Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 99

April 2015: ISIL

Topic Primer
Page 1

INDEX
ProProProProPro-

Air Strikes Inefective


Al- Qaeda- Ties
Central Asia
Ground Troops Effective
Ground Troops Effective- Burden-Sharing

11 Pro- Ground Troops Effective- Intelligence


12 Pro- Ground Troops Effective- Iraq
13 Pro- Ground Troops Effective- Local Opposition
14 Pro- Ground Troops Effective- Mission Creep
15 Pro- Ground Troops Effective- Propaganda
16 Pro- Ground Troops Effective- AT: Arab Backlash
17 Pro- Ground Troops Effective- AT: Iran
18 Pro- Ground Troops Effective- AT: Long Time Frame
19 Pro- Ground Troops Effective- AT: Terrorism
20 Pro- Ground Troops Effective- AT: Troops at Risk
21 Pro- Inherency
22 Pro- Interests
23 Pro- Iran
28 Pro- Lebanon
29 Pro- Must Act Now
30 Pro- North Africa
32 Pro- Oil

3
5
6
8

33 Pro- Saudi Arabia


34 Pro- Terrorism
35 Pro- AT: Arab Intervention Solves
36 Pro- AT: Kurds
38 Pro- AT: Status Quo Solves
39

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 2

INDEX
Con-

Afghanistan

40

Con-

Air

41

Con-

Air

43

Con-

Air

44
45
46

ConCon-

47
48
53
54
55

Al-Qaeda-

Strikes

Al-

Ground

ConConCon-

troops

Ground
Ground

Troops

Troops

57

Con-

Ground

Troops

60

Con-

61
62
63

ConConCon-

Ground

Ground
Ground
Ground

Troops

Sum
Backlash
Burnout

Elusive

Victory
Escalation

Insufficient

InefectiveInefectiveInefective-

Inefective-

Troops

Arab

Inefective-

Troops

Troops

Inefective-

Troops

Ground

Inefective

Inefective-

Inefective-

Ground

al-Nusra)
Fighting

Inefective-

Troops

Con-

Con-

(Jabhat
Link-

Inefective-

56

58

Ideology

Troops

Troops

Ground

AQ

No

Ground

Oil

Link-

Syrian

Qaeda-

Iraq

Effective-

No

Link-

Effective

Effective-

Strikes

No

ConCon-

Strikes

Al-Qaeda-

Con-

Tradeof

Long

Inefective-

Iran
Kurds

Legitimacy
Time

Frame

Mission

Creep

64

Con-

Ground

troops

Inefective-

Noncombat

65

Con-

Ground

Troops

Inefective-

Overstretch

66

Con-

Ground

Troops

Inefective-

Resilient

67

Con-

Ground

68

Con-

Ground

Troops
Troops

69
Con-

72

Ground

Con-

Iraq-

Religion

Con-

Syrian

ConCon-

Syrian
Syrian

Con-

81

Con-

82

Con-

83

Troops
Sunni-Shiite

Con-

75

80

Terrorism
Iraq

Iraq-

73

78

Inefective-

Stability

Con-

71

76

Inefective-

Opposition

Opposition-

OppositionSyrian

Iran
Opposition-

Syrian

Opposition-

Syrian

Opposition-

Con-

Threat

Assad
Fill

In
Iraq

Moderates
Propaganda
Low

84

Con-

Threat

Low-

Burnout

86

Con-

Threat

Low-

Interests

87

Con-

Threat

88

Con-

Low-

Threat

Low-

90

Con-

Threat

Low-

Regional

91

Con-

Threat

Low-

Sunni

92

Con-

Threat

93
94

Con-

Low-

AT:
AT:

Isolated
Momentum
Stability
Legitimacy
Cyberattack
Terrorism

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 3

Pro- Air Strikes Ineffective


Air strikes alone are not enough- ground forces are necessary.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Success depends on others. The campaign against ISIS cannot be won by airpower alone. And because the Obama
administration has ruled out the use of U.S. ground combat forces against ISISthough it is not clear that this prohibition
would extend to Army Special Forces personnel or Air Force combat controllerssuccess in Iraq and Syria will
ultimately depend on the effectiveness of local partners on the ground.

Airstrikes dont affect ISIS fighters and increase their viability with local tribes
Hassan, research analyst at Delma Institute, 10-25-14 (Hassan, The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/26/isis-exploits-tribal-fault-lines-to-control-its-territory-jihadi)
But ISIS still has an over-arching presence in these areas, in the form of a mobile checkpoint. Typically, ISIS members
would hide their weaponry in a house and show minimum force in public. Such weapons and fighters, with often
exaggerated reinforcement from nearby areas, would be deployed if ISIS were attacked.
These policies mean that the local population has little motivation and huge deterrent to rise up against ISIS, particularly
in the absence of a viable and acceptable alternative. Such policies also make it much harder for any force from outside to
retake these areas from ISIS, owing to the difficulty of filling the void and forming new alliances with the local
communities.
Given these dynamics, the idea of encouraging tribes to rebel against ISIS is currently an illusion. The air strikes have
forced ISIS to change its military tactics, but for the local communities the air strikes are no more than noise in the
background. They have not had a meaningful impact on the ground - despite claiming the lives of more than 500 ISIS and
al-Nusra fighters - except in so far as prices of food and fuel have gone up.
Also, it is worth noting that the fighters ISIS deploys to the front lines, who are more exposed to the air strikes, tend to be
from outside the group's core members. They are mostly new members whose death will not disrupt the group's longterm capabilities in a substantial way. And with the increased activities of the Assad regime because of the air strikes, the
international action is viewed as a threat rather than a rescue, a perception that additionally plays into the hands of ISIS.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 4

Pro- Air Strikes Ineffective


Drone strikes and raids not enough to turn back ISIS
Cronin, Director of the International Security Program at George Mason Univ., March 2015 (Audrey Kirth,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 2, p. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143043/audrey-kurth-cronin/isis-is-not-aterrorist-group)
In the post-9/11 era, the United States has built up a trillion-dollar infrastructure of intelligence, law enforcement, and
military operations aimed at al Qaeda and its affiliates. According to a 2010 investigation by The Washington Post, some
263 U.S. government organizations were created or reorganized in response to the 9/11 attacks, including the Department
of Homeland Security, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Transportation Security Administration. Each year,
U.S. intelligence agencies produce some 50,000 reports on terrorism. Fifty-one U.S. federal organizations and military
commands track the flow of money to and from terrorist networks. This structure has helped make terrorist attacks on
U.S. soil exceedingly rare. In that sense, the system has worked. But it is not well suited for dealing with ISIS, which
presents a different sort of challenge.
Consider first the tremendous U.S. military and intelligence campaign to capture or kill al Qaeda's core leadership through
drone strikes and Special Forces raids. Some 75 percent of the leaders of the core al Qaeda group have been killed by
raids and armed drones, a technology well suited to the task of going after targets hiding in rural areas, where the risk of
accidentally killing civilians is lower.
Such tactics, however, don't hold much promise for combating ISIS. The group's fighters and leaders cluster in urban
areas, where they are well integrated into civilian populations and usually surrounded by buildings, making drone strikes
and raids much harder to carry out. And simply killing ISIS leaders would not cripple the organization. They govern a
functioning pseudo-state with a complex administrative structure. At the top of the military command is the emirate,
which consists of Baghdadi and two deputies, both of whom formerly served as generals in the Saddam-era Iraqi army:
Abu Ali al-Anbari, who controls ISIS operations in Syria, and Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, who controls operations in
Iraq. ISIS civilian bureaucracy is supervised by 12 administrators who govern territories in Iraq and Syria, overseeing
councils that handle matters such as finances, media, and religious affairs. Although it is hardly the model government
depicted in ISIS propaganda videos, this pseudo-state would carry on quite ably without Baghdadi or his closest
lieutenants.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 5

Pro- Al- Qaeda- Ties


ISIS supports Al-Qaeda.
Zelin, Fellow Washington Institute for Near East Policy & Fellow International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation & Political Violence; June 2014 (Aaron; Research Notes; The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for supremacy of the global
jihadist movement; http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf)

While the fight between ISIS and al-Qaeda/JN has mainly played out within the Syrian zone of conflict, it has affected
jihadist organizations and factions in other locales. For instance, while both AQAP and al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) have kept a neutral position and called for reconciliation between the two groups, AQIMs central region came
out in support of ISIS in late March 2014.54 The central regions legitimacy, however, has been questioned considering
that the signers of its statement were previously unknown.
Additionally, in late January 2014, some AQAP fighters in Syria have in their own capacity backed ISIS, including as
expressed by the AQAP leader Hatim al-Mamun.55 Closer to home, a breakaway faction of nine individuals in al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan, including Maqdisis brother and some other relevant leaders, pledged baya to Baghdadi in early April
2014.56 This forced one of al-Qaedas ideologues, Abu Amir al-Naji, to respond in late May 2014 that the nine-person
letter made false claims against al- Qaeda.57 Such a stiff response to the defection of just nine people illustrates al-Qaedas
worries about its ability to win the war of ideas with the future generation of global jihadists. In addition, other regional
groups like Ansar al-Sharia in both Tunisia and Libya as well as jihadists in Gaza/Sinai and Indonesia have posted proISIS propaganda.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 6

Pro- Central Asia


ISIS is looking to expand in Afghanistan and Pakistan which could destabilize the region
Smith, freelance journalist, 3-1-15 (Nicola, London Sunday Times, p. 21)
But analysts such as Afzal Ashraf, from the Royal United Services Institute think tank, believe that reports of recruiting
are "very worrying" because Afghanistan and Pakistan are "likely to be primary efforts for ISIS beyond the Middle East.
They will see access to Pakistan nuclear weapons as the only realistic option of achieving their state objectives." They
could also "hugely destabilise" the Afghan government.
Ashraf said reports from Farah fit ISISs methods of manipulating local populations. "They go out there and find people's
grievances and say we will fix them," he said.
In Kabul another heroin trafficker, who asked to remain anonymous, said ISIS was also operating in northern Badakhshan
province, tapping into the anger of locals that the proceeds from lapis lazuli mines were being exploited by corrupt
warlords.
"ISIS have promised that if they control the province then the benefits of the mines will go back to the people," he said.
"They have offered people money and peace."
The group had also begun recruiting, he said. "They pay a (EURO)275-(EURO)350 monthly salary, then they tell people,
'stay at home, when we need you we will call'."

ISIS is expanding into former Taliban territory and could start operations by June
Smith, freelance journalist, 3-1-15 (Nicola, London Sunday Times, p. 21)
The message of the video is chilling: ISIS, also known as Islamic State, has set its sights on Afghanistan, hoping to
capitalise on the chaos left behind after a 13-year US-led war that cost 453 British lives.
Interviews conducted by The Sunday Times in Kabul, the Afghan capital, and Herat, in the west, revealed that ISIS had
started recruiting and training militants. Often working with heroin traffickers, ISIS is concentrating its efforts on remote,
lawless areas far from the reach of Afghanistan's struggling security forces.
Speaking in hushed tones in a Herat hotel, Muhammad Shah, 30, a smuggler from neighbouring Farah province, said ISIS
was taking advantage of its wealth to buy allegiance.
"When you first join ISIS, they give you $700 [(EURO)620] and then send you to a military training centre," said Shah,
who claimed to be trafficking heroin and recruiting for the militants.
Discipline at the centre, in a secluded location of Farah's Khaki Safed district, is strict: recruits are trained with weapons
and in hand-to-hand combat.
Required to sign a year's contract, they receive a (EURO)275 a month "salary" - substantially more than they would be
paid in the regular army.
Poverty, not ideology, was driving people to join, Shah said, noting that during the Afghan war, Farah was neglected by
both the government and the western allies.
"There is no infrastructure and nothing has been done to create jobs," Shah said. "Many are struggling to go to Turkey and
Iran illegally. Then they get killed or it's very problematic. Now they can stay in Afghanistan with ISIS."
Afghanistan provides 90% of the world's heroin, with Farah's economy highly dependent on the crop. If, as feared, this
year's harvest fails, it looks likely to help ISISs recruiting drive.
"If the climate destroys the crops then the numbers joining could go up to 200 a month because people will be jobless,"
Shah said.
The Taliban, fighting an insurgency against successive Afghan governments since they were driven from power in 2001,
demand protection money from smugglers and food from the impoverished locals. ISIS, by contrast, appears to have won
popularity among the locals for its freespending ways. "They give but they do not take," Shah said, adding that the group
flaunted expensive cars and the best weapons.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 7

One local Taliban commander, Mullah Abdul Raziq Mehdi, has already reportedly defected to the group with dozens of
his armed men.
Other Taliban commanders were becoming increasingly nervous, Shah said. Suspicions were raised when ISIS offered to
buy several villages from Haji Mullah Bari, the shadow Taliban governor of the Zirko district. "They said 'give us a figure
for the houses and crops and we will pay you more than that'. But the Taliban are concerned," Shah said.
He suggested that ISIS may start an operation during Ramadan in June.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 8

Pro- Ground Troops Effective


Discrediting the ideology behind ISIS is the most effective way to defeat them. Military victories show
ISIS is beatable. ISIS is a major threat to U.S. interests and the region as a whole.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

As for a solution, clearly part of it lies in the military defeat of the groups or states that embody these extremist
ideologies. Just as the defeat of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany discredited fascism (but did not eliminate all fascists), and
the economic collapse of the Soviet bloc discredited communism (but did not eliminate all communists), the military
defeat or at least military and political marginalizationof jihadist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda represents the
most important step in countering their ideology, even if jihadists will still exist even after these organizations demise.
These groups are all about wielding power and achieving worldly successwhatever their theological claimsand
militarily thwarting their political aims is the most effective way to counter them.
And such an endeavor is critical to U.S. interests. What happens in the Middle East increasingly has consequences beyond
the region. Foreign fighters returning to their countries of origin have already conducted acts of violence, while
ideological currents among Middle Eastern jihadists have a major impact on radical Muslims around the world. If ISIS
continues to chalk up successes, it will inspire and radicalize Muslims everywhere. Indeed, the war in Syria has already
spurred an unprecedented international jihadist mobilization of an estimated 15,000 foreign fighters from more than
22
eighty nations. ISISs defeat would discredit its brand and might cause at least some Muslims to reconsider their
embrace of jihadist ideology.

Even a limited number of ground troops could ensure that ISIS does not achieve more victories.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

The United States needs to find a way to reduce the threat posed by ISIS to manageable proportions without a major
investment of American blood and treasure in a region that has an insatiable appetite for both. And it will need to avoid
focusing so intensely on ISIS that it jeopardizes Americas ability to manage other crises and threats in the region and
beyond. This does not mean no boots on the groundit may soon be necessary to dispatch Special Forces and combat
controllers to call in air- strikes, combat search-and-rescue assets to recover downed pilots, additional attack helicopters to
augment coalition air operations, and small conventional ground elements to serve as quick-reaction forces for U.S.
partners. It does mean, however, that the United States should limit its ground presence to the minimum needed to ensure
that ISIS is allowed no more victories, and that the air campaign against it continues to make gains.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 9

Pro- Ground Troops Effective


ISIS uses a hybrid strategy of guerilla and state warfare- US ground forces are the only way to seize and
hold territory.
Rothkopf, CEO & Editor of FP Group & Visiting scholar @ Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace; 10/30/14 (David; Time; How to defeat ISIS; http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/30/how-to-beat-isis/ht9z)
While its well known that fighting insurgencies is challengingwitness the 13-year war against the Talibanthats not
the whole answer. Unlike al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, ISIS isnt fighting purely guerrilla-style, fading in and
out of the background. ISIS is seeking to claim and hold territory, build and maintain supply chains, protect illicit oil
shipmentsall in the effort to construct a state. ISIS is a hybrid forcepart insurgency and part traditional armyand the
U.S. should have no trouble defeating a traditional army.
But to do that, you need to rely on more than just air strikes. Ground forces are needed to seize and hold territory where
ISIS has been weakened. While those troops neednt be entirely or even primarily American, if Washington is leading a
coalition against ISIS, and it is, then the U.S. must be on the ground as well. There is no other way.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 10

Pro- Ground Troops Effective


ISIS has a number of weaknesses that ground troops can exploit.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

But ISIS also has a number of critical weaknesses and vulnerabilities that, if effectively exploited, could help bring about
its defeat and the collapse of its Islamic state:
12
Overstretched forces. ISIS is spread thin through- out northern Iraq though its ranks have been filled out recently by
13
Syrian jihadist groups that pledged fealty to it and by foreign fighters who rallied to its side. These additions may have
mitigated this problem somewhat, though ISIS still appears to lack sufficient manpower to hold on to its gains
everywhere. And these gains could unravel should its future dim, with groups that had rallied to its side for opportunistic
reasons abandoning it for opportunistic reasons. At that point, its over- stretched forces would be vulnerable to internal
uprisings and external attack.
Propensity to overreach politically. If it is to hold its territorial gains, ISIS will have to curb its propensity to alienate the
very Sunni constituency it claims to fight for through its brutal tactics and the harsh application of Islamic law, and it will
need to improve its delivery of services and the economy in areas it controls. (These are not traditional concerns for ISIS
whose idea of good governance focuses on the stringent application of Islamic law rather than meeting the populations
temporal needs.) However, the pall of fear it has created is likely to deter unrest in many areas it controls unless
shattered by coalition military action.
Potentially fractious coalition. ISIS will have to hold together the loose military coalition that it leads, which includes
tribal militias, Iraqi insurgent groups that do not share its worldview or interests such as the neo-Baathist Jaish al-Tariqa
al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), Syrian jihadist groups that only recently pledged fealty to it, and foreign fighters who flocked to
fight with ISIS when it was a rising force. Indeed, ISIS may have eliminated some of these elements since declaring its
state. Keeping together the remaining coalition wont be easy, as the latent divisions within it could eventually create
opportunities for the United States and its local partners.
Military vulnerabilities. By creating a state, ISIS must now defend terrain. And its army, consisting of highly mobile
formations of armed pickup trucks and light and heavy armored vehicles, has proven vulnerable to U.S. airpower
whenever the former have massed to attackat least when the United States has had sufficient reconnaissance and strike
assets on hand to counter them.
Insufficient finances. ISIS is said to be the wealthiest jihadist movement in the world, earning $12 million a day from oil
sales, and perhaps another million a day more from smuggling, shakedown rackets, and taxes. Its war chest is said to
total several billion dollars. But ISIS is probably poor by state standards. For instance, the recent annual budget of the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which governs a similar number of people, is $12 billion. And ISIS may not
have the resources needed to effectively run its Islamic state for longat least in accordance with the standards that
many of the people it now rules have come to expect.
Isolated and landlocked. Finally, the ISIS state is landlocked and surrounded by enemies; reliant on a small number of
extended and vulnerable lines of communication to connect its bases of operation in Iraq and Syria; and has long, exposed
14
flanks.
All of these factors make ISIS susceptible to pressure or military actions by the United States, and by its neighborsif the
latter can get their act together. The key challenge for the United States will be to exploit the groups vulnerabilities
through unilateral and multilateral action and, by targeting these vulnerabilities in a systematic and sustained manner, to
defeat ISISs conventional forces and destroy its Islamic state.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 11

Pro- Ground Troops Effective- Burden-Sharing


Modest troop commitment would lead to commitments from other countries
von Drehle, journalist and Time editor-at-large, 3-9-15 (David, Time, vol. 185, no. 8, p. 30)
One deeply experienced American observerretired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, former head of
Centcomrecently returned from a trip to the Middle East full of similar confidence Sunni-majority nations in
the region are getting scared, Zinni says, and have gotten angry at ISISs atrocious behavior. The general
believes that if Obama would commit 10,000 U.S. troops to coordinate the counteroffensive, the others would
join in: A brigade from the UAE, a brigade from Jordan, maybe a brigade or two from Saudi Arabia and a
brigade or two from Egypt. We could certainly twist the arms of the Kuwaitisthey owe us anywaymaybe
even the Qataris. I think if it starts to form that way, you could even see the French, the Brits, the Belgians and
others throw in. Pretty soon, you could have a pretty good force.
Other states want to participate; only U.S. commitment can bring together an effective coalition Kagan,
founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical Threat
Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly,
Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p. 21)

The U.S. should have many allies in the fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Australia, Canada, and Great Britain
have already shown their willingness to participate in the effort, while Germany and others have already
provided assistance to the Kurds. Arab states most directly threatened by ISIS could well make meaningful
contributions, including troops and other direct military support, as Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee Buck McKeon has noted.17 Turkey should also be enlisted in an effort that would secure its borders
and mitigate the humanitarian crisis produced by Syrian refugees in its borders.
This coalition will not come together, however, without strong American leadership, resources, and commitment
to the struggle. The U.S. military has critical capabilities apart from airpower and precision munitions that
no other state or collection of states can match. The U.S. will have to provide command-and-control elements;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; intelligence analytical support; communications support;
and intra-theater mobility, particularly helicopters. Arab state and NATO partners can provide some Special
Forces troops, but their capabilities are limited by the generally small sizes of their militaries and their need to
retain the ability to defend their own borders. The U.S. need not and should not enter this struggle alone, but
neither can we lay back and expect our allies to be able to make it happen.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 12

Pro- Ground Troops Effective- Intelligence


Its impossible for the US to accurately count the number of ISIS fighters killed or recruited without
boots on the ground.
Mak & Youssef; 2/3/15 (Tim & Nancy; The Daily Beast; ISIS ranks grow as fast as US bombs can wipe them out;
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/03/isis-recruits-thousands-of-new-fighters-despite-u-s-bombs.html)

Foreign fighters keep coming in, even though we are killing many of them, Sen. Bob Menendez, the top Democrat on
the foreign relations committee, said. So one of the key issues youve got to [address] is stopping foreign fighters. The
Pentagon has said airstrikes cannot defeat an ideology and that the war cannot be measured in numbers. But in an opaque
war like this, many are leaning on such statistics to assess the air campaign. Some question the reliability of the Pentagon
count. Christopher Harmer, an analyst with the Institute of the Study of War, said drones and other kinds of air power
cannot accurately estimate the number of ISIS fighters that have been killed. Theres just no way for the U.S. can do this
accurately When it comes time to killing people, the only way to really confirm it, you need boots on the ground or
eyeballs on the target, Harmer said. As long as ISIS shows the ability to continue to recruit foreign fighters, and
regenerate lost manpower, then its an irrelevant metric. I dont know how long ISIS can sustain battlefield damage but
so far they havent collapsed. Harmer also pointed out that the United States has no ability of tracking how many internal
recruits ISIS is able to attract. Good, were killing ISIS fighters, he said. Just dont dislocate our shoulders patting
ourselves on the back. What matters is: Have we broken their will or ability to fight? So far they havent collapsed.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 13

Pro- Ground Troops Effective- Iraq


U.S. military presence gives them leverage in the political process to address ISIS.
Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical
Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly,
Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p. 24)
Success against ISIS requires more than effective military operations. Political accord in Baghdad and the emergence of
meaningful inclusive politics in Syria are necessary but not sufficient conditions for securing U.S. vital national security
interests in the region. The U.S. must use the expanding leverage increased military support will give it in Baghdad to
continue to shape the emerging Iraqi government to be as inclusive and non-sectarian as possible. Well-known sectarian
actors and Iranian agents such as Hadi al-Amiri (Badr Corps commander), Qais al-Khazali (Asaib Ahl alHaq leader), and
Qassim al-Araji (Badr Corps deputy) cannot have leading positions in the security ministries or security services if there is
to be any hope of persuading Iraqs Sunni Arabs that they are safe in the hands of the new government. Reported U.S.
pressure to keep Hadi al-Amiri from getting a ministry was an important step. Continued pressure must be exerted to keep
him and others like him from getting ministerial posts or otherwise obtaining de jure control over Iraqs security services.
If such individuals are given inappropriate portfolios, the U.S. should continue to exert leverage including refusing to
work with forces over which they have been given command or influence to secure their removal.
The U.S. and its partners must meanwhile engage energetically with Sunni leaders in Iraq to determine who does (or
might be able to) represent Sunnis willing to re-engage with the government in Baghdad. The dramatic changes in Iraqs
Sunni provinces has badly undercut the ability of current Sunni political leaders such as Osama Nujaifi (former speaker of
parliament) and Rafia al-Issawi (former minister of finance) to speak for the populations of their home areas (Ninewa and
Anbar in particular). The ability of well-known tribal leaders such as Sheikh Abu Risha and Sheikh Ali Hatem Suleiman
to represent their tribes at this point is equally unclear.19 The U.S. should not assume that elected leaders or sheikhs have
lost their credibility and simply go around them, but neither can we assume that speaking with them is equivalent to
speaking with their people. Getting U.S. personnel on the ground in Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din Provinces is just as
central to this political effort as it is to the military effort against ISIS. It does not matter whether we think a given
individual represents part of Iraqs Sunni population (and no individual can represent all of it). It only matters what the
Sunni themselves think about it. Our first task is to find that out.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 14

Pro- Ground Troops Effective- Local Opposition


US ground forces will galvanize the local opposition in Iraq and Syria.
Boot, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 3-9-15 (Max, Time, vol. 185, no. 8, p. 32)
The only real exceptions are the Kurdish peshmerga fighters and the Iranian-backed Shiite militias. But neither

the Kurds nor the Shiites will be able


to clear and hold Sunni areas stretching from Fallujah to Mosul. Indeed, the more that bloodthirsty Iranian-backed militias gain prominence in
the anti-ISIS cause, the more Sunnis will rally to ISIS as defenders of their embattled community.
Back in 200708, when al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISISs precursor, was pushed out of

the Sunni -dominated northwest of Iraq, it was by


Sunni tribal fighters working in conjunction with American troops. To inflict serious setbacks on ISIS today will require
resurrecting that successful coalition rather than flatly refusing, as Obama has done, to put any boots on the ground.
It is in Americas interest to send as few troops as possible into harms way and to get our allies to do as much of the fighting as
possible. But sending only 3,000 troops and essentially prohibiting them from leaving base, as Obama has done, is a recipe for
ineffectiveness. If were going to have any impact on the fight against ISIS, we need to take off our self-imposed shackles.
Its hard to know now what commitment may be necessary, which is why its vital not to pass an Authorization for the Use of Military
Force that would prohibit enduring offensive ground combat operations. It is folly to tell ISIS in advance that it has nothing to fear
from the best ground troops on the planet.
Credible estimates of how many troops we should send range from 10,000 to 25,000. Just as important as the troop numbers are the
rules of engagement under which they operate. It is imperative that U.S. advisers and joint tactical air controllers be able to operate on
the front lines with the local troops they support. This was the formula that made possible the rapid overthrow of the Taliban in
Afghanistan in the fall of 2001.
In addition to sending advisers along with support personnel to protect and sustain them, we should be sending joint Special
Operations task forcescomposed of Navy SEALs, Army Delta Force and other Tier 1 operatorsto target ISIS as they once did so
successfully with al-Qaeda in Iraq. While aircraft can drop bombs and kill people, only commandos can capture and interrogate highlevel terrorists, gathering intelligence that has the potential to wipe out an entire enemy network.

