In The United States District Court For The District of Idaho

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 2
Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Jacob H. Naylor
[ISB No. 8474]
Landon S. Brown
[ISB No. 9023]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com; landon@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
DONALD KNAPP; EVELYN KNAPP;
HITCHING POST WEDDINGS, LLC,
Case No. 2:14-CV-00441-REB
Plaintiffs,
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT
vs.
CITY OF COEUR DALENE,
Defendant.
Defendant City of Coeur dAlene, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales,
P.C., hereby moves this Court to dismiss all claims against Defendant under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), because Plaintiffs do not have standing and their claims are not ripe for review.
In support of this motion, Defendant relies upon the pleadings and other documents that have
been filed in this case, as well as the Memorandum in Support and the Declaration of Michael C.
Gridley, filed herewith.
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1
Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 2 of 2
DATED this 30th day of March, 2015.

By: /s/ Kirtlan G. Naylor. Naylor, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur dAlene
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of March, 2015, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent a Notice of
Electronic Filing to the following person(s):
David A. Cortman; dcortman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
Kevin H. Theriot; ktheriot@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
Rory T. Gray; rgray@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
Jeremy D. Tedesco; jtedesco@alliancefendingfreedom.org
Jonathan A. Scruggs; jscruggs@alliancefendingfreedom.org
Virginia McNulty Robinson vrobinson@robinsonlaw-pllc.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
/s/ Kirtlan G. Naylor
9293_18 M otion to D ismiss Amd C omplaint.w pd
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 2
Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 21
Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Jacob H. Naylor
[ISB No. 8474]
Landon S. Brown
[ISB No. 9023]
Attorneys at Law
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com; landon@naylorhales.com
Case No. 2:14-CV-00441-REB
Plaintiffs,
DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT
vs.
CITY OF COEUR DALENE,
Defendant.
Defendant City of Coeur dAlene, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales,
P.C., brings this Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint.
As shown below, all claims against Defendant must be dismissed because Plaintiffs lack standing
and their claims are not ripe for review.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Donald and Evelyn Knapp are members, owners, and operators of Plaintiff Hitching
Post Weddings, LLC. (Dkt. 29, 53, 56.) Hitching Post Weddings, LLC, is a religious
corporation created on or around September 12, 2014. (Id. at 57, 144-46; Dkt. 29-2; Declaration
DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
of Michael C. Gridley in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint,

