CANON 6

[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

(PCGG), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division),
LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T.
SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN
HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO
TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG
CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL
KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO,
CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM,
BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING
CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION,
ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP.,
FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.,
GRANDSPAN
DEVELOPMENT
CORP.,
HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES
AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT
CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT,
PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC.,
SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance

for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics
of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right
of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)

encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable
financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to
incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central
Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had
approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related
interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful
and P0.505 million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank
extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total
of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover
from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a
resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public,
and ordering its liquidation.[4] Apublic bidding of GENBANKs
assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan
group submitted the winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of
First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court
in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act
No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos
government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was
to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the
PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for reversion,
reconveyance,
restitution,
accounting
and
damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan,
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee,
Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N.
Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano
Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso
Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy
Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and
Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,
Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan
Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development
Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp.,
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp.,
Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as

respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.

Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.[6]In connection therewith, the
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their
close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs
of sequestration issued by the PCGG.[7] After the filing of the parties
comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for
proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented
by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has
then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General[10] and counsel to Central
Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in
the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his
capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks
officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and
appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition
for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule
6.03 prohibits
former
government
lawyers from
accepting
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.
On April
22,
1991 the
Second
Division
of
the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGGs motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.[11] It found that
the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his
present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that

respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on

behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.[12] It
further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period
under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be
Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former
public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from
his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.[13] The PCGG
did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its
resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza.[16] It adopted the resolution of its Second
Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were
the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No.
0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was
denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the
resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition forcertiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18] The
PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from
accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that
Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendozas
appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case
No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of
law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the
government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive
issue.
I

Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition
states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace
the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for
lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The
early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of
conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but
surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of
the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It
underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as
superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation
duties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an
obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and
service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately
had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early postrevolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in England.
The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight,
and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from
England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation.
The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early
America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a
single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had
the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was
sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the
traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the
formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the
duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.[20]

The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal
ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers
were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of
the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of
uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of
eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of
the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as
David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were
working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These
reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus
brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of
mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code,
governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the
do no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some
states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an
attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized
basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property.
Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorneyclient privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of
the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had
some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early postrevolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide
a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by
contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's
duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.[21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical
standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association
code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards
formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary
sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the
academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the
statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic
lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the
official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar
association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them
as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes
was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar
associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they
disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth
century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their
colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations,

most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar
Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of
conduct for their members.[22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar
association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the
model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the
American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.[23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a
lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to
which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar
Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.[24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form
and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the revolving
door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter
government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in
private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and
influence garnered in government service.[25] These concerns were
classified as adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest
conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the matter in
which the former government lawyer represents a client in private
practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with
while employed by the government and the interests of the current and
former are adverse.[26] On the other hand, congruent-interest
representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply
primarily to former government lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABA
attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons,
individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA
amended one canon and added thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with
problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted
which disqualified them both for adverse-interest conflicts and
congruent-interest representation conflicts.[29] The rationale for
disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyers
largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to
take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the
advantage of parties who might later become private practice
clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36.

Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the
merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public
employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection
with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the
canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own
Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing
consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In
1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a
committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA
Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed
substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to
distinguish between the inspirational and the proscriptive and were
thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United
States likewise observed thatCanon 36 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers
for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the
government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the
1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic
ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were
supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of
conduct to which the lawyer must adhere.[34] In the case of Canon 9, DR
9-101(b)[35] became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting
committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates
approved the Model Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied
with the results and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in
August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement format, where
the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following
each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and

clarity for enforcement because the only enforceable standards were

the black letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons
altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by
placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the
content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of
substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of
interests.[37] In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the
hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the
subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite
nature.[38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions,
and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21,
1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the
general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phraseinvestigated
and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore,
properly
applicable
to
both adverse-interest
conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect
of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse
interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No.
0005
and
Civil
Case
Nos.
0096-0099
before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of
whether there exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to
disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et
al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the

meaning of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and
bounds of the intervention made by the former government lawyer
on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion
342, defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as
identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and
specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the
subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the
Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent
Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a
Solicitor General, viz:[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated
July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty.
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of
GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said
banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of
Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977
prepared by certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior
Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then
Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special
Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor
Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28,
1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who
advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The
pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General
and he advised that the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board

reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since the last
examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that
the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it
may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors
and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order
the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation
and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of
Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the
liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First
Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken and praying
the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the
Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies
of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with
the court the petition for assistance in the banks liquidation. The pertinent
portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E.

To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General

with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29,
1977, together with copies of:
1.

Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and

Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March
25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of
Genbank;

2.

Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank

and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3.

Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial

and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24,
1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265,
as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4.

Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by

the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent

Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is advising the
Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and
even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In fine,
the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank
on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is
given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon
examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or examining
department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it
shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or
that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its
depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head
concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the
facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the
department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the
Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a
person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to
immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as
possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the
benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these
purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing
mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions.
...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said
period that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with
safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the
public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by
the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance
reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the
assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court
shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed
claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the
stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such
institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the
Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or
finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver
previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The
liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the
banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose
of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the
debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or nonbank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions,
institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to
collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and the second
paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and
can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the
action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order
or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank
from implementing its actions under this Section and the second
paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof
that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in
bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of
the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the
Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining
order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved
upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of

cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount

of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the
damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or
the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New
Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution
of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the
inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual
and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not
include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or nonbank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused
by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly
evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial
community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act
or the appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested
exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general
or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos.
72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot
disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that
the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter
per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of
respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is entirely different from the matter involved in Civil Case
No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that
respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate

in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got

himself
involved was
in
informing
Central
Bank
on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts
and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then
Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812,
therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the
subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096
involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are illgotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor
does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the
shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of
GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among
others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and
officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is
not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes
without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter
involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of
the intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03. Intervene means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . .
2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in
or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur
or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an
intervening river . . .)[41]
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2:
interference that may affect the interests of others.[42]
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word
intervene. Under the first interpretation, intervene includes
participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has
no effect or little influence.[43] Under the second interpretation,

intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to

influence the subject proceedings.[44] We hold that this second meaning
is more appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils
sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government
lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x
x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and
insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former government
lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the broad
sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed upon
resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The
1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition
extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government
service, had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules
further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a
lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in
which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a
public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza
in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial. We
disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent
Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record
is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the
subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a
long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early
termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the
Central Bank in determiningclaims of creditors against the
GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but
as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the
Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the
interest of government.