With a slightly larger commitment of American forces, we might be able to galvanize more local opposition to ISIS in
Syria and Iraq. But we need to be careful not to make the U.S. the enabler of Shiite death squads working at the behest of Irans General Qasem Soleimani, the
commander of the countrys far-reaching, elite Quds Force. The entire Iraqi army may be so badly compromised by militia infiltration that
it is better to focus American efforts on persuading the Sunni tribes of Syria and Iraq to join forces against ISIS. Baghdad
and Soleimani might not approve, but the U.S. must ignore those concerns. Without the support of the Sunni tribes, the West will face an
impossible task in the war against ISIS.

Ground troops will aid the political process by providing military victories and support for the ISF and
moderate Syrians.
Kagan, founder & president Institute Study of War, Kagan, director Critical Threat Project @ American
Enterprise Institute, & Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly, Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to
Defeat the Islamic State, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf)
The deployment of U.S. forces into Syria and Iraq is as important to these political efforts as it is to our military efforts.
We must not fall again into the trap of relying on leaders in Baghdad, Damascus, Amman, or Turkey to inform us of the
situation on the ground, still less to rally their people from afar. Populations under attack respect most the leaders who stay
with them and fight. Those are the leaders we must seek out for the benefit of the political settlement as much as for their military capabilities.
This phase of the strategy will require a significant commitment of U.S. forces perhaps as many as 25,000 ground troops
in all in Iraq and Syria although in roles very different from those they played in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. The decisive effort will belong to teams of
Special Forces and special mission units deployed in a dispersed footprint throughout the Sunni lands, as well as advising the Iraqi Security Forces
and the moderate Syrian opposition. Those forces will likely number in the low thousands.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 15

Pro- Ground Troops Effective- Mission Creep


Further delay on action risks more mission creep later as ISIS continues to control the momentum
Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical
Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly,
Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p. 22)

The ISIS maneuver campaign in Iraq that started in June has culminated short of its objectives. A combination
of Iraqi forces, volunteers, Iranian and Hezbollah support, and, recently, U.S. air power has stopped ISIS from
continuing to advance in the mid-Euphrates and mid-Tigris River Valleys, north and east of Mosul, and toward
Baghdad. ISIS retains the ability to launch new offensive operations in Iraq, however, and is consolidating its
control over the areas it has conquered. The ISIS campaign against Deir-ez-Zour in Syria began in March 2014
and has accomplished all but one of its major military objectives so far. ISIS launched a new campaign against
the Syrian regime in July, attacking bases in central Syria, northeastern Hasaka Province, and Raqqa Province.
This campaign is continuing with the momentum still in the hands of IS IS.
In these dire circumstances, the next step we take cannot have accomplishing the desired end state as its goal.
We will have to execute an iterative approach. Framing an iterative approach with identified decision points is
the antidote to mission creep, which is what happens when the U.S. takes military action without any strategy
or one that presumes the necessary pre-conditions exist for strategic success. The answer is not to wait for
conditions to set themselves, however. Reversing the battlefield dynamics so that they no longer favor ISIS is
the necessary first step of any strategy.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 16

Pro- Ground Troops Effective- Propaganda


Effective U.S. military actions create counter propaganda victories.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Linking information activities and military action to achieve


psychological efects. Information activities are critical to ISISs success and are, in many ways, its
decisive line of operation. Accordingly, information activities must be a central element of the coalition response. And
because so much of ISISs appeal derives from its aura of military invincibility, information activities linked to military
action may be the decisive line of operation in the anti-ISIS campaign, and the key to altering the psychological
environment in the region. Accordingly, the United States will not succeed against ISIS unless it discredits its brand and
punctures its aura of invincibility.
To this end, the United States must show that like the parties and movements that in the past embraced pan-Arabism and
the more extreme variants of political Islam, ISIS is the embodiment of yet another failed ideology that will bring only
ruin to those who embrace it. Through military victories, the United States can demonstrate that the tide is turning against
ISIS and that its days are numbered. In this sense, the nonlethal effects of coalition military action may be even more
important than its lethal effects.

Military victory for the US will diminish the appeal of ISIS propaganda.
Byman, Prof Security Studies @ Georgetown Univ & Research Director Center for Middle East Policy
Brookings Institute & Williams, Research Assistance Center for Middle East Policy Brookings Institute;
2/24/15 (Daniel & Jennifer; National Interest; ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadisms global civil war;
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war-12304)

Military efforts also matter tremendously. For Al Qaeda, the constant drone campaign has diminished its core in Pakistan
and made it harder for it to exercise control over the broader movement. For the Islamic State, defeat on the ground will
do more to diminish its appeal than any propaganda measure. Washington should also work with regional allies to ensure
cooperation on intelligence and border security.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 17

Pro- Ground Troops Effective- AT: Arab Backlash


Airstrikes are a worse U.S. signal and besides Sunnis are all that matter and they like U.S. intervention
Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical
Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly,
Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p.13-14)

The most important variable in this entire fight is the will and ability of the Sunni Arab community in Iraq and
Syrians living in eastern Syria to reject the Islamic State, fight with U.S. and other allied support against it, and
then join renewed and reformed Iraqi and Syrian states. Airstrikes alone which may be perceived as U.S.
support to Iranian-backed Shia governments trying to oppress the Sunni Arabs will not allow the U.S. to
evaluate this variable and may well reduce the willingness of Sunni Arabs to join with us and, more
importantly, to rejoin Iraq and Syria. Developing a strategy that has a chance of success requires identifying the
center of gravity of the overarching regional problem the struggle within the Sunni Arab community itself
amidst the collapse of state structures in the Middle East.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 18

Pro- Ground Troops Effective- AT: Iran


Operations are far away from Iranian border
Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical
Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly,
Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p. 26)

Iran may perceive intervention as a re-invasion to position U.S. forces to attack Iran in the event of the failure of
nuclear negotiations and may respond with regional attacks. The geographic focus of U.S. efforts may provide
Tehran some reassurance, since they will be focused in northern and western Iraq away from the Iranian border .
But the U.S. should also consider supplying its Gulf allies with additional defensive capabilities to deter any
such Iranian response or render it ineffective if deterrence fails.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 19

Pro- Ground Troops Effective- AT: Long Time Frame


Slow operations are more effective.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

This argues for an anaconda strategy that slowly, methodically squeezes ISIS from all directions, in both Iraq and Syria,
and along multiple lines of operation, rather than the kind of rapid, decisive operations the United States aspired to in
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. (A key lesson from Afghanistan and Iraq is that decisive operations that lead to the
enemys rapid collapse but not its defeat in detail often create more problems than they solve. In particular, such
operations may cause enemy fighters to go to groundonly to return as insurgents, or to destabilize neighboring states
where they have taken refuge. More force does not necessarily yield better military results.)

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 20

Pro- Ground Troops Effective- AT: Terrorism


The risk terrorists buildup in Iraq and Syria outweigh the risk of bring Al-Qaeda and ISIS together.
Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical
Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly,
Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p. 26)

A US intervention could drive JN and ISIS to bury the hatchet and join forces. It could also spur attacks from
other al-Qaeda affiliates. This risk is outweighed by the much greater risk of inaction, which would allow ISIS
and JN to build up their forces independently and offers no assurance that they will not ultimately recombine in
any event. The ongoing jihadi competition caused in part by the ISIS-al Qaeda rivalry, moreover, has already
increased the likelihood of attempts by other al-Qaeda affiliates to attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests
abroad. The additional spur such efforts might receive from an American intervention in Syria and Iraq would
be more than balanced by depriving two of the most lethal affiliates JN and ISIS of large territorial
sanctuaries.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 21

Pro- Ground Troops Effective- AT: Troops at Risk


The consequences of inaction are greater than the risk to American troops.
Kagan, founder & president Institute Study of War, Kagan, director Critical Threat Project @ American
Enterprise Institute, & Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly, Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to
Defeat the Islamic State, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf)

Even then, this strategy suffers from the high risk of failure and the near-certainty that the U.S. will suffer
casualties, including at the hands of supposedly friendly forces. American troops dispersed among the Sunni
population are at risk of being kidnapped. The significant anti-aircraft capabilities of ISIS put American
helicopters at risk. It may turn out that the Sunni Arabs cannot or will not fight with us, finally, and that the
overall strategy proposed here is infeasible. In that case, it will be necessary to abandon this strategy and
reconsider our options.
The U.S. should adopt this strategy despite these risks. The consequences of inaction or inadequate action are
evident: ISIS will retain control of much of the territory it holds, sectarian war will escalate, more foreign
fighters including Americans and Europeans will cycle through the battlefield and get both trained and further
radicalized, and al-Qaeda will benefit from the largest and richest safe-haven it has ever known. It is worth
accepting the risks of this strategy to avoid this outcome.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 22

Pro- Inherency
Democrats will not authorize force against ISIL
Hennigan and Memoli, staff writers, 2-26-15 (W.J. and Michael A., Orlando Sentinel,

http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-fg-military-force-debate-20150225-story.html)

"I think I speak for Democrats: We want to fight ISIL," said Sen. Bob Menendez of New Jersey, ranking
Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at a hearing Wednesday. "But we can't provide a blank
check to this or a future president."
The hearing, which heard testimony from retired Marine Gen. John Allen, special envoy for the American-led
coalition against the Sunni extremists, was the first in a series expected in Congress this spring as lawmakers
debate and almost certainly revise the president's proposal.
The White House has indicated Obama is willing to change the language. The president wants to show the
world broad, bipartisan support in Congress for America's latest military action in the Middle East.
Obama announced the U.S. intervention in August after militants swept out of Syria and overran western Iraq so
quickly they reached the edge of Baghdad before they were stopped.
Since then, coalition warplanes have dropped more than 8,200 bombs on Islamic State targets, and U.S.
commanders insist the militants have been put on the defensive.
The war in Iraq is expected to grow more intense this spring as Iraqi security forces, Kurdish peshmerga fighters
and Shiite militias try to wrest back several major cities, including Tikrit and Mosul, from the militants. At the
same time, militants claiming allegiance to Islamic State have carried out deadly attacks in France, Libya, Egypt
and elsewhere as the group's influence spreads.
Pentagon officials have said they may need to deploy U.S. special operations forces as ground spotters to help
direct fire and guide U.S. airstrikes in the offensive on Mosul.
The president's proposal, which would expire in three years, does not limit the missions Obama or his successor
could approve, barring only what it calls "enduring offensive ground combat operations."
Sen. Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., said she supports the president's strategy but not his proposed resolution to
authorize military force.
"I'm going to fight very hard against this," she said. "And to be honest, I don't really see the votes for this."

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 23

Pro- Interests
ISIL is a threat to American interests.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Despite these challenges, American interests require that the United States succeed in its campaign to destroy ISIS
however one defines these criteria. And the United States will need to adequately resource the effort, while finding ways
2
to work through the contradictions inherent in its current approach.

ISIL is the biggest threat to Middle East stability.


Haas, President Council on Foreign Relations; 2/23/15 (Richard; Project Syndicate; Managing the ISIS crisis;
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/isis-sunni-crisis-management-by-richard-n--haass-2015-02)

The stakes human, economic, and strategic are enormous. Hundreds of thousands have lost their lives; millions have
been rendered homeless. Oil prices are low, but they will not remain so if Saudi Arabia experiences terrorist strikes or
instability. The threat to the region is large and growing, and it menaces people everywhere, as extremist fighters return
home and still others who never left are inspired to do terrible things. Indeed, though the Middle East is facing an
abundance of challenges to its stability, none is as large, dangerous, and immediate as the Islamic State.

ISIL poses a grave danger to the world and clear and present danger to US security.
Kagan, founder & president Institute Study of War, Kagan, director Critical Threat Project @ American
Enterprise Institute, & Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly, Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to
Defeat the Islamic State, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf)
The Islamic State poses a grave danger to the United States and its allies in the Middle East and around the world. Reports
that it is not currently planning an attack against the American homeland are little comfort. Its location, the resources it
controls, the skill and determination of its leaders and fighters, and its demonstrated lethality distinguish it from other alQaeda-like groups. Its ability to offer safe-haven and support to terrorists planning attacks against us is beyond any
terrorist threat we have ever seen. The thousands of American and European citizens who are fighting alongside the
Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra in Iraq and Syria constitute an unprecedented threat to our security regardless of
whether those groups intend to attack us. The Islamic State is a clear and present danger to the security of the United
States. It must be defeated.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 24

Pro- Interests
The US homeland may not be a target of ISIS but their military presence threatens Jordan, Saudi Arabia
and Lebanon.
Byman, Prof Security Studies @ Georgetown Univ & Research Director Center for Middle East Policy
Brookings Institute & Williams, Research Assistance Center for Middle East Policy Brookings Institute;
2/24/15 (Daniel & Jennifer; National Interest; ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadisms global civil war;
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war-12304)

However, the Islamic States triumphs so far have profound implications for U.S. counterterrorism. The good news is that
the Islamic State is not targeting the American homelandat least for now. Its emphasis is on consolidating and
expanding its state, and even the many foreign fighters who have flocked to its banner are being used in suicide bombings
or other attacks on its immediate enemies, not on plots back in the West. The bad news is that the Islamic State is far more
successful in achieving its goals than Al Qaeda has been: like it or not, the Islamic State really is a state in that it
controls territory and governs it. Its military presence is roiling Iraq and Syria, and the threat it poses extends to Jordan,
Saudi Arabia and especially Lebanon. The more than ten thousand foreign fighters under its banner are a recipe for
regional instability at the very least, and U.S. officials legitimately fear they pose a counterterrorism problem for the
West. Ideologically, the sectarianism it foments is worsening Shia-Sunni tension throughout the region. So the Islamic
State is a much bigger threat to Middle Eastern stability than Al Qaeda ever was. In addition, young Muslims in the West
find it inspiring, and those who dont fight directly under its banners might decide to attempt attacks in the West instead in
the Islamic States name.

ISIS uses mass executions and torture to attempt purification of entire populations.
Byman, Prof Security Studies @ Georgetown Univ & Research Director Center for Middle East Policy
Brookings Institute & Williams, Research Assistance Center for Middle East Policy Brookings Institute;
2/24/15 (Daniel & Jennifer; National Interest; ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadisms global civil war;
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war-12304)

The Islamic State evolved out of the civil wars in Iraq and Syria, and its tactics reflect this context. The Islamic State
seeks to conquer, and thus it deploys artillery, massed forces and even tanks as it sweeps into new areas or defends
existing holdings. Terrorism, in this context, is part of revolutionary war: it is used to undermine morale in the army and
police, force a sectarian backlash or otherwise create dynamics that help conquest on the ground. But it is an adjunct to a
more conventional struggle.
In territory it controls, the Islamic State uses mass executions, public beheadings, rape and symbolic crucifixion displays
to terrorize the population into submission and purify the community, and at the same time provides basic (if minimal)
services. This mix earns them some support, or at least acquiescence, from the population. Al Qaeda, in contrast, favors a
more measured approach. A decade ago Zawahiri chastised the Iraqi jihadists for their brutality, correctly believing this
would turn the population against them and alienate the broader Muslim community, and he has raised this issue in the
current conflict as well. Al Qaeda recommends proselytizing in the parts of Syria where its affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra holds
sway, trying to convince local Muslims to adopt Al Qaedas views rather than forcing them to do so.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 25

Pro- Interests
ISIS is threatening the interests of Arab neighbors making a bad region worse.
Byman, Prof Security Studies @ Georgetown Univ & Research Director Center for Middle East Policy
Brookings Institute & Williams, Research Assistance Center for Middle East Policy Brookings Institute;
2/24/15 (Daniel & Jennifer; National Interest; ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadisms global civil war;
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war-12304)

ALMOST OVERNIGHT, the Islamic State sent its enemies reelingand turned U.S. policy in the Middle East upside
down. Islamic State forces carved out a haven in Syria and, in June 2014, routed the Iraqi army, capturing large swathes of territory and prompting the Obama
administration to overcome its long-standing aversion to a bigger U.S. military role in Iraq and Syria. Even in many Arab countries where the Islamic
State does not have a strong presence, its rise is radicalizing those countries populations, fomenting sectarianism and
making a bad region even worse.

ISIS success cascades to other groups across Africa and Asia collapsing the global state system
Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical
Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly,
Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p. 18)
The threat to American interests goes beyond ISIS and even al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi and Syrian states have
largely collapsed. They are not legitimate while they cannot assert the integrity of their borders and while they cannot regain physical control of their cities.
Numerous major armed groups hold large areas of Iraq and Syria. At least four separate groups the Iraqi and Syrian governments, the Islamic State, and the Kurdish
Regional Government are currently governing independently of one another.
The permanent destruction of the Iraqi and Syrian states, a principal objective of the Islamic State, would be a grave blow to the international order and American
interests. The Islamic State and regional events are bringing enormous pressure on Lebanon and Jordan, which may well

collapse under the weight. Al-Qaeda franchises in the Sahel and North Africa particularly Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Mali, and Niger
are eroding state borders and structures in that region (the Libyan state has, in fact, collapsed). Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has established
a safe-haven in eastern Yemen and, together with the al-Houthi uprising, is threatening the continued existence of the Yemeni state as well.
Al-Qaeda has long sought to destroy borders in the Muslim world as part of its effort to create a universal caliphate, which
might be reason enough to see danger in the collapse of so many states. American and Western strategy, however, is so
intimately connected with the persistence of the states system that the collapse of that system would unhinge our efforts
entirely. President Obama rightly says that the U.S. must work through local partners to defeat al-Qaeda and set conditions to prevent its return. But al-Qaeda and
regional war are destroying or threatening the local partners with which we need to work. U.S. strategy cannot focus only on attacking the Islamic State. It must also
work to re-establish functional and legitimate states that will be able to ensure that al-Qaeda does not return.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 26

Pro- Interests
ISIL threat high now and has growing momentum, recruitment numbers prove
Taylor, staff writer, 2-27-15 (Guy, Washington Times, p. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/26/jamesclapper-intel-chief-cyber-ranks-highest-worl/?page=all)

Mr. Clapper testified that "Sunni violent extremists are gaining momentum and the number of Sunni violent extremist
groups, members and safe havens is greater than at any other point in history."
While he said "the threat to key U.S. allies and partners will probably increase," the intelligence director added that the growing number
of the extremist groups is likely to be "balanced by a lack of cohesion and authoritative leadership."
He also said that while "the January 2015 attacks against Charlie Hebdo in Paris is a reminder of the threat to the West," most groups place a higher priority on "local
concerns" than on attacking the so-called far enemy of the the U.S. and the West the way that Osama Bin Laden's original al Qaeda had been so focused during the
years leading up to and immediately following Sept. 11, 2001.
But Mr. Clapper's testimony suggested that there is still uncertainty surrounding the threat posed by the Islamic State movement, known by the acronym ISIL.
"If ISIL were to substantially increase the priority it places on attacking the West rather than fighting to maintain and

expand territorial control, then the group's access to radicalized Westerners who have fought in Syria and Iraq would
provide a pool of operatives who potentially have access to the United States and other Western countries," he said.
"Since the conflict began in 2011, more than 20,000 foreign fighters at least 3,400 of whom are Westerners have
gone to Syria from more than 90 countries."

