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10763320/Ukrainian-forces-launch-antiterrorist-operation-in-Slaviansk.html.
21
J. Borger & A. Luhn, Ukraine crisis: Geneva talks produce agreement on defusing conflict, 17 April
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/17/ukraine-crisis-agreement-us-russia-eu.
22
BBC, Ukraine crisis: No sign of Russia withdrawal, says Nato, 19 May 2014, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-27476172.
23
BBC, Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko declares ceasefire, 20 June 2014, http://www.bbc.
com/ news/world-europe-27948335.
24
ITAR-TASS, Putin asks Federation Council to cancel resolution on use of Russian forces in
Ukraine, 24 June 2014, http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/737498.
19

that it strengthened its resolve to pursue a hard line vis--vis Russia. As a result, for
the first time tough sanctions were imposed on Russia in late July (see section 3.2).25
Meanwhile, on the battlefield in Ukraine it seemed as if the rebels were doomed. In
order to prevent this, Russia intervened in late August, inflicting heavy losses on the
Ukrainian armed forces. In the course of the fighting against the rebels and the Russian
army, the armed forces of Ukraine lost up to 65% of their heavy equipment, forcing the
country to request for an armistice.26 A deal was eventually reached after negotiations
in Minsk on 5 September.27 Besides freezing the military conflict, the peace agreement
included granting a certain measure of self-government to some areas of the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions and calling for the disbandment of illegal military formations,
without specifying whether this applied to Ukrainian or pro-Russian forces. 28 In
response to Russias continued support for the armed rebellion and despite the latter
agreement, the US and the EU tightened further their sanction regime on 12
September (see section 3.2).29 While there were no changes on the military front, the
parliamentary election in late October strengthened Ukraines pro-western forces and
the Minsk peace plan concluded a week earlier.30
On 2 November, elections were staged in the separatist regions of Donesk and
Luhansk which, unsurprisingly, confirmed the pro-Russian leadership there. The
elections were condemned by Ukraine and the West as a violation of the Minsk
agreement 31 , whereas Russia declared to recognize them. 32 With this outcome,
prospects for the realization of Poroshenkos peace plan look bleak.

2. Russian Justification with regard to Crimea and Western Response

Russias intervention and annexation of Crimea raised a series of questions. Russia
put considerable effort into justifying its actions both on legal and moral grounds. The
most important step was certainly the speech held by Putin on 18 March in the Kremlin
on the occasion of Crimeas incorporation into the Russian Federation.33 The set of

25

B. Waterfield, MH17: EU closes ranks to impose sanctions on Vladimir Putins cronies , 29 July
2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10996832/MH17-EU-closes-ranksto-impose-sanctions-on-Vladimir-Putins-cronies.html.
26
NZZ, Zum Frieden gezwungen: Kiew gehen die Waffen aus, 22 September 2014,
http://www.nzz.ch/international/kiew-gingen-die-waffen-aus-1.18388440.
27
S. Walker, Ukraine ceasefire 'agreed for east of country' at Minsk peace talks, 5 September 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/05/ukraine-ceasefire-east-minsk-peace-talks.
28
Kyiv Post, OSCE releases the 12-point protocol agreements reached between Ukraine, Russia and
separatists in Minsk, 8 September 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/osce-releases-the-12point-protocol-agreements-reached-between-ukraine-russia-and-separatists-in-minsk-363816.html.
29
BBC, How far do EU-US sanctions on Russia go?, 15 September 2014, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-28400218.
30
Reuters, Ukraine president hails support for peace plan, pro-West course, 26 October 2014, http://
uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/26/uk-ukraine-crisis-election-poroshenko-idUKKBN0IF0W920141026.
31
R. Oliphant, West condemns rebel elections in eastern Ukraine, 31 October 2014, http://www.
telegraph. co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11201684/West-condemns-rebel-elections-ineastern-Ukraine.html.
32
D. Wechlin, Konflikt in der Ukraine: Die januskpfige Politik des Kremls, 3 November 2014,
http://www.nzz.ch/international/die-januskoepfige-politik-des-kremls-1.18417328.
33
V. Putin, Address by President of the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/
news/6889.