hereafter Gridley Dec., 8.) On March 16, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Verified
Complaint (Amended Complaint) alleging various federal claims. (Dkt. 29.)
Plaintiffs claims arose as a result of Defendant enacting an anti-discrimination ordinance.
On June 4, 2013, the Coeur dAlene City Council passed Ordinance 9.56, which makes it a
misdemeanor to deny to or to discriminate against any person because of sexual orientation and/or
gender identity/expression the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities
or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement. COEUR
D ALENE , IDAHO , ORDINANCES
ch. 9.56.030(B). The ordinance also contains certain exceptions.
Specifically, the ordinance does not apply to [r]eligious corporations, associations, educational
institutions, or societies. Id. at 9.56.040(B)(1). Plaintiffs contend that their rights have been
violated because the anti-discrimination ordinance requires them to choose between violating the
ordinance by refusing to perform same-sex marriages or violating their religious beliefs by
performing same-sex marriages. However, Plaintiffs qualify as a religious corporation and are
exempt from the ordinance. Since the ordinance does not apply to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs lack standing
to bring this lawsuit and their claims are not ripe for review.
II. BACKGROUND
The Knapps purchased a wedding chapel in 1989. (Dkt. 29, 94.) When the Knapps
purchased the chapel, they began operating the business as an S-Corporation. (Id. at 95, 101,
143.) The Knapps continued to operate the business as an S-Corporation until September 12, 2014.
(See Dkt. 29, 145-46; Gridley Dec., 8.) This S-Corporation no longer exists.
On May 13, 2014, a federal district court judge invalidated an Idaho law defining marriage
as the union between a man and a woman. (Dkt. 29, 369.) After various stays and legal
proceedings, same-sex marriage became legal in Idaho on October 15, 2014. (Id. at 376.)
As the same-sex marriage controversy was being resolved in the court room, the media took
notice of the issue and provided coverage of the story. On May 15, 2014, a local newspaper ran a
story about whether wedding chapels would violate the citys ordinance if they refused to perform
same-sex marriages. (Id. at 340-42.) The article included a quote from a city official stating, I
would think that the Hitching Post would probably be considered a place of public accommodation
that would be subject to the ordinance. (Id. at 341.) That same day, a local television station aired
a report about same-sex marriages. During that segment, a city official stated that a wedding chapel
that refused to perform same-sex marriages in theory could violate the ordinance. (Id. at 354.)
At that time, city officials had no knowledge or information which would lead them to believe that
the Knapps operated a religious corporation. In fact, the Knapps still operated the Hitching Post
as the S-Corporation and had not yet memorialized their purpose, character, ethos, and goals. (See
Id. at 143-45; Gridley Dec. 8.)
Around May 20, 2014, and again around June 20, 2014, the Knapps allegedly called a city
official to inquire whether the Hitching Post, the S-Corporation, would be subject to the citys
ordinance. (Id. at 9-27.) Based on the citys limited knowledge of the Hitching Posts
organizational structure and without any knowledge of Plaintiffs purpose, character, ethos, and
goals, the city official allegedly informed the Knapps that the ordinance would require the Hitching
Post to perform same-sex marriages, should such marriages be upheld by the courts. (Id.) However,
the Knapps were never informed that they would be prosecuted pursuant to the ordinance if they
refused to perform same-sex marriages. Additionally, the Knapps never informed city officials that
they believed they operated a religious corporation, that their purpose was to promote biblical
marriages, or that they exclusively performed religious ceremonies. (Gridley Dec. 6.)
Thereafter, the Knapps took preemptive action to ensure that they would not have to perform
same-sex marriages in case those marriages became legal in Idaho. On September 12, 2014, the
Knapps formed Hitching Post Weddings, LLC. (Dkt. 29, 144-45; Gridley Dec., 8; Dkt. 29-2.)
This new business entity replaced the former S-Corporation, and the Knapps started performing all
business operations using the new business entity, Hitching Post Weddings, LLC. (Id.) Around the
same time, the Knapps identified and memorialized Hitching Post Weddings, LLCs character,
ethos, and goals by creating an operating agreement. (Dkt., 29 161; Dkt. 29-2.) The operating
agreement stated:
The Hitching Post is a religious corporation owned solely by ordained ministers
of the Christian religion who operate this entity as an extension of their sincerely
held religious beliefs and in accordance with their vows taken as Christian
ministers. The purpose of the Hitching Post is to help people create, celebrate,
and build lifetime, monogamous, one-man-one-woman marriages as defined by
the Holy Bible.
(Dkt. 29. 163; Dkt. 29-2, p. 4) (emphasis added). Additionally, the operating agreement stated,
The Hitching Post provides wedding and marriage-related services for the purpose of publicly
expressing and promoting that marriage is the union of one man and one woman and for the
purposes of promoting the social institution of marriage as a fundamental building block of our
society and promoting the public understanding of marriage as the union of one man and one
woman. (Id.) (emphasis added).
To ensure that the new company, Hitching Post Weddings, LLC, accomplished its goals, the
Knapps created and implemented certain policies and procedures, including requiring all employees
to sign a new policy stating that they would abide by the new rules and regulations of the company.
(Dkt. 29, 169-74; Dkt. 29-3.) The Hitching Post Weddings, LLC also created a customer policy
informing customers that it was a religious corporation owned by Christian ministers for a religious
purpose. (Dkt. 29, 178-80; Dkt. 29-4.) The new employee and customer policies were created
when Hitching Post Weddings, LLC, was formedaround September 12, 2014 to October 6, 2014.
(Dkt. 29, 144-45; Dkt. 29-2; Dkt. 29-3; Dkt. 29-4; Gridley Dec., 8.)
As a result of their preemptive actions, the Knapps successfully reorganized their business
activities and memorialized their belief that Hitching Post Weddings, LLC, was a religious
corporation with the purpose of promoting biblical marriages by at least October 6, 2014. (See Dkt.
29, 144-45; Dkt. 1-4; Gridley Dec. 8.) After memorializing their belief that Hithcing Post
Weddings, LLC, was a religious corporation, and after memorializing their purpose, character, ethos,
and goals, Plaintiffs never inquired with city officials whether their newly formed entity would be
subject to the anti-discrimination ordinance. (Gridley Dec. 9.) Further, after Plaintiffs changed
their business organization and memorialized their belief that they were a religious corporation, city
officials never stated or threatened the newly formed entity with prosecution if Plaintiffs refused to
perform same-sex marriages. (Id.)
Even though Plaintiffs took these preemptive actions to fit within the exception found in
9.56, and despite receiving no threats of prosecution from Defendant and making no inquiries to
Defendant regarding the newly formed entity, Plaintiffs elected to close Hitching Post Weddings,
LLC, on October 7-11, 2014 and October 14-15, 2014. (Dkt. 29, 372-78.) Notably, same-sex
marriages could not be performed in Idaho until October 15, 2014. (Dkt. 29, 376.) Plaintiffs
reopened their business on October 16, 2014. (Dkt. 29, 383.)
On October 17, 2014, Plaintiffs allege that two customer contacted them and asked if they
would perform a same-sex wedding. (Dkt. 29, 385, 389.) Plaintiffs declined the invitations. (Id.
at 386, 390.) That same day, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Defendant seeking relief from
application of the Citys anti-discrimination ordinance. (See generally Dkt. 1.) Plaintiffs filed suit
without receiving a single threat that their newly formed entity would be prosecuted pursuant to the
ordinance, and apparently without realizing that their new entity was a religious corporation,
excepted from the ordinance. Additionally, Plaintiffs filed suit before any formal action was
threatened or taken against Plaintiffs for any alleged violation of the ordinance.
That same day, city officials obtained the Verified Complaint and several exhibits attached
to the complaint. (See Dkt. 1.) These exhibits included the operating agreement, employee policy,
and customer policy. (Dkt. 1-1; Dkt. 1-2; Dkt. 1-3.) Upon reading these documents, city officials
first learned that Plaintiffs reorganized their business affairs and considered themselves a religious
corporation. (Gridley Dec. 7.) Additionally, based on these documents, city officials first learned
that Plaintiffs purpose was to promote biblical marriages. Indeed, the complaint informed city
officials that all wedding services provided by the Hitching Post were religious ceremonies and
were entirely based on religious messages and biblical scriptures. (Dkt. 1, 190, 159-226.) Prior
to this date, city officials never knew that Plaintiffs considered themselves a religious corporation,
that their purpose was to promote biblical marriages, or that their services were exclusively
religious ceremonies. (Gridley Dec. 7.) After reviewing these documents, city officials
determined that Hitching Post Weddings, LLC, qualified as a religious corporation and was exempt
from the ordinance. (Id.)
On October 20, 2014, the City Attorney sent a letter to Plaintiffs attorney informing him that
Plaintiffs were exempt from the ordinance because they were a religious corporation. (Dkt. 29-1.)
The purpose of the letter was to inform Plaintiffs that, as a religious corporation, they would not be
subject to the anti-discrimination ordinance. (Gridley Dec., 10.) On October 23, 2014, the City
Attorney sent Plaintiffs attorney another letter reasserting that Plaintiffs were exempt from the
ordinance and would not be subject to prosecution under the ordinance if a complaint was ever
received by the city. (Id.)
On October 23, 2014, the Coeur dAlene police department received a complaint from an
individual in Massachusetts who alleged that Plaintiffs refused to perform a same-sex marriage.
(Gridley Dec., 11.) No action was taken in regard to the complaint because Defendant recognized
that Plaintiffs were exempt from the ordinance. (Id.) Thereafter, Defendant continued to
communicate to the Plaintiffs that they would not be prosecuted for refusing to perform same-sex
marriages. (Id. at 12.) On February 23, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
that Plaintiffs lacked standing. (Dkt. 24.) The motion included a declaration from the City
Attorney, swearing that Plaintiffs would not be prosecuted pursuant to the anti-discrimination
ordinance so long as they remained a religious corporation. (Dkt. 24-2, 12.) Plaintiffs received
the motion and declaration, and in response, filed a First Amended Verified Complaint, re-asserting
their allegations from their Verified Complaint and adding claims challenging the constitutionality
of the ordinance on its face. (Dkt. 29.)
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
FRCP 12(b)(1) Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may ask the court to dismiss
a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction and possess only the power authorized by the United States Constitution and
statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). It is presumed
that a cause lies outside the federal courts limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing
otherwise rests on the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold
matter, which a court must determine before proceeding to the merits of the case. Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Envt, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
A defendant may move to dismiss a cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in
one of two ways. See Thornhill Pub. Co. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.
1979); Nampa Classical Academy v. Goesling, 714 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1087 (D. Idaho 2010). The
challenge may be a facial challenge where the defendant attacks the sufficiency of the allegations
supporting subject matter jurisdiction. Nampa Classical Academy, 714 F.Supp.2d at 1087 (citing
Thornhill Pub. Co., 594 F.2d at 733). Or, the challenge may be a factual challenge attacking the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Id. A factual attack may be accompanied by extrinsic
evidence and the court is ordinarily free to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that
issue prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where necessary. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 686 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074,
1077 (9th Cir. 1983)). In such instances, no presumption of truthfulness attaches to the plaintiffs
allegations in the complaint, and the existence of disputed material facts do not preclude the court
from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Thornhill Pub. Co., 594 F.2d at 733
(citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3rd Cir. 1977)). Moreover,
when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) the district court is not restricted
to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to
resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United States, 850
F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). The burden is on the plaintiff, as the party asserting jurisdiction, to
prove that federal jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.
B.
Article III Jurisdictional Requirements
Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of federal courts to deciding actual
Cases or Controversies. Hollingsworth v. Perry, __ U.S. __, __, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
The case or controversy requirement must be satisfied at all stages of litigation and review, not
merely at the time the complaint is filed. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10, (1974). Both
standing and ripeness are essential aspects of the case or controversy requirement and must be
present in order for a person to invoke the power of a federal court. Hollingsworth, __ U.S. at __,
133 S.Ct. at 2661; Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). Absent standing
or ripeness, a federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case.
IV. ARGUMENT
A.
Plaintiffs Failed to Establish Standing to Challenge the Anti-Discrimination