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 27

Pro- Interests
ISIS success cascades to other groups across Africa and Asia collapsing the global state system
Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical
Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly,
Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p. 18)
The threat to American interests goes beyond ISIS and even al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi and Syrian states have
largely collapsed. They are not legitimate while they cannot assert the integrity of their borders and while they cannot
regain physical control of their cities. Numerous major armed groups hold large areas of Iraq and Syria. At least four
separate groups the Iraqi and Syrian governments, the Islamic State, and the Kurdish Regional Government are
currently governing independently of one another.
The permanent destruction of the Iraqi and Syrian states, a principal objective of the Islamic State, would be a grave blow
to the international order and American interests. The Islamic State and regional events are bringing enormous pressure on
Lebanon and Jordan, which may well collapse under the weight. Al-Qaeda franchises in the Sahel and North Africa
particularly Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Mali, and Niger are eroding state borders and structures in that region (the Libyan
state has, in fact, collapsed). Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has established a safe-haven in eastern Yemen and,
together with the al-Houthi uprising, is threatening the continued existence of the Yemeni state as well.
Al-Qaeda has long sought to destroy borders in the Muslim world as part of its effort to create a universal caliphate, which
might be reason enough to see danger in the collapse of so many states. American and Western strategy, however, is so
intimately connected with the persistence of the states system that the collapse of that system would unhinge our efforts
entirely. President Obama rightly says that the U.S. must work through local partners to defeat al-Qaeda and set
conditions to prevent its return. But al-Qaeda and regional war are destroying or threatening the local partners with which
we need to work. U.S. strategy cannot focus only on attacking the Islamic State. It must also work to re-establish
functional and legitimate states that will be able to ensure that al-Qaeda does not return.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 28

Pro- Iran
U.S. action prevents Iranian militias from gaining a foothold.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Though the air campaign should be designed to be sustained for months or years, the United States must also be capable
of undertaking sudden surges to prevent local ISIS victories, act against time-sensitive or high-value targets, and prevent
mass killings as nearly occurred at Sinjar and Amerli. Indeed, the case of Amerli suggests that prompt U.S. support may
some- times prevent situations where bad actors, such as Iran-supported militias, can gain a foothold in areas where they
were formerly absent. And the United States needs to enhance its ability to rapidly reallocate air-support assets from one
front to another, as tar- gets emerge and ISIS shifts its mobile forces from one theater to another.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 29

Pro- Lebanon
Instability in Syria and Iraq threatens to collapse Lebanese state into civil war
Spyer, fellow at the Middle East Forum, 10/17/14 (Jonathan, Jerusalem Post, http://www.meforum.org/4858/theshia-sunni-war-reaches-lebanon)

There are increasing indications that the sectarian war raging in Iraq and Syria is now moving irrevocably into
Lebanon.
The Shi'ite group is currently seeking to shore up its legitimacy by reminding its constituents, and other
Lebanese citizens, of the role that gains it the most domestic sympathy resistance against Israel. It is likely the
strike at Mount Dov last week was part of this effort.
It is also, in its propaganda, somewhat oddly trying to assert that Israel and the Sunni jihadis of the Nusra Front
and Islamic State are allies.
All this activity comes as the Nusra Front is demonstrating its ability to hit at Hezbollah across the border with
increasing impunity.
Attacks by Sunnis in Lebanon are not new, and similar incidents have taken place throughout the Syrian civil
war.
The longstanding tension in the Tripoli area between the mainly Alawi, pro-regime inhabitants of the Jebel
Mohsen neighborhood and the mainly Sunni, pro-rebel Bab al-Tabbaneh neighborhood is continuing.
Hezbollah, in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), managed to stem a bombing campaign by
the Sunnis in the Shi'ites' heartland of southern Beirut in the middle of 2013.
And tensions between Hezbollah supporters and the local Salafi leader Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir in June 2013
ended in pitched battles and the destruction of Assir's local power.
The current tension, however, differs from previous episodes.
It does not involve Hezbollah fighting much weaker local Sunni forces. This time, the movement is clashing
directly with Syrian Sunnis.
The current phase began with the seizure of the Lebanese border town of Arsal in August by members of both
the Nusra Front and Islamic State. They left with a number of captured Lebanese soldiers, some of whom have
since been executed.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 30

Pro- Must Act Now


Nazism proves that ISIS ideology spreads quickly; delaying war would cost millions more lives
Nalapat, director of the geopolitics and international relations dept. at Manipul Univ., 2-20-15 (M.D.
Pakistan Observer, vol. 26, no. 50, http://emiratesnewsgazette.com/natos-unity-struggle-with-isis-pakistan-observer/)
These days, by joining ISIS, a youth can gain access to slave women who he can use at will, and to human beings who can
be treated with the cruelty sometimes shown by young children to small animals. Unless ISIS be eliminated within the
next six to seven months, it will be too late to avoid a further metastasis that accelerates its spread within the GCC as well
as within the NATO bloc.
Unfortunately, not merely are the military measures of NATO against ISIS halfhearted, they are often counteracted by
other steps that have the effect of strengthening the group. An example is UN envoy Steffan de Mistura's forcing of the
Assad regime to declaring a halt to bombing operations in and around Aleppo. Clearly, de Mistura is responding to
Ankara, in a context where Turkey has become to ISIS what Islamabad is to the Taliban. Certainly such bombings result
in the deaths of innocent civilians, but given the reluctance of NATO to strike hard at ISIS targets, they are an essential
means of finally driving that group out of Syria's business hub. The bombing pause caused as result of the diplomacy of
Stefan de Mistura will give a second wind to ISIS and further prolong the agony of those in its clutches.
In effect, what NATO is carrying out is the old Comintern policy of "Unity and Struggle", where some steps get taken
against the group, while others assist ISIS. As yet, there has been no movement towards identifying and punishing the
Iraqi army commanders who were bribed by ISIS and who therefore arranged for the surrender of their men during 2013.
Unless at least a few such treasonous elements in the Iraqi military get prosecuted, the culture of permissiveness
towards ISIS will continue. To this day, vast amounts of money are flowing to the group from locations across the GCC.
Such donors seem to be oblivious to the fact that from 2019 onwards, a metastized ISIS will erupt within their countries
and plunge them into chaos by 2023 of a virulence which will make them failed states, with attendant geopolitical
consequences.
It is unfortunate that India and China are simply sitting on their hands doing nothing about ISIS, despite that organisation
becoming a major threat to both. What is needed is for China to pursue a twin track policy of assisting the Damascus
government militarily in Syria and the elected government in Baghdad to roll back ISIS and for India to join hands with
Egypt and the UAE in Syria and Libya against ISIS targets, and with the Government of Iraq in that country. Standing by
is no longer an option for these global powers. As for Russia, Moscow needs to do more than merely giving (minimal)
assistance to the Assad regime. Moscow needs to get involved in the air war against ISIS together with China and India.
Given their policy of the right hand assisting ISIS while the left hand gives it a slap, NATO may be expected to frown at
such assistance.
However, such misgivings need to be disregarded, for the measures used by NATO are only prolonging a war which
ought to be brought to a speedy conclusion within the year. "Unity and Struggle" is a defeatist philosophy in the face of an
enemy of the chemistry of ISIS, just as the lack of response to Hitler in the Rhineland and later in Czechoslovakia ensured
that the 1939-45 war became inevitable. ISIS can still be eliminated without significant human cost, but that window is
closing.
The organisation is on the cusp of metastasizing into a deadlier variety with a pulling power over hundreds of thousands
of maladjusted youth in the NATO bloc rather than merely a few thousand. NATO needs to throw off its "Unity" steps
and focus only on struggle. The war can still be won within a year, but if not, will take two decades to overcome, at a cost
in human lives of millions.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 31

Pro- Must Act Now


Insufficient action of the status quo will embolden ISIS and other terrorist groups, must intervene now
Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical
Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly,
Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p. 29)

The threat from ISIS is already very real. Whether the group itself is planning attacks against the U.S. at this
moment, at least a thousand American and European citizens are cycling through the fight and returning to their
home countries.20 The longer the conflict is allowed to continue, the higher the likelihood that some of those
fighters will turn their attention against their home countries. This threat will increase as ISIS gains the freedom
to consolidate, train, and plan its next moves outside Iraq and Syria. It will increase from other al-Qaeda groups
while all attention remains on ISIS. Terrorist armies, rather than cellular groups, have already emerged
elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. They will embolden other violent non-state actors and criminal
organizations to challenge weak state security across the Middle East and North Africa. This is both the most
dangerous and the most likely scenario while a clear path to ISIS defeat is not yet clear.
The strategy to defeat and destroy ISIS must instead be determined, deliberate, and phased, allowing for
iterative decisions that adjust the plan in response to the actual realities on the ground. The U.S. is not
positioned to estimate these ground conditions accurately without more direct engagement of the Sunni
populations in Iraq and Syria. Developing this accurate intelligence picture, which should be accomplished in
conjunction with military action to disrupt ISIS and end its current offensive, means that the first phase of the
U.S. strategy should be a movement to contact. The operational risks of this phase outweigh the strategic risks
of decided to destroy ISIS and then engaging insufficiently.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 32

Pro- North Africa


ISIS threatens to spread their regime of rape and slavery across North Africa
Waterman, research associate with Consultancy Africa Intelligence, 2-3-15 (Alex, CAI,
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1745:the-impact-of-isis-mentoring-of-northafricas-jihadist-groups&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers&Itemid=265)
If ISIS appears to have primarily influenced African jihadists on an ideational rather than operational level, this is primarily due to the nature of the conflicts in which
the North African jihadists are engaged. The groups are essentially fighting in local conflicts, whereas ISIS end-game is to establish a regional dominance. However,
the significant financial, military and political growth of ISIS and the cases of its developing ties with Algerian, Egyptian, Libyan

and Tunisian Islamic militants show closer and practical ties are likely to develop between ISIS and these groups in the near future. If
ISIS, itself a former al-Qaeda affiliate, is able to supplant al-Qaeda as the Middle Easts paramount jihadist organisation, then ISIS may develop relations with the
emergent Sons of the Caliphate groups in a similar fashion to the way in which al-Qaeda provided financial, spiritual and logistical support to such African affiliate
groups as AQIM in Algeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia. AQIM statements condemning the US airstrikes against ISIS may suggest that al-Qaeda is in fact

already being supplanted by its rival ISIS. Attempts are being made by al-Qaeda to stem an exodus of defections of
former affiliated groups across Africa. In 2014, though, the tide turned in ISIS favour , with more pledges of allegiance from former alQaeda affiliates and more slavishly violent copycat acts emerging.
While rivalries between terror groups may seem good news to North Africas governments and potential civilian victims of their terror acts, a shift from radical
extremists to extreme extremists is a troubling development for the region and international partners with stakes in North Africa. Violently bloody as is al-Qaedas
terror playbook, the groups acts are motivated by the rationale of its political beliefs. ISIS seems motivated by publicity-seeking and the acquisition of territory to
empower a dictatorial leadership. ISIS professed goal of a state of religious purity is sought through a wanton disregard of human

life and a lack of empathy toward human suffering that characterises the psychopath. The December 2014 release of an ISIS manifesto that
approves of the rape and enslavement of underage girls who are nonbelievers is typical. North African states and their allies must devise a
rational programme to counter the ISIS cruelty-laced challenge.

ISIS is having success in North Africa right now


Waterman, research associate with Consultancy Africa Intelligence, 2-3-15 (Alex, CAI,

http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1745:the-impact-of-isis-mentoring-of-northafricas-jihadist-groups&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers&Itemid=265)

The key jihadist insurgencies in North Africa are choosing to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The
Islamic fundamentalist group that had declared an Islamic State, or caliphate, in territories its solders have captured in Iraq and Syria has inspired tactics and
propaganda of the African insurgencies it is mentoring, and also provides practical support by training and giving experience to fighters who then carry out in Africa
what they learned on the battlefields of the Middle East. ISIS goal in North Africa is to assist insurgency groups to establish Islamic

states in their respective countries. These states would then become part of a larger Islamic caliphate that, as envisioned by ISIS,
would dominate the globe in time. North African Islamic states would be strategic allies to ISIS as it controls its own state from the remnants of Iraq and Syria.
Born out of the former Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) affiliate group, incubated in the Syrian Civil War and having swept into Iraq to exploited dissatisfaction of the alienation
of Sunni tribes, the Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi-led ISIS insurgent organisation at the end of October 2014 controlled a belt of territory from Kobane, a Syrian town on the
Turkish border, to the outskirts of Baghdad, Iraq. Notorious for its brutality and executions of Western hostages, ISIS has also gained concerned notice in the Western
world for its ability to recruit members from Western countries such as Britain, Australia and the US. Considering the instability that has swept across much of North,
West and East Africa in recent years and the economic and military power of ISIS in comparison to its rival al Qaeda, ISIS is a formidable security threat

to the North African region.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 33

Pro- Oil
Even a failed attack by ISIS on Saudi oil would send oil prices skyrocketing.
Cunningham, Writer energy & environmental issues; 1/11/15 (Nick; Oil Price; Could ISIS attack Saudi oil?;
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Could-ISIS-Attack-Saudi-Oil.html)

What if ISIS attacked energy installations? The January 5 attack at the border was a worrying, albeit, small warning of
what is possible. As the largest exporter of crude oil in the world, an attack on oil-related facilities even if unsuccessful
could rattle the markets. After all, in the immediate aftermath of a failed 2006 Al Qaeda attack on Saudi Arabias
Abqaiq oil processing facility oil prices spiked 3.4 percent.
Abqaiq is the worlds largest processing facility, and if the 2006 attack had succeeded, it could have sent oil prices to
unfathomable heights.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 34

Pro- Saudi Arabia


ISIS is a major threat to Saudi Arabia.
Cunningham, Writer energy & environmental issues; 1/11/15 (Nick; Oil Price; Could ISIS attack Saudi oil?;
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Could-ISIS-Attack-Saudi-Oil.html)

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is at the top of ISIS hit list. The groups leader has called Saudi Arabia head of the snake
and stronghold of disease. Much of that has to do with Saudi Arabias cooperation in combating ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
The feeling is mutual the highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia labeled ISIS as the greatest enemy of Islam.
While there has been little news about the presence of ISIS in Saudi Arabia, the militant group has conducted several
attacks there over the past year. The group released a video on December 1 depicting the murder of a Danish national,
which apparently occurred inside Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, Sputnik News reported that ISIS launched an attack on Saudi border guards on January 5. Three guards were
killed after a militant detonated a suicide belt. The ISIS attackers were Saudi nationals.
Saudi Arabias involvement with the military campaign in Iraq and Syria, which involves military cooperation with the
United States, fuels anger among its own population. This presents ISIS with a recruitment opportunity within Saudi
borders.
Several thousand Saudi nationals have joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and the Saudi government has even resorted to
implementing a counseling and care program for returning fighters to reintegrate them into society. The Saudi
government has stated that 12 percent of returning fighters have relapsed, and returned to terror-related activities.

IS existence threatens Saudi Arabia.


Rogers, Prof Political Science @ Texas A&M; 12/9/14 (James; First Things; Oil and ISIS;
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2014/12/oil-and-isis)

ISISs existence threatens Saudi leadership at some of its most vulnerable points. ISIS is a product of the international
Islamic revival, parts of which developed into various factions of the international jihad. Once fellow travelers in
opposing Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the alignment between revivalists and the Saudi state
evaporated soon after, prompted by the first Gulf War.
The Saudi governments reliance on a non-Islamic, foreign government for its defense, and the physical presence of U.S.
troops on Saudi territory (which later were withdrawn in 2003), provoked jihadists into bitter criticisms of Saudi rulers,
and a series of dramatic, violent attacks in Saudi Arabia.
Islamic revivalism is a distinct, externally-developed religious current relative to Saudi Arabias traditional Wahhabism. It
has developed even in Saudi Arabia as a result of visitors and immigrants, influences picked up in the Afghan war, and
increased communication across national borders. ISISs claim to reestablish the Islamic caliphate attempts to draw on
widely shared aspirations of Muslims in general, but particularly aims to strike a chord with jihadists. In doing so, it aims
to delegitimize the authority of other Islamic states and their rulers. This theme also resonates with some in Saudi Arabia
who feel alienated from both Saudi rulers and from traditional Wahhabism. Given the numerous, violent attacks in Saudi
Arabia by jihadists, and indigenous criticisms of the government and Wahhabism, ISIS stands as a focused, existential
threat to Saudi rule in ways that other regional powers, like Iran and Iraq, do not.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 35

Pro- Terrorism
Use of force against ISIS is justified by Islamic scholars.
Middle East Media Research Institute; 12/21/14 (Al-Azhar: The Islamic State (ISIS) is a terrorist organization, but it
must not be accused of heresy; http://www.memri.org/report/en/print8343.htm)

Shouman stated further that engaging in this issue is unproductive, and that it is therefore not the business of the Al-Azhar
conference or of the conferees to judge the religious doctrine of terrorist organizations, but rather to discuss ways of
dealing with their crimes and keeping their evil away from the public. He explained that Al-Azhar was not authorized to
judge the Islam of ISIS and their ilk, or to accuse them of heresy, and that this was not what the conference was about
the conference was aimed at defining any armed element that threatens people and attacks them and their property as a
terrorist organization, whether it is ISIS, Ansar Bait Al-Maqdis, the MB, or any other group whose actions have nothing to
do with the correct Islam.
He concluded: "Everyone must support the countries' role in stopping the [elements of] evil by appropriate means even
by fighting them to the death. Therefore, we need not focus on heresy or their Islam, since this has to do with their [fate
on] the Day of Judgment. We judge what is seen; Allah is in charge of what cannot be seen." He added that, whether or
not ISIS was heretic, the use of force to deter it and save society from its evil was permitted.[8][]
In a December 17, 2014 interview with the Egyptian daily Al-Watan, Shouman said: "I affirm that ISIS's actions are
terroristic and are not in line with the correct Islam. We must combat the evil of this organization, even by use of force to
eliminate it. However, its members must never be accused of heresy."[9]

ISIS is a terrorist organization.


Middle East Media Research Institute; 12/21/14 (Al-Azhar: The Islamic State (ISIS) is a terrorist organization, but it
must not be accused of heresy; http://www.memri.org/report/en/print8343.htm)

Al-Azhar members stressed that their refusal to accuse ISIS of heresy must not be seen as either implicit support for the
organization or opposition to the fight against it. They explained that ISIS is a terrorist organization whose actions deviate
from the correct Islam, but at the same time they clarified again and again that judging whether or not it is heretical is
beyond their authority. It should be mentioned that Al-Azhar and the Egyptian religious establishment have recently been
campaigning against ISIS and other groups, such as the MB, depicting them as terror organizations that have strayed from
Islam and harm both Islam and Muslims.
The following is a review of the statements by the Nigerian mufti and of Al-Azhar's position on accusing ISIS of heresy.

Islamic scholars call ISIS terrorists.


Middle East Media Research Institute; 12/21/14 (Al-Azhar: The Islamic State (ISIS) is a terrorist organization, but it
must not be accused of heresy; http://www.memri.org/report/en/print8343.htm)

Al-Husseini called ISIS members deviants from the correct tradition who carry out all kinds of extremist and corrupt
activity, sowing destruction, raping, murdering, and beheading. These people "accuse the entire [Muslim] ummah of
heresy, and give no shari'a explanation or justification for this," he said. He went on to say that they are "evil, since they
claim that they have the exclusive right to [establish] the Islamic caliphate" and are committing the sin of hiraba
highway robbery which is subject to Koranic punishment. He added that "their statements and declarations are what has
brought them to heresy, because all [clerics] agree that those who permit what is forbidden [by the shari'a] must be
excommunicated... and those who accuse others of heresy are [themselves] viewed as heretics by the shari'a." He also said
that fighting Muslims constituted heresy.[2]

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 36

Pro- AT: Arab Intervention Solves


Arab countries cannot sustain cooperation and Arab militaries cannot defeat ISIS, empirically proven
Ghosh, Quartzs managing editor, 2-23-15 (Bobby, Defense One online,
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/02/why-arab-ground-troops-wont-defeat-isis/105876/)

It is one thing for the Egyptian air force to bomb ISILaka ISISfrom the air. But when it comes to ground
troops, the ability of Arab militaries to fight an organized, motivated enemy is highly suspect . (That may
explain why, only last week, Sisi was calling for a United Nations force to bring order to Libya.)
It has been decades since the Egyptian military has fought a full -fledged war, and the last time it was deployed in
another Arab countryin Yemen in the 1960sit was humiliated. Since then, Egypts rulers have used their
army mainly to bully and beat up unarmed civilians protesting against oppression, and to fight homegrown
terrorist groups in the Sinai Peninsula. Theyve been pretty good at the former, but not especially effective at the
latter. Despite official claims of successes in the Sinai, terrorists attacks have been on the rise, and it is a bad sign
that the Sisi regime feels it necessary to exercise strict censorship on reporting from the peninsula.
If Egypts recent track record is dismal, the history of Arab military cooperation isnt especially reassuring,
either. Some Western analysts hope that the GCC Peninsula Shield, a 40,000-strong force made up of countries
in the Persian Gulf, can be brought to bear against ISIL. But like the Egyptian military, this mini-military was
built mainly to protect Gulf regimes from internal political unrest. The Peninsula Force was most recently
deployed in Bahrain in 2011, to stamp down civilian rallies against the royal family.
Its worth remembering, too, that one of the most powerful Arab militariesSyriashas been fighting against
ISIL for nigh on four years. The forces of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad enjoy home-field advantage,
and are not restrained by any concern for civilian casualties or such niceties as the Geneva conventions. Assads
planes and tanks have flattened entire towns and cities, and still have failed to defeat ISIL, much less recover
territory under the terrorists control.
The other Arab military in the war against ISIL, Iraqs, seems to be leaving the hardest fighting to Kurdish
militias and Iran-backed Shiite gangs. Last week, as the Pentagon talked up an Iraqi-led, US-guided offensive
against Mosul, many Iraqi leaders were skeptical that their troops would be ready.
None of this is to suggest that the fight against ISIL will not require Arab military involvementit will. But just
as in the current air campaign against the terrorists in Syria and Iraq, regional forces can at best be expected to
put in a token effort. When the time comes for a ground offensive against ISIL, expect the heavy lifting to be
done by battle-hardened Western troops, rather than the tin soldiers who make up most Arab militaries.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 37

Pro- AT: Arab Intervention Solves


Arab intervention has failed and has actually creates favorable conditions for ISIS
Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical
Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly,
Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p.13)

As conditions are set for lasting security solutions in Iraq and Syria, the campaign to degrade ISIS and to force
its urban offensive in both countries to culminate must run in parallel. The Iraqi and Kurdish security forces are
not sufficiently trained or equipped to retake Mosul, with or without U.S. air support . The same may be true of
the Syrian opposition with respect to Syrias northern cities under ISIS control, while the opposition is still
locked in the fight against Assad. The U.S. cannot destroy ISIS from the air while ISIS controls major cities
without formal Iraqi security forces and Peshmerga on the ground. But these forces will not regain legitimacy
across Iraq and Syria without working with Iraqs Sunni tribes.
Only military formations that cross sectarian lines will be able to challenge ISIS . This is an exceptional
battlefield condition that cannot be assumed in either Iraq or Syria. Furthermore, the involvement of regional
actors such as Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in the Syrian war has only increased the sectarian nature of the
conflict over the last two years; their involvement in Iraq at this point may have the same effect. The U.S.
strategy as articulated by President Obama will require that existing conditions reverse and cohere in a way that
favors the coalition and not ISIS. These conditions will not occur naturally nor will they be properly driven by
merely providing advice and assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces now infiltrated by Shia militias that the
Sunni reject. Rather, these conditions must be set as part of a phased strategy.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 38

Pro- AT: Kurds


Supporting the Kurds and Shia only further alienates Sunnis which drives ISIS recruitment Kagan,
founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical
Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly,
Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p. 20)

Meeting this challenge requires centering operations within the Sunni Arab community rather than
strengthening Shia and Kurdish forces that are alien and threatening to that community. A strategy of basing in
Kurdistan and Shia Iraq and providing air support to Kurdish troops and ISF forces intermingled with Shia
militias and Iranian advisers may achieve some initial successes, but will ultimately fail . The prospect of
Kurdish domination over Ninewa Province, including Mosul, and of the permanent Kurdish seizure of Kirkuk,
could well spark an ethnic Arab-Kurdish war. ISIS has been working actively to stoke those ethnic tensions in
order to provoke precisely such a conflict, which would allow it to embed itself more deeply among an
embattled Arab populace. Merely strengthening Iraqi Security Forces that are rightly seen as Shia dominated
and militia-infiltrated may also achieve short-term gains, but at the cost of setting conditions for an even larger
Sunni Arab mobilization against perceived Shia domination that would create new opportunities for ISIS or a
successor group to establish itself.
The Sunni Arabs in Iraq and Syria are the only local partners who can be decisive in the fight against ISIS and
JN. Our strategy must focus on making direct contact with them, coordinating our efforts with them, building
their strength against ISIS, and finding out the terms on which they would be willing to reintegrate into
reformed states in Iraq and Syria. They are the pivot of the entire effort and must be at the heart of every phase
of our strategy.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 39

