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Ireland. aidan.hehir@ul.ie
A Structural Explanation for NATO’s Transformation and the
Introduction
The end of the Cold War led to the questioning of NATO’s relevance. Given that the
organisation was established to provide military security in the face of the Soviet
threat NATO appeared to have fulfilled its mandate and lost its raison d’etre with the
implosion of communism. 1 The increasingly vocal calls made in the early 1990s from
within certain states in Western Europe for a European defence force divorced from
US control and the tentative moves towards a common EU foreign policy further
contributed to an emerging belief in NATO’s obsolesce. NATO did not whither away,
however, and in fact the 1990s witnessed a resurgence in NATO’s role culminating by
the end of the decade in an expanded mandate, the organisation’s first full scale
military operation (in Kosovo), the accession of three new members and plans for a
further major enlargement. The narrow mandate established for NATO in 1949 did
prove obsolete, but NATO proved capable of reinventing itself and establishing a new
raison d’etre.
The end of the Cold War was said, however, to have ushered a new era of uni-polarity
system. 2 In both political and military terms the US’s dominance was considered
absolute and its foreign policy duly unencumbered by constraints. It is, therefore,
1
As noted by Duffield, ‘Much of international relations theory teaches that states form military
alliances in response to common external threats. Conversely, alliances should disintegrate
when the threats that occasioned their formation disappear’. John Duffied (1994) ‘NATO’s
functions After the Cold War’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 109/5, p. 764
2
See, Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.) (1999) Unipolar Politics: Realism and
State Strategies After the Cold War, New York: Columbia University Press
worth analysing why the US has maintained an interest in sustaining NATO and
facilitating its reinvigoration given the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the desire
articulated within Europe for an exclusively European defence force and, more
importantly, the asserted ability of the US to act unilaterally in the context of the new
potential military rival and to ensure a stable Europe. This article will argue that these
explanations, though essentially accurate, do not fully explain the US’s desire to
maintain NATO. It will be argued that, contrary to the prevailing discourse, the
current system is not one of uni-polarity, but is more accurately classified as a uni-
multipolar system. This systemic configuration means that the US, though the
unrivalled global hegemon, cannot act without support, especially support from key
via an ostensibly multi-lateral coalition. The US’s impetus for maintaining NATO
contrasts with European perspectives as to the organisation’s functions and this strain,
manifested most obviously during the invasion of Iraq, will continue to undermine the
In March 1999 NATO launched Operation Allied Force (OAF) against Yugoslavia.
This constituted NATO’s first full scale military operation and the intervention was
sanctioned by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This intervention in itself
3
Justifying NATO’s intervention in Kosovo President Clinton stated, ‘Ending this war [in
Kosovo] is a moral imperative.’ Quoted in Foreign Desk (1999) ‘Conflict in the Balkans’, The
New York Times, March 25, Section A, p. 15. Additionally Javier Solano, then NATO
Secretary General, stated that the organisation had a ‘moral duty’ to intervene. NATO Press
Release (1999) 041, 24 March 1999.
signalled a new direction for NATO and this was cemented by subsequent summits.
Clinton stated, ‘For five years now, we have been working to build a new NATO
prepared to deal with the security challenges of the new century.’ 4 At this summit
noted that NATO members had, ‘…reaffirmed our readiness . . . to address regional
and ethnic conflicts beyond the territory of NATO members.’ 5 The ‘Strategic
considerations within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, as instabilities
response’ and discusses, ‘Mounting and sustaining operations outside the Allies’
summit NATO also announced, ‘Even though all NATO member states undoubtedly
would prefer to act with such mandates [from the Security Council] they must not
The November 2002 NATO summit in Prague witnessed the creation of the new
NATO Response Force constituting ‘…a body of around 20,000 troops available at
short notice for deployment around the world across the full spectrum of military
4
Quoted in William Drozdiak and Thomas W. Lippman, ‘NATO Widens Security Map;
Commanders Get New Authority To Pick Yugoslav Bombing Targets’, p. A01
5
Ibid
6
NATO (1999) ‘The Alliance’s Strategic Concept’, NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, 24th
April.