arguments presented by the Russian side to vindicate their actions in Crimea and the
Wests counter-arguments shall be analyzed here.
At an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council on 1 March, Russian ambassador
Vitaly Churkin justified his countrys actions, asserting that the prime minister of
Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, had directly asked with Yanukovychs support president
Putin to restore order in Crimea. On Putins request, the Federation Council, the upper
house of the Russian Parliament, passed a bill ordering the deployment of armed
forces on the territory of Ukraine, not against Ukraine. 34 The ambassador
emphasized this distinction, implying thereby that the intervention could not be
considered an act of aggression against Ukraine and thus a breach of international
law, notably of article 2 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force by states
against other states. US ambassador to the UN Samantha Power rejected this
argument, stating that this intervention is without legal basis; indeed, it violates
Russias commitment to protecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
independence of Ukraine.35
In his address to the OSCE Extraordinary Preparatory Committee on 2 March, US
ambassador to the OSCE Daniel Baer equally lambasted Russia for not respecting the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as for not refraining from the
threat of force. He argued that Russia was acting in contravention of the UN Charter,
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Charter of Paris, the 1999 Charter for European
Security and the declarations of the 1996 Lisbon Summit, the 1999 Istanbul Summit
and the 2010 Astana Summits of OSCE. Moreover, he accused Russia of breaching
the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Black Sea Fleet Agreement (see
below), which are unlike the other treaties and agreements mentioned by Baer
specific to the Ukrainian context and thus play a special role in the current conflict.36
In fact, even before the special meeting of the Security Council on 1 March, the
Budapest Memorandum had been invoked by the Ukrainian Parliament on 27 February
in a call for Western assistance.37 This warrants a more detailed discussion:
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, newly independent Ukraine suddenly
found itself as the third biggest nuclear power in the world. Both the US and Russia
were concerned about the fate of the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal and after three years
of negotiations, an agreement was reached. The Budapest Memorandum provided for
Ukraines accession to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In return for Ukraine
renouncing its nuclear arsenal, the signatory powers Russia, the US and Great Britain
guaranteed Ukraines territorial integrity and sovereignty.38 The bindingness of these
guarantees has been disputed by some experts, arguing that they were rather rights
than obligations.39
34

UN Security Council, Security Council Report S/PV.7124, 1 March 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/

search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7124.
35
Ibid. (fn. 34).
36
United States Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, U.S. Calls for
OSCE Observers to be Sent Immediately to Ukraine, 2 March 2014, http://osce.usmission.gov/
mar_2_14_ukraine.html.
37
K. Stacey & R. Olearchyk, Ukraines new premier invokes treaty in bid to resist Russia, 27
February 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4eed830e-9fd0-11e3-9c65-00144feab7de.
html#axzz34Ld9U5bH.
38
Arms Control Association, The Lisbon Protocol at a Glance, March 2014, http://www.armscontrol.
org/node/3289.
39
I. Bilych & A. Gudko & K. Kuntsevich & M. Sena & M. Seth & O.Sharvan, The Crisis in Ukraine: Its
Legal Dimensions (Jersey City, RAZOM, 2014), p. 34.

Russia, however, never argued in this vein. Instead the subject was conspicuously
missing from Putins speech of 18 March the Russian Foreign Ministry accused the
EU and the US on 19 March of breaching the Memorandum by interfering with
Ukrainian domestic affairs when they announced economic sanctions against the
Yanukovych government in mid-February, blaming it for the escalation of violence.40
This was meant as an allusion to article 3, which stipulates that the signatories refrain
from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by
Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any
kind. Furthermore, the Ministry argued in a statement issued on 1 April that the
disintegration of Ukraine was an internal affair of Ukraine and therefore bore no relation
to the Memorandum:
At the OSCE Summit in Budapest in 1994 [] Russia did not undertake to force
a part of Ukraine to remain within the country against the will of the local
population, and the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum do not extend to
circumstances arising as a result of internal political or socio-economic factors.
As you are aware, 97 per cent of the voters in Crimea who took part in the
referendum held on 16 March this year under the supervision of international
observers voted for admission to the Russian Federation. Thus the loss by
Ukraine of its territorial integrity was the result of complex internal processes
that are unrelated to Russia and its commitments under the Budapest
Memorandum.41
This statement is at odds with another argument brought forward by Russia, stating its
right to intervene in order to protect the Russian minority from persecution. This
argument also figured prominently in Putins 18 March speech. On other occasions,
Putin rejected the characterization of the Russian military operation in Crimea as an
intervention. He rather argued that the military presence was nothing out of the
ordinary, as the Black Sea Fleet Agreement signed in 1997 between Russia and
Ukraine allowed for the presence of 25,000 Russian troops in Crimea. This troop
presence was confirmed and extended until 2042 in the Kharkiv Pact, which was
concluded between the Yanukovych government and Russia in 2010. While Putin is
right on the numbers, observers have rejected this view, as the agreement explicitly
stipulates the obligation "to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine, honor its legislation and
preclude interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine." 42 Nor does the agreement
allow for Russian troops to travel freely without Ukrainian consent, let alone occupy
Ukrainian military sites in Crimea.43
At a press conference on 4 March, Putin defended an intervention in Ukraine on the
grounds of the alleged crimes committed against the Russian-speaking population:
When we see this we understand what worries the citizens of Ukraine, both
Russian and Ukrainian, and the Russian-speaking population in the eastern and
40
ITAR-TASS, Foreign Ministry: US, EU violate commitments under Budapest memorandum, 19
March 2014, http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/724337; S. Castle & S. L. Myers: E.U. Imposes Sanctions
Despite Russian Criticism, 20 February 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2014/02/21/world/europe/
Ukraine-Crisis-Diplomacy.html.
41
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Statement by the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs regarding accusations of Russias violation of its obligations under the Budapest
Memorandum of 5 December 1994, 1 April 2014, http://mid.ru/BDOMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/
B173CC77483EDEB944257CAF004E64C1?OpenDocument.
42
S. Kimball, Bound by treaty: Russia, Ukraine and Crimea, 11 March 2014, http://www.dw.de/
bound-by-treaty-russia-ukraine-and-crimea/a-17487632.
43
Ibid. (fn. 42).

