FINALCHAPTER1withCHAPTER2 PDF

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The newly elected public officials from this years mid-term elections are now
sitting on their respective positions in the various government offices. Many expect great
things from them as they were voted by the public to serve and represent them in the
government. These officials, regardless of circumstances, now have the responsibility to
uplift and fulfill their various advocacies and promises they have sworn to the public with
due process and with the aid of law. Though they have rightfully claimed their positions
by election, many still object to the validity of their capabilities to fulfill their duties and
responsibilities in their respective posts.
Modern technology and the internet made it easy for the people to express their
thoughts about politics, politicians, and the issues that surround them. The campaign
period gave the public enough time to gather data and judge these candidates. Reactions
varied. Some turned out violent as serious flaws were pointed out in the process of
counting the votes.
In a certain perspective, Filipinos are expected to be highly
untrusting to the results of elections. The issue here is that there are factors that trigger
Filipinos to feel discontented or distrustful towards elected politicians, especially when
they are known politicians from Political Dynasties.
In the study of politics, there is this political narrative called populism which
manifests when the majority of the population aims at voting for the most popular
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candidate instead of those who are less known (while disregarding other factors). This
issue of election by popular vote has been a recurring issue in disputes regarding
elections. This was supported by Walden Bello, one of the main organizers of the Forum
for Philippine Alternatives (FOPA) 1 , which, according to him, popular political culture
plays an important role during elections as it is considered by the Filipinos as the only
form or source of political legitimacy. This means that a person running for a spot in the
government is more likely to be elected by the people if, to name a few,: (1) the candidate
already possesses the experience to fulfill his or her duties in his or her respective post as
observed from his or her previous service in the government; (2) the candidate is related 2
to a person, currently or previously holding a position in the government; (3) the
candidate is well known due to media; (4) the candidate belongs to the elite. Though
these arguments fall in favor of the populism perspective, it cannot be denied that these
factors are present in the minds of the Filipinos when voting for government officials.
One of the most controversial issues about elections, in line with the populist
perspective, is the existence of family politics or Political Dynasties in the Philippines. A
recent petition for the enactment of the Anti-Dynastic Act defines Political Dynasties as
the concentration, consolidation or perpetuation of political powers by persons related to
one another. In this petition, wherein the needed bills has been passed over by each
Congress since 1987, it is stated that the Political Dynasties are prohibited in accordance
with Republic Act No. 6735, Section 26, Article 2 of the 1987 Philippine Co nstitution
1
2
FOPA a left ist organization wh ich considers electoral struggle as one of the central arenas of change.
Refers to family relat ion, whether full or half b lood or as defined by law
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stating that The state shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties, as may be defined by law. Though the law states the
prohibition of political dynasties, the premises surrounding its legal definition stands
vague. That is why the local and national level of the Philippine government is swarming
with politicians who belong to Political Dynasties.
Through the help of the media, the public has learned about the existence of these
Political Dynasties monopolizing power in the government. This monopoly allows some
of these politicians to garner massive influence and power to the point of abuse. A good
example would be the Ampatuan Clan that ruled Maguindanao in the past few years and
then, were accused for the use of their personal military force to massacre dozens of
people, mostly journalists, who were on their way to witness the filing of Esmael
Mangundadatus candidacy. Since the incident, justice has yet to be served. Speculations
from the various sectors zero in to the fact that Political Dynasties does not just extend to
blood relatives. Some Political Dynasties seek support from the other Political Dynasties
and elite public figures for their request for power and control over their dominion. These
can be suggested as causes for the public to dissent the existence of Political Dynasties in
the country.
The root of dynasties in the Philippines can be traced back to pre-colonial times.
The Datu is the best example for this. A Datu is considered as the leader or ruler of a
certain group of people. They can be compared to the Kings of the Western world as they
also possess nobility and royalty in their blood. The society during the Pre-Colonial Era
followed a class system classifying the people into three classes. In Luzon, people
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belonging in the lowest class in the society are called Alipin (slaves or commoners). The
next in the hierarchy are the Maharlika (warrior nobility). The highest in the class
structure are the Maginoo (nobility) which includes the Datu and his relatives. The
members of the Maginoo class are the wealthy beings among the population who possess
numerous properties and slaves. It is said that the closer ones relation to the Datu is, the
higher your position in the class structure becomes. It is in this class wherein the next
person in line for the role of Datu is chosen from. The process of choosing the next leader
is monopolized from a pool of wealthy nobles and, in some instances, from the warrior
class. This had been their practice even after the first Europeans came to the Philippines
and will remain that way until the Spanish Colonization Era that began after the
rediscovery of the Philippines to the world by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521.
The Spanish Colonization Era gave the wealthy locals more recognition. It was
during this time that the local elite were given positions for the local government such as
the Gobernadorcillo. The Spaniards gave these titles to the Filipino elite, such as the
Mestizos, since they were educated, able to speak in Spanish and also had the monetary
capabilities to fulfill their role. Though these positions were menial as compared to the
positions held by the Peninsulares, the local elites considered it as a measure of influence
and power. And, like during pre-colonial times, only a small pool of individuals was able
to participate in the government.
In the American Colonial Period, Political Dynasties resulted as an offshoot of an
experiment by the government of the United States of America. According to Jose S.
Arcilla, in his article The Origin of the Philippine Political Elite, the US government
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when it acquired the Philippines from Spain, did not know the conditions in the
Philippines after the Hispano-American conflict. The Treaty of Paris freed the Philippines
under Spanish control after more than three centuries of occupation and had the US
Government take charge of the archipelago. However, there was no clear idea on what to
do with the Philippines. President McKinley, with the suggestion of Commodore Dewey,
institutionalized a commission to survey the conditions in the Philippines. The Philippine
elite or the Illustrados were the ones who greatly helped the Americans in fulfilling this
goal by giving them useful information about the conditions present in the archipelago.
As explained in the article, the elite were property owners who wanted peace and
considered the option of rebellion as a futile path to take. Bloodshed for them was not the
ideal direction to pursue. That is the reason why the American Government had close ties
with the upper-class. The main problem of the American Government then was the
middle-class composed of teachers, government employee and other professionals. This
population urged to resist the American Colonization for they believed that the
Philippines was ready for self-rule. This created a chaotic environment for the Americans
to work in. It can be assumed that this perception became a product of the years of
fighting for independence from the Spanish Regime. This leaves the Commission to
further investigate the situation in the Philippine before urging its complete sovereignty.
In order to help the American Government to strengthen their control over the
land, they formed civil governments in places where peace has been restored. Soon after,
the first local elections were held through the idea of Col. William A. Kolbe. The first
local elections took place in the year 1903 for town presidents, vice-presidents and
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members of the town councils. However, there was a shortage in people who were
qualified for the positions. The minimum requirements for the post were (1) literacy in
English or Spanish, (2) previous experience in government service and (3) a minimum
amount of assets. This narrowed the qualified candidates to those members of the elite or
privileged sector.
The number of elites as compared to the other members of the Philippine society
was less than a fifth of the total population then. This granted said sector to monopolize
the population of these posts. Also, it can be suggested that as an effect of Spanish
Colonialism in the country for over three centuries, Spanish traits and behaviors have
been brushed-off to the Philippine population. This may be the explanation why a number
of the ruling class possessed an authoritarian disposition as well as an arrogant nature.
Again, as mentioned by Arcilla, this effect was not rare nor surprising as abuse in
government positions was common with town presidents who became petty dictators.
These people collected fees for government services that were supposed to be for free.
The principle of indebtedness among the lower class became a fashion as the upper class
ruled the government. These local leaders monopolized the ruled over their bulwarks. An
example would be the locale of Taal wherein it was governed by the same town president
from 1904 to 1912.
Though the country has long surpassed the era of colonialism from the Unites
States of America, the population still practiced a patron-client relationship with the elite
class. The elite have been the forerunners of political glory. Since the time of the Datus,
the elite were considered as the ruling class. It still holds true today as some of the elected
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government officials come from prominent families. According to Bobby M. Tuazon

from the Center for People Empowerment in Governance, there exists 178 dominant
Political Dynasties as of the 2010 Philippine Presidential Elections. Old elites comprise
56 percent of that number. The influence of these old elites persists as they have retained
their level in the society up to the present. In a study by Paolo Querubin from the Harvard
Academy for International Studies suggest that elites have a tendency to not only persist
but also expand their power through time which may weaken the effectiveness of
institutional reform. Considering the length of time of each term, the turnover of the
incumbent to the next may either result to two things: 1) Enable the incumbent to fulfill
his or her duties as a government official or 2) have the people suffer from ineffective
governance. On top of that, with the monopoly of the elite on the seat of governance, the
two perceived outcomes may be prolonged in case that change does not occur in the
manner by which the government is managed.
The term or length of service in the government is a mechanism to ensure that
there will be fair and equal opportunities for people to represent in the government as
mentioned by law. However, according to Corazon H. Ignacio of the National Citizens
Movement for Free Elections, politicians have made use of this mechanism to their
advantage. For instance, since there are only three allowable chances for re-election, an
incumbent government official might opt to divide these chances. Between these terms,
he would insert a relative or trusted personnel to take the position for him. Though he is
not in position, the people he asked to take the position from him would form part of the
extension of his influence and control. And once the term is over, he can go back and
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campaign to be re-elected once more. Of course, that is just one instance. In other cases,
more intricate patterns revolve around Political Dynasties. Again, from Pablo Querubin,
from his study Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political
Dynasties in the Philippines, there are three general patterns that he discussed. The first
one are called benchwarmers which is explained by the instance above. The second one
is called alternating offices wherein person A and person B switch posts every end of
their terms. And lastly, the expanding control across offices wherein different relatives
occupy different positions in the government simultaneously. The examples mentioned
by Querubin in his study are based on factual instance s that he illustrated in graphs.
The number of the political elites proves to be numerous. Here are two wellknown families in the political limelight:
1.) In Zambales, the Gordon family has been serving in the government since 1963.
James Leonard Gordon was the first mayor of Olongapo when it was converted
into a city. There existed a horizontal expansion 3 of Political Dynasty when he
died in 1967. His wife, Amelia Gordon, took over the mayoral post in the same
year. Then Richard Gordon ran for the post in 1980 who took back the position as
Mayor of Olongapo after two years of non-representation by the Gordon family in
the post. He held office until 1993. His sister Katherine took over the position in
1995 to 2004. Then followed James Gordon Jr., in 2003 and is still the Mayor of
Horizontal Expansion means the extension of political control o r monopoly fro m the same level. (e.g.
Mayor A passes his position to his wife who becomes Mayor B after Mayor A steps down from his post)
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Olongapo up to the present. Also, in 2004, the Gordon family stepped up for a
vertical expansion4 as Richard Gordon took office in the Senate up to 2010.
Gordon also ran for the Presidential Elections in 2010 for the Presidential Post,
only to be outmaneuvered by Benigno Noynoy Aquino III who also belongs to
a long line of Political Dynasty.
2.) Tarlac, on the other hand, has the Cojuangco family. Melecio Cojuangco, the
patriarch of the Cojuango Clan in the Philippines, was a representative of the 1st
District of Tarlac in the 1st Philippine Assembly from 1907 to 1909. His son, Jose
Cojuangco Sr., also took the same position from 1934 to 1946. Jose Cojuangcos
daughter, Corazon Cojuangco-Aquino, became the first female President of the
Philippines in 1986 while her son took the same position after winning the 2010
Presidential Elections.
The existence of Political Dynasties may have constitutional issues. Other than that,
some people believe that their existence weakens institutional gro wth. Others think that
entering Political Dynasties will benefit dynastic politicians to exploit the countrys
resources for their personal gain by legislating policies and laws that would ultimately
benefit them. The thing is that the general notion of Po litical Dynasties is subject to
issues brought about by media and past experiences that do not always apply in every
case.
4
Vert ical Expansion means the extension of political control o r monopoly fro m a lower position in the
government to a higher or much lower position. (e.g. Mayor A beco mes Senator, his son takes his place as
Mayor B and his daughter decides to be Vice-Mayor A to support his brother)
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1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The existence of Political Dynasties in the Philippines remains a debatable matter as to its
legalities and its impact to the society. This study aims to prove whether or not Political
Dynasties are beneficial to the country. The studys main concern reads:
Do Political Dynasties in the Philippines contribute positively to the management

of the government and the development of the society it serves?
The following are questions that the study will seek to answer in order to provide a
conclusion for the main problem:
What are the events in Philippine History that described how Political Dynasties
helped in the formation and management of the state? Also, what events describe
them contrary to their duties as public servants?
How well do these public servants from Political Dynasties perform in the
government compared to those who do not belong to such?
How does the Thomasian Community (in the University of Santo Tomas)
perceive Political Dynasties in the Philippines?
What are the present conditions of the provinces represented by members of

Political Dynasties in the Government?
How do the members of the Congress perceive Political Dynasties?
How do members of Political Dynasties perceive Political Dynasties?
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1.3 THEORETICAL PARADIGM