7
Quoted in Richard Caplan (2000) ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Which Way Forward?’, Ethics
and International Affairs, Vol. 14, p. 31 Strobe Talbott similarly stated, ‘[NATO] will try to act in
concert with other organisations, and with respect for their principles and purposes. But the
Alliance must reserve the right and freedom to act when its members, by consensus, deem it
necessary.’ Quoted in David Chandler (2000) ‘International Justice’, New Left Review,
Nov/Dec, No. 6, p. 60
operations.’ 8 NATO’s deployment in Afghanistan in August 2003 is testament to the
Alliance has also discussed the broadening of its functional remit to include counter-
combat operations. There have even been suggestions that NATO should branch out
into “soft power” activities such as post-conflict nation building.’ 9 In 2004 seven
former communist states joined NATO and since its establishment in 1994 the
Partnership for Peace programme has grown to incorporate twenty states including
traditional rivals Russia, neutrals like Austria and Switzerland and countries in the
Caucasus region.
The period since OAF has been marked by great transformation for NATO and it has
rapidly moved beyond the previously narrow remit adhered to a position of increased
opportunity, for which they have been hoping for several years…to
indispensable.’ 10
8
Paul Cornish (2004) ‘NATO: The Practice and Politics of Transformation’, International
Affairs, Vol. 80/1, p. 65
9
Ibid, p. 64
10
Ibid, p. 65
Traditional Explanations
NATO has often been charged with obsolesce and, as noted by Drew, the organisation
has in many respects been in perpetual crisis as to its role.11 Dominant explanations as
to the US’s rationale for preserving NATO in the post-Cold War era, though not
necessarily incorrect, do not sufficiently explain the US’s drive to reinvent the
organisation.
At the 1991 Rome Summit President Bush outlined the US’s ongoing commitment to
NATO in the post-Cold War era. He described NATO as ‘…the guarantor of security
and stability in Europe’ and stated that NATO ‘…could not be replaced in the long
term’. 12 NATO, therefore, still had a role following the implosion of the Soviet Union
external threats, but also served to foster internal unity and prevent inter-state
violence within Europe. It is certainly fair to say that NATO contributed to peace in
Europe throughout the Cold War but its contribution to European stability and unity
was surely less than that of the EU and its previous organisational manifestations. US
perspectives on the need for the US to play a guiding role in Europe lest the continent
revert back to the violence that characterised the first half of the twentieth century, as
predilection for internal animosity. Economic integration, more so than unity derived
11
S. Nelson Drew (1995) ‘American Leadership in NATO’, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.) The
Future of NATO, London: Frank Cass, p. 6
12
Quoted in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.) (1995) The Future of NATO, London: Frank Cass, p.
114
13
In his article, Holbrooke outlines the historical role played by the US in Europe arguing that
World War II would not have occurred had the US maintained a role in European affairs. See,
Richard Holbrooke (1995) ‘America, A European Power’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74/2, pp. 38-51
made war between European states both economically and politically irrational, as
In his analysis of the rationale behind NATO’s maintenance Duffield asserts that
NATO affords the US a key role in European affairs and a means by which European
principle institutional vehicle through which the US can exert influence on West
European policies’ noting that NATO, ‘…imbues the US with considerable political
NATO was the foundation for the US claim to leadership of the Western world’. 15
While, as Sloan acknowledges, the US has not exercised dominance over European
foreign policy and has periodically met with opposition from within Europe regarding
certain foreign policy endeavours, the US has nonetheless used NATO as means by
US has many organisational links with Europe through the UN Security Council, the
G-7, and international financial bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank as well as
extensive trade links. The US exerts influence in many regions globally, such as East
Asia and the Middle East, without an organisational or formal institutional expression
14
John Duffield (1995) ‘Why NATO Persists’, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.) The Future of
NATO, London: Frank Cass, p. 111
15
Stanley Sloan (1995) ‘NATO and the US’, in S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss
(eds.) NATO in the Post-Cold War Era, New York: St Martins Press, p. 155
of this influence. Orchestrating the wholesale reinvention of NATO for the sole
purpose of maintaining a means of influencing European foreign policy does not seem
wholly plausible given the myriad other means by which influence could be exerted.