Ordinance Because They are Unable to Articulate an Injury in Fact that is
Causally Connected to Defendants Conduct.
To establish standing, Plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that: (1) they suffered an
injury in factan invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the existence of a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained ofthat is, the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party
not before the court; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Gibson v. Credit Suisse AG, 787 F.Supp.2d 1123,
1128-29 (D. Idaho 2011) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). See
also Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). As with all questions of
subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. . . . The party invoking the jurisdiction of the court cannot rely on events that unfolded
after the filing of the complaint to establish its standing. Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th
Cir. 2005) abrogated on other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010)
(quoting Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, 418 F.3d 453, 460 (5th Cir. 2005)). As standing is a
core component of the case or controversy requirement, it must be established through all stages
of federal proceedings, including the filing of a complaint and the filing of subsequent amended
complaints. Lewis v. Contl Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990).
Plaintiffs allegations are generally based on three types of injuries: (1) that Defendant
threatened them with prosecution, which caused them injury; (2) that Defendants conduct caused
them to close their business, resulting in loss income; and (3) that Defendant created an uncertainty
in the application of the ordinance, which chilled and deterred Plaintiffs from conducting wedding
ceremonies. These allegations are not sufficient to establish standing as they are based on
hypothetical injuries and/or are not causally connected to Defendants alleged conduct. Accordingly,
all claims must be dismissed.
1.
Plaintiffs Cannot Establish an Injury in Fact Regarding Alleged Threats of