southern regions of Ukraine. It is this uncontrolled crime that worries them.

Therefore, if we see such uncontrolled crime spreading to the eastern regions
of the country, and if the people ask us for help, while we already have the
official request from the legitimate President, we retain the right to use all
available means to protect those people. We believe this would be absolutely
legitimate. This is our last resort.44
The argument was also taken up at Putins triumphant speech on 18 March, where he
justified the intervention because the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to
Russia for help in defending their rights and lives. As others observed, Putin crafted
these statements to conform them to the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)45,
which provides the basis for humanitarian interventions and was invoked as recently
as 2013 by the US to find consensus in the UN Security Council for an intervention in
Syria. In fact, Russia had explicitly referred to R2P during the Russian-Georgian War
in 2008, when the Russian foreign ministry proclaimed that it was Russias duty to
intervene in order to protect its citizens in Georgia.46 But this time, Moscow did only
implicitly allude to R2P, not citing it explicitly, probably since it would have been hard
to claim mass atrocity crimes in Ukraine (genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansing and war crimes), as covered by R2P. Primarily, however, Russia had simply
no interest in becoming a formal party to the conflict.
Moreover, Russia has its homegrown R2P concept, laid down during the presidency
of Boris Yeltsin, which provides the legal basis for interventions on behalf of the
Russian diaspora. The Karaganov doctrine, named after its ideological father and
former presidential advisor Sergei Karaganov, elevated the protection of the interests
of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people to a duty of the Russian state.47 This
doctrine was implemented in two steps. First, in 1999, the Law on Compatriots Abroad
was adopted by the Duma. 48 The laws article 5 stipulates Russias obligation to
support the human and citizen rights of its compatriots, who are defined as the former
citizens of the Soviet Union.49 Secondly, the law was amended in 2010, when all ethnic
Russians and Russian-speaking people were defined as compatriots, thus creating the
legal basis for future interventions in its neighbouring countries with a Russian
minority. 50 The Karaganov doctrine has often been criticized by Western states as
providing the pretext for arbitrary aggression against neighbouring states.51
Russia not only followed the R2P line of argument, it also echoed Western arguments
by claiming, both in the OSCE Permanent Council and in other venues, that the
precedent for the Crimea intervention was set by the West in Kosovo. The case of
44

Website of the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin answered journalists questions on the situation
in Ukraine, 4 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6763.
45
T. Stafford & L. Dzelzyte, Crimea and the Hijacking of the Responsibility to Protect, http://www.
humanitarianintervention.org/russia-and-eurasia/crimea-hijacking-responsibility-protect/.
46
G. Evans, Russia, Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 1 No. 2 Amsterdam Law Forum
2012, pp. 25-28.
47
P. Pryce, Putin's Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism, Vol. 13 No. 1 Romanian Journal of
European Affairs 2013, p. 33.
48
I. Zevelev, Russias Policy Toward Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union, Vol. 6 No. 1 Russia in
Global Affairs 2008, p. 52.
49
A. Zhuravsky & O. Vykhovanets, Compatriots: Back to the Homeland, 31 May 2013, http://
russiancouncil. ru/en/inner/?id_4=1908#top.
50
Voice of Russia, Russia amends law on compatriots abroad, 9 July 2010, http://voiceofrussia.com/
2010/07/09/11904454.
51
See for instance A. Petrova, Security Police: Russia's compatriot policy could be risk to Latvia's
national security, 3 May 2012, http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/legislation/?doc=56785.

