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PALMAS ISLAND CASE

Reports of International Arbitral Awards
FACTS
Both the United States laid claim to the ownership of the Island of Palmas. While the
U.S. maintained that it was part of the Philippines, the Netherlands claimed it as their own. The
United States traces their title over discovery of Spain and by virtue of Cession under the treaty
of Paris, claims that it followed that the soverieghty was passed to them when Spain transferred
control of the Philippines over. Netherlands anchored it title over the exercise of sovereignty
over the Island.
ISSUE
Whether or not United States or Netherlands has title over the Island
RULING
A title that is inchoate cannot prevail over a definite title found on the continuous and
peaceful display of sovereignty. The peaceful and continuous display of territorial sovereignty is
as good as title. However, discovery alone without subsequent act cannot suffice to prove
sovereignty over the island. The territorial sovereignty of the Island was not contested by anyone
from 1700 to 1906. The title of discovery at best an inchoate title does not therefore prevail over
the Netherlands claims of sovereignty. Evidence of contracts made by the East India Company
and the Netherlands was examined by the arbitrator. The claims made by the Netherlands were
also based on the premise of the convention it had with the princes and native chieftains of the
islands.
Hence, at the time of the Treaty of Paris in 1898, Spain was found not to have dominion
over this island.
LEGAL STATUS OF EASTERN GREENLAND
Reports of International Arbitral Awards
FACTS
A suit was instituted before the Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter
PCIJ) by Royal Danish Government against the Royal Norwegian Government over the legal
status of certain territories in Eastern Greenland. Cause of Action for the dispute arose when
Norwegian Government on July 10th, 1931 proclaimed that it proceeded to occupy certain
territories of Eastern Greenland which as contented by Denmark are subject to sovereignty of
Crown of Denmark.
ISSUE
Whether or not Norway or Denmark has title over Eastern Greenland
RULING
Danish Government placed reliance on Palmas Island decision of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration which stated that a title "founded on the peaceful and continuous display of State

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authority over the island". It stressed on various conventions and treaties ratified by the Denmark
with other countries where a stipulation for non-application of such convention over Greenland
was inserted to demonstrate that other nations admitted that Denmark has right to exclude
Greenland.
These treaties are sufficient to establish Denmark's will and intention to act exercise
sovereignty. From the facts stated above i.e. legislations on Greenland for administration, various
treaties ratified, concessions granted for erection of telegraph lines, fixing limits on territorial
waters, etc are manifestations of the exercise of sovereign authority.
Regarding uncertainty over sovereignty during 1814 to 1915, the Court said that taking
into account the above facts and circumstances Denmark should be regarded as having displayed
her sovereign authority. Despite considering just the period from 1921 to 1931 the Court
concluded that Denmark regarded itself as possessing sovereignty over Greenland.
The PCIJ after it was satisfied about the valid title to the sovereignty over Greenland at
the critical date adjudged the contention in favour of the Danish Government. It said
havingregard to a pattern of activity between 1921 and 1931, including the enforcement by
legislation of a state trade monopoly, the granting of trading, mining, and other concessions, the
exercise of governmental functions and administration, and the making of numerous treaties in
the terms of which Danish rights over Greenland were explicit. The Norwegian occupation was
illegal and invalid, since Denmark, at the very least in the 10 years previous to the Norwegian
occupation, had displayed and exercised her sovereign rights to an extent sufficient to constitute
a valid title to sovereignty'.
MINQUIERS AND ECREHOS CASE
International Court of Justice, November 17, 1953
FACTS
The United Kingdom and France are in contest in the ownership over the islets and group
of islands collectively known as Minquiers and Ecrehos. The United Kingdom Government
derives its title from the conquest of England by William Duke of Normandy in 1066. The
French Government contended for its part that, after 1204, the King of France held the Minquiers
and the Ecrehos, together with some other islands close to the Continent and referred to the same
medieval treaties as those invoked by the United Kingdom.
For its part, the French Government saw a presumption in favour of French sovereignty
in the feudal link between the King of France, overlord of the whole of Normandy, and the King
of England,his vassal for these territories. In this connection, it relies on a Judgment of the Court
of France of 1202, which condemned John Lackland to forfeit all the lands which he held in fee
of the King of France, including the whole of Normandy.
ISSUE
Whether or not Untied Kingdom or France has title over Minquiers and Ecrehos
RULING