A third explanation for the US’s desire to maintain NATO is that dissolving it could
prompt the emergence of a European security organisation that may in time rival the
US and challenge its global dominance. As with the other explanations this
perspective is not without merit. The inability of Europe to act independently of the
obviously insufficient. Had NATO not been extant and able to provide a means by
which Europe could act to ultimately intervene in Yugoslavia, the crisis in the region
may well have forced the EU to adopt a more coherent and robust common foreign
and security policy. Had the EU been able to resolve the crisis without US support
then potentially the new European security organ may have developed into a rival
European security force, if one was to have been created, to challenge the military
would have anything to fear from a European defence force given first, the enormous
gap between European and US military capabilities, and second, the unlikelihood that
a European defence force would threaten the US given the shared ideological
convictions and the historically cordial relationship between the two entities.
The above analysis therefore suggests that NATO’s expanded remit and the US’s
the explanations here articulated to provide a more holistic explanation for NATO’s
transformation.
Following the events of 1989-1992 a consensus emerged, which, as Layne wrote, held
that, ‘…the Soviet Union’s collapse transformed the international system from
fundamentally asymmetrical the term unipolarity is not wholly accurate. The nature of
the present system is not one of unipolar dominance but rather of uni-multi-polarity.
As Huntington explains, ‘There is now only one superpower. But that does not mean
that the world is unipolar. A unipolar system would have one superpower, no
significant major powers, and many minor powers. As a result the superpower could
zenith of the international system but this position of primacy is derived from its
status as leader of the dominant group of states loosely called ‘the West.’ For the US
to preserve its eminence within the uni-multi-polar system it must have support at
least within its primary catchment area. According to Sarkesian et al, ‘The global
whose power and security postures preclude, or considerably reduce, the major
16
Stanley Sloan (1995) ‘NATO and the US’, in S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss
(eds.) NATO in the Post-Cold War Era, New York: St Martins Press, p.
17
Christopher Layne (1993) ‘The Unipolar Illusion’, International Security, Vol. 17, no. 4, p. 5
18
Samuel Huntington (1999) ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78/3, p. 35. Heller
has also defined the current system as uni-multipolar. See Mark Heller (2003) ‘The
International System After the War in Iraq’ in Shai Feldman (ed.) After the War in Iraq, Sussex
Academy Press: Sussex p. 13
powers’ control and influence’. 19 This need for support explains the US’s assertion of
universality in its foreign affairs and its determination to act in unison with a wider
War era they have asserted both the legality of the intervention and the existence of a
contrasted sharply, in both instances the US portrayed their actions as legal and
with the US exercising unrivalled power, then this consistent desire to be seen to act
within the law and as part of a coalition of the willing appears unnecessary. Certainly
were portrayed as legal and multi-lateral. However, as noted by Wheeler 20 and others,
support while a supposed threat to US interests and citizens, in the case of Iraq the
manifestation of the US flexing its muscle in a unipolar world, points to the flaws in
19
Sam Sarkesian, John Williams, Stephen Cimbala (2002) US National Security:
Policymakers, Processes and Politics, London: Lynne Rienner, p. 266
20
See Nicholas Wheeler (2003) ‘Humanitarian Intervention After September 11th’, in Anthony
Lang (ed) Just Intervention, Washington: George Washington Press
As a basis for intervention the US articulated the imminent threat posed by the Iraqi
targeting the US, and the human rights abuses prevalent in Iraq. These in themselves,
intervention. The articulation of the legal basis for action and the multi-lateral nature
currently there exists a uni-polar system the US would have no need to seek support
from the international community. Therefore, the assertions of legality and multi-
lateralism prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom point to a realisation within the Bush
Administration of the limits of its own power and the need for international support.