II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility
represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the
ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a
take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been
without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is
still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy
considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the
case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other
values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause
a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At
present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation
offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be
able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the
only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them
defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can
later be exchanged for higher income in private practice.[45] Rightly,
Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government
service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules
prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty
which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which
they become associated to be disqualified.[46] Indeed, to make
government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing
to enter.[47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use
as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive
his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will
be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere
guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted
the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay
proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and
harass and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was
so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent
judicial and academic commentary.[48] Even the United States Supreme
Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of

disqualification motions as a dangerous game.[49] In the case at bar,

the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to
divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been
a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and
only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of
respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification
in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court
which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the
circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar
were refiled put petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not
unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by
its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification
motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but
probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.[51] The
client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit
of the work done by the latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the right
to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in
denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a
truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of
lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: An
individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private
employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error,
and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this
assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom.[53] He
adds: Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the
ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence.[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor
General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot
be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be
endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this
independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal
of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse
to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue
dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a
corrosive effect on the rule of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the

former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his
profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a
former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law
firm.[55] Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming
the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible
appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in
government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public
perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best[56] which can lead to
untoward results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the
lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have
any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the
government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to
protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct[59] and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification
based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and
demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the
witnesses in the case, and the public.[60]
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its
strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is
claimed that switching sides carries the danger that former
government employee may compromise confidential official
information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in
the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in
informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate
GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case
No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure,
there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at
bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et
al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central
Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the
action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to
Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this
reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents

Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are

involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is
intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government
employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.[61] The example given by the proponents of this
argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or
she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute
less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar
Committee in 1960: The greatest public risks arising from post
employment conduct may well occur during the period of employment
through the dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as probably
excessive.[64] He opines x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm
would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or
her last client the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently
confirm that law firms want the best government lawyers the ones
who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous
advocates.[65] But again, this particular concern is a non factor in
the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that
he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in
later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he
continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents
Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is
perceived as the excessive influence of former officials or their
clout.[66] Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too
far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of what
appears to be an employees influence may actually be the power or
authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon
departure from government x x x.[67] More, he contends that the
concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote
him further: x x x The idea that, present officials make significant
decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about
the present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies
a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem
justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will
tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of
favoritism.[68]

III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others,
that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive
period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively
to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted
by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor
General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this
Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made
after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as
reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of
the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at
that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed
by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated
July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.

EDNA S.V. OGKA BENITO,

Complainant,

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2103

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2664RTJ)

Present:

-v e r s u s-

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,**

CHICO-NAZARIO,
*
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION and
PERALTA, JJ.
RASAD G. BALINDONG,
Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Malabang,
Lanao del Sur, Branch 12,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
February 23, 2009

x---------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

In a complaint dated April 30, 2007, complainant Dr. Edna S.V. Ogka
Benito, then acting mayor of the Municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur,
charged respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12, with gross ignorance of the
law.
Complainant alleged that on May 3, 2005, she filed administrative and
criminal complaints against Mamarinta G. Macabato, then municipal
treasurer of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, for grave misconduct in the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) docketed as OMB-M-A-05-175E. On September 15, 2005, the Ombudsman impleaded then Mayor Hadji
Amer R. Sampiano as co-respondent. Complainant claimed that these

respondents refused to pay her salary as vice mayor since July 1, 2004
despite repeated demands.[1]
On May 16, 2006, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in that case
finding respondents therein guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and imposing on them the penalty of suspension from office
without pay for a period of nine months. It further directed the Regional
Secretary[2] of the Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DILG-ARMM) in Cotabato City
to immediately implement the decision.[3]
In compliance with the decision of the Ombudsman, the Regional
Secretary of the DILG-ARMM issued Department Order (D.O.) No. 200638 dated September 1, 2006 implementing said decision.[4] Due to the
suspension of Mayor Sampiano, complainant was sworn in as acting
mayor.[5]
Meanwhile, on September 4, 2006, respondents in OMB-M-A-05175-E filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition[6] in the RTC of
Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12. The petition was raffled to the sala of
herein respondent and docketed as Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 12181. Their prayer was to annul and set aside D.O. No. 2006-38 of the
DILG-ARMM and prohibit its implementation.[7]
On the same date, respondent issued an order granting a temporary
restraining order (TRO) effective for 72 hours directing the Regional
Secretary of the DILG-ARMM to cease, desist and refrain from
implementing the D.O.[8]

In an order dated September 6, 2006, respondent extended the TRO

for a period of 20 days.[9]
On September 25, 2006, respondent issued another order for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing the Regional Secretary
to cease, desist and refrain from implementing D.O. No. 2006-38.
On October 5, 2006, respondent rendered an order/decision
annulling D.O. No. 2006-38.[10] This decision and the writ of preliminary
injunction were annulled by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its February 8,
2007 decision.[11] The CA held that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
petition filed by the respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E pursuant to
Sections 14 and 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770[12] (Ombudsman Act of
1989) and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman,
as amended by Administrative Order No. 17-03.
Complainant asserted that, despite the clear provisions of the law and
procedure, respondent took cognizance of SCA No. 12-181 and issued the
TROs, writ of preliminary injunction and October 5, 2006 decision. Hence,
she submitted that respondent should be administratively disciplined because
of his gross ignorance of the law which prejudiced the rights of her
constituents in Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. [13]
Respondent countered that he issued the orders in good faith. He was
not moved by corrupt motives or improper considerations. This could be
shown by the fact that complainant filed this complaint only after eight
months from the resolution of SCA No. 12-181. Considering that

complainant failed to establish bad faith or malevolence on his part, the

complaint against him should be dismissed.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its evaluation dated
September 24, 2007, found that the pertinent provisions of the law were
clear. It stated that:
the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction is not
a mere deficiency in prudence, or lapse of judgment by
respondent judge but is a blatant disregard of basic rules
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In the first place,
respondent Judge should have refrained from taking cognizance of
the said special civil action when it was raffled to his court, he
ought to know this, yet he did otherwise.