Prosecution Made by Defendants.
In regards to Defendants alleged threats of prosecution, Plaintiffs cannot establish the first
prong of standing because they have not suffered an injury in fact. To demonstrate an injury in fact,
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they received an injury that is concrete and particularized and actual
or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Here, Plaintiffs have not
been prosecuted with violation of the ordinance. When plaintiffs bring suit challenging the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance prior to the statute or ordinance being enforced against the
plaintiffs (a pre-enforcement challenge), the plaintiffs must show that they face a credible threat
of adverse action sufficient to establish standing. Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 786 (9th Cir.
2010). The mere existence of a proscriptive law is not sufficient to create an injury in fact. Thomas
v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commn, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, a
generalized threat of prosecution will not satisfy this requirement. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586
F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009). Instead, there must be a genuine threat of imminent prosecution.
Id. The Court makes three inquires when considering whether a plaintiff demonstrated a genuine
threat of imminent prosecution sufficient to bring a pre-enforcement challenge: (1) whether plaintiffs
articulated a concrete plan to violate the law in question; (2) whether the prosecuting authorities have
communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings; and (3) the history of past
prosecution or enforcement under the challenged statute. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Commn, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs have failed to articulate that there exists a genuine threat of
imminent prosecution. First, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a concrete plan which would violate the
ordinance in the future. Indeed, Plaintiffs cannot establish this prong as they are exempt from the
ordinance and will not violate the ordinance by declining same-sex weddings.
Second, prosecuting authorities have not threatened Plaintiffs with prosecution. City officials
have informed Plaintiffs numerous times that they are excepted from the ordinance. On October 23,
2014, city officials, in writing, informed Plaintiffs that they were exempt from the ordinance and
would not be subject to prosecution. (Gridley Dec., 10.) On February 23, 2015, the City Attorney
signed a sworn declaration stating that Plaintiffs would not be prosecuted pursuant to the ordinance.1
(Dkt. 24-2.) Further, Defendant has never initiated any type of proceedings against Plaintiffs.
Additionally, the Amended Complaint fails to articulate a single threat made by city officials against
Plaintiffs. All alleged threats were made against the S Corporation, which no longer exists.
Moreover, the statements made to the S Corporation were simply city officials unofficial analysis
of how the ordinance in theory and probably could apply, based on the limited information
provided to city officials. (See Dkt. 19-25, 341, 354.) At that time, city officials had no
information indicating that Plaintiffs considered themselves a religious corporation, had the
purpose of promoting biblical marriages, or performed exclusively religious ceremonies. Once
Plaintiffs established Hitching Post Weddings, LLC, and informed city officials of their religious
purpose, city officials acknowledged that they were a religious corporation excepted from the
ordinance and never made any statements to Plaintiffs indicating that they would be prosecuted
under the ordinance. (Gridley Dec., 9.)
Third, Plaintiffs fails to allege a single instance where city officials initiated proceedings
against an individual or business for violation of the ordinance. Indeed, Defendant has not
1
Evidence that the prosecuting authority decided not to prosecute the plaintiffs for
violations of the challenged law demonstrates that plaintiffs have no fear of prosecution
sufficient to establish standing. See Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764,
773-74 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a medicine restriction
ban when prosecutors indicated that they had no intend on prosecuting the plaintiff for violation
of the medicine restriction ban). See also Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1255-56 (10th Cir.
2007) (finding that a plaintiff lacked standing because he could not demonstrate a credible fear
of prosecution when: (1) he potentially violated a law; (2) law enforcement opened an
investigation into his conduct; (3) he filed a complaint while the investigation was ongoing; (4)
the prosecutor then declined to prosecute him; (5) he then filed an amended complaint, knowing
that he would not be prosecuted).
prosecuted anyone for violation of the ordinance during the ordinances one and one-half year
existence. (Gridley Dec., 5.) As a result of the applicable factors, Plaintiffs are unable to
demonstrate that they have received an injury in fact. Accordingly, they lack standing to challenge
the ordinance based on any alleged threats to prosecute them.
2.
Plaintiffs Cannot Establish an Injury in Fact that is Causally Connected

to Defendants in Regards to their Allegation of Lost Income.
Plaintiffs contend that they lost income when they closed the Hitching Post on October 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 14, and 15, because city officials allegedly informed them that they would be in violation
of the ordinance. (Dkt. 29, 372-73, 378-79.) This allegation fails to establish standing because
it does not allege an injury in fact and Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a causal connection.
In regards to the injury in fact prong, Plaintiffs have failed to allege with particularity that
they have suffered actual injury. Plaintiffs only allege that they have lost clients and income on those
days. However, Plaintiffs never allege that they had any weddings scheduled on those dates, or that
anybody came to their business requesting a wedding on those dates. Instead, their allegation is
purely speculative and hypothetical. Plaintiffs merely assume that they would have had a customer
had they remained open. This is not the type of injury in fact required by Thomas v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Commn, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 1999). In that case, the Ninth Circuit en banc panel
required that a plaintiff seeking to establish standing based on lost income must demonstrate when,
to whom, where, or under what circumstances they turned down a customer. Id. at 1139. Plaintiffs
have failed to make such allegations. Accordingly, they cannot establish an injury in fact.
Additionally, Plaintiffs cannot allege that there is a causal connection between their alleged
injury and the conduct of Defendants. As discussed above, Plaintiffs reorganized their business and
memorialized their purpose by October 6, 2014. By at least that date, the Hitching Post Weddings,
LLC, was a religious corporation exempt from the ordinance. Plaintiffs never received any threats
in any manner after that date. (Moreover, any alleged threats made against Plaintiffs before that date
were simply city officials unofficial legal analysis of the ordinance and not a threat of prosecution.)
Therefore, Plaintiffs were under no threat of prosecution when they elected to close their business
on October 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, and 15. City officials never informed Plaintiffs that they would be
subject to prosecution if they remained open on those dates. (Gridely Dec. 9.) Plaintiffs never
inquired whether they would be prosecuted if they remained open on those dates. (Id.) Plaintiffs
decision to close their business was a unilateral decision based purely on speculation. More so,
same-sex marriage was not legal in Idaho on October 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 14. Therefore, even if
Plaintiffs were subject to the ordinance (which they were not), they still would not have violated the
ordinance by remaining open and denying same-sex marriages on those dates. Additionally, on
October 15, 2014, when same-sex marriage became legal, Plaintiffs would not have been subject to
the ordinance because they were exempt. Therefore, they were under no legitimate threat of
prosecution which would require them to close their business on that date. Even if they were,
Plaintiffs failed to allege that they had a wedding scheduled on October 15, 2014, that they had to
cancel, which resulted in loss income. As a result, Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing based
on loss income when they unilaterally closed their business.2
The Knapps also allege that they suffered an injury when they only renewed their lease
for one year instead of seven years for fear that the City might require them to perform same-sex
marriages sometime in the next seven years. (Dkt. 29, 434-35.) For the same reasons
discussed above, Plaintiffs also cannot establish standing based on this allegation. Specifically,
this allegation is based on pure speculation and is not sufficient to establish standing.
3.
Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Standing Based on the Alleged