Kosovo loomed particularly large in Putins triumphal speech on 18 March on the

occasion of the annexation of Crimea. To prove the Wests alleged hypocrisy in this
regard, Putin, in his 18 March speech, cited the 2010 advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice and a written statement by the US to that court from 2009,
which were both supportive of Kosovos secession from Serbia. How is this argument
to be assessed?
Evidently, there are some similarities between the situation in Kosovo and Crimea. In
both cases, a military intervention facilitated the secession. The massive human rights
violations that occurred in Kosovo provided the moral basis for NATOs intervention,
even though a formal UN mandate was not reached (due to Russias opposition).
Russia therefore sought to paint a picture of the situation in Crimea and eastern
Ukraine similar to that which had preceded NATOs intervention in Kosovo in order to
vindicate its military intervention. The US, its allies and most observers, however, have
been arguing for years that Kosovo was a case sui generis.52 This came hardly as a
surprise, as US officials had long foreseen a scenario, where Russia would use the
case of Kosovo in order to legitimize an intervention of its own.53
Critics of the comparison further point out that the Russian-speaking population in
Crimea was never oppressed, that the legal ground for the referendum was dubious at
best and did not fulfill OSCE standards, and that Kosovo had never been incorporated
into another nation. Moreover, they cite Russias own inconsistency and double
standard with respect to the question of secession. After all, Russia has opposed the
independence of Kosovo and that of any of its own provinces.54
Finally, the Russian side also brought forward historical arguments in order to justify
the annexation of Crimea. In his speech of 18 March, Putin invoked the historical
significance of Crimea in Russian history. He did not fall short of criticizing the
decisions of the Soviet leadership to allocate predominantly Russian-speaking areas
to Ukraine, first those of Novorossiya in 1922 and later Crimea in 1954: Naturally in
a totalitarian state nobody bothered to ask the citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol,
argued Putin, and consequently called the annexation of Crimea a reunification,
comparable to that of Germany in 1990. In his speech, Putin also referred tothe notion
of Ukrainians and Russians as one people, bound together by history: [] we are one
people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and
we cannot live without each other.55 This statement made clear that Putin despite
assertions to the contrary does not consider Ukraine a fully sovereign country,
implicitly denying its right of territorial integrity.
What were the true reasons behind the annexation of Crimea? Apparently, the
arguments brought forward to justify the annexation succeeded if the numbers are
to be trusted in convincing the majority of the Russian people. In the wake of the
annexation, Putins approval rating skyrocketed, peaking at 86%. As a result, many
52
See for instance Madeleine K. Albright, Press Conference with Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov, 26 July 1999, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990726b.html.
53
See, for example, David Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs,
Remarks to the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, 31 May 2007, http://2001-2009.state.gov/
p/eur/rls/rm/85874.htm.
54
I. Somin, Why the Kosovo precedent does not justify Russias annexation of Crimea, 24 March
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/24/crimea-kosovo-andfalse- moral- equivalency/; O. Sukhov, Kosovo? Hong Kong? Abkhazia? Few Precedents for Russia's
Crimea Takeover, 26 March 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/kosovo-hong-kongabkhazia-few-precedents-for-russias-crimea-takeover/496873.html.
55
V. Putin (fn. 33).

have concluded that the annexation was primarily motivated by domestic affairs and
was populist in nature.56 Other explanations emphasize the role of geopolitics. In this
vein, the annexation is seen as a stepping-stone in the creation of a greater Russian
empire or as a means to prevent the West and in particular NATO from expanding into
Ukraine.57 These arguments can serve to explain the Russian policy towards Ukraine
in general, but fail to answer the question why Crimea and not some other territory was
annexed. Others are more concrete in this regard. From the military point of view, it
has been argued that the annexation eased the situation of the Black Sea Fleet located
in Sevastopol, whose size and distribution was previously bound by the RussianUkrainian agreements of 1997 and 2010.58 Still, the strategic importance of Sevastopol
if often overrated. Russia already has access to the Black Sea and it has been
expanding the port of Novorossysk, which could serve as an alternative to Sevastopol,
a few years from now. 59 In addition, the Black Sea Fleet lays largely neglected,
although with the acquisition of two French Mistral-class ships, this may be about to
change.60 With regard to Russias energy policy, it has furthermore been observed that
the annexation gives Russia access to new deep water energy resources in the Black
Sea and that the acquisition of the peninsula allows for cutting the length of South
Stream, the pipeline project currently put on hold, and thus saves money and time.61
Given Russias abundance of deep-water energy resources and its dearth of
technology to exploit them, the energy aspect is hardly the sine qua non of the
annexation of Crimea. Thus, as none of these explanations is fully convincing on its
own, and since nothing has become public of the decision-making process in the
Kremlin, it is advisable to see the annexation of Crimea as the result of a combination
of various factors.
3. Strategic Assessment and Outlook
1. The Future of Eurasian Integration
For many observers, the crisis in Ukraine has marked the end of the era that started
with the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia has been described as a revisionist power,
which intends to roll back the order that was established by the US and its allies after
the end of the Cold War.62 In Putins view, the US hegemony after its victory in the
Cold War was a historical mistake, which can only be corrected by a multipolar world
with Russia being one of its major powers: After the dissolution of bipolarity on the
planet, we no longer have stability.63 Putins famous statement about the demise of