It recommended that respondent be held administratively liable for gross

ignorance of the law and fined P21,000.[14]
We agree with the findings and evaluation of the OCA but we modify
the penalty.
A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[15] Judges are expected to exhibit
more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural rules.[16] They
must know the law and apply it properly in good faith.[17] They are likewise
expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence.[18] For a judge who is
plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privilege vested
in him. Respondents gross ignorance of the law constituted inexcusable
incompetence which was anathema to the effective dispensation of justice.

In SCA No. 12-181, respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E sought to

annul and set aside D.O. No. 2006-38 of the DILG-ARMM and prohibit its
implementation. Since D.O. No. 2006-38 was issued merely to implement
the decision of the Ombudsman, respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E were
actually questioning this decision and seeking to enjoin its implementation
by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC.
This is not allowed under the law, rules and jurisprudence. Under
Sections 14 and 27 of RA 6770, no court shall hear any appeal or application
for a remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on a pure question of law.
Section 14.
Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall
be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima
facieevidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside
the jurisd7iction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on [a] pure question of law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All

provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration
of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when

supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or

reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary

shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the
Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may
require.

However, in Fabian v. Desierto,[19] we enunciated the rule that

appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the CA. Following our ruling in Fabian, the
Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. 17[20] amending Section 7,
Rule III[21] of Administrative Order No. 07:[22]
Section 7.
Finality and execution of decision.
Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final,
executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may
be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for
review under the requirements and conditions set forth in
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying
the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent
wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other

emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or

removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The
Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be
strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure
by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the
Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or
censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said
officer. (Emphasis supplied)

These provisions clearly show that respondent had no jurisdiction to

take cognizance of the petition and to issue his subsequent orders. He
proceeded against settled doctrine, an act constituting gross ignorance of the
law or procedure.[23]
Respondents defense of good faith has no merit. Indeed, good faith
and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations, are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can
find refuge.[24] However
good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only
within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply
where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles
evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error.[25]

If ordinary people are presumed to know the law,[26] judges are duty-bound
to actually know and understand it. A contrary rule will not only lessen the
faith of the people in the courts but will also defeat the fundamental role of
the judiciary to render justice and promote the rule of law.

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge under

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-810-SC,[27] punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension or a fine
of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[28] Since this is
respondents first offense, we deem it proper to impose upon him a fine
of P30,000.
Members of the bench are enjoined to behave at all times in a way that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.[29] Respondent's act of taking cognizance of a case which was
plainly not within his courts jurisdiction failed to meet the high standards of
judicial conduct.
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[30] this administrative case against
respondent as a judge, based on grounds which are also grounds for
disciplinary action against members of the Bar, shall be considered as
disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.[31]
When respondent entertained SCA No. 12-181, issued a TRO and writ
of preliminary injunction and subsequently granted the petition, he acted
contrary to law, rules and jurisprudence. In doing so, he consented to the
filing of an unlawful suit, in violation of the Lawyers Oath. A judge who
falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the peoples
respect for the law and legal processes.[32] He also fails to observe and
maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers.[33] Thus,
respondent violated Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR):

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws

of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents gross ignorance of the law also runs counter to Canons

5 and 6 of the CPR:
Canon 5. A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,
participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts
to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical
training of law students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.
Canon 6. These Canons shall apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks. (Emphasis
supplied)

Judges should be well-informed of existing laws, recent amendments and

current jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as members of the
bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments.
For such violation of the Lawyers Oath and Canons 1, 5, 6 and 11 of
the CPR, respondent is fined in the amount of P10,000.[34]
WHEREFORE, Rasad G. Balindong, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12 is hereby
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law. He is FINED P30,000.

Respondent is further hereby FINED P10,000 for his violation of the

Lawyers Oath and Canons 1, 5, 6 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
He is STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Let this resolution be attached to the personal files of respondent in
the Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 7
ROSARIO T. MECARAL,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 8392 [ Formerly CBD

Case No. 08-2175]
Present:

- versus -

ATTY. DANILO S.
VELASQUEZ,
Respondent.

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
June 29, 2010

x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee
on Bar Discipline (CBD)[1]with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral
Conduct which she detailed in her Position Paper[2] as follows:

After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his
lover and common-law wife. In October 2007, respondent brought her to the
mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a
religious group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of
which he was the leader. Although he visited her daily, his visits became
scarce in November to December 2007, prompting her to return home to
Naval, Biliran. Furious, respondent brought her back to San Agustin where,
on his instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her with
drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the members of the
group tied her spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and
diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the women
members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received
information that she was weak, pale and walking barefoot along the streets
in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social
Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers
to rescue her. The religious group refused to release her, however, without

the instruction of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1
Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her
mother.
Hence,
the
present
disbarment
complaint
against
respondent. Additionally, complainant charges respondent with bigamy for
contracting a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996, despite
the subsistence of his marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.

In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including

the following: Affidavit[3] of Delia dated February 5, 2008; Affidavit of
PO3 Lee and PO1 Robedillo[4] dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the
Certificate of Marriage[5] between respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy
of the Marriage Contract[6] between respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal;
National Statistics Office Certification[7] dated April 23, 2008 showing the
marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on April 27, 1990 in
Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H. Azur to respondent on August 2,
1996 in Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified machine copy of the
Resolution[8] of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran and
the Information[9] lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval, Biliran,
for Serious Illegal Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on
complaint of herein complainant.
Despite respondents receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order[10] of the
Director for Bar Discipline for him to submit his Answer within 15 days
from receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to properly make [his]
defense in a verified pleading,[11] he did not file any Answer.
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of
which the parties were duly notified, only complainants counsel was
present. Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.

Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his

Report and Recommendation[12] dated September 29, 2008, found that:
[respondents] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting
two marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral which no
civilized society in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention
and torture of the complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast
may be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
xxxx
In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently
imposed severe penalty for grossly immoral conduct of a lawyer like the
case at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose
Manuel Eala, the [Court] ordered the disbarment of the respondent for
maintaining extra-marital relations with a married woman, and having a
child with her. In the instant case, not only did the respondent commit
bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and Leny
Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made his secretary (complainant) his
mistress and subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All these
circumstances showed the moral fiber respondent is made of, which
[leave] the undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment
of Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez.[13] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by

Resolution[14] dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the Investigating
Commissioners findings and APPROVED the recommendation for the
disbarment of respondent.
As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP
Commissioners evaluation and recommendation well taken.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state
upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the

qualifications required by law for the conferment of such

privilege.[15] When a lawyers moral character is assailed, such that his
right to continue

practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the

charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating
body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of
Attorneys.[16]
Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the
hearings before the IBP to rebut the charges brought against him, suggesting
that they are true.[17] Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008 manifesting that
he would come up with his defense in a verified pleading, he never did.
Aside then from the IBPs finding that respondent violated Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he also violated the Lawyers
Oath reading:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of
law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself
this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God, (underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

The April 30, 2008 Resolution[18] of the Provincial Prosecutor on

complainants charge against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo for Serious
Illegal Detention bears special noting, viz:
[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in
the complaint) has the effect of strengthening the allegations against Atty.
Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was really physical
restraint employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario
Mecaral. Even as he claimed that on the day private complainant was
fetched by the two women and police officers, complainant was already
freely roaming around the place and thus, could not have been physically
detained. However, it is not really necessary that Rosario be physically
kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact, she
was always accompanied wherever she would wander, that it could be
impossible for her to escape especially considering the remoteness and the
distance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran
where she is a resident. The people from the Faith Healers Association had
the express and implied orders coming from respondent Atty. Danilo
Velasquez to keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go freely.
That can be gleaned from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita
Tadeo. The latter being reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez would
learn that complainant had untangled the cloth tied on her wrists and
feet.[19] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the

criminal
complaint
against
respondent,
his
therein
corespondent corroborated the testimonies of complainants witnesses, and
that the allegations against him remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the
charges against him by clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.[20]

In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and

acts which constitute gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the
qualifications of a lawyer.[21]
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez,
is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part
of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines.
Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5700

January 30, 2006

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, represented by Atty. Carlos

R. Bautista, Jr.,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANTE A. CARANDANG, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a verified complaint for disbarment filed by the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) against Atty. Dante A. Carandang.
The complaint alleges that Atty. Carandang, respondent, is the president of Bingo Royale,
Incorporated (Bingo Royale), a private corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines.
On February 2, 1999, PAGCOR and Bingo Royale executed a "Grant of Authority to Operate
Bingo Games." Article V of this document mandates Bingo Royale to remit 20% of its gross
sales to PAGCOR. This 20% is divided into 15% to PAGCOR and 5% franchise tax to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
In the course of its operations, Bingo Royale incurred arrears amounting to P6,064,833.14 as
of November 15, 2001. Instead of demanding the payment therefor, PAGCOR allowed Bingo

Royale and respondent Atty. Carandang to pay the said amount in monthly installment
of P300,000.00 from July 2001 to June 2003.
Bingo Royale then issued to PAGCOR twenty four (24) Bank of Commerce checks in the
sum of P7,200,000.00 signed by respondent.
However, when the checks were deposited after the end of each month at the Land Bank,
U.N. Avenue Branch, Manila, they were all dishonored by reason of Bingo Royales "Closed
Account."
Despite PAGCORs demand letters dated November 12 and December 12, 2001, and
February 12, 2002, respondent failed to pay the amounts of the checks. Thus, PAGCOR filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila criminal complaints for violations of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against respondent.
PAGCOR contends that in issuing those bouncing checks, respondent is liable for serious
misconduct, violation of the Attorneys Oath and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and prays that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
In his "Opposition" to the complaint, respondent averred that he is not liable for issuing
bouncing checks because they were drawn by Bingo Royale. His act of doing so "is not
related to the office of a lawyer."
Respondent explained that since the start of its operations, Bingo Royale has been
experiencing financial difficulties due to meager sales. Hence, it incurred arrearages in
paying PAGCORs shares and failed to pay the amounts of the checks.
On November 20, 2001, PAGCOR closed the operations of Bingo Royale. This prompted the
latter to file with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, a complaint for damages
against PAGCOR, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1671.
Subsequently, Bingo Royale became bankrupt. Respondent now maintains that the dishonor
of the checks was caused by circumstances beyond his control and pleads that our power to
disbar him must be exercised with great caution.
On February 24, 2003, we resolved to refer this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.1
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Doroteo B. Aguila, the Investigating IBP
Commissioner, made the following findings and observations:
Whether to issue or not checks in favor of a payee is a voluntary act. It is clearly a choice for
an individual (especially one learned in the law), whether in a personal capacity or officer of a
corporation, to do so after assessing and weighing the consequences and risks for doing so.
As President of BRI, he cannot be said to be unaware of the probability that BRI, the
company he runs, could not raise funds, totally or partially, to cover the checks as they fell
due. The desire to continue the operations of his company does not excuse respondents act
of violating the law by issuing worthless checks. Moreover, inability to pay is not a ground,
under the Civil Code, to suspend nor extinguish an obligation. Specifically, respondent
contends that because of business reverses or inability to generate funds, BRI should be
excused from making good the payment of the checks. If this theory is sustained, debtors will

merely state that they no longer have the capacity to pay and, consequently, not obliged to
pay on time, nor fully or partially, their debt to creditors. Surely, undersigned cannot agree
with this contention.
As correctly pointed out by complainant, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is an offense that involves
public interest. In the leading case of People v. Taada, the Honorable Supreme Court
explained the nature of the offense, thus
xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment xxx. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on thepublic interest, the
practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property
but an offense against public order.
xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure
the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and the legal processes. It also prohibits a lawyer from engaging in
unlawful conduct (Canon 1 & Rule 1.01). By issuing the bouncing checks in blatant violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent clearly was irresponsible and displayed lack of concern for the
rights of others nor for the canons of professional responsibility (Castillo v. Taguines, 254
SCRA 554). Atty. Carandang deserves to be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one year. Consistent with the ruling in this Castillo case, suspension for one year is the
deserved minimum penalty for the outrageous conduct of a lawyer who has no concern for
the property rights of others nor for the canons of professional responsibility. Moreover,
conviction for the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not even essential for disbarment (De
Jesus v. Collado, 216 SCRA 619).
Commissioner Aguila then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-177
adopting and approving Commissioner Aguilas Report and Recommendation with
modification in the sense that the recommended penalty is reduced to suspension of six (6)
months, thus:
RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering that the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer

to obey the laws of the land and promote respect of law and the legal processes, and also
prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful conduct, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.2
Section 1, B. P. Blg. 22 provides:
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who
actually signed the check on behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, even if the check was drawn by Bingo Royale, still respondent is liable.
In People v. Tuanda,3 we explained the nature of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as follows:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment xxx. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property but an offense against public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure
the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B. P. Blg. 22. By issuing
checks in violation of the provisions of this law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.
In Camus v. Civil Service Board of Appeals,4 we defined misconduct as follows:
Misconduct has been defined as "wrong or improper conduct;" and "gross" has been held to
mean "flagrant; shameful" (Webster). This Court once held that the word misconduct implies
a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.
In Lizaso v. Amante,5 we held that a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in
connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional
capacity, thus:
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney,
uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. xxx So it is held
that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the principles which his
license and the law confer upon him. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent likewise violated the Attorneys Oath that he will, among others, obey the laws;
and the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically the following provisions:

