Dueling Realisms

Dueling Realisms
Author(s): Stephen G. Brooks

Source: International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer, 1997), pp. 445-477
Published by: The MIT Press
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DuelingRealisms
StephenG. Brooks
International
relationsscholarshavetendedto focuson realism'scommonfeatures
ratherthanexploringpotentialdifferences.'
Realistsdo sharecertainassumptions
and are oftentreatedas a group,but such a broadgroupingobscuressystematic
divisionswithinrealisttheory.
someanalystshavearguedthatitis necesRecently,
withinrealism.2
Thisarticlebuildson thislineofargument.
The
saryto differentiate
andneed,todividerealismonthebasisofdivergent
has so far
potential,
assumptions
In thisarticleI arguethatrealismcan be splitintotwocompeting
beenoverlooked.3
branchesbyrevealinglatentdivisionsregarding
a seriesof assumptions
aboutstate
behavior.The first
branchis KennethWaltz'swell-known
a secneorealist
theory;4
ondbranch,
termed
here"postclassicalrealism,"has yettobe delineated
as a major
Thismaterial
is basedon worksupported
undera NationalScienceFoundation
GraduateFellowship.I
thankDeborahJordan
Brooks,JosephGrieco,Ian Hurd,David Lumsdaine,SylviaMaxfield,
JohnOdell,
BarryO'Neill,Jonathan
Rodden,FrancesRosenbluth,
AllanStam,StephenSkowronek,
NigelThalakada,
ShaoguangWang,BradWesterfield,
themembersof Yale University's
RelationsReading
International
Group,theanonymous
reviewers
forInternational
andespeciallyBruceRussettandAlex
Organization,
Wendtfortheirhelpfulcomments
on earlierdrafts.
1. See, forexample,Gilpin1984,290-91; Keohane 1986, 164-65; Grieco1995,27; Vasquez 1983,
26-28; Stein 1990,4-5; Kapstein1995,753; Keohaneand Nye 1977,23-24; Grieco 1990, 3-4; and
Gilpin1996,7-8.
2. See, forexample,Snyder1991, 11-12; Lynn-Jones
and Miller 1995, x-xiii; Deudney1993, 8;
Glaser1994-95,378-81;Mastanduno
1996,2; Walt1992,474;Mearsheimer
1994-95,fns.20,27; Frankel
1996,xv-xviii;Grieco 1997; Wohlforth
1993, 11-14; Zakaria 1992, 190-93; Miller1996; and Jervis
1993,55-56.
3. Someanalysts
theneedtomakedistinctions
identify
within
realismbutemphasizeonlythoseassumptionsthatrealistshold in common;see, forexample,Mearsheimer1994-95, 11-13; Lynn-Jones
and
Miller1995,ix-x; Glaser1994-95,54-55; Walt1992,473; andMastanduno1996,3-5. Otherscholars
outlinedivisionswithinrealismonlywithrespectto particular
issue areas; see, forexample,Deudney
1993;Miller1996;andDesch 1996.Somesuggestthatrealistsmaydivergeregarding
certainassumptions
butdo notaddresswhether
realismshouldbe dividedon thisbasis; see, forexample,Grieco1997; and
Waymanand Diehl 1994,9. The divisionbetween"aggressive"and "defensive"realistsis themost
outlinedso far;see,forexample,Snyder1991,11-12;Zakaria1992,190-93;andFrankel
comprehensive
1996,xv-xviii.Sectiontwoarguesthatthisaggressive/defensive
distinction
is usefulbutis reflective
of
thedeeperdivergence
within
realismoverassumptions
outlinedin thisarticle.
4. Waltz1979.
International
Organization
51, 3, Summer1997,pp. 445-77
? 1997byThe 10 Foundation
andtheMassachusetts
Institute
ofTechnology

Organization
446 International
witha numberof realistanalysesthatcoherewithone
butcorresponds
alternative
withWaltzianneorealism.5
another
andareincompatible
bothhavea
similarities:
Neorealismandpostclassicalrealismdo shareimportant
as
politics inherently
bothviewinternational
focus;6botharestate-centric;
systemic
such
rather
thannonmaterial
factors,
bothemphasizematerialfactors,
competitive;
selfstates
are
actors
that
pursue
egoistic
andbothassume
as ideas andinstitutions;
in
very
general
how
states
behave
only
features
describe
help.But thesecommon
varies
competitiveness
terms:theyare silentabout,forexample,how international
over
economic
Specifycapacity.
security
military
orhowandwhenstatesprioritize
about
ing how statesengagein self-helprequiresmakingadditionalassumptions
into
branches
I
divide
realism
two
contend,
further
assumptions,
These
statebehavior.
abouthow stateswill act in a given
and resultin competingsets of hypotheses
environment.
is
thesetwobranchesofrealism.Mostsignificant
Threeassumptions
differentiate
of
mere
conflict
alternatively,
or,
are
conditioned
the
possibility
whether
states
by
Neorealismholdsthatthe
of aggression.7
makedecisionsbased on theprobability
who
are
seenas alwaysadoptinga
actions
of
of
the
states,
shapes
possibility conflict
not
assume
statesemployworstrealism
does
Postclassical
worst-case
perspective.
as makingdecisionsbased on assesscase reasoning;ratherstatesare understood
threats.
security
regarding
mentsofprobabilities
followfromthispossibility/
naturally
Twootherdifferences
assumptions
regarding
concernsthediscountrate.
The firstrelateddisagreement
distinction.
probability
Neorealism'semphasison thepossibilityof conflictreflectstheview thatactors
overlongermilitary
preparedness
short-term
favoring
heavilydiscountthefuture,
In contrast,
postclassicalrealismdoes notregard
termobjectiveswhentheyconflict.
here,
requirements;
security
toshort-term
objectivesas alwayssubordinate
long-term
trade-offs.
statesoftenmakeintertemporal
All realistsagreethat
concernsstatepreferences.
The secondrelateddisagreement
capacity
andthatrelativemilitary
security
is thestate'sprimeresponsibility
military
base. But realistsdivergewhenthese
ultimately
dependson a state'sproductive
All
statepreferences.
underspecify
conflict:
commonrealistassumptions
priorities
thestatefrommilitary
takesfirst
priority,
butneorealists
threats
agreethatdefending
andpostclassicalrealistsdisagreeaboutthedegreeto whichstatesfavorimmediate
preparedmilitary
Within
neorealism,
overeconomiccapacity.
preparedness
military
In postclassicalrealism,
economiccapacityifthetwoconflict.
ness alwaystrumps
5. In choosingtheterm"postclassicalrealism"to distinguish
thetwobranchesof realism,I do not
divided,just thatdividingrealismis
meanto implythatthetheorynecessarilymustbe permanently
The rationaleforselectingthetermis outlinedin
currently
necessaryto improveand clarifythetheory.
sectiontwo.
behavioris sometimesseen as beinginterinternational
6. A "systemic"approachto understanding
one.I use thetermsystemic
toreferto analysesthatfocuson international
changeablewitha "structural"
analyses-whichfocuson the
influences
and do notexaminedomesticpoliticalvariables."Structural"
thanbeingsynonymous
with,"systemic"theory.
roleofpolarity-arebestseenas a formof,rather
betweenpossibility
andprobability
in a different
context,
7. Forarguments
discussingthedistinction
see Wendt1992,404; andKeohane1993,282-83.