56

For example D. Treisman, Driven by Domestic Politics, August 2014, http://perspectives.carnegie.

org/us-russia/driven-by-domestic-politics.
57
J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the Wests Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked
Putin, Vol. 93 No. 5 Foreign Affairs 2014, p. 1.
58
See A. Wilk, The military consequences of the annexation of Crimea, 19 March 2014, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/ en/publikacje/analyses/2014-03-19/military-consequences-annexation-crimea.
59
M. Bugriy, The Future of the Russian Black Sea Fleets Bases: Novorossiysk Versus Sevastopol, 6
September 2014, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41327&
no_cache=1#. VFe1rfmG9k4.
60
P. N. Schwartz, Crimea's Strategic Value to Russia, 18 March 2014, http://csis.org/blog/crimeasstrategic-value-russia.
61
W. J. Broad, In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves, May 17 2014, http://www.
nytimes. com/ 2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putin-gains-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html.
62
W. R. Mead, The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers, 17 April 2014,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return-of-geopolitics.
63
V. Putin (fn. 33).

10

the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century64 has
also to be understood in this context and not as mere nostalgia. But the quest for a
new, multipolar world order and concomitantly the fight against Western, in particular
US, hegemony had shaped Russian foreign policy long before the crisis in Ukraine. In
fact, Russian strategic planning since 2008 has stressed Russias role as an
independent power wielding influence on the world stage, in particular in the postSoviet states. 65 Obamas reset policy, which strived to repair the damaged USRussian relations after the Georgian War in 2008, has never changed Russias
strategy.
To achieve its great power status and repel foreign, foremost Western influence Russia
has strived to bind the former Soviet Republics closer to itself by using a variety of
means: military cooperation, economic support, especially by cheap supplies of natural
gas and the buildup of integration projects. In the crisis in Ukraine, the most prestigious
of these projects, the Eurasian Union, clashed with the EU (see section1). In his
speech of 18 March, Putin described Western foreign policy in Eastern Europe as
fundamentally opposed to Russias stature as an independent world power,
countervailing the concept of Western hegemony. The West therefore fights Eurasian
integration and pursues a policy of containment vis--vis Russia. The West is not to
be trusted: They have lied to us many times [].; And with Ukraine, our Western
partners have crossed the line, warned Putin.66
The direct impact of the Ukrainian crisis on Eurasian integration is obviously that Kiev
will not be part of any political scheme led by Moscow in the foreseeable future. Beyond
that, there are signs that caution about Russias political integration plans has soared
even within member states of the Eurasion Union. For example, protests erupted on
the conclusion of the OSCE Summit in Astana on 29 May 2014, accusing Kazakh
president Nursultan Nazarbayev, one of the main supporters of Eurasian integration,
of selling the countrys sovereignty. Kazakh officials felt compelled to stress that they
had successfully negotiated to eliminate those clauses from the treaty that aimed at a
higher level of political integration. The events in Ukraine and Astana are likely to have
reminded the leaders of post-Soviet states that they may be faced with their own
Maidan movement should they continue to proceed on their pro-Moscow course.67
Russian policy towards Ukraine seems also to have affected Moscows relations with
Beijing, which has been viewed as a partner in the struggle for a multipolar world. They
collaborate both bilaterally and on the international stage, foremost within the
framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the UN Security
Council, where they have been blocking successfully the West on the question of
Syria. 68 Both countries have a shared interest in combatting colour revolutions
perceived as Western intrusions in their neighbourhood, foremost in Central Asia.69
However, the conflict in Ukraine did have repercussions on Russian-Chinese relations.
Fearful of its own separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang, the principle of territorial
64

BBC, Putin deplores collapse of USSR, 25 April 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm.

A. Monaghan, Putin's Russia: shaping a grand strategy?, Vol. 89 No. 5 International Affairs 2013,
p. 1230f.
66
V. Putin (fn. 33).
67
J. Lillis, Kazakhstan: Landmark Eurasian Union Treaty Signed Amid Protests and Arrests, 29 May
2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68416.
68
A. Cooley, The League of Authoritarian Gentlemen, 30 January 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2013/01/30/the_league_of_authoritarian_gentleman.
69
D. Trenin, Color Revolutions in Asia? Beijing and Moscow are on the Same Side, 20 June 2014,
http://carnegie.ru/2014/06/20/color-revolutions-in-asia-beijing-and-moscow-are-on-same-side/he5y.
65