Pro- AT: Status Quo Solves


ISIS recruitment methods are immune from SQ antiterrorism policies
Cronin, Director of the International Security Program at George Mason Univ., March 2015 (Audrey Kirth,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 2, p. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143043/audrey-kurth-cronin/isis-is-not-aterrorist-group)
ISIS, however, seems impervious to the risk of a backlash. In proclaiming himself the caliph, Baghdadi made a bold (if
absurd) claim to religious authority. But ISIS core message is about raw power and revenge, not legitimacy. Its
brutalityvideotaped beheadings, mass executionsis designed to intimidate foes and suppress dissent. Revulsion
among Muslims at such cruelty might eventually undermine ISIS. But for the time being, Washington's focus on ISIS
savagery only helps the group augment its aura of strength.
For similar reasons, it has proved difficult for the United States and its partners to combat the recruitment efforts that have
attracted so many young Muslims to ISIS ranks. The core al Qaeda group attracted followers with religious arguments
and a pseudo-scholarly message of altruism for the sake of the ummah, the global Muslim community. Bin Laden and his
longtime second-in-command and successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, carefully constructed an image of religious legitimacy
and piety. In their propaganda videos, the men appeared as ascetic warriors, sitting on the ground in caves, studying in
libraries, or taking refuge in remote camps. Although some of al Qaeda's affiliates have better recruiting pitches, the core
group cast the establishment of a caliphate as a long-term, almost utopian goal: educating and mobilizing the ummah came
first. In al Qaeda, there is no place for alcohol or women. In this sense, al Qaeda's image is deeply unsexy; indeed, for the
young al Qaeda recruit, sex itself comes only after marriageor martyrdom.
Even for the angriest young Muslim man, this might be a bit of a hard sell. Al Qaeda's leaders' attempts to depict
themselves as moraleven moralisticfigures have limited their appeal. Successful deradicalization programs in places
such as Indonesia and Singapore have zeroed in on the mismatch between what al Qaeda offers and what most young
people are really interested in, encouraging militants to reintegrate into society, where their more prosaic hopes and
desires might be fulfilled more readily.
ISIS, in contrast, offers a very different message for young men, and sometimes women. The group attracts followers
yearning for not only religious righteousness but also adventure, personal power, and a sense of self and community. And,
of course, some people just want to killand ISIS welcomes them, too. The group's brutal violence attracts attention,
demonstrates dominance, and draws people to the action.
ISIS operates in urban settings and offers recruits immediate opportunities to fight. It advertises by distributing
exhilarating podcasts produced by individual fighters on the frontlines. The group also procures sexual partners for its
male recruits; some of these women volunteer for this role, but most of them are coerced or even enslaved. The group
barely bothers to justify this behavior in religious terms; its sales pitch is conquest in all its forms, including the sexual
kind. And it has already established a self-styled caliphate, with Baghdadi as the caliph, thus making present (if only in a
limited way, for now) what al Qaeda generally held out as something more akin to a utopian future.
In short, ISIS offers short-term, primitive gratification. It does not radicalize people in ways that can be countered by
appeals to logic. Teenagers are attracted to the group without even understanding what it is, and older fighters just want to
be associated with ISIS success. Compared with fighting al Qaeda's relatively austere message, Washington has found it
much harder to counter ISIS more visceral appeal, perhaps for a very simple reason: a desire for power, agency, and
instant results also pervades American culture.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 40

Con- Afghanistan Tradeoff


Increased military support for fighting ISIL trades off with resources in Afghanistan.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

This means diverting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets now in Afghanistan, even if it means
accepting greater risk there. It also justifies putting Army Special Forces personnel and Air Force combat controllers on
the ground in Iraq and Syria, as the inability to either locate or positively identify tar- gets seems to be a major bottleneck
in coalition operations. Finally, it means ramping up air operations in Iraq and Syria to halt ISISs progress and to retake
16
lost ground. (In this regard, it is instructive that in the first sixty days of the campaign against ISIS, the coalition
launched a total of some 400 ground-attack sorties. By comparison, during the 1991 war in Iraq, coalition forces averaged
17
800 to 1,000 ground-attack sorties per day. )

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 41

Con- Air Strikes Effective


Air strikes are effective- multiple reasons.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

A deliberate, paced air campaign. The air campaign is the most prominent element of the U.S. strategy, but
airpower alone wont defeat ISIS. Its principal importance will be as an enabler for other, potentially more decisive
components of the strategy. Airpower can prevent ISIS victories, break its momentum, degrade its capabilities, and
contain the group militarily, providing a flexible and quick-acting reserve to counter its mobile strike forces. Airpower can
also isolate ISISs forces in Iraq and Syria and prevent them from reinforcing one another, and buy time and space to
organize and grow Americas partners on the ground in Iraq (the Iraqi security forces, peshmerga, and tribal militias) and
Syria (moderate opposition groups and perhaps tribal militias).

Air strikes are sustainable.


Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Ideally, the air campaign would be a careful, deliberate, paced effort that could be ramped up or down and sustained for
years on end, if need be. This is because many of Americas partners on the ground in Iraq and Syria will need time to
organize and prepare, while in many places, conditions may not be ripe for the local uprisings and awakenings that will
presumably be the key to defeating ISIS. Moreover, the United States needs to avoid inflicting civilian casual- ties, which
could undermine support for the campaign in the region and at home. And neighboring states may need time to strengthen
border and internal security capabilities to deal with potential blowback. Finally, since the campaign is unlikely to yield a
decisive outcome, the United States will need to husband its resources and pace itself so that it can sustain the effort over
the long haul, while remaining prepared for contingencies elsewhere in the region or the world.

Air strikes can produce military and propaganda victories and create breathing room.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Coalition airstrikes during the first two months of the campaign have produced mixed results: at the very least, they
helped break the siege of minority communities in Sinjar and Amerli and blunted the momentum of an ISIS offensive
against Erbil, creating breathing space for U.S. coalition partners; but ISIS has continued to register incremental gains on
the ground in Anbar province in Iraq, and it continues to hold on in the town of Kobani in Syria. If the campaign is to
succeed, ISISs progress must be halted and the coalition must begin to retake lost ground and publicize its victories. The
failure to deliver quick initial results could cause the American people and U.S. allies to question the efficacy of the U.S.
campaign plan and enable ISIS to claim that it is not working.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 42

Con- Air Strikes Effective


ISIS collapse coming now due to airstrikes; U.S. troops are already deployed to train and advise
Tritten, staff writer, 3-3-15 (Travis, Stars & Stripes online edition, http://www.stripes.com/news/middleeast/centcom-chief-islamic-state-can-be-defeated-without-us-ground-troops-1.332526)

The general in charge of U.S. forces in the Middle East defended the Obama administrations war strategy
Tuesday, telling House lawmakers that the Islamic State will be defeated without ground U.S. combat troops.
Gen. Lloyd Austin said the Islamic extremist group is already losing the ability to govern and hold territory in
Iraq and Syria following seven months of U.S. and coalition airstrikes, and that eventually it will be pushed out
by Iraq and Syrian proxy forces.
The U.S.-led military coalition in Iraq has killed more than 8,500 Islamic State fighters since its bombing
campaign began in August, he said.
The general testified before the House Armed Services Committee as Congress including many skeptical
Republicans weighs the presidents proposal for a new war authorization that would lay down guidelines for
the Islamic State offensive, including whether American troops will join the fight.
I think we will be able to get this done with the approach we have taken, Austin said. At the end of the day
this needs to be done by the Iraqis.
To replace authorizations passed after 9/11, the White House is proposing a war authorization that would
restrict large-scale combat ground forces and expire after three years.
It would largely continue current policies, which administration and military officials say are working. Several
months ago, the Islamic State could move freely in large convoys waving its signature black flags, but the air
offensive has pushed the group into a defensive crouch across Iraq and Syria, Austin said.
The enemy is beginning to struggle in a number of areas, in the ability to govern and the ability to hold
territory, he said.
Meanwhile, President Obama has authorized some 3,000 U.S. troops, many of whom are deployed to Iraq to
train and advise the Iraq army, which launched a major offensive this week to take back the city of Tikrit, but
without U.S. help. In Syria, a new program to train and equip moderate Syrian rebels against the Islamic State is
set to begin later this month and could enable a coordinated ground offensive later this year.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 43

Con- Air Strikes Effective- Iraq


Air strikes are turning the tide against ISIL in Iraq.
Pollack, Senior Fellow @ Brookings Institution; 2/4/15 (Kenneth; New York Times; ISIS is losing in Iraq. But what
happens next?; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/opinion/isis-is-losing-in-iraq-but-what-happens-next.html?_r=0)

The good news right now is largely on the military front. Iraqi, Kurdish and American forces appear to be turning the tide
against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.
American air operations have inflicted heavy losses on the group killing its fighters, destroying its equipment,
disrupting its command and impeding its movements.
As a result, the Islamic State is more and more on the defensive. It has not made any significant conquests since the
summer. During the past month, it mounted a major offensive in western Anbar Province but achieved only modest gains.
American military officials in Iraq tell me they are confident that a smaller, revamped Iraqi Army will be ready to begin
big operations to retake Iraq from the Islamic State in the next four to eight months. Kurdish and Iraqi forces have largely
secured Baghdad and its environs, made gains in the cities of Baiji and Samarra, cut off the road by which the Islamic
State was supporting its garrison in Mosul from its base in Syria, and are encroaching on Mosul itself. In six to 18 months,
the Islamic State may be driven out of Iraq altogether.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 44

Con- Air Strikes Effective- Oil


Air strikes are crippling ISIL oil production.
Johnson, Senior energy reporter for Foreign Policy; 10/7/14 (Keith; Foreign Policy; Has the US turned off the
Islamic States oil spigot?; http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/07/has-the-u-s-turned-off-the-islamic-states-oil-spigot/?
wp_login_redirect=0)

Two weeks after the beginning of the Pentagons campaign to degrade and destroy ISIS in Syria, the U.S. militarys
Central Command says that it has hit some 16 mobile oil refineries, a key piece of ISISs ability to make money off the oil
fields found in territory it has overrun.
But the Defense Department is not tracking the impact of those strikes on ISISs oil operations; that falls to the Treasury
Department, which spearheads the fight against terror financing. A Treasury spokesperson said that it is too soon to make
any formal estimate of how the military campaign has affected ISISs oil operations.
Still, rough estimates are available. The Pentagon said that each of those mobile refineries could churn out between 300
and 500 barrels a day of refined products such as diesel fuel. So airstrikes so far may have wiped out as much as 8,000
barrels a day of ISISs refining capacity or almost half the 18,000 barrels a day of capacity that ISIS was believed to
have at the peak of its expansion this summer.
Crippling that capacity could pay dividends for the United States and its Arab allies in two ways: by cutting into ISISs
ability to make money, and by curtailing its own fuel supplies, which are needed to run military vehicles and meet
civilian energy needs in the areas it controls.
"Taking half of that refined capacity out would be very problematic for the group," said Valrie Marcel, an oil expert at
Chatham House in London. "If there are fuel shortages everywhere they are in charge, they arent providing services, and
if their military logistics are affected by a lack of refined products, it would be very serious for them," she said.
The Islamic States ambitious military operations, including a large-scale assault on the Syrian town of Kobani and its
ongoing use of Humvees, trucks, and tanks, make it more dependent on a steady supply of fuel, just like other armed
forces throughout history. Gen. George S. Pattons armored dash across France in World War II wasnt stopped by the
Wehrmacht, but rather by empty gas tanks.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 45

Con- Al-Qaeda- No Link- Ideology


No links between ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
Zelin, Fellow Washington Institute for Near East Policy & Fellow International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation & Political Violence; June 2014 (Aaron; Research Notes; The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for supremacy of the global
jihadist movement; http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf)

Since the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) shot into the news after its takeover of Mosul, many have been
confused over how to describe the group in relation to al- Qaeda,1the global jihadist organization best known for its
audacious terror attacks against the West from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s. Relations between ISISand its
prior incarnations, to be discussedand al-Qaeda have been fraught with distrust, open competition, and outright hostility
that have grown over time. The two groups are now in an open war for supremacy of the global jihadist movement. ISIS
holds an advantage,2 but the battle is not over yet.

Connection between ISIS and Al-Qaeda cut in February 2014.


Zelin, Fellow Washington Institute for Near East Policy & Fellow International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation & Political Violence; June 2014 (Aaron; Research Notes; The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for supremacy of the global
jihadist movement; http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf)

These finer points of baya are important because only an individual can pledge allegiance to a leader. An organization
does not pledge baya to another organization. Therefore, Zarqawis death invalidated MSMs implied pledge to bin Ladin.
This means that, in effect, the group and its subsequent incarnations have not technically been subordinate to al-Qaeda in
eight years. In practice, of course, the situation was a bit more complicated since the groups continued to share resources
and work together. And bitter grievances related to the issue of baya were not fully aired until after al-Qaeda disaffiliated
itself with ISIS in early February 2014. In retrospect, Zawahiris push for Zarqawi and AQI to move toward an
institutional model hurt al-Qaeda in the long run. This allowed a better organized MSM/ISI/ISIS to establish an
independent agenda and gain its own follower base.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 46

Con- Al-Qaeda- No Link- Syrian AQ (Jabhat al-Nusra)


Al Qaeda Syrian affiliate JN split with ISIS.
Zelin, Fellow Washington Institute for Near East Policy & Fellow International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation & Political Violence; June 2014 (Aaron; Research Notes; The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for supremacy of the global
jihadist movement; http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf)

In April 2013, overt enmity between ISIS and al- Qaeda broke out in full when ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
announced that he was extending the Islamic State of Iraq into Syria and changing the groups name to the Islamic State
of Iraq and al- Sham.36 He also noted an open secret that ISIS and JN were one and the same. This did not sit well with JN
leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, who rebuffed the move into Syria and reaffirmed his allegiance to Zawahiri.37 In turn,
Zawahiri later tried, but failed, to nullify Baghdadis power play by telling ISIS to return to the Iraq front and leave the
Syrian front to JN.38 Neither Jawlani nor Zawahiri was allegedly consulted in advance about the expansion of the Islamic
state. In defiance, Baghdadi released an audio message stating ISIS would remain in Syria and would not adhere to a
division based on the Sykes-Picot deal dating to World War I.39 Moreover, as William McCants notes, Baghdadi also gave
Zawahiri al-Qaedas most brazen rebuke from an affiliate ever, stating in the same audio message that Baghdadi had
chosen the command of my Lord over the command in the letter that contradicts it. 40 Therefore, contrary to the original
media narrative that JN had merged with ISIS, the two groups actually separated.
The context for the recent split can be found in late summer 2011, when ISI began the first stages of its comeback because
of the Syrian uprising. Baghdadi dispatched operatives to Syria to set up a new jihadist organization, which Zawahiri was
involved in planning, too.41 Among the operatives was Jawlani, whose group, JN, publicly announced itself in late
January 2012.42 By November 2012, Jawlani had built JN into one of the oppositions best fighting forces and locals
viewed its members as fair arbiters when addressing corruption and providing social services. Such success helped inspire
Baghdadi to extend his groups writ into Syria. Syrians, he felt, got to know JN members on their own terms rather than
being falsely guided by media misrepresentations and therefore felt it opportune to announce the expansion.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 47

Con- Al- Qaeda- No Link- Fighting


ISIS and al-Qaeda are killing each other on the battlefields.
Zelin, Fellow Washington Institute for Near East Policy & Fellow International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation & Political Violence; June 2014 (Aaron; Research Notes; The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for supremacy of the global
jihadist movement; http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf)

Al-Qaedas ultimate disaffiliation with ISIS occurred as a result of various factors, including the January 2014 uprising
against ISIS by main- stream Syrian rebels over the groups excesses;43 the groups general predatory way of taking
territory and resources from other rebel groups; and a failed public reconciliation effort by the independent Saudi cleric
Abd Allah bin Muhammad al-Muhaysinialongside the failed private attempts mentioned earlier.44 On February 2, 2014, al-Qaedas general command (AQGC) released
a statement that said:
ISIS is not a branch of the Qaidat al-Jihad [al-Qae- das official name] group, we have no organizational relationship with
it, and the group is not responsible for its actions.45
Afterward, Adnani went after Zawahiri by responding,
If God decrees to you [Zawahiri] to set foot in the land of the Islamic state, he should pledge allegiance to it and be a
soldier of its amir [Baghdadi].46
AQGCs statement began what both ISIS and al- Qaeda/JN describe as a fitna (state of discord), which has led to open
warfare in Syria that continues to this day.
In addition to killing one another on the battle- field, including Abu Khalid al-Suri, both groups have used media to lure
fence-sitters and possible defectors among the global jihadist community. It is likely that social media, especially Twitter,
has amplified mutual hatred, with supporters of each camp refusing to back down rhetorically, likely signaling their
steadfastness to their respective leaders. One wonders whether the situation would have become so hostile a decade ago,
when al-Qaeda could control the message on its password-protected forums. Each group also released official testimonies
from defectors from the other side. A JN video series from ISIS defectors is called Muhajirin [emigrants or foreign
fighters] under Siege.47 A nine-part ISIS video series, Series of the Life from the Words of the Ulama [religious
scholars] on the Project of the Islamic State,48 high- lights positive comments about the creation of its Islamic state from
its own past leaders (Zarqawi, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi), al- Qaeda leaders (bin Laden and
Abu Yahya al-Libi), and a leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP (Anwar al-Awlaqi).

ISIS fighting against al-Qaeda and has been disavowed by many jihadists.
Zelin, Fellow Washington Institute for Near East Policy & Fellow International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation & Political Violence; June 2014 (Aaron; Research Notes; The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for supremacy of the global
jihadist movement; http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf)

In addition to al-Qaedas troubles with Zarqawi, his mentor, the independent jihadist scholar Maqdisi, exhorted him to
stop engaging in the shortsighted fighting strategies and to focus more on consolidat- ing gains. Maqdisi hoped to steer
the jihadist com- munity to a more pure jihad.27 In the recent fighting between al-Qaeda, its official branch in Syria,
Jabhat al-Nusra ( JN), and ISIS, Maqdisi has come down on the side of al-Qaeda.28 He announced:
ISIS is a deviant organisation from the path of truth, [they are] aggressors against the mujahidin...I also call upon the
members of ISIS to join the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra, giving baya to its leaders.
Similarly, many other independent jihadist ideologues, such as Abu Qatada al-Filistini, Iyad Qunaybi, and Hani al-Sibai, have
disavowed ISIS.29 While the most prestigious sheikhs have put in their lot with JNs position, ISIS has also been able to corral
support from less influential, but still relevant, sheikhs such as Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti and Turki al-Binali (Abu Humam al-

Athari).30

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 48

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective


ISIS will collapse in the status quo; only U.S. intervention can sustain ISIS as a long-term threat
Eichenwald, author and contributing editor, 9-19-14 (Kurt, Newsweek Global, vol. 163, no. 11, p. 14-15)
ISIS, then, faces two major military threats: other terrorist groups and the possibility of a Sunni uprising in areas
under its control, driven by revulsion among the Muslims these jihadists consider traitors to Islam. ISIS faces
enemies in all directions, and eventually, no matter how many weapons it holds, no matter how much money it
has, it will fall when confronted by those terrorists or those Muslims.
Unlesspoliticians in the United States and its allies adopt their traditional "Fire first, think later" approach to
military planning. Consider for a moment: ISIS has begun decapitating Western journalists and placing the
videos online for everyone to see. The target audience, of course, is the United States. ISIS says it is engaging in
this barbarism to warn the Americans away, but even they aren't that stupid. The 9/11 attacks, as every terrorist
knows, were intended to and succeeded in luring us into warjust as bin Laden hoped it would. He believed his
Al-Qaeda fighters would defeat the American military and drive it from Saudi Arabia. Why would ISIS think
that killing a few journalists would cause the United States to cower when slaughtering thousands did not?
Simple: They don't. As one terrorism expert told me, ISIS is hoping America will go too far in response, launch
attacks that kill lots of innocent Muslims in an attempt to wipe out the jihadists. That would not destroy ISIS,
but would derail the Islamic threat to the group. For no matter how hated ISIS is among the other jihadists and
Middle Eastern Muslims, the United States is despised more. A new American strategic blunder on par with the
Iraq War would distract ISIS's Islamic enemies and turn the battle, once again, toward the U.S. If ISIS is to
survive, it needs America to strike out rashly and harshly against it.
All this sounds like three-dimensional chess, and it is. Unfortunately, in a world of Twitter foreign policy
analysis and cable news blathering, America is rarely able to handle more than checkers when addressing global
threats. Yes, ISIS is hoping to strike the U.S. with something, anything, and it has enough supporters in-country
that it may succeed in an attack on a soft target. But the purpose of such an assault will be to provoke a
response, one that will, inadvertently, save ISIS from the threat of the billions of other Muslims who want
nothing to do with it.
So remember this: Every time you hear commentators say America should "do something," they are reading
from the ISIS script. The U.S. can soften up ISIS with strategic bombing to aid the Islamic fighters taking them
on. But it cannot beat them by rolling the Humvees into Iraq or Syria. ISIS will be defeated by its own brutality
against people who might otherwise be its allies. In this case, the enemies of our enemies are truly our friends,
at least for now.
ISIS will fall. It is inevitable. That is, unless the United States becomes the stupid one and gives them what they
want.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 49

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective


U.S. intervention ensures blowback and another long entangling war
Sniegoski, ph.D. in American history, 9-25-14 (Stephen, Veteran News Online,
http://www.veteransnewsnow.com/2014/09/25/510190-here-come-the-kagans-their-war-plan-to-defeat-the-islamic-state/)
While the authors believe that the Iraqis would for swear Iranian support in order to receive superior aid from the US, this
would not seem to be obvious. The Iraqi Shiites, like any group of people, might not like to be bossed around by
outsiders. They might in some cases opt for Iranian support. Now since the rationale for intervention hinges on the
argument that defeat of the Islamic State is essential to protect the American homeland and that victory over the Islamic
State is not guaranteed, then one would think the US would be willing to accept help from any quarterjust as the United
States collaborated with Stalinist Russia against Nazi Germany. The Iraqi government has been pro-Iran, so one might
conjecture that a purpose of the Kagans war plan is to eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, Iranian influence over
Iraq. And while that might inhibit protecting US interests, it would fit in with the position of Israel. Israeli Ambassador to
the United States Ron Dermer warned the US to eschew any cooperation with Iran in the war against the Islamic State,
insisting they will never be a partner. The ambassador went on: Iran as a nuclear power is a thousand times more
dangerous than ISIS.[23]
It would seem that this gigantic military and nation-building scheme, with the chances of success being negligible, would
likely go on forever. For it would not be possible to achieve a military success alone without transforming key
governments of the region because, as the plan has laid out, the military and political aspects are integrally
related. Success for the military aspects critically depends upon all the political transformations. And though nationbuilding has been bandied about, the US has yet to demonstrate that it can be successful in this type of undertaking. Thus,
based on past experience, what would likely result from this combination of military intervention and interference in the
internal affairs of other countries is that more people than ever in the Middle East would be inflamed against America.
Thus the threats to those states that have been friendly to the United States would be intensified and the United States
would become militarily ensnared in the region. Undoubtedly, any call to withdraw American forces would be condemned
as defeatist and as harmful to American security, and, in reality, the United States would likely be far more endangered
than it is today. The United States would become just as hated as Israel is in the region, if not more so. And unlike Israel,
the United States would be doing the fighting. Israel, on the other hand, would have something of a respite, for while the
United States would be battling what are the Jewish states external enemies, who would also be fighting among
themselves, Israel could treat the Palestinians as it sees fit. And to deal with all these difficulties, it is likely that the
Kagans will come up with more war plans for the United States.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 50