DuelingRealisms 447
ifthepotential
preparedness
maytradeoffa degreeofmilitary
rationalpolicymakers
of security
relativeto theprobability
netgainsin economiccapacityare substantial
losses.
andpostclasbetweenneorealism
Thefirst
twosectionsofthisarticledifferentiate
ofthisdifferenofthearticleoutlinessomeimplications
sicalrealism;theremainder
assumptions
In thethirdsectionI arguethatawarenessofrealism'sdivergent
tiation.
debatesand shouldlead to a better
opensup avenuesforcumulativeintra-realist
of thesedivergent
realistassumpof thetheory.
The significance
conceptualization
theyimplyabout(1) German
hypotheses
tionsis shownbycomparing
thecompeting
in Ukraine,and (3) regional
and Japaneseforeignpolicy,(2) nuclearproliferation
In thefinalsectionI arguethata
countries.
amongdeveloping
economiccooperation
whypast
ofrealism'stwobranches
makesiteasiertounderstand
clearunderstanding
theorieshave generand domestic-level
withliberals,constructivists,
interchanges
and also opens up thepossibilityof a moreconstructive
ally been disappointing
future
dialogue.
The Neorealist Conception of State Behavior
conception
theneorealist
thatundergird
Thissectionoutlinesthethreeassumptions
is themostsignificant,
withthenexttwo
of statebehavior.The firstassumption
fromthefirst.
naturally
following
assumptions
versusProbability
Possibility
As John
pressures.
systemalwayshas highsecurity
theinternational
Forneorealists,
viewtheinternational
Mearsheimer
neorealists
systemas a "brutalarena
contends,
to takeadvantageofeach other.. . International
wherestateslookforopportunities
security
competirelationsis nota constantstateof war,butis a stateofrelentless
abound.
tion."8Similarly,
orseemingthreats
to... security
Waltzarguesthat"threats
thembecomea way of
dangersand counteracting
withidentifying
Preoccupation
life.Relationsremaintense;theactorsare usuallysuspiciousand oftenhostile."9
Neorealists
envisionthesystemtobe "one ofhighrisk,"although"thisis meantnot
inthesensethatwarconstantly
occursbutin thesensethat,witheach statedeciding
foritselfwhether
ornottouse force,warmayatanytimebreakout."10
thereis thenconstant
Waltzarguesthat"in theabsenceof a supremeauthority,
11Yetwhatwouldseemultimately
willbe settledbyforce."
thatconflicts
possibility
butrathertherelative
is notthatconflictis alwayspossiblein anarchy,
important
ofpotential
chancesthatitwilloccur.Becausefailingtofullybalancethecapabilities
it wouldseema rational
resultin conflict,
does notnecessarily
military
aggressors
8. Mearsheimer
1994-95,10.
9. Waltz1989,43.
10. Waltz1979,111,102.
11. Waltz1959,188.

448 International
Organization
defensive
decisionmakermightoperateon themarginof whatis safe regarding
preis low,especiallysincemilitary
whenthelikelihoodofaggression
preparations
Within
parednessis generallyquitecostly.This is nottheneorealistperspective.
pera rationalstateneverletsdownitsguard:statesadopta worst-case
neorealism,
ofpotential
aggressors.12
capabilities
spectiveandalwaysaimtobalancethemilitary
by themerepossibility-andnottheprobstatesare conditioned
For neorealists,
ability-ofconflict.
forthreeprinperspective
Neorealists
regardstatesas adoptingsucha worst-case
costsofwaras causingactorsto
pointtothepotential
cipalreasons.First,neorealists
As Mearsheimer
maintains,
"politicalcomofconflict.
focuson themerepossibility
businessthaneconomicintercourse;
amongstatesis a muchmoredangerous
petition
andevenmass
itcan lead towar,andwaroftenmeansmasskillingon thebattlefield
ofthe
cases,warcanevenleadtothetotaldestruction
ofcivilians.In extreme
murder
inducesa highdegree
ofconflict
view,themerepossibility
state."13In theneorealist
tobe defensively
costsofneglecting
vigilant.
ofcaution,giventheextreme
potential
focuson otherstate'sunderlyarguethatstateswillultimately
Second,neorealists
capabilities-because"intenbymaterial
ingpotentialforaggression-asmeasured
andthepossibility
always
certainty,"
tionsareimpossibletodivinewith100percent
canbe benignone dayandmalignthenext."14 In the
existsthat"a state'sintentions
focusbecausethisis theonly
rationalstatesadopta worst-case
framework,
neorealist
waytoensureagainstbeingcaughtoffguard.
ofconmaintain
thatrationalstateswillfocuson thepossibility
Third,neorealists
are consideredtheonlytrueassuranceagainst
flictbecausedefensiveprecautions
by
For neorealists,
warcan be prevented-orat leastforestalled-only
aggression.
defensivepreparations;
"onlythevigilanceof
directchoiceto pursueappropriate
of hugeclashing
defensivecoalitionsstandsin theway of an Orwelliannightmare
a worstorevena singleworldempire."15Statesarethusseenas adopting
despotisms,
becauseit is assumedthatthey"do notenjoyeven an imperfect
case perspective
16
unlesstheysetouttoprovideitforthemselves."
oftheirownsecurity
guarantee
foThe neorealist
thatrationalactorsadopta worst-case/possibilistic
perspective
cus does notmeanneorealistsbelievewar is alwayshighlylikely.Waltzclearly
arguesthat"worldpolitics,althoughnotreliablypeaceful,fallsshortofunrelieved
do notmaintain
thatinternational
relations
neorealists
chaos."17 Although
certainly
hold thatthecombinedeffectsof the
is a constantstateof war,theynevertheless
focus.
cause statestoadopta worst-case/possibilistic
aforementioned
threefactors
threefactors-whichtheyassert
Neorealists
wouldlikelyarguethatthepreceding
induce
can be tracedto theanarchicstateof theinternational
system-necessarily
theyattribute
thisworst-case
although
12. KeohaneandMartinandWendtreacha similarassessment,
torealismingeneral;KeohaneandMartin1995,43; andWendt1992,404. As willbe seen,not
assumption
focus.
all realistsadoptsucha worst-case
1994-95,12.
13. Mearsheimer
14. Ibid.,11.
15. Liberman1993,125.
16. Waltz1959,201.
17. Waltz1979,114.