11

integrity is a key tenet of Chinas policy. Russia has violated this principle twice, first in
Georgia in 2008 and now with the annexation of Crimea. Moreover, Putin has defended
openly the right of peoples to secede from their mother country, which may also prove
short-sighted in light of Russias multi-ethnic fabric. Therefore, it is hardly surprising
that Chinas support to Russian actions in Crimea has been lukewarm at best. China
walked the narrow line between not condoning Russias breach of Ukrainian
sovereignty and not being seen as sharing the Western censure for Russian actions.
As a result, Beijing chose to abstain from the vote on a UN Security Council draft
resolution on 15 March condemning the referendum in Crimea as illegal.70
Thus, Russian policy towards Ukraine poses a severe rift in its relations with China, a
rift which can hardly be bridged by the economic relations in the foreseeable future:
Russia has long sought to increase its export share of oil and gas to the Asian markets
in order to reduce its dependency on the European market and increase the
manoeuvrability of its export policy. Accordingly, the Energy Strategy 2035, which was
published in a draft version in January 2014, envisions Russian export of commodities
to Asia to reach about one third of the total export within the next two decades; this
ambitious aim was reaffirmed by Russian officials just recently.71 The signing of a 400
bn. US$ gas deal with China at the height of the Ukraine crisis in May was therefore
hailed as a big success.72 However, observers have questioned the deals profitably,
noting that while China pays less than European market prices for Russian gas,
Gazprom will have to shoulder the huge investment costs estimated to be roughly 55
bn. US$ that are needed for exploring and shipping gas to the Chinese border.73
Besides, China can satisfy its need for natural gas without Russian supply.74 Against
this background, the prospects of a Russian economic reorientation toward the East
seem exaggerated for the time being. Russia has less economic flexibility than it wants
others to believe.
2. Relations between Russia and the West
It looks as though Crimea will remain occupied by Russia for the foreseeable future as
there is little the West or Ukraine can do about it. Since the beginning of the occupation,
Moscow has been pursuing a policy aimed at removing Crimea from the Wests
agenda and at returning to a state of normalcy with the West. While the latter was not
achieved, there was some success regarding the first aim.

70
S. Tiezzi, China Reacts to the Crimea Referendum, 18 March 2014, http://thediplomat.com/
2014/03/china-reacts-to-the-crimea-referendum/; see also UN News Centre, UN Security Council
action on Crimea referendum blocked, 15 March 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=47362#. U6loUvl_v7w.
71
Reuters, Russia to double oil, gas flows to Asia by 2035-draft document, 24 January 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/24/russia-oil-asia-idUSL5N0KY0JW20140124; Ria Novosti,
Western Sanctions Will Not Cause Changes in Russias Energy Strategy to 2035, 23 September
2014, http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140923/193186221/Western-Sanctions-Will-Not-Cause-Changes-inRussias-Energy-Strategy-to-2035.html.
72
C. Wright, $400 Billion Gas Deal Shows Russia Looking To China To Replace Western Money, 22
May 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/chriswright/2014/05/22/400-billion-gas-deal-shows-russialooking- to-china-to-replace-western-money.
73
T. Treadgold, Merrill Lynch Says Russia's Gas Deal With China was a Political Win but a Business
Loss, 28 May 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timtreadgold/2014/05/28/merrill-lynch-says-russiasgas-deal-with-china-was-a-political-win-but-a-business-loss/; A. Kawato, Much Ado About SinoRussian Axis, 10 June 2014, http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=55870.
74
M. Krutikhin, East or West, Home Is Best, 15 October 2014, http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/
?fa=56936.