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective


ISIS has too many strengths for ground troops to overcome.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

SISs ability to capture and hold large swaths of northern Iraq in just a few days this past June was a remarkable
achievement that can be attributed to its strengthsas well as the weaknesses of its enemies. These strengths include:
Leadership and organization. ISIS has a charismatic leader in Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and skilled and capable military
field commandersthough its ability to effectively administer the areas it controls over the long term remains in
9
question, due to a model of governance that favors implementation of sharia over the delivery of services.
Resonant cause. ISIS has a cause that resonates with at least some Sunni Muslims: that of reestablishing the caliphate,
restoring Islam to its former glory, and combating the enemies of true Islamfirst and foremost, the Shiites and Iran.
And it offers alienated and aggrieved Sunnis a religious justification for their will to power and their desire to dominate
10
others. While supporters of ISIS are a small minority in many Sunni communities, they are enough to provide a critical
mass for an effective military organization. And ISIS has shown an ability to use social media and the Internet to mobilize
its far-flung followers.
Powerful propaganda. ISIS disposes a highly effective propaganda machine that churns out chilling videos of beheadings
and mass killings to terrorize its enemies and energize its support base. The manipulation of fear and the management of
savagery through media campaigns is perhaps its most potent tool.
Aura of invincibility. Until recently, ISIS could boast of an impressive string of military successes, though recent U.S.
airstrikes have thwartedat least thus faradditional Mosul-style coups de main in Iraq and Syria. ISISs military
prowess is perhaps its most potent recruiting tool for young Sunni men who want to fight on a winning team and to make
history. Thus, the fall of the town of Kobani in Syria, or Anbar province in Iraq, would be a major boost for ISIS and a
disastrous setback for the United States.
Well-equipped forces. ISIS is also well equipped, having captured large quantities of arms of all types from the Syrian and
Iraqi armies, though its army still consists largely of armed pickup trucks and light armored vehicles. It is not clear, however, that it can maintain, repair, or effectively employ some of the more advanced arms it may have takensuch as Iraqi
11
M1 tanks and Syrian Scud missiles. Moreover, the only way for ISIS to significantly augment its arms inventories is
through battlefield recovery (capture), whereas several of its adversaries can now count on resupply from abroad.
Adaptability. ISIS has successfully morphed from an insurgent group that relied largely on terrorist methods to a hybrid
organization that engages in an array of violent activities, including conventional military operations, insurgency, and
terrorism. And it has responded to U.S. airstrikes by dispersing its forces, ceasing its reliance on large armed convoys, and
moving and communicating in less conspicuous ways, while continuing to engage in offensive action in Iraq and Syria.
Interior lines of communication. ISIS has centralized command and control and enjoys the benefits of interior lines of
communication, enabling it to rapidly redeploy ground forces within a theater and between Syria and Iraq in response to
military exigencies. By contrast, its enemies are located along the periphery of ISISs territories in Syria and Iraq, and
have not yet demonstrated an ability to coordinate actions to pressure ISIS simultaneously on multiple fronts.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 51

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective


A comprehensive solution that includes multinational combat forces led by Sunnis in addition to stopping
the flow of money, recruits, and countering propaganda. Moderate Syrian opposition and Kurdish forces
should supported.
Middle East Research Institute; 12/23/14 (Special Dispatch No. 5912; Syrian Oppositionist Harshly Criticizes U.S.: It
Weakened The Moderate Opposition, Strengthened The Extremists; http://www.memri.org/report/en/print8345.htm)

A strategy must also be comprehensive. First, the flow of money to the Islamic State must be reduced. Lower oil prices
help, and there are only so many banks to rob. But extortion continues, as does financial support from individuals. Such
flows should be shut down both by governments and financial institutions.
Curtailing the flow of recruits is even more essential. Countries can do more to make it difficult for individuals to leave
for Iraq or Syria; a Europe-wide watch list, for example, would help. But nothing would have a greater impact than
Turkey deciding that it will no longer allow itself to be a conduit, and that it will enforce United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2178, which calls for stronger international cooperation against terrorism.
Another component of any strategy must be to counter IS's appeal and propaganda. This means publicizing the misery it
has caused to those living under its rule. It also means persuading Muslim religious leaders and scholars to make the case
that IS's behavior is illegitimate from the standpoint of Islam.
Of course, any strategy must challenge IS directly in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, there is some evidence that its momentum has
been halted; but the growing role of Iran and the Shia militias it backs all but guarantees that many Iraqi Sunnis will come
to sympathize with or even support the Islamic State, whatever their misgivings. This is why outsiders should place
greater emphasis on providing military and political support to Kurdish forces and Sunni tribes.
Syria is a far more difficult case, given its civil war and the competition among outsiders for influence. Attacks from the
air on IS forces are necessary but insufficient. Because IS is a territorially based entity, there must be a ground dimension
if the effort is to progress; after all, only ground forces can take and hold territory.
The best approach would be to create a multinational force consisting of soldiers from neighboring countries, particularly
Jordan. The United States and other NATO countries could offer assistance, but the fight must be waged largely by other
Sunnis. What is occurring in the region is a clash within a civilization; to enable IS to portray it as a conflict between
civilizations and itself as the true defender of Islam would be a grave strategic mistake.
Moderate Syrian opposition forces and local Kurds could be part of such a multinational Sunni force, but they are not in a
position to substitute for it. If such an expeditionary force cannot be formed, air attacks can be stepped up, thereby at least
slowing IS and buying time to develop alternative strategies. Under such a scenario, IS would remain less a problem to be
solved and more a situation to be managed.
Diplomacy cannot play a large role at this point. No solution can be imposed, given disagreements among the outside
countries with a stake in Syria and the strength of both IS and the Syrian government. What diplomacy may be able to do
is reduce, if not end, the fighting between the Syrian government and its own people, as the UN is attempting to do in
Aleppo.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 52

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective


Ground troops will not defeat ISIS- they are resilient, regional 0-sum politics, and insufficient resources.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

But the campaign to defeat ISISwhich renamed itself the Islamic State (IS) earlier this yearfaces major challenges:
(1) Its results are almost certain to fall short of expectations, due to ISISs resiliency and the complexity of the Middle
East operational environment, which limits the prospects for success. (2) While ISIS has tremendous vulnerabilities, the
U.S. ability to exploit these is limited by the weaknesses of its partners on the ground and the regions zero- sum politics,
which will complicate the campaigns political-diplomatic component. (3) The United States has allocated insufficient
resources in pursuit of unrealistic objectives. President Obamas reluctance to adequately resource the overall effort and to
1
commit ground troops to the fight (a sentiment backed by public opinionthough that may be changing) will limit U.S.
options and further reduce prospects for near-term success.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 53

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- 0 Sum


Regional 0-sum politics prevent successful military intervention.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Given regional politicians tendency to see relations with adversaries in zero-sum (versus win-win) terms, and to renege
on deals reached under duress once pressure is removed, one should not assume that the requisite political deals in Iraq
7
and Syria will occur, or that they will last once concluded.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 54

Con- Ground troops Ineffective- Arab Backlash


Arab unity against ISIS would not overcome other rivalries; troops could inflame tensions
von Drehle, journalist and Time editor-at-large, 3-9-15 (David, Time, vol. 185, no. 8, p. 30)
But that pretty good force would be a team of rivals, at best. For example, Egypts ambassador to the Arab
League recently denounced Qatar as a sponsor of terrorism. Saudi Arabias new King Salman recently hosted a
group of Islamic scholars with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the leading force in the opposition
to Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.
At the same time, the very existence of the coalition could aggravate tensions on the Iraqi border with Iran.
Shiite Iran, along with Assad, its vassal in Syria, wouldnt be happy to see a multinational force of Sunni
soldiers massing so close by, with the U.S. and its allies poised alongside. To many in the Iranian government,
ISIS is a creation of Western interests intent on stirring up Sunnis and discrediting the Islamic faith .
What Yezid Sayigh, a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center, says of the ISIS threat and Lebanese
politics is true of the entire region: Its a unifying factor, but not to the point where anyone is going to set aside
their private agendas. Sharing a common enemy will not make foes into friends. The broader the coalition, the
more fragile it might be in the long haul.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 55

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Burnout


Absent U.S. intervention, ISIS cannot sustain itself long-termsix major warrants (no local support, no
long-term financing or resources, international consensus, geographically isolated)
Becker, department chair at National Intelligence Univ., 12-12-14 (Joseph, Small Wars Journal,
http://anasoft.base.pk/(isis)%20obama%20strategy%20for%20defeating%20isis%20is%20the%20(joseph%20becker)%20
small%20wars%20journal.pdf, p. 5-6)
So why might it be a blessing that the U.S. is constrained in its immediate options for dealing with ISIL? First, it will probably take a long time for Baghdad to
establish legitimacy with its Sunni constituents, but only the central government of Iraq can do it. Direct interference by the U.S. is likely to undermine the process. If

the U.S. were able to jump in and solve this crisis for Baghdad, the Iraqis might also be less inclined to find long-term
solutions. Even worse, the presence of U.S. ground forces might once again galvanize Iraqi public opinion against outside crusaders and
provide ISIL with fuel for its propaganda machine. However, if the government in Baghdad is unable to ever establish effective legitimacy, does this mean that
ISIL wins and that the rest of the world will have to accept them as legitimate? Certainly not. As this paper will discuss shortly, the citizens of western Iraq are
likely to find ISIL domination unpalatable in the long run. It is far easier to imitate a state than actually build one.
Second, time is not on ISILs side. ISIL finances its organization primarily through oil smuggling, hostage ransoms and extortion of local business and commerce.
[16] As international pressure increases, these sources are likely to get squeezed. Their ability to operate the captured oil wells in the long-term without
outside assistance is questionable at best. Their ability to capture more oil wells can easily be limited, particularly by a force with the benefit of air power. Hostage
taking is going to become more difficult as foreigners shun this region or take greater security precautions. While smuggling might be a cottage industry in this region
of the world, legitimate commerce is going to feel the squeeze from international pressure and rising security concerns. Some would argue that sanctions dont work,
and you could even point to Iraq under Saddam Hussein as an example. However, ISIL has practical concerns and requires resources to continue
both its consolidation and advance. The impressive windfalls experienced in 2014 are likely to prove short-lived.
Third, ISIL occupies terrible real estate. The population centers they control are surrounded primarily by open desert. The lines of communication

Limitations on water and other natural resources, combined


with a lack of industry and infrastructure, make this region dependent upon the outside world. As they expand, they find
themselves ringed by nations unfriendly to their vision of the caliphate.
Fourth, ISIL has probably reached the limit of its easy gains. In terms of Iraqi territory, they now abut regions populated by the Shia and the
Kurds, neither of which are keen to lose any more ground. The Iranians are particularly interested in checking their advance. ISIL is within striking distance of
connecting these centers are vulnerable to monitoring and interdiction from the air.

Baghdad, but taking this city would be no easy feat. Defending Baghdad against a conventional assault would play better to the strengths of supporting international
forces than would the mission of retaking ground in a counter-insurgency. In Syria, Asad is giving no ground. ISIL has made a priority of battling their rival opposition
groups instead of Asads forces.[17] ISILs advance has motivated nations previously reluctant to get involved in the Syrian conflict to provide support for their
opponents. In terms of weapons and equipment, there are few stockpiles left within easy reach that might be captured. ISIL will be challenged to maintain and operate
the equipment that it currently has, and it will find few suppliers of weapons or spare parts outside of illicit channels.
Fifth, ISIL has chosen a path of defiance against the global community and has sown the seeds of its own destruction . Were it
not for their insistence on publicizing a string of brazen human rights violations and sounding a worldwide call to Jihad, many Western nations, including the U.S.,
might still consider the rise of ISIL much the way that it has evaluated the Syrian civil war since 2011 like an unfortunate development to be managed from a distance
without direct intervention. Now, however, nations previously reluctant to intervene are uniting to take action. Even authoritarian regimes like Russia and

China are disturbed by ISILs separatist agenda and attempts to spread their ideology internationally.
Middle Eastern nations have begun to recognize ISIL as an existential threat instead of simply a pawn on their chessboard. It is a remarkable feat when any
organization can unite Saudi Arabia and Iran in common cause. In return, ISILs defiance has won support and admiration from the fringes of modern society. While
these disaffected people and groups present a variety of threats in their own context, their ability to provide meaningful aid to ISIL is very limited.
Lastly, ISIL has chosen to establish its caliphate in a historically unruly area of the world. As previously mentioned, their control over the cities of Anbar

Province depends largely upon the acquiescence of tribal leaders whose constituents have little history of support for radical Islam. During the Anbar Awakening
period, the Sunni tribes of this region showed little patience for foreign fighters pushing their own agendas. [18] With no crusader army to rally against, and finding
themselves extorted from within and under siege from without, they are likely to seek a better deal.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 56

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Elusive Victory


Ground victory will be too elusive. History proves military interventions are easily overturned.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Elusive victory. Wars always entail the potential for unintended consequences and uncertain outcomes. This tendency is
amplified in the Middle East and its periphery by an operational environment that has frequently confounded foreign
military intervention, and that is likely to complicate efforts to defeat ISIS.
This is because identities and politics in large parts of this region have been shaped by past struggles against colonial and
foreign interventions, and by a belief systemIslamthat deems the defense of the community of believers and their
territorial domain a religious obligation. Moreover, the propensity of local actors to intervene in the regions numerous
conflicts and wars, whether as arms suppliers or as participants, tends to exacerbate and prolong these struggles, and
hamper efforts to end them.
Thus, the outcomes of Americas military interventions in the region have often been overturned within a few years by the
very social and political forces that the wars unleashed. These wars have often yielded unintended consequences as vexing
as the problems they were meant to solve. And they have frequently failed to resolve the underlying conflicts that brought
them about, paving the way for yet another round of fighting. For instance:
Iraq 1991. The expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by a U.S.-led coalition, which marked the high point of U.S.
prestige and influence in the region, led within a few short years to an anti- American backlash, in response to continuing
sanctions on Iraq, that complicated U.S. policy in the region. The U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, a key
component of the policy of containing Iraq, would likewise generate tensions with the Saudis and eventually lead to the
rise of al-Qaeda, and thus the September 11 attacks and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Afghanistan 2001. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan led to the overthrow of the Taliban government, but the Taliban
continues to wage a low-level insurgency in parts of the country, including the capital, while al-Qaeda, which was pushed
into Pakistan, remains the target of a decade-long counterterrorism campaign that has destabilized that country. Neither
struggle shows any sign of abating, and nearly ten thousand U.S. military advisors are expected to remain in Afghanistan
for years to come.
Iraq 2003. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and overthrow of President Saddam Hussein ended the threat the latter posed to
the region, but the mishandled occupation undermined Americas standing, created a new front in the war against alQaeda, led to the emergence of a Shiite-led government that often proved responsive to Iranian concerns, and helped
foment a sectarian proxy war in the region that continues to this day.
5
These patterns also hold for regional conflicts, strengthening the impression that they are rooted, at least in part, in the
politics of the Middle East and its periphery. This would further suggest that the campaign against ISIS is likely to face
many of the challenges of prior campaigns in the region, with the potential for inconclusive outcomes, unintended consequences, and new phases in the long war against jihadist groups in the Middle East and beyond.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 57

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Escalation


Ground combat troops fighting ISIL risks escalation with Iran.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Finally, tensions with Iran over the evolving U.S. role in Iraq and faltering nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 (Britain,
China, France, Russia, the United States, and Germany) could greatly complicate the U.S. campaign against ISIS. Recent
threats against U.S. military personnel by Iran-supported special groups could potentially limit the scope or nature of the
U.S. advisory effort in Iraq and spark a crisis between the United States and Iran should these threats be carried out.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 58

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Insufficient


Ground troops alone are not sufficient.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

ISIS, however, is a hybrid threat that requires a hybrid response, including conventional operations targeting its
conventional military formations, unconventional warfare operations to foment uprisings against ISIS rule, and
counterterrorism operations to disrupt ISIS terrorist attacks in the region and over- seas. Enabling activities include
coalition efforts to disrupt ISIS recruitment, counter ISIS financing, and discredit ISIS information activitiesthe last
arguably being the most important line of operation in the campaign against ISIS. Moreover, U.S. diplomatic efforts to
broker political deals between Baghdad and Sunnis in Iraq and acceptable regime elements in Damascus (excluding
Assad) and moderate Sunni opposition groups in Syria will be key to defeating ISIS and destroying its Islamic state. If
Sunnis in Iraq and Syria see a hopeful future, the fight against ISIS may be a long war, but at least it will not be a
forever war.

Comprehensive action against ISIL is necessary. Ground troops are not enough.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

The defeat mechanism. If ISIS is to be defeated and its Islamic state destroyed, the United States will
need to exploit ISIS vulnerabilities and sharpen the contradictions inherent in its rule. This will require actions along
military, economic, and psychological lines of operation to create synergies capable of producing decisive results:
Military. Military operations should degrade ISISs combat power, hit symbolic and substantive targets associated with its
rule (e.g., key leaders), and pressure ISIS simultaneously in Iraq and Syriaprioritizing neither, while employing
different means in eachin order to overextend ISIS and render it vulnerable to internal uprisings and external attack.
Economic. The United States should likewise continue to disrupt ISISs oil production and smuggling activities to choke
off its revenue stream and resources available for public services, governance, and economic activities. This will
hopefully stir discontent and unrest in areas it controls. Disrupting the criminal activities that have traditionally been its
main source of income will, however, be much harder.
Psychological. The United States should strive to transform the psychological environment in Iraq and Syria by creating
the perception, mainly through military means, that ISISs days are numbered. Such an effort may induce allies to defect
or turn on the group; deter prospective foreign fighters from joining it; and embolden subject populations to rise up
against its overstretched forces.
Efforts to transform the psychological environment should likewise include attempts to convince Syrians of a viable third
way between the regime and ISIS, and to convince Iraqi Sunnis that the new government of Prime Minister Abadi offers a
better future than does ISIS. Offers by the Iraqi government of administrative and security federalism to the largely Sunni
18
provinces of Iraq will be key.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 59

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Insufficient


Civil society is key to defeating ISISeven if troops win, rebuild plan is critical to long-term solvency
von Drehle, journalist and Time editor-at-large, 3-9-15 (David, Time, vol. 185, no. 8, p. 31)
There is a deeper issue behind the ISIS ugliness, and there will be no true victory until that issue is dealt with .
Civil society is collapsing in large parts of North Africa and the Middle East. The absence of competent
government creates mass unemployment theres the jobs issuebut it also creates resentment, suspicion,
desperation and a sense of victimhood. And this is the nest in which terrorists are hatched.
As tricky as the military piece of the ISIS puzzle may be, it is simple compared with the civil-society piece. The
U.S. showed in 1991 and again in 2003 that it knows how to take down enemies in Iraq. What it has never
shown an ability to do is leave something better afterward.
Some might say this deeper problem should be left to the countries themselves to solve. But the history of
Western interventions in the region has made self-help much harder than it might have been. The very idea of a
nation called Iraq was a half-considered Western confection spun in the wake of World War I, and it doomed the
region to a century of three competing peoplesShiite, Sunni and Kurdliving miserably under one flag. To a
significant extent, the bleeding Middle East is the Wests own botched creation. Says Middle East analyst David
Butter of the London-based think tank Chatham House: The big question is, Have outside powers blundered
around in the Middle East, doing too much or too little? He answers his own question. Having become very
deeply involved in Iraq, theyve made a lot of mistakes, underestimated and badly planned what they were going
to do.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 60

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Iran


Iran is suspicious of US military involvement and attempts to broker a political solution.
Barzegar, Director Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies & Chair Political Science & International
Relations @ Science & Research Branch of Islamic Azad Univ in Tehran; 2/8/15 (Kayhan; Foreign Affairs; To
defeat ISIS, get Iran on board; http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/to-defeat-isis-get-iran-on-board)

Indisputably, the international coalition against ISIS has been able to weaken the terrorist group. Yet, as the coalitions
focus shifts from military tactics to a political solution, the United States role at the head of the table will stand in the
way of progress. Understanding as much, each regional actor has developed its own specific strategy for containing the
ISIS threat. Iran is suspicious of the coalitions air operations, which include some Arab rival states operating over Iraqi
territory and beyond. Turkey is worried that the conflict could diminish Turkeys regional political and economic role and
empower Kurds at Turkeys expense. Saudi Arabia mainly aims to restrain ISIS, which presents an ideological challenge
to the government, and to weaken the Bashar al-Assad regime to constrain Irans regional role.

Iranian involvement in a regional solution to ISIS will build confidence with the U.S. and spillover to
nuclear talks.
Barzegar, Director Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies & Chair Political Science & International
Relations @ Science & Research Branch of Islamic Azad Univ in Tehran; 2/8/15 (Kayhan; Foreign Affairs; To
defeat ISIS, get Iran on board; http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/to-defeat-isis-get-iran-on-board)

With good diplomacy, the ISIS issue, as a common challenge, has the potential to advance cooperation between Iran and
the United States. Initial confidence-building measures in Syria could even be beneficial for the nuclear talks, given that,
even in the aftermath of a possible comprehensive deal, the two sides need to closely work together. This, in turn, can
provide the ground for developing a regional counterterrorism strategy.
Destroying ISIS, as Obama has vowed, requires developing a regional counterterrorism strategy in which states work
together. Such cooperation should also be supported and guaranteed by the United Nations mediatory efforts. ISIS has
emerged and spread in ungoverned areas of Syria and Iraq. Battling it, therefore, needs to involve strengthening states.
The U.S. led international collation against ISIS has led the individual states to follow their own policies. But that will
give ISIS even more space to operate. As such, only a multilateral strategy, based on collective effort and comprehensive
security, and not on the balance of power, will be able to destroy ISIS.