The current government of the Philippines was the result of the adaptation of the
different types of government and the evolution and development that happened to cope
with the society. While it is true that the Philippine government is a mixture of the past
conquerors politics, it had gradually changed, slowly but steadily. At first this proved to
be sufficient to attend to the countrys needs, but as of the present time, the Philippines
isnt exactly a strong country that could deliver goods properly and majority of these
goods and other services that should be provided by the government are only received by
those living near the capital, in this case, Manila. Different problems arose from this issue
which includes terrorism, poverty, malnutrition and the lack of proper education. It could
be blamed to the archipelagic form of the country, but still this weakness and the inab ility
to provide an efficient solution is what had caused the slow deterioration of the
government.
In order for the other provinces to survive on their own, local government exists.
However, there are some instances in which even the local government is too weak to
handle the society and with this opportunity, a group of people (oftentimes a family) who
is influential and wealthy enough would take power and control away from the local
government. This event could be seen by the constituents as a way to lift their status, as
the family would perceive that they are leading the locality to development. In some
cases, this development occurs, while in some, this development is withheld, as the
influential group would like to take advantage of the situation, to gain more power,
authority and wealth. This is where the political dynasty starts. Political dynasty, as like
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any other issue, has two sides, the good side and the bad side. In the figure below, it is
illustrated how the partition of the society goes and what are the factors that created the
gap with the elite and the commoners.
Figure 1: Paradigm of The Ruling Class
H
1) Race
U
The
Chosen
Few
Who are
selected by
virtue of
superior
2) Ancestry
3) Age
A
is
4) Sex
divided
5) Religion
N
I
into
T
The
Subject
Mass
Who are
selected by
virtue of
inferior
6) Military
7) Culture
8) Wealth
9) Political Power
10) Knowledge
Lipson, Leslie; The Great Issues o f Politics, p.77
In the figure illustrated above, one could see that the factors aforementioned were
enumerated. These ten factors are not really requisites for the elite to survive, but rather
these are the common things that affects one influence and power. First of all, race is
considered, whether this idea is accepted or not, racial discrimination is present. People
tend to think that the white is more superior to other races. This is definitely not true. It
may be considered as a hangover when these white people had controlled and
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overpowered other nations as to why this discrimination still exists. Also under the
category of race superiority, ones physical distinctions are also taken notice of, the
sharpness of ones nose, his faces shape, the color of his skin, his height and all of the
other things in between. Ones definition of beauty differs from ones upbringing and by
any sense cant be generally defined as all have different opinions regarding this matter.
However, since the white community had gain more authority than the black
community, the whites way of thinking affected the opinions of others. Nations try to
erase this boundary but it will continue to exist. This ideology had already been
embedded to the mentality of others, thats why it would be a hard struggle to erase this
way of superiority thinking.
Second is the ancestry of the elites. There are several families who are popularly
known in the political field like the Arroyos, Aquinos, Marcos and so on. The family
name is often the wielder of interest, its the fame caller. This attitude of the masses is
one of the stereotypes of human; they only notice those who are already known. It could
be considered as a trend to only know who is who when they are famous, notoriously
known for something they had committed and so on. However, the middle class persons
who are neither known for their good deeds and crimes dont have enough publicity. In
this way of thinking, people would tend to generalize that if a member of that family
served well, the others would follow suit that the following generation had been raised to
the familys high standard and will develop into something higher than his prestige
slowly by trying to achieve the uncommon. If the ancestor succeeds in this, he slowly
secures the familys rank in the society.
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The next factor would be age. The Roman Empire had the council of elders, as
they equate age with wisdom. Even in ancient times, the elders opinion were respected
and followed as it is seen that the elders have experienced what the younger one had not,
thus the older a persons age is, the more respected he is and looked up to.
The gender of the ruling class is also considered. In the past, the government was
pre-dominantly under the leadership of the men, but as of now both the men and women
have equal rights, though sometimes there is still this male dominance which could be
understood as in the Philippine setting, the country is considered as a patriarchal country
which means that mostly the father is the head.
Religion is also considered as one of the factors. It is known the religious leaders
and sect heads have this power and control over their followers or subordinates. In one
way or another, these religious leaders affect the way how their followers perceive
candidates for elections. Every religion has their own different ideas on what should be
present to the candidates platforms in accordance to their religions beliefs. Candidates
tend to find a religious affiliate as this would rally a huge amount of support for him that
could eventually elected him as a government official. Also, several sect heads or
religious personalities tried to run for government posts and have won with the support of
those people from their religion.
The military power is also considered as this plays an important role is the
differentiation of the ruling class the subject mass. The continuous terrorism acts
surrounding the society or community poses threats to the well-being of the society,
especially if the community is weak. It is one of the governments roles to protect its
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constituents, yet if the government fails to give them the assurance of safety, they have
no one to turn to except to the capable ones, the people who have the power to protect
them. Also military power is also used to force out obedience from the people, to carry
out the ruling class demands in exchange for their protection.
Ones culture is also considered. The ruling class is seen as the proponent of the
culture, as this culture perhaps shape out from ones governance. This is also because
they somehow fuse in what they believe in, unconsciously or consciously influencing
their constituents with that belief. Although one could view that cultural aspect is what
binds the ruling class and the subject mass together.
Money is the life of governance. Without funds, it would be impossible for
someone to lead as this fund is important to supply the needs of the society. Also, money
is often equated to power, since money influences how things work in a society.
Decisions are affected by monetary affairs and people would think that if their leaders are
rich, then by electing them, they would also be like them which often do not happen.
Also, political power had been listed as one of the factors. The aspect of political
power in this sense is the experience that they have gained from previous terms they have
served in government posts and offices. It also indicates an individuals authority over his
neighbors. Experiences that could be applied to the current issues and the power to
influence are deemed as something that could only be achieved by those who have a
higher degree or status in the society.
Lastly, the educational background is one of the things people consider, thinking
that if a person had studied in a well-known school, they have learned what the common
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people have not. However, one must be reminded that a good or in this case, the best
education a man had is not a guarantee that he is fitted to be a leader, as having the best
education does not equate to being a good leader. It is up to the person if he would use
what he had learned in a way beneficial to the society or in a way beneficial to himself.
The ten factors mentioned and discussed are viewed as the factors that separate
the ruling class and the general mass, enabling the ruling class to strengthen their hold in
the reins of political power and governance. These factors create the wall that serves as
leverage to those who possess a higher degree or status, thus making them a plausible
candidate for office.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This portion of the research discusses the importance of investigating the existence of
Political Dynasties to the following benefactors:
Legislators. This study will be a good source of information for legislators in case that
they would arrive at a decision to formulate a law regulating the existence of Political
Dynasties in the country. The status quo that persists dictate the acceptance of Political
Dynasties in general though a population does not agree with its persistence and the law
also mentions its prohibition but without sufficient parameters and mechanisms to limit
its interpretation. The law on equal opportunity to serve in the Philippine Government has
been around since the promulgation of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. However, its
formulation does not contain sufficient mechanisms in mitigating the emergence of
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political families who take advantage of the vagueness of the law for their personal
interests. This is the main reason why legislators should take account of this study for
there is a demand for policies and mechanisms to alleviate Political Dynasties. Though
some Political Dynasties do not pose as parasites that slowly gnaw on the system and
manipulate political institutions for their own gains, there are those who enter into
Political Dynasties as means of extending their control over their bulwarks which, in
some cases, has something to do with their persona motives and thus, creating a conflict
of interest between them and the general public. It would be hard for just legislators to
provide the law with the proper mechanisms to stop the pro liferation of Political
Dynasties since even in the legislative body of the government is swarming with these
entities belonging to Political Dynasties. The results of this study will be able to help
legislators in determining if the current existence of Political Dynasties is beneficial or
detrimental to the state. This study will serve as evidentiary support for legislators who
will pursue the creation of such law.
Students of Liberal Arts. Since the topic deals with Political Dynasties, students of
Liberal Arts will find the study helpful in providing a clearer understanding of the
existence of Political Dynasties in the country. The study will benefit them for it will
provide valuable information that may be used for further research. The chapter on
Related Literatures shall prove to be a great source of insights and discussions about the
topic and will provide the needed information for their thesis in case they choose the
same topic as this one. The avid reader would also find this study quite informative for it
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will contain numerous facts and ideas that one may use for class participation. Other than
that, Liberal Arts students may refer to this study in case that there would be instances
like the need of a connotative or denotative definition to a term connected to the topic. It
is important to be familiar with the issues concerning Political Dynasties since it has been
considered unconstitutional but is not properly addressed to the society for the lack of
legal support from specific laws that deal with its prohibition. The study can enlighten
students of Liberal Arts to better understand how the political arena works and the things
that happen within it. Other than that, students of Liberal Arts should have a level of
interest in the topic because it deals about a political phenomenon that has evolved
through time. It is in their field as students of Liberal Arts to be fascinated and intrigued
with these occurrences in the world of politics. Enabling the readers to understand the
topic and letting them provide others with viable information from facts regarding the
study will help in lessening wrong notions about Political Dynasties. These students
should study this topic because it will let them realize that Political Dynasties comprise a
majority of the population in the government and that fact affects how institutions are
being run and how government services are provided for the people. Furthermore,
reading the contents of this study will affect the perspective of these students about the
nature of Political Dynasties. It will educate them greatly about the contribution of the
Spanish and American Colonization Era in the formation of Political Dynasties.
Public. The most important beings that should find time to read this study are the general
public. This is due to the fact that Political Dynasties affect how the government is being
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managed. The government is there to serve the people who are part of the government
should have the capabilities to do so to meet the expectations of the public who voted for
them. This study will help the general readers to understand that Political Dynasties are
not just mere fashion in the realm of politics but as an offshoot of the decisions of the
mass of voting and supporting candidates belonging from Political Dynasties. This study
will inform the public how the rise of Political Dynasties helps shape the country and,
also, how Political Dynasties destroy political institutions for their own gains. This study
will also help the public to understand that inserting relatives into positions in the
government is a form of political strategy that may ultimately lead to the formation of
Political Dynasties. In turn, the public should use the study as a tool to recognize what a
Political Dynasty is and what is not. The public, specially the voting population, should
know when Political Dynasties are used as coercive propaganda and when Political
Dynasties are just present because of the existence of relatives in the government. Also,
the public should also be vigilant of the abuses that members of Political Dynasties make
in their monopoly in the seat of power. The public should not take it lightly and, in fact,
should suggest the Congress to provide policies that would regulate the existence of
abusive Political Dynasties that are rampant in the country. By studying this issue, the
public will know that Political Dynasties are able to manipulate elections as Filipinos
tend to support politicians who treat them as their clients during the campaign period.
Other Researchers. There are many articles regarding Political Dynasties. However, the
researchers of the study found it difficult to collect directly related academic papers or
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thesis that discuss said topic in a broad picture. It is important that the issue in Political
Dynasties to be studied as a mean of providing useful data that would help educate the
public in the current problems that the country is facing. Though technically, the issue on
Political Dynasties does not interest the majority of the population since there is no
support from the media- probably the best way to broadcast its existence as a problem.
That is why the best alternative for this issue to be addressed is for an influx of studies
regarding Political Dynasties and the factors that affect the ir existence. This study will
help researchers in realizing that Political Dynasties from part of the factors on how the
country ended up this way. This study will serve as a reference for these researchers
when conducting their studies.
1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

This study is conducted to determine if Political Dynasties do or do not contribute
positively to the Philippines with respect on how the third and fourth year, tertiary
students from the University of Santo Tomas and the selected representatives from the
Philippine Congress perceives the effects of these Political Dynasties to the Philippine
government. Different factors had been used in this study that were identified as factors
that affects the way on how these chosen few from Political Dynasties are separated from
the general mass and the process on how Political Dynasties are formed.
1. This research will only focus on the analysis of the nature and the contribution of
the political dynasties in the Philippines. The research also studied these
dynasties' behavior and the pattern they use to ensure their existence in the
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political arena. It would not include any other issues under the Philippine
government.
2.
The research is conducted in the First Semester of the Academic Year 2013 and
shall not include in its scope any presumptions of future studies or any other
researches that could affect the aforementioned research.
3. This research is a quantitative-qualitative study and thus, made use of the

questionnaire method and conducted interviews respectively. The respondents for
the research's questionnaire are three hundred and ninety-six (396) students in the
tertiary level from the University of Santo Tomas, Espaa, Manila, who are
currently in their third and fourth year. The number of respondents was measured
using the Slovins formula and distributed to the different colleges and faculties of
the university in accordance to their population. The respondents' year level were
chosen as these year levels were deemed to be the most appropriate when their
age was taken into consideration. The age was taken into consideration to ensure
that the respondents have now the legal capacity to vote and participate in the
elections.
4. The perception of those students from other universities and educational
institutions and those from the primary and secondary level shall not be included
in this research. The researchers had chosen the respondents from the University
of Santo Tomas as these respondents are from different social backgrounds and
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thus, would provide variation in their responses that is deemed appropriate for the
study.
5. The interviewees from the Philippine Congress were selected as they possess
first-hand knowledge about issues and intrigues regarding the existence of
political families monopolizing the different offices and institutions of the
government. The specialization of the congressmen would help the researchers to
identify the factors that greatly affect the process of Political Dynasty building
and would help in the formulation of the researchers ideas in regards to the
nature of the Political Dynasties and their behavior in the Philippines Local and
National government.
1.6 HYPOTHESIS
Ho : Political Dynasties do not contribute positively to the management of the
government and the development of society itself.
H1 : Political Dynasties do contribute positively to the management of the
government and the development of society itself.
1.7 ASSUMPTION OF THE STUDY

There should be a clear statement as to the degree of confidence of the researchers on the
different methods, tools and respondents that they have chosen. These will inevitably
affect the feasibility and validity of the study.
PAGE 23
1. The researchers had assumed that both the respondents and interviewees had
been truthful to their responses and that they are aware of the current issues and
abnormalities that surround the existence of Political Dynasties in the Philippines. Thus,
the researchers did no longer whether or not the respondent and interviewees answered
the queries honestly.
2. Also, there is little need of explanation on the part of the researchers to

elaborate on Republic Act No. 6735, Section 26, Article 2 of the 1987 Philippines
Constitution to the interviewees from the congress as it is expected for legislators and
government officials to be familiar with it.
3. Furthermore, because of the diverse cultural mix of the population of the third
and fourth year college students from the University of Santo Tomas, the researchers
believe that they can provide a wide spectrum o f data as they have different societal
backgrounds.
4. Moreover, it is considered by the researchers that some problems that occur in

the country, such as corruption and poverty, are rooted to the very existence of Political
Dynasties.
5. Lastly, the researchers are confident that the paradigm that they followed is
feasible and helped in the development of their study.
PAGE 24
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
2.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the related literature and studies associated with Political
Dynasties: Political Elites, Political Clans and the dominance of Political Dynasties and
its possible implications to Political Competition. This chapter also discussed historical
accounts that can be treated as the foundation of dynasty building. This also includes
articles that would be useful to outline its possible linkages in the researchers own study
of political dynasty.
This chapter also presents articles with different definition of political dynasty for
further analysis of the true meaning of political dynasty. The researchers also used
foreign literature and studies to determine the different causes of dynasty building in their
country. This foreign literature could be used to correlate the prevalence of political
dynasty in the Philippines and to other countries like Unites States of America.
2.2. RELATED LITERATURE

2.2.1. Role of the Elites in the Politics
Arcilla (2006) discussed the origin of the Political Elites in Philippines. The
Philippines was awarded to the American Government through the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1989 at the end of the Hispano-American Conflict. But the American
Government had no idea of the conditions in the Philippines during their colonialism. In
order to determine and investigate the condition of the Philippines, Jacob G. Schurman
PAGE 25
was assigned to be the head of the commission formed by President McKinley. The
President of the United States that time hoped to plan new program for the new colony.
In the following year, the second commission was formed headed by William H. Taft.
The commissions were formed to provide information to the Filipinos and to assure them
the benefit of a wise and generous protection of life and property 5
The Commission reported to Washington that manila was suffering under a reign
of terror. The city was half-deserted because of fire daily occurrence, the street empty and
gun shots were frequent. Some Americans mysteriously disappeared and some received
threats from the unknown people. Therefore, the American Government conclud ed that
the Anti- American feeling was merely a Tagalog rebellion.
Out of retaliation, few people bravely volunteered to give information about the
Tagalog Rebellion. Some informants came from foreign businessmen residing in
Manila and others were the Filipino ilustrados who concluded that peace with the
Americans was the better alternative that to a bloody fight. The Filipino ilustrados served
to be the spokesmen for the rest of the Philippines
At that time Filipinos were classified into three groups: (1) the Ilustrado elite and
property owner; (2) the middle class or working class like teachers, writers, clerks and
government employees; and (3) the majority of the poor that can be classified as property
less, land less and apathetic to the public issues.
The issue of whether or not the few months of investigation of Schurman were
sufficient for a broad view of the Philippine condition. To strengthen the report of
PAGE 26
Schurman, President McKinley appointed William H. Taft to head the second

commission to execute the program suggested by Schurman. 6
When the Taft Commission arrived in the Philippines of June 1990 and assumed
legislative powers on September that ended the military government established by
Emilio Aguinaldo during the Philippine-American conflict. Tafts commission was also
questionable because he governed the Philippines through the eyes of elite. Some places
in the Philippines wherein peace had returned, the American Government established a
civil government. The first local elections held in 1903 were only for town presidents,
vice-presidents and members of the town councils. Arcilla (2006) indicates the limited
voting or candidacy to the propertied class who had necessary qualifications of: (1)
literacy in either English or Spanish; (2) previously experienced in government service;
and (3) a minimum amount of assets. The limited voters only cover the educated and
wealthy elite, who has effectively controlled by the privileged sectors of the society.
The towns in the Philippines now became monopolized local political power. For
example in Taal, Batangas the people who assumed power in the government were the
town presidents who had also been members of the past principalia for nine successive
years. While in Pampanga 13 out of 20 town presidents were former local
gobernadorcillos or their relatives. In this view, Political Dynasties were clearly
emerging under the new American democracy in the Philippines.
Schurman report in Reports of the Philippine Co mmission, I. p 185

