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To cite this Article O'Driscoll, Cian(2010) 'Ethics and War in the Twenty-First Century: International Society at a 'Fork in
REVIEW ARTICLE
Henrik Syse and Gregory M. Reichberg (eds.), Ethics, Nationalism, and Just
War: Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives (Washington, DC: Catholic
University Press of America, 2007). Pp. 405, biblio., index. 26.50. ISBN
978-0-8132-1502-0.
David B. MacDonald, Robert G. Patman and Betty Mason-Parker (eds.),
The Ethics of Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). Pp.249, biblio.,
index. 55.00. ISBN 978-07546-4377-7.
Michael L. Gross, Bioethics and Armed Conflict: Moral Dilemmas of
Medicine and War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). Pp.384, biblio.,
index. 16.95 Pb. ISBN 0-262-07269-6; 41.95 Hb. ISBN 0-262-57226-5.
The discipline of International Relations has a patchy record when it comes
to accounting for change in world politics. It has tended to focus on
continuity instead. A typical statement in this regard is Martin Wights
depiction of international affairs as a realm of recurrence and repetition,
while Hans Morgenthau has drawn attention to its repetitive character.1
On a more general level, the dominant realist/neorealist orthodoxy has
presented statecraft as a timeless and invariant practice, unchanged since the
time of Thucydides. Against this backdrop, the events of 9/11 delivered a
1
Martin Wight, Why is There No International Theory? in James Der Derian (ed.)
International Theory: Critical Investigations (London: Macmillan 1995) p.25. Hans J.
Morgenthau, The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory in James Der Derian (ed.)
International Theory: Critical Investigations (London: Macmillan 1995) p.39.
87
massive shock to the system, signalling change, disruption and even rupture.
As such, it called into question many of the articles of faith upon which
contemporary international relations rests, challenging conventional wisdoms and moralities.2 Tony Blair captured something of this sense of crisis
when he remarked in October 2001 that 9/11 shattered global order and
presented international society with a moment of instability that the agents
of justice must seize upon in order to reconstruct the world along more
progressive lines.3 This, he declared, is a moment to seize. The kaleidoscope
has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before
they do, let us re-order this world around us.4
Blairs conviction that 9/11 marked a moment of change in international
politics is widely shared. Jean Bethke Elshtain famously compared the events
of 9/11 to the sack of Rome in 410 AD, while Fred Halliday declared it a day
that shook the world.5 According to this perspective, 9/11 revealed the
emergence of new threats to international peace and security namely, those
located at the nexus between terrorism, weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and rogue states. These threats call into question the present
constitution of international society, and in particular its security
architecture. Put simply, it is alleged that the spectre of shadowy networks
of individuals organized to bring great chaos and suffering to our shores at
any cost and by any means circumvent existing security mechanisms like
deterrence and reactive national self-defence.6 As the Bush administrations
National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 puts it, new threats have emerged
that challenge old rules and require new thinking.7
This had lead to what Kofi Annan has described as a fork in the road
facing international society.8 Do we abandon the established security regime
and invent it anew, in order to better manage these new threats, or should
we try instead to continuing working within the old rules, merely adapting
Andrew Hurrell, There are no Rules (George Bush): International Order after September
the 11th, International Relations 16/2 (2002) pp.185204. Also, Ian Clark, Legitimacy in
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005) pp.2248.
3
For more on the idea of crisis, see Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and Americas War on Terror
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006).
4
Prime Minister Tony Blair, Address to the Labour Party Conference, Brighton, 2 October
2001, 5http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/oct/03/uk.afghanistan4 (18 February
2008).
5
Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror: the Burden of American Power in a Violent
World (New York: Basic Books 2004) p.151; Fred Halliday Two Hours that Shook the
World: September 11, 2001, Causes and Consequences (London: Saqi Books 2002).
6
George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, 17
September 2002, 5http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/print/nssall.html4 (18 January 2010).
7
Ibid.
8
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, The Secretary-General Address to the General
Assembly,
23
September
2003,
5http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/
sg2eng030923.htm4 (18 January 2010). Cited in Jef Huysmans, International Politics of
Insecurity: Normativity, Inwardness and the Exception, Security Dialogue 37/1 (2006) p.13.