Iran must be involved in peace talks in order to stop violence and build confidence.
Barzegar, Director Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies & Chair Political Science & International
Relations @ Science & Research Branch of Islamic Azad Univ in Tehran; 2/8/15 (Kayhan; Foreign Affairs; To
defeat ISIS, get Iran on board; http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/to-defeat-isis-get-iran-on-board)

It is obvious that Syria will not return to its pre-conflict status. The issue now is how to convince Irans security and
political elites of the benefit of a political transformation in Syria. This is likely to happen only during a process of peace
talks. Iran has recently endorsed the UN Syria envoy Steffan de Misturas freeze plan, which calls for step-by-step
confidence-building measure in Syrias volatile political environment. This latest peace plan aims to make peace workable
from the local level (the city of Aleppo) to the national level, thereby increasing the chances that Syrias various political
forces can reach a political solution.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 61

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Kurds


Support for the Kurds would look bad with Sunnis in Syria and Iraq.
Cordesman, Chair Strategy @ CSIS; 9/30/14 (Anthony; CSIS; The Real Center of Gravity in the War Against the
Islamic State; http://csis.org/publication/real-center-gravity-war-against-islamic-state )

These problems go beyond Iraqs borders and involve ethnic as well as sectarian conflicts. There are no clear dividing
lines between Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis and Iraqi Sunnis who will seek to secure Iraq out of some loyalty to the central
government. Iraqs Kurds have had far too few reasons to be loyal to the central government, strong incentives to turn to
Turkey for exporting oil, and very different incentives to come to the aid of Syrias Kurds and grab as much disputed
territory in Iraq as they can. The United States cannot deploy ground forces where it will be seen by one side or another as
either supporting Kurdish claims and separatism or taking sides against them.
The United States also faces the problem that there are no clear boundaries between Syrian, Iraqi, and Turkish Kurds and
deeply divided factions within them as well as the problem of coping with the PKK a group the United States has
labeled as a terrorist organization. The United States also could not easily avoid coming to the aid of every threatened
minority or humanitarian crisis in Syria, or being perceived as many in the region already perceive it as supporting
Assad and Alawites in some conspiracy against the Sunnis and Turkey.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 62

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Legitimacy


SQ policy best; U.S. ground troops would give legitimacy to Daesh and collapse cooperation with Arab
states
Zakaria, Newsweek editor, 2-28-15 (Fareed, The Arizona Daily Star, p. A16)
Washington is getting enthusiastic about an ideological war these days between Americans and radical Islam. Many of
those who spent the past several weeks insisting that we label jihadi terrorists Islamic now urge that we fight them on
the ideological front. Its the right arena, but such a struggle would be different from past wars of ideas and could lead to
some surprising recommendations for action.
Our image of an ideological war comes from the Cold War, another titanic struggle between two opposing worldviews.
But the Cold War was so pervasive and intense because each sides ideas were potentially attractive to anyone, anywhere
in the world. Communism and capitalism were both secular ideologies.
Its difficult to remember today that for decades, tens of millions of people around the world were greatly attracted to
communism.
Radical Islam, by contrast, is severely limited in its global appeal. Almost by definition, it is deeply unattractive to all
non-Muslims. What Christian would want the forced imposition of Sharia law? Even within the Muslim world, radical
Islam does not resonate. In the half of that world that holds elections including Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Bangladesh,
Turkey, Iraq, even Pakistan such ideologies have not garnered many votes.
Because the ideas at stake are potentially seductive only to Muslims, the ideological war today is really a struggle within
Islam. Its a cultural war that has to be waged by Muslims. If outsiders, like America, want to play a role, they should
listen to and support those Muslims fighting the good fight. One such person is the king of Jordan, Abdullah II.
The king supports President Obamas inclination not to describe ISIS as Islamic because theyre looking for legitimacy
that they dont have inside of Islam. But the truth of the matter is that its irrelevant what Obama wants to call these
terrorists. What matters is what the king and other locals in Jordan and across the Arab world call them. And uniformly,
they choose not to call it the Islamic State, ISIS or ISIL. Instead, they call it Daesh, a rough acronym that is seen as
derogatory because it sounds like the Arabic word daes, which means to crush underfoot.
The word Abdullah prefers to describe the jihadis is khawarij, which translates to outlaws or renegades of Islam.
Its not a Western fight, the king said to me. This is a fight inside of Islam where everybody comes together against
these outlaws. He wants international support and involvement, of course, but is wary of Western troops.
Those most insistent that we need to name and know the enemy want the Obama administration to jump into the fight,
guns blazing. But the irony is that, if one understands the ideology behind the Islamic State properly, it leads in the
opposite direction.
Graeme Wood, in his essay in The Atlantic, discusses the prospect of a larger American military involvement against the
group. The biggest proponent of an American invasion is the Islamic State itself, he writes. The provocative videos ...
are clearly made to draw America into the fight. An invasion would be a huge propaganda victory for jihadists
worldwide. Instead, he counsels containment, selective airstrikes and support for Muslims working to dissuade their
brethren from falling prey to radical Islam.
In other words, fighting an ideological war against the Islamic State actually points one toward a sophisticated strategy
that involves, for America, military restraint and close political cooperation with Arabs. I wonder if those clamoring for
such a struggle would still be on board.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 63

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Long Time Frame


Victory will take years to accomplish.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

For these reasons, the United States needs to define down success in its campaign against ISIS, while allocating greater
resources to the effort. The declared goal should be to reduce the ISIS problem to manageable dimensions. In practical
terms, this means discrediting and marginalizing ISIS by reducing its base of support inside and outside the region,
destroying its military formations and the administrative machinery of its Islamic state, and forcing ISIS to once again
become an underground organization capable of little more than occasional acts of terror. This could take years to
accomplish.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 64

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Mission Creep


Empirics go con: even a limited military force fails in Iraq and causes mission creep Becker,
department chair at National Intelligence Univ., 12-12-14 (Joseph, Small Wars Journal,
http://anasoft.base.pk/(isis)%20obama%20strategy%20for%20defeating%20isis%20is%20the%20(joseph%20becker)%20
small%20wars%20journal.pdf, p. 3)

The next question that this paper will examine is what it would take to defeat ISIS militarily. There is no doubt
that with commitment to a full-scale invasion, the U.S. military could route the forces of ISIS and destroy their
conventional fighting forces. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 clearly demonstrated that the U.S. military is capable
of seizing and holding this terrain. U.S. military operations in Fallujah in 2004, in addition to the southern cities
of Karbala and Najaf, demonstrated that conventional forces could prevail against insurgents in large-scale
clear-and-hold operations targeting entire cities. However, as we have already mentioned, this deployment of
U.S. ground forces is not an option because the American people as a whole do not see a clear national interest
in this sacrifice. Even if it were an option, its success could require an indefinite commitment in order to ensure
that these areas do not fall again into unfriendly control. The U.S. military has already been down this road,
spending more than eight years at war in Iraq, with most of it in difficult counter-insurgency operations. In spite
of staggering costs, the war failed to resolve the issues preventing Iraq from moving forward as a unified nation.
What of a more limited role for U.S. ground troops? Perhaps the Iraqi forces who were so easily routed by ISIL
in recent months would fare better with several brigades of U.S. forces in support. Unfortunately, history is not
kind to this argument. U.S. forces throughout the duration of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM were a lightning rod
for galvanizing the opposition of both Shia and Sunni malcontents, along with foreign fighters from around the
world. Furthermore, the U.S. was clearly instrumental in establishing the Shia-dominated government, led by
Nuri Al-Maliki, whose heavy-handed policies sparked the current uprising. If U.S. ground forces were
committed, how many would be enough, and how could they avoid the appearance of bias? If the recent wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan fail to suffice, the Vietnam conflict provides stark warnings about the dangers of making
limited military commitments to a conflict. If the host nation forces do not rise to the challenge, the U.S. is left
with three unappealing options: send more troops, fight a losing battle, or cut its losses and pull out.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 65

Con- Ground troops Ineffective- Noncombat


Advisors solve all your internal links and avoid risk of anti-American blowback
Boot, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 8/16/14 (Max, The Spectator,
http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9287832/defeat-isis-yes-we-can/)

This is a good start but only a start. The US and its allies, Britain foremost among them, need to expand their
goals and their means to achieve them. So far President Obama has talked only of containing Isis, of preventing
it from massacring Yazidis or taking Erbil. Thats not enough. We should not tolerate the existence of a terrorist
state similar to Taleban-era Afghanistan sprawling across Iraq and Syria. Already thousands of foreign jihadis,
including many Europeans, have been drawn to Syria. If left unchecked, this terrorist playpen is likely to
generate attacks not only on neighbouring states such as Lebanon and Jordan but on western targets too . The
Wests goal should be rollback, not containment. In for a penny, in for a pound. If were going to bomb Isis, lets
do it right. Or, as Napoleon aptly advised, If you set out to take Vienna, take Vienna.
Defeating Isis will require boosting the western advisory and special operations presence in Iraq to somewhere
in the neighbourhood of 10,000 to 15,000 personnel and sending aircraft that will be based in Iraq, rather than at
sea or from distant bases, to facilitate a more sustained bombing campaign. Advisers should be evenly
distributed between the Kurdish peshmerga, the Sunni tribes and some of the more capable units of the Iraqi
security forces in order to make clear that we are not playing favourites among Iraqs sectarian groups. Simply
having western advisers present alongside anti-Isis fighters will greatly enhance their morale, professionalism
and effectiveness.
With more American (and, one hopes, allied) eyes on the ground, it will be possible to call in more air strikes
with greater effectiveness, as occurred in Afghanistan during the autumn of 2001. Western commandos such as
Seal Team Six, Delta Force and the British and Australian SAS should also expand operations to carry out the
kind of intelligence-driven leadership targeting that was an important part of the 2007 -2008 surge. Such actions
in Iraq must be complemented with greater aid to the Free Syrian Army in order to fight Isis on the other side of
the rapidly disintegrating border with Iraq.
It will not be quick or easy to reverse the gains that Isis has made. But with the right strategy, appropriate resources and a
little determination, Mosul and Fallujah can be retaken before the self-styled Islamic Caliphate solidifies its hold on a
region larger than Jordan. However much they may want to avoid further entanglement in the messy Middle East, Obama
and Cameron have no choice but to act unless they want to leave a new terrorist state as part of their legacy in office.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 66

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Overstretch


U.S. military intervention would fail, exhaust resources, and overstretch the U.S.
Cronin, Director of the International Security Program at George Mason Univ., March 2015 (Audrey Kirth,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 2, p. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143043/audrey-kurth-cronin/isis-is-not-aterrorist-group)

Of course, this opens up a third possible approach to ISIS, besides counterterrorism and counterinsurgency: a
full-on conventional war against the group, waged with the goal of completely destroying it. Such a war would
be folly. After experiencing more than a decade of continuous war, the American public simply would not
support the long-term occupation and intense fighting that would be required to obliterate ISIS. The pursuit of a
full-fledged military campaign would exhaust U.S. resources and offer little hope of obtaining the objective .
Wars pursued at odds with political reality cannot be won.
CONTAINING THE THREAT
The sobering fact is that the United States has no good military options in its fight against ISIS. Neither
counterterrorism, nor counterinsurgency, nor conventional warfare is likely to afford Washington a clear-cut
victory against the group. For the time being, at least, the policy that best matches ends and means and that has
the best chance of securing U.S. interests is one of offensive containment: combining a limited military
campaign with a major diplomatic and economic effort to weaken ISIS and align the interests of the many
countries that are threatened by the group's advance.
ISIS is not merely an American problem. The wars in Iraq and Syria involve not only regional players but also
major global actors, such as Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states. Washington must stop
behaving as if it can fix the region's problems with military force and instead resurrect its role as a diplomatic
superpower.
Of course, U.S. military force would be an important part of an offensive containment policy. Air strikes can
pin ISIS down, and cutting off its supply of technology, weapons, and ammunition by choking off smuggling
routes would further weaken the group. Meanwhile, the United States should continue to advise and support the
Iraqi military, assist regional forces such as the Kurdish Pesh Merga, and provide humanitarian assistance to
civilians fleeing ISIS territory. Washington should also expand its assistance to neighboring countries such as
Jordan and Lebanon, which are struggling to contend with the massive flow of refugees from Syria. But putting
more U.S. troops on the ground would be counterproductive, entangling the United States in an unwinnable war
that could go on for decades. The United States cannot rebuild the Iraqi state or determine the outcome of the
Syrian civil war. Frustrating as it might be to some, when it comes to military action, Washington should stick
to a realistic course that recognizes the limitations of U.S. military force as a long-term solution.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 67

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Resilient


ISIS is too resilient to be defeated by U.S. ground combat troops. Their ideology, organization, and
operational environment make their survival inevitable.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Defining Down Success


The declared goal of degrading and ultimately destroying ISIS has created expectations among many Americans that are
unlikely to be met. There are a number of reasons for this:
ISISs resilience. ISIS is the second incarnation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which was defeated by several hundred
thousand U.S. and Iraqi troops and tribal allies between 2006 and 2011, but which was never completely eradicated. It is a
highly resilient organization due to ideological and organizational factors, and the nature of the environment it operates
3
in: Ideology: The takfiri jihadist ideology of ISIS has roots reaching back to the early days of Islam. Accordingly, the
enduring appeal of this ideology to some Muslims will likely prove difficult, if not impossible, to expungeat least in the
short term. Furthermore, ISISs supporters reject the authority of establishment religious scholars, making the movement
difficult to delegitimize on religious grounds. ISISs adherents simply do not care what traditional clerics think, and thrive
4
on rejecting establishment views. Finally, the reach of social media and the Internet enables ISIS to mobilize supporters
from around the world, and to continuously replenish its ranks with fresh volunteers.
Organization: ISIS functioned for years as an underground insurgent network before trans- forming itself, in the past two
or three years, into an army with a state that now dominates large swaths of eastern Syria and northern Iraq. This
transformation, however, creates vulnerabilities: clandestine networks are much more difficult to identify and eliminate
than conventional military formations, which can be destroyed by conventional military means, though ISIS might revert
to operating as a clandestine network if placed under sufficient military pressure. And foreign fighters who identify with
the group are a strategic reserve often operating under the anti-ISIS coalitions radar or beyond its reach.
Operational environment: The popular uprisings, insurgencies, and sectarian violence wracking the region will likely
define, for years to come, the emerging Middle East conflict system now spanning North Africa to the Persian Gulf. So
even if ISIS is defeated militarily, its remnants will likely find ungoverned spaces or safe havens where they can
reorganize, or they will continue the fight after fleeing to neighboring states. And some foreign fighters will return to the
region to resume the struggle if the opportunity presents itself.
Furthermore, the Obama administrations approach of targeting ISIS and other jihadist groupsbut not the Syrian regime
of Bashar al-Assadplays into the jihadist narrative that the United States kills only Sunnis, thereby fueling the sense of
grievance that sustains ISIS.
For all these reasons, ISIS is likely to survive the U.S. campaign against it, albeit with greatly diminished capabilities and
perhaps in a different guise, much as AQI eventually morphed into ISIS.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 68

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Stability


Ground troops cant stabilize the Middle East, solve problems, or create stable end states. Eisenstadt,
Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

More broadly, in terms of U.S. policy toward a Middle East undergoing convulsive change, the best that the United States
and its allies can hope for at this time is to influence developments and mitigate threats emanating from the region.
Washington should abandon hopes of stabilizing the Middle East, solving its problems, or achieving stable end
states, never mind imposing grand designs or elaborate strategies for that part of the worldat least for the foreseeable
future.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 69

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Terrorism


Committing U.S. troops would bolster recruitment for ISIS and risk escalation in the region
Wood, lecturer of political science at Yale Univ., March 2015 (Graeme, Atlantic, vol. 315, no. 2, p. 90)
And yet the risks of escalation are enormous. The biggest proponent of an American invasion is the Islamic State itself.
The provocative videos, in which a black-hooded executioner addresses President Obama by name, are clearly made to
draw America into the fight. An invasion would be a huge propaganda victory for jihadists worldwide: irrespective of
whether they have given bayaa to the caliph, they all believe that the United States wants to embark on a modern-day
Crusade and kill Muslims. Yet another invasion and occupation would confirm that suspicion, and bolster recruitment.
Add the incompetence of our previous efforts as occupiers, and we have reason for reluctance. The rise of ISIS, after all,
happened only because our previous occupation created space for Zarqawi and his followers. Who knows the
consequences of another botched job?

Its impossible to completely eradicate ISIS with troops; only a risk of blowback with U.S. invasion
Becker, department chair at National Intelligence Univ., 12-12-14 (Joseph, Small Wars Journal,
http://anasoft.base.pk/(isis)%20obama%20strategy%20for%20defeating%20isis%20is%20the%20(joseph%20becker)%20
small%20wars%20journal.pdf, p. 3)
In more practical terms, a military defeat of ISIL would fail to eradicate the base of fighters from which it draws. Foreign
fighters make up only a portion of the ISIL force, currently estimated at up to thirty percent.[6] The Sunni militias and
tribal forces constituting the majority of ISILs supporters would likely melt back into the population as quickly as they
appeared if the fortunes of the organization were reversed. Many of these fighters are disaffected youth with few prospects
in peaceful society, especially in the war-torn regions of Iraq and Syria. They have found empowerment and prosperity
through their violent pursuits. Providing these individuals with a level of opportunity that would dissuade them from
returning to violence might prove costlier than the government in Baghdad can manage. Furthermore, violence breeds
violence. In the years since the U.S. invasion in 2003, a generation of Sunni youth has grown up nursing grievances that
follow a variety of narratives, but with a common theme of deprivation at the hands of perceived outsiders. ISIS has
proven shameless in perpetuating these narratives, even recruiting or coercing school-aged boys to military service and
indoctrinating many more.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 70

Con- Ground Troops Ineffective- Terrorism


Beheadings are a warning to Western countries about the consequences of intervention and a test of the
stomachs of countries support.
Simcox, Research Fellow @ Henry Jackson Society; 9/15/14 (Robin; Foreign Affairs; ISIS worst nightmare: Why

the group is not trying to provoke a U.S. attack; http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141987/robin-simcox/isis-worst-nightmare)

In the video of Foleys beheading, for example, a British ISIS fighter suspected of carrying out the murder claims to be
retaliating against U.S. bombing raids and the United States attempt to deny the Muslims their rights of living in safety
under the Islamic caliphate. In the second video, Sotloff is made to ask whether U.S. citizens are interested in another
war against ISIS having already spent billions of U.S. taxpayers dollars and lost thousands of our troops. The
British ISIS fighter warns governments looking to assist the United States to back off and leave our people alone. The
video then cuts to an image of the British hostage, David Haines. These videos, understandably, did not lead to a change
in Western policy, and Haines was killed next. The rhetoric in the video of his killing is similar to that in the Foley and
Sotloff videos. The British ISIS fighter explicitly references how the Western military campaign in Iraq will lead to
another bloody and unwinnable war, and that by continuing the fight against ISIS, the West will cause more British
citizens to die. Alan Henning, another British man captured by ISIS, is identified as the next potential victim.
ISIS ideological forebears have used similar tactics with Western hostages. When American citizen Nicholas Berg and
British citizen Kenneth Bigley were beheaded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawis network in 2004, Zarqawi was not trying to
draw the United States and United Kingdom more deeply into the Iraq war. (There were already over 140,000 U.S. troops
in Iraq at the time of Bergs murder.) Rather, he was trying to weaken public support for the war and test whether the
West had the stomach for this kind of fight. For example, prior to his death, Bigley was forced to read a statement saying
that Iraqis don't like foreign troops on their soil walking down the street with guns -- it's not right and it's not fair. We
need to pull the troops out.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 71

Con- Iraq
Ground troops would be perceived as picking sides in a civil war.
Cordesman, Chair Strategy @ CSIS; 9/30/14 (Anthony; CSIS; The Real Center of Gravity in the War Against the
Islamic State; http://csis.org/publication/real-center-gravity-war-against-islamic-state )

Even if the United States could solve the logistic and sustainment issues involved on a timely basis, the United States
cannot deploy its own major ground force combat units into the middle of a civil war. The rise of the Islamic State and the
support it has gained from Iraqs Sunnis is the result of the conflict between Arab Sunni and Arab Shiite that former
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki provoked between 2010 and being pushed out of the position in 2014. Far too many Iraqis
will now see any U.S. action as taking sides in their civil war, there are far too many hostile Shiite and Sunni militias, and
far too many Iraqi politicians who will exploit the situation for their own benefit.

Sunni and Shiite political reconciliation at the current moment is at a standstill. Military victory in these
conditions will inflame the world and turn into catastrophic successes.
Pollack, Senior Fellow @ Brookings Institution; 2/4/15 (Kenneth; New York Times; ISIS is losing in Iraq. But what
happens next?; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/opinion/isis-is-losing-in-iraq-but-what-happens-next.html?_r=0)

The problem is that political progress in Iraq has not kept pace with the military campaign. In fact, political reconciliation
between the Sunni and Shiite communities is at a standstill. A military victory under these circumstances could turn into a
catastrophic success.
Iraqs Sunni and Shiite communities are captive to the mistrust from the 2006-8 civil war, inflamed by Prime Minister
Nuri Kamal al-Malikis violent treatment of the Sunnis from 2010 to 2014 and the subsequent Sunni embrace of the
Islamic State.
The governments security forces, both army and police, are overwhelmingly Shiite. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has
done a heroic job replacing many Shiite loyalists and political hacks at the top of the military chain of command with
more competent officers, including many Sunnis. But the enlisted ranks and junior officers remain disproportionately
Shiite.
On top of that, many of Iraqs recent conquests were won by Iranian-backed Shiite militias. The government does not like
to admit it, but these Shiite militias often lead Iraqi attacks and form the backbone of their defenses.
In these circumstances, offensive operations into the Sunni heartland Anbar, Nineveh and Salah al-Din Provinces
could be disastrous.
The Sunni populace is terrified by reports of Shiite troops and militiamen conducting brutal ethnic cleansing operations.
Without a new power-sharing agreement, promises that they will not be mistreated, and a program for reconstruction, the
Sunnis may well see Iraqi government forces (and even the Kurds) not as liberators, but as a conquering Shiite army.
If that is the case, they will defend the Islamic State and, even if it is defeated, resist the Shiite forces. Military victory
would not end the slow-burning Iraqi civil war, but inflame it.

Military victories will back fire without political resolution of Sunni-Shiite differences.
Pollack, Senior Fellow @ Brookings Institution; 2/4/15 (Kenneth; New York Times; ISIS is losing in Iraq. But what
happens next?; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/opinion/isis-is-losing-in-iraq-but-what-happens-next.html?_r=0)

Mr. Obamas willingness to recommit to Iraq has already yielded important results, but the military victories that have
been achieved could backfire if military progress is not coupled with political reconciliation. Doing so will be hard, but
hardly impossible. It is essential if we are to turn the battlefield gains against the Islamic State into lasting political
achievements.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 72

Con- Iraq- Ground Troops


Ground troops will only be effective if there is Iraqi political acceptance and support of Iraqi forces.
Cordesman, Chair Strategy @ CSIS; 9/30/14 (Anthony; CSIS; The Real Center of Gravity in the War
Against the Islamic State; http://csis.org/publication/real-center-gravity-war-against-islamic-state)
The United States does need Special Forces, enablers, intelligence personnel, air support experts, and wide range of skills
that can help create effective units and combat leaders to be deployed forward with Iraqi combat units, not simply safely
in the rear. The numbers can be far smaller than in U.S. combat units, and the cost in dollars and blood can be far smaller,
but putting the right mix of boots on the ground in the right places to create combat capable forces rather than simply
train and equip is as critical to success as putting major U.S. combat forces into Iraq is stupid. But, this requires Iraqi
political acceptance and the support of Iraqi forces in the field. Thrusting U.S. advisors forward without such acceptance
means taking terrible risks in terms of problems with hostile Iraqi forces.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 73

Con- Iraq- Sunni-Shiite


Maliki is to blame; military approach doesnt address root of ISIS popularitySunni insecurity
Cronin, Director of the International Security Program at George Mason Univ., March 2015 (Audrey
Kirth, Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 2, p. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143043/audrey-kurth-cronin/isis-is-not-aterrorist-group)
But vast differences exist between the situation today and the one that Washington faced in 2006, and the logic of U.S.
counterinsurgency does not suit the struggle against ISIS. The United States cannot win the hearts and minds of Iraq's
Sunni Arabs, because the Maliki government has already lost them. The Shiite-dominated Iraqi government has so badly
undercut its own political legitimacy that it might be impossible to restore it. Moreover, the United States no longer
occupies Iraq. Washington can send in more troops, but it cannot lend legitimacy to a government it no longer
controls. ISIS is less an insurgent group fighting against an established government than one party in a conventional civil
war between a breakaway territory and a weak central state.