As such, the US’s unrivalled strength is tempered by the realisation that to act without
support would risk fomenting resentment among lesser, but still major powers,
While the intervention in Iraq conformed to the systemic constraints prevailing upon
the US in the post-Cold War era it did nonetheless differ significantly from the
expressed. NATO was sidelined during the lead up to the intervention in Iraq yet it
constituted the cornerstone of the operation in Kosovo. The need for unanimity within
NATO before any action can occur was evidently seen as too much of a constraint for
the Bush administration and a ‘coalition of the willing’ was assembled. The
Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003 following the invasion of Iraq suggests that
the rationale behind the US acting in concert with its powerful allies in Europe, lest
The fallout from the Iraq invasion has, however, witnessed an attempt by the US to
Hunter, ‘…the value of the experiment [of acting without NATO support in Iraq] if it
had a value, was that it showed the limits of such an approach’.22 The UN was
according to Cornish ‘…came close to collapse’ 23 over Iraq, was given a minor role in
the maintenance of security. The experience in Iraq, therefore, suggests that the US
has learned that it must work with its major NATO allies to insure both success and to
counter the emergence of a rival security organisation. The ‘Coalition of the Willing’
assembled for the invasion of Iraq proved unstable and unreliable as many of the
countries involved have lost enthusiasm for the operation and either reduced their
A 1992 draft of the Pentagons Defense Planning Guidance on post-Cold War Strategy
and further noted, ‘We must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential
21
Watson and Bennet wrote of the summit, ‘…it is not an exaggeration to talk about the death
of NATO. What we are watching is a slow death, but the plan put forward by France,
Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg is a heavy blow.’ Rory Watson and Rosemary Bennet
(2003) ‘EU Gang of Four Agree to Form New Defence Force’, The Times, April 30, p. 4
22
Robert Hunter (2004) ‘A Forward-Looking Partnership’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83/5, p. 14
23
Paul Cornish (2004) ‘NATO: The Practice and Politics of Transformation’, International
Affairs, Vol. 80/1, p. 63
competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.’ 24 The Pentagon’s
European security.’ 25
There is, therefore, clear evidence that throughout the 1990s the US administration
believed that NATO constituted the best way to maintain its pre-eminence in
international affairs. The need to maintain NATO’s primacy derives from the US’s
acceptance of the need to work, to the greatest extent possible, in accord with its
to exercise its dominant power with legitimacy. They are key instruments of states
craft – indeed of realpolitik – for a dominant state that is seeking…to convince other
states to cooperate with it rather than to balance against it.’ 26 NATO constitutes a
led by the US. According to Duffield ‘[The US’s] preponderance within the Alliance
allows [it] to exercise such leadership as setting the agenda, defining options and
24
Report quoted in Marjorie Cohen (2003) ‘The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention In Kosovo’,
in Alexsandar Jokic (ed.) Lessons of Kosovo: The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention,
Toronto: Broadview Press, p. 123
25
Quoted in Seth Ackerman (1999) ‘Forgotten Coverage of Rambouillet Negotiations’, in
FAIR, May 14th, available at http://www.fair.org/press-releases/kosovo-solution.html
[Accessed September 2004]
26
Michael Mastanduno (1999) ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment’, in Ethan Kapstein and
Michael Mastanduno (eds.) Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold
War, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 157
constitutes a stable alliance whose members are socialised to accept the leadership,
While the expansion of NATO, both literally and in terms of its operational remit,
progressed rapidly in the pos-Cold War world the US and European conceptions of
the organisation’s purpose nonetheless differed and came to a head over the invasion
of Iraq. While as noted above the US sees NATO as a means by which its hegemony
can be exercised in a multilateral manner, in Europe the trend has been towards the