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The French Government alleged certain facts. It contended that the Minquiers were a
dependency of the Chausey islands, granted by the Duke of Normandy to the Abbey of MontSaint-Michel in 1022. In 1784 a correspondence between French authorities concerned an
application for a concession in respect of the Minquiers made by a French national. The Court
held the view that this correspondence did not disclose anything which could support the present
French claim to sovereignty, but that it revealed certain fears of creating difficulties with the
English Crown. The French Government further contended that, since 1861, it has assumed the
sole charge of the lighting and buoying of the Minquiers, without having encountered any
objection from the United Kingdom. The Court said that the buoys placed by the French
Government at the Minquiers were placed outside the reefs of the groups and purported to aid
navigation to and from French ports and protect shipping against the dangerous reefs of the
Minquiers. The French Government also relied on various official visits to the Minquiers and the
erection in 1939 of a house on one of the islets with a subsidy from the Mayor of Granville, in
continental Normandy.
The Court did not find that the facts invoked by the French Government were sufficient
to show that France has a valid title to the Minquiers. As to the above-mentioned facts from the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in particular, such acts could hardly be considered as
sufficient evidence of the intention of that Government to act as sovereign over the islets. Nor
were those acts of such a character that they could be considered as involving a manifestation of
State authority in respect of the islets.
In such circumstances, and having regard to the view expressed above with regard to the
evidence produced by the United Kingdom Government, the Court was of opinion that the
sovereignty over the Minquiers belongs to the United Kingdom.

WESTERN SAHARA CASE

Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975
FACTS
This concerns the request for an advisory opinion of the UN General Assembly regarding
the decolonization process of Western Sahara under the auspices of Spain. Spain challenges the
request for an advisory opinion stating that it will interfere with the decolonization process.
Rio de oro and Sakiet El Hamra, invokes the right to self-determination in the in the
determination of their geographic boundaries.
ISSUE
Whether or not the principle of UtiPossidetisJuris applies in this instance
RULING
The principle of utipossidetisjuris requires that the boundaries set by colonial rulers,
regardless of how idiosyncratic, be respected in exercising self-determination in order to prevent
the incessant disruptions to international order that would result if every ethnic minority within a
territory were to claim this right, such a doctrine is necessary to prevent the decolonization

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process from threatening the stability of the international political order. A consensus has
emerged that there must be some link between the people entitled to self-determination in the
decolonization process and a specific Non-Self-Governing Territory. It was the territorial status
of a people that mattered in determining whether the peoples had a right to self-determination.
The Court concluded that the history and culture of a people have no legal bearing on the right to
selfdetermination in the absence of a territorial connection, because such historical and ethnic
characteristics have no bearing on territorial rights.

CASE CONCERNING THE TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR

International Court of Justice, June 15, 1962
FACTS
The case concerning the Temple of PreahVihear, between Cambodia and Thailand, were
instituted on 6 October 1959 by an Application of the Government of Cambodia. The dispute
was sovereignty over the region of the Temple of PreahVihear. This ancient sanctuary, partially
in ruins, stood on a promontory of the Dangrek range of mountains which constituted the
boundary between Cambodia and Thailand. The dispute had its fons et origo in the boundary
settlements made in the period 1904-1908 between France, then conducting the foreign relations
of Indo-China, and Siam. The application of the Treaty of 13 February 1904 was, in particular,
involved. That Treaty established the general character of the frontier the exact boundary of
which was to be delimited by a Franco-Siamese Mixed Commission
ISSUE
Whether or not the principle of Cambodia or Thailand was sovereignty over the teritory
RULING
The Siamese Government and later the Thai Government had raised no query about the
Annex I map prior to its negotiations with Cambodia in Bangkok in 1958. But in 1934-1935 a
survey had established a divergence between the map line and the true line of the watershed, and
other maps had been produced showing the Temple as being in Thailand: Thailand had
nevertheless continued also to use and indeed to publish maps showing PreahVihear as lying in
Cambodia. Moreover, in the course of the negotiations for the 1925 and 1937 Franco-Siamese
Treaties, which confirmed the existing frontiers, and in 1947 in Washington before the FrancoSiamese Conciliation Commission, it would have been natural for Thailand to raise the matter:
she did not do so. The natural inference was that she had accepted the frontier at PreahVihear as
it was drawn on the map, irrespective of its correspondence with the watershed line. Thailand
had stated that having been, at all material times, in possession of PreahVihear, she had had no
need to raise the matter; she had indeed instanced the acts of her administrative authorities on the
ground as evidence that she had never accepted the Annex I line at PreahVihear. But the Court
found it difficult to regard such local acts as negativing the consistent attitude of the central
authorities. Moreover, when in 1930 Prince Damrong, on a visit to the Temple, was officially
received there by the French Resident for the adjoining Cambodian province, Siam failed to
react.

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From these facts, the court concluded that Thailand had accepted the Annex I map. Furthermore,
the acceptance of the Annex I map caused it to enter the treaty settlement; the Parties had at that
time adopted an interpretation of that settlement which caused the map line to prevail over the
provisions of the Treaty and, as there was no reason to think that the Parties had attached any
special importance to the line of the watershed as such, as compared with the overriding
importance of a final regulation of their own frontiers, the Court considered that the
interpretation to be given now would be the same.

For these reasons, the Court upheld the submissions of Cambodia concerning sovereignty over
PreahVihear.

CASE CONCERNING THE FRONTIER DISPUTE BETWEEN BENIN AND NIGER

International Court of Justice, July 12, 2005
FACTS
Benin and Niger have disputed the entire course of their shared boundary. The disputed
boundary is divided into two sectors: the Mekrou River sector and the Niger River sector. In the
Niger River sector, Benin argues the boundary is the left bank of the river, keeping all navigable
waters within the territory of Benin. Niger contends, however, that the true boundary is the
middle line of the Niger River. In the Mekrou River sector, Niger contends the river and certain
land beyond are the territory of Niger. Benin argues the Mekrou River's median line is the true
boundary.
ISSUE
Where the boundary between Benin and Niger is situated
RULING
The Frontier Dispute represents the ICJ's ability to resolve territorial disputes between
States, utilizing the special jurisdiction provisions provided by the Statute of the Court. This case
also upholds the principle of utipossidetisjuris, especially when the boundaries of former
colonial territories are being considered.
The Court then considers the boundary in the Niger River sector and then specifies "to
which Party each of the islands in the river belongs."The Court first considers evidence presented
by both Benin and Niger, which attempts to establish the boundary on the basis of colonial
documents and decrees. After evaluating the evidence, the Court "concludes that neither of the
Parties has succeeded in providing evidence of title on the basis of regulative or administrative
acts during the colonial period." To determine the boundary, the Court then examines any
evidence of effectivits during the colonial period. On the basis of the exercise of administrative
authority during the colonial period, the Court determines "the boundary between Benin and
Niger follows the main navigable channel of the River Niger as it existed at the dates of

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independence." From this decision, the Court presents a list of 154 geographic coordinates, based
on latitude and longitude, providing the exact location of the boundary. Using this boundary-line,
the Court determines the ownership of the islands within the Niger River (the island of Lt is
deemed the territory of Niger).
Next, the ICJ chamber considers the course of the boundary in the Mekrou River sector.
After evaluating several colonial decrees, the Court finds a 1927 decree defined the colonial
boundary at the date of independence to be the Mekrou River. Based on this finding, and the fact
the Mekrou River is not navigable, the Court concludes the median line of the Mekrou River to
be the boundary between Benin and Niger.

CASE CONCERNING THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE BETWEEN BURKINA FASO

AND MALI
International Court of Justice, December 22, 1986
FACTS
A question pertaining to a border dispute was tabled before the International Court of
Justice by Burkina Faso and Mali.

ISSUE
Whether or not an obligation exist to respect pre-existing international frontiers in the
event of a state succession

RULING
Yes. An obligation exists to respect pre-existing international frontiers in the event of a
state succession, whether or not the rule is the rule is expressed in the form of utipossidetis.
The fact that the principle did not exist when the states declared such independence in 1960
does not foreclose its present application.

CASE CONCERNING TERRITORILA DISPUTE BETWEEN LIBYA AND CHAD

International Court of Justice, February 3, 1994
FACTS
On August 31, 1990, Libya submitted a compromis to the ICJ, which included an official
letter and a two-page framework agreement signed by the two countries a year before signaling
that if they were unable to settle the dispute politically in a year after the signing of that
framework agreement (notified to the Organization of African Unity), they would submit their
dispute to the ICJ.
Chad complained that since 1971 a year after the dispute began Libyas forces had
illegally occupied the Aozou Strip, which it described as an important part of its territory. The
disputed area, according to Microsoft Encarta, is believed to contain deposits of uranium, oil, and
manganese.

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The parties did not agree on the exact question to put before the court. For its part, Chad
asked the court, to determine the course of the frontier between [the parties], in accordance
with the principles and rules of international law applicable
ISSUE
Whether or notthe Libya or Chad was sovereignty over the Azou Strip
RULING
The critical juncture in history was 1955, when Libya and France concluded the 1955
treaty. The ICJ ruling notes that, French authority in parts of those territories had been
challenged and a settled border was essential It is recognized by both parties [Libya and Chad]
that the 1955 treaty is the logical starting point for consideration of the issues before the court.
The treaty had the pre-independence treaties listed in its annex, signaling that the 1955
treaty was merely confirming boundaries that had already been in place prior to Libyas
independence. The ICJ decision turned on Article 3 of the 1955 treaty, which said that the parties
recognize the frontiers that arise out of the pre-independence treaties. Using the word
recognize indicates that both parties accepted the frontier referred to, giving it a legal force, the
court noted.
CASE CONCERNING CERTAIN PHOSPAHTE LANDS IN NAURU
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1992
FACTS
On 19 May 1989, Nauru filed an Application instituting proceedings against Australia in
respect of a dispute over the rehabilitation of certain phosphate lands mined under Australian
administration before Nauruan independence. In its Application Nauru claimed that Australia had
breached the trusteeship obligations it had accepted under Article 76 of the United Nations
Charter and under the Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru of 1 November 1947. The alleged
violation consists of among other that Australia violated the agreement by inflicting irreparable
damage to the lands. The courts jurisdiction was questioned
ISSUE
Whether or notAustraliaviolated the Agreement
RULING
Australia played a very special role established by several agreements and by practice.
The Court pointed out that third states were free to apply for permission to intervene in
accordance with Art. 62 of the Statute. But the absence of such a request for intervention, the
Court determined, in no way precluded it from adjudicating upon the claims submitted, provided
that the legal interests of the third state did not form the very subject-matter of the decision. The
interests of New Zealand and the United Kingdom did not constitute the very subject-matter of
the judgment. The Court thus, also rejected Australias objection that New Zealand and the
United Kingdom were not parties to the proceedings.

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Finally, the Court dealt with Australias objection that Naurus claim concerning the
overseas assets of the British Phophate Commissioners was a new claim incompatible with Arts.
40 para.1 and 38 para.2 of the Statute. The Court found that the preliminary objection raised by
Australia on this point was well founded.
The Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the
Republic of Nauru on 19 May 1989 and that the said application was admissible except as to the
claim regarding the overseas assets of the British PhophateCommissoners.
On September 9, 1993, Nauru and Australia notified the Court that they had reached a
friendly settlement. By order of 13 September 1993, the Court placed on record the
discontinuance, by agreement of the parties, of the proceedings initiated on 19 May 1989 by the
Republic of Nauru against the Commonwealth of Australia and directed that the case be removed
from the list.

LEGAL COSNEQUENCES OF THE COSNTRUCTION OF A WALL IN THE

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004
FACTS
The wall which Israel constructed on the Palestinian territory and its route impaired the
freedom of the Palestinians. The I.C.J. was however asked to provide an advisory opinion on
the matter when the U.N. General Assembly requested Israel to halt and reverse the
construction of the wall.

ISSUE
Whether or notthe construction of the wall violated Public International Law
RULING
International law, the Fourth Geneva Convention, The Hague Convention, relevant
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions were all contravened by Israel, the
occupying power, for constructing a wall on the Palestinian occupied territory.
This action of the Israelites impaired the liberty of movement of the occupied territory with the
exception of Israels citizens as it was enshrined under Article 12 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. The actions of Israel also curtailed the Palestinians access to work,
health facilities, education and an adequate standard of living under the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child.Although Israel had through its actions contravened International Law and these
conventions, both parties, that is, Israel and the Palestinians are under an obligation to observe
the rules of international humanitarian law. The implementation of the relevant Security Council
resolutions is the only solution to the hostile situation since both sides had taken illegal actions
and unilateral decisions.

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IM ALONE CASE
Joint Interim Report of the Commissioners, June 30, 1933
FACTS
The Im Alone ship was sunk by the United States Revenue Cutter, Dexter on the high
seas. The vessel was of Canadian registry and was engaged in the carrying of liquor to be
smuggled into the United States. Compensation is now sought.
ISSUE
Whether or notthe United States is liable for to pay compensation for the sinking of the
ship
RULING
The United States, might consistently use necessary and reasonable force for the purpose
of effecting the objects of boarding, searching, seizing and bringing into port suspected vessels,
but the admitted intentional sinking of the suspected vessel was not justified by anything in the
Convention, hence, the United States is liable to pay compensation.
CHURCH v. HUBBART
6 U.S. 187, 1804
FACTS
The ship, Aurora, was hovering on the coast of Para and not within Portuguese dominion;
it was however nevertheless seized along with its cargo for violating trade restrictions of
Portuguese Law
ISSUE
Whether or notthe a State can enforce laws beyond its harbors
RULING
The right of a nation to seize vessels attempting illicit trade is not confined to its harbors,
or to the range of its boundaries. Its power to secure itself from injury, may certainly be
exercised beyond the limits of its territory. If the means used by a nation are such unnecessarily
to vex and harass foreign lawful commerce, it may be resisted. If they are reasonable they will be
submitted to.
ANGLO-NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE
International Court of Justice, December 18, 1951
FACTS
British fishers came in increasing volumes off the coast of Eastern Finnmark. Measures
were taken by the Norwegian government with a view to specify the limits to which foreign
fishing vessels are allowed to fish.

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ISSUE
Whether or notNorwegian measures were allowed by International law.
RULING
The method of straight lines established by Norway was imposed y the peculiar
Norwegian coast; that even before the dispute arose, this method has been consolidated by a
constant and sufficiently long practice, in the face of which the attitude of governments bears
witness to the fact that they did not consider it to be contrary to international law warrants that
the actions were not violative of international law.
FISHERIES JURIDCITION CASE BETWEEN UNTIED KINGDOM AND ICELAND
International Court of Justice, February 2, 1973
FACTS
United Kingdom instituted proceedings against Iceland in respect of a dispute concerning
the proposed extension by the Icelandic Government of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a
distance of 50 nautical miles from the baseline around its coasts. Iceland refused to submit to the
courts jurisdiction but the court proceeded to render judgment on whether it can acquire
jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or notthe Court could acquire jurisdiction.
RULING
By virtue of the resolution of 1959, which provides for limits of Icelands jurisdiction,
and at the same time provides for in cases one as this, any dispute will be referred to the Court of
Justice, the ICJ could validly take jurisdiction.
FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE BETWEEN GERMANY AND ICELAND
International Court of Justice, February 2, 1973
FACTS
Germany instituted proceedings against Iceland in respect of a dispute concerning the
proposed extension by the Icelandic Government of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a
distance of 50 nautical miles from the baseline around its coasts. Iceland refused to submit to the
courts jurisdiction but the court proceeded to render judgment on whether it can acquire
jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or notthe Court could acquire jurisdiction.
RULING
By virtue of the resolution of 1959, which provides for limits of Icelands jurisdiction,
and at the same time provides for in cases one as this, any dispute will be referred to the Court of
Justice, the ICJ could validly take jurisdiction.

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FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE BETWEEN GERMANY AND ICELAND

International Court of Justice, February 2, 1973
FACTS
Germany's North Sea coast is concave, while the Netherlands' and Denmark's coasts are
convex. If the delimitation had been determined by the equidistance rule ("drawing a line each
point of which is equally distant from each shore"), Germany would have received a smaller
portion of the resource-rich shelf relative to the two other states. Thus Germany argued that the
length of the coastlines be used to determine the delimitation.Germany wanted the ICJ to
apportion the Continental Shelf to the proportion of the size of the state's adjacent land and not
by the rule of equidistance.
ISSUE
Whether or notGermany owns the shelf.
RULING
The Court ultimately urged the parties to "abate the effects of an incidental special feature
[Germany's concave coast] from which an unjustifiable difference of treatment could result." In
subsequent negotiations, the states granted to Germany most of the additional shelf it sought.The
cases are viewed as an example of "equity praeter legem"that is, equity "beyond the law"
when a judge supplements the law with equitable rules necessary to decide the case at hand
GULF OF MAINE CASE
International Court of Justice, October 12, 1984
FACTS
This case concerns the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine area
regarding the continental shelf and fisheries zone between Canada and United States of America.
ISSUE
Whether or notCanada or United States has sovereignty over the area
RULING
The court applied the equitable criteria in delimiting the maritime boundary between the
states. The equidistance method is not the only method applicable to the present dispute, and it
does not even have the benefit of a presumption in its favour. Thus, under existing law, it must be
demonstrated that the equidistance method leads to an equitable result in the case in question.
The Court is bound to stress in this connection that delimiting with a concern to achieving an
equitable result, as required by current international law, is not the same as delimiting in equity.
The Courts jurisprudence shows that, in disputes relating to maritime delimitation, equity is not
a method of delimitation, but solely an aim that should be borne in mind in effecting the
delimitation.
US vs TAIYO
United States District Court, D. Maine, S. D. June 17, 1975

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FACTS
The United States contends that, by fishing in the contiguous fisheries zone, the TAIYO
MARU 28 and her captain violated the Bartlett Act, 16 U.S.C. 1081 et seq., and the Contiguous
Fisheries Zone Act, 16 U.S.C. 1091 et seq., and that international law permits, and United
States law authorizes, the hot pursuit of a foreign vessel from the contiguous fisheries zone and
the seizure of the vessel on the high seas for violation of domestic fisheries law. Defendant's
position is that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the TAIYO MARU 28 and her master, because
the vessel was seized on the high seas in violation of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas.
ISSUE
Whether or notUnited States has the right to hot pursuit
RULING
Defendant makes no contention that the contiguous fisheries zone created by the United
States in the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act violates customary international law. Defendant also
recognizes that, within the three-mile territorial sea, the United States has the right to prohibit
foreign fishing and that Article 23 of the Convention on the High Seas provides express authority
for the United States to conduct hot pursuit from the territorial sea onto the high seas for the
purpose of apprehending foreign ships which have violated domestic fisheries law within the
territorial sea. And defendant does not contest that the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act extended
to a zone nine miles from the seaward limit of the territorial sea all the rights with respect to
fisheries which the United States previously had in its territorial sea, and that, unless restricted
by treaty, the United States has the right to conduct hot pursuit from a contiguous zone onto the
high seas for violations of its domestic law.
PEOPLE v. TULIN
G.R. no. 111709, August 30, 2001

FACTS
MT Tabangao was sailing off the coast of Mindoro and was suddenly boarded by armed
pirates. They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel. The cargo of the ship
was transferred off the coast of Singapore. The appellants were all arrested.
ISSUE
Whether or notthe Philippine courts have jurisdiction.
RULING
Yes, the attack on MT Tabangao was carried out in Philippine waters, although the
captive vessel was later brought to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, such disposition by
the pirates of the cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.

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