12

The agreement concluded in Geneva on 17 April constituted a tactical victory for

Russia, as there was no mention of the annexation of Crimea and the role the Russian
military had played there, but only of the situation in eastern Ukraine. 75 Thus, the
Russian support for the rebellion in the East has succeeded in three respects: First in
drawing attention away from the annexation of Crimea, second in creating a Russian
leverage on domestic politics of Ukraine and restoring Russian influence on the
countrys affairs, and third in breaking the diplomatic isolation of Russia, as Russia is
now recognized by all parties as the essential partner in resolving the conflict in
Ukraine. So, paradoxically, Russia is the instigator and the mediator of the conflict at
the same time. This will not change unless Russia achieves its strategic aim of
alienating Ukraine permanently from the West a very remote scenario for the time
being. To the contrary, as long as the conflict serves Russian interests, Russia has a
good reason to keep it smouldering on a low level, keeping the balance of power
between both parties, the armed forces of Ukraine and of the separatists. As the
conflict in eastern Ukraine is likely to last, the situation there will resemble those of
other frozen conflicts like in the regions of Transnistria, Abchasia or South Ossetia,
and, concomitantly, the more irreversible will become Crimeas secession.
However, unlike after the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, there are no signs that the US
and the Europeans will return to business as usual with Russia, even less so after the
downing of Malaysian flight MH17 on 17 July, and the subsequent military escalation
in eastern Ukraine. Instead, EU countries are striving to find long-term alternatives to
their imports of Russian commodities. Their opposition to the construction of the South
Stream pipeline has proven that EU leaders are willing to pay a price for this policy. At
the outset, the West was reluctant to directly target the Russian commodity sector due
to Europes dependence on imports of Russian energy. As a consequence, the first
rounds of sanctions by the West focused on individuals and companies close to the
regime and thus failed to impinge on the Kremlins policies vis--vis Ukraine. The
sanctions, however, imposed in late July after the downing of MH17 constituted a
significant escalation. They were meticulously crafted to hurt the Russian economy,
targeting the banking sector, restricting arms trade and technology transfer without
endangering Europes supply of Russian gas.76 After Russias military intervention in
eastern Ukraine in late August, the EU and the US tightened their sanctions against
state enterprises in the arms, banking and energy sector, among else Gazprom and
Rosneft.77 In addition, the sanctions banned the provision of services and technology
for the exploration of Arctic, deep sea and shale oil wells. Their effect will not be felt
immediately by the oil industry,78 but in the long run, they may prove highly detrimental,
as they make it difficult for Russia to maintain its current level of energy production.
This is exactly the purpose of the sanctions: They are not crafted to immediately cripple

75

L. Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management, Vol. 56 No. 3 Survival 2014, p. 26.
The Economist, Sanctions on Russia This is going to hurt, 2 August 2014, http://www.economist.
com/news/europe/21610322-cost-vladimir-putins-gamble-ukraine-going-up-he-shows-no-signchanging; A. Panin, How Slumping Oil Prices Hit Russia's Sanctions-Struck Oil Industry, October 28,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/510231.html.
77
BBC, How far do EU-US sanctions on Russia go?, 15 September 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-28400218.
78
J. Carroll & I. Lakshmanan & A. Katz, Why Sanctions Won't Stop U.S. Oil Drilling in Russia, 18
September 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-09-18/why-sanctions-wont-stop-u-dot-sdot-oil-drilling-in-russia.
76

13

the Russian economy and thereby risk the stability of the global market, but to damage
Russia in the long term.79 In other words: They are strategic, not tactical tools.
There are three conclusions following these observations regarding the Wests
strategy towards Russia. First, the long-term nature of the sanctions avoids cornering
Russia and especially Putin, thus giving the latter time and opportunity to negotiate
with the West and possibly justify to the Russian people an eventual retreat from
eastern Ukraine. Secondly, they also aim at increasing the flexibility of the West, lifting
public pressure from Western politicians to react instantly. And third, they indicate
together with the halting of infrastructure projects like South Stream that the EU
means business about reducing its dependence on Russian energy exports
permanently.
Russia, on the other hand, has also imposed sanctions on the import of EU, US and
other western countries foodstuffs. Although these sanctions will hurt the agriculture,
observers expect their overall effect on the economy to be limited.80 They are therefore
to be understood foremost as an expression of Putins populism. Despite this, the
sanctions have the potential to deepen already existing divisions within the EU.
Whereas Baltic States and Poland feel most threatened by Russia and are therefore
the firmest backers of a tough stance, some EU member states in south-eastern
Europe, benefitting from Russias cheap delivery of commodities and investments in
construction projects, advocate a more conciliatory approach towards Russia. This
became apparent when they together with Italy opposed the EU-enforced halt to South
Stream. 81 Russian firms may also engage in legal warfare, challenging the Wests
sanctions in court, which Gazprom and other companies have already done in the
past.82
Still the continued crisis has strengthened those who advocate a tough stance on
Russia. The case of Germany is particularly notable: it used to be considered a friend
of Russia but has become one of the firmest backers of the sanctions in the course of
the crisis.83 As the lifting of sanctions would require a unanimous vote by all 28 EU
member states, chances for this to happen in the short run are low. But when economic
sanctions run out in July 2015, the same unanimity is needed to renew them and
Russia will use its leverage to prevent this from happening.84
Already today, Russia is paying a high financial price for its adventurous policy in
Ukraine. As a direct result of the sanctions, Russian firms have trouble finding creditors
on the world-market. Other direct costs of Russias actions are often overlooked.
According to the Russian NGO Union of the Committees of Soldiers Mothers, some
15,000 Russian soldiers were engaged in battle in Ukraine and over 400 soldiers were
79