Uncertainty of the Ordinances Application.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant changed its mind about the application of the ordinances
exception, which has created an uncertainty that will chill and deter [Plaintiffs] from conducting
wedding ceremonies. (Dkt. 29, 465-470.) Plaintiffs allege that this uncertainty arose as a
result of letters sent to Plaintiffs attorney on October 20, 2014, and October 23, 2014. (Dkt. 29,
441-460.) According to Plaintiffs, the October 20, 2014, letter allegedly articulated that only nonprofit entities would be excepted from the ordinance, and the October 23, 2014, letter allegedly
changed course by stating that Plaintiffs were excepted from the ordinance. This allegation is
insufficient to establish standing as no injury in fact occurred as a result of the alleged uncertainty.
The alleged uncertainty of the ordinances application has not chilled or deterred Plaintiffs
from conducting wedding ceremonies. There is no allegation in the Amended Complaint that the
uncertainty of the letters caused Plaintiffs to decline to perform any wedding ceremonies after
October 20, 2014. Indeed, the Amended Complaint indicates that Plaintiffs reopened the wedding
chapel on October 16, 2015, and have not closed or refused to perform religious wedding ceremonies
since that date. (Dkt. 29, 383.) Therefore, to the extent that the October 20 letter may have caused
confusion, Plaintiffs still suffered no injury as they continued to fully operate after that date. Any
confusion or uncertainty was immediately dispersed on October 23, 2014, when city officials sent
Plaintiffs attorney a letter clearly and unambiguously stating that Plaintiffs were exempt from the
ordinance. (Gridley Dec. 10.) Thus, at the latest, any alleged uncertainty was dispersed on
October 23, 2014. Moreover, on February 23, 2015, Plaintiffs received a signed declaration from
the City Attorney swearing that Plaintiffs will not be prosecuted pursuant to the anti-discrimination
ordinance. (Dkt. 24-2.) Accordingly, when Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on March
16, 2015, Defendant had communicated to them as clear as possible that they would not be
prosecuted pursuant to the ordinance. There was no threat to Plaintiffs at all, and certainly no threat
that was sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing controversy.3 As a result, Plaintiffs lack
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance.
B.
Plaintiffs Claims Lack Ripeness as the Ordinance Does Not Apply to Plaintiffs.
Ripeness is also an essential aspect of the case or controversy requirement. See Stormans,
Inc., 586 F.3d at 1122. Ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing, designed to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where standing is primarily concerned with
who is a proper party to litigate a particular matter, ripeness addresses when that litigation may
occur. Colwell v. Dept of Health and Human Services, 558 F.3d 1112, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, courts are limited to adjudicating only live cases or controversies consistent with the
Article III powers granted to the judiciary branch. Stormans, Inc., 586 F.3d at 1122. The ripeness
inquiry contains two components: (1) a constitutional component; and (2) a prudential component.
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commn, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 1999).
The constitutional component coincides squarely with standings injury in fact prong and
can be characterized as standing on a timeline. Stormans, Inc., 586 F.3d at 1122. For example,
a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Bova v. City of Medford, 564 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir.
3
A sufficiently real and immediate threat or controversy is required to establish standing