88
This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the UN
was founded . . . Now we must decide whether it is possible to continue
on the basis agreed then, or whether radical changes are needed. And
we must not shy away from questions about the adequacy, and
effectiveness, of the rules and instruments at our disposal.9
In response to the gauntlet thrown down by Annan, it is tempting to argue
that what is required is a wholesale overhaul of the international security
regime. To return to the slogan offered by the NSS, new threats require new
thinking. Yet there are those who argue that this would be a rash and even
foolhardy move. These thinkers, displaying a strand of Burkean conservatism, contend that any programme that actively eschews the wisdom of the
ages embodied in established norms and practices is to be entered into
cautiously. Accordingly, we should be wary of any line of thought that
would disown the received past, and divorce us from its inheritance. Such a
move is likely to undercut the foundations of society, cutting communities
adrift from their own history and leaving them to flounder unaided in a
present marked by turmoil and instability. From this perspective, then, it is
important that people remain true to the inheritance we receive in the form
of established norms and practices. Such an approach, Burke himself argues,
is the key to stability and indeed future progress; without it we could not
possibly hope to surpass or even equal the achievements of the past. People,
he writes, will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to
their ancestors.10 This Burkean tendency to look to established practice as
the best tutor for political life is present to varying degrees in three recently
published books on the normative challenges posed by the war on terror.
Force and Justice
The first of these books, and the most Burkean in tone, is the excellent
Ethics, Nationalism, and Just War: Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Henrik Syse and Gregory M. Reichberg, both of the
International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO). The purpose of this
volume is to explore the utility of the just war tradition as a resource for
engaging the many pressing normative issues thrown up by the war on
terror. To this end, the book is divided into two sections, the first of which is
dedicated to the examination of medieval formulations of the just war, while
the second extends these formulations to the war on terror. The underlying
assumption here is that, despite the purportedly novel character of the war
9
Ibid.
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings in Certain
Societies in London Relative to that Event, edited by Conor Cruise OBrien (Baltimore, MD:
Penguin 1969) pp.1923.
10
89
on terror, the just war tradition still provides a useful intellectual and
practical resource through which to interrogate questions of force and justice
in international society.
Indeed, this is the core point advanced by James Turner Johnsons
prefatory essay for section one of this book, Thinking Morally about War
in the Middle Ages and Today. As one would expect of Johnson, his
argument in support of this view draws upon his own canon of work and
is suitably nuanced.11 He contends that although the medieval just war
tradition does not provide a straight-forward template for the modern
theorist of war, because the world it presupposes is now a thing of the
past, there is still value in returning to it. The objective of such a return is,
for Johnson, to partake in reflective encounter with history, where the
ultimate aim of such an encounter is to shed light on the practices of the
present (p.4). This, we must be clear, is not an incitement to abstract,
ahistorical generalizing. Rather, it is a call to explore the points of
convergence and divergence evident in historical and contemporary
articulations of the role and right of war in international society. To this
end, Johnson encourages scholars interested in the relationship between
force and justice as it plays out in any age, including the present time, to
enter into a stream of reflection, debate, and dialogue with the historical
development of the just war tradition (p.9). It is, he contends, only by
exploring the historical origin and usage of the principles and values of the
just war tradition that one can properly ascertain whether and how they
might be applied to the contemporary world.
Johnsons modus operandi is adopted by most of the scholars
contributing to this volume. It is probably not unfair to say, then, that
the success of this book is dependent upon the strength of this approach.
Happily for all concerned, the venture is very successful indeed. Following
Johnsons remarks, the first section contains a number of fascinating
entries. Of particular note here is John von Heykings piece on the
distinction between classical and early modern approaches to the limitation
and restraint of war. It contains a fascinating account of the relation
between virtue, glory, salvation, and just war, as these concepts figured in
both Ciceronian and early Christian formulations of the right to war.
Perhaps, however, the author is guilty of (imperial) overstretch when he
asserts, by way of conclusion, that Ambrosian thought might provide some
pointers with respect to how the love of apocalyptic glory, as in the case
of Al Qaeda, can be moderated and, more important, can be moderated on
its own terms (p.54). Also of great merit is Reichbergs chapter on
Thomas Aquinas, and whether or not a presumption against war occupies
the core of his just war thought. This is an issue not merely of antiquarian
11
Some of Johnsons key works include: James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason and the
Limitation of War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1975); Just War Tradition and
the Restraint of War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1985); Can Modern War be
Just? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1984); Morality and Contemporary Warfare
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1999).