Cannon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is declared GUILTY of serious misconduct and
violations of the Attorneys Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. As
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, he isSUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months effective from notice.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts in the land for their information and guidance. The Office of the
Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to spread a copy of this Decision on the personal record of Atty.
Carandang.
SO ORDERED

CANON 8

[A.C. No. 5148. July 1, 2003]

Atty. RAMON P. REYES, complainant, vs. Atty. VICTORIANO T.

CHIONG JR., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and

civility. The bickering and the hostility of their clients should not affect
their conduct and rapport with each other as professionals and
members of the bar.
The Case

Before us is a Sworn Complaint filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with

the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, seeking the disbarment of
Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyers oath and of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. After the Third
Division of this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to
suspend him as follows:
[1]

x x x [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him to

the obligation that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. In
addition, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. In impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in Civil Case No.
4884, when it was apparent that there was no legal ground to do so, respondent
violated his oath of office as well as the above-quoted Canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, [r]espondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years.
[2]

The Facts
In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January
1998, his services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu, a ChineseTaiwanese, in a business venture that went awry. Xu
invested P300,000 on a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and seafood
products factory being set up by a certain Chia Hsien Pan, another
Chinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga City. Eventually, the former
discovered that the latter had not established a fishball factory. When
Xu asked for his money back, Pan became hostile, making it necessary
for the former to seek legal assistance.
[3]

Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa against

Pan, who was represented by respondent. The Complaint, docketed as
IS 98J-51990, was assigned to Assistant Manila City Prosecutor Pedro
B. Salanga, who then issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for
preliminary investigation on October 27 and 29, 1998. The latter neither
appeared on the two scheduled hearings nor submitted his counteraffidavit. Hence, Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal Complaint for
estafa against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. On
April 8, 1999, the Manila RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest against Pan.
[4]

[5]

[6]

Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrant

of Arrest. He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga City a Civil
Complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as
for the dissolution of a business venture against complainant, Xu and
Prosecutor Salanga.
[7]

When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it was

Pan who had decided to institute the civil action against Atty.
Reyes. Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the
civil case, if complainant would move for the dismissal of the estafa
case. However, the two lawyers failed to reach a settlement.
In his Comment dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that
he had shown no disrespect in impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendant
in Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to conclude
that the suit was groundless, and that it had been instituted only to exact
vengeance. He alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an
additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had
committed in conducting the criminal investigation. Specifically,
Prosecutor Salanga had resolved to file the estafa case despite the
pendency of Pans Motion for an Opportunity to Submit CounterAffidavits and Evidence, of the appeal to the justice secretary, and of
the Motion to Defer/Suspend Proceedings.
[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because he

allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in filing the estafa case, which the
former knew fully well was baseless. According to respondent, the
irregularities committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal
investigation and complainants connivance therein were discovered
only after the institution of the collection suit.
The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Board of
Governors of the IBP passed its June 29, 2002 Resolution.
[12]

[13]

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for investigation
and report, averred that complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had been
impleaded in Civil Case No. 4884 on the sole basis of the Criminal
Complaint for estafa they had filed against respondents client. In his
[14]

Comment, respondent himself claimed that the reason x x x was x x x

the irregularities of the criminal investigation/connivance and
consequent damages.
Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with
damages had been filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa
case, in which respondents client was the defendant. There was no
need to implead complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, since they had
never participated in the business transactions between Pan and
Xu. Improper and highly questionable was the inclusion of the
prosecutor and complainant in the civil case instituted by respondent on
the alleged prodding of his client. Verily, the suit was filed to harass
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.
Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to
implead Prosecutor Salanga and complainant in Civil Case No.
4884. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the
investigating commissioners recommendation for his suspension from
the practice of law for two (2) years.
This Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs recommendation.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession,
they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Moreover, Canon 8
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
[15]

Respondents actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case

No. 4884 was for the collection of a sum of money, damages and
dissolution of an unregistered business venture. It had originally been
filed against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant
and Prosecutor Salanga.
The Amended and Supplemental Complaints alleged the following:
[16]

27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and

deliberately refused and failed to perform his duty enjoined by the law and the
Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan due process by violating his
rights under the Rules on preliminary investigations; he also falsely made a
Certification under oath that preliminary investigation was duly conducted and
plaintiff [was] duly informed of the charges against him but did not answer; he
maliciously and x x x partially ruled that there was probable cause and filed a
Criminal Information for estafa against plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan, knowing fully
[well] that the proceedings were fatally defective and null and void; x x x;
28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan filed
said appeal and motion to defer for the valid grounds stated therein deliberately
refused to correct his errors and consented to the arrest of said plaintiff under
an invalid information and warrant of arrest.
29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant
Zongoi Xu is baseless connived with the latter to harass and extort money from
plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in the manner contrary to
law, morals and public policy, resulting to the arrest of said plaintiff and
causing plaintiffs grave irreparable damages[.]
[17]

We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint and
the failure to resort to the proper remedies strengthen complainants
allegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage against the
estafa case. If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor
Salangas resolution, they should have used the proper procedural and
administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to the justice
secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for
Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salangas decision to file an information
for estafa.
In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he could
show that the estafa case was filed without basis. Moreover, he could
have instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to act
illegally. As a lawyer, respondent should have advised his client of the
availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had no
justification.
The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in
the business transaction subject of the collection suit shows that there
was no reason for their inclusion in that case. It appears that
respondent took the estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil

case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client. His

actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every
lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to
harass them.
[18]

Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with
courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of
their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their
professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they
must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling
between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and
demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified
recriminations and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract
from the dignity of the legal profession, but also constitute highly
unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.
[19]

Furthermore, the Lawyers Oath exhorts law practitioners not to

wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.
Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleading
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga. Such excuse is flimsy and
unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of
their clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or any
manner of fraud or chicanery. Their rendition of improper service
invites stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly, they advance the
honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they
render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral
law.
[20]

[21]

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem

of their professional brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased,
perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of
sharp contests and thrives despite conflicting interests. It emanates
solely from integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorable
performance of professional duty.
[22]

WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is

hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective
immediately.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
JOSE C. SABERON,

A.C. No. 6567

Complainant,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG,
Respondent.