Schurman suggested having a civil government having a bicameral leg islation.
Schurman s commissions were intended only to give information to the ilustrados.
6
PAGE 27
These issues were neither surprising nor unexpected. Abuse of authority was
common, the town presidents became dictators and there were fees charged for
government services that were supposedly free. In fact, the Philippines has not yet
overcome the Spanish Colonization for more than 300 years and still imply its PreHispanic traditions like utang na loob that persisted today as the lagay system. Higher
budgetary allocations were approved for the salaries of the municipal officials, while the
school teachers were not given a just compensation. There was no budget allocation also
for basic infrastructure. The local treasury was appointed by the provincial governor who
was usually an American. These issues occurred is not surprising because of the Spanish
colonization for more than 300 years Filipinos were not allowed to be part of the p ublic
administration.
It was the year 1903 when almost half or 50% of the town elections were reported
to be dishonest. An example of this stated in the article was the election in Tiwi, Albay
wherein Ramon Morales won the town presidential elections over Pantaleon Azcuna with
95 votes to 64. The Provincial Board annulled the results because unqualified voters had
been allowed to vote. This kind of incidents triggered the Americans to conclude and
made decisions that Filipinos were not still capable of self-rule because they lacked basic
moral integrity. The Filipinos reacted by an Anti-American campaign in the Manila
newspapers and wanted a national independence.
The idea of forming political party can resolve issues between the FilipinoAmerican conflicts. Taft approved some ilustrados to organize the Partido Federalista,
PAGE 28
the first political party in the Philippines. The founders 7 believed that Peaceful union to
the American Government can resolve economic development until the Americans
consider the idea of independence. A younger party reacted and formed their other
political party called the Partido Nacionalista with the platform of urgent and complete
independence. The Nacionalistas became the majority party and won all the national
elections led by Manuel L. Roxas and Sergio Osmea.
William H. Taft was the first Civil Governor of the Philippines and took office on
July 4, 1901. During his reign as the Civil Governor the Cooper Act had provided that a
national census should be taken, after which national elections for the National Assembly
should take place. The lower legislative body will be acted by the National Assembly.
The upper is the Philippine Commission, while Taft and Schurman would represent the
Philippines before the Washington Government.
The national elections occurred in 1907 that 81 representatives were voted into
the Assembly. Almost all the new Assemblymen came from aristocratic families and the
first Philippine Legislature was clearly composed of countrys elite.
The study conducted by Arcilla (2006) can help the researchers study about Political
Dynasties in order for them to determine the roots of Political dynasty. Today, more than
a century after the establishment of the Political Democracy, the politics in the
Philippines are governed by family dynasties. But these Political leaders involving in the
family dynasty can offer the people good governance or a change in government? The
PAGE 29
researchers think of their membership in the family of politicians become the key for
personal advancement and personal political power but not for the welfare of the society.
2.2.2. The Public and the Private in Conte mporary Philippine Society: A Study on
Political Dynasties
Sison (2006) discussed a Study on Political Dynasties on what such culture
considers as public and private. The scholars considered three different accounts of what
is Political Culture: 1.) Scholars Pye & Verba (1965) talked about of the system of
empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values; 2.) Almond & Powell (1966) referred
to the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations towards politics among the
members of a political system; and 3.) Berger & Luckmann (1966) theories from the
Sociology of Knowledge to understand the subjective realm of politics. These accounts
are too broad to define what political culture is. Political Culture can be referred to
Political attachments towards the nation and its symbols. There are specific knowledge,
feelings and beliefs about political institutions. There can be brief views about specific
political policies, issues, programs, personalities and events.
The author considered integrative elements that were not necessarily exclusive to
the Filipinos nor shared by all of them. But in the authors article, some relatively
important and dominant factors which provide a general explanation and interpretation of
political behavior were given to support the researchers study on Political Dynasty. One
of its factors was the co-relative notion of public and private space. Sison (2006)
7
Trinidad Hermenegildo Pardo de Tavera, Ben ito Legarda and Jose de Lu zurriaga.
PAGE 30
discussed this based on the observation of (Roces & Roces 1985) that Traditional Filipino
kinship patterns developed a lenient attitude about helping oneself to a family members
goodies. The researchers thought of this observation that Filipinos do not think of public
space as being shared community asset. There may be vital areas which are subject to
public and private domain that reveals the countrys political culture.
These issues were only one of the arising factors on dynasty building. The major
issues discussed in the article were the May 8, 1995 elections for Senate, Congress and
Local Government which really concerned the Political Dynasties. Just before the end
of December 1994 former Lt. Col. Proceso Maligalig 8 urged the Philippine Government
to enact a new election code that prohibits Political Dynasties. President Ramos appealed
to the congress decide on the new election code, other bill such as Guingona bill and
Palacol bill bothe seeks for the ban of Political Dynasties in the Senate and in the House
respectively, were already introduced. But the House Speaker, Speaker Jose de Venecia,
Jr. said that it will not be easy to pass a bill prohibiting Political Dynasties because a lot
of family dynasty will get affected.
The earliest mention of political dynasties in contemporary Philippine society
that can be found in the 1986 Constitution, Article II Declaration of Principles and State
Policies section 26: The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. But the law does not
stop the Family Dynasties from elected in the public office. One of the political dynasties
mentioned in the article is the Ramos-Shahani clan based in Pangasinan wherein former
PAGE 31
President Fidel V. Ramos, former Senate President Pro Tempore Leticia Ramos-Shahani
(sister of Fidel) and former Vice Governor Ranjit R. Shahani (Leticias son) elected to a
public office. Another one family dynasty is the Joson clan based on Nueva Ecija.
Eduardo Joson, Sr. the first governor of Nueva Ecija in 1959 and stayed in the position
when he was appointed by Aquino Government. In 1988 elections the Joson, Sr. regained
governorship. On the other hand, Eduardo Nonato Joson, II was the representative of the
first district of Nueva Ecija and Eduardo Joson III was the vice- mayor of Cabanatuan,
still in Nueva Ecija.
These families are two only of the dominating political family in the Philippines.
And up to now, these traditional surnames of politicians are very evident in the Philippine
Government. It is not surprising that until the next generation the people will still see the
names of these families in the Government.
Political dynasty in the Philippines can be viewed as by emphasis on the very strong
family ties that the extended family is the most important social and economic unit in
the Philippines. The dominance of Family Dynasty in Politics can be observed by the one
of the factors presented by Sison (2006), specifically the system of empirical beliefs,
expressive symbols and values. The researchers thought of this as the main point
because Family Ties falls on values and beliefs, wherein each family member can have
a role to strengthening and upholding their family pride and can be a symbolism of their
accomplishment. However, the Kinship is traced through the fathers and the mothers
8
Spokesman for the rebel soldier group RAM (Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabayan)
PAGE 32
ancestral lines are broadened because of the ties of blood and marriage and also ritual
from being a sponsor in wedding, baptism and confirmations.
The study conducted by Sison (2006) can help the researchers study about Political
Dynasties in order for them to determine the one of the factors affecting the building of
Family dynasties in the Philippine Government. This study allows the researchers to raise
a couple of points for the deliberation of the righteousness or wrongness of political
dynasties.
2.2.3. Diminished Democracy: How long will this hold? Politics in the Philippines
According to Ignacio (2009) the Philippines presents a unique model of
democracy in Asia. The author pointed out the foundation ideals of its uniqueness of
freedom, liberty, and equality that is implanted in the consciousness of the Filipinos.
Democracy is healthy, tough, and natural in the country. Its principles are obvious in the
freedom being enjoyed by the citizens, the distribution of authority among the three
branches of government, a functioning public service, a growing middle class, regular
elections that elects officials from the national up to the local position, supreme power of
civilian over the military power, earning money because of OFWs and having no external
or internal threat to its security, peace and order. These ideals are good to maintain
democracy in ones country, but it faces threats from the people who are supposed to
maintain it: namely, the politicians. The author gave four combination on how the
politicians exercise their authorities, these governance-politics are; 1.) Good governance-
PAGE 33
good politics; 2.) Good governance-bad politics; 3.)Bad governance- good politics and;
4.) Bad governance-bad politics. These combinations may happen depending on the
leaders holding the reign of authority. The author gave an example of one of the
governance-politics happened in the Philippines, the bad governa nce-bad politics. It was
the Marcos regime between 1972 and 1986, where the basic rights of the people and
freedom were suspended. Bad governance when Former President Marcos put the
Philippines under Martial Law and Bad politics when Benigno Aquino, Jr. was
assassinated in order to regain authority.
Another threat argued in the article that can diminish democracy in the
Philippines is the Electoral Politics. Many issues of immoral, unlawful, and expensive
practices have arisen in electoral politics. Elec tion Laws are supposed to guide the
conduct of elections and prescribe parameters for the political parties and candidates but
continuously violated over the past 25 years. Elections are essential to democratic
governance. Because of elections, politicians are the ones who are held responsible for
their actions. Philippines electoral politics have enlisted the nature of clientelism,
nepotism, fraud or even violence. This issue is not new to the Philippine Government
because it has been traditionally done and being adapted by generation.
The article also gave an analysis on how politicians rule the country. Elections are
attended by festive and expensive campaigns, professional political strategists, isolated
violence like killing and ambushes and violation of election rules. In addition, the author
stand for that there are two kinds of Politicians: the winners and the cheated.
PAGE 34
The author also argued other reprehensible happening in the Electoral Politics it
includes the continuous reign of political po wer wherein it is concentrated within a few
families that having their spouse, children and siblings occupying public office at the
same time. It leaves a narrow road for those able and gifted leaders of the country whose
clan has never been heard of in the field of politics. The author also cited seven Ms of
dynasty building from investigative journalists: money, machine, media, marriage,
murder, myth and merger (alliances) these seven Ms can be a factor of dynasty building
but few of it has to critically assess like the murder, not all Political Clan committed
murder in order to gain authority. One best example is the Aquino Dynasty; they are from
family dynasty but have not committed any murder. Another dynasty building involves
the entry of the celebrity politics- having movie stars, TV, radio and media personalities
entering the politics and seated in public office because of their popularity. There are
many good people who are capable of leading the country, but the voters tend to keep on
electing officials who are known, those who have a celebrity name, and those who have
brought influence to the public. These voters must critically assess the candidates
credibility of they are really worth it of a position in the government.
The family dynasty became toxic in the Philippine Politics. There must be a clear
distinction between politics and show business in the Philippines. Today, many actors,
actresses, and other showbiz personalities entered politics. For example, Aga Muhlach
who ran for a congressional seat in Camarines Sur province, unfortunately defeated by
Wimpy Fuentebella. Showbiz personalities credibility to hold a public office is
PAGE 35
questionable to others because they lack knowledge in running a government. Political

positions must be as valuable as show business because more and more entertainers are
choosing the politics.
The study conducted by Ignacio (2009) can help the researchers study about political
dynasties in the Philippines in order to determine if the building of Political Dynasties
can be one of the factors as stated in the article to diminish democracy. Also, to find out
why politics and governance are complicated enough for lawyers, administrators,
economists, accountants, businessmen, and other professions that have more credible
reputation in running a public office.
2.2.4. Restoration or Transformation? Trapos versus NGOs in the Democratization

of the Philippines
Eaton (2003) discussed that the central argument of this article is that Philippine
civil society in the years since the democratic change has largely been not permitted from
playing the kinds of characters necessary for the consolidation of democracy. The
capability of the civil society actors to partake meaningfully in the making policy remains
quite constrained
despite of increasing partnership
with bureaucrats
in the
implementation of government policies. Many of these actors have continued to perform

the same forms of oppositional positions under Marcos regime, like protest against
politicians in the society of politics. The issues, this article wants to express is not to a
large extent that civil-society actors have been reluctant to involve their selves in
PAGE 36
substantive policy debates but, relatively, that traditional actors in political society have
aggressively used their positions of authority to interrupt new participatory roles for the
civil society.
The author discussed the article by parts to easily extract and track the sequential
details. Eaton (2003) pointed out that Civil Society has broad definitions. It lays every
actor between the family and the state. The author adapted the study of McCoy (1994)
that there is unequal distribution of economical and political power in the Philippines and
to the extent elite family clans have traditionally dominated the policymaking. NGOs
play an important role in the civil society because of their attempt to give voice to lowerincome groups. The author described NGOs as the most critical civil-society actor and as
a core component of civil society. Political society is defined in the article as the arena
in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise
control over public power and the state apparatus. The author pointed out democracy
requires a political society composed primarily of career politicians and political parties.
In the Philippines, the reason behind of really damaging the society is the continuous
emergence and dominance of members of traditional elite families. In the article, it was
the year 1992 wherein members of traditional political clan occupied almost threequarters of the legislators elected to the Lower House, the House of Representatives. The
articles tend to demonstrate that traditional politicians have opposed the transformative
PAGE 37
features of the evolution and have required as a replacement for restoration of pre-1972
politics. 9
Another highlight of the article is the Authoritarian Interlude from 1972 to 1986.
It deals with the legacy of the authoritarian government for succeeding democratic
regimes. The author define this phenomena as directly relevant to the Philippines
although Asian country cases have not yet figured it significant due to the lack of past
experience with democracy. Re-democratization, traditional political parties have
reclaimed their essential roles in the national political systems even though there were
attempts by the authoritarian government to destroy the democratization. The sub article
gave to main point that helped to illuminate democratization in the Philippines. First,
former President Marcos retained the clientelist structure of Philippine Politics. Marcos
closed the Philippine Congress in 1972, when the trapos opposed the attempt of Marcos
to stay in power. Marcos moved to appropriate business interest of the elites throughout
the Philippines having closed off the traditional elites chief policymaking venue.
Marcos created a new set of cronies dependent on favorable state policy instead of to use
the available resources to construct the organizations of a developmental state. The
second point is that Marcos neither inherited nor created important corporatist structures.
It is stated in the article that Labor Unions in the Philippines have been historically very
weak as political actors and Marcos failed to organize labor under martial law in ways
that would have misrepresented patterns of intervention after the democratic transition. In
The predominantly rural social base of the trapos, in contrast to the largely urban social base of the NGOs,
means that conflicts between trapos and NGOs in the Philippines often reflect deep rural -urban conflicts.
PAGE 38
1978, the Marcos administration agreed to hold elections for a national assembly. All
members of the House of Representatives were elected in small, single- member districts
that traditional political families dominated through the well-established patronage
networks. The 1978 elections when Marcos insisted the use of multimember districts in
which Marcos made use of a formula that would make the political system more
comprehensive. Three major developments in the late 1960s and 1970s led to the
broadening of civil society through a remarkable number of NGOs. First, the Vatican
Council 1962-1965 changed the traditional conservative image of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines through the establishment of social action centered in each diocese of the
country. The transformation in its behavior had consequences for civil society. Second,
the economic conditions in the Philippines worsened in the 1970s and triggered the
appearance of urban NGOs 10 . Lastly, the Marcos government provoked important social
movements 11 that lead to political exclusion, repression and ultimately produced scores of
NGOs. This confusion in civil society provided a severe difference with the continued
practice of clientelism by Marcos and indicated that re-democratization in 1986 would be
something other than a simple return to pre-1972 politics.
The author also highlighted the Anti-Dynasty Bill that tends to discuss the case of
the partylist system; legislators passed a legislation that weakened the scope for political
reforms. Many of the same NGOs that were active in the partylist debate also focused
their efforts on the attempt to abolish political dynasties. The NGOs stand for the
10
Zone One Tondo Organization (Constantino-David 1998)

A mong these movements were student movement, the human rights movement and the national
democratic movement aligned with the underground communists insurgency.
11
PAGE 39
dominance of powerful and elite families in Congress have resulted in the

institutionalized legislation of laws biased in the traditional political families. This
became a issue and broke up the long-established political dynasties proved to be a direct
assault to the interests of traditional politicians than adding partylist representatives to
the Congress. Throughout the Philippines, the spouses, children, parents and relatives of
legislators can do take their place at the national level. In addition, because of the
legislators are simply restricted to three consecutive terms rather than three terms in a
lifetime, the members of well-established political families can cycle back and forth
between national and local offices.
One of the central ironies of the contemporary period in the Philippines is that,
although the civil society has appeared as the chief defense against a return to Marcosstyle politics. On the ther hand, politicians have successfully threatened other aspec ts of
the constitution that were designed to allow NGOs to shift their energies from the streets
to real decision- making bodies. Civil society has developed the potency essential to
prevent a repeat of the breakdown of democracy that occurred in the early 1970s.
Traditional actors in political society, though, have conserved the strength necessary to
deny nontraditional actors a more institutionalized space in the political arena. And the
result is a political system that sometimes appears deadlocked, unable to overcome the
considerable obstacles that hinder democratic consolidation.
This article will help the researchers own study about Political dynasties that
despite changes, however, the imposition of term limits and adaptation of
decentralization are closely related phenomena in the Philippines. Though there is a
PAGE 40
failure to establish an anti-dynasty legislation important political reforms are bound to

reveal another reforms for the benefit of the Philippine politics.
2.2.5. Philippine Politics in Town, District, and Province: Bossism in Cavite and
Cebu
Sidel (1997) argued in the article to reflect neither the strength (or the decline) of
patron-client relations nor the resilience and rule of a landed oligarchy, but rather the
typical institutional structures of the Philippine State, particularly those established
during the crucial decades of American colonial rule. The American colonial rule in the
Philippines basically extended the Spanish-era organization of private control over the
states local coercive and agencies through the subornation of a national state system to
provincial and national level elected officials. The elections to the municipal offices were
restricted from the right to suffrage held in 1901, followed by the provincial governors in
1902, representatives to the national Philippine Assembly in 1907, an American-style of
bicameral legislature in 1916 and the Commonwealth presidency in 1935. The author
pointed out that the spirit of Spanish-era retained in the American rule because the
elected municipal presidentes, at present time called mayors, has the powers over local
law-enforcement, public works and taxation. While the elected governor enjoyed kind of
similar law-enforcement and taxation powers at the provincial level, the representatives
gained control over the legislatures. The subordination of municipal, provincial, and
national agencies of the state apparatus to elected officials joint with the onset of
primitive capital growth and the growing role of the colonial state in the economy to
PAGE 41
facilitate the emergence and entrenchment of colonial-era proto-bosses in a variety of