DuelingRealisms 449
focus.However,evenifthesethree
rationalstatesto adopta worst-case/possibilistic
thissituation
byno meanscompelsa rationalstateto adopta
factors
aremanifested,
simplyassumethatrationalstates
worst-case/possibilistic
perspective-neorealists
forneowillreactin thismanner.
Thesethreefactorsmerelyprovidea justification
is usefulreviewpoint;whether
thisassumption
realism'sworst-case/possibilistic
mainsopentoexamination.
it plays a
view is only an assumption,
Althoughthisworst-case/possibilistic
As RobertPowtheory.
pivotal-althoughusuallyunrecognized-rolein neorealist
towardcooperation
ell andAlexanderWendtargue,balancingbehaviorandattitudes
intheinternational
system
per
areconditioned
notbya lackofhierarchical
authority
se butbytheperceivedrelativelikelihoodthatforcewillbe used.'8Absenttheworstthereis
case assumption
neorealism,
evenin an anarchicenvironment
undergirding
recurandthatstates
no logicalreasontoinferthatbalancingbehaviorwillconstantly
willbe highlyaverseto cooperate.Ultimately,
thisworst-case/possibilistic
assumpwork
ofanarchy
tion-and notthecondition
-performsthebulkoftheexplanatory
intheWaltzianneorealist
framework.
areleadingcriticsofclassicalrealistexplanations
Ironically,
although
neorealists
the
ofinternational
behaviorpredicated
on particular
conceptions
ofhumannature,19
on the
framework
itselfdependsfundamentally
internal
coherenceoftheneorealist
For Hans
thatactorsarecharacteristically
highlyfearful.
psychological
assumption
actorsareguidedbya rapaciousquestforpowerthatis theresultofan
Morgenthau,
viewof
animal-like
Morgenthau's
cravingto dominateone's fellows.20
aggressive,
conception
emphawhereastheneorealist
humannaturethusemphasizesaggression,
of humannaturemaynotbe so
sizes warinessand anxiety.
Thesetwoconceptions
ifactorsareunderstood
tobe aggressive,
itmakessenseto
distinct
fromoneanother:
In thisrespect,neorealists
assumetheywillalso be characteristically
highlyfearful.
perspective
preciselybecause theyimplicitly
mayadopta worst-case/possibilistic
thatactorsare inherently
aggressive.Takento its
acceptMorgenthau's
argument
viewofhumannatureimpliesthat(1) actorswill
logicalconclusion,Morgenthau's
seekto takeadvantageof weakerstateswhenever
theyhave thechance,andhence
is theonlytrueassuranceagainstbeingexploited.Thisis
(2) military
preparedness
viewthat"conflict
is commonamongstatesbesimilarto neorealism's
remarkably
andwheredefensivevigilance
cause ... [of]powerful
incentives
foraggression,"'21
Neorealiststhusemphasizea different
is theonlyguaranteeagainstaggression.22
butthenetresultis thatbothview the
aspectof humannaturethanMorgenthau,
doesnotmove
terms.In theend,neorealism
worldinverysimilar,
highlypessimistic
18. See Powell, 1991, 1993; and Wendt1992, 1995.AlthoughWendtand Powell advancethesame
balancingandcooperation,
thatanarchy
byitselfdoesnotshapedecisionsregarding
underlying
argument
theperceivedlikelihoodofforce:Powellexamines
underlying
factorsas affecting
theypointto different
ofintersubjective
understandtechnology,
whereasWendtoutlinestheimportance
theimpactofmilitary
ings.
19. Waltz1959,16-42.
1946,192-94.
20. Morgenthau
1990,12.
21. Mearsheimer
22. Waltz1959,188.

450 International
Organization
of classicalrealism;neorealistssimplyswap
beyondthehumannaturearguments
(fear).23
one aspectofhumannature(aggression)foranother
assumption
is
To be clear,neorealism'srelianceon thisworst-case/possibilistic
ofinternathisassumption
is a usefulapproximation
notfatalforthetheory.
Whether
tionaldecisionmakingremainsan open question;neorealistsmaybe correctthat
inthismanner.
has
characterized
statesaremostproductively
Mytaskatthisjuncture
thisassumption
is useful,butratherto emphasizeits
notbeento evaluatewhether
intheneorealist
architecture.
centrality
ShortTermversusLongTerm
one could arguethat
againstelimination,
Because anarchyprovidesno guarantees
intheshortterm,
even
maximizetheirmilitary
stateswillalwaysseektofirst
security
In
forthestate'slong-term
if doingso has less-than-ideal
priorities.
repercussions
in thismanner,
discountthefuture
even
a rationalstatewillnotnecessarily
practice,
in an anarchicsystem.
howrationalstatesweighshort-term
military
security
Rather,
in theinterofsecurity
competition
againstlong-term
goalsdependson thestrength
nationalsystem.
a rationalstate'sfirst
concern
In a systemwithhighlevelsofsecurity
competition,
will be to maximizethelikelihoodof its continuedexistence,even if focusingon
has negativelong-term
short-term
pressures
repercussions.
But,if security
security
In
are notas strong,
a rationalstatewill give moreweightto long-term
priorities.
themorea rationalstatediscounts
thefuture.
thesystem,
sum,themorecompetitive
in which
forsecurity
competition
Seeingtheinternational
systemas a relentless
about
statesadopta worst-case/possibilistic
drivesneorealist
assumptions
perspective
to maximize
thediscountrate.Giventhisview,a rationalstatewillalwaysseekfirst
frompotential
rivals,evenifthishas negativelongitsshort-term
military
security
forotherstatepriorities.
termrepercussions
Ofcourse,neorealists
do notthinklongbuttheydo view suchconcernsas subordinate
to
termstategoals areunimportant,
whenthetwoconflict.
To be clear,neorealshort-term
military
security
requirements
ism'sviewthatstatesheavilydiscountthefuture
followsnotfromtheanarchicnatureoftheinternational
thetheory's
that
assumption
reflects
system
perse,butrather
ofconflict
statesareshapedbythemerepossibility
andhenceseektobe prepared
for
all contingencies
theshort-term
use offorcebypotential
rivals.
regarding
versusEconomicCapacity
Military
Security
Waltzcontendsthatstateswill be concerned,above all else, withsecuringtheir
survival.24
WhileWaltz'sargument
appearsto saya greatdeal,thisnotionofsurvival
is onlya precursor
ofstatepreferences
rather
thana satisfactory
to an understanding
23. For a clearexampleof how neorealistsrelyon humannature,see Fischer'sanalysisof feudal
Europe;Fischer1992,465.
24. Waltz1979,91.