Political intervention is key to stopping ISIL, military approach has failed


Feinstein, staff writer, 2-26-15 (Chelsea, The Lowell (MA) Sun, p.
http://www.lowellsun.com/todaysheadlines/ci_27602172/moulton-u-s-needs-longterm-political-plan-iraq)
In Iraq, where Moulton served four tours and earned a Bronze Star, less progress is evident.
"In contrast, I don't see a strong political plan in Iraq. This is really a political crisis that has led to a rise of ISIL, and
there's got to be a political situation, a military solution is not enough," he said. "We have to make sure in Iraq that if we
have some military action supporting the Iraqis that it's not in vain because there's no longer term political strategy. We're
looking at going back into Iraq, and none of us want to do that."
Instead of bringing in military advisers, he said, the U.S. should be providing political advisers in Iraq.
"We've sent hundreds of military advisers to Baghdad, but the fundamental problem is political. We need to send political
advisers to Iraq," Moulton said.
On his trip, Moulton said he saw an interest for a united regional effort against ISIL. When he asked Ghani what role the
U.S. should have in that coalition, he said that Ghani said the U.S. should lead.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 74

Con- Iraq- Sunni-Shiite


The U.S. and allies can solve Sunni Awakening without U.S. combat troops
Boot, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 8/16/14 (Max, The Spectator,
http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9287832/defeat-isis-yes-we-can/)

Similar success could be possible now even without dispatching 170,000 western troops, because Isis has a
major weak spot that we can exploit: it is unpopular even with its Sunni constituents. Already there have been
rumblings of discontent from Mosul among Iraqis who are not happy to have jihadists destroying their ancient
monuments, such as the tomb of the prophet Jonah, and telling them how to live. (Among other things, Isis is
fanatically opposed to smoking and drinking, two activities that ordinary Iraqis love.) Unfortunately, past tribal
uprisings against Isis were brutally snuffed out until in 2006-2007 US military forces came to their aid. The US
and its allies, including Britain, need to mount a similar campaign to mobilise tribal fighters once again.
It wont be easy, because Sunnis are intensely suspicious and understandably so of the sectarian leaders in
Baghdad. There should, however, be a decent chance to form a government of national unity under Haider al Abadi (who, unlike the more insular Maliki, speaks fluent English and earned a DPhil at the University of
Manchester) that would have more credibility with Sunnis and Kurds. Then it would be a matter of giving the
vast majority of Iraqis, who detest and fear Isis, the means to fight back without having to rely, as the Shiites
have been doing lately, on help from Irans notorious Quds Force.
What this means in practical terms is that the US and its allies will have to beef up their presence in Iraq. That
doesnt mean sending ground troops but it does mean sending more advisers, more intelligence personnel, more
aircraft and more special operations forces. Obama has already increased the US presence to more than 1,000
troops and set up two joint operations centres with the Iraqi military in Baghdad and Erbil. He has also begun air
attacks on Isis, which are being carried out from the aircraft carrier George H.W. Bush. The CIA has apparently
also begun to arm the Kurdish peshmerga, whose resistance to Isis had been hindered by lack of ammunition and
heavy weapons.
The US should designate a high-level representative to mediate the political disputes in Iraq first.
Pollack, Senior Fellow @ Brookings Institution; 2/4/15 (Kenneth; New York Times; ISIS is losing in Iraq. But what
happens next?; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/opinion/isis-is-losing-in-iraq-but-what-happens-next.html?_r=0)

The White House should designate a high-level representative to take on the challenge, like the United States ambassador
to Iraq, Stuart E. Jones, or another diplomat with Iraq experience, like Brett H. McGurk, now the envoy to the global
coalition fighting the Islamic State.
This representative should serve as a mediator, bringing Sunnis and Shiites together to hammer out a new power-sharing
arrangement and establish the mechanics of the reconquest of the Sunni lands. However, because of the fragmentation of
the Sunni leadership, the American representative will probably have to act as its surrogate in negotiations. This is
effectively what Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker did in Baghdad in 2007-8.
Finally, the American representative will most likely need some additional leverage to secure a deal. If Washington were
willing to offer additional military training, hardware and support forces, as well as diplomatic, technical, financial and
targeted economic assistance, it could persuade Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites to accept less from one another in expectation of
getting more from the United States.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 75

Con- Religion
The U.S. needs to delegitimize ISIS on religious grounds.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Efforts to delegitimize ISIS on religious grounds by demonstrating how its words and actions contradict the tenets of
Islam may influence some potential recruits, and are therefore a necessary part of the coalitions information campaign.
But such efforts are unlikely to have an impact on the overwhelming majority of its followers, who reject the legitimacy
20
and authority of establishment clerics. Accordingly, efforts to delegitimize ISIS on religious grounds should not be the
centerpiece of coalition information activities. Rather, the coalition should seek to dis- credit ISIS in the eyes of its
followers by thwarting its worldly ambitions. The failure of ISISs political project and the dismantling of its Islamic
state will have a much greater impact on its flock.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 76

Con- Syrian Opposition


U.S. focus on ISIL weakens moderate forces in Syria that are attacking the root of the problem. Middle
East Research Institute; 12/23/14 (Special Dispatch No. 5912; Syrian Oppositionist Harshly Criticizes U.S.: It Weakened
The Moderate Opposition, Strengthened The Extremists; http://www.memri.org/report/en/print8345.htm)

In an interview published in the Qatari London-based daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi,[1] senior coalition official Michel Kilo
expressed the coalition's frustration at its situation and also at the West's especially the U.S.'s handling of the Syria
crisis. Kilo claimed that the U.S. had acted deliberately to eliminate the moderate forces and empower radical terror
groups in order to escalate the crisis, so as to make it easier to settle accounts with its rivals. He added that this had served
the regimes agenda of claiming that it was fighting terrorists rather than political opponents.
Kilo opposed giving top priority to the fight against ISIS, explaining that resolving the Syrian crisis would make the war
on this organization easier and shorter. Prolonging this war, he added, serves Iran by enabling it to infiltrate the Gulf
countries. He also objected to the plan of UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura to freeze the fighting in Syria,
starting in Aleppo, saying that this plan is a waste of time and only allows Assad to present himself as supporting a
ceasefire while in practice he escalates his attacks. Kilo did not spare the opposition, and the National Coalition itself, in
his criticism, saying that the coalition lets Assad and his allies toy with it and that the Syrians may therefore seek to
replace it. However, despite the opposition's difficulties, Kilo believes that Assad's allies will not be able to save him and
that he will be ousted, sooner or later.

Syrian opposition is critical to defeat ISIL- U.S. ground troops against ISIL would be playing whack-amole.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)
25

Syria is a complex problem that will inevitably pose difficult policy challenges. The way forward, however, starts with a
moderate opposition capable of taking on regime forces as well as ISIS, and of effectively governing areas under its
26
control. This would be a first step toward a negotiated transition in Syria that could pro- duce a transitional government
that would incorporate acceptable members of the former regime and the moderate opposition. Or, if such an end proves
27
unattainable and the opposition proves capable, it could be the first step toward the overthrow of the Assad regime.
If politics do not permit the United States to work effectively with its local partners on the ground, or if their own
organizational and political dysfunctions prevent them from growing effective fighting forces, then the United States will
likely be consigned to playing whack-a-mole with ISIS in Iraq and Syria, as it has done with al-Qaeda affiliates in
Somalia, Yemen, and western Pakistan for much of the past decade. The prospects for achieving a modicum of success
against ISIS will thus be even further diminished. Unfortunately, this is not an implausible outcome.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 77

Con- Syrian Opposition


ISIL will only be defeated when military strategy is combined with a political solution centered on
governance and alternatives that address the regime.
Khatib, Director of the Middle East Center Carnegie Middle East Center; 3/4/15 (Lina; Al-Hayat; The human
dimension of life under the Islamic State; http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=59246)

In the absence of a strong Syrian opposition to fight ISIS, and a real strategy by the international coalition to eradicate
the organization, those enduring life under ISIS rule are desperate to be saved but cannot rise up against the organization
because they do not have the means to do so. The more time passes, the more passive those people become, which is to
the advantage of ISIS. The way forward is to abandon the current coalition strategy of air raids over ISIS areas, which is
resulting in the deaths of many civilians who in reality resent the Islamic State. In its place there has to be a plan to
provide people with a political alternative that addresses grievances against the regime, frustration with corruption, and
economic destitution. Only when a comprehensive military strategy is combined with a socio-political plan centered on
good governance and attentive to the human dimension of the Syrian conflict can the international coalition truly claim to
be fighting ISIS effectively.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 78

Con- Syrian Opposition- Assad


Defeating ISIS empowers Assad. Broader strategy key.
Rothkopf, CEO & Editor of FP Group & Visiting scholar @ Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace; 10/30/14 (David; Time; How to defeat ISIS; http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/30/how-to-beat-isis/ht9z)
Even if the U.S. manages to defeat ISIS militarily in Iraq or Syria, there is no clear plan to fill the political, economic and
social void that will be created by its elimination. In Syria victory over ISIS might end up empowering the brutal regime
of President Bashar Assad, which is already responsible for a war thats produced 200,000 deaths and a massive
humanitarian catastrophe. In Iraq, if the only result is a Shiite-led regime in Baghdad that acts much like the last one, it
wont be long before Sunni unrest invites the rise of a new insurgency. Weve seen that movie once before.
We need a broader strategy to curb the alarming spread of violent extremism, which currently takes the form of dozens of
groups from West Africa to Asia. Insiders call it squeezing the balloongetting rid of the problem in one place only to
see it burst forth in another. Its not enough, as the President recently suggested, to simply see this as a generational
problem.

U.S. focus on ISIL weakens moderates fighting Assad- must increase support for Syrian opposition.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

In Syria, recent U.S. strikes against elements of Jabhat al-Nusra believed to be planning terrorist attacks in Europe or the
United States engendered a political backlash by the many Syrians who support that group. Members of the moderate
opposition subsequently demanded that the United States target the Assad regime as well as ISIS, lest the coalition air
campaign redound to the regimes benefit. Given suspicions of Washington by the moderate opposition, U.S. failure to
signal its resolve to replace Assad
could greatly reduce the prospect for future cooperation between the two. One way to counter the claim that the United
States is only interested in growing the opposition to fight ISIS and not Assad is to help vetted moderate opposition units
conduct a number of high-profile attacks on Syrian government forces using U.S. equipment, for videotaping and
dissemination on social media.

Assad is worse than ISIS.


Khatib, Director of the Middle East Center Carnegie Middle East Center; 3/4/15 (Lina; Al-Hayat; The human
dimension of life under the Islamic State; http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=59246)

The escalating terror by the Islamic State group (ISIS) is driving attention to this organization to increasingly focus on its
military face. The response of the international coalition set up to fight ISIS has also been purely military rather than also
incorporating a social or political dimension. This risks overlooking how, in addition to its hardcore fighters, ISIS harbors
not just people with power ambitions but also those with grievances, and very often, despair. No matter the threat posed
by this organization and other extremist groups, we should not forget their human dimension, for it carries the key to
fighting them effectively.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 79

Con- Syrian Opposition- Assad


Resolving the Syrian problem solves the root of other issues like of terrorism and ISIS.
Middle East Research Institute; 12/23/14 (Special Dispatch No. 5912; Syrian Oppositionist Harshly Criticizes U.S.: It
Weakened The Moderate Opposition, Strengthened The Extremists; http://www.memri.org/report/en/print8345.htm)

The War On ISIS Is Unserious And Off The Mark


About the war against ISIS, Kilo said that it is not serious and that it is following an incorrect plan. According to him, "if
priority had been given to resolving the Syrian problem, which is the root of the other problems in the region, the Syrians
themselves, after solving their problem, would have eliminated terrorism within several months... In effect, this war
[against ISIS] is being waged so that the problems and crises in the region will not find a solution... Had [the U.S. ]really
wanted to address the problem of terrorism, they should have first of all dealt with the Syrian problem and given the
Syrian people its rights..."

Getting rid of Assad and supporting the moderate opposition key to defeating ISIS
Kagan, founder & president Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director Critical Threat Project @
American Enterprise Institute, & Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly, Frederick, and Jessica, A
Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf, p. 14)

ISIS operates within the complex dynamics in Iraq and Syria, where security has collapsed over the last three years. The
Syrian conflict began as a peaceful revolt against Bashar al-Assads autocratic rule, escalated to armed conflict when
Assad used force against protesters in Deraa,1 and became a full-scale civil war in July 2012 when the Syrian regime lost
control of large swaths of territory to insurgents.2 The regime rebounded in 2013 with the help of Iran, Lebanese
Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shia militias, which provided manpower and equipment upon which it became dependent.3 The
regime sought to eliminate civilian support to the opposition using mass casualty attacks including airstrikes, barrel
bombs, deliberate starvation campaigns, and chemical weapons, creating an immense humanitarian crisis.4 But the regime
has not been able to destroy the opposition or regain control of Aleppo or the territory in the east that it had lost.
The armed groups comprising the Syrian opposition have yet to form strategic military structures to direct operations that
combine forces against the regime on multiple fronts. But there are still opposition forces with operational capability that
continue to mount offensives against the regime and adapt to changes in the character of the conflict. The opposition is
currently undertaking offensives in Idlib, Hama, Damascus, and Deraa provinces.5 It is also defending terrain in Aleppo
province against the encroachment of ISIS. 6 Where ISIS presents a serious threat to the opposition in the north, the
Syrian opposition writ large may have gained a relative strategic advantage after ISIS began to attack regime bases.7 Now
the regime as well as the opposition is challenged to fight against multiple enemies. Both sides have been depleted over
nearly three years of fighting, increasing the strategic implications of individual battlefield losses at this point in the war,
although a continued influx of foreign fighters and support mitigates these losses for the violent jihadist groups.
The moderate elements of the opposition have been especially degraded because they are fighting against both the regime
and ISIS. They have also received far less international support than either of their opponents. JN has penetrated the opposition thoroughly and interwoven itself
with opposition forces across the theater. JN has close operational ties with other Salafist-jihadist groups such as Ahrar al-Sham (HASI), although many other
opposition groups also cooperate with Jabhat al-Nusra in battle without necessarily being aligned with JN. This includes an array of groups ranging from members of
the Islamic Front to groups falling under the umbrella of the moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA).8
Jabhat al-Nusras fighting prowess keeps it central to opposition efforts in the southern Deraa and Quneitra fronts as well as the Hama and Idlib fronts. It is also
influential in the fight for Damascus. Jabhat al-Nusra is quietly cultivating influence within rebel governance and shaping the opposition where it can, although it
appears that most opposition groups are cooperating with JN opportunistically rather than ideologically.
Assads atrocities and the humanitarian crisis they have caused favor Jabhat al-Nusra and harm the prospects for forming an inclusive and stable government. The death
toll as of April 2014 approached 200,000 according to the United Nations.9 The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that more than 3

million Syrian refugees have left the country, with another 6.4 million internally displaced.10 This massive population
movement has likely destroyed traditional social structures in many parts of Syria, creating conditions propitious for
radicals to recruit and terrorize.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 80

Con- Syrian Opposition- Iran Fill In


Prioritizing the war on terror and ISIL over the Syrian political struggle allows Iran to fill in.
Middle East Research Institute; 12/23/14 (Special Dispatch No. 5912; Syrian Oppositionist Harshly Criticizes U.S.: It
Weakened The Moderate Opposition, Strengthened The Extremists; http://www.memri.org/report/en/print8345.htm)

The Arabs Must Give Priority To The Syrian Cause Over The Struggle Against Terror
Later in the interview Michel Kilo referred to the positions taken by the Arab States, and particularly the Gulf states, on
the crisis in Syria. He said that they "now increasingly realize that the Syrian people are protecting them from Iran and
defending them from [Iran's] escapades, recklessness, insanity and cupidity. [They also realize] that now, especially since
the start of the war on terror, they must stick [to a policy] that extends priority to the political struggle in everything
pertaining to the Syrian cause because prioritizing the war against terror while neglecting the Syrian cause will admit
Iran into their countries on a silver platter"

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 81

Con- Syrian Opposition- Iraq


Focus on Iraq complicates Syrian opposition.
Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute;
November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)
24

Likewise, the United States should not emphasize that it is pursuing a policy in which Iraq is the main effort. This
leaves Syrians believing they have been abandoned by the United States and complicates efforts to work with the
opposition there. Rather, the United States should emphasize that it is moving forward simultaneously in both Iraq and
Syria, even if the means at its disposal in each country are very different.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 82

Con- Syrian Opposition- Moderates


The US is weakening moderates- labels opposition terrorists and moderates oppose US ground forces..
Middle East Research Institute; 12/23/14 (Special Dispatch No. 5912; Syrian Oppositionist Harshly Criticizes U.S.: It
Weakened The Moderate Opposition, Strengthened The Extremists; http://www.memri.org/report/en/print8345.htm)

Kilo opens the interview by criticizing the National Coalition and saying that if it continues adopting a policy based on
improvisations and indecision, without recognizing the true situation, forces on the ground and within the coalition will
seek a replacement for it. Asked what he thought about the U.S. vetting the opposition fighters' ideological inclinations
before admitting them into the American-supervised training program, in order to weed out Islamist extremists, he
answered: "The U.S. is not the one that will determine the suitability of Syrian politicians or soldiers. What will determine
this is the role played by the Syrians in the revolution, the sacrifices they have made for its sake, and the duties they have
fulfilled for their peoples sake. The U.S. has played a central role in weakening what it calls the moderate stream within
the Syrian revolution. One time it argues that there are terrorists and extremists, and therefore in cannot provide
ammunition and assistance, while another time it says there are international disputes that affect it and it cannot overcome
them in order to pressure the Arab states to provide the necessary aid. On the other hand, it argues that it cannot enter into
a ground war despite the fact that no one ever asked it to do so, at least we never asked this in order to say that it
cannot involve itself in the conflict. [It says this] although it has effectively intervened in this conflict more than any other
party, and although it is the one that has played the main role in managing the Syrian conflict for four years now The
Americans are a major factor in eliminating the moderate forces in the Syrian revolution, and have played a major role in
weakening them, isolating them, putting them out of action and removing them from the arena. And now they say they
look for moderate forces and cannot find them.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 83

Con- Syrian Opposition- Propaganda


Information activities can politicize Syrian opposition victories and counter ISIS propaganda. Eisenstadt,
Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute; November 2014
(Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict;
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-a-strategy-for-a-resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf)

Information activities also have a key role to play in efforts to build up Americas partners and address Syrian opposition
concerns about U.S. objectives. As the United States conducts airstrikes to degrade ISIS and ramps up efforts to train and
equip the moderate opposition in Syria, it should help the latter under- take a small number of well-planned attacks on
Syrian government military targetssuch as attacks on convoys and antiaircraft ambushesthat should be captured on
video and disseminated via social media. The buzz created by these early symbolic victories, as well as the infusion of
cash and arms funneled to the moderate opposition, will hopefully help recruiting and eventually win defections to these
groups. Only later, once these groups are ready, should they attempt to seize and hold territory or actively take on ISIS.
Here, quality is more important than quantity, and image more important than reality. U.S. policymakers should not
focus exclusively on the numbers of oppositionists who can be trained annually, though numbers do count, but also on
creating the perception that moderate groups are once again key actors in the opposition. This way, these groups may be
able to attract experienced fighters who previously left them for better-resourced opposition formations, enabling them to
further augment their numbers.
Such proof that Washington is helping the armed opposition fight the Assad regime will hopefully assuage Syrian
oppositionists concerned that the United States is only interested in fighting ISIS, and mitigate the public relations
setbacks created by Americas initial airstrikes in Syria against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate. Failing to
19
deal with these issues could doom the U.S. campaign in Syria to failure.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 84

Con- Threat Low


Ground forces are unnecessary since the combination of airstrikes and proxies is already defeating ISIS.
Tritten; 3/3/15 (Travis; Stars and Stripes; CENTCOM chief: Islamic State can be defeated without ground troops; http://www.stripes.com/news/middleeast/centcom-chief-islamic-state-can-be-defeated-without-us-ground-troops-1.332526)

WASHINGTON The general in charge of U.S. forces in the Middle East defended the Obama administrations war
strategy Tuesday, telling House lawmakers that the Islamic State will be defeated without ground U.S. combat troops.
Gen. Lloyd Austin said the Islamic extremist group is already losing the ability to govern and hold territory in Iraq and
Syria following seven months of U.S. and coalition airstrikes, and that eventually it will be pushed out by Iraq and Syrian
proxy forces.
The U.S.-led military coalition in Iraq has killed more than 8,500 Islamic State fighters since its bombing campaign began
in August, he said.
The general testified before the House Armed Services Committee as Congress including many skeptical Republicans
weighs the presidents proposal for a new war authorization that would lay down guidelines for the Islamic State
offensive, including whether American troops will join the fight.
I think we will be able to get this done with the approach we have taken, Austin said. At the end of the day this
needs to be done by the Iraqis.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 85

Con- Threat Low


ISIS lacks the money, mission, and popular appeal to pose a long-term threat, no WMD threat
Eichenwald, author and contributing editor, 8-28-14 (Kurt, Newsweek Global, vol. 163, no. 9,
http://www.newsweek.com/hearts-and-minds-and-isis-267227)
Based on my conversations with intelligence officials and other security experts, saying ISIS is the biggest threat to the
homeland since Al-Qaeda circa 2001 is like saying Charles Manson was the biggest threat to the country since Nazi
Germany. Sure, both could inflict damage, even ugly, barbaric, horrific damage. But the potential harm is comparable
only ifthrough hysteria and political tribalismwe let it be.
The reason comes down to the different missions, philosophies, goals and capabilities of the two groups. Start with AlQaeda just before 9/11. It had a strong, established leadership under Osama bin Laden, including military, operations and
financial committees. The group was organized primarily around one major goaldriving the United States out of Saudi
Arabia, in part by luring America into a ground war with jihadists. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon accomplished that goal, but contrary to bin Laden's expectations, Al-Qaeda fighters did not rout the Americans.
It had years of successful attacks overseas (as well as a number of bungled ones). It maintained significant support
throughout the Arab world, something the CIA once measured by the fact that "Osama" became one of the most popular
names in the Middle East for baby boys. It maintained bank accounts around the world as part of an extremely
sophisticated financial network.
Compare that with ISIS. Its leadership is muddledthe group is led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, but unlike Al-Qaeda, its
structure below the top leadership is ad hoc. Its goals are so expansive as to border on the absurd: It hopes to sow civil
unrest in Syria and Iraq with the intent of establishing a single, transnational state based on Islamic law. Even in the midst
of wars in those two countries, al-Baghdadi has called for ISIS to march on Rome and Spain. As far as the United States
goes, its primary interest is to keep America out of a Middle East conflict, which is what the beheading of Foley was all
about. And outside of war zones, it has completed no successful terror attacks against the West.
Unlike Al-Qaeda, ISIS is deeply unpopular with large swaths of the Muslim world, including jihadists: It is roundly
opposed by the Shiites it attacks ruthlessly, and its brutality with even other Sunnis has undermined support among them.
In Syria, jihadist groups combined as the Mujahedeen Army with the goal of driving ISIS out of the country. AlBaghdadi's proclaimed merger with Jabhat al-Nusra, an Al-Qaeda affiliate that has legitimacy among Syrians, was
annulled by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the successor to bin Laden as head of Al-Qaeda. When ISIS declared a caliphate with alBaghdadi as the leader, Jabhat al-Nusra secretly approached Zawahiri's aides to urge him to publicly oppose it.
ISIS has money, but, unlike Al-Qaeda, its financial system is crude and vulnerable. As they do for most jihadist groups,
wealthy Sunnisprimarily from Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabiapony up cash. Prior to America's withdrawal from Iraq,
Shiites in Iran crossed tribal boundaries to provide ISIS with money in hopes of creating trouble for the U.S. military, but
that dried up as soon as the group started slaughtering Shiites. The bulk of its money comes from criminal enterprises
such as smuggling and blackmail. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, ISIS obtains as much as $8 million a
month by extorting businesses in the Iraqi city of Mosul. But there is no large network of financial groups disguised as
charities, nor any of the other advanced techniques used by Al-Qaeda to finance its operations. Given all the battles it is
waging, ISIS is more of a hand-to-mouth organization.
Sometimes, even the scariest-sounding successes of ISIS are nothing much. In June, ISIS reportedly seized nuclear
material used at the University of Mosul in Iraq and entered the al-Muthanna site located about 60 miles outside of
Baghdad, where remnants of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons program were stored. This might
have been cause for concern if Al-Qaeda had done it, given its other capabilities. But, in light of the limited resources
of ISIS, the danger that this nuclear material would be used in a dirty bomb, for example, is near zero: Since it is
unprocessed, detonating it would be akin to blowing up a box filled with dinner plates. And as for those chemical
remnants? Ancient stuff, dating back to before 1991, and probably useless.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 86

Con- Threat Low- Burnout


ISIS is already suffering message fatigue; they will slowly lose legitimacy
Wood, lecturer of political science at Yale Univ., March 2015 (Graeme, Atlantic, vol. 315, no. 2, p. 90)
Properly contained, the Islamic State is likely to be its own undoing. No country is its ally, and its ideology
ensures that this will remain the case. The land it controls, while expansive, is mostly uninhabited and poor. As
it stagnates or slowly shrinks, its claim that it is the engine of Gods will and the agent of apocalypse will
weaken, and fewer believers will arrive. And as more reports of misery within it leak out, radical Islamist
movements elsewhere will be discredited: No one has tried harder to implement strict Sharia by violence. This
is what it looks like.
ISIS momentum fading now due to demands of governance
von Drehle, journalist and Time editor-at-large, 3-9-15 (David, Time, vol. 185, no. 8, p. 29)
Perhaps the best way to think about the ISIS threat is to weigh the power to control vs. the power to inspire.
Where the group has control, it is nothing less than a nightmare. Unlike most terrorist organizations, it has
sophisticated weapons, captured from arsenals well stocked by the departing Americans. It has many sources of
revenue, including a special taxthe jizyalevied on Christians in its territory who hope to be left alone by
this new government. ISIS kidnaps for ransom, plunders antiquities and smuggles commodities to market.
But unlike other terrorist organizations, ISIS also has large bills to pay. Much of its money must be plowed into
local patronage, experts explain, to shore up support and fulfill Quranic obligations. Now that they have
declared a caliphate, said Choudary, that means they are providing food and shelter and facilities like
education to the Sunni faithful in the ISIS domain. Like other Middle East conquerors before it, ISIS may
discover that governing territory is harder than winning it.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 87

Con- Threat Low- Interests


Defeating ISIS is insignificant in the greater scope of regional interests; other groups will take its place
Becker, department chair at National Intelligence Univ., 12-12-14 (Joseph, Small Wars Journal,
http://anasoft.base.pk/(isis)%20obama%20strategy%20for%20defeating%20isis%20is%20the%20(joseph%20becker)%20
small%20wars%20journal.pdf, p. 3)

A military defeat of ISIL would also fail to destroy the international appeal of the Islamist ideology which the
organization espouses. Ending the self-proclaimed Caliphate of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi would certainly sever
a prominent head from the hydra of militant political Islam, and it might help deny extremists a particular safe
haven from which to operate. But just as Osama Bin-Ladens demise failed to defeat the pan-Islamist dream, so
would this effort likely fall short. Religion can serve as a powerful mobilizing agent for many of the world
populations disillusioned by the forces of globalization and Westernization. The defeat of ISIL would only be
one step in the larger campaign against the terrorism promoted by Islamic radicals.
Perhaps most important in terms of shortcomings, a decisive defeat of ISIL in strictly military terms would fail to
address the regional dynamics which have allowed this organization to flourish in its current context. ISIL does
not exist in a vacuum. This is not simply an Iraqi or even a Syrian insurgency. The Syrian civil war has played
out largely as a proxy conflict among competing power bases in the greater Middle East region, and this contest
has spilled over into Iraqi soil. The spider web of competing and converging interests defies borders and makes a
mockery of any attempt at oversimplification. In the words of the Saudi Interior Minister, Prince Muhammad Bin
Naif, We know that ISIS [ISIL] was not randomly formed but rather sponsored by states and organizations that
employ all their resources and ill intentions in backing ISIS [ISIL].
As demonstrated by the cases of Saudi Arabia with Al Qaeda and Pakistan with the Taliban, governments are not
monolithic and may choose to fight against a group such as ISIL with one hand while supporting it with the
other. Turkeys reluctance to cooperate in efforts against ISIL serves as a stark demonstration of the different
calculus employed by regional actors. Turkish buyers have provided a market for oil smuggled out of ISILcontrolled territories.[9] The Turkish government clearly sees Assad as a greater threat than ISIL, and many
suspect that its early-October agreement to join the coalition against ISIL largely reflected an ulterior motive of
suppressing Kurdish separatism.[10] If regional interests are not adequately addressed, then even erstwhile allies
are likely to undermine any military solution in the long run . This could mean preserving and enabling the
defeated rump of ISIL in Syria. It could also mean the fostering of new manifestations of this movement which
might prove even more destabilizing in the future.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 88

Con- Threat Low- Isolated


ISIS has not spread across the Muslim world and is not a threat to the West
von Drehle, journalist and Time editor-at-large, 3-9-15 (David, Time, vol. 185, no. 8, p. 29)
The ability of ISIS to inspire violence beyond its sphere of control rests with its propaganda arm, though its not
clear whether ISIS is lighting fires or simply blowing smoke. ISIS is adept at gaming Twitter by using bots and
cascading retweets to project an impression of overwhelming support. And many of the terrorist cells now flying
the black flag in scattered countries are pre-existing groups that have changed their brands, according to one
senior U.S. Administration official. Most of these groups are pretty insular, the official said. Below that flag,
its all about themselves. Theyve got their own agenda, theyve got their own objectives, and often those
objectives are completely localtheyre tribal, theyre ethnic, theyre religious. So far, ISIS has shown scant
ability to direct the actions of its associates even in nearby countries. As for taking jihad to the West attacking
Rome, as ISIS puts it in its antimodern idiomthats mostly talk. In contrast with al-Qaeda, ISIS has not
directed a single successful plot in the West, although analysts say they cant rule one out.
The threat to the homeland resembles what we have seen in Ottawa and Australia and Paris, says Rhodes, the
White House adviser, referring to recent terrorist attacks. That is, individuals who are either radicalized of their
own volition taking up arms to commit those types of acts, or individuals who may have traveled to Iraq and
Syria returning to create those kinds of attacks. People with guns or IEDshomemade bombscarrying out
those kinds of attacks. Its different than 9/11.
Muslim world is aligned against ISIS
von Drehle, journalist and Time editor-at-large, 3-9-15 (David, Time, vol. 185, no. 8, p. 30)
Though deeply skeptical about another war in the Middle East, Obama came away from a recent meeting at the
U.N. more hopeful than before that something can be done. He met with the Shiite Iraqi Prime Minister alAbadi and representatives from the Sunni leadership of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan,
Bahrain and Qatar. For all the differences there have been in the region, everybody essentially agreed , Rhodes
says. For the first time there was a regional alignment that understood that even if there were differences . . .
everybody could essentially agree that this was a group that had crossed into a different area . Thats when I think
we had sensed that the regional balance had shifted to the point where this was the one thing everyone in the
region could agree on.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 89

Con- Threat Low- Isolated


ISIS is focused on local legitimacy; does not target the West
Wood, lecturer of political science at Yale Univ., March 2015 (Graeme, Atlantic, vol. 315, no. 2, p. 90)
The humanitarian cost of the Islamic States existence is high. But its threat to the United States is smaller than
its all too frequent conflation with al-Qaeda would suggest. Al-Qaedas core is rare among jihadist groups for
its focus on the far enemy (the West); most jihadist groups main concerns lie closer to home. Thats
especially true of the Islamic State, precisely because of its ideology. It sees enemies everywhere around it, and
while its leadership wishes ill on the United States, the application of Sharia in the caliphate and the expansion
to contiguous lands are paramount. Baghdadi has said as much directly: in November he told his Saudi agents to
deal with the rafida [Shia] first then al-Sulul [Sunni supporters of the Saudi monarchy] before the
crusaders and their bases.
The foreign fighters (and their wives and children) have been traveling to the caliphate on one-way tickets: they
want to live under true Sharia, and many want martyrdom. Doctrine, recall, requires believers to reside in the
caliphate if it is at all possible for them to do so. One of the Islamic States less bloody videos shows a group of
jihadists burning their French, British, and Australian passports. This would be an eccentric act for someone
intending to return to blow himself up in line at the Louvre or to hold another chocolate shop hostage in Sydney.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 90

Con- Threat Low- Momentum


ISIS has already lost the momentum and has lost its aura of invincibility
Cordall, free-lance journalist, 12/2/14 (Simon, Newsweek Global, vol. 163, no. 23,
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/12/12/how-isis-governs-its-caliphate-288517.html)

This is not to claim that ISIS enjoys universal popularity. Abu Ibrahim Raqqawi, founder of a network of
activists called Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, has spoken about a haves and have-nots culture, where
members of ISIS enjoy a relatively high standard of living and the rest of the community is left struggling.
"The city is suffering from poverty and disease. A big problem is that all the prices inside the city have become
very expensive, especially after the coalition airstrikes. There is no electricity. Everyone is dependent totally on
the generators,'' Raqqawi told British newspaper The Observer.
In many regions, not least the more liberal or Western-looking pockets of Iraq and Syria, such as
Aleppo, ISIS's ruthless actions have earned it hatred. However, in those areas where it has established some
degree of governance, that, at least, has been welcomed.
Over the past few weeks, however, ISIS's hegemony has started to show signs of shifting, with some observers
pointing to the first indications of a stall in the jihadist blitzkrieg. In Kobane, Syria, the focal point of the
present conflict, the ISIS tide is, if not turned, then possibly stilled, which may be a critical blow to the group's
mythic appeal. Much of ISIS's attraction in terms of recruitment rests upon the group's reputation for
indomitability, and if, after unleashing its full fury upon the small border town, it remains unsuccessful, the
damage could prove lasting.
Recently, a highly respected strategic security intelligence organization, the Soufan Group, pointed
to ISIS's mired efforts to take Anbar, a key strategic point to the west of Baghdad, commenting that, while the
group was unlikely to collapse overnight, "its aura of invincibility has been thoroughly pierced."

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 91

Con- Threat Low- Regional Stability


ISIS exists in a unique political vacuum; no chance of destabilizing the region
Alexander, coordinator of the Cambridge Digital Humanities Network, 1-5-15 (Anne, International
Socialism, no. 145, http://www.isj.org.uk/www.isj.org.uk/index0d04.html?id=1037&issue=145)

The catastrophic defeat of reformist Islamist movements on a regional scale has intersected with the specific
dynamics of Iraqi society, projecting ISIS to a wider audience, and allowing it to vie with Al Qaedas historic
leadership for the allegiance of those looking for successful, powerful organisations that appear to be able to
challenge imperialism and dictatorship. ISIS is also attractive in the context of that defeat because it offers false
explanations and constructs new narratives of victimhood, providing other targets for their rage and
disappointment: Shias, Christians, immodest women. Other dynamics of frustration and alienation are most
likely at work on ISISs recruits from Europe: anger at rising levels of racism and Islamophobia in the context
of endless imperial interventions in the Middle East.
This does not mean, however, that we can expect to see ISIS-type spectacles across the Middle East. As this
article has outlined, the specific dynamics of Iraq since 2003 have interacted with the defeat of the Syrian
Revolution to produce a zone of intense competition between regional powers, and new political and military
actors, such as ISIS itself, in the Jazeera region, that lies between Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Kurdistan, and its
hinterland. These conditions are not present across most of the region, and more importantly, much of the rest of
the region has a far richer experience of the kinds of struggle from below that are the real alternative to ISIS .

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 92

Con- Threat Low- Sunni Legitimacy


Sunnis may already burn out of ISIS violence with political concessions in Baghdad
von Drehle, journalist and Time editor-at-large, 3-9-15 (David, Time, vol. 185, no. 8, p. 29)
This reading of Islams founding text is far from the mainstream. But if al-Baghdadis orgy of bloodshed repels
Muslims by the millions, it has also attracted a few thousand Western Muslims to Syria and Iraq to defend the
caliphate. The question is whether extreme violence is costing ISIS momentum, says Fawaz Gerges, the
Emirates chair in contemporary Middle East studies at the London School of Economics. ISIS has won support
by capturing territories from the Iraqi and Syrian governments, showing by its deeds and actionsnot just
rhetoricthat it is able to help the Sunni communities defend themselves, he says.
What we are seeing now is more and more Sunnis taking a second look at ISIS and wondering, Whats going
on here? We have many reports now that there are summary executions, that theyre burning Iraqis, theyre
terrorizing the population . Refugees from the territory held by ISIS describe town squares decorated with
severed heads and military conscription for children. The Sunnis may once again turn against al-Baghdadi to
become a liability that could really implode ISIS from within , Gerges says.
Thats the hope of U.S. military and foreign policy planners, who helped to pressure al-Maliki from office in
favor of a more conciliatory Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi. The new administration in Iraq hopes to woo
minority Sunnis with a share of the countrys oil riches and a promise to authorize local units of the national
guarda counterweight to the Shiite militias backed by neighboring Iran.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 93

Con- Threat Low- AT: Cyberattack


ISIS lacks capabilities and motivation to cyberattack the U.S.
Frizell, staff writer, 9/22/14 (Sam, Time.com, http://time.com/3403769/isis-cyberattack/)
But do we really need to fear a cyber attack from ISIS? As it turns out, probably not: ISIS's social media savvy
doesn't necessarily translate into a real cybersecurity threat against the United States, and much of the talk about
the group's growing cyber-prowess overstates the point, experts told TIME.
"I don't think anyone has any proof that there's an imminent attack or that ISIS has acquired the manpower or
the resources to launch an attack on the infrastructure of the United States," said Craig Guiliano, senior threat
specialist at security firm TSC Advantage and a former counterterrorism officer with the Department of
Defense. "It could be a potential threat in the future, but we're not there yet."
ISIS, a group with little technological infrastructure, doesn't have many resources to wage a cyberwar against
the United States. Compared to larger, state-sponsored hacking operations, ISIS is miles behind. Chinese
hackers, for instance, who have been accused of attacking U.S. businesses and government contractors, are
reported to have wide-ranging support from Chinese authorities, with many of the hackers hailing directly from
the Chinese army.
A few ISIS-related figures have been connected with cyberattacks or cybercrime. Abu Hussain Al Britani, a
British hacker who has since moved to Syria and begun recruiting for ISIS, was jailed in 2012 for hacking into
former Prime Minister Tony Blair's Gmail account. One of the more prominent tech-savvy ISIS supporters, Al
Britani maintains a Twitter account that calls for new ISIS recruits.
You can sit at home and play call of duty or you can come here and respond to the real call of duty the choice
is yours
-- AbuHussainAlBritani (@AbuHussain102) July 24, 2014
And a group called "Lizard Squad" that has claimed responsibility for high-profile cyberattacks that have
brought down the websites of the Vatican, Sony and others has tenuously been linked to ISIS on the basis of
tweets like this one:
Today we planted the ISIS flag on @Sony's servers #ISIS #jihad pic.twitter.com/zvqXb2f5XI
-- Lizard Squad (@LizardSquad) August 24, 2014
But ISIS doesn't appear to have the manpower to launch sophisticated attacks against the United States . "You
need some resources. You need access to certain kinds of technology. You need to have hardcore
programmers," Jim Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said. "ISIS doesn't have those
capabilities."
Unlike China's state-sponsored hackers, who have a strong interest in attacking U.S. businesses to hawk trade
secrets and intellectual property, ISIS is more concerned with taking real-world territory and controlling it. ISIS'
first priority is establishing control over the disparate desert regions from the outskirts of Aleppo in Syria to
Falluja in Iraq and creating an Islamic caliphate--not an expensive and often intangible cyberwar against
American websites.
"ISIS wants to conquer the Middle East, not hack websites in Omaha," said Lewis

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 94

Con- AT: Terrorism


Calling ISIL terrorists is wrong because it only highlight one side of the organization.
Khatib, Director of the Middle East Center Carnegie Middle East Center; 3/4/15 (Lina; Al-Hayat; The human
dimension of life under the Islamic State; http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=59246)

But this characterization of ISIS as terrorist is problematic because it only highlights one dimension of the organization.
A key attraction for people who have pledged allegiance to ISIS or have at least thought they found in it a better
alternative to the regime and the opposition is its presentation of itself as the deliverer of justice. Despite its brutality,
ISIS imposed a sense of order in areas under its control that appealed to those who had been living either in the chaos of
war or under the authoritarianism of a regime that was unpredictable in the way it handled citizens property. In the
heyday of Assad rule, if someones car was stolen, they may or may not have gotten it back depending on whether the
thief had connections with the regime, and on whether the victim of the crime was well connected or not.
Under the rule of the Islamic State, if the same problem were encountered, people could rely on the ISIS sharia courts to
secure their property rights without the need for wasta (personal connections). No matter that ISIS suppresses peoples
freedom of speech and that its courts are far from equitable on most matters, the organization has used property rights to
build up a reputation of fairness. In doing so, it has capitalized on how both war and authoritarianism reduce peoples
concerns from high-level values like freedom and democracy to basic needs, so that justice comes to be associated with
material goods not with human dignity.
ISIS also took advantage of economic destitution to lure people to its ranks. By way of example, in southern Turkey, the
Danish Refugee Council offers around $50 per month to each Syrian refugee who is assessed to be in need. In
comparison, the Islamic State offers Syrian fighters monthly salaries of at least $300 in addition to $50 per child and other
allowances for wives and housingmore than what any other group, including the regime, the FSA, and Jabhat al-Nusra
offer their members. For those whose livelihoods were destroyed by the war, the promise of significant economic
support can cause them to lock their values away in order to feed their children.

ISIS gives no unique inspiration to global terrorism; they actually make tracking jihadists easier
Becker, department chair at National Intelligence Univ., 12-12-14 (Joseph, Small Wars Journal,
http://anasoft.base.pk/(isis)%20obama%20strategy%20for%20defeating%20isis%20is%20the%20(joseph%20becker)%20
small%20wars%20journal.pdf, p. 7)
But what of the danger that ISIL poses to the U.S. and its interests? ISIL certainly presents a terrorist threat, but are we
actually seeing anything new? ISILs current situation in Iraq and Syria looks similar in many ways to the symbioses of
Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan prior to the attacks of 9-11 which spurred the Global War on Terrorism. The
U.S. military, in particular, is often criticized for its uncanny ability to focus on the last war at the expense of preparing
for the next. In this case, however, ISIL is playing to U.S. strengths gained during previous conflicts. The terrorist threat
posed by Islamic radicals is real, and it is dangerous, but the Western world is more prepared than ever to face this
scenario. Just like Al Qaeda in Afghanistan or previously in Iraq, ISIL is drawing radicalized Westerners to the jihad.
Compared with the past, Western nations have a far greater capability to monitor international travel, especially that of
their own citizens. Many of these individuals are doing society a favor by marking themselves to security services around
the world. The greatest terrorist threat comes not from the warzone, but from individuals who act alone, out of the watch
of security services, motivated by radical ideology. Extremist ideologies of one bent or another have existed throughout
human history. ISIL is not the first organization to advocate an extreme form of political Islam. Unfortunately, they will
probably not be the last.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 95

Con- AT: Terrorism


Counterterrorism fails against ISIS because their funding is too diversified
Cronin, Director of the International Security Program at George Mason Univ., March 2015 (Audrey
Kirth, Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 2, p. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143043/audrey-kurth-cronin/isis-is-not-aterrorist-group)
ISIS also poses a daunting challenge to traditional U.S. counterterrorism tactics that take aim at jihadist financing,
propaganda, and recruitment. Cutting off al Qaeda's funding has been one of U.S. counterterrorism's most impressive
success stories. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the FBI and the CIA began to coordinate closely on financial intelligence, and
they were soon joined by the Department of Defense. FBI agents embedded with U.S. military units during the 2003
invasion of Iraq and debriefed suspected terrorists detained at the U.S. facility at Guantnamo Bay, Cuba. In 2004, the
U.S. Treasury Department established the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, which has cut deeply into al
Qaeda's ability to profit from money laundering and receive funds under the cover of charitable giving. A global network
for countering terrorist financing has also emerged, backed by the UN, the EU, and hundreds of cooperating governments.
The result has been a serious squeeze on al Qaeda's financing; by 2011, the Treasury Department reported that al Qaeda
was struggling to secure steady financing to plan and execute terrorist attacks.
But such tools contribute little to the fight against ISIS, because ISIS does not need outside funding. Holding territory has
allowed the group to build a self-sustaining financial model unthinkable for most terrorist groups. Beginning in 2012,
ISIS gradually took over key oil assets in eastern Syria; it now controls an estimated 60 percent of the country's oil
production capacity. Meanwhile, during its push into Iraq last summer, ISIS also seized seven oil-producing operations in
that country. The group manages to sell some of this oil on the black market in Iraq and Syriaincluding, according to
some reports, to the Assad regime itself. ISIS also smuggles oil out of Iraq and Syria into Jordan and Turkey, where it
finds plenty of buyers happy to pay below-market prices for illicit crude. All told, ISIS revenue from oil is estimated to
be between $1 million and $3 million per day.
And oil is only one element in the group's financial portfolio. Last June, when ISIS seized control of the northern Iraqi
city of Mosul, it looted the provincial central bank and other smaller banks and plundered antiquities to sell on the black
market. It steals jewelry, cars, machinery, and livestock from conquered residents. The group also controls major
transportation arteries in western Iraq, allowing it to tax the movement of goods and charge tolls. It even earns revenue
from cotton and wheat grown in Raqqa, the breadbasket of Syria.
Of course, like terrorist groups, ISIS also takes hostages, demanding tens of millions of dollars in ransom payments. But
more important to the group's finances is a wide-ranging extortion racket that targets owners and producers in ISIS
territory, taxing everything from small family farms to large enterprises such as cell-phone service providers, water
delivery companies, and electric utilities. The enterprise is so complex that the U.S. Treasury has declined to
estimate ISIS total assets and revenues, but ISIS is clearly a highly diversified enterprise whose wealth dwarfs that of any
terrorist organization. And there is little evidence that Washington has succeeded in reducing the group's coffers.

April 2015: ISIL


Topic Primer
Page 96

Con- AT: Terrorism


Counterterror approaches that worked against Al-Qaeda will not defeat ISIS.
Cronin, Distinguished Prof & Director International Security Program @ George Mason Univ;
March/April 2015 (Audrey Kurth; Foreign Affairs; ISIS is not a terrorist group;
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143043/audrey-kurth-cronin/isis-is-not-a-terrorist-group)

Now, however, a different group, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which also calls itself the Islamic State,
has supplanted al Qaeda as the jihadist threat of greatest concern. ISIS ideology, rhetoric, and long-term goals are similar
to al Qaedas, and the two groups were once formally allied. So many observers assume that the current challenge is
simply to refocus Washingtons now-formidable counterterrorism apparatus on a new target.
But ISIS is not al Qaeda. It is not an outgrowth or a part of the older radical Islamist organization, nor does it represent the
next phase in its evolution. Although al Qaeda remains dangerousespecially its affiliates in North Africa and Yemen
ISIS is its successor. ISIS represents the postal Qaeda jihadist threat.

ISIS is a pseudo state so counterterrorism and counter insurgency wont work.


Cronin, Distinguished Prof & Director International Security Program @ George Mason Univ;
March/April 2015 (Audrey Kurth; Foreign Affairs; ISIS is not a terrorist group;
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143043/audrey-kurth-cronin/isis-is-not-a-terrorist-group)

In a nationally televised speech last September explaining his plan to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS, U.S.
President Barack Obama drew a straight line between the group and al Qaeda and claimed that ISIS is a terrorist
organization, pure and simple. This was mistaken; ISIS hardly fits that description, and indeed, although it uses terrorism
as a tactic, it is not really a terrorist organization at all. Terrorist networks, such as al Qaeda, generally have only dozens
or hundreds of members, attack civilians, do not hold territory, and cannot directly confront military forces. ISIS, on the
other hand, boasts some 30,000 fighters, holds territory in both Iraq and Syria, maintains extensive military capabilities,
controls lines of communication, commands infrastructure, funds itself, and engages in sophisticated military operations.
If ISIS is purely and simply anything, it is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army. And that is why the
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies that greatly diminished the threat from al Qaeda will not work against
ISIS.

Вам также может понравиться