90
For more on the idea of using the past as an authority citation, see: Cian ODriscoll, The
Renegotiation of the Just War Tradition and the Right to War in the 21st Century (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan 2008). Also see Richard Tuck, Why is Authority Such a Problem?
in Peter Laslett, W.G. Runciman and Quentin Skinner (eds.) Philosophy, Politics, and Society
(London: Blackwell 1972) pp.194207.
13
For more on the distinction between traditions and traditionalism, see: Jaroslav Pelikan,
The Vindication of Tradition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1984) p.65.
91
92
the task set for them; for instance, they make no allowance for intervention
in cases of genocide where there is a veto in the UN Security Council (p.97).
Yet Wheeler and Owen seem to come down against any effort to simply set
the Charter aside when it produces results that are distasteful to us: If
powerful states disregard Charter rules when these prove inconvenient . . .
then the overall effect would be to undermine the authority of the law
(p.97). This would be in the interest of no party. Accordingly, instead of
advocating this approach, Wheeler and Owen suggest that we might
emphasize the flexibility built into the Charter. In this manner, they deny the
rigidity of international law by stressing its mutability at the hands of those
who would invoke it in good faith. Parallel to Syse and Reichbergs
treatment of the just war tradition, then, Wheeler and Owen depict the UN
Charter, and indeed international law, as a protean field that possesses the
capacity to evolve with the times.
Barry Coopers Ethics and National Security in an Age of International
Terrorism returns our focus to the just war tradition. The aim of this essay
is to assess the ethical basis for responding to terrorism. With this in mind,
Cooper trawls through the idea of the just war as it was passed down from
Roman times to Spanish scholasticism in an effort to provide a different
framing for 9/11 than the dominant clash of civilizations narrative. Yet, the
notion of the just war is treated with caution. Cooper contends that the
notional just war has historically functioned to dress national security up in
transcendental claims, introducing an imperial element into international
politics as the experience of the US attests. This is an interesting thesis,
though it is not without its own flaws. Coopers treatment of scholastic
thought, and particularly his exegesis of Francisco de Vitorias writings, is
not entirely convincing, and the sweep of the argument is so broad that it
loses all sight of context.14 Richard Allen also takes up the question of
terrorism. However, he discusses it in relation to the threat posed by rogue
states. In contrast to Coopers critical stance, Allen is supportive of US
leadership in the war on terror. More specifically, he speaks of the necessity
of the Bush doctrine at a time when terrorism combines with proliferation
and rogue regimes. This essay serves well as a letter of support for the Bush
administration, but it does little more than this. Put bluntly, it is rather
unsatisfying.
More successful is B.K. Greener-Barchams piece on the contemporary
trend towards deploying domestic security agents (i.e. police) in external
jurisdictions. He argues that the deployment of police in peace support
operations in cases such as Kosovo and East Timor reflects the emergent
tendency of outside powers to undertake executive roles within the
14
93
For example, Margot Light and Karen E. Smith (eds.) Ethics and Foreign Policy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001).
94
95
among three groups those who will die regardless of care, those who will
live with only minimal care, and those who will die without care. The
standard peacetime norm is that medical need should dictate this ranking. In
times of war, however, this system must be disrupted by the rule of salvage,
the requirement to utilise medical resources in such a way as to return as
many soldiers to battle as possible (p.138). As a result, dilemmas arise as one
is forced to choose between saving the worst off, saving the most lives, and
saving those fit for duty.
The second issue is whether injured soldiers have a right to medical care.
In peacetime, the duty of the doctor to care for the patient is generally selfevident, derived from their relation to one another. Further, it is usually
unaffected by external conditions and actors. Military medicine, however,
introduces a number of rights, duties, and interests that challenge the
exclusivity of the doctorpatient relationship. Soldiers are, after all, not
ordinary patients; they have already been deprived of the right to life and
many of the civil liberties that anchor medical care. As Gross puts it, if a
soldier is sent to die, why is it necessary to care for him or her when
wounded? (p.66). Putting this difficulty aside, we are still left with the
thorny question of who possesses the authority to decide that a wounded
soldier should be offered medical care. On the battlefield, the provision of
medical care is never the sole preserve of doctors; military commanders
intrude upon the process. Physicians may determine their patients medical
needs, but military commanders decide when and how to serve them
consistent with military necessity and the prosecution of war (p.66).