for equitable relief, including a declaratory judgment or injunctive relief. See City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 104 (1983).
2009) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)). If the
contingent events do not occur, the plaintiff will not suffer an injury that is concrete and
particularized enough to establish the injury in fact prong of standing. Id. As a result, the doctrine
of standing and the constitutional component of ripeness are intertwined and often indistinguishable,
and the analysis almost completely merge. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1138-39. Whether the issue is
analyzed as standing or ripeness, the Constitution requires the existence of a case or controversy and
that the issues presented are definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract. Id. at 1139.
After weighing the injury in fact factors under the standing analysis, the court will conclude
that a pre-enforcement action is ripe for review if the alleged injury is reasonable and imminent
and not merely theoretically possible. Protectmarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 827, 838
(9th Cir. 2014). A claim is not ripe where the asserted threat is wholly contingent on the occurrence
of unforeseeable events, or where the plaintiffs do not confront a realistic danger of sustaining a
direct injury as a result of the statutes operation or enforcement. Id. The Ninth Circuit discussed
the constitutional component of the ripeness analysis in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Commn, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 1999). In that case, the plaintiffs were landlords that owned
residential rental properties. Id. at 1137. The plaintiffs were devote Christians who did not believe
in renting rooms to unmarried cohabitating people. Id. The state of Alaska and the City of
Anchorage both adopted anti-discrimination laws that prohibited a landlord from refusing to rent on
the basis of marital status. Id. The plaintiffs filed suit alleging that enforcement of the law infringed
upon their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and free speech. Id. at 1139.
The Ninth Circuit en banc panel concluded that the case was not ripe for review. Id. at 1141.
Specifically, the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate a concrete plan to violate the law. Id. at 1139.
Although they refused to rent to unmarried couples in the past, they were unable to identify when,
to whom, where, or under what circumstances they refused those particular renters. Id. Additionally,
their pledge to violate the law in the future did not rise to the level of an articulated, concrete plan
because they again could not specify when, to whom, where, or under what circumstances they
would turn down a renter. Id.
Further, there was no threat of enforcement of the law against the plaintiffs. Id. at 1140. The
plaintiffs had not been threatened with prosecution and no action had been brought against them.
Id. The court found that the threat of enforcement based on a future violation was beyond
speculation. Id. Moreover, the record was void of past instances were the law was enforced in a
similar situation. Indeed, no criminal prosecutions were ever initiated as a result of a violation of
the anti-discrimination laws. Id. Only two civil complaints were ever filed, and these came from
actual prospective tenants, not hypothetical complaints. Id. at 1140-41.
Based on these factors, the en banc panel concluded that the case was not ripe for review.
Id. at 1141. The threat of prosecution was entirely dependent on future unforeseeable events such
as whether the plaintiffs retained their rental properties; whether an unmarried couple sought to lease
the property; whether the couple filed a complaint with the enforcement agency; and whether the
enforcement agency decided to prosecute the complaint. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiffs did not face
a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the anti-discrimination laws.4 Id.
The ripeness analysis in the present case is even more attenuated than the analysis in Thomas.
4
See also San Diego County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the standing and ripeness requirements to
challenge a law regulating the sale and manufacture of firearms because, in part, the plaintiffs
failed to establish a concrete plan to violate the law when they only claimed that they intended to
violate the law at some point in the future).
In Thomas, the plaintiffs claim was not ripe because the plaintiffs: (1) could not identify when, to
whom, where, or under what circumstances they would violate the laws; (2) the plaintiffs were never
threatened with prosecution; and (3) the prosecuting authority never initiated proceedings against
anyone pursuant to the challenged laws. Here, the same factors weigh in favor of finding that
Plaintiffs claims are not ripe. First, the Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they will violate the
ordinance because they are excepted from the ordinance. In Thomas, the plaintiffs were challenging
laws that they could potentially be prosecuted for if they declined renters based on marital status.
Here, Plaintiffs cannot be prosecuted pursuant to the ordinance because they are excepted from it.
Second, the Plaintiffs have never been threatened with prosecution as they are presently constituted.
Third, Defendant has never initiated prosecution proceedings against anyone for violation of the
ordinance. Additionally, city officials have provided Plaintiffs with a sworn declaration swearing
that Plaintiffs will not be prosecuted pursuant to the ordinance so long as they remain a religious
corporation. (Dkt. 24-2.) Thus, Plaintiffs claims are not ripe for review.
The prudential component of ripeness requires the court to make two inquires: (1) whether
the issues are fit for judicial review; and (2) whether withholding court consideration would cause
a hardship to the parties. Id. at 1141. In inquiring into whether hardships would result from
withholding court consideration, the court will look at whether there exists any real or imminent
threat of enforcement against the plaintiffs. Id. at 1142.
In the instant case, the Court should elect not to decide this case as a result of the prudential
component of ripeness. First, as demonstrated by the constitutional component, this case is not fit
for judicial review. The record contains no allegations that the Plaintiffs have ever been threatened
with prosecution, will be subject to prosecution in the future, or have suffered any injury as a result
of Defendants alleged conduct. Second, withholding court consideration will not cause hardship
to the parties. Plaintiffs are under no threat of prosecution and are under no pressure to deny their
religious beliefs because they are exempt from the ordinance. The Plaintiffs may decline to perform
same-sex marriages, thereby adhering to their religious beliefs, without the fear of prosecution.
Thus, there is no hardship to decline court consideration.
V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the ordinance because they cannot establish an
injury in fact or a causal connection to Defendants conduct. Plaintiffs are excepted from the
ordinance. Therefore, they cannot demonstrate a concrete intent to violate the law and they cannot
show a genuine threat of imminent prosecution. Plaintiffs also have suffered no injury as a result
of Defendants alleged conduct. As a result, Plaintiffs do not have standing and their Amended
Complaint must be dismissed. Additionally, Plaintiffs claims are not ripe for review. Plaintiffs
have not suffered an injury in fact and are under no threat of prosecution; therefore, they cannot
demonstrate that their alleged injury is reasonable and imminent. Moreover, Plaintiffs will suffer
no hardship as a result of dismissal of their Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs can continue to adhere
to their religious beliefs without fear of prosecution because they are excepted from the ordinance.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims are not ripe for review and their Amended Complaint must be
dismissed.
DATED this 30th day of March, 2015.
By: /s/ Kirtlan G. Naylor. Naylor, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur dAlene
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of March, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the
following person(s):
David A. Cortman; dcortman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
Kevin H. Theriot; ktheriot@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
Rory T. Gray; rgray@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
Jeremy D. Tedesco; jtedesco@alliancefendingfreedom.org
Jonathan A. Scruggs; jscruggs@alliancefendingfreedom.org
Attorneys for Plaintiff
9293_17 M emo R e M TD Amd C omplaint_FIN AL.w pd
Naylor
Jacob H. Naylor
Landon S. Brown
Kirtlan G.
[rSB No. 356e]
[ISB No. 8474]

[rSB No.9o23]
NAYLOR & IIALES, P.C.

Attorneys at Law
Boise,Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; iake@,naylorhales.com; landon@,naylorhales.com

Case No. 2:14-CY -0044 1 -REB
Plaintiffs,
DECLARATION OF IVtrCHAEL C.
GRIDLEY
vs.
CITY OF COE,UR D'ALENE,

Defendants
I, MICHAEL C. GRIDLEY, declare underpenaltyofperjurythat the following is true and

correct:
l.
I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein and
if called upon to testiff
of them I could do so competently.
2.
I am the City Attorney for the City of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. As the City Attorney,
I am responsible for all litigation involving the City of Coeur d'Alene. This includes prosecutions
pursuant to city ordinances.
DECLARATION OF MICHAEL C. GRIDLEY.
1.
3.
amfamiliarwith DonaldKnapp, EvelynKnapp, andHitchingPostWeddings, LLC,
("Plaintiffs").
4.
As a result of my job responsibilities,
am familiar with Coeur d'Alene City
Ordinance $ 9.56 ("anti-discrimination ordinance"). I am also familiarwith the exception to the anti-
discrimination ordinance, Coeur d'Alene City Ordinance
9.56.040(BX I ). The exception provides,
inpart, that "religious corporations" are excepted from the anti-discrimination ordinance. "Religious
corporation" is not defined in the ordinance. Whether or not a business is
"religious corporation"
is determined on a case-by-case analysis based on a variety of factors. My opinion about whether