localities and at different levels of state power.
The author gave an example of this bosses in the Philippines. The provincial
boss Manuel Tinio of Nueva Ecija used his influence and his control over the local
government machinery that includes the police forces, justices of the peace and the Court
of the Land Registration to obtain more of landholdings and to build up a province-wide
political machine. In Negros Occidental, the sugar planters acted and seated as the
congressmen and senators in the legislature because of their landownership many times
over and having generous loans from the Philippine National Bank in order to process
sugar canes that helps the economy to grow. The Commonwealth era received bad
feedback from one historian as he described the government near total control of the
bosses in the legislature and judiciary and through government corporations that
considerable control over the national economy.
The author described bossism and bosses the dominance of local power
brokers who attained and sustained monopolistic control over both coercive and
economic resources within given territorial jurisdictions. As stated in the article Bosses
are not simply large landowners who won elective offices through the control over of
local economies of scale. In addition, the post war Philippines experienced several
different kinds of bosses in municipalities, congressional districts and province s all over
in the Philippine archipelago. The bosses have dominated and succeeded in establishing
PAGE 42
themselves when and where the so-called commanding heights12 of the local economy
and have let themselves to engage in monopolistic control.
The author used the province of Cavite and Cebu as an example of the bossism
in the municipalities, congressional districts and provincial levels. The study in these two
provinces offered new insights for the better understanding of boss rule in the
Philippines. Both provinces offer many examples of protracted boss and dynastic rule at
the municipal, district and provincial levels despite of possession of ample plantation
belts or huge concentrations of landownership. Furthermore, the difference between the
establishment of single-generation bosses in Cavite and the prolonged existence of
multigenerational dynasties in Cebu suggested the significance of the study for
comparison of so-called warlords and political clans to a different place in the
Philippines.
The Cebu Province located at the Central Visayas is known for its dry,
mountainous interior, a major regional port and manufacturing center. Cebu is also
known in coconut and nipa groves, a small sugar plantation belt, extensive mining,
poultry and fishing industries. Those characteristics of Cebu helped the province to have
steady inflow of foreign and domestic capital that also transformed the region into a
major location for tourism and manufacturing in Visayas. Those attributes of Cebu is
truly remarkable that can help the tourism in the Philippines but when it comes to the
politics, Cebu is one of the provinces dominated by local families, clan families, or
12
The "most important" or "strategic elements" of an economy, including primarily those industries which
provide goods/services that are essential for other industries to operate (e.g., transportation, energy,
financial markets, etc.)
PAGE 43
family dynasties. The local elite families in Cebu owning a huge corn fields, coconut
groves and sugar plantations and has the control over the trading networks, rural banks
build up alliances with other local notable and Cebu city based politicians. This network
served as the resources for electoral competition in Cebu. Also, the shifting of alliances
and factional rivalries between local clans has reigned in most towns. However, with the
combination of wealth and power, the families were able to control over the economic
and political situation in Cebu. Sidel (1997) gave specific example in the being of Isidro
Escario, 13 Escario succeeded in using the mayors powers to assume regulatory and
proprietary control over the authority of Bantayans local economy and pass the smalltown to his family in dynasty form. Escario is only one of the families who established
family dynasty in politics.
Meanwhile in the provincial level, the Osmea clasn has remained at the centers
of politics in both Cebu City and Cebu Province. It was the prewar period when Sergio
Osmea, Sr. represented the Cebu City in the national legislature for five terms. Osmea,
Sr. also served as Vice President from 1935-1944 and became president from 1944 until
1946 of the Commonwealth era. While his son, Sergio Osmea, Jr. served to be the
Cebus provincial governor, Cebu City Mayor, Cebu 2nd district representative and
senator. The revival of Osmea family has seen a third generation to take power, it was
the post-Marcos era when Osmea, Jr. s son Tomas won the successive term as the Cebu
City Mayor and a second son and two nephews occupied the provincial governorship and
congressional and senatorial seats, respectively. The Osmea family before assumed
PAGE 44
powers has used their close ties to the urban commercial elite of Cebu City in order to
maintain their preeminent position in Cebu. Sergio Osmea, Sr. won the support of a
Chinese Mestizo because of the establishment of the local commercial elite. The Osmea
clan has successfully to establish family dynasty used this for winning the majority of
positions in the government like in local, congressional, provincial and national elections.
The family has expanded their influence throughout Cebu Province using the national
state patronage to establish a network of small town notables loyal to the city-based
clans.
The author argued that over the generations, the Osmeas have used their access
to state patronage and control over the local resources to enhance and to enlarge their
familys properties in Cebu. The presence of Chinese mestizos helped to dominate the
copra and corn trade throughout the Visayas and Mindanao region and the shipping
industry of the entire Philippine archipelago. These Chinese mestizos have by and large
supported, befriended, and on occasion intermarried with the Osmea clan, while
refraining from entering Cebu politics themselves. In exchange, the Osmeas have
provided these dynasties access to government financing and contracts and guaranteed
friendly regulation of their business operation.
The province of Cavite primarily known to be one of the rice-bowl provinces also
has banana, corn and sugar cane. The author also argued family dynasty dominated in the
Province of Cavite. But not all family who wishes to establish family dynasty succeed.
13
A small-town polit ical operator of relatively modest means who first won the mayorship in 1937.
PAGE 45
The author gave example in the being of Cesar Casal, who is a long time municipal
mayor from 1955-1979 and a provincial board member failed to secure a position for his
family. Over the years, Casal also took abundant advantage of his mayoral discretionary
powers over Carmona's more than three hundred hectares of prime "communal" rice land,
which since the late Spanish-era has been parceled out through a lottery to residents of
the municipality. Those Carmona residents fortunate enough to win parcels of communal
land have found themselves effectively dependent on and indebted to former Mayor
Casal for provision of irrigation as well as capital, with Casal assuming effective property
rights over their parcels in exchange for cash payments and labor services or offering
credit and agricultural inputs in exchange for a share of the harvest. In addition, through
ownership of a local rice mill, shares in the town's rural bank, the local franchise from a
major fertilizer company, and control over the town's quota at a nearby sugar mill, Casal
has come to occupy a central role in Carmona's economy. As with the Escarios of
Bantayan, in Cebu City, occasional challenges to Casal's preeminence have been
effectively suppressed, with his own fortune and supportive provincial political allies
bankrolling the vote-buying, intimidation, and violence necessary for electoral victory.
Both in Cavite and Cebu, the bosses have emerged and established themselves
although it is still lacking to use these provinces for the representation of the whole
Philippines. There are still many family dynasties that have authority that at the same
time is wealthy and own properties that can be a resource for tourism in the Philippines.
The researchers stand for this article is that the main predators have been elected
PAGE 46
government officials and their allies, who through a system of bossism have retained
control over the state apparatus throughout the twentieth century.
This article will help the researchers own study about Political dynasties in order for
them to determine another factors, phenomena, or reasons on the establishment of
political dynasties. This article can give information on a specific place where the
building of dynasty is common. The researchers also think of Cebu and Cavite as one of
the emerging provinces in terms of growing political clans.
2.2.6. Family Ties and Political Participation

Alesina and Guiliano (2011) conducted a study about family ties and their
political participation. The authors argued that the concept of politics is not simply voting
in elections, joining political groups, and political strikes, writing letter to representatives
and attending political meetings but it has a broader definition that one must critically
asses. The authors also adapted a study by Banfield, wherein Banfield defined amoral
familism.14 Banfield argued that this amoral familism leads to low well- functioning
political institutions and created a situation where politics is simply a private affair of
those who control it, the common goods are completely disregarded and low interest in
political affairs. In the article, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) argued the relationship
between family ties and political participation. The argument presented in the article
involves the lack of political participation and generalized trust that it is transmitted from
PAGE 47
parents to children in strong family ties within the society. The authors wanted the
readers to understand that once this political attitude is acquired, it will tend to pass on
generation to generation. The author also argued that the attitude of dissatisfaction with
politics do not vary with the fortunes of specific parties or candidates. This argument
presented by the authors are sort of negative attitudes towards politics and if this will still
continue to the next generation, the possibility of democracy in the Philippines will
declined because of abusive use of privilege.
In the article, the authors have measured the strength of family ties to the extent of
different cultures family members are closely tied together. The authors argued that this
amoral familism is the reason of extreme in the direction of strong family ties, which
family members tend to participate in matter of social connections. The author cited an
example of Northern European culture, in which family ties and social capital is
relatively poor while trust and political participation is dominating. But social capital
includes political participation and civic engagement. This remains a question and its
roots and origin have to discuss more to determine the evolution of social capital over
time.
Another argument presented is Cultural Values. A cultural value is an explanatory
variable of political participation. In fact, cultural values like the structure of a family are
very stable as of today. The parents teach their children about values of trusting only the
family, or trusting others, for instance.
14
Social equilib riu m in which people exclusively trust their immed iate family.
PAGE 48
The authors wanted to point out that family ties are not bad and life satisfaction
and happiness are positively contributing with strong family ties. Strong or weak family
ties are neither bad nor good but they have different function in the society and social
implications. The effects of family ties contributed in political participation. For example,
some family dynasties in the Philippine context, the researchers wanted to explain t hat
these family members who ran for public office is more likely want to continue their
familys legacy in public service. Legacy can be viewed as one of the effects of family
ties because they value their family they respect what their family is being known for. In
this regard, family ties are good because of good purpose.
The authors of the article presented determinants of political behavior. One of
these determinants presented were demographic such as age, gender, race, and especially
education. A persons political involvement may start at a young age. Age can be a vague
determinant, since young people should be more militant. An example in the Philippine
politics is the Sangguniang Kabataan15 or (Youth Council) wherein a teen aging 15 to 18
at the time of election is elected in public office. For the researchers point of view 15
years of age is very young to start running a public office. For example, Mayor
Rhoderick Dondon Alcala 16 started as Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairman came
from a prominent political clan in the Province of Quezon. The question is, what if the
current mayor of Lucena City did not came from a political clan. Can he still win the SK
elections? The answer may be a yes or a no, but the researchers wanted to point out that,
15
Is a youth legislature in every local co mmunity

Lucena City, Quezon Province Mayor. Nephew of Proceso Alcala, a representative of 2 nd District in
Lucena.
16
PAGE 49
his belongingness to family of politicians can be one of the reason why people voted for
him to be the SK chairman. Education appears to be the most significant determinant of
political interest as it is the alternative for both information and civic virtues. A male or a
female can be involved in politics. And we all know that, men are always more interested
in politics and more active in political activities. But as of today, female has already a
role in the politics.
The authors concluded that individuals with strong family ties do not engage
much in political activity and are generally less interested in politics. But it is Amoral
Familism that contributed to a family to be involved in politics, because of this extreme
version of family ties the society misunderstood the concept a politician from a family
dynasty that is following his ancestors family oriented legacy. The authors have
emphasized how the structure of family and family ties in particular.
The study conducted by Aesina and Giuliano (2011) can help the researchers study on
Political Dynasties in the Philippines because the articles argument is be able to present
two kinds of family ties that has an impact to the society, specifically to the political
society. A family ties that is helpful to the development of the society and an extreme one
(amoral familism) that can be the reason of dominance of family dynasty in the
Philippines.
PAGE 50
2.2.7. The Left, Elections, and the Political Party system in the Philippines
According to Quimpo (2005) one of the hallmarks of a democracy in a country is
having a regular, free and fair election. Democracy as a procedural approach by Joseph
Schumpeter is virtually equated with free and fair elections and the existence or
nonexistence of such elections can be regarded as means of deteriorating democratic
governments from others. In the article, the Philippine passed the standards on having a
democracy. Specifically after the Marcos regime because of the people power in
February 1986 17 together with the holding of elections the following year, the Philippine
became an example of the restoration of democracy. But many scholars, however,
criticized the post-Marcos democracy as elite democracy, oligarchic democracy, a
weak state captured by the landed elite and foreign capital, a patriarchal oligarchic state
and a boss state, respectively.
Many political parties and electoral systems have been dominated by members of
the elite, ever since the Philippines were under colonialism. The countrys major political
parties were represented by the members of the elite. Particularly, the post-Marcos parties
have been the reflection of unclear character of the Philippine political party system.
Relating most politicians with the patronage, Filipinos often refer to politicians as
trapos18 short for traditional politicians. In the case in pre- martial law times, the post1986 elections have focused more on the candidates personalities, background and
wealth rather than on the issues or ideology. A political scientist cited by Quimpo (2005)
17
18
EDSA Revoultion I
Trapo means a dirty old rag
PAGE 51
claimed that Philippines democracy remain weak because of the mismatch between
formal institutions 19 and entrenched informal institutions of politics patronage. For more
understanding of the real context of democracy, the author argued, the involvement
against the grain of traditional informal institutions and establishing political parties
based on programmatic politics. The restoration of democracy after the Marcos regime,
some space has been created for new political actors to challenge the control of political
clans and to engage in issue and not personality oriented politics.
One of the authors arguments in the article is the electoral challenge of the left 20
to the traditional politicians and the traditional parties. The author argued that the left has
not made much progress in breaking the domination of the trapos over the post-Marcos
era political party and electoral system. The left still holds an instrumental rather that an
integral view of democratic processes and institutions. The instrumental and integral
approach to electoral politics discussed as the shift from dictatorship to democracy. For
example, the Marcos regime after 20 years of power shifted to democracy by means of
people power against the dictatorship.
The Left and Elections before EDSA I were discussed in the article. The author
argued that Elections have long been one of the weakest elements of the Philippine Left.
Quimpo (2005) cited a work of Randolf David that one of the main reasons why the left
has never won power in the Philippines it is because the deep entrenchment tradition of
refusal by progressive elements to engage in electoral struggles. The tradition is referred
19
Free elections, universal suffrage and free expression, etc.

Co mmun ists and Co mmunist Party aligned national democrats as well as social democrats and
independent socialists.
20
PAGE 52
back when the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) founded in 1986. CPP
members, most of them during the Marcos era agreed to boycotted elections, but the
social democrats (SDs), another left group opposed to boycott the elections.
Another argument in the article is the Local Elections. Since 1998, the media
attention to the lefts participation in electoral politics has tended to focus on the partylist ballot. The overall partylist system has made much of an impact on the trapo system.
The traditional politicians represented different section of the elite that they dominated
majority of the positions in both House of Representatives and Senate. To develop
themselves nationally, left parties need to win at least one seat in Congress through the
partylist system. The crucial electoral battle for the left parties and groups has been
dominated by the trapos which the author argued that these trapos merely controlled
Congress and of the Political system. The researchers point of view in this phenomenon
is that the left parties must build relationship, ties or even networks between at t he
municipal level. The trapos have already built their own that it was easy for them to win a
congressional seat. In addition, these trapos were not only traditional politicians from the
elite sectors but also from the political family dynasty.
The local elections associated with the municipal, city and provincial elections.
The Philippine elections are also popular in terms of Barangay and youth elections.
Barangay that served as the little government within a community and youth elections
such as Sangguniang Kabataan between the age of fifteen and eighteen years of age
served as the voice of the youth in the society, have separate elections from the local
elections. Like the trapo parties, many left parties have also participated in the barangay
PAGE 53
and youth elections. The invasion of left parties to the barangay and youth elections
triggered to be a hospot during election period. Moreover, the election-related violence
is often attributed to trapos.
Local elections are only part of the Philippine Electo ral system in the Philippines.
The author gave more argument in the bigger and main electoral arena, the national level.
The left parties also fought for a position in the national level against the trapos. It is in
the regular elections where a candidate of alternative politics comes face to face with the
heart of trapo politics. The trapos built and developed clientelist ties with their supporters
not just during the elections but became part of their daily routine in order to assure for
public office at the time a trapo run for office.
The researchers analysis in this article is that the left has a long way to go before it will
be able to break the domination of the trapos in the Philippine electoral politics. Until
those who patronize the trapos will be awakened on the reality that the traditional
politician already dominated the country in terms of governance and to be able to fully
understand the real essence of elections. This issue is neither surprising nor new because
as of the recent election, Political clans used the partylist system as another way through
which their members of the family gained access into Congress.
The study conducted by Quimpo (2005) can help the researchers own study on Political
dynasties in the Philippines because political dynasty may be incorporated with the
traditional politician. In some cases, traditional politician came from a political dynasty,
like Joseph Ejercito Estrada, who became the mayor of San Juan for seventeen years, a
PAGE 54
senator for a term, Vice President under former president Fidel V. Ramos, 13 th president
of the Philippines, ran again in the 2010 elections as president and now the Mayor of
Metro Manila. Another is the argument in the article of left parties who wanted political
reforms but struggled to gain authority because of the prevalence of traditional
politicians.
2.2.8. Oligarchic Patrimonialism, Bossism, Electoral Clientelism, and Contested

Democracy in the Philippines
Quimpo (2005) examines the article by interpreting the Philippine Politics as
patrimonial oligarchic state, bossism and clientelist electoral regime as well as the
challenges posed to oligarchic, boss or clientelist rule by the Communist Party of the
Philippines. The Philippine politics were interpreted in different ways particularly in
Contemporary Philippines wherein the variations of elite democracy.
A sizable portion of the Philippine government is composed of people who, in the
social hierarchy, belong to the upper-class. Members of the upper-class constitute of
elites who have the necessary amount of wealth, influence, power and capabilities to
secure a seat in the government. Elites play a major role in Philippine politics as political
and social analysts believe that they have the necessary means to steer all aspects of the
state which may inevitably lead to the fruition of their personal plans and motives. This
assumption provides us with a vague and arguable impression about the nature of
Philippine politics. Quimpo provides us with theoretical analyses on the matter. In the
article, one of the interpretations of Philippine politics is characterized by its foundation
PAGE 55
from patron-client ties or other personal relationships that foster mutual assistance and
trust. A perspective dissenting the major influence of elite groups in the government was
also argued due to the point that it is foreign interest that greatly influenced the country.
The recurring argument, however, remains on the mal-development of the country due to
the monopoly of elites in the government.
The publics patrimonial support to politicians helped kindle the reign of powerful
elites. Quimpo mentions that the Philippines is a patrimonial oligarchic state. The
government is ran by a random few who are likely elites that possess their own
businesses but requires access to state machineries in order to gather resources as well as
legal and military protection. Moreover, John Sidel argues that not only is the Philippine
government a target of oligarchical plunder, it also falls prey to predatory mechanisms. A
predatory state is vulnerable for private exploitation of all forms of its resources. The
public is also targeted for control through coercion which, according to Sidel, has been
effective in the manipulation of elections, distortion of the economy and affect social
relations. Heading this predatory regime as mentioned by Sidel are bosses who control
coercive and economic resources within their marked territories or bailiwicks. This
oligarchic mechanism is further defined by Hutchcroft as a social organiza tion which
strength relies on wealth and has the tendency to change over time.
In another study, it has been observed that clientelism has long been part of
Philippine history. Jennifer Franco asserts that clientelism persists because of the
existence of local authoritarian territories. This pervading circumstance, according to
Franco, allows the democracy to fall short. Franco and Sidel both agree with the
PAGE 56
influence of coercion in local politics. Franco terms this political narrative as

authoritarian clientelism, which she describes, according to Jonathan Fox, a situation
where there is an imbalance in the
bargaining relations among politically subordinate
clients which is fortified with the threat of coercion.