N. Buckley, Sanctions noose begins to tighten on sanguine Russia, 15 October 2014,

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2751e288-5455-11e4-b2ea-00144feab7de.html#axzz3HMoGcGeC.
80
T. Worstall, The Quite Hilarious Russian Propaganda About The Ban On EU Food Imports, 8
August 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/08/08/the-quite-hilarious-russianpropaganda-about-the-ban-on-eu-food-imports.
81
J. Overdorf, Russia's pipeline politics are dividing the EU, 3 July 2014, http://www.globalpost.com/
dispatch/news/business/energy/140702/russia-south-stream-pipeline-ukraine-european-union.
82
Reuters, Gazprom Challenges Sanctions, 28 October 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/
article/510226.html.
83
See A. Rinke, How Putin Lost Berlin: Moscows annexation of Crimea has transformed Germanys
Russia policy, 29 September 2014, https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/how-putin-lostberlin.
84
The Economist, EU sanctions on Russia will be eased in 2015, 8 October 2014, http://country.
eiu.com/ article.aspx?articleid=1172365101.

14

killed as of late August. 85 Pay and equipment for the army, compensation for the
bereaved families and other costs directly resulting from the military conflict are
burdening an already strained Russian budget. The indirect costs of the sanctions are
even heavier. With a deteriorating economic climate, inflation and capital flight have
reached new heights, the latter being expected to amount to more than 100 bn. US$
in 2014.86 The Russian Ministry of Economic Development warned that the country will
slip into a recession in 2015. The dire outlook is exacerbated by falling oil prices. As a
result, the Duma passed a reduced budget for 2015-17 in late October, which is still
unrealistic, as it is based on an oil price of 100 US$ per barrel, while the current price
is at 85 US$ per barrel, and on excessive growth expectations.87 According to the
Russian economist Sergei Aleksashenko, the Kremlin has the means to stabilize its
household for another two to three years.88 Thus, a collapse of the Russian economy
does not seem imminent, but its future looks gloomy. With the toughening economic
and political climate, ever more Russians will opt out, leaving their country for good.
Emigration in the first eight months of 2014 reached more than 200000 people, more
than last year or any year since Putin came to power.89
Many have noted that Putin emerged stronger from the current crisis, with his regime
consolidated.90 The emigration of opposition leaders and educated elites, who tend to
be more liberal, also may work to this effect. But if the sanctions become permanent,
they will gradually exacerbate the deteriorating economic climate. This will undermine
Putins authority, which rests also on his promise of bringing wealth and stability to the
Russian people and its elite. Should he fail to deliver in this respect, Putin will find his
leadership very quickly challenged. He still has room for manoeuvre: If Putin drops his
hard stance on Ukraine and stops supporting the armed insurrection in the countrys
East, many EU countries, especially on its poorer southern and eastern periphery, will
find themselves tempted to re-establish their good relations with the Kremlin. Even so,
it is very unlikely that the EU member states will ever recognize the annexation of
Crimea de jure, though they will de facto ignore it when dealing with Russia, like in the
case of Turkey and Northern Cyprus. But such a shift in Russias policies in eastern
Ukraine would present Putin with the risk of losing face and make him look weak a
mortal danger for his rule. This may be the main reason why Putin is very unlikely to
back down on Ukraine.

85

O. Sukhov, Russians see war cost as their army invades, 28 August 2014,
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/russians-see-war-cost-as-their-army-invades-362476.html.
86
A. Kolyandr, Sanctions, Oil Prices May Harm Russian Economy, Ministers Warn: Government May
Need to Cut Budget Spending, 24 October 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/russia-may-need-tocut-budget-spending-finance-minister-says-1414158145.
87
Moscow Times, Finance Ministry Eyes 10% Cuts to Russia's State Spending as Economic Outlook
Worsens, 27 October 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/510112.html.
88
Klaus-Helge Donath, Aus einer anderen Zeit, NZZ am Sonntag 26 October 2014 , p. 27.
89
J. Corcoran & J. Rudnitsky & S. Saitto, Russian Brain Drain Saps Talent as Sanctions Hit
Financing, 27 October 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-27/russia-brain-drain-sapstalent-as-sanctions-hit-financing.html.
90
Reuters, Western Sanctions Unite Russia's Oil and Gas Kingpins Around Putin, 29 October 2014,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/510269.html.

15

Annex
Chronology of Events
20 November 2013

Ukraine withdraws from signing the Association Agreement

with the EU

22 February 2014

The Ukrainian Parliament decides to depose president

Yanukovich

18 March 2014

Russia formally annexes Crimea and Sevastopol

25 May 2014

Petro Poroshenko is elected as Ukrainian president

17 July 2014

Downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17

5 September 2014

Ukraine, Russia and the pro-Russian separatists sign a

peace agreement at Minsk

26 October 2014

Pro-Western forces win parliamentary elections in Ukraine

3 November 2014

Pro-Russian separatists win parliamentary elections in

the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk

16