April 16, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Complaint[1] filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this
Court, complainant Jose C. Saberon (complainant) charged Atty. Fernando
T. Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct for allegedly using abusive and
offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP).
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition[2] against Surigaonon
Rural Banking Corporation (the bank) and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin),
whose family comprises the majority stockholders of the bank, for
cancellation of the banks registration and franchise. The Petition, he said,
arose from the banks and/or Bonpins refusal to return various checks and
land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by his
(complainants) wife, despite alleged full payment of the loan and interests.

Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the

bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses[3] to the Petition
stating, inter alia,
5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed
by plaintiff [herein complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife to
coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain
x x x x.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder[5] to

complainants Reply.
Finding the aforementioned statements to be totally malicious,
viscous [sic] and bereft of any factual or legal basis, complainant filed the
present complaint.
Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the
legitimate exercise of his constitutional right to seek redress of his
grievances; and that respondent, as in-house counsel and acting corporate
secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by his
(complainants) wife in behalf of her children had been paid in full, hence,
there was no more reason to continue holding the collaterals.
Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of
damages upon his wife and her children who were thus deprived of the use
of the mortgaged property.
In his Comment[6] to the present complaint against him, respondent
argues that: (1) there was nothing abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper in the way he used the word blackmail to characterize the suit
against his clients; and (2) when a lawyer files a responsive pleading, he is
not in any way aiding or abetting the infliction of damages upon the other
party.

By Resolution of March 16, 2005,[7] the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006,[8] IBP
Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa held that the word
blackmail connotes something sinister and criminal. Unless the person
accused thereof is criminally charged with extortion, he added, it would be
imprudent, if not offensive, to characterize that persons act as blackmail.
Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present
factual arguments and to anchor his case on the legal merits of his clients
claim or defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as follows:
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate
in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Moreover, he noted that in espousing a clients cause, respondent should not

state his personal belief as to the soundness or justice of his case pursuant to
Canon 15[9] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that
were unnecessary and irrelevant to the case, respondent went overboard
and crossed the line of professional conduct. In view thereof, he
recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and
suspended from the practice of law for 30 days.
By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007,[10] the IBP
Board of Governors disapproved the recommendation and instead dismissed
the case for lack of merit.
The Commission on Bar Discipline, by letter of March 26, 2007,
transmitted the records of the case to this Court.[11]

Complainant appealed the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

to this Court via a petition filed on March 7, 2007, under Section 12 (c) of
Rule 139-B[12] of the Revised Rules of Court.
Complainant challenges the IBP Board of Governors Resolution as
illegal and void ab initio for violating the mandatory requirements of Section
12(a) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court that the same be reduced
to writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it
is based.
Finding the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent
is guilty of grave misconduct to be in accordance with the evidence,
complainant nevertheless submits that the recommended penalty of
suspension should be modified to disbarment. The offense committed by
respondent, he posits, manifests an evil motive and is therefore an infraction
involving moral turpitude.
In his Comment to [the] Petition for Review, respondent states that the
administrative complaint against him is a harassment suit given that it was in
his capacity as counsel for the bank and Bonpin that he filed the Answer
objected to by complainant.
Moreover, respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation
was a statement of fact which he had backed up with a narration of the
chronological incidents and suits filed by complainant and his wife against
his clients. That being the case, he contends that the allegation made in the
Answer must be considered absolutely privileged just like allegations made
in any complaint or initiatory pleading.
Respondent in fact counters that it was complainant himself who had
made serious imputations of wrongdoing against his clients the bank for
allegedly being engaged in some illegal activities, and Bonpin for
misrepresenting himself as a Filipino.
Nonetheless, respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive
and offensive language was used, he was only two years into the profession,

with nary an intention of bringing dishonor to it. He admits that because of

some infelicities of language, he may have stirred up complainants
indignation for which he asked the latters and this Courts clemency.
In his Reply,[13] complainant counters that respondents Comment
reveals the latters propensity to deliberately state a falsehood; and that
respondents claim that the administrative complaint was a harassing act,
deducible from the fact that [it] post-dates a series of suits, none of which
has prospered x x x against the same rural bank and its owner, is bereft of
factual basis.
Complainant goes on to argue that respondent, as counsel for Bonpin,
knew of the two criminal cases he and his wife had filed against Bonpin and,
as admitted by respondent, of the criminal charges against him for libel
arising from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or robbery against him
and his wife.
Finally, complainant refuses to accede to respondents entreaty for
clemency.
This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using
intemperate language in his pleadings.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,

offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted

members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance
the interests of their clients.[14]
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language.[15] Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.[16]
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged.[17] In keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.[18]
It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of
respondent were made not before a court but before the BSP. A similar
submission that actuations of and statements made by lawyers before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the NLRC not being a court, was struck
down in Lubiano v. Gordolla,[19] thus:
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in
addressing the National Labor Relations Commission, he
nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant
of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.[20]
The observation applies with equal force to the case at bar.

Respecting respondents argument that the matters stated in the

Answer he filed before the BSP were privileged, it suffices to stress that
lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or comment
in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their
clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in
making such remark or comment.[21]
True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial
proceedings have consistently been considered as absolutely privileged,
however false or malicious they may be, but only for so long as they are
pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.[22] The test of relevancy has
been stated, thus:
x x x. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to
make alleged defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a
liberal rule. The matter to which the privilege does not extend
must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of
the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy
and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be
privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues
presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately
related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy
that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial
x x x. [23]

Granting that the proceedings before the BSP partake of the nature of
judicial proceedings, the ascription of blackmail in the Answer and
Rejoinder filed by respondent is not legitimately related or pertinent to the
subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, which were Bonpins alleged
alien citizenship and majority stockholding in the bank. Those issues were
amply discussed in the Answer with Affirmative Defenses without need of
the further allegation that the Petition was another in a series
of blackmail suits . . . to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial
gain. Hence, such allegation was unnecessary and uncalled for. More so,
considering that complainant and his wife were well within their rights to

file the cases against the bank and/or Bonpin to protect their interests and
seek redress of their grievances.
Respecting the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
indeed only a Notice of Resolution was transmitted to this Court, together
with the Records of the case, which Notice simply stated that on January 18,
2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 in
which it:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.