a business
qualifies as a "religious corporation" exempt from the ordinance would be dependant on
the information provided to me about the particular business.
5.
The anti-discrimination ordinance has been in force for approximately one and one-
half years, and the City has pursued no prosecutions pursuant to the ordinance.
6.
In the spring of 2014, Donald Knapp contacted myself and another city official and
inquired whether the Hitching Post would be in violation of the anti-discrimination ordinance.
Donald Knapp never informed me that he believed the Hitching Post was a religious corporation,
that the pulpose of the Hitching Post was to promote biblical marriage, or that the Hitching Post
performed only religious ceremonies. Based on the information I had at that time, it appeared that
the Hitching Post was not operating as a religious corporation. I had no contrary information that
would have indicated that the Hitching Post qualified as a religious corporation.
7
On October
17
,2014, Plaintiffs filed
Verified Complaint against the City of Coeur
d'Alene. Upon reading the Verified Complaint and its accompanlng exhibits, I learned that
Plaintiffs substantially changed their business entity and considered themselves a religious
DECLARATION OF MICIIAEL C. GRIDLEY - 2.
corporation. This was the first time I was aware that Plaintiffs considered that they operated a
religious corporation. The Verified Complaint also informed me that Plaintiffs' purpose was to
promote biblical marriage and that Plaintiffs' only performed religious ceremonies. Based on this
new information, it appeared to me that the Hitching Post qualified as a "religious corporation"
excepted from the anti-discrimination ordinance.
8.
Based upon the contents of the Verified Complaint and corporate filing records,
Plaintiffs formed a religious corporation by at least the time period of September 12,2014, to
October 6,2014. Specifically, Plaintiffs created a new entity, Hitching Post Weddings, LLC, and
filed a certificate of organization with the Idaho Secretary of State on September 12,2014.
Afterwards, Plaintiffs drafted anew operating agreement, signed October 6,2014,which articulated
that the new entity's purpose was to promote biblical marriages. Around that same time, Plaintiffs
also created new employee and customer policies, which stated that the new entity was a "religious
corporation owned by Christian ministers for a religious purpose." Based on this new information,
the Plaintiffs operated as a religious corporation by at least October
6,2014. Upon information and
belief, the Plaintiffs have operated as a religious corporation since at least October 6,2014, and still
currently operate as a religious corporation. As a result, the Hitching Post Weddings, LLC, and its
owners, Donald and Evelyn Knapp, as presently constituted, are a religious corporation excepted
from the anti -di scrimination ordinance.
9.
Since Plaintiffs formed a religious corporation, city officials have never threatened
Plaintiffs with prosecution if theyrefused to perform same-sex wedding ceremonies. Additionally,

after forming a religious corporation, the Plaintiffs have not requested an opinion from city officials
whether their newly formed religious corporation would be subject to prosecution pursuant to the
DECLARATION OF MICHAEL C. GRIDLEY.3.
anti-discrimination ordinance. Prior to October 7 ,2014,city officials never informed Plaintiffs that
theyneededto close theirbusiness ortheywouldbe subjecttoprosecutionpursuantto the ordinance.
Additionally, Plaintiffs never inquired with city officials about whether they would be prosecuted
pursuant to the ordinance if their business remained open from October 7,2014, through October
15,2014.
10.
After reading the Verified Complaint, I sent a leffer to Plaintiffs' attorney, on October
20,2014, attached as Exhibit A, to clarify that the Plaintiffs were not subject to prosecution,. The
purpose of the letter was to inform the Plaintiffs that, as a religious corporation, they would not be
prosecuted under the anti-discrimination ordinance, and therefore,
I believed their lawsuit was
premature and not ripe for adjudication. After sending the letter it was clarified to me that Hitching
Post Weddings, LLC was a for-profit religious corporation. This information did not alter my
conclusion that Plaintiffs operated a religious corporation exempt from the ordinance. However,
recognizing that my first letter may have caused confusion,
sent a second letter to Plaintiffs'
attorney on October 23,2014, attached as Exhibit B, clariffing that Plaintiffs were exempt from the
anti-discrimination ordinance and would not be subject to prosecution under the ordinance.
ll.
On October 23,2014, the Coeur d'Alene Police Department received a verbal
complaint from
person asserting that Plaintiffs refused to perform a same-sex wedding ceremony.
I knew that Plaintiffs were excepted from the anti-discrimination ordinance; therefore, I informed
the Police Department that Plaintiffs had committed no legal wrong and would not be prosecuted
for any violation.
12.
I have communicated to the Plaintiffs that
perform same-sex marriages. So long as Plaintiffs remain
theywill not
a
be prosecuted for refusing to
religious corporation, the Plaintiffs
will
not be prosecuted pursuant to the anti-discrimination ordinance.
PURSUANTto28U.S.C. SlT46,Ideclareunderpenaltyofperjurythattheforegoingistrue
and correct.
EXECUTE O on tt
isflday of March, 2015.

(
C.
DECLARATION OF MICHAEL C. GRIDLEY - 5.
30th day of March, 2Ol5,I electronically filed the foregoing with
certiff that on the _
the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the
lollowing person(s):
I hereby
David A. Corhnan; dcortman @,al I i an cedefendi ngfreedom. org

Kevin H. Theriot;
Rory T. Gray; rerav@al liancedefendi nefreedom.orq
Jeremy D. Tedesco; i tedesco@,al I i ancefendi ngfreedom.org
Jonathan A. Scruggs; i scrugss@al I i ancefendingfreedom. org
Attorneysfor Plaintffi

9291 l6 Dcclaration of Gridlcy MTD Amd Complaint (FINAL 2).wpd
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
c6'iJi d'Alene
IDAHO
710 E. Mullan Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

(208)7 69-2348
- F AX
(208\7 69-2349
Legal@cdaid.org
www.cdaid.org
October 20. 2014
Mr. David A. Cortman

Via email: dcortman@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
Alliance Defending Freedom
1000 Hurricane Shoals Road NE, Suite D-1 100
Lawrenceville, GA 30043
RE: Knapp, et al v. City of Coeur d'Alene