Without entering into the details of Grosss response to these dilemmas, it
suffices to note that they demonstrate exactly how war tempers the quality
of medical ethics in specific cases. The doctrine of military necessity attaches
conditionality to medical practices undertaken on the battlefield, transforming the nature of the medical enterprise so that it hardly conforms to
peacetime norms. Gross has succeeded, then, for this reader at least, in
debunking the WMAs claim that medical ethics remain the same in war as
in peace. But does he offer more than a mere deconstruction of
commonplaces, or is this enough? In the first instance, he does offer more
than just a critical attitude. He actively seeks to formulate innovative
responses and solutions to the problems he uncovers in his analysis. Some
of these solutions are more convincing than others, but in each case the
authors singularity of purpose and his willingness to argue the case ought
to be commended. Moreover, these responses will both invite and
provoke further debate, rather than stunting it and this can only be a
good thing.
On a more general level, it seems to me that critical analysis of the kind
offered by Gross is exactly what we need at this point in time, as we confront
that fork in the road identified by Kofi Annan. Grosss analysis does not
mindlessly disregard the old rules and standard frameworks passed down
from previous generations, but rather questions them on their own terms
and assumptions. It is only with sustained reflection of this kind what
Johnson terms reflective encounter that we might begin to gauge whether
96
Conclusion
Having surveyed these recent publications, we are in a position to offer some
(tentative) views regarding the fork in the road currently facing international
society, and which direction we should take. The first point to note is that
this divergence of the ways is overdrawn. It is not the case that international
society is restricted to either doggedly adhering to the old rules or starting
from scratch and inventing them entirely anew. There is of course a middle
way, and the books reviewed in this essay confirm both its viability and its
attractions. This middle way comprises reflective encounter with embedded
norms, with a view to adapting and revising them to fit contemporary
circumstances. It involves an interpretative mode of theoretical and political
engagement that looks to clarify, develop and renegotiate received norms
and practices in light of changing historical conditions. This, for instance, is
Reichberg and Syses objective with respect to the just war tradition, Keiths
ambition vis-a`-vis international law, and Grosss aim for military medical
ethics. The difficulty with such an approach lies in steering a path between
what I earlier referred to as traditionalism and anachronism. If traditionalism refers to the reification of a tradition, anachronism occurs when a
tradition is stretched beyond its own limits something that occurs, to put it
crudely, when too much new wine is poured into old bottles. Although these
difficulties are very real, the books reviewed here suggest that, where due
care is taken, they are avoidable.
This brings me to my second and final set of remarks, which return us to
the theme of change and continuity introduced at the outset. The
interpretative approach accredited to the literature reviewed here suggests
that we should not view that element of change introduced by the events of
9/11 in isolation from continuity in international affairs. Rather, we should
understand this change as circumscribed by continuity. This is certainly the
case when we consider the general response to 9/11. Although there were
clearly numerous attempts to overhaul the international security regime in
the wake of 9/11, these proposals were typically anchored in that same
regime. They relied, in other words, upon the prevailing discourse.16 Thus,
even the Bush administrations determination to promote a broader right to
anticipatory war, articulated in the NSS, is premised upon extant
international law.17 Equally, the new challenges facing international society
16
We might think here of Quentin Skinners statement that all revolutionaries are to this
extent obliged to march backwards into battle. Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume
1, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002) p.150.
17
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before
they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent
danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of
preemption on the existence of an imminent threat most often a visible mobilization of
97
identified in the three books reviewed here can only appear novel when set
against the long sweep of relation to established norms and practices
respectively, in relation to the just war tradition, established foreign policy
norms and military medical ethics. These books succeed, then, in putting the
disruption signalled by 9/11 into perspective by addressing it from within,
and relating it to, established normative frameworks.18 The significance of
this simple move is not to be understated: by emphasizing continuity, they
have contributed to disenchanting 9/11 and the newness of the security
environment it gave rise to. This, of course, is only the first step towards
properly engaging and addressing the challenges posed by this security
environment, but it is a necessary one.
armies, navies and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent
threat to the capabilities and objectives of todays adversaries, Bush, National Security
Strategy of the United States.
18
Contrast this to the approach of, for example, Robert Kaplan. Kaplans basic thesis is that
present times call for a radical shift from modern political practices towards what he terms a
pagan ethos that favours warrior politics. In broad terms, it is an argument for turning away
from the established liberal framework of international society towards a more robust
engagement with the world. Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a
Pagan Ethos (New York: Random House 2002).