Upon such Notice, it is evident that there is no compliance with the

procedural requirement that the IBP Board of Governors decision shall state
clearly and distinctly the findings of facts or law on which the same is
based. Thus Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12.
Review and decision by the Board of
Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be
reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and
evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The
decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and
shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board
following the submittal of the Investigator's report. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The above requirement serves a very important function not just to

inform the parties of the reason for the decision as would enable them on
appeal to point out and object to the findings with which they are not in
agreement, but also to assure the parties that the Board of Governors has
reached the judgment through the process of legal reasoning.[24]

With regard to complainants plea that respondent be disbarred, this

Court has consistently considered disbarment and suspension of an attorney
as the most severe forms of disciplinary action, which should be imposed
with great caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious
administrative charges.[25]
Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such
transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit respondents
disbarment. In light of respondents apologies, the Court finds it best to
temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is
considered simple, rather than grave, misconduct.
WHEREFORE, complainants petition is partly GRANTED.
Respondent, Atty. Fernando T. Larong, is found guilty of SIMPLE
MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language. He is FINED P2,000 with
a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

[A. C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002]

ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO

PEFIANCO, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct

unbecoming a member of the bar for using improper and offensive
language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant.
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent
District Public Attorney of the Public Attorneys Office in San Jose,
Antique. He alleged that on May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III
was conferring with a client in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the
Hall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approached
them. Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the
group and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a
hearing was taking place in another room. At this point, respondent
Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted
at Atty. Salvani and his client, saying, Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina,
ipapreso ang imo nga kliyente para mahibal-an na anang sala.(Why
do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will
realize his mistake.)
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefiancos
outburst and asked him to cool off, but respondent continued to
fulminate at Atty. Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to respondent
that it was the woman who was asking if the civil aspect of the criminal
case could be settled because she was no longer interested in
prosecuting the same. Respondent refused to listen and instead
continued to scold Atty. Salvani and the latters client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and
asked him to take it easy and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the
matter. Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he again started
shouting at and scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with
respondent, complainant went inside his office. He asked his clerk to
put a notice outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activity
in the Public Attorneys Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but
when he came back he heard respondent Pefianco saying: Nagsiling si
Atty. Alcantara nga pagwa-on na kuno ako dya sa PAO, buyon nga
klase ka tawo. (Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the
PAO, what an idiot.) Then, upon seeing complainant, respondent
pointed his finger at him and repeated his statement for the other people
in the office to hear. At this point, according to complainant, he
confronted respondent Pefianco and told him to observe civility or else
to leave the office if he had no business there. Complainant said

respondent resented this and started hurling invectives at

him. According to complainant, respondent even took a menacing
stance towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr.
Robert Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify
respondent Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take
respondent out of the office, but before they could do so, respondent
tried to attack complainant and even shouted at him, Gago ka!
(Youre stupid!) Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off
respondents blow and complainant was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III,
Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert
Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said
that the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered,
moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that he
resented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee, Napoleon
Labonete, to put a sign outside prohibiting standbys from hanging
round in the Public Attorneys Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning
the womans case, complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and
shouted at him to get out of the Public Attorneys Office. He claimed
that two security guards also came, and complainant ordered them to
take respondent out of the office. Contrary to complainants claims,
however, respondent said that it was complainant who moved to punch
him and shout at him, Gago ka! (Youre stupid!)
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal
complaint against complainant. However, the complaint was dismissed
by the said office.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines found that respondent committed the acts alleged in the
complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only to
deny the accusations against him but also to give any explanation for
his actions. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same act will be dealt
with more severely in the future.

We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline

to be well taken.
The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent
Pefianco who provoked the incident in question. The affidavits of
several disinterested persons confirm complainants allegation that
respondent Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty.
Salvani and even attempted to lay hands on him (complainant).
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes
lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the
dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and
candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without
reproach at all times.
[1]

[2]

In this case, respondents meddling in a matter in which he had no

right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand
an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or
could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the
matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose
husband had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of
her case because she needed the money. Be that as it may,
respondent should realize that what he thought was righteous did not
give him the right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently
the accused in the criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Even
when he was being pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he
insulted and berated those who tried to calm him down. Two of the
witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to the
Public Attorneys Office because they heard the commotion, and two
guards at the Hall of Justice, who had been summoned, failed to stop
respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have
realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal
profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for
it. Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the
way he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted
by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation
of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering
this to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00

and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will
be sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.


CANON 9

FIRST DIVISION
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA,
Complainant,

Adm. Case No. 6290

Present:
- versus -

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,

PANGANIBAN,
SANTIAGO,
CARPIO, and
AZCUNA, JJ.

ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
July 14, 2004

X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May
2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of
respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the
latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office.

On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been

falsely representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who
has
a
prior
and
subsisting
marriage
with
another
woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage
contract,[1] which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in
Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila[2] and the National
Statistics Office (NSO)[3] prove that no record of marriage exists between
them. The false date and place of marriage between the two are stated in
the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio[4] and
Felicisimo Tenorio III.[5] But in the birth certificates of their two other
children, Oliver Tenorio[6] and John Cedric Tenorio,[7] another date and
place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the
respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit
derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The respondent
would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her
co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant
alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by
her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her
clients money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an
estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family
on 24 January 2000 with the statement Isang bala ka lang to deter
them from divulging respondents illegal activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against
her. As to the charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as
shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil
Registry of Quezon City.[8] Her husband has no prior and subsisting
marriage with another woman.