While Operation Allied Force appeared to unite NATO, the differing emphasis and
NATO’s role. While within Europe Blair, Havel and others stressed the humanitarian
Europe declared, ‘…this wasn’t a conflict strictly about Kosovo. It wasn’t even a
conflict ultimately about ethnic cleansing. It was a battle about the future of NATO,
about the credibility of the United States as a force in world affairs’.27 In his speech to
the nation when the campaign began President Clinton stated, ‘Imagine what would
happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the other way as these people
were massacred on NATO’s doorstep. That would discredit NATO, the cornerstone
27
CBS News Interview with General Wesley Clark by David Morris, 15 May 2000,
http://cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/clark.pdf [accessed June 2005]
on which our security has rested for 50 years now.’ 28 The unity that surrounded the
intervention was therefore illusory and as noted by Rodman, ‘Operation Allied Force
helped [the allies] paper over [their] numerous differences over NATO’s mission and
The European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the EU in 2003 outlines the EU’s
foreign policy goals. As noted by Quille the ESS seeks to combat threats by
and by addressing root causes such as poverty and weak governance through
instruments of regional dialogue’. 30 This desire contrasts with the US’s National
Security Strategy of 2002 with its emphasis on pre-emptive strikes and unilateralism.
The rhetoric of the Bush administration has increasingly accentuated the gap between
Europe and the US over issues such as the ICC and Kyoto while the foreign policy
domineering and committed to working outside NATO if needs be. 31 Europe, though
not committed to opposing the US has sought to serve, as Strobbe Talbott notes, as
28
Quoted in Foreign Desk (1999) ‘Conflict in the Balkans’, The New York Times, March 25th,
Section A, p. 15
29
Peter Rodman (1999) ‘The Fallout from Kosovo’, Foreign Affairs, 78/4, p. 45
30
Gerrard Quille (2004) ‘The European Security Strategy’, International Affairs, Vol. 11/3, p.
422
31
According to Talbott the Bush administration’s actions have meant that, ‘…the US has
rarely been so at odds with so many of its traditional friends on so many issues’. Strobe
Talbott (2002) ‘From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81/6, p. 46
32
Ibid, p. 55
Constitution ‘…would have profound and troubling implications for the transatlantic
therefore increasing evidence that US-European relations are in decline on the basis
will lead to competitive or confrontational behaviour and disputes over the legitimacy
Conclusion
The above analysis suggests an explanation for NATO transformation in the post-
Cold War era. The US has, in the context of the uni-multipolar world, sought to
maintain NATO as it offers it a means by which it can execute its foreign policy in a
increasing the chances of success in its international endeavours. NATO more so then
the UN, constrained as it is by the Security Council veto, or ad hoc coalitions of the
willing, which are inherently unstable and transitory, offers the US the most attractive
means by which it can operate within the current systemic conditions as it constitutes
This US rationale for the maintenance of NATO differs from emerging European
perspectives, which see NATO as more than merely a ready-made supporting organ
33
Jeffrey Cimbalo (2004) ‘Saving NATO from Europe’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83/6, p. 111
34
Gerrard Quille (2004) ‘The European Security Strategy’, International Affairs, Vol. 11/3, p.
423
35
Celeste Wallander (2002) ‘NATO’s Price’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81/6, p
become less a source of protection and more a cause of resentment and a problem to
policy objectives will impact on NATO’s role. The US’s invasion of Iraq in the face
of European objections, ‘[created] the impression on both sides of the Atlantic that
NATO was a wasting asset’. 37 The ESS, and to a lesser extent the Constitutional
treaty, signal Europe’s direction in international relations and this contrasts sharply
with the US view. The intervention in Kosovo and, to a greater extent, the invasion of
Iraq illuminated the US and Europe’s rival foreign policy outlooks and suggest that
36
Strobe Talbott (2002) ‘From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81/6,
p. 46
37
Ibid, p. 51