These political narratives studied by different analysts all point out to the
influence of elites on Philippine politics. Dante Simbulan, in the article, explained that
political parties are homogenous since they are basically alliances of different leaders
who belong to the same socioeconomic stratum which, needless to say, are the elites. He
asserts that the influence of elites can be traced back to the Spanish Colonization in the
Philippines wherein the privileged class who possess vast wealth and land are the only
ones considered capable of fulfilling the tasks ordered by the Spanish government.
During the advent of the introduction of democracy in the Philippines, elite families
served as the head of political parties whose primary objective is to manipulate local
politics to support the interests of the elite families. Winning elections among these elites
would mean proper allocation of their wealth, the use of fraud as well as violence. Not
surprisingly, this political strategy has been proven effective and has endured the
changing society as contemporary politicians are allegedly still performing the very same
thing. The problem with this persistence is that public opinion provides media with the
image of discontent and disagreement with such practice in the political arena but no
proper action has been made to provide a solution to avoid the deliberate abuse of
politicians to the needy public.
PAGE 57
Much have been said how elites pose a threat in the even share of political power
within the state. Through the Constitution and with democracy, it has been provided that
everyone has a right and equal chance of being elected for a seat in the government. The
public promotes democracy as it is a mechanism to attain freedom and sovereignty from
colonizers. This was, to some extent, originally the p urpose of democracy. However, this
notion has been tilted against the elite wherein the public strives to attain freedom from
the hands of elite families who continue to oppress the public. Hence, elite families are
supposed to be less supported by the public compared to those who are not from the elite.
But that is not the case in some instances as elites have infiltrated the ideological freedom
that the public yearn for in exchange for services and goods that they need. The problem
with the persistence of elite families in the government may, in some points, not be
directly caused by their efforts alone. It can also be inferred that, through a utilitarian
perspective, since the majority of the public are in need of financial support, they will
inevitably choose to sacrifice freedom and rights for a handful of cash. At the end of the
say, it is not freedom that would satisfy their grumbling stomachs but rather the food that
they would be buying from the money they would receive from the political elite famil ies
they support.
2.2.9. Parties and Politics in the Philippines

Lande (1968) discussed the local origin of Philippine Political Organization in
order to fully understand the present-day Philippines political structure and its evolution.
The present day political structure has been influenced by two colonialists, the Spanish
PAGE 58
Regime and the American Regime. Philippine politics is composed of elective offices
from barrio lieutenant (village head) to the Presidency of the Republic, evolved out to
Barangay Captain to the President of the Republic. In 1898 under the American regime,
each municipality had its wealthy and educated Filipino Families whose rivalry for
prestige and influence extended back into the Spanish colonial period. The latter part of
the colonialism, the members of the elite families, the prinicipales, which grouped
themselves loosely into rival factions, had been allowed to run for election to the position
of gobernadorcillo. This succession of elite families continues in running for public
office during the first few years of American regime. Primarily, the property and literacy
requirements continued in the old way. Both regimes gave impact to the Philippine
politics. During the Spanish period, the officials of Manila and the government of the
provinces were composed of appointed officials who almost of them were Spaniards
while during the American regime, aside from running as a mayor, new elective positions
to the Filipino political minded were introduced these were officials for provincial
governorships and seats in the lower house were elected through popular election. But
these new higher post were far different from the mayoral candidacy for they need to
have large group of constituents to gain larger bloc of voters and at the same time costly.
Accordingly, these candidates for high office had to be men of great resources in
prestige and wealth in order to win a public office. Also, these candidates for high office
when campaigning outside their home town had to seek for the help of t he local
politicians in each town. And these local politicians will be able to gain help from those
politicians who ran for high office when their votes will be counted. The researchers
PAGE 59
perception about this situation is political patronage, for these politicians help each other
and expect in return for financing each other campaigns for public office. Thus, this
setting of political patronage became chain of relationships of mutual political assistance
linking ordinary voters to barrio leaders, these barrio leaders to town politicians and these
town politicians to provincial governors, who in a matter of time will be linked to the
leaders of national political parties.
The authors argument regarding the role of factions in the Philippines will help
to assess the importance of this group in the building of political dynasties in the
Philippine politics. These nationwide political parties play a major role in organizing,
emerging political leaders. One of the arguments of the author presented were tentative
conclusions, aside from partisanship, there are also other bases of political grouping at
the local, provincial and to some extent national level. Most of these bases are localism,
kinship and adherence to personal leaders. Lande (1968) argued that out of these
combinations various types of factionalism arise. The relationship between national and
local politics and for the character of politics at each of these levels has various
consequences by the presence of these strong local factions. The author po inted out that
these relationships give the leaders of local factions sufficient strength to be relatively
independent of central party control.
These political elite persist because of patronage. In a patron-client relationship,
which is based on reciprocity, the political supporter which is the client casts his or her
votes in favor of a political candidate which is the patron, who in turn will see to it that
the family welfare of the client is protected even at public expense.
PAGE 60
2.2.10. Populism and the Revival of Reform: Competing Political Narratives in the
Philippines
In the article of Thompson (2010) there exist competing political narratives in the
country. During the 2010 Presidential Elections, the two main competing political
narratives were populism and reformism. The history of such narratives has been
determined by the author of this article and estimated its emergence since the postMarcos era wherein reformism was the favored narrative to topple the clientelist narrative
that existed during the presidency of Ferdinand E. Marcos. The general mass is just part
of a collection of factors that determine the effectiveness of the narratives. Also, there is a
belief that the voting mindset of the people during the 1960s differ from therecent
mindset during the 2010 elections. These, among others, help determine how populism
pars with reformism during the 2010 elections.
It was during the post-Marcos era when people started focus on the revival of
good governance in the country. The reign of Marcos was stained with political and
social instability. Though it was a time when the economy was being uplifted by the
present government, the rampant injustices caused mass dismay to the poor population
of the country. It was a time when cronies grew rich while the poor remain poor and
become oppressed with the advent of dictatorship. Because of this, uproars erupted and
people who aspire the return of the original purpose of the government become beacons
of hope to the mass. One of these aspirants was Sen. Benigno Aquino. However, the era
of the Martial Law was a dangerous time. Marcos adhered to his strategy of guns, goons
and gold to take hold of his power. He soon disposed of the biggest threat to his
PAGE 61
administration. Aquinos love for the country, its people and the belief that many things
can be achieved through peace sunk into the hearts of the mass. His support grew even in
his death. In reality, it was in his death that people really took it as their responsibility to
continue the fight against oppression and injustice. People demanded change. And they
did when Marcos stepped out of office.
The half-clientilist and half- traditionalist narrative of the administration of
Marcos paved way to the emergence of reformism wherein change was the battle cry of
the mass. The change that the people sought was in the form of a promise to promote
good governance and avoid the mistakes and horrors experienced during the Marcos
administration. The people saw that promise through Corazon Cory Cojuanco-Aquino.
Though inexperienced in the field of politics, Corys reformist narrative was backed-up
by the death of his husband while in the state of patriotism. However, the problem she
faced during her administration was finding out that reform was easier said than
implemented. The emergence of scandals took hold during her administration and
clientilism began creeping back. In the end, the reformist narrative of Cory did little to
improve the 90 percent of the people who considered themselves belonging to the lower
class. The return of the rich vs. poor dilemma caused mass dissatisfaction even during
the administration of Fidel V. Ramos even if his administration did better in the
development of the economy than during the administration of Cory Aquino.
This sudden shift of public perspective to the government was a result of distrust
from the mass. Class differentiation created a rift among the population- the rich as the
superior beings while the poor as the less favored lower class. This helped propel Joseph
PAGE 62
Erap Ejercito Estrada from movie star to president after the administration of Ramos. It
was during his time that movies were about power struggle between the rich and the poor.
The rich were depicted as antagonists who kept on oppressing the poor while the poor
were mere hopefuls that need heroes to help them acquire the deserved justice that they
need. A lot of people believed that these actors were as real as the action star heroes that
they portray in movies and TV series. That is why Erap became so popular with the mass.
He portrayed the image of a vigilante who would liberalize people from the injustices that
they are experiencing. Another effective political tool that he used was tying him with the
brand of the mass. His campaign slogan Erap para sa mahirap was a promise of
salvation from the rift created by the upper class rich population. However, though
having a very successful campaign, his administration was short lived because of
anomalies with gambling. He was ousted. But even so, the mass remained solid in their
support to him.
His Vice President, Gloria Macapacal-Arroyo, took office once he stepped down.
It was hard for Arroyo to determine what image she would use as president. She tried
using the reformist look but people saw past it with the scandals she was in. People saw
her as an intellectual and knowledgeable with economics and business. This created a gap
between her and the poor population because the poor believed that intellectuals would
take advantage of them easier and manipulate the m. This discouraged Arroyo to run for
the 2004 presidential elections. However, on October 2003, she announced her plans to
run for re-election for presidency. She was faced with another star movie populist in
her campaign for election. Fernando Poe Jr., also known as FPJ followed the footsteps of
PAGE 63
his co-actor and friend Erap to seek public service as President. And, like Erap, FPJ also
amassed a large following from the poor sector who dissent the rule of capitalist. Even
so, FPJ lost to Gloria as it was later found out that she rigged the electoral process in her
favor. This caused massive uproars not only from the poor mass but also to the upper
class. Though protests existed to oust her from office, she was still able to salvage herself
and continue her administration.
The 2010 presidential elections was another turning point in Philippine politics.
The current condition of the country was smeared with a huge amount of people still
dismayed with the bad governance portrayed by the administration of Arroyo. It was
during this time that Benigno Simeon Noynoy Aquino Jr. was running for presidency.
His campaign promoting the reformation of the government was in a timely position
since the death of his mother, Cory, garnered him supporters with the belief that he is
morally good as his mother. Also, the martyrdom of his father also pushed him to the
top of the surveys. His greatest opponent was a populist. Manual Manny Villar Jr. used
his acquired wealth to help the poor mass earn money through game shows hosted by his
friends in the media. His applied populism was the strongest political machinery during
that period. Though in the end, it was Noynoy who won the presidential elections. It is
then proper to ask why this happened.
According to Thompson (2010), there is a question why there exists a competition
among political narratives. In Thailand, populism remains the only political narrative that
works. However, the situation in Thailand differs from that of the Philippines. It can
therefore be declared that it is through existing social and political situations that
PAGE 64
determine what narrative people would follow. However, during the 2010 presidential
elections, both candidates were neck and neck. Unlike the past presidential elections, the
difference from the winning candidate and the other were so little that proper
interpretation would still require further investigation. So, it is not safe to say that the ill
state of the government would provoke people in siding with a reformist. There are other
factors to be considered.
This article explains the other factors that revolve around the patronage of people to
political dynasties. Dynasties exist in every political narrative. The relation between
political dynasties and their target supporters may not always depend on the present
conditions. Since traditionalist narratives are intertwined with other political narratives,
the use of guns, goons and gold by some political dynasties become inevitable as serves
as their political machinery to preserve their posts. However, it can also be the other way
around wherein some members of political dynasties only get elected because of perfect
political conditions.
2.2.11. The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories
Collins (2004) argued that Central Asia was in chaos after the dissolution of the
communist Soviet Union. Powerful clans took over in the governance of these countries
which resulted to inter-clan competition. The pervading questions that the article seeks to
answer include why clans are considered powerful political actors and how clan
dynamics affect the durability of the regime.
PAGE 65
First, the author considers four propositions about clan dynamics. According to
the author, clans can persist in strong states that merely repress them but do not destroy
them which allow them to endure. In the Philippines, we find this statement true with
the lack of laws governing such issue though it is unconstitutional in nature. Another
proposition states that clans can make informal pacts. An example of this in Philippine
context would be the controversial alliance of Gloria Arroyo and the Ampatuans. Third,
pacts have short term political trajectories. Lastly, clan rule would give rise to clan
politics that would be used for the benefit of the clan members.
Now, focus on the propositions mentioned by the author. According to him, clans
are informal social organizations that interact with the state but do not emerge in
response to it. They persist even in with modernity within strong colonial states.
Colonial states during the Colonial Era have long tried to modernize the society and
exterminate informal organizations such as clans. However, demographic and social
factors made it hard for colonialists to rid clans from the society. Clans exist when (1)
states abhor them but do not really disarticulate them, (2) when they are not identified by
the state, and (3) when the institution of the state allow these clans to tap into resources
that enable them to survive. It is when the state begins to weaken that clans become
stronger. They can salvage the state from social, economic, or political downfall as
resources are easier to obtain from within clans than getting from outside sources.
Clans enter into informal pacts to foster durability of the regime. Pacts are
important in a state that is weakened as its collapse will leave no system to manage the
interest of competing clans. Clans will enter into pacts when (1) a common external
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threat induces them to cooperate with one another, (2) when the re exists a balance of
power among major clan factions, and (3) when a legitimate broker or leader trusted by
all factions assume the role of maintaining the pact and in the distribution of resources all
concur. As support to the previous proposition, political instability and weakness also
lead to the cooperation of clans in the form of pacts. These pacts balance clans so that
conflict will be prevented.
Clan-based societies render elites, formal institutions and ideology to experience
significant constraints. This is due, according to the author, that elites, formal institutions
and ideology have only a short-term effect on the regime type and political trajectory.
Clans would not opt in deepening democracy and consolidation as clans are informal
institutions that would seek to serve their own purpose and goals. Though colonial states
may push this through, it would be hard for a systematized action to hinder the motives of
clan pacts.
Lastly, there are several mechanisms by which political clans persist a nd
transform in democracy through clan-based mobilization. First, clan members who have
access to government institutions and resources are patronized by their kin as they benefit
from them. These clan members steal from the government and direct them to t heir own
networks. This fuels the persistence of political clans.
Clans also engage in crowding out schemes in institutions. They monopolize the
required posts in organizations so that command and information can travel more
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accurately and inexpensively. They use the clan members of these organizations for the
benefit of their own agenda.
Also, clan politics is self-enforcing in a seemingly endless and vicious cycle.

Since clans are exclusive and prove to be nontransparent, it is hard for any opposing force
to sever the line of influence.
Applying these propositions in the context of the Philippines through example
would justify the insights mentioned by the author. It can be understood that political
dynasties are informal organizations that grow rampant in the government. Numerous
allegations also point out to their abuse in power as well as taking advantage of their
numbers in the legislation and execution of laws. Political dynasties are icons of strength
in numbers and in influence. However, if that is true, would that mean that the country is
weak since strength is vested upon the clans? To determine the answer would require
further study as this research would not be able to verify such query.
Overall, this article helps readers and researchers alike to better understand the nature of
political dynasties as a general phenomenon. The Philippines is but one country among
others who experience the rampant existence of political dynasties. However, just like in
other countries, the emergence of political dynasties in the country was the result of a
transition from a regime to a democratic state. It is during these transitions where
powerful families use their influence in their respective locales to serve as springboards
to government rule.
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2.2.12. Kinship Politics in Post-War Philippines

The recurrence of corruption in the Philippine political setting is present and all of these
repetitive situations lead to the impeachment or dismissal of the involved parties in
corruption. Although the Marcos regime underwent the same tragedy of corruption in
this case a lot worse, to the point that the political and economic goods had only been
beneficial to his family and cronies. Politica de Familia (Traditional Kinship Politics) is
the type of politics wherein a group of individuals from a family who share the same
interests, tries to promote their own interests to the society for their own benefit.The
traditional kinship politics had gone against the western values that were fused by the
Philippines past conquerors, thus these two types went head on with each other that
caused the fluctuation of PH government. Personal values and obligations hinder the
nationalism and democratic value to settle in the PH government.
`
Throughout the article, a distinction was created between personal values (politica
de familia) and western values that focus more on the institutionalized and collective sets
of idea and beliefs. Personal values gave birth to the feeling of indebtedness to people
who had helped you rise to power and offered help to you. This feeling of indebtedness
creates a protective barrier then, giving off an assurance that this person will not betray
you. The people then, working for a prominent family would be considered as a member
of the family and ought to remain loyal, even if there is no force to ensure loyalty from
these people/workers.
Martial Law: The article mentioned that Ferdinand Marcos practiced western
values, stating that the continuous practice of kinship politics in pre-martial law PH only
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created government leaders who wanted nothing but economic gain for them and their
families, fully rejecting the power that comes along with being a leader. The declaration
of Martial law made Marcos powerful to dictate anything he wanted and thus, this
declaration opened up an opportunity to finally destroy kinship politics. However, what
happened is that the martial law was seen by families as a way to build their own party to
gain rights in regards to avail of the opportunities that only the influential people co uld
have. Marcos forcefully grabbed the Lopezes company (ABS-CBN, Meralco) through a
blackmail, Marcos kidnapped Geny, Eugenio Sr.s son and promised that he will set
Geny free if the Lopezesagree to sell their shares to MFI (Meralco Foundation Inc., - the
Marcoses), Eugenio sold everything but Geny remained imprisoned. The Lopez patriarch
died alone, Geny planned the great escape with Sergio Osmena III and went to the US
to plead their case which was ignored. The assassination of Benigno Ninoy Aquino
happened and caused the people power revolution and the remaining Lopezes in Manila
spoke up. The Lopezes also promised to help the next administration to recuperate with
the intense corruption that happened during the Marcos regime.
After Febrev: The Marcos regime was thrown out and the Aquino (Cory) regime
settled in. The Lopezes are close with the Aquinos, as Stephen Psinakis the husband of
Presy Lopez, is a close friend of the late Benigno Aquino, the presidents deceased
husband. The Lopezes pleaded that their companies be returned to them. The kinship
politics played its part again, as the Lopezes tried to regain control of their companies
that they had surrendered to the Marcos regime. While it is true that the company used to
be theirs and they were forced to give it up, the companys growth (ABS and
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MERALCO) cant be determined that happened only from the funds the family left as
some of the funds used were from the MFI and the Marcoses even though its only a
part, paid the due for the agreement with regards to meralco. Aggressive kinship politics
is what the Lopezes exhibited, with the way they tried to gather their resources back and
the stronghold they have inside the government and regime of the Aquino. The Lopezes
were so against with what the Marcoses had done, but they were too blind to notice that
they were just the same; they both used the western values promotion as a front to be
accepted by the society and then under- handily apply kinship politics all over again. The
Lopezes aggressiveness towards Meralco proved this point.
2.2.13. The Philippines: The Political Party and Corruption

Quimpo (2007) described the Philippines has low quality or weak political parties
and an ill-developed political party system. But the people do really kno w what political
party is. As defined in the article, Political party is an organized group of persons
pursuing the same ideology, political ideas or platform of government. 21 The author
argued that politics in the Philippines were dominated by politico-economic elites, these
elites were built around personalities rather than political programs or platforms as
expected.
Another argument by Quimpo (2007) led to a question about the notions of
political parties and the relationship of political parties and party systems with political
development and democratic consolidation. The author adapted the idea of Richard
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Gutner and Larry Diamond that there were two types of elite-based party, the traditional
local notable party and the clientelistic party. However, the author argued that these trapo
parties have been beyond a simple clientelist politics and developed into patrimonialistic
parties.
Secondly, a countrys political modernization and democratic consolidation has
been regarded very important if an institutionalization of political parties and party
system is present. Samuel Huntington, a scholar, tend to have a development of parties
and party systems from weak to strong, from uninstitutionalized to institutionalized. The
Philippines main parties and its party system would be regarded as weak and
uninstitutionalized under the traditional characterization of political parties and party
systems.
The author argued that Philippine politics important feature for a long time is
traditional patron-client relationship. The author adapted the observation of Carl Lande
that the Philippines polity was less structured by organized interest groups. Also, one of
the authors arguments about the switching of a person from one party to the other was
common as long as the parties cater the need of its members of all social classes. Landes
study on traditional political clientelism interpreted the Philippine politics as a political
country of personal relations and networks linked by kinship, friendship, exchange of
favors, influence and money.
As per the study of David Wurfel which adapted by Quimpo (2007), under the
Marcos regime dictatorial rule, political clientelism turned into patrimonial or
21
Omn ibus Elect ion Code
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neopatrimonial authoritarianism. Marcos used his full dictatorial powers to exploit the
resources available of the state for personal enhancement. The dictator set up his own
political party, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL) or New Society Movement and
dominated all the elections during 1978-1984. The members of this movement were the
wife of the late President Marcos, Imelda Marcos, the son, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and the
daughter, Imee Marcos. The KBL marked the shift from clientelistic to patrimonialistic
party politics. This movement showcase political dynasty, though it was no t started to
build during the Marcos Era.
In 1986, after Marcos was ousted through a People Power, Democracy in the
Philippines was restored. But many scholars questioned this kind of democracy restored
and a variety of adjectives were given such as elite democracy, oligarchic democracy and
electoral clientelist regime. The author argued that these variations of restored democracy
showed that the countrys politics continues to be controlled by factions of wellestablished politico-economic elite that resulted to maintain their hold on wealth and
political power.
Another scholars study adapted by Quimpo (2007) is the study of Paul
Hutchcroft that described the Philippines as having a patrimonial oligarchic state; a weak
state preyed upon and plundered by different factions of the elite, and took advantage of
the privilege from a large incoherent bureaucracy. The scholar argued that it is not only
one person and his or her cronies but the oligarchic elite as whole were engaged in
plunder. In addition, the Philippines main obstacles to sustained economic development
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lie in the weaknesses of its political development and the patrimonial oligarchic state and
booty capitalism have put the country in a developmental bog.
Another argument adapted by Quimpo (2007) b y Alfred McCoy is the
Philippines powerful political families resort to various tactics and methods to maintain
themselves in power, but most especially to political violence and rent-seeking, with
being prevalent in the provinces. The interaction between the state and rent-seeking
political families strengthened a few fortunate families in the privatization of public
resources. Another scholar, John Sidel depicted bossism as a common phenomenon in the
Philippines. The scholar described these bosses as strongmen who have monopolistic
control over both coercive and economic resources within certain areas and use mafiastyle methods.
Quimpo (2007) presented another argument in the article, this is Patrimonialistic
parties are catch-all affairs. The authors argued that for as long as a person who is
holding a political power can help the party to win, he or she is welcome. The candidates
do not need to have a political, organizational or management experience so long as the
candidate is has the capability to win the vote of the people and connected to media is
more important. These showbiz or sports stars provide entertainment and attract crowds
are more welcome in the parties.
The study conducted by Quimpo (2007) though focused more on the political parties and
corruption in terms of democracy this can help the researchers own study about Political
Dynasty because the rise of patrimonialistic trapo parties are now being dominated by a
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family dynasty. These family dynasties are getting a new way of dominat ing the public
office, though it is not yet proven and need further studies. But the factors stated in the
article can be a basis for the researchers to test and to prove.
2.2.14. Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric

The Family is an institution that reproduces and transmits norms of social
behavior to all its members. Each member has their own role to play in order to
contribute to the family. Their legal roles, likewise, are related to the state and the
official family. The family is privatized and neither the market nor the state directly
helps in nurturing its members. The burdens of supporting the family rest within its
members. Thus, a family is naturally dependent to its members. The amount of burden
allocated to each member is unequal and depends on the role of each member. Traditional
normative structures dictate that the husband- father is required to work for the family.
The wife- mother, likewise should take do house work, serve his husband and tend to her
children whose main role is to absorb norms and grow to achieve new roles in the
society.
However, this linear model of family norms has evolved through history to meet
the changing demands of the modern family. Some couples no longer opt to have
children while some do not even consider marriage. Women have also broken out from
their original roles such that the modern woman now strives for education and job
opportunities as they fulfill new roles in the economic development of the family. The
deviation of the normative structure has set a new definition of the family. Such
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arguments about the definition of the traditional family relates to its core foundationmarriage. Another would be the homosexual model consisting of a homosexual couple,
married or not, with their non-biological or biological children. Others consist of the
emphasis on the true nature of the family- whether or not a family should only be defined
by biological ties or legal ties, or, in a more romantic perspective, as to where one
chooses to be part of (affectional family). Hence, these definitions of families relate to
how they are forged- sexually (marriage), biologically (parenthood), or relational
(nurturing or caretaking).
Despite the emergence of complex family norms, the only politically normative
family is the intact family- heterosexual and formally married couple with their biological
children. Hence, other family norms are labeled deviant and are highly regulated by
laws for their nonconformity. However, it is arguable that deviance from the intact family
results from the wanting to escape restricting norms and not a deliberate act to distract or
destroy social institutions as offered in the article. Regardless of form, a family should be
able to fulfill their roles within itself (private) and to the society (public).
The family has two meta-narratives. The first one is that the family has a natural
form composed of family members from biological reproduction and relation. The second
meta-narrative is that of the private family who are entitled with protection form the state.
Here, the family has freedom from state intervention as reciprocation from their
fulfillment of societal and political roles. In other words, it is argued that the government
operates the family. Proof of this within the article includes the notion that the state
PAGE 76
constructs the image of the ideal family as well as the roles of each member of the family
in their normative share of burden.
Overall, the family is an integral part of the society as it plays multiple roles
through its members. The government is the agent that regulates the norms that should be
followed by family members through laws and implied sets of standards. Contemporary
families deviate from the traditional linear model of a family to cope with their changing
needs as well as the changing world. Though modern families grow complex in their
form, laws constrict extremist deviants to control them and prevent them from setting
unacceptable standards.
The article explains how the family is seen by the society as well as how it is defined by
the state. The family is an integral part in the growth and development of the country as
they are the basic unit of society. Each member has his own role to perform in order to
fulfill his part of the burdens of the family and of the state. This direct link from the state
makes the family susceptible for infiltration and control. Such instances may not
specifically come from the government as a whole but micro-control from specific
government officials is more likely to be the viable source. The changing roles of
members of the family and the influence of the government towards the family have
changed the course of the political arena to a more hybrid one. Though history has proven
the fact that Political Dynasties have been existing in the country since the Spanish
Colonial Era, the system by which families take authority through several of its members
has adapted their influence through the help of media and technology. The family is
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therefore an integral part in the development of the ego or psychology of its members
who are part of the government.
2.2.15. Democracy in the Philippines: A Political Culture Approach

The article presented argument from different authors that cause to diminish
democracy and the misconception of democracy in the Philippines. Ligeralde (1997)
adapted from Diamond, Linz, and Lipset the definition of democracy as a system of
government that meets three conditions: meaningful and extensive competition for
effective governmental positions, a high level of political participation and the freedom
necessary to assure the integrity of political competition.
The author argued despite of regular elections and guarantees of basic freedom,
the elitism, strength of political dynasties, the high level of graft and corruption continue
to exists and the power exerted by the institutions such as the family and the church,
make it more difficult for democracy to prosper and have a true essence in the
Philippines. Moreover, political party formations remain weak and co ntinue to be
temporary alliances between the power brokers, coalitions of major political clans or the
camp following of a strong political player.
The author adapted the claim of Timberman that it was because of the American
approach that democracy problems in the Philippines continue to exist. Timberman
argued that American and Filipinos equated national interest with elite interest;
legitimacy of leadership was based on the individuals ability to extract political
concessions from the Americans. Filipinos were taught of politics means elections and
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not a career in the civil or public service. Also, Constantino claimed that for many
Filipinos, democracy is simply the act of voting and nothing more. One of his claim, is
also a strong argument that leaders were elected because of their personality, physical
attributes and/or the willingness to pay for a vote rather than to concretize their political
platform.
Another argument discussed is from Lucian Pyes claim that Patron- Client
relations added to the difficulties of gaining democracy in the country. The authors
concepts of Patron-Client relations lead to utang na loob, a habit practiced by Filipinos
when a favored is being done and in return this utang na loob must have to be reciprocate
in a later date.
Furthermore, Family relations are very important to all Filipino, in fact we were
known for having a trait of Close Family ties. But this trait of close family ties has been
transferred to the political arena. In fact, former President Marcos used his family ties to
the fullest that turned into the appointment of family members to important positions in
the government. The author argued that because of this family ties, late Marcos, brought
a group of people who know little of governance. When Marcos regime decline and the
Cory Aquino government come in, it promises the Filipino nation to reform the family
dynasty build up by Marcos but this promise turned into false promises. The basic thread
which ties all of Philippine politics together remained and that is the strength of kinship
ties. John McBeth mentioned that even though one half of the congressmen will be
ineligible to run again, the size of the political families in the political arena are simply
handed on to a son, daughter or nephew of a legislator. This statement of McBeth showed
PAGE 79
how strong the political dynasties are, that once again their families are in control of
power.
As Timberman, described Kinship ties as the source of socialization, emotional
and financial support for its members and of loyalty. Kinship ties as the foundation of
most political organizations and the building blocks for local and national politics.
Loyalty as a factor contributed as the pre dominant characteristic which describes all
Filipinos. To many, loyalty served as the only source of strength and feeling of security
and especially during financial times. Another, strengthen family ties, is respect for
family members. Family members are expected to treat each other with respect especially
older than them. Then, this concept of respect carries out up to the political arena that
once a family member enters government and assumes a powerful position, he then
obliged to improve the circumstances of his family and that is what called nepotism.
The researchers found out to this article that political dynasties can be a one factor to
diminish democracy in the Philippines. Although future studies may have to conduct to
justify the real cause or the greater factor that contributed to diminish democracy. The
researchers may used this as a foundation or reference of their own study about political
dynasties.
2.2.16. Legislative Oversight under the Philippine Decentralization Policy

Abellera (2012) dissected the Philippine Decentralization policy and its effects to
the local governance and power of the legislative and executive branch. Institution had
PAGE 80
been defined by (North, 1990) as 1.) rules of the game in a society or more formally, the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.; while March and Olsen
(2009) viewed institution as a relatively stable collection of rules and practices,
embedded in structures of resources that make action possible. In accordance with these
definitions used by the author, institution can be put as a group sharing the same set of
principles or beliefs pushing for the fulfillment of a goal. Also, the author identified two
elements of institution namely the formal institutional factors which houses the laws,
acts, rules and the like that affects the policy-making and implementation of such. On the
other hand are the informal institutional factors which are leaning towards the personal
behavior and socialization methods of the group.
The author gave an in-depth analysis with regards to the executive and legislative
branches of the local government under the Local Government Code of 1991. Under the
legislature branch are the Sanggunian(s) assigned for the different levels of community
labeled as Panlalawigan, Bayan, Panlungsod and Barangay.
While both of these
branches of the government have different roles to play, the Local Government Code of
1991 gave additional powers to the executive branch, the power to legislate issues of
funding, position appointment and other powers administrative in nature. These said
powers being granted to the executive branch, the balance and separation of powers it
was supposed to share with legislative branch diminished as the legislative now only
acted as a branch to approve proposals of the more powerful executive branch. This
diminished balance of authority between the two branches also became the root for the
weakened policy implementation. The additional power granted by the LGC to the
PAGE 81
executive branch gave them additional funds for their fiscal activities thus, caused the
said branch to be situated in a position that rarely anyone opposes them as all the other
lower-ranked units would want to have a share in this budget for their projects.
The author also discussed that politicians tend to exhibit a clientelistic behavior,
doing favors and granting requests of certain individuals whose support could be
understood as electoral votes. The researchers agreed to this statement of the author, as
this type of behavior is the norm for politicians. It is more beneficial for these politicians
to prioritize people who in return would support their political advocacies and would
solidify their hold in the reins of governance. Also, the author said that for these types of
politicians, presence in events and other socializing acts are given of more importance to
create a connection with those who already cemented their names in the political field
than actually trying to propose for acts or laws that would be beneficial in the long run.
The political parties in the Philippines are now being run by disloyalty, as their
candidates or bearers would use this party only as a stepping stone and as they gather
power and rally more support would jump to another political wagon that could help
them in achieving the position they want to play. This was viewed by the researchers as a
common practice in the Philippine political arena. Politicians would rather try to
associate themselves to those political parties known and the basis of this association
would be for their own personal gain, not because the party shares what they actually
want to pursue if they are elected.
According to Conde (2007), As these clans protect their reign, they often resort
to violence to frustrate any attempt by rivals to unseat them. The existence of private
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armies is a way to show how the supposed democratic politics cease to exist. The
political groups or dynasties who wanted to keep their reign in security tend to use
violence as a means of protection. Thus, majority of those legislators according to the
author are overruled or scared to even perform their duties and responsibilities. Alongside
the ruthless use of violence to protect their seat of power enters wealth, derived from the
support of these politicians clients creating an impenetrable barrier for those who
would gather the guts to try to oppose these political groups and political dynasty.
The discussion done by Abellera (2012) can assist the researchers study about
Political Dynasties by means of identifying how these politicians continue to exist with
the support of those third parties who have the means to support them. This discussion
showed how the Philippine decentralization policy caused an internal decay and help
developed the abusive nature of those people who hold the executive power.
2.2.17. An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines.

According to Roces (1994) the author of the book, Alfred McCoy said that
scholars of Philippine studies have ignored the importance of elite families in the
historical development of the Philippine State. Some of them focused only on the
negative effects of the persistence of these elites. McCoy presented four hypotheses in the
article: 1) family oligarchies are a significant factor in Philippine history, 2.) It is the
relations between these families that influence Philippine politics, 3.) Elite family
networks bring factionalism into the political arena and 4.) Interaction between powerful
PAGE 83
rent-seeking families and a correspondingly weak Philippine state has been synergistic.
But Roces (1994) argued that the study of these hypotheses failed to support its validity.
The author argued that the essays used for the hypotheses are about individuals,
not families. Another thing Roces (1994) pointed out that the majority of the essays
concentrated only to an individual politicians rise to power through violent means and
narrate the failure to pass the legacy of prominence and success to the next generation.
McCoy focused on two critical characteristics of elite family dynamics: violence and
rent-seeking22 . According to Roces (1994) McCoy argued that violence is necessary for
an elite familys rise to political and national prominence. Another argument criticized by
Roces is McCoy portrayed warlordism as a common feature of Philippine politics. Then,
Roces argued that violence and warlordism are different from Kinship politics. In the
essay, McCoy argued that the Osmeas are not one-dimensional rent-seekers; the
Osmeas relied on electoral machine rather than simply on military or economic
coercion. McCoys concept of rent-seeking is in his essay about the Lopez family. The
author argued that the Lopezes are the rent-seeking families and patron-client ties are
applicable to them and sees the Philippine presidents as supreme patron. The business
empire of the Lopez is created from the rents that it was able to acquire through the
closeness to the Philippine presidents. Thus, the author argued that the Lopez families
have been successful because of being skilled to secure presidential patronage. The
author perceived that the presidential patronage as the key to empire building wherein a
22
Defined as the familys desire to gain business monopoly franchises from the state through patronage ties
with the president
PAGE 84
president can create vast wealth for a favored few by granting a de facto monopoly or
approving low-interest loans. But for McCoy Patronage politics is too simplistic model
for explaining the complexities of family dynamics in post-war Philippines.
The author argued that patronage politics is too simplistic model to explain the
complexities of family dynamics in the Post-war Philippines. The author presented two
points to support the argument, first is that not just the president who hands out a favor
but it is through the senators and congressmen that laws were passed giving privilege for
a certain business. Second point is that Lopez was not the only allied to the Philippine
Presidents, they were also called as the king- makers because of the support given by the
Lopezes, and Marcos made it to the presidency. Then, the president owed them favors, in
that sense Marcos in 1965 and 1969 was not the supreme patron. But these points of
McCoy were being criticized by Roces giving the idea of patronage politics is indeed the
overarching dynamic that operated in the political culture. Roces pointed out there are
other dynamics operating apart from the rent-seeking or familial ones. Roces argued
that kinship politics are more of family alliance using power and influence to benefit the
kinship group, though a dominant influence is not the only dynamic operating in
Philippine political culture.
2.2.18. The Philippines: Predatory Regime, Growing Authoritarian Fe atures

The Philippines is said to be a predatory state. It is predatory, based on the
definition given in the article, because the public as well as the politicians they support
are mere clients of people from higher positions in the state. The government does not
PAGE 85
aim to provide public goods and services for the mass but rather private goods and
services that would benefit its officials, their families and as well as their cronies. The
need for monetary gains has long polluted the political system of the country. It is as if
the only means to survive is to know where the money is and all concepts of morality
should be suspended in order to attain it. This status quo has led members of the elite to
use this weakness among the population and create a mechanis m to maintain power and
wealth for longer periods that surpasses generations. The result of such mechanism has
been termed dynastic. Due to this greedy nature of elite families who constitute
political dynasties as well as the corresponding violence and coercion that occurs within
their governance, public distrust and cynicism has plagued the minds of the population.
The roots of dynasties can be trace back to pre-colonial times. During the Spanish
Colonization Era, the elites were at the forefront of local governance. Democracy then
was still non-existent in the country and being able to secure a seat in the government
would mean that a Filipino must have such influence and wealth before the Spanish
Government would even consider putting someone on post. Other than that, the Spanish
Government would not likely choose someone who they cannot control. This is why they
chose from a small pool of elites who would obey their every command as long as the
price is right. The American Colonization Era was not that different from the Spanish
Colonization. Their treatment for qualified politicians was hardly altered. Democracy was
at its rise but the countrymen have yet to fully learn the ups and downs of a free
country. The US Government appointed politicians who were educated and well versed
with the law. However, those people mostly constituted members of elite families since
PAGE 86
they had the means to grasp such level of education and influence. The Marcos Regime
was also not different. Though elections were held during his rule, his presidency was
marked with grave abuses to laws and human rights. His authoritarian government, more
or less, only catered to his supporters. Politicians from the other branches of the
government had to obey him in fear of being arrested. And to be sure no one would
question him, he appointed several of his cronies in the departments that he needed in
order for the persistence of his regime. Post-Marcos governments were then aimed to stop
such atrocities from happening again. They ended up following a reformist political
narrative through the presidency of the late Cory Aquino. Even then, the public was still
in a state of distrust as Corys government was still catering to clients and cronies that
they needed to satisfy in order for their government to prosper. Other than that, her
familys personal gain was also a controversial subject. The story continues and the rise
of elites seemed to be unstoppable. Erap Estrada, with his poor-oriented campaign,
brought hope to the public as an end o f the rule of corrupt and greedy elites who only
served for their own gains. The problem was that because of his support for the gambling
enterprise in the country, he himself was caught using public funds for his personal use.
Then came Gloria Arroyo who took over after Estrada was ousted from his presidency.
Her political narrative was a clientelistic one and it was evident with her projects as she
focused on the economic development of the country. Her cause was not bad but because
she was rich-oriented, people from the mass were very unsatisfied with her. Soon she was
ousted and the problem for elite governance remains at large.
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Presently, Quimpo argues that the Philippines will continue to experience political
instability in the coming years. However, the predatory government that the country is
experiencing may subtly decrease over time as Diamond believes that predation cannot
provide a sustainable way for itself to develop its economy. The problem with this
perspective is that a simple vague prognosis does not always happen exactly as it should.
In the end, Quimpo recognizes the difficulty of purging corrupted politicians from the
government. It is difficult, partly, because democratic institutions are already influenced
by elite predators and cleansing such institutions would pose a major challenge for a
reformist political narrative leader.
2.3. RELATED STUDIES

2.3.1. Political Dynasties
Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009) argued that in democratic country such
Political Dynasties have long been present that concerns regarding inequality of
distribution of political power were raised to reflect on the imperfections in democratic
representation. Those concerns were discussed by Mosca adapted by Dal bo et al (2009)
to support the authors own study of Political Dynasties. According to Mosca (1999), the
author argued that every class displays the tendency to become hereditary, in fact if not
in law. This argument presented come up that political position are open to all but those
family members who are already in the political position or in power has the bigger of
chances to be in the position or has the most advantage position to confer on the
achievement of a particular political dynasty. The article presented that political power in
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the U.S is self-perpetuating. In the article self perpetuating is defined as a power

treatment, means that a family holding a political position for a longer term has the bigger
probability of the successors or heirs also to attain political position in the future
regardless of the credibility and characteristics of a family member.
The authors used two approaches to prove relationship between political strength
and subsequent dynastic success. The authors first approach in proving is the outcome of
the US election and used this as a basis in measuring the tenure of length of a term in
political position. In the authors study that resulted of the legislators who won their first
election have the bigger chances of having a relative in Congress in the future rather than
the other legislators who have lost their first elections. The Marcos family can served as
an example, before Ferdinand Marcos Jr. was elected a senator, Marcos Jr. served as a
congressman and now the widow of the late President Marcos served as the
congresswoman for another term. The Marcos completely dominated the politics in the
province of Ilocos Norte. The second approach of the authors was comparison if the
legislators first re-election attempt is successful while using the re-election rate of a
fellow party legislator at the same state and year. The authors overall findings lead to a
politician who is holding a political power for more than one term doubled the probability
that a politician will have a relative entering the Congress or the political are na in the
future.
The authors also argued of self-perpetuation as one of the possible reasons which
political power is transmitted. Dal bo et al (2009) argued that this self-perpetuation has
the role for a longer tenure of a political or family member of a politician. And there were
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reasons to consider for this longer tenure of politicians, one reason is because of public
service. Public service has been a familys vocation that most of the family members tend
to run in the political arena to continue the familys legacy. Another possible reason is to
acquire an asset in the form of financial capital, human capital, name and recognition in
the society. The researchers thought of this reason may be applicable in the U.S context
but not in the Philippine context because no politician has been proven that he runs for
name and recognition. Human capital may be a factor for political power because it
creates contact persons and constituents that can help the future re-election or election
attempt.
The authors another finding was the increasing probability that relatives of the
politicians who will gain power have multiple implications of political power has
persistent effects. The authors also argued that the existing democratic processes still
allow the inheritance of political power despite of the inheritance of political power was
viewed as undemocratic. In addition, the authors argument about self perpetuation has
the importance of dynamic effects in shaping the composition of the political class.
The authors conclusion in their study was that when a person holds more power,
it becomes more likely that this person will start or continue a political dynasty. Thus,
this political power in democracies becomes inheritable for reasons other than permanent
differences in family democracies. These conclusions of the authors were sustained by
the two instrumental approaches used in their study.
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The study conducted by Dal Bo et al (2009) can help the researchers own study about
Political Dynasty because same study has been done. The researchers can consider the
factors and approaches used by the authors to come up information that is applicable to
the Philippine politics. This study is helpful for the researchers own study to distinguish
whether the authors study has similar and different results can be obtained by using the
data from other countries and political system.
2.3.2. Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in
the Philippines
Querubin argued that the existence of Po litical Dynasties hinder political reforms
that would aid the country to develop in all spectrums. He believes that their existence
degrade the quality of political reforms in a way that these ultimately lead to benefit the
elites rather than the public. Unfortunately, the elite constitute the majority of these
Political Dynasties. Elites who abuse their power in office use their advantage to
promulgate laws (especially those from the congress) that would help them persist in
their respective political institution or so called captured democracies. Hence, the
political system, created by the political elites, helps foster the persistence of Political
Dynasties in the country.
The government is swarming with members of political elites whose family
members spread to its different branches. However, there are still those members of the
government who do not belong to this paradigm. There are still those who promote
political reform to benefit the public. These reforms are a threat to the existence of
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Political Dynasties who have long sought shelter with the reforms they have created to
protect themselves from dismantlement. Querubin mentioned that these political elites
who benefit from the status-quo block important reforms that would actually benefit the
public. This argument would explain why the current conditions in the Philippines do not
progress positively even with the existence of politicians whose objectives are to
promulgate reforms to promote the growth of the country. In a wider perspective, it ca n
be contended that there exists a conflict of interest between the state and the members of
Political Dynasties. Following Querubins arguments, it can be drawn from context that
Political Dynasties are, in essence, a threat (and problem) to the political and economic
growth of the country. Quite evidently, the contention that Political Dynasties pose as
banes to the state is widely accepted. This sparks the question on why the society lets this
happen. More importantly, the Constitution can be questioned on why it possess loopholes that allow Political Dynasties to form though they are essentially unconstitutional.
The Constitution, through Article II Section 26, guarantees equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties However, the
Constitution does not contain a concrete definition for Political Dynasties making Article
II Section 26 extremely vague, allowing political elites to form Political Dynasties.
However, the law does provide term limits to politicians in office to maintain equilibrium
with the constitution. The purpose of term limits is to eliminate incumbency advantage
and promote the alternation of power. Other than that, Querubin also mentioned through
his sources that term limits have been used in early democracies as a mechanism to
legally remove bad politicians and leaders in office. Despite the existence of term limits,
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political power does not necessarily end when an incumbent has finished his term.
Political power can be extended to family members whose interests are parallel with the
incumbent politician. In other words, term limits only provided political elites a system to
extend their power using a roster of their members to fill in vacant positions. In a comical
sense, it is like using substitutions during a basketball game. This suggests that even with
the existence of political reforms that would ultimately lead to their dismemberment,
Political Dynasties can adapt. Also, term limits produce a double effect: (1) its purpose of
limiting the term of politicians and (2) provide reason for political elites to formulate a
mechanism to assure the continuity of their political power.
Querubin found in the results of his study that term limits do not increase the
turnover rates of incumbent families in congress and provincial governorship. This
proves the double effect argument in the previous paragraph. Since there are term limits,
political elites need a mechanism to maintain political power. In a contextual analysis, it
can be assumed that Political Dynasties emerged from political reforms (threats to
political power) such as term limits. However, it cannot be implied that all political
reforms will turn out ineffective in purging Political Dynasties. Querubin suggested that
in order to constitute an effective political reform, the underlying sources and causes of
power of Political Dynasties should be addressed as well as their strategies and
mechanisms to counteract reforms. Political reforms should then have checks and
balances with other government branches since political elites (especially from the
legislative branch) would only promulgate reforms which they can adapt to.
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However, Political Dynasties persist not only because there is a flaw with the
political system. There is also fault found on the people who voted for them in the first
place. Media does not help in the education of voters as it is also controlled by common
elites who are associated with political elites. False advertisement through political
campaigns is but one reason among many how people are brainwashed about the ultimate
goal of some political elites. Furthermore, the greed and corruption among the public
made them vulnerable to political exploitation, giving them remuneration for their vote
and support. Family name has also become a brand which ultimately leads to common
notions about their capabilities as leaders or legislators for the country. So if Political
Dynasties do not positively contribute to the society, then the public should act up against
it- beginning with themselves.
2.3.3. Is Local Development Good Politics? Local Development Expenditures and

the Re-Election of Governors in the Philippines in the 1990s
The article focused on the claim of the authors on efficient provisions of local
public services and its advantage over the national government. The authors argued that
fiscal decentralization leads to more efficient provisions of local public services are
achieved through a better team up of supply and demand of such services. The authors
improved matching results are presented by two advantages of local government over the
national government. The first advantage is about the constituents of the politicians
wherein they have better information about their constituents preferences. In addition,
local officials provide customized public services better than the national officials which
PAGE 94
resulted to more improved welfare. But the authors are not satisfied to the first advantage
result. This argument of better information is not sufficient enough because the pr inciple
of the national government has high political power that can also provide public service
better than the local government. The second advantage which was argued by the authors
as the real advantage of local government is not better information of t heir constituents
preferences but local officials are more directly accountable to their constituents. The
authors provided two accountability mechanisms in a democratic country. First is election
and the second is civic participations. Elections are cons idered as institutional device to
choose political leaders and discipline them to reach collective discussions. The people
direct involvement and the publics consultations in legislation, planning or monitoring
activities helps to avoid costly local government mistakes due to poor information,
indifference or corruption. The marginalized groups add to the welfare effects of the
intrinsic value of social inclusion. The improvements of local public service in overall
welfare are manifested through voting. The incumbent local official may then have to
implement development-oriented public programs and projects for the official to be reelected.
The authors argued that fiscal decentralization also have its dangers that could
lead to poor implementation of decentralization. A greater fiscal deficit, interjurisdictional externalities and costly fiscal competition, wide disparities in service
provisions and to capture of the local government by interest groups can be an effect to
the poor implementation of decentralization. The authors also argued that state capture or
local governments are granted powers and fiscal resources without requisites of
PAGE 95
tightening political and administrative controls could lead to inefficiency of service or