As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied

that she caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit
against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who
caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant and
her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on
the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondents
good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was
likewise denied by the respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio
Law Office is registered with the Department of Trade and Industry as a
single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of
Business Name.[9] Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the
estafa case, the same had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14
June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.[10] The respondent likewise denied that she threatened the
complainant with the words Isang bala ka lang on 24 January 2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was
filed by the complainant to get even with her. She terminated
complainants employment after receiving numerous complaints that the
complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of
processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on
her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically motivated:
some politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should
they initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they were rehired. The respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received
numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service to
the community. She then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment
case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty.
Kenny H. Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the
complainant would submit a Reply to respondents Answer, while the

respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also agreed
that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as
the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants.[11]
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the
respondent cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband by
submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office[12] where the
name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a
Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card[13] signed by the
respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as Atty.
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. She added that respondents husband even
appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law
partnership with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court
on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband appeared in court,
he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by
the complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband is one
of her law partners. But upon cross-examination, when confronted with
the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, she
admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a
certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as
senior partners because they have investments in her law office.[14]
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later
discovered that their marriage contract was not registered she applied for
late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a
certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in
the birth certificates of her children as to the place and date
of her marriage were merely an oversight.[15]
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of
Evidence and Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this

disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and

misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing the
case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP
Commissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the
complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge
of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in
violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead
of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a
senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identification
card of Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., signed by respondent as
Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 20734,
wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and
even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the
private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the
said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended that the
respondent be reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The modification
consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the
practice of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the
future would be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San
Juan as approved and adopted with modification by the Board of
Governors of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the
Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In RayosOmbac vs. Rayos,[16] we declared:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly

executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless
of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this

disbarment case should proceed accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving his case by convincing
evidence.[17] With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the
charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is
not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling,[18] we held that when
the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in
court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must
await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBPs finding that the respondent is guilty of
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a nonmember of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law
is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the

unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.

The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding

oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding ones self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying
oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of
law.[19] Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds
himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him
in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead
of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A.
Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted that
the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the
letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office.[20] That is a blatant misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is
another proof that the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in
misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the
identification card stating that he is Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., bears
the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The

permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited

privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus,
the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his
professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible
the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.[21]
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B.
Cristal-Tenorio is herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent CristalTenorios record as attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7056

February 11, 2009

PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C. GARCIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 13, 2006, finding
respondent guilty of gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional falsehood

before the court, misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
To recall, the antecedents of the case are as follows:
On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite
(PARAD) in favor of herein complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers
Leopoldo de Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido de Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez
Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco, Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra,
who were the clients of respondent, Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that
respondents clients were mere tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject
land. The case was elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining
complainants rights over the land. Continuing to pursue his clients lost cause, respondent
was found to have committed intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with the
intention to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions
for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the
decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law
holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm.
The dispositive portion of the decision thus reads:
WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is
SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on
the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.1
Respondent duly filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, appealing
to the Court to take a second look at his case and praying that the penalty of suspension of
two years be reduced to mere reprimand or admonition for the sake of his family and the
poor clients he was defending.2
Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of action
he took were not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision dated
November 19, 1999, but were based on his serious study, research and experience as a
litigation lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him by his clients in the
DARAB case. He believes that the courses of action he took were valid and proper legal
theory designed to protect the rights and interests of Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al.3 He
stresses that he was not the original lawyer in this case. The lawyer-client relationship with
the former lawyer was terminated because Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. felt that their former
counsel did not explain/argue their position very well, refused to listen to them and, in fact,
even castigated them. As the new counsel, respondent candidly relied on what the
tenants/farmers told him in the course of his interview. They maintained that they had been
in open, adverse, continuous and notorious possession of the land in the concept of an
owner for more than 50 years. Thus, the filing of the action to quiet title was resorted to in
order to determine the rights of his clients respecting the subject property. He avers that he
merely exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled
under the law, considering that his clients were subjected to harassment and threats of
physical harm and summary eviction by the complainant.4 He posits that he was only being

protective of the interest of his clients as a good father would be protective of his own
family,5 and that his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro bono.6
1avvphi1

Anent the issue that he permitted his name to be used for unauthorized practice of law, he
humbly submits that there was actually no sufficient evidence to prove the same or did he fail
to dispute this, contrary to the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). He was
counsel of Leopoldo de Guzman, et al. only and not of the cooperative Kalayaan
Development Cooperative (KDC). He was just holding his office in this cooperative, together
with Attys. Dominador Ferrer, Efren Ambrocio, the late Alfredo Caloico and Marciano
Villavert. He signed the retainer agreement with Atty. Dominador to formalize their lawyerclient relationship, and the complainants were fully aware of such arrangement.7
Finally, he submits that if he is indeed guilty of violating the rules in the courses of action he
took in behalf of his clients, he apologizes and supplicates the Court for kind consideration,
pardon and forgiveness. He reiterates that he does not deserve the penalty of two years
suspension, considering that the complaint fails to show him wanting in character, honesty,
and probity; in fact, he has been a member of the bar for more than 20 years, served as
former president of the IBP Marinduque Chapter, a legal aide lawyer of IBP Quezon City
handling detention prisoners and pro bono cases, and is also a member of the Couples for
Christ, and has had strict training in the law school he graduated from and the law offices he
worked with.8 He is the sole breadwinner in the family with a wife who is jobless, four (4)
children who are in school, a mother who is bedridden and a sick sister to support. The
familys only source of income is respondents private practice of law, a work he has been
engaged in for more than twenty-five (25) years up to the present.9
On August 15, 2008, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from
respondent, requesting that he be issued a clearance for the renewal of his notarial
commission. Respondent stated therein that he was aware of the pendency of the
administrative cases10 against him, but pointed out that said cases had not yet been resolved
with finality. Respondent sought consideration and compassion for the issuance of the
clearance -- considering present economic/financial difficulties -- and reiterating the fact that
he was the sole breadwinner in the family.
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.11 A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not only requires but
also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due
him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latters cause to succeed.12 In
this case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that
the respondents acts complained of were committed out of his over-zealousness and
misguided desire to protect the interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We
are not unmindful of his dedication and conviction in defending the less fortunate. Taking the
cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but respondent should
not forget his first and foremost responsibility as an officer of the court. We stress what we
have stated in our decision that, in support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the
duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law. This obligation,
however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and justice.13 This is the criterion that
must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case.14 Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution
of a judgment or by misusing court processes.15

Certainly, violations of these canons cannot be countenanced, as respondent must have

realized with the sanction he received from this Court. However, the Court also knows how to
show compassion and will not hesitate to refrain from imposing the appropriate penalties in
the presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondents length of service,
acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances,
humanitarian and equitable considerations, and respondents advanced age, among other
things, which have varying significance in the Courts determination of the imposable penalty.
Thus, after a careful consideration of herein respondents motion for reconsideration and
humble acknowledgment of his misfeasance, we are persuaded to extend a degree of
leniency towards him.16 We find the suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law
sufficient in this case
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the letter-request dated August 15, 2008 is NOTED.
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 13, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that respondent is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
Respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of said Resolution
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on
the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator, who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice