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Being, the World, and Appearance in Early Stoicism and Some Other Greek Philosophies

Author(s): Josiah B. Gould


Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Dec., 1974), pp. 261-288
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
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BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE


IN EARLY STOICISM AND SOME
OTHER GREEK PHILOSOPHIES
JOSIAH B. GOULD

only

Someone

slightly

familiar

with

ancient

con

and

Greek

temporary philosophy can hardly fail to be impressed by a major


difference in their interests.
One does not find contemporary phi
losophers trying to say what the world is like, but one does dis
cover

most

ancient

Democritus

13B2a).1

of

them

of

in our world

verse

consists

earth

is a

is only

small

solar

rounded by a vacuum,
543).
curate
to get

All

these

description
an accurate

the philosophers.
the

astronomer,

sets

several

of

sphere

xii.8; De C?elo
one

that

there

is no

sun

are

larger

and moon

(DK 68A40).

of

relatively

(Metaphysica

there

them

sun

the

moon

system

Aristotle
concentric
at

the

ii.13-14).
and

that,

are

take

than

chemist,

that

and

the

sun

and

that the uni

claimed

and

spheres
center
of

the

the

that

universe

The early Stoa held that


while

that

system

to be giving
universe.

themselves
of

go to the scientist?to

is sur

it (SVF II 530,

the physical
feature
of the world
description
today
and

innumerable

and moon,

there is no vacuum within

philosophers
of some

We

the world.

about

talking

said that the sun is flat like a leaf (DK

maintained

in some

that

worlds,
in some

philosophers

for example,

Anaximenes,

there

Greek

we

an

do not

the physicist,

ac
But
to

go

the

the biologist.

There is another element in ancient Greek philosophy which


goes in tandem with this effort to give an account of the physical
universe

and

its parts.

It

is the

reaching

out

for

or

the attempt

to grasp being, reality, or what is. The thought behind this en


deavor seems to have been that there exist certain basic entities
which it is incumbent upon philosophers
to grasp and in terms of

1
this essay I will use DK
to refer to Diels, Hermann.
Throughout
Die Fragmente
der Vorsokratiker.
5th edit. Herausgegeben
von Walther
Kranz
(Berlin: Weidmannsehe
Buchhandlung,
1934) and SVF to refer to
von.
Hans
Stoicorum
Veterum
4 vols.
Arnim,
Fragmenta.
(Leipzig:
B. G. Teubner,
1903-1914).

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JOSIAH B. GOULD

262

are

in the physical
universe
the goings-on
between
this connection
philosophy
or less overt
of the
in a number
is more

of and

the generation

which

to be

While

explained.
for being
the quest

and

one of its most

Greek philosophers,
made

in one

who

by Plato,

explicit

refer

Socrates

has

dialogue

is

acknowledgements
several

search for reality (Phaedo 65c9, 66c2)


times to the philosopher's
and to philosophy itself as a discipline which liberates the soul so
that it may contemplate being or reality (82d9-83c3).
one

Finally,

ancient

the

finds

also

Greek

men

philosophers

tioning a third kind of entity which is, for most of them, different
from both the physical universe and its objects and basic realities
of the kind

ness or mind.
in all

a person

of

deal

He

curiosity.

does
he, of course,
curiosity
as much
but learns
astronomy,
The

possible.

to

ancient

Greek

one's

to gratify
as

suggested,
found
together
quently
Because
appearances.
Greek

plexity might
were

ing questions

the

to know,

not

ancient

study
physics,

Greek

philosophy,

and

however,

ex

in part

of

the presence
is a somewhat

be brought

in it of
complex

out by noticing

trying

to give

diverse

ele

affair.

This

com

that the Greek

answers

to all

of

the

philos
follow

uni

(3) How does the person, one of the units


universe, come to know what it is like?
(4) How
alities

the

these

(1) What basic things or realities are there?


(2) How do these basic realities give rise to a physical
verse

as

biology

certainly

as being

of wisdom

this

To satisfy

chemistry,

philosophers,

other

among

about what
the universe
is like.
curiosity
the physical
talk about
universe
is fre
or reality
and
with
statements
about being

philosophy

ostensibly
:

is that he is a person having

is curious

the ideal of the pursuit

emplify

ophers

avenues

the only reality

in which he lives is like.

the universe

things, what

ments

there

viewed

the unique

identical with

My own view of the philosopher

And,

them

can know.

a great

effort

that one

contexts

finds
as

to knowledge,

obstacles

and as being themselves

knowledge,

one

; and

to appearances

lights?as

in a conscious

appearances

it is in epistemological

Typically

references

finds

are

These

described.

just

does

the

person

come

to know

in the physical

what

are?

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the

basic

re

263

BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE


occur

(5) Appearances
if
What,

is

any,

in

This essay will discuss


the

being,

and

these

in which

persons.
to

appearances

(b) to the basic

universe?

the way

world,

of

relation

the

of

consciousnesses

in the physical

(a) things
realities?

about

the

talk

the early Stoa's


coherent.

is

appearances

But

that Stoicism is in a certain class of Greek


philosophies by showing how with respect to ontology and physics
to be found
Stoicism
exhibits certain general characteristics

wish first to indicate

some

among

of

its

it from schools of philosophy


This

traits.
ophers
neous

procedure
evince

generally
interests

shall

We
Democritus,
are

fidence

take

an

interest

as

plain
in the three

the contrary
Greek

philos

rather

heteroge
and
the world

entities,

with

both

of

predecessors
The general

significant
and Aristotle.

to

the

of basic

status

and dogmatism

acteristics

Stoa

early
which

are

can

and being
universe
physical
names
the somewhat
of
ambiguous
I hope,
become
used will,
evident

is being
on Plato,
to whom we now turn.
of Plato's
take their
Many
dialogues

and

entities

of con

in the high degree

the

in which

the
traits

of these thinkers and that of the early

respect

universe

that
sense

distinguishing

how

make

to above?basic

in the systems
realism

the physical
The

also

by

bearing

appearances.

Plato,

exhibited
Stoa

in antiquity

will

referred

and

its contents,

and

predecessors,

important

be

known.
char

these

re

in my

marks

some question
None

of them

such as What
takes

off

Plato

however,
tities.
The

Platonic

tioned

of entities

class

present

spicuously

Plato
search

stresses
for

from

straightforwardly
In
exist?
things
affirms
the existence

or What

is there?

or Ideas

Forms
in this

In

the

certain

are

the most

of

Tim,aeus

Plato

is knowledge?

the

en

fundamental

and mention

connection

from

impetus

the question,
What
scattered
passages,

several
of

regard,
one
in the Phaedo,

the intrinsic

being.2

dramatic

or What

is piety?

dialogues

of philosophy
claims

men

frequently
of them

is con
in which

with

existence

the
for

2Phaedo
102bl and 61c6-103e7
See W. D. Ross, Plato's
passim.
Theory of Ideas (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1951), Chaps. 1-8, passim,
for a list of passages
in the dialogues where references
to the Forms appear.
I do not go into the question whether
or not Plato
to a
always adhered

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264

JOSIAH B. GOULD

certain

mathematical

elementary

two kinds
of triangular
objects,
which
in combination
surfaces
provide
as
of
each
the latter
then being
solids,

shaped
spatial magnitudes
for four
of the regular

signed to a primary
octahedron

fire,

element

physical

to air,

and

to

(cube to earth, pyramid

icosahedron

to water).3

in

And

the

Theaetetus
there is advanced the view that the whole universe is
nothing else but motion, of which there are said to exist two kinds
(156a). These are not the only things said by Plato in the di
to exist,4
as specimen
but they have
been
selected
alogues
a basic
for to each set is assigned
and irreducible
nature.
are said to be the causes
of the characteristics
of material
as has
100c).
And,
are constitutive

(Phaedo
magnitudes
bodies,
kinds

the varieties
of

ble

of the
of

sets

the other

one

being

which

These

entities

this

pair

of which

triangular-shaped
the four primary
to the main

rise

give

(Timaeus
58c-61c).
is said to generate
being

(Theaetetus

objects

something

Finally,
innumera
and

perceived

156a-b).

entities

in these

will

is independence
of minds.
essay
emphasize
are independent
of minds
in the sense
that they are
are not merely
of some mind.
in
elements
They
of persons
consciousnesses
but they are assumed
to

occupants

the

subjective
an inter-subjective

in fashioning

in each

of

about each of the fundamental

not

have

of motion

a perception

The feature
sets

compounds
in the universe

two kinds

twins,

of

the

indicated,
the surfaces

and

substances

the union

been

items,
Forms

the

cosmos

In

existence.
looks

to

the

the Timaeus
already-existing

the demiurge
as
Forms

models

(30c-d). In the Parmenides Socrates suggests, but is then


compelled to deny, that Forms reside in minds (132b-c).
Shapes

are

apparently

assigned

the

elementary

physical

bodies

by

the

(Timaeus 55d-56c), but these bodies are nonetheless


demiurge
extra-mental entities. Nothing
is said in the Theaetetus
to lead

for an answer is not germane


to the features
of Plato's
theory of Forms,
I am emphasizing
which
I have, however,
here.
philosophy
expressed my
view on this matter
in a review of Gilbert Byle's Plato's
(Man
Progress
and His World, Vol. 3 (May, 1970), pp. 122-34).
3
Timaeus
53c-56e and Francis M. Cornford, Plato's
(New
Cosmology
The Liberal
York:
Arts
Friedrich
Press,
1957, pp. 212-24)
Solmsen,
Aristotle's
System
of the Physical World
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell Uni
versity 4 Press, 1969) pp. 46-49.
For others see my "Palabras
de Platon"
y Cosas en la Filosof?a
107.
(Enero-Marzo
(Di?logos, Vol. VII
pp.
p.
105-24),
1970),

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265

BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE


one to suppose
presumably

damental

in ontology

entities
and

extra-mental,
other

The

its dogmatism.

a grasp

get

on

or

reality

things there are and how they are disposed.


that dogmatism
ommendations
set of basic
Not

is here
about

entities,
is said

enough

used.

Plato's
and

knowing,
the Forms,
in regard

come

in one

of

to either
or

of
the

It is in this sense

two kinds
views

rec

two

main

his

mind.

by the human
the two species

on Plato's

The first approach

what

to know

contain
writings
that
each
supposes

can be known

angular-shaped
spatial magnitudes
make
any evidenced-statements

objects of cognition.

is

consider

(Vitae i.16), to refer to the view

of philosophers

can

is realism.

thought

we
shall
philosophy
used
"dogmatism"

Laertius

Diogenes

the mind

of his

of Plato's

feature

are taken by him to be

and physics

feature

this

his classifications
that

which
in perception,
fun
then, the most

results
their union
although
In Plato's
is mental.
dialogues,

mind-dependent,

are

there introduced

that the two kinds of motion

of

tri
to

of motion5
about

as

these

is that the mind becomes

and forgets
in a pre-natal
with
existence
the Forms
acquainted
and
them at birth, but well-placed
experience
questions,
diagrams,
a
of
recollection
with material
it
is
can,
averred,
engender
objects

the Forms

(Meno 81c-86c; Phaedo

mendation

or

is that

73b-76d).
accounts

The second recom

are to
of phenomena
the existence
of Forms.6

explanations
or hypothesizing
be given
by supposing
are regarded
the hypotheses
In the Phaedo
and the Parmenides
as being
In the Republic
to revision.
it is main
always
subject
tained

progresses
is unhypothesized
A negative
check

which
vision.
for Plato
thought

one

that

the
to be

same

thing

and

assumptions
through
so presumably
not

on one's

grasp

as

grasp

one's
in one's

inconsistency

to

something
to re
subject

of

the Forms,
which
or being,
of reality

was
was

beliefs.

as appear
in one dialogue
analyzed
view was
that they are private,
in the
themselves
views
of some one object which

In regard
to perceptions,
ances
in the mind,
Plato's
sense

that

they

are not

5
in so far as these fall under the general restrictions
which
Except
Plato places on doing physics ; see p. 7 of the text.
6Harold
of the Theory
"The Philosophical
of
Economy
Cherniss,
Journal
Vol.
57 (1936),
pp. 445-56),
Ideas," American
of Philology,
p. 445.

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JOSIAH B. GOULD

266
has

an

existence

inter-subjective

sense

in the

;7 incorrigible,

that

if something appears white to someone, it is white for him (Theae


And it is this third
tetus 171el-3) ; and less real than Forms.
or are
they are,
than Forms?which

of

way

appearances?that
regarding
of reality
have a lesser degree

which

for Plato's

the mind

from

a trustworthy

bridge

to reality.

did not think that there could be an exact physics,

Plato
cause

that the senses provide

doubts

of, things
accounts

be

is always
universe,
physical
can
one
tell "a
in
only
(Timaeus
27c-29d),
physics
changing
in his cosmological
of the sort Plato
sets forth
story"?one
likely
state
and likely
in
contrast
to
the
rather
tentative
But,
dialogue.
the

of

subject

the

physics,

and

one

ments

can make

physical
universe,
and
truth
about

these by means

of the
and nature
of the origin
speaking
certitude
with
in Plato's
view
speak
one can apprehend
for
basic
real
entities,

when
one
the

can

of reflection.

in physics?or

one might

perhaps

a fallibilist

then, Plato was

While,
say

a dogma

was

fabulist?he

tist in ontology.
now

a figure with whom


to Democritus,
Plato
is often
one finds
a philosopher
same
in whom
these
traits,
are
the inter
clearly
exhibited,
though
dogmatism,

Turning
contrasted,8
realism
and
relations
the

of basic

same

as

Democritus
regarded
(DK

they
there

are hardly
and appearances
the world,
entities,
are in the philosophy
In the case of
of Plato.
are to be
about which
is no controversy
entities
are of course
They
it is in terms
of the shapes,

as fundamental.

67A6),

and

atoms

and

the void
and

arrangements,

it the origin
positions of the atoms in the void that all else?be
of a solar system (DK 67Al) or the formation of a compound
to be explained.
And, while
body in that system (DK 67A14)?is
it is true
to constitute
they

are

that

some

of

the

minds,9
occupants

the

of

are of the
atoms
spherical-shaped
are not mental
in the sense
atoms

some

mind

7
166c3-6.
Here
Theaetetus
this much of the theory which he

and

so depend

on

a mind

sort
that
for

I take Plato
to be in agreement
with
on behalf of
is having Socrates
present

Protagoras.

bridge:

8W. K. C. Guthrie, A History


The University
Press, 1965),
9
De Anima
403b31ff.
Aristotle,

Vol.
of Greek Philosophy,
p. 395, note 2, and p. 462.

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II

(Cam

267

BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE


their

existence.

tities,

and
In

sense
to

addition

the

about

from atoms

pound bodies

to what

references
philosopher
making
and
the void,
to what
and
and their contents.
systems
Democritus

also

(DK 68A135; Aetius

in the

fragments
there
is much

and
edge
One can, however,
ritus'
view mind
occasion
are.

what

And

could

say with
can know
the

this

shapes,

knowledge

controversy
considerable

have

been

rectly
atoms
as

by-pass
for Plato
of

another
ritus
directly
bitter,
ances

there

of

that a mental

accounted

the

atoms

for

the void

exist

on

and

like inference

process

form

atomistic

have been thought


when

certain

of mate

to become di
from

films

the

and

the soul atoms.13


Just
upon
impinge
reason
of Forms
and
grasped
by
so for Democ
grasped
by the senses,

realities

are

one
two worlds,
the mind
and one of

by
hot and

and

color"

to the

For

both

the mind

interpretation.11
that in Democ

is one world

there
lesser

an

by

themselves

senses

of knowl

theory
their

and

perception

are contra

and positions
of atoms
arrangements,
the senses.12
is not
through
acquired

rialism and that the mind must


aware

both

confidence

atoms

that

is correct in holding

not

over

images
outside"

"from

There

Democritus'

reporting

solar

or

appearances

IV, 8, 10).

atoms

eternal,

ephemeral,

and

bodies

proceeding
and as constituting
dictions

about

com

too, we find a

and

and

so entering
the mind
for
the necessary
conditions

from

and thought

a doctrine

had

systems
of
formation

is basic

is derivative

beings,
are

solar

So here,

(DK 68A37).

or

entities

fundamental

in which
of the way
speaks
and of the
vortices
of atoms10

from

Guthrie

mind-independent
is a realist.

too,

Democritus,

talk

en

are

void

also

Democritus
formed

and

Atoms

in this

cold,
senses.

of

the

atoms

secondary
(DK

68B9),

philosophers

somewhat as the world of Homer

and

void

grasped
"sweet
and

qualities,
which
reality

are

appear

is exposed

is exposed

to

to the minds

10DK
67A1.
As Kirk notes, while
this fragment
is formally
at
to Leucippus,
it represents
tributed
the general views of Democritus
as
well.
G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven,
The Pre-socratic
(Cam
Philosophers
bridge: The University
Press, 1957), p. 411.
11W. K. C. Guthrie,
op. cit., pp. 454-65.
12
Sextus Empiricus,
Adversus Mathematicos
vii. 135, 139.
13
W. K. C. Guthrie,
op. cit., p. 464.

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268

JOSIAH B. GOULD

of hearers

and

is the world

readers

are

in which

goings-on

For,

not

would
basic

be

entities

a receptacle
could draw

and

in, one
and that

there

Olympus
for

in the
goings-on
a
is
supra-sensi

the
there

of which

relationships

make

to the senses.14 Although


if

warranted,
were
elementary
or space for them

some

in Homer

on one level, the

and Democritus
and

as

just

to account

the nature

entities,

interpretation
Plato's
only

one

the
that

supposed

triangular-shaped
to move
about

and

between
his
parallels
interesting
even
one
as most
if
But
holds,

of Democritus.15

do, that the basic kind of being for Plato was always

interpreters

are

there

Forms,

epics.

on Mount

the world which appears

intelligible

atomism

the

seen

so for Plato

Trojan
plain,
ble world
of

magnitudes
combine

of

of the gods

two

still

remarkable

likenesses

between

own

his

Both held that there exist


philosophy and that of Democritus.
entities and both held that the mind can know
transempirical
In

them.
and

both

both

short,

philosophers

were

philosophers
mistrusted

the

and

realists

dogmatists;
of sensible

value

cognitive

appearances.

one

in Aristotle

Again
and
Stoa

of

doctrines

and

intellectual

few,
the

if any,
senses

bate,
matist

but
in

in Aristotle,

The
mary
tures

development
that
deny

attached

to

there
he

those

has

fundamental

substances,
and belonging

and this sparrow.

were

which

appearances

or

entities

noticed

realities

to natural

kinds,

e.g.,

are

of

above.

the

whose

much
and

expressions

or particulars

individuals

been

is a realist

too, one finds the threefold distinction


and

the world,
Plato.

would

predecessor
stature
about

important
of
philosopher

a Greek

course

an

finds

de

a dog
And

between being,

in Democritus

and

for Aristotle

pri
na

having
this man,

They do not inhere in anything

essential
that

lizard,

and they are

141 borrow the comparison


from Karl Popper's
"The
with Homer
of Philosophical
in Science"
and Their Roots
Nature
Problems
reprinted
in Conjectures
and Refutations,
and
(third edit. rev. London:
Routledge
Guthrie
Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 89, note 48).
(op. cit., p. 456) writes, "For
the phenomenal
Democritus
there is no noumenal world to set over against
or a supra-sensible
But I think we can speak of a trans-empirical
world."
even though the atoms are impercep
world
in the thought of Democritus,
tible because of the accident of smallness.
15

F.

M.

Cornford,

op.

cit.,

p.

210.

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269

BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE


not

of anything.16

predicable

are

They

exist either.

and
the matter
succinctly,
crisply
totle, putting
no primary
were
be impossible
it would
substances,

other things to exist" (Categoriae 2b6).


In Aristotle
the linkage between the primary
is more

world
that

between

of

compelled
and changes

and void

the

cosmos.

to give

and

is not

elaborate

on

going

cosmos.

a kind of disparity

between Forms

the

and

stars,
animals,
there
is a marked

totle's

or

take,
units

ordinarily
the primary
Individual
men,

world

stances.
of

in an

difference

the

taken

spheres
the basic
realities.17
There

are

say,

particular

separately

hierarchical

levels

the

an

of

with

tions,
"like
machea
which

are

categories,
and
dependent

an off-shoot
1096a21-22).
are principles

and

of

atoms

causes,

the

and

in Aris

the

sub
primary
movers
and the
substances

an

philosophy

the kinds

In regard
in
of being
and rela

qualities,
as Aristotle

secondary.
They
accidental
of being"
feature
In regard
to the world,
there
and

is

in Democritus

to be,

in Aristotle's

are,

feel

in the world?

earthworm

while
primary,
such as quantities,

the gen

there

earthworms,
just are the primary

are

substances

De

contents,

swering both to being and to the things in the world.


to being,
the
non-substance

than

a philosopher

similarly
or cluster

coalesce

the

of

for Aristotle

and the units


atom

there

realities and the

structure,
in Plato

Whereas

artifacts?and

one would

what

any

world

as

does,
however,
account
of

in the

"If

for

an account

to give

required

He

an

The

the world.

says,

sense

Aris

or palpable
that between

conspicuous
or
the world

and

Forms

so he

and

is eternal
eration

immediate
Platonic

atoms

mocritean

and more

in the

entities

basic

else would

that if they did not exist, nothing

unmoved

says,

(Ethica Nico
are substances
movers

of

the

16
3a8-9.
As for what Aristotle
means when he says that
Categoriae
one thing inheres in another, see Categoriae
la24-25.
For opposing
inter
see J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's
and De Interpretatione
pretations
Categories
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 74-76 and G. E. L. Owen, "In
Vol. X (1965), pp. 97-105.
herence," Phronesis,
171 am aware that Aristotle
at times, and especially
at the time when
he wrote Metaphysica
to
vii., was inclined to take eternal essential natures
be basic entities
rather than the primary
substances which
exhibit these
natures for a brief span of time, but in the main I believe that he adhered
to the view that primary
substances are the basic units of being.

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270

JOSIAH B. GOULD
which

spheres,
celestial

take

of place.
primacy
and planets,
stars
animals
and planets

bodies?the
non-human

persons,

Next

in

then

the

on and

come

rank

the

and
the
earth,
near
its surface.

Whether Aristotle
be analyzing being into its kinds or the
world into its elements, he adheres to the view that the world and
reality are external to mind. And in this he, like Democritus and
is a realist.

Plato,

In addition

to modes

knowledges
in conjunction

the existence

imagination,

memory,

with

getting
and give

those

for

disposed.

Unlike

is a reliable

of

of animals,
sory apparatus
ences
leads
to the grasping
an

accurate

(An. Post,

partmental

sciences,
connections
denying
tween
the statements

are

the world

ii.19).

between
produced

(Analytica

in man

of
are

to be given
the world,
of statements
consist

instrument

on

reproduced

In fact, Aristotle

by any

held that

important
are and how

repetitions
which

universals.

persist
Posteriora

Aristotle

decisively
there
things

of universals,

w^ould

impressions

and

and

of

description

the

in knowledge

stages

sense

experience

of what

occur

They
such as perception,
operations
The
desire.
made
impressions

and Democritus,

Plato

knowledge
The
features

in the world

in the mind.

are the initial


and

ac

and the world Aristotle

in which

animals

perception

gaining

and

thought,

to memory

rise

99b35-100a6).
sense

mental

various

the senses

by objects upon
in

of being
of appearances

are

they
the

such

sen

experi

in the

things

maintains
by

that

several

de

affirming

and

relationship
science
is, in his

be

The

given

view,

ultimately deductive,18 and it is only in the form of the possibility


of an infinite regress in a deductive
system that the threat of
scepticism

ever

occurs

in Aristotle's

(An.

philosophy

Post.

i.3).

He met this threat by maintaining


that while a great deal of man's
some of it is basic and
is deductive and discursive,
knowledge
intuitive (An. Post, ii.19). He was a philosopher
confident that
human

minds

can

grasp

the

essential

features

of

reality

and

the

18
Posteriora
the whole of the Analytica
tries to make a case
Really
that Aristotle
for this.
For evidence
thought the demonstrative
syllogism
was to be used by the scientist not for purposes
of investigation
and dis
'
see Jonathan Barnes
covery but for teaching a finished body of knowledge,
of
"Aristotle's
Vol.
XIV
Phronesis,
Theory
Demonstration,"
(1969), pp.
123-52.

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BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE 271


; and

world

a knowledge

for gaining

that

of

the world

appearances

in the mind by things in the world are of crucial impor

produced

is in
too, therefore,
Aristotle,
and Plato.
of Democritus
philosophers
tance.

the

of

tradition

dogmatic

Before turning to the Stoa let us look at two contrasting posi


tions in Greek philosophy, those of idealism and skepticism, which
with

contrast

ism" will mean


some

minds,
cannot

mind

and

realism

that what

The

dogmatism.

and

the

expression

know

how

things

in a mind

there is exists

reality

"ideal

expression
to mean

"skepticism"

or in

that

the

are.

In regard to idealism, it undoubtedly goes too far to say that


it was represented by a tradition in ancient Greek philosophy.
But

there
are

which
cluded,
though

are
worth

noting.

grounds,
good
calls what
Guthrie

has

clude,"

briefly
introduced

writes

this

independent

Guthrie
been

that

and

to idealism
approximations
con
K.
W.
C.
Guthrie
recently

Protagoras
calls
essay

according

Protagoras,

tence of reality
mind.

Most

on

jectivism."19

of

representatives

an

was

idealist,
"extreme

idealism

to Guthrie,

of appearances

denied

the

and beliefs

with

compares
Protagoras
as a realist
in ontology.

al
sub
exis

in the

Democritus,
"We
may

who
con

Guthrie,

to which
that Protagoras
according
adopted an extreme subjectivism
no dif
of appearances,
there was no reality behind and independent
and being, and we are each the judge of
ference between appearing
. . . Democritus
our own impressions
too said that all sensations are
and
in
and
hot
that
sweet
bitter, have no existence
cold,
subjective,
as due to the
nature, but this was because they were to be explained
interaction between the atomic structure of our bodies and that of the
There was a permanent
object.
physis or reality, namely
perceived
atoms

Protagoras,
ism, because
ances,

and

and

the

void.

For

Protagoras

there

is none.

. .20

to have been a representative


then, appears
there
in his view what
is resides
reality
are
mental.
appearances

of

ideal

in appear

to say that the latter-day Skep


It would be an exaggeration
and then the Empirical Skeptics,
tics in antiquity, Aenesidemus
denied

the

reality

of

extra-mental

19
W. K. C. Guthrie, A History
bridge: 20The University
Press, 1969),
Ibid., p. 186.

entities,

but

of Greek Philosophy,
p. 186.

they

came

close.

Ill

(Cam

Vol.

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272

JOSIAH B. GOULD

on the senses
as
in antiquity
and reason
skeptical
onslaught
avenues
reliable
to knowledge
of the external
world
is well-docu
mented.21
the
Aenesidemus
systematized
skeptical
arguments,
The

of which were designed

most
of

the

which

appearances

moment,
mental

one may
one

licenses

nothing

to show that while one can be certain

to bridge
world,
in consciousness
pearances

the gap

in consciousness

have

to make

inferences

at

about

the
non

the

between

and

the

the present-moment
extra-mental
entities

ap

thought
no
words,

to be producing
those appearances.
There
is, in other
or reality
to know what
the world
is like, for one cannot
way
step
to look and see.
out of one's
consciousness
the
Among
Empirical
were
a
there
that
doubts
of
serious
science
Skeptics,
although
and causes,
of substance
reality,
was
that
be a
there
could
great
of appearances?a
science
which
juxtapositions
further
predict
of appearances.22

Empirical

in

one

and

successions
And,

Skeptics

of

stretch

although

had

on

most

This
recent

remarks

judgment
studies

on Aenesidemus

is supported

of Greek
with

a basis for a purely


provides
the external
object, deprived

the

basis

of

observation

successfully
later
stretch

in a

that

on

lavished
included

reality

of

any

that there is nothing


they

and

successions

could

juxtapositions
it is not attested

the appearances,
the close attention
ena makes
it look as if in their view

mental.

legitimacy,
on the
based

appearances

ever said flatly

confidence

any

science

the

back of

the phenom
non
nothing

by the author of one of the

Skepticism,
the statement

for

phenomenalistic
of any function,

she
that

her

concludes
his method

epistemology
has become

in which
un

quite

necessary.23

Sextus
idealism

Empiricus
and

skepticism

is a noteworthy
in
figure
reviewed
above.
cursorily

relation

to

the

For

in ontol

ogy he sides with the realism of Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle,


and he rejects the idealism of Protagoras
and the near idealism
or phenomenalism
of Aenesidemus
and the Empirical
Skeptics,

21
Sextus Empiricus,
Adversus
Mathematicos.
Pyrrh.
Hypotyposes.
Cicero. Acad?mica.
Victor
Les Sceptiques
Grecs
(Paris: Li
Brochard,
J. Frin, 1959 (f.p., 1887).
brairie Philosophique
Charlotte
Stough, Greek
of California
California:
Skepticism
University
1969).
(Berkeley,
Press,
22
V. Brochard,
op. cit., pp. 331-80.
23
C. Stough,
op. cit., p. 105.

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273

BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE

he sides with the Pyrrhonic Skeptics.


For,
that a substance can be identified with its

but in epistemology
rejecting the view
mental

substance

since

and,
with

for

truth

"the

Sextus
he

neither

real

nor

accept
superfluous"
is knowable.24

and hidden
with

is associated

could

unknowable

object

to regard

continues

as both existing

appearances,

which

he

in consciousness,

manifestations

the

extra

from knowledge;
rather

reality

a phenomenalism
accept
. . . have become
would
claims

which

dogmatism,

that

than
in

the

quite
real

object

now

Turning

to early

one

discussed,
already
entities
affirmed?basic

philosophies
of
classes

shall

set

forth

four

inter

is that in the Stoa, as in the Greek

The first

connected points.

we

Stoicism,

finds

realities,

the

of

existence

a world,

and

three

appear

ances.

My second point will be that the early Stoics were realists


and dogmatists and are therefore in the tradition of Democritus,
It is important to emphasize this, for the
Plato, and Aristotle.
Stoics

are

ophers

where

often

placed
they are

in the category
of post-Aristotelian
not merely
to come after
assumed

philos
Aristotle

but are thought to have ceased doing philosophy


in the dispas
sionate way in which Aristotle had done it and to have adopted
interests
some

parallels

basic

entities,
and

Stoicism

the

other

is essentially

re
which
have
been
philosophies
on what
shall remark
happened
briefly
as one
of
the
conception
philosopher

Greek

And

in Stoicism
who

we
ethical.
shall draw
exclusively
Thirdly,
and contrasts
in which
between
ways
appearances,
are related
in
in the world
and middle-sized
objects

finally we
to the Platonic

to.

ferred

were

which

engaged

in a search

for

being.

In regard to the first point that the Stoa affirms the existence
of basic

entities,

a world,

get at what the Stoics


a report by Alexander
the

doctrine

that

ically we might

24
Sextus
op.

cit.,

p.

appearances,

one

can

perhaps

best

thought to be basic entities by considering


of Aphrodisias
that the Stoics laid down
said

is

"being

note here

Empiricus,

and

of

bodies

that the Stoics

Adversus

Mathematicos

Parenthet

only."25

placed

vii.

corporeal

and

294 and C. Stough,

145.

25
Alexander
In Aristotelis
Aphrodisiens.
Maximilian
Commentaria
Wallies.
(Edited
by
1891), 301, 42-43.

Libros
Octo
Topicorum
Berlin:
George Reimer,

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274

JOSIAH B. GOULD

If
would

there

are,
them

expect
hold
that

Stoics

a more

under
''

incorporeal
things
''
called
something.

in Stoic
then,
philosophy
to be bodies.26
And,
are

there

two

and logos or god

matter
bodies.

That

ber of fragments
(SVF
evident from the facts
to them is "that which
upon" for matter (SVF
complementary

one

: substance

or

these are

And
are

they

the

indeed

in a num

called

II 300, 301, 310), are not incorporeal is


that another pair of descriptions
applied
acts" for logos and "that which is acted
II 300) and that the incorporeal is in the
class

of

that

which

neither

nor

acts

(SVF II 363). And in one fragment (SVF II 310)


said that both matter and God, according to the

is acted upon
it is virtually
Stoics,
As

as

they

entities,
of fact,

any basic
a matter
entities

II 300).

(SVF

in the

class,

as

fundamental

two "principles,"

these

which

category

generic

are

bodies.27

for

one

of their

two basic

entities,

the Stoics

matter,

main

tain that it is "substance without quality" and "that which is


acted upon" (SVF II 300). As will be pointed out shortly, when
it undergoes changes from the logos acting upon it or from within
It is worth notic
it, the substance becomes imbued with qualities.
ing

that

the

to name

(ousia)
had

let

this
and

ontology

now

both

range
expression
their essential
natures.

its attributes
sort

in

attractive,28

the

vii. 3).
for

all

entities.

the

basic
once

in fact,

Aristotle
units

in his

considered,

that the substance of a thing was

the hypothesis

(Metaphysica

He,

"substance"

expression

this first of their two basic

substratum?substratum

sis of this

the

using
over

but then rejected,


the

are

Stoics

one

sense

of matter?underlying

The Stoics
of the

found an hypothe

two basic

entities

in their

26
see Eduard
On Stoic materialism
der
Zeller, Die Philosophie
in Ihrer Geschichtlichen
5th edit. Dritter
Griechen
Teil.
Entwicklung.
Erste Abteilung
Wissenschaftliche
(Darmstadt:
Buchgesellschaft,
1963,
pp. 119-32.
27
for the reason given
Zeller, op. cit., p. 134.
Johnny
Christenson,
in the text, seems to me fundamentally
in holding
that the Stoa's
wrong
on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy
in An Essay
basic archai are incorporeal
Scandinavian
Books,
(Copenhagen:
University
1962), p. 11. The term,
cites in support
as?mata, in the fragment
(SVF II 299) which Christenson
of his view, appears
in none of the manuscripts,
and somata, as Pohlenz
2 Auflage.
Die Stoa.
II
Vol.
says, ought to be retained
(Max Pohlenz,
Vandenhoeck
&
Ruprecht,
(Gottingen:
1959), p. 38).
28

Christenson,

op.

cit.,

pp.

17-20.

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BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE

275

ontology is matter without quality which is liable to change when


The
acted upon (SVF II 309), and this they call "substance."
term,

then,

is no

of

the

countenanced.

or

"substance"

expressions
One could

or of particular
matter
nor diminishes
increases

it was

as ont?logically

to use of any entity regarded


use

as

to them,

available

longer

speak
or substance.

substance

twofold

was,
or

however,
substance

substance

neither

matter

Universal

;particular

basic.

"matter"

of universal

to Aristotle,

increase

undergoes

and diminution

(SVF II 316).
As for the other basic entity in Stoic ontology, god or logos,
this is described variously as "an active cause" (SVF II 302),

"the

reason

of the universe"

(ibid.),

"a

self-moving

toree"'

(SVF

II 311), and "a body" (SVF II 310). This power or god is said
to "go back and forth" in the matter without quality (SVF II
311),

to be "mixed"

it (SVF II 318).
apart

from

one

with

The

and

the matter,29

though

advance"

through

or substance never exist

logos and matter

another,

"to

they may

be

ana

distinguished

The most significant characterization


of the logos is
lytically.
"that which acts" (SVF II 300). For as "the active cause in the
matter"
(SVF II 305) the logos is a kind of power or force30
which provides the matter with unity (SVF II 318), causes the
substance

to be moved,

shaped,

and

animated,

otherwise

qualified

(SVF II 302), and generates the cosmos and each of the things
in it. And this last result leads one naturally from the Stoics'
of basic
conception
ing at the world.

The world
combination

The world
formation

to a consideration

entities

for the Stoics

of

the

two

of

formed matter

the

is a periodic phase

basic

is that unity
cosmos

from within

of their way

entities,

the

of

look

in the life of the

substance-logos

unity.

in one of its states or conditions.


takes

place

when

logos

works

to convert it into the physical

The
on

un

elements

29
SVF II 310 and 473.
One of the main aims of the Stoic doctrine
was to explain how two bodies could penetrate
of mixture
one another.
See my The Philosophy
SUNY Press,
of Chrysippus
(Albany, New York:
1970), pp. 109-12.
30
SVF II 311. For accounts of the dynamism
in Stoic ontology and
see Zeller, op. cit., pp. 132-41.
Max Pohlenz,
physics
op. cit., Vol. I, pp.
67-68.
S. Sambursky,
and
Physics
(London:
of the Stoics
Routledge
Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. 21-48.

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276

JOSIAH B. GOULD
water,

?air,

arise the plants,


celestial bodies

And

fire.

from

then

the mixture

of

these

animals, and other kinds of things, including the


the cosmos is
(SVF II 580, 581). Periodically

or matter
in which
and
the substance
by a conflagration
a
a
more
enter
state
ethereal
upon
(of
united,
fiery

destroyed
still

logos,

and

earth,

nature than the fire in the humdrum element), which is thought


to be a kind of seed (SVF II 618) from which another cosmos is
(SVF II 624, 625). One of our fragments
(SVF II
generated
647) reads, "The Stoics held that the earth is one and finite."
one notices

ments
sun,
and

on a cursory

even

And

the moon,

the

that as philosophers
not

about

only

which
physics,

seasons,

but

entities,

universe which

we

today

meteorological
and
animals,

the

frag

about the
phenomena
nature
of

also

about

the

and

origin

nature

they inhabited, the kinds of beliefs

should

regard
and
chemistry,

biology,

of

thus talked about the world and apparently held


it was their business to hold defensible views

basic

of the physical

's collection

similarly held beliefs

non-human

plants,

The Stoics

the

stars,

Arnim

through

that the Stoics

earthquakes,

man.

glance

as

under

falling

the

of

purview

geology.

In regard to the physics of the Stoics it ought to be noticed


that any body in the world is, on their view, susceptible to two
The first is that which views the body, now7
kinds of analysis.
regarded
of bodies
body

as a particular
the
composing

also

may

be a

body,

ments?fire,

air,

This one might


Secondly,
nents,
matter

physical
a frog,
or an

analyzable
and
earth,

into

oak

tree.

And

some

analysis

of

undergoing

inanimate
condition

one might

31SVF

upon

is a kind of cohesiveness
bodies

this

; in animals

cohesiveness
it is soul

call the ontological

; and

its

effects

and

holding
takes

the

in persons

analysis.

II 368, 716.
Sextus Empiricus,
1-11.
op.
pp.
Sambursky,
cit.,

the

four
or

proportion

which

acted

class

ele

other.

of the body in question.

into

is being

some

the
example,
if it is such a

a combination

water?in

call the physical

of

For

universe.

can be analyzed
every
body
a
force which
into
is producing

logos-force

234.

star,

it is further

as a member

substance,

compo
ontological
or
and a substance
The

changes.

bodies
form

in

together;
of

state

or

it is reason.31

This

Sextus Empiricus,

writ

Adversus

Mathematicos

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vii.

277

BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE


ing about

Stoic

in one

says

cosmogony,

passage

The Stoics suppose the genesis of the universe


from one unqualified
to change
body ; for the unqualified matter which is entirely amenable
to them a principle
of existing
is according
this
things, and when
and air, earth and water?are
gen
changes the four elements?fire
erated.32

But

fire, air, earth,


and plants,
animals

and

are

water

the whole

the

cosmos

"from

elements
and

the

which

all
in

contained

things

it are composed"
If, then, the elementary bodies
(SVF II 413).
are just a changed state of one of the basic ontological entities re
from

sulting
bodies

the

other

acting
in one

can be analyzed
One might
also approach

on
of

the Stoic
of

the evolution

cated, by considering
one fiery
state or conflagration
tion the God-substance
unit

which

substance

a cosmos,

the

tiated until

is minimally

substance

view

of

to another.

suggested.
the world,

During
state

differentiated.

as
unit

conflagra
in a state
in

it changes

increasingly

ontological
that together

a concern
to evincing
for an intelligible
and the world,
entities
the Stoics
attended
than those
of their predecessors
mentioned

entities

in

they

then

In addition
basic

assiduously

in consciousness.

appearances
tant

role

appearances

played

One
in

into

differen

is itself a fully articulated

of the two basic


universe.
One
physical
in
duces
the
in such a way
other
changes
a physical
cosmos.
become
about

indi
from

the
or

As

becomes

unity

non-elementary

the God-substance

is in its purest

in the unit

the God-substance

all

it, obviously
the two ways

reason
Stoic

is found

doctrine
even more
above

to

in the

impor
Another

epistemology.

related reason is found in the peculiar form of the Skeptical at


tack on the Stoic criterion of truth. The Stoics believed that ob
jects

produced
on
apparatus

of themselves
appearances
the regent
of the soul.33
part

through
Memory

the

sensory
is a store

32
x. 312.
Sextus Empiricus,
Adversus Mathematicos
33
There was disagreement
between Cleanthes
and Chrysippus
about
the model to be used in thinking about the mode in which these appearances
are produced
in consciousness,
Cleanthes
taking the view that the regent
are made as by a
part of the soul is like a wax block on which
impressions
that had of course been made
familiar
signet ring, a model
by Plato
as
of these appearances
; and Chrysippus
(Theaetetus
191d3-el)
thinking
being alterations which the regent part of the soul undergoes
(SVF II 56).

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278

JOSIAH B. GOULD
of

house

such

phenomena
suffered
Orestes

early Stoics
inasmuch

are

they
son's

fall
as
that

confident

mind.

the

The

Stoics

a class

into
their

basic

reality
are

realists

are

void

images

of

consciousness
snake-haired

which

example

with
entities
not

does

and God

an

have

to be bodies

said

Chrysip

for

elude

a per

of

the grasp

in ontology
nor
logos

and

and
is

dogmatists
to be
thought

to be merely
mental.
extra-mental
existence,
they

and

to have

Forms

Democritus,

and

Plato,
Democritus,
are extra-mental

the

of incorporeal

traits thought to be distinctive


and

an

from,

in epistemology.
substance
Neither
or
some
the
content
mind
of
merely
only do matter
as was noted,

in

often made use of (SVF II 54).

pus apparently
Aristotle

occur

also

as

such

hallucinatory
which
maidens

The

There

appearances.

for

of

contraries

are,
those

atoms

things. What

for

substances

Plato,

Not

God and matter are for the Stoics?namely,


entities
Aristotle,
referred to in their answer to the question, What things are there?
And for all of them these entities are perfectly objective or inde
pendent
between

of mind.

Some

the ways

in which

basic

their

and
horses,
and pointedly
in Stoic

entities
chairs.

comparisons
interesting
view
these philosophers

to middle-sized
But

drawn

epistemology.

bodies

can
the

drawn

be

relation

of

as

such

trees,
everyday
can be more
comparison
precisely
our minds
have before
the main
points

that

if we
And

in going

over

this

familiar

relatively

terrain the path I take is that of considering two different kinds


of truths which Stoic epistemology
claims can be had by the
human

mind.

the Stoics, like all of their mentioned


While
predecessors,
were confident that the mind could grasp the nature of existing
they hold that the sensory
things, unlike Plato and Democritus,
it was

was
in knowing,
above
apparatus
suspicion
to know what
for coming
crucial
instrument
a
to
adhered
theory
representational
They

and

that

real

things

key term in their theory is "presentation."

A presentation

of

are

perception.

the
like.
The

in the soul which


shows in itself just that
is a condition
occurring
which has produced
it. For example, when through vision we view
an object which
is white,
there exists a condition
which
has been
of
in
is
because
this con
the
it
the
soul
And
seeing.
by
engendered
is
dition that we are able to say that there subsists a white which
The process occurs similarly
in the case of touch and
affecting us.

smell (SVF II 54).

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279

BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE


presentations
along with
to nor
neither
correspond
The
(ibid.).
the impressive

that
images
extra-mental

illusory

are

by anything
produced
made
the Stoics,
particularly
was
of Academic
Skeptics,

for

problem

occur

also

there

But

arguments

acute

by
of pro

that

viding a criterion, by which one might say with certitude that this
or that thing was before one (SVF II 53). And this they sought
or the "pre
to do in setting forth the "kataleptic presentation"
a trustworthy
of
criterion
a grasp"
as
Laertius
is,
Diogenes

a grasp"
The "presentation
with
it, the presentation

as

with

sentation

the

truth.
reports

which proceeds
from a real object, agrees with that object itself,
has been imprinted
and stamped upon the mind.34
seal-fashion

and

This essay is not interested so much in the unfriendly reception


which this criterion got among Academic Skeptics as it is in the
kind of information about the world its employment was thought
by the Stoics to secure. And to this inquiry we now turn.
of the
One would gather from the two main characteristics
criterion

Stoic

one

that whenever

a presentation

has

which

satis

fied it, one can believe with truth two kinds of facts?(i)
that
a
or
certain kind exists and (ii) that it has this
that
something of
For

attribute.

of a brown horse knows


his

sensory

other

(ii)
criterion

in consciousness

any

one

The

use

of which

which
could

that

horse

this

is brown.

a person,

enables
satisfy

presentation

in the range of

is present

it,

an

appear

having
a class

to know

of facts,
statement.35

be

Put

expressed
by
singular
as the subject
of a uniquely
of the
expression
referring
an
a
statement
of
the
existence
of
certain
object
signifies

singular

kind and the predicate


of

object
ment
"this

statements
nents,

a kataleptic

having

(i) that a horse


and

apparatus
the Stoic

way,

ances

a Stoic

example,

'this

expression
attribute.

signifies

specified
horse
is brown"

is a

which

criterion

horse'

the
and

Stoic

the possession

For

'is brown'

example,
member
typical
sanctions,

signify

the

by that

state
singular
of the class
of
and

respectively

its
that

compo
there

34
Vitae vii. 46.
The translation
is that of R. D.
Diogenes
Laertius,
Hicks found in the Loeb Classical Library
edition of Diogenes
Laertius.
35
See SVF II 52 for a report that "presentation
leads the way, then
comes thought capable of expression
which brings forth in a proposition
that which the subject experiences
by dint of the presentation."

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JOSIAH B. GOULD

280
is a horse

something which

exists

and that it has

the attribute

brownness.

there other objects of knowledge according to the Stoic


theory of cognition besides particular or individual facts? The
:
Stoics explicitly acknowledge three kinds of atomic propositions
the definite, the indefinite, and the intermediate, of which examples
Are

are
and

man

"this

respectively
"Socrates

is walking."36
affirmative
of universal

recognition
are mortal"

or

"all

clude from this that the Stoics


any
fact

knowledge
like the

appears

propositions

are

horses

of general
ones
surveyed

"someone

is walking,"
There

is walking,"
no
been
to have
''
all men
such as
we

Are

viviparous."37

to

con

did not think that there could be


and

truths

that

are

above

singular

the

only

of

statements
of

objects

knowl

edge?
To go at all far into this question would take us away from
the main feature of the Stoa which I am here trying to emphasize.
Briefly what I think would have been the Stoa's reply to this ques
tion is the following.
First, the Stoa did not accept the existence
mind

no acquaintance
with
universals.
between

has

relations

to arrive

persons
verse
by mounting
between
particulars.

conditional
Generality
use

making

or

'anyone'
jective

anyone

(i.e.,
that person

at general

The
truths

generalizations
were
These

Stoa

view

the

or with

for
it possible
in
the
uni
happenings
of connections
experience
believed

about
on
then

expressed

in

the

form

of

such as "if it is day, then it is light."38


propositions
in the exposition of such truths could be achieved by
of

the

'anything'

or a pronoun

assessment

so in their
universals,
Forms
connections
between

or Aristotelian

Forms

of Platonic

conditional

in the antecedent,
in the consequent.

at all you

and

The

a demonstrative

For

example,
from
is suffering

may
choose)
one you've
chosen)

(i.e., the
of the facts."

indefinite

the

connective,

example

cannot

make

of a conditional

"if

pronoun
ad
anyone

then
envy,
a rational
proposi

36
Mathematicos
viii. 96, 100. Benson
Adversus
Sextus Empiricus,
of California
California:
Stoic
Press,
University
Logic
(Berkeley,
Mates,
1961), p. 30.
37
Ibid., p. 32.
38
II 207.
8VF
op. cit., pp. 65-71.
Gould, The Philos
Samtrarsky,
pp. 76-82.
ophy of Chrysippus,

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281

BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE

tion which appears several times in the fragments is, "if it is day,
then it is light," which could also be read, "if there is any tem
called

span

poral

it is light

then

day,

''

that

during

span.

temporal

And Cicero reports a Stoic conditional which has almost exactly


this form; it is "if anyone is born at the rising of the dogstar, he
will not die at sea."39 The Stoa believed that cognitive progress
beyond the data of immediate experience has to be made by the
reach

for

and

of general

grasp

as

such

truths

those

in

embodied

There is nothing in the fragments


these conditional statements.
that indicates that the Stoics had any glimmerings of the problem
of

induction.

this we can now see that Stoic philosophers

From

can

a store of singular
and general
acquire
on reality.
can get a grasp
that the mind

the mind
the world;

feature of their philosophy

a rather

finds
tion

of these

set of contrasts

interesting
contrasts

is the

third

of our

here

other

But
between

in mind

this

Given

if one

asks

their

basic

the
how
en

one
appearances,
A
considera
emerging.
and

set out

tasks

above.

hold of a

in the world,
such
to the appearance

middle-sized

any
object
or a rabbit, would
in
relation
do)
of a chair, on the one hand,
and atoms

(and
as an oak tree

about

truths

If we take atomism first and consider what would


chair

that

into a class with

they fall squarely

and Aristotle.
Democritus,
Plato,
dogmatists
these philosophers
the relationships
view
in the world,
tities, middle-sized
objects

held

other, we find that there is an obliteration

and

on

the void

of the distinction

the

be

a group
some
of interlocked
atoms
including
in some region
interstices
of void
of the void.40
The
appearance
as an ag
in the mind
of the chair
is not like the chair
regarded
tween

the

chair

and

of atoms.

glomerate

colors while

the atoms
seem

it would

a place

for the existence

Fato
DK

houses,

39
"Ai
11.
40
For
68A37,

guis

and

that

hedges

oriente

the appearance

constituting

sidered

horses,

a start,

For

it do not.

Democritean

of gross

natus

the chair

All

things

atomism

bodies

if one means

Can?cula

of

does

not

est, in mari

those

con
allow

such as

in the world
that

has

things

are

non morietur."

the formation
of compound
bodies on the atomic
67A14.
De Rerum Natura
ii. 582-729.
Lucretius,

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theory

as

De
see

282

JOSIAH B. GOULD
to be.

they appear
them between
and

no place
for
system
atoms
the basic
entities,

is in Democritus'

There

or outside

and

appearances

the void.

now to Plato
Turning
conclude
that middle-sized
to a degree
they
mere
they

Forms

just

tacle

of

about

the

the

features

of reflections

cosmological

myth.41
between
objects,

ordinary

in

jects in the world,

if one stresses

are

the Forms

imperfect
copies
clude
that
the difference

middle-sized

if one

hand,

suppose

between

constituents
space-recep
would

say

qualitative
to de
matter

as
regard
longer
of ma
deductions
to Forms

regard

that
then

which

particulars
one would
basic

Plato's

to

those

set

ob

and

imply that
or

are more

con
naturally
and
the
entities

On the

which

passages

state

one

appearances,

objects

in

the

to

consistent

it only
from

finds

different

ob

ordinary

the dis

philosophy
and

world,

basic

is preserved.

In Aristotle
ships

no

On either view, in Plato's

jects in the world.


entities

or

of self-predication,
subjects
are entirely
that the Forms

tinction

of by

spoken

is only one of degree.

mainly

are

are incorporeal and immutable and imply that they

that the Forms


not

attends

sense

the

difficult

those passages

in the world

objects

in the

the theory of perception

In

between

have

Plato
and

appearances
is a very

particulars
of the Forms,

perfect

less

are

what

birds

neither

in the

one can
to Plato,
or mathematical
the metaphysical
in the Timaeus.

bodies

other

for

As

this

given

terial

are

They

the Theaetetus
either

Plato's

and

guise

of Forms

if one attributes

cide, largely because


forth

world

both in terms of their physical

of bundles

relationship
of

in Plato's

in a certain

in consciousness.

appearances

in the Timaeus
in terms

and

not

question,
and
chairs

as

such

one must

same

the

putting

objects
existence

an autonomous
are

that

Plato

and

between

's system one finds a still different


basic

entities,

ordinary

objects,

and

set of relation
appearances.

individual earthworm and each individual pumpkin just is a


The ordinary objects in the
primary substance for Aristotle.

Each

world?animals,

plants,

and

artifacts?are

identical

with

primary

41For an account of the


and the mathemat
deduction
metaphysical
see Solmsen,
in Plato's
bodies
of the primary
ical deduction
cosmogony
op.

cit.,

pp.

48-50.

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283

BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE


but

substances,
holds
that
as

tatively
ness
between

an ordinary
it appears
basic

object
to be.

and

entities
no

radical

objects
is for Democritus.

and

their

there

to be Aristotle's

entities,

ordinary

ordinary
differences

then

entities,

in regard

like that of Plato

his

to be made

between

tities.

to put

Or,
three

these

to be analyzed.
ence about
the
appearances
With

basic

in Greek philosophy,
there is no distinction

Pro
at all

and
objects,
the distinction

views

is, as was
and
spatial

sequence

between

pointed

and

objects,

can

one

of

see what

the relationships

about

a sci

out,

juxtaposition

objects.
a background,

providing
to say
have

the early Stoics would


their basic entities,
ordinary

en

basic

as is true for
just in part,
chair
in con
just is its appearances
more
in terms
basic
of which
it is

those

constituting
these

up more

shapes

not

and

is nothing
science
of objects

temporal

qualities

between

ordinary
another
way,

the matter

takes
system

appearances,

there

and

sciousness

Skeptics,

collapses
altogether
and Aristotle.
A

Democritus

the

as
consciousness,
natures
essential

in

appearances.

at the idealist

Glancing briefly
tagoras and the Empirical

objects,
between

is quali
reality
is no disparate
as there
is for

to the relationships

and

objects,

there

appearances
if one
course,

Of

basic

Aristotelianism

atomism,
as a basic

regarded
For Aristotle

are

and
Plato;
of ordinary
there

Democritean

unlike

between
the

While

appearances.

Stoa cannot hold that its basic entities are flatly identical with the
that each object
ordinary things in the world, it would maintain
a fish or a stone?is
some region
it a plant,
a
of basic
in
certain
realities
condition
unity

in the world?be
substance-logos
certain
time.

The

the more

comes

one
is not

sumably

more

of

to know

is in the primitive

for

appearances,

to be likenesses
if these
the
basic

it assumes

shown,

some

realities,
in
realities

objects
then
those

are
some

themselves

just

appearances

conditions.

Since

at a

to know,

person
unity

pre

when

basic

it

But

periodically.

the Stoic

from the world


been

realities.

are

realities

and the things in it.


of

are

them

of the ordinary objects which produce

ordinary

basic

as has

comes

substance-logos

universe

of course not at all different


As

basic

the

fiery state which


physical

one

conditions

the

with

acquainted

as a well-articulated

these

of the

certain
are

thought

them. And
conditions

likenesses

in Stoicism

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of
basic

of
the
re

284

JOSIAH B. GOULD
in one

of their
evolutions
between
innumerable
fiery
phase
with
and
states
since
converge
objects
ordinary
ordinary
objects
are like some appearances
in the minds
of persons,
the patterns

alities

of relationships between these elements is most like that exhibited


in the philosophy
of Aristotle.
And for this reason those who
as a key influence on Stoic philosophy42 have
look to Aristotle
some justification for adhering to this thesis as a guide to their
research.
from

are

There

these

some

to
conclusions
significant
bear upon
of which
Stoicism's

some

contrasts,

tion of philosophical

activity.

be brought

out

context

sideration

of what happens

in a quest

engaged

the

for

the Phaedo

being

with

the

to ; it also
on

theater-fan
while

reality.

where

the

the

latter

concep
con

point?a

of

conception

the philosopher
to be one
This
of the
conception

in the passages

straightforwardly

(475b4-480al3),

of being

enamoured

final

and

to Plato's

takes

or

referred

already

in the Republic

fourth

in Stoicism

is set forth most

philosopher

trasted

of

drawn

these latter can best

But perhaps

as a quest
for being.
shown
Plato
earlier,

philosophy
As was

of

in the

be

appears

unambiguously

the lover of wisdom


that
ground
a
is
devotee

the
of

is con

former

is

becoming.43

The implication of this conception of philosophy, an implication


which is explicitly drawn in the Phaedo and Republic, is that the
is
philosopher
real :44 the basic

is one

philosopher

real.

or

for

to
trying
Forms.

or Platonic

concerned

peculiarly

but of course it takes a different

Aristotle,
because

searching
entities

of Aristotle's
seem

There

losopher,
One
is in

different
to be

in Aristotle's
the

interest

two
view,
shown

conception

very

general
a
exhibits
in a

grasp

what

The

notion

with

being

is most
that

the

survives

in

form in his philosophy


of what
ways

is basically
in which
the phi

interest
strong
of being
science
qua

42For

in being.
being,

The Uni
example, J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy
(Cambridge:
Press, 1969).
43
in Republic
in which passionate
See also the passage
(490a8-b7)
is described
in erotic terms.
love of being by the philosopher
44For
see Gregory
of reality
in the philosophy
of Plato
degrees
"A Metaphysical
and Addresses
Vlastos,
Paradox,"
Proceedings
of the
American
1965-1966.
Association.
Ohio :
Philosophical
(Yellow Springs,
The Antioch Press),
pp. 5-19.
versity

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285

BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE


science which

is concerned both with

of being and the

the modes

which
The other
have
is in the in
qua being.45
properties
things
in gaining
terest
shown
of primary
of the attributes
knowledge
a
to
task
the
but the
substances,
departmental
sciences,
belonging
are

sciences

departmental

considered

to be

by Aristotle

"second

and, in his view, they contrast not with philosophy


philosophy"
in its entirety, but only with one branch of philosophy, which is
as being
of that
the science
regarded
are "principles
which
and causes."46

In dealing with
one

as

so

being

Stoicism.47

Equally

one

when

extraordinary

in my

astonishing

from

turns

as the materialism

ished, indeed almost non-existent,


contrast

substances

the Stoa, Zeller remarks that nothing

to the Stoics

Aristotle

of primary

class

is

and

one meets

which

view

strikes

Plato

the

now

in

dimin

talk about being in the Stoa

in

to the

and Aris
attention
it in Plato
conspicuous
given
as
case
is
the
when
these
course,
always
discrepancies
are noticed,
one can say that this derives
from
the state
of our
sources
of information
about Stoicism
rather
than from a radical
totle.

Of

shift in thought about the philosopher and being in the Stoa. But
that is a last recourse, and before being driven to it, I make the
following conjecture which finds some support in the Stoic frag
ments.

The Stoics held that the most


is the class

"something"
major

of somethings.

The

was used to designate

sub-classes

within

this

class

class of things

comprehensive

Greek

indefinite

this class
are

pronoun

meaning

(SVF II 329).

bodies

and

The

incorporeal

things (SVF II 331). What happens to being in this classifica


tion? In one fragment (SVF II 334) it is reported that "some
thing" is the most generic of existing or being things; but in an
other already mentioned
(SVF II 329), Alexander of Aphrodisias
says that the Stoics predicated being of bodies alone. The Stoics
have, I believe, adopted a criterion of being very like the one set
forth by the Stranger in Plato's Sophist
(247d8-e4) : a thing has

45
iv. 1 and Categoriae.
Metaphysica
194bl5
and Metaphysica
?6Physica
toteles (Heidelberg:
Carl Winter,
1966),
47
Zeller, op. cit., p. 119.

vi. 1.
p. 264.

Ingemar

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During,

Aris

JOSIAH B. GOULD

286
it can

if

being

or

act

be

acted

upon.

the

Secondly,

Stoics

con

cluded that only bodies satisfy that criterion. And, finally, since
they do not wish to exclude incorporeal things, which are for them
expressibles, the void, place, and time (SVF II 331), from reality
altogether, they say that each of these is in the generic class of
somethings but is without being. More could be said about the
status of these incorporeal somethings,48 but the point I wish to
here

stress

is that

the

now

Stoa

connects

being

exclusively

with

This had two significant consequences.


One is that the
study of being is now identified with physics, the science of bodies.
And in the Stoa physics becomes regarded formally as one of the
three main branches of philosophy
(SVF II 37). The second con
bodies.

is that

sequence

logic,

too, now

becomes

formally

one

department

of philosophy
(ibid.). If the Stoa had continued the Platonic
motif of philosophy as essentially a quest for being, it would have
had

in consistency

clusively with
comprehensive
for
losopher
the physical
sibles, which
reason

this
search
and

not

that

entities.

corporeal

is concerned

philosophy

But

ex

that is not a sufficiently

of philosophy
for the Stoa.
The
conception
phi
them is, as has been
in
nature
of
the
interested
seen,
he is concerned
with
but in addition
expres
universe;

For
and arguments.
propositions,
meanings,
formulates
the philosopher's
the Stoa,
unlike
Plato,
as a quest
as
for being,
the
cultivation
of wisdom49
but
include

wisdom

conceives

human"

(SVF

Socrates

is made

tance

to maintain

of a science

II 36).

as

"the

of

knowledge

In one place

to urge upon
the other
or
of valid
arguments

divine

things

in the Phaedo

while

And,

logic.

(90b-91b)
the

interlocutors

and

impor
Plato

makes plain there his conviction that without logic one might "be
deprived of the truth and knowledge of being" (Phaedo 90d6-7),
he

never

makes

clear

that

logic,

which

has

as

its

subject

48
Emile

argu

"La Theorie
des Incorporels"
Etudes
de Philos
Br?hier,
de France,
(Paris: Presses Universitaires
ophie Antique
1955), pp. 105-16.
in Stoic philosophy,
see A. A. Long,
For a recent account of the expressible
in
and
in
edited by
Problems
"Language
Thought
Stoicism,
Stoicism,"
A. A. Long
(London: The Athlone
Press, 1971), pp. 75-113.
49SVF
et
II 131
Emile
(line 28, p. 41).
Br?hier,
Chrysippe
Stoicisme.
?dition revue
Nouvelle
L'Ancien
1951),
(Paris: Felix Alean,
p. 29, note 1.

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287

BEING, THE WORLD, AND APPEARANCE


could be a part

ments,

The

being.50

to the

ophy

study

who

One

reads

are

of being,

they

in consistency

able

Greek

soon

philosophy

thinkers,
pre-Socratics,51
beginning
and
tween
the
appearances
world,
being,
in
of
and
variety
positions
epistemology

cordance with how one views


of

entities.

limit philos
to incorporate

not

do

itself both logic and physics.


with

classes

has as its subject

which

because

however,

Stoics,

within philosophy

of philosophy,

This

discovers

that

a distinction

make
in

consciousness.
emerge

ontology

the interrelationships

essay

has

be
A
in ac

of these three

some

reviewed

Greek

of

those

posi

tions in Greek philosophy and has in particular tried to show how


the early Stoics in their philosophy dealt with being, the world,
and

nature

of
found

account

has

emphasized

had a great deal of curiosity

philosophers
have

The

appearances.
the

world,
physical
alien any attempt

and

as

to draw

about

(i)

that

Greek

the origin and

consequence
they would
a sharp distinction
between

physics and philosophy;


(ii) that there are a number of significant
contrasts and affinities between Stoicism and earlier Greek philos
ophies in regard to the ways in which they view the relationships
between

basic

entities,

objects

in

the world,

and

in

appearances

(iii) and, for those who still may be incredulous on


consciousness;
this point, that early Stoicism was a full-fledged philosophy and
not merely

a species

of practical

counsel

for Everyman

50

which

his

It might be thought that since Plato always emphasized


the impor
of dialectic
and since for him in the final analysis
dialectic
just is
The
logic, then Plato does after all make a place for logic in philosophy.
in this line of reasoning
is that for Plato dialectic
is
suspect assumption
"Dialectic"
is for Plato an honorific
to what
logic.
term, being attached
ever philosophical
to be recommending,
method
he happens
whether
that
be Socratic
the Republic
method
of ascent to an unhypothesized
elenchus,
or the method
first principle,
of division
in the Phaedrus
expounded
briefly
and lavishly
in the Sophist.
The expression
illustrated
'dialectic'
was,
and crit
however, never applied by Plato to the study of the justification
icism of inference,
i.e., to logic.
51
For a treatment
of this motif
in early Greek philosophy
see Alex
ander P. D. Mourelatos,
"The Real and Human
Error
in Early
Greek
The Review
19 (1965), pp. 346-65.
Moure
of Metaphysics,
Philosophy,"
on the distinction
latos concentrates
between Being
and the world, and he
a very plausible
advances
thesis as to why the early Greek thinkers
felt
compelled to penetrate
beyond ordinary mundane
objects to a transcendent
realm of being in their thinking about reality.
tance

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JOSIAH B. GOULD

288
a defunct
replaced
this essay
has not

torically
A point
curred

to many

parallels

of great

philosophies
of

losophers
entities
the data

who

interest

surveyed
science

like atoms
of human

have

here
about

and

I have

this

and

the

the

and neutrons,
consciousness.52

in mind

that

will

have

oc

are
some
is that
there
far,
to be drawn
between
the various
Greek
read

of

views

contemporary
phi
between
theoretical

relationships
familiar
objects

State University
52
Here
and Kuhn.

Aristotelianism.

tougher-minded
but one
broached,

the views

in the world,

and

of New York at Albany.

of Carnap,

Quine,

Sellars,

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Popper,

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