worse scenario is corruption. Thus, this decentralization concluded by the authors, the
local elites or the Political clans or the bosses or oligarchs will have a full effective
control over the local government. The mere presence of these political elites does not
perforce indicate a corrupted local government but possibly to commit like a stationary
bandit.
Another argument of the authors of local political elites called as a predatory to
the state that is verified with the entire performance of the local official while in public
office. The authors hypothesis of incumbent officials who are bad performers are less
likely that the good ones to be re-elected. The author explained this argument in
realistic approach that certain factors other than performance in public service can help to
secure electoral victory. On the other hand, when the voters are less likely informed of
the political candidates platform or these political candidates lack credibility or
commitment for public service. Then, there is possibility of bad incumbent official of
being re-elected or for a good candidate to run unsuccessfully. Another argument in the
article discussed wherein a political candidate belonging to a clan has its own network of
supporters then becomes a candidates effectively political machinery. The question is
whether the incumbent officials who are members of Political clans will still pursue prodevelopment projects or programs in order for them to get re-elected.
Decentralization of local elections in the Philippines is an interesting study, thus
the authors used the findings of the other author that the established political clans are
more likely to be found in more developed provinces. The authors gave two views of
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Political Clans existing in the Philippines. The authors highlighted that the incumbent
public servants choice between good performance in office and reliance on membership
of a clan to be re-elected showed in the authors study the chances of the incumbent
public servant improve with the proportion of the totality of public expenditures spent on
economic development-oriented services. These chances may be reduced by the rivals
political clan. Therefore, the incumbent public servant has more pressure than local
political clans as the incumbent public servant compete more to adopt developmentoriented projects, even among public servant who are members of political clans. This
rivalry of political clan and incumbent public servant could be a factor behind poor public
service when they lack effectiveness to implement their development-oriented platforms,
thus the authors conclude the policy implication that is gained from decentralization may
be strengthened and to minimize its danger a political competition must be enhanced.
The local politics in the Philippines dominated by the traditional political elite has
the minimal impact in elections in transforming local governments. The authors argued
that political families are often the ones who dominate as economic players at the local
and the national levels. Typically, local political elite comprises of several public officials
who are bind together by blood or marriage that are successively hold their government
positions. These members of political clans may occupy both the elective and appointive
positions in both the executive and legislative branches of the government at both the
local and national levels. Notable political clans in the country such as the Osmeas and
Duranos of Cebu, the Marcoses of Ilocos Norte, and the Aquinos and Cojuangcos of
Tarlac trace their origin from the Spanish and American colonial periods.
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The predominance of these clans in local political in the politics may account by
two factors. These are the old political clans and recent local political clans. In the case of
old political clans, who were wealthy land owners acquired their political power because
of the feudal conditions in the rural area that enabled them to take advantage of their
wealth for political ends. The authors argued that this wealth of the old political clans,
they were able to sustain and secure their hold to public office because of the limited
outside economic growth and opportunities in their locality. An example of this political
clans are the Lopezes and Lacson of Negros Occidental, who were able to sustain their
political influences as they expanded their control over the industrial and modern sectors
of the economy. In the other hand, the authors argued that the recent local political clans
is less likely initial contribution in the economic resources but because of their ties with
national authorities, especially during the Marcos regime. The authors cited examples of
families belonging to this era of political clans are the Gordon of Zambales, Josons of
Nueva Ecija, Singsons of Ilocos Sur and Zubiris of Bukidnon. Some clans became part of
the oligarchy or cronies of Marcos. After the Marcos regime, more local clans gained
confidence in seeking for public office because of their close links with national leaders.
Another argument of the authors in the article is the relationship between local
political clans and the national leadership. The authors argued irrespective of their origin
of being a political clan, the relationship of these politicians is Symbiotic that is being
sustained by the highly centralized economic structure of the government. To easily
understand this relationship, the authors have explained the one part of the relationship
wherein the national political leaders, who are in control of the bulk of public resources
PAGE 98
and exercise administrative power over the local governments, can obtain the support
local political leaders, who are often clan members, during elections. On the other hand,
local political leaders who are able to deliver successful votes to the national candidates
are rewarded with favorable central fiscal transfer, other forms of generosity and the
pork barrel projects.
These arguments presented by the authors, local government is perceived as less
efficient because of some elected politicians is likely to misappropriate public resources
for his own benefits or of those of his allies and supporters. Therefore, the authors
conclusion on their study is that elections become less effective mechanisms for
improving local welfare.
The researchers may use the arguments of the authors because of the discussed
relationship of the local politicians, who are often members of a dynasty, to the national
leadership. Other than that, it explained disadvantages and advantages of local politics
that can support the researchers own study of Political Dynasties.
2.3.4. An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15 th Congress

Political democracies are important because they contribute to the growth of the
countrys economic and human development. Its existence promotes rights for election as
well as for freedom of speech and can potentially draw out an environment that would
cater to the greater needs of the society. However, weak political participation due to
underdeveloped democratic institutions would, in some cases, produce political dynasties.
PAGE 99
In the Philippines alone, about 70 percent of the total persons who have ranks in the local
and national government belong to political dynasties. The existence of political
dynasties may mean that there is a deterioration of political equality and competition. It is
also argued that the prevalence of political dynasties prevent people from effectively
communicating their needs to the government, allow dynastic officials to abuse their
positions to manipulate government institutions in the aim of s elf-preservation at the
expense of the states well-being, and promote the populist mentality when selecting
political leaders, favoring those who have greater influence or to those whom they can
benefit from. This allows reformists to extend time horizons with the belief that they are
effective in the promotion and implementation of just policies with long-term goals.
Furthermore, dynastic politicians may also possess in their plans legacy-related motives.
This phenomenon may contribute to the relationship of the factors relating to the length
of service of these politicians and their ulterior motives.
For the authors of the article, political dynasties are composed of family members
who serve across different leadership positions simultaneously. Like the other literatures
in this research, the authors of this article believe that political dynasties use public
resources for their ulterior motive for self-preservation. Political Dynasties, as mentioned
earlier, are less likely to promote the legislation of policies that have a long-term effect.
This, however, may be partially a result from the short term length for public service.
Since politicians or local government units may only be in their respective seats for a
short span of time, whatever good plans they may have that possess long-term gains is
prevented because they are bound within their term limits. Because of this, policies that
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should have long-term effects are less focused upon by them but rather promote policies
in preparation for their next election. Term length is a significant factor in the
determination of political dynasty behavior especially for those who are re-electionists. It
has been found that senators who are bound to be re-elected secure a populist narrative
and a protectionist stance compared to other senators, especially those who have safe
seats, who are less likely to vote in support for protectionist policies.
In the history of the United States since its establishment in 1789, it has been
hypothesized that political dynasties emerge because some families have certain
characteristics, such as wealth and influence, which were needed in order to gain a certain
level of advantage in the political arena. This, together with the theory of an
accumulation effect in the succession o f family members in government service also
promotes the perpetuation of political dynasties. In line with this, a predicted model was
formed. According to Asako et al, (1) dynastic candidates possess a certain amount of
political advantage over non-dynastic candidates and (2) they also promote distributional
programs which were effective to spread their dynasty but did not promote sustained
growth since they lacked the resources to do so.
The American theory of how political dynasties emerged in the government is
quite similar with the Philippines. Teehankee argued that political dynasties are a result
from the highly unequal socio-economic structure of the Philippine society and from the
lack of highly democratic electoral and party systems. Possessing wealth is a crucial
factor in order to establish political dynasties in the Philippines as it build influence and
also provide resources in the funding of coercive measures in order to accumulate a
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population that would vote for their members during elections. The media also helps in
the establishment of the foundations of political dynasties. To further strengthen their
power, political dynasties consolidate with other political dynasties.
In conclusion, the researchers have found that there appears little bias against the young
or against women when voting especially those who are members of political dynasties.
Political dynasties dominate major political parties and, on average, are situated in areas
and regions that are highly impoverished and where inequalities and lower average
incomes exist. It can be inferred also that members of political dynasties are wealthier
than non-dynastic politicians.
2.3.5. Political Dynasties and Pove rty: Resolving the chicken or the egg question
The argument that political dynasties are significant in the deterioration of
political institutions and systems, among others, is recurring in many political science
literatures. Political dynasties are argued to be buffers for the effective communication of
the needs of the people to the government. They can also manipulate and weaken
government institutions to allow their self-preservation and, in some cases, also control
the pool of favorable political candidates for government posts disabling the more
deserving to execute their right for the equal opportunity for public service. The nature of
their behavior can also be related to the length of their terms. Longer terms would mean
that dynastic politicians would focus on long term goals.
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In line with this, it is needed to understand the relationship of political dynasties

and the economic development that occurs during their terms. It has also been found that
a politicians time in office may fortify his or her image and will serve as a trusted
brand that would add to the further success of members of that dynasty.
There are two contrasting arguments in this article. First, is if political dynasties worsen
poverty and, second, if poverty promote the existence of political dynasties. In the study,
it has been found that there is a direct relationship between poverty and political
dynasties. As poverty increases, the prevalence of political dynasties also increases. This
suggests that there is an existing patron-client tie between members of the poor and of the
elite enabling political dynasties to fortify. The media, unlike in other sources, has been
found not directly linked with political dynasties.
The effect of political dynasties to poverty is less conclusive as political dynasties
do not seem to be linked with either more or less poverty reduction. However, it can be
inferred that non-dynasties are incapable of offering viable alternative for reform. On
another note, the existing patron-client ties promote the proliferation of new dynasties
and even though political dynasties do get replaced, those who replaced them would
eventually be political dynasties themselves in one point in time. This suggests that it
might be the nature of all running political candidates to have plans for the extension of
their leadership whether they contribute or not to the state.
Furthermore, an inverse relationship between the presence of political dynasties
and the level of political competition that exists within their jurisdictions has been found.
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It can be inferred that under an intense political competition, political parties are forced to
put in non-dynastic politicians who are more talented over dynastic politicians. In line
with this, dynastic officials are observed to be predominant in less open, less mobile and
les competitive states. With the background of the Philippines in the political arena, it has
been found that the capacity of self-perpetuation of political dynasties is three times
higher in the Philippines than in the United States.
The status of Philippine elections is shrouded in corruption and coercion. The
patron-client narrative is very dominant in the Philippines. Mostly those who can afford
to sway the people into voting them are the only ones who can have a chance in attaining
a position in the government. This can be supported by the recurring argument that vote
buying remains a detrimental factor in the proliferation of fair elections. In another
reference, promoting development-oriented projects would increase the chances of
politicians to be re-elected. As corrupt politicians support the poor and as the poor
continue to eat the lure cast by those politicians, the majority of votes would surely be in
support of those who are following a populist narrative. As a result, corrupt officials will
continue to prosper and political dynasties will continue to strengthen. And as long as
these politicians take good care of their poor constituents, they will surely reap the votes
that they worked hard for.
As a conclusion, the relationship between members of politica l dynasties and nondynastic politicians do not have a significant difference. This means that though political
dynasties do promote poverty, some non-dynastic politicians are also unable to promote
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policies that would help alleviate poverty levels in the country. Furthermore, policy
making by political dynasties have been found to be neither supporting nor offering
policies that would help alleviate poverty but rather promote policies that would help
their self-preservation.
2.3.6. The Causes of Political Dynasties in Democratic Countries

According to Rossi (2009) the democratic representation is not essentially reflects
imperfections by mere existence of Political dynasties. The author argued that the
presence of political dynasties may be because of the response of voters to the fact that
certain families have the will to be in public service. But this argument does not want to
conclude that it is the only reason. The article explored causes of the existence of political
dynasties. The articles purpose is to assess if the presence of these political elites
imposed a threat to political representation. The author wanted to test if there is causal
relationship between the tenure length and posterior dynastic success. The author made
use of Argentina to conduct the experiment that provided a source of variation for tenure
length. The duration of elected legislator term in Congress were used by the author as an
instrument to determine the tenure length of congressmen. The author argued that having
longer tenure in Congress will increase the chances of probability of a political candidate
having a relative in a future Congress. This argument of the author is supported by the
study conducted by Dal Bo et al (2009) using the U.S. Congress as a basis, that having a
longer tenure in the U.S. Congress increase significantly the chances or probability of
establishing a political dynasty. Although the U.S. Congress is quite different from
PAGE 105
Argentina, results from U.S. Congress and the ones reported in Argentina has simi larity
and suggests that self-perpetuation of political elites is a phenomenon that arises under
different institutional environments.
Another argument of the author is the exploration of various channels through
which political power is being transmitted. Behind this longer tenure that induced a
vocation in other family members to run for office is the authors finding that the
particular channel behind this self perpetuation is because of family name recognition.
The author found out that there is no sufficient evidence on the causes behind the
existence of these political dynasties. But the author exempts the study of Dal Bo et al
(2009) who used two different instrumental variables in order to come up a causal link
between tenure length and the probability of continuing a political dynasty. The first
approach used is the probability of continuing a political dynasty. Dal Bo et al (2009)
tested the instrument variable whether a legislators first re-election attempt is successful.
The result then, that an electoral shock affects the probability of having a relative in the
future Congress only because of the impact on the predecessors election to another term.
The second approach wherein regression discontinuity design is being used to determine
what relies on the outcome of the close elections as an instrument for tenure length. The
author concluded that under these two approaches the authors have identified local
treatment effect for those legislators that attempt to be reelected.
The overall findings of the author indicate that having longer tenure in Congress
increases the chances or probability of having a relative in future congresses. The author
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concluded that self-perpetuation of political power is a cause of the existence of political

dynasties. The result of the author was similar to Dal Bo et al (2009) finding that staying
in office for more than a term has the big probability that a legislator will have a relative
entering the Congress in the next election or in the congress in future. But the author
argued that this self perpetuation of political power is incorporated by the other cause
which is family name recognition.
2.3.7. The Dynasty Advantage: Family Ties in Congressional Elections

Feinstein (2010) defined political dynasties as the families in which multiple
members have held elected office. The authors description of political dynasty is based
from the phenomenon in the U.S. Congress that is commonly features dynasty building.
The authors study has presented significant advantages over first- generation politicians
in open-seat House elections. The authors exploration in this phenomenon found out that
dynastic politicians enjoy brand name advantages that significantly give this political
candidate and edge over non dynastic opponents.
The article is supported by a survey results that indicates the respondents are more
likely to have a favorable disposition toward dynastic candidates. The author also used
past work on political dynasties. The author adapted other scholars work partic ularly
Putnam (1976) indicating that the importance of family ties for leadership recruitment in
a wide variety of nations, from tradition-bound, semi hereditary societies to modern
democracies. Another scholars work by Laband and Lentz (1985) considered the extent
to which the fathers of members of Congress were themselves involved in politics.
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The author has used economics to understand the advantages of political dynasties
to be reelected. The author argued that the act of sons and daughter entering into a
parents profession provides the first resource to explain the large presence of secondgeneration politicians in Congress. The author also argued that success is more dependent
on occupation-specific capital and goodwill.
The author argued to broad kinds of advantages that a dynastic politician enjoys:
the capital advantages and brand name advantages. Under the capital advantages are the
resources and skills that political heirs received. The author also presented two potential
advantages under capital advantages. First, the dynastic politicians may be benefited from
increased access to human capital. Second is the dynastic politicians enjoyed greater
access to financial capital through an established donor networks.
Another kind of advantage is the brand name advantages where dynastic
politicians could possess. The benefits of these dynastic politicians were enjoyed due to
their family ties to elected officials. Specifically, the author argued that this brand name
advantages concept suggested that dynastic politicians enjoy family advantages beyond
the financial, social and human capital advantages obtained by their relatives. The author
argued that brand name advantages exist when voters have an expressed preference for
political legacies, irrespective of the difference between the dynastic and non-dynastic
politicians.
The author has discussed the basic differences of dynastic politicians to a nondynastic politician. The dynastic politicians tend to top the poll survey because of having
its brand name advantage than to non-dynastic politicians who are also called as first
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generation politician. The dynastic politicians were being able to market themselves
because of that identity as being branded and often reelected in the position. Dynastic
member could also have greater opportunities for public service in lower- level political
positions. The author conclude that if a dynasty members have a greater access to these
lower- level positions it could represent an indirect advantage for these advantages.
The author have concluded through the use of survey respondent in the article, it
tends to assign higher likeable ratings to a dynastic members and may be more likely to
recall dynastic candidates name when the election will come. In addition, two impor tant
campaign related factors may be similar to a dynastic candidate to first generation
candidate, the spending and prior political experience.
The author argued that the observed electoral strike for dynastic candidates is
highly suggestive of brand name advantage that the second generation enjoyed because of
their association with office holding relatives.
2.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter gave an overview of Family as an institution that reproduces and
transmits norms of all social behavior to all its members. Each members of the family has
their own role to play in order to contribute to the family. But these families have already
played another role, which is in political arena. Many of families are now involved in
politics that even their sons, daughters, wife or husband patronized political power for
self-preservation. The other related literatures and studies of different authors have been
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used by the researchers that revealed places and provinces where dynasty building is very
common.
This chapter of related literatures and studies also presented families that have
new way of entering the politics through political parties running in the election. But this
claim still need to prove whether they are essential enough to say that it is one of the
causes of dynasty building.
This chapter of related literatures and studies presented four main points that was
discussed in the articles. The first one is the predatory view that dynasties are associated
with rent-seeking and state capture, corruption and ineffective and poorly designed
policies. Second is stationary bandit that dynasties have longer runways for reform and
are more firmly associated with socio-economic outcomes. Third is the patronage that
tends to increase dynastic prevalence: the poor vote for dynasties as long as these are able
to directly support during elections or in times of income shocks. And Lastly, Selfperpetuation that politicians are capable of developing dynasties: being in public office
affords politicians the opportunity and means to keep on winning or to increase their
successors chances of winning.

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1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

In a certain perspective, Filipinos are expected to be highly

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government officials come from prominent families. According to Bobby M. Tuazon

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1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Do Political Dynasties in the Philippines contribute positively to the management

What are the present conditions of the provinces represented by members of

How do the members of the Congress perceive Political Dynasties?

How do members of Political Dynasties perceive Political Dynasties?

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1.3 THEORETICAL PARADIGM

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Lipson, Leslie; The Great Issues o f Politics, p.77

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1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

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1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

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3. This research is a quantitative-qualitative study and thus, made use of the

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1.7 ASSUMPTION OF THE STUDY

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2. Also, there is little need of explanation on the part of the researchers to

4. Moreover, it is considered by the researchers that some problems that occur in

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2.2. RELATED LITERATURE

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Schurman, President McKinley appointed William H. Taft to head the second

Schurman report in Reports of the Philippine Co mmission, I. p 185

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questionable to others because they lack knowledge in running a government. Political

2.2.4. Restoration or Transformation? Trapos versus NGOs in the Democratization

despite of increasing partnership

implementation of government policies. Many of these actors have continued to perform

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Zone One Tondo Organization (Constantino-David 1998)