[)ear Mr. Gortman
I am the city attomey for the city of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. As we discussed today by telephone I
have reviewed the 63 page complaint and the attached exhibits filed by your clients in their lawsuit
against the City. While I appreciate your clients' concems, it appears from the documents filed in
their lawsuit that they are claiming to be operating a "religious corporation". lf they are truly
operating a not-for-profit religious corporation they would be specifically exempted from the City's
anti-discrimination ordinance, Municipal Code 9.56.01 0 et seq.
My office has responded to questions from your clients in the past and told them that, based on the
facts presented and their corporate status at the time, they would likely be govemed by the antidiscrimination ordinance if a complaint was made against them. Their lawsuit was something of a
surprise because we have had cordial conversations with them in the past and they have never
disclosed that they have recently become a religious corporation. However it now appears that on or
about October 6,2014 they filed with the Idaho Secretary of State as a religious corporalion. These
are new flacts. [fthey are operating as a legitimate not-for- profit religious corporation then they are
exempt from the ordinance like any other church or religious association. On the other hand, if they
are providing services primarily or substantially for profit and they discriminate in providing those
services based on sexual orientation then they would likely be in violation of the ordinance.
I want to be clear that absent a change in the City's anti-discrimination ordinance or other applicable
state or lederal law, the City will not prosecute legitimate, nonprofit religious corporations,
associations, educational institutions, or societies or other exempt organizations or anyone else as a
result of their lawfi:l exercise oftheir first amendment rights offreedom of speech and religion. In
addition to specifically exempting religious corporations, associations, educational institutions, and
societies, section 9.56.040 ofthe anti-discrimination ordinance states that the ordinance "shall be
construed and applied in a manner consistent with first amendment jurisprudence regarding
the freedom of speech and exercise of religion".
EXHIBIT A
I believe that given the current facts your clicnts' lawsuit is premature and not ripe for adjudication.
As such, I would ask that you review this letter with your clients and urge them to dismiss their
Iawsuit beforc any more time and resources arc expended. Please call me if you have any questions.
Very
C.
City Attomey
Ms. Virginia McNulty Robinson

Robinson Law, PLLC
1910 Northwest Blvd., Suite 200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Via email: vrobinsonlaw-pllc.com
EXHIBIT A
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

7't0 E. Mullan Avenue
c,;'d,ii d'Arene
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
IDAH O
(208)7 69-2348
- F AX
(208)7
69-849
Legal@cdaid.org
www.cdaid.org
October 23. 2014
Mr. David A. Cortman

Alliance Defending Freedom
1000 Hurricane Shoals Road NE, Suite D-l100
Lawrenceville, GA 30043
RE: Knapp,
Via email: dcortman@alliancedelendingfreedom.org
et al v. City of Coeur d'Alene
Dear Mr. Cortman:
This letter is intended as a clarification of my letter to you on October 20, 2014 regarding the above
referenced case.
Based on the facts presented to the city by your clients' pleadings in the above referenced lawsuit and
further review and analysis of the city's anti-discrimination ordinance (MC 9.56.010, et seq.) it is my
opinion and the city's position that as currently represented, the conduct by Hitching Post Weddings
L.L.C. is exempt from the requirements olthe ordinance and would not be subject to prosecution under
the ordinance if a complaint was received by the city.
Pleasc contact me
ifyou
have any questions.
Very truly yours,
ichacl C.
City Attomey
cc
Ms. Virginia McNulty Robinson

Robinson Law. PLLC
I 910 Northwest Blvd.. Suite 200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Via cmail: vrobinsonlaw-pllc.com
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Naylor & Hales, P.C.
950 West Bannock St,, Suite 610
Boise, lD 83702
Via email: kirt@naylorhales.com
EXHIBIT B

In The United States District Court For The District of Idaho

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Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 2

Case No. 2:14-CV-00441-REB

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 2 of 2

DATED this 30th day of March, 2015.

/s/ Kirtlan G. Naylor

9293_18 M otion to D ismiss Amd C omplaint.w pd

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 21

Case No. 2:14-CV-00441-REB

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 2 of 21

of Michael C. Gridley in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint,

ch. 9.56.030(B). The ordinance also contains certain exceptions.

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 3 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 4 of 21

DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 4

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 5 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 6 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 7 of 21

FRCP 12(b)(1) Standard

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 8 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 9 of 21

Article III Jurisdictional Requirements

Plaintiffs Failed to Establish Standing to Challenge the Anti-Discrimination

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 10 of 21

Plaintiffs Cannot Establish an Injury in Fact Regarding Alleged Threats of

DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 10

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 11 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 12 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 13 of 21

Plaintiffs Cannot Establish an Injury in Fact that is Causally Connected

DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 13

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 14 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 15 of 21

Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Standing Based on the Alleged

DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 15

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 16 of 21

A sufficiently real and immediate threat or controversy is required to establish standing

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 17 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 18 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 19 of 21

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 20 of 21

DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 20

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 21 of 21

/s/ Kirtlan G. Naylor

9293_17 M emo R e M TD Amd C omplaint_FIN AL.w pd

DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 21

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-2 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 6

[rSB No. 356e]

[ISB No. 8474]

NAYLOR & IIALES, P.C.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. 2:14-CY -0044 1 -REB

CITY OF COE,UR D'ALENE,

I, MICHAEL C. GRIDLEY, declare underpenaltyofperjurythat the following is true and

I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein and

if called upon to testiff

of them I could do so competently.

DECLARATION OF MICHAEL C. GRIDLEY.

Case 2:14-cv-00441-REB Document 31-2 Filed 03/30/15 Page 2 of 6

amfamiliarwith DonaldKnapp, EvelynKnapp, andHitchingPostWeddings, LLC,

As a result of my job responsibilities,