DuelingRealisms 451
deterrent
in anarchy
requiresbotha potentmilitary
on itsown.Surviving
conception
survivalas states'ultimate
base. As a result,identifying
and a dynamicproductive
ofa survival
security
component
howstatesbalancethemilitary
goal is insufficient:
Willa
inrelation
totheeconomiccapacityelementmuststillbe established.
strategy
sigevenifdoingso sometimes
security,
rationalstatealwaysmaximizeitsmilitary
will a statesometimes
its economiccapacity?Alternatively,
constrains
nificantly
reducesdefensivevigievenifitthereby
to enhanceitseconomiccapacity,
attempt
danger?Waltz's
tosomemilitary
exposesa state'svitalinterests
lanceandpotentially
tensionbetween
thatstatespursuesurvivalthuscontainsan underlying
argument
by deWaltzskirtsthistrade-off
security
andeconomiccapacity;however,
military
as
strength"
to increasemilitary
scribing"movesto increaseeconomiccapability,
balancingstrategy.25
bothbeingelementsofan internal
arenotalwaysincompatpreparedness
Ofcourse,economiccapacityandmilitary
oftenleavesless resourcesavailablefor
military
preparedness
ible.Yet,heightened
economicpriorities,
especiallyoverthelongterm.Thisis notto say a fixedinverse
attention
tomilitary
whereincreasing
existsbetweenthetwoobjectives,
relationship
decreasein economiccapacity.26
causesa corresponding
alwaysnecessarily
security
in wealthystatesmaynotalwaysbe overlyconcernedevenwherean
Policymakers
tension
thatsignificant
itis undeniable
inverserelationship
does exist.Nevertheless,
oftenexistsbetweenthesetwo goals,especiallyforstateswithhighlyconstrained
economicresources.Moreover,as JohnLewis Gaddis,Paul Kennedy,andWilliam
emphasize,decisionmakersveryoftenperceivethattheyface such a
Wohlforth
thattheycannotfully
trade-off
and hencedesignpolicybased on theassumption
bothobjectives.27
satisfy
existsbetweenpursuingstatesurvivalby
In practice,a fundamental
difference
substantially
morethaneconomiccapacity(as
military
preparedness
emphasizing
NorthKoreahas doneinthepostwarperiodandtheSovietsdiduntilthemid-1980s)
thehighandtheopposite,advancingeconomiccapacityattheexpenseofproviding
rivals(as theBritishdid in
frompotential
short-term
military
estlevelofprotection
themid-1930s,as theSovietsdid in thelate 1980s,and as Ukrainehas done reheadingssuch
underamorphous
strategies
cently).Lumpingsuchradicallydifferent
because it leaves neorealism
as "survival"and "self-help"is highlyproblematic
content.
withverylittleexplanatory
notionofsurvivaltoa morepreciseneorealGoingbeyondWaltz'sunderspecified
how statestradeoffmilitary
requiresexamining
of statepreferences
istconception
Whatis themarginal
rateof
andeconomiccapacitywhenthetwoconflict.
security
In otherwords,
statebehavior?
substitution
betweenthesetwogoalsthatcharacterizes
howmucheconomiccapacitywilla statebe willingtogiveup inordertohavemore
be an interThe trade-off
betweenthesetwogoalswillfrequently
security?
military
economiccapacand long-term
security
military
temporalone betweenshort-term
25. Ibid.,118.
as to whyan ironcladtrade-off
26. For a good summary
does notexistbetweenmilitary
security
and
see Friedberg
1989.
economiccapacityunderall circumstances,
27. See Gaddis1982,58, 133-35;Kennedy1983;andWohlforth
1994-95.

452 International
Organization
Forthisreason,assumptions
ity.28
aboutthediscount
ratesubstantially
affect
howthe
trade-off
is understood.
How do neorealists
envisionstatesmakingthistrade-off?
Neorealism's
worst-case/
theviewthatrationalstates
possibilistic
perspective
andhighdiscountratereflects
willseekfirst
to ensuremilitary
security
beforeadvancingotherobjectives,suchas
Thisis nottoclaim,as RichardRosecrancedoes,thatneorealists
economiccapacity.
maintain"economicsneed notbe includedin a valid conspectusof international
do notvieweconomiccapacityas unimportant.
politics."29
Neorealists
certainly
Howfora stateto focuson theenhancement
ever,neorealistsconsiderit irrational
of
economiccapacityto theextentthatthelikelihoodofbeingsubjectedto a military
defeatbypotential
rivalsincreasestoanydegree.As Mearsheimer
maintains,
"states
operateinbothan international
politicalenvironment
andan international
economic
and theformerdominatesthe latterin cases wherethe two come
environment,
intoconflict.The reasonis straightforward:
the international
politicalsystemis
anarchic."30
Thisneorealist
viewthatsecurity
priorities
trump
economiccapacitywhenever
the
twoconflict
implicitly
presumesstatesfavorshort-term
overlongmilitary
security
termmilitary
security.
Why?Economiccapacityultimately
providesthefoundation
forfuture
as a result,engagingin intertemporal
trade-offs
between
military
security;
short-term
and long-term
economiccapacityis also a choicebemilitary
security
intheshorttermversusthelongterm.Thisimplicit
tweenmilitary
neorealist
security
thatprotection
threats
fromshort-term
argument
potential
trumps
long-term
military
is consistent
withthetheory's
viewthatactorsheavilydiscount
security
underlying
thefuture.
Giventhatlong-term
economiccapacityand long-term
military
security
ofneorealism's
ofstatepreferences
overlap,themostprecisearticulation
conception
is consequently
thatshort-term
military
security
requirements
supersedebothshorttermandlong-term
economiccapacity.
It wouldbe an incorrect
to portray
as simplymaintaining
caricature
neorealists
thatstateswillalwaystakeeveryconceivablesteptoensuretheirshort-term
military
vis-a-vispotential
rivals.Waltzverycarefully
security
arguesthat"to say,then,that
international
politicsis a gamethegeneralrulesofwhicharedisregarded
attheperil
oftheplayer'sexistencedoes notnecessarily
meanthateverystatemustbendall its
efforts
towardssecuringitsownsurvival."'31Waltzrecognizesstateshaveotherimportant
objectivesbesidesmilitary
and he does notarguethatstateswill
security,
devoteall,orevenanywhere
nearall,oftheirresources
justtoensurethisobjective.32
The neorealist
perspective
allowsstatestopursueeconomiccapacitytoa significant
28. See Kennedy1987;andGilpin1981.
29. Rosecrance1981,693. AlthoughRosecrancedid notspecifythemeaningof "economics"in the
preceding
quote,heappearstohavebeenreferring-correctly-to
thefactthatWaltzignoresinternational
economicinteractions
as unit-level
processes;see Rosecrance1982,682. Thisis an important
critiqueof
itis cloudedbyRosecrance'suse oftheblankettermeconomicsrather
Waltz'stheory;
unfortunately
than
morespecifically
toeconomicinteractions
referring
betweenstates.
30. Mearsheimer
1992,222 (emphasisadded).
31. Waltz1959,206.
32. Waltz1979,92.

DuelingRealisms 453
vulnerableto
degreebutnotto theextentthatdoingso leaves a statepotentially
rival.
bya possiblemilitary
exploitation
military
as arguingthatstates
neorealists
wouldbe toportray
Another
mischaracterization
security
bybalancingthecapabilities
military
willalwaysmaximizetheirshort-term
Waltzcarefully
arguesthatjust as firmsare freeto pursue
of potentialaggressors.
havelatitude
statessimilarly
ofprofit
maximization,
otherobjectivestothedetriment
of theirchancesforcontinuedexistence.33
to pursueothergoals to thedetriment
as arguingthatstateswill neverpursue
Neorealistsshouldthusnotbe stereotyped
frompossiblerivalsis potensecurity
economiccapacityto theextentthatmilitary
politicsis risky;
tiallyjeopardized.WhatWaltzdoes argueis that"balance-of-power
politicsis a realmwhere"any
still,"becauseinternational
toignoreitis riskier
trying
be readyeitherto
statemayat anytimeuse force[and]all statesmustconstantly
thatignore
Justas firms
forcewithforceorto paythecostof weakness."34
counter
arguesthat"a unitofthesystemcan
Waltzsimilarly
market
forceswillbe punished,
one in whichthe
arenais a competitive
behaveas itpleases,"but"theinternational
recognize
Neorealists
mustexpecttopaythepriceoftheirineptitude."35
less skillful
preparedstatesmaydecideto pursueeconomiccapacityat theexpenseofmilitary
rivals,butsuchdecisionsareseenas havingbeencausedbya
potential
nessvis-'a-vis
tenetsthatgovernintercompetitive
ofthefundamental
lackofproperunderstanding
nationalpolitics.
the
resistbroadening
whyneorealists
Thisanalysismakesit easierto understand
as David
toincludean economicelement,
factors
beyondmilitary
conceptofsecurity
Neorealism'sworst-casefocusand conceptionof thediscount
Baldwinsuggests.36
short-term
ofstatepreferences-where
understanding
in a particular
rateculminates
concernsalwaystrumpthoseof economiccapacitywheneverthe
security
military
to focuson themilitary
two conflict-whichthenleads neorealism'sproponents
theconcept
Broadening
theeconomicelement.
whiledownplaying
aspectofsecurity
withinthe
of security
to includeeconomicfactorssimplycannotbe accomplished
assumptions
theunderlying
sinceitwouldrequiredismantling
framework,
neorealist
neotherefore,
Notsurprisingly,
coherence.
withitsinternal
thatprovideneorealism
in military
terms.Taking
definetheconceptofsecurity
torestrictively
realistsprefer
why
to its logical conclusionmakesit easierto understand
thisline of argument
to ignoretheecoconcludesthatitis possible,indeedproductive,
Waltzultimately
behavior.37
aboutinternational
nomicdomainwhentheorizing
WhatIs Neorealism
's TheoryofDecisionMaking?
international
view of decisionmakingin mainstream
thestandard
Expectedutility,
ofanalysts
by a widespectrum
oftennotexplicitly,
although
is employed,
relations,
33. Waltzarguesthatstatesmay"seek goalsthattheyvaluemorehighlythansurvival;theymay,for
withotherstatestotheirownsurvivalinform";Waltz1979,92.
amalgamation
example,prefer
34. Waltz,1959,221, 160.
35. Waltz1986,331.
36. Baldwin1995.
37. Waltz1979,79-80.

Organization
454 International
been
Up to thispoint,neorealismhas normally
in varyingdegreesof formality.38
outof
different
utilities
the
actors
weight
that
understood
to sharethisperspective
policies,
of
all
alternative
benefits
costs
and
calculate
comesby theirprobabilities,
neohowever,
On closerexamination,
andchoosetheoptionwiththehighestutility.
doesnothaveexpectedutility
view;neorealism
realismfallsoutsidethismainstream
formulation,
expectedutility
As RobertKeohaneargues,"in a standard
foundations.
in theextheir
Instead,
behavior."39
mere
determine
will
not
let
possibilities
states
to their
are
outcomes
weighted
according
the
utilities
of
framework,
pectedutility
neorealism's
here,
as
emphasized
Yet,
probability.
subjective
toprobabilities.
focusis insensitive
it
withthetypicalexpectedutilityframework,
Since neorealismis inconsistent
repreneorealism
of
decision
making
as
to
what
theory
becomesusefulto speculate
do not
is "minimax."Actorspursuinga minimaxstrategy
sents.One possibility
minimize
the
that
options
but
instead
choose
utility
per
se,
expected
pursueaggregate
emphaand
Howard
Raiffa
As
R.
Duncan
Luce
can
suffer.40
loss thatthey
maximum
(orpessimistic)
are "ultraconservative
size,actorsthatuse theminimaxriskcriteria
the
worstconsehaving
on
the
state
they
concentrate
act,
in that,relativeto each
costsof
factor
the
actors
In
opportunity
framework,
quence."'41 theexpectedutility
chances
when
the
potential
and
take
into
their
decisions
measures
precautionary
actorsthat
oflosses.In contrast,
gainsofdoingso arelargerelativetotheprobability
the
do nottakechancesunderanycircumstances:
alwayspursuea minimaxstrategy
scenariowilloccur.
overriding
goal is tominimizethelikelihoodthattheworst-case
emphaIn thisrespect,minimaxis highlycompatiblewithneorealism'sworst-case
theprobabilities
also doesnotrequiretheactortoestimate
criterion
sis.Theminimax
consistent
withneorealism's
outcomesandis consequently
associatedwithdifferent
focus.
possibilistic
ProsA secondalternative
ofprospect
theory.42
is representative
is thatneorealism
arguesthatactorsgivemoreweightto lossesthanto gains,andalso that
pecttheory
actorswill oftenexaggeratethelikelihoodof rareevents;"dramaticeventswhich
comereadilyto mind... areperceivedto be morelikelythantheyactuallyare."43
thatactorsaredominated
byloss aversionandthattheywillexagThisperspective
geraterareanddramaticeventsparallelsneorealism'sviewthatactorsfocuson the
lossesofmilitary
Moreover,
proponents
security.
worstcase withrespecttopotential
ofprospect
theory
arguethatactorswillbe "willingtopayfarmoretoreducetherisk
loss from.10 to 0 thanfrom.20 to .10,eventhoughthechangein
of a catastrophic
thatactorswillpay a steeppriceto
is thesame."44Thiscontention
expectedutility
loss downto verylow levelsis compatiblewith
reducetheriskof a catastrophic
includeGilpin1981;Huthand
based on expectedutility
38. Examplesof analysesthatareexplicitly
Russett1984;Buenode Mesquita1981;andLipson1984.
39. Keohane1993,282.
40. Luce andRaiffa1957,278-89.
41. Ibid.,282.
42. See Farnham1994;andTverskyandKahneman1986.
43. Levy 1994,14.
44. Ibid.

DuelingRealisms 455
requirements
security
wheremilitary
neorealism'sconceptionof statepreferences,
thetwoconflict.
thoseofeconomiccapacitywhenever
alwaystrump
The "PostclassicalRealist" ConceptionofStateBehavior

ofstatebehaviorthatcan be contrasted
Does realismadmitanyotherunderstanding
RobertGilpinarguesthatall realistssharean
conception?
to theWaltzianneorealist
affairs."45
natureof international
conflictual
"theessentially
regarding
assumption
to
thecrucialquestionis theextent
is accuratebutunderspecified;
Gilpin'sargument
vary
Does thelevel and formof conflict
areconflictual.
affairs
whichinternational
towhichfactors?
overtime?Ifso,towhatdegreeandaccording
answersfromthoseadprovideverydifferent
A varietyofcurrent
realistwriters
Althoughsome of theserealistscholarshave atvancedby Waltzianneorealists.
theiranalysesdo not
to mergetheiranalysesintotheWaltzianframework,
tempted
Instead,theycanbest
assumption.
followfromneorealism's
branchof realism-whatis termedhere
a competing
as reflecting
be understood
bytheprobability
realism"-whichviewsactorsas beingconditioned
"postclassical
ofconflict.
Althoughtheemphasisin thissectionis to delineatehow postclassicalrealism
thepostclassicalrealistconceptionof state
fromWaltz'sneorealisttheory,
differs
to classicalrealism.The
standsin contrast
behavioroutlinedbelowsimultaneously
term"postclassicalrealism"was chosento designatea branchofrealismthatdoes
thatareheldincommonbyclassicalrealism
characteristics
notsharefourimportant
neorealism
andclassicalrealismsharethe
theory.
Specifically,
andWaltz'sneorealist
static
conceptionof international
have
a
highly
they
(1)
followingcharacteristics:
forclassiof
human
nature-aggression
on
aspects
particular
they
rely
relations;
(2)
(3) theyassumethatstates
hypotheses;
cal realists,
fearforneorealists-togenerate
ofmilitary
forceto securetheirobjectives;
tendtorelyprimarily
on theuse orthreat
capabilities,withneorealists
on thebalance of military
and (4) theyconcentrate
influother
international-level
and
classical
realists
downplaying
generally
excluding
tothesefourcharacPostclassicalrealismdoesnotsubscribe
enceson statebehavior.
teristics.
Possibility
versusProbability
Waltzianneorealists
place
perspective,
Consistent
withtheirworst-case/possibilistic
the
thelikelihoodofconflict:
factoras affecting
theemphasison a singleendogenous
is seenas less likelywhenstatesbalAggression
balanceof military
capabilities.46
45. Gilpin1984,290.
also havean imporrecognizethatdomesticfactors-suchas hyper-nationalism-can
46. Neorealists
to
haveattempted
someneorealists
Although
tantimpact,butsuchfactorsareexcludedfromtheirtheory.
intoneorealism(see, forexample,Mearsheimer
domesticfactorssuchas hyper-nationalism
incorporate
power;
explanatory
thetheory's
meansofincreasing
1990,21), doingso wouldbe a posthoc,degenerative
on thispointsee Haggard1991,421; andWendt1995,78-79.

456 International
Organization
Do anyothervariablesbesidesthedisaggressors.
ancethecapabilitiesofpotential
to varysystematitribution
capabilitiescause thelikelihoodof conflict
of military
theories.
Liberals
bynonrealist
cally?Thisquestionhas beenaddressedextensively
or notstatesare demoof conflictdependson whether
arguethattheprobability
Constructivists
andon institutional
actors.48
linkagesbetweeninternational
cratic,47
dependson thenatureof sharedunderstandings
arguethatthelikelihoodofconflict
betweenactors.49
regarding
normsandidentities
shouldnotobscurethe
Thatrealistsoftendisagreewithliberalsandconstructivists
of realistscholars-all of
existsin whicha variety
factthatan expandingliterature
as fallingoutsideWaltzianneorealismwhom,as willbe seen,arebestunderstood
analyses:which
havesoughtto answertheverysamequestionthatguidesnonrealist
ofmilitary
causetheprobbesidesthedistribution
capabilitiessystematically
factors
factors
other
to vary?Theserealistscholarspointtothreematerial
abilityofconflict
ofcapabilitiesthataffect
theprobability
ofconflict:
technology,
thanthedistribution
of technoland international
First,theimportance
economicpressures.
geography,
BarryBuzan,CharlesGlaser,and
byrealistssuchas RobertJervis,
ogyis identified
a rangeof factorsthathave a
innovation
affects
StephenVanEvera.Technological
such as: (1) theoffense-defense
balance and offense-defense
bearingon conflict,
capacity,"thatis, thevolume,speed,range,and
(2) "interaction
differentiation;50
and(4) theease of
capabilities;52
(3) reconnaissance
reliability
ofcommunications;51
whichdependssubstaneconomicresourcesfromconqueredterritory,
extracting
productive
capacityis basedonknowledge-intensive/technological
tiallyon whether
Second,
resourceindustries.53
"smokestack"/natural
industries
or moretraditional
theimportance
of
realists,includingStephenWaltand StephenKrasner,identify
ofemploying
force54
whichaffects
boththeutility
andaccessto
military
geography,
thesignifiunderscore
rawmaterials.55
Third,realistssuchas GilpinandWohlforth
in theecoeconomicpressures,
whichlead to fluctuations
cance of international
andaffect
whether
or
nomicopportunity
costof an assertiveforeign
policystance56
influenceotherstatesthrough
informaleconot statescan mostcost-effectively
means.57
nomic,as opposedtoformalmilitary,
which
material
factorsinvolvesideasor institutions,
Noneoftheaforementioned
These
theoriessuchas liberalismand constructivism.58
are thefocusof nonrealist
47. Russett1993,1995.
48. KeohaneandMartin1995.
49. Wendt1992,1995.
50. See, forexample,Jervis1978;Quester1977;andGlaser1994-95.
51. Buzan 1993,72-80.
52. Gaddis1987,232.
53. See VanEvera 1990-91,14-16; andKaysen1990,49, 53.
54. See, forexample,Walt1987,23-24; Jervis1978,183-86,194-96; andBuenode Mesquita1981,
40-44.
55. See, forexample,Krasner1978;andJervis1978,179.
56. See, forexample,Gilpin1977;Wohlforth
1994-95;andKennedy1987.
57. See, forexample,Gilpin 1981, especially132-33, 138-40; Huntington
1993; Lake 1996; and
Pollins1994.
58. WendtandFriedheim
1995,691-92.

DuelingRealisms 457
more-orcosteffective-andtherefore
materialfactorsmakeconquestmore-or-less
about
orsharedunderstandings
characteristics
ofinstitutional
lesslikely-irrespective
providea comI am notsuggesting
thatthesematerialfactors
normsandidentities.
northattheyareofequal imporofthecausesofconflict,
prehensive
understanding
a rangeof
thatrealistscholarsidentify
tance.Rather,I merelywishto underscore
the
capabilitiesthatinfluence
ofmilitary
materialfactorsotherthanthedistribution
probability
ofconflict.
can
realistarguments
whether
thepreceding
Untilnow,therehas beenconfusion
framework.
Someoftheserealistwriters
be incorporated
intotheWaltzianneorealist
theWaltzian
as amendingand revising,ratherthancritiquing,
portray
themselves
neorealism'sconceptionof statebehavioris
As emphasized,
neorealist
approach.59
of conby themerepossibility
basedon theassumption
thatstatesare conditioned
flict.The precedinganalysessimplydo notfollowfromneorealism'sworst-case/
argument
advancedbytheserealistscholarstheunderlying
possibilistic
assumption;
accordingto factorsotherthan
thattheprobability
of conflict
variessystematically
ofcapabilities-insteadservesto undermine
thisneorealist
assumpthedistribution
theseanalysesare incompatible
tion.Withtheirimplicitemphasison probabilities,
any of thesefactorsintoneorealism
withtheWaltzianframework:
incorporating
destroying
neothereby
assumption,
wouldgutthetheory'sworst-case/possibilistic
to incoherence.This helpsto explainwhyWaltzis so resistant
realism'sinternal
ofcapabilicludeanyadditional
international-level
variablesbeyondthedistribution
can be more
ties intohis theory.In the end, each of the precedingarguments
realrealistframework-postclassical
incorporated
intoa competing
productively
assumption
thatactorsmakedecisionsbasedon
ism-thatis basedon theunderlying
theprobability
ofconflict.
aboutstate
two assumptions
postclassicalrealism'sremaining
Beforeoutlining
distinction
outlinedhere
it shouldbe notedthatthepossibility/probability
behavior,
subsumesan emerging
debatewithinrealismbetweenwhatJackSnyderterms"agwhoare
realists,
Snyderarguesthataggressive
gressive"and "defensive"realists.60
action
military
realists,believeoffensive
sometimes
also referred
to as "offensive"
whereasdefensiverealistsreachtheoppositeconcluoftencontributes
to security,
thataggressiverealists"positthatsecusion.61
In turn,
BenjaminFrankelmaintains
is
contend
security
realists
system
is scarce,"whereasdefensive
rityin theinternational
aboutthelikelihoodofavoidingwar."62
moreplentiful
andare "moreoptimistic
behavtheexpectedfuture
Inpractice,
assumption
regarding
animplicit
worst-case
to assertthatstates
iorof risingpowersleads aggressiverealistslikeMearsheimer
secuadversaries"
as a meansofenhanacing
"seekopportunities
toweakenpotential
Withina worst-case
as beingscarceinthesystem.63
rityandhencetoregardsecurity
bythefear
andareconditioned
framework,
statesfocusonthebalanceofcapabilities
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
See, forexample,Glaser1994-95;Buzan 1993;andWalt1987.

Snyder1991,11-12.
Ibid.,12.
Frankel1996,xv-xvi.
1990,12.
Mearsheimer

Organization
458 International
thata risingpowermightbecomeaggressiveat somepoint.In thisview,statesare
actiontoremoveorcripplerisingpowersin
military
offensive
inclinedto undertake
becompetitors
ofcoercivebehavioroncepotential
thepossibility
orderto forestall
comepredominant.
conclusion:giventhat
viewleadstoa different
a probabilistic
adopting
In contrast,
only
contributes
to security
waris riskyand costly,actingpreemptively
preventive
use miliexiststhattherisingpowerwillaggressively
probability
whena significant
realists
fordefensive
in thefuture-which,
taryforcewhenitbecomespredominant
but
suchas Jervis,
Glaser,andWalt,dependsnotjuston thebalanceofcapabilities,
economicpressures.Ultimately,
and international
also on technology,
geography,
viewthanaggressiverealistsas to
realistshavea muchmoreconditional
defensive
as often
actionsenhancesecurity-andhencesee security
military
whether
offensive
ofconflict.
focusontheprobability
becauseoftheirimplicit
beingplentiful-exactly
within
a deeperdivergence
reflects
debateultimately
Thattheaggressive/defensive
Underitssignificance.
does notin anywaydiminish
assumptions
realismregarding
debateis rootedin thepossibility/probability
thattheaggressive/defensive
standing
disputeis
becauseithelpsexplainwhythisintra-realist
is vital,however,
distinction
theneed to delineatethe
it underscores
in factoccurring,
and,moreimportantly,
accordingto whichrealistsdiverge.Tracingempiricaldisputessuchas
assumptions
asdifferences
regarding
realistdebatebackto underlying
theaggressive/defensive
withinrealisttheory;
focusingon
cumulation
is imperative
to promoting
sumptions
a wholeseriesof empiricaldisputes
makesit possibleto interconnect
assumptions
acrossa broadrangeofcases.
realismandpromote
aggregation
within
ShortTermversusLongTerm
arehigh,a rationalactorwillsignifipressures
earlier,whensecurity
As mentioned
rivals.
by stronger
in orderto guardagainstelimination
cantlydiscountthefuture
The focusof postclassicalrealismon theprobability-andnotthepossibility-of
resultsin a conceptionof theinternational
systemas oftenhavinglower
conflict
assume.As a result,postclassicalrealismexpects
thanneorealists
security
pressures
statesto oftendiscountthefutureto a lesserextentthanis assumedby Waltzian
stateobjectivesarenotnecessarily
Forpostclassicalrealism,long-term
neorealists.
instead,actorsareseenas
to short-term
security
requirements;
subordinate
military
trade-offs.
makingintertemporal
regularly
Gilpin'srealistanalysisprovidesan excellent
trade-offs,
intertemporal
Regarding
theviewthatactorsdo
reflect
toWaltzianneorealism.64
contrast
Gilpin'sarguments
of
butare insteadconditioned
by theprobability
notmakeworst-case
assumptions
actorswill
conflict.
Gilpinalso arguesthatinternational
Perhapsnotsurprisingly,
andlong-term
objectives.Indeed,muchof
betweenshort-term
oftenmaketrade-offs
withina state'scontoexamining
thosefactors
Gilpin'sworkis devotedspecifically
relativeposition.
alteritslong-term
trolthatmaypotentially
64. Gilpin1981.

DuelingRealisms 459
Waltzianneorealism
to Gilpin'smoredynamicrealistframework,
In comparison
Yet,this
has oftenbeen criticizedon thegroundsthatit is a verystatictheory.65
shouldnotbe seenas an omissionon thepartofWaltzandhisfollowers;thestatic
focus.Givensuchan underreflects
itsworst-case/possibilistic
natureofneorealism
focus,andconsestanding
oftheworld,a rationalstatewillhavea veryshort-term
In
exhibitsthissamecharacteristic.
theoryitselfnotsurprisingly
quentlyneorealist
analysisleadstotheviewthatstatesoftenhave
Gilpin'sprobabilistic-based
contrast,
andworryabout
requirements
security
thediscretion
tolookbeyondtheirshort-term
it is Gilpin'sunderlying
thelonger-term
consequencesof theiractions.Ultimately,
changes.
oflong-term
focusthatlendsitselftoan examination
probabilistic
Security
versusEconomicCapacity
Military
of
resultin a rivalunderstanding
underpinnings
Postclassicalrealism'sprobabilistic
In thisrespect,Gilpin'sanalysis
fromthatadvancedbyneorealists.
statepreferences
to Waltzianneorealism.Untilnow,however,the
again providesa usefulcontrast
as
Gilpin'sconceptionof statepreferences
has beento portray
tendency
prevailing
ratherthanto explorehow,or if,Gilpinmightbe
Waltzianneorealism,
reflecting
This has partlybeen theresultof several
understanding.66
advancinga competing
inGilpin'spresentation.
Myaimherewillbe tooutlineGilpin'sunderlyambiguities
morepreciselyand to providea clearcontrast
ing conceptionof statepreferences
aboutstate
theirexpectations
realismregarding
betweenneorealism
andpostclassical
behavior.
Gilpinarguesthatall realistsareunitedin assuming"theprimacyin all political
thismayseema clear
Although
in humanmotivation."67
lifeofpowerandsecurity
objectiveof decisionmakers,it is actuallya muchmore
expositionof theprimary
power
thatall realistsviewstatesas pursuing
statement.
Gilpin'sargument
ambiguous
do not
ofpowerandsecurity
and security
is complicated
bythefactthatthepursuit
thecombined"military,
overlap.Gilpindefinespoweras resources:
alwaysperfectly
Thus,powerincludes-butis
capabilitiesof states."68
economic,andtechnological
powercontainswithinit
to-militarycapabilities;morespecifically,
notrestricted
and economiccapacity-thatwill
two different
elements-military
preparedness
powerleadstoverydifferent
be incompatible.
Viewingstatesas pursuing
sometimes
Maxisecurity.
aboutstatebehaviorthaniftheyareseenas maximizing
hypotheses
willtrump
thoseofecosecurity
requirements
impliesthatmilitary
mizingsecurity
the
nomiccapacitywheneverthetwo conflict-as neorealistsargue.In contrast,
between
thatstatespursuepowersuggeststhatstateswillmaketrade-offs
argument
65. See, forexample,Ruggie1983;andNye 1988,245.
and Risse66. See, forexample,Grieco 1990,39; Ordeshookand Niou 1991,fn. 1; and Grunberg
Kappen1992,113.
67. Gilpin1984,290.
techthisarticle;however,
ofpowerwillbe usedthroughout
68. Gilpin1981,13. Gilpin'sconception
tobe an elementofeconomiccapacity.I recognize-as doesGilpin-the
nologicalcapacityis understood
factors,suchas
of power,since it leaves out a myriadof nonmaterial
limitations
of such a definition
qualities;see Gilpin1981,13-14.
publicmorale,andleadership
prestige,

460 International
Organization
a funcpreparedness,
giventhatpoweris ultimately
economiccapacityandmilitary
andeconomicmight.In theend,however,
itis unclearwhether
tionofbothmilitary
pursuing
powerorsecurity.69
Gilpinviewsstatesas ultimately
Waltzis veryclearon thisquestion,arguing"theultimate
concernofstatesis not
ofsecurity
andpower
"70 Waltzrecognizesthatthepursuit
forpowerbutforsecurity.
do notalwayscoincideand makesexplicithis view thata rationalstatewill seek
beenensured.7'Yet,Mearsheimer
apobjectivehas first
poweronlyifthesecurity
Waltzon thispoint;Mearsheimer
assertsthatstatesultimately
pearsto contradict
"aim to maximizetheirrelativepower."72Mearsheimer's
statement
notwithstandreflect
pursue
theviewthatstatesultimately
ing,his own analysesand hypotheses
basis of
notpower,as Waltzargues.Mearsheimer
focuseson themilitary
security,
powerat theexpenseof
thatstatesaim "to acquiremoremilitary
power,asserting
mightis nottheonlybasis of power,with
potentialrivals."73Of course,military
as Gilpinand Kennedyemphaeconomiccapacityalso beinga vitalcomponent,
thatstates
can mostaccurately
be viewedas arguing
size.74In theend,Mearsheimer
thisgoal,willsometimes
above all seekto maximizetheirsecurity
but,in pursuing
also enhancetheirpower.The pursuitof powerand securitycoincideonlyunder
state
whencapturing
theeconomicresourcesofanother
certainconditions-notably
as well as themostcost-effective
meansof
is boththepreferred
routeto security
nottoconfound-asMearsheimer
apparhowever,
increasing
power.Itis important,
ofpowerandofsecurity
can sometimes
overentlydoes-the notionthatthepursuit
pursuepower,sincetherewillbe manycircumlap withtheideathatstatesultimately
will notonlyfailto overlap,but
stanceswhenthepursuitof powerand of security
as Waltzrecognizes.In circumstances
wherethepursuitof
will actuallyconflict,
wouldundoubtedly
end up
Mearsheimer
powerand securitydo, in fact,conflict,
security
agreeingwithWaltz'sview thatstatesfirstseek to ensuretheirmilitary
statesultimately
beforetheypursuepower.For neorealists,
pursuesecutherefore,
notpower.
rity,
to
Anothersourceof confusionwithinGilpin'sanalysis-whichrelatesdirectly
he viewsstatesas havinga
thepowerversussecurity
question-concernswhether
ofobjectives.In someplaces,Gilpincontends
statesdo havea hierarchy
of
hierarchy
goals; he arguesthatalthoughstateshave a wide varietyof objectives,all of the
"morenoblegoals" of society"will be lostunlessone makesprovisionforone's
in thisformulation
in thepowerstruggle
Inherent
is the
amonggroups."75
security
thepursuit
ofotherstateobjectives,
andhence
idea thatsecurity
trump
requirements
of state
conception
thatGilpin'sanalysisis compatiblewiththeWaltzianneorealist
withinGilpin'sanalysis-and withinrealismin
pointsto thisambiguity
69. JosephGriecosimilarly
althoughGriecoframesthepower/security
whether
statespursuepoweror security,
general-regarding
thanI do here;see Grieco1997.
distinction
differently
70. Waltz1989,40.
71. Waltz1979,126.
1990,12.
1994-95,12; see also Mearsheimer
72. Mearsheimer
1994-95,13.
73. Mearsheimer
74. See Kennedy1987;andGilpin1981.
75. Gilpin1984,290-91.

DuelingRealisms 461
preferences.76
At otherpoints,however,Gilpinmaintains
thatstatesdo nothave a
hierarchy
of objectives;instead,he arguesthattheoriesthat"assumethatone can
speakofa hierarchy
ofobjectives"actually"misrepresent
thebehavioranddecisionmakingprocessesofstates."77
Gilpinassertsthat"itis themixandtrade-offs
Rather,
ofobjectivesrather
thantheirordering
thatis criticalto an understanding
offoreign
policy."78
Gilpinis thusambivalent
aboutwhether
to assumethatstateshavea hierarchy
of
preferences
ortocriticizesucha perspective.
Gilpinequivocatesbecausehe actually
occupiesa middle-ground
position:althoughhe clearlyregardsmilitary
security
as
thevitalpriority
ofthestate,hedoesnotviewrationalstatesas privileging
short-term
overeconomiccapacityin themannerthatneorealists
military
preparedness
do. In
theend,Gilpincan bestbe understood
as arguingthatstatesdo have a hierarchy
of
objectives,
yetitis a muchmoreflexiblehierarchy
thanneorealists
envision.
Thisunderstanding
ofGilpin'sargument
canbe generalized
toproducea postclassicalrealistconception
ofstatepreferences.
Whereasneorealism
viewsthepursuit
of
tothatofsecurity,
poweras secondary
realismregardsrationalstatesas
postclassical
ultimately
seekingto increasetheeconomicresourcesundertheircontrol-andthus
theirlong-term
powergiventhat"wealth... is a necessarymeansto power"79ofproviding
forshort-term
Forpostclassisubjecttotheconstraint
military
security.
cal realism,therefore,
power-and notsecurity-istheultimate
goal ofstates.
The postclassical
realistviewthatstatespursuepoweris compatible
withGilpin's
thatit is thetrade-offs,
and nottheordering,
of objectivesthatis
apt contention
important,
sincetheconceptof poweritselfcontainswithinit an inherent
tension
betweeneconomiccapacityandmilitary
In markedcontrast
to neorealism,
security.
postclassicalrealismarguesthata rationaldecisionmakermaydecideto tradeoff
to some degreewhenthepotentialnetgainsin termsof enmilitary
preparedness
hancedeconomiccapacityaresubstantial
relativetotheprobability
ofsecurity
losses.
Stateswill be especiallylikelyto make such trade-offs
whentheireconomicresourcesarehighlyconstrained.
Perhapsthemostprominent
exampleof sucha scenariois Gilpin'sand Kennedy'sargument
thata decliningpowermayrationally
decideto retrench
fromsome of its externalpositions,enhancinglong-term
economiccapacityatthecostofsomewhat
vis-a-visporeducingshort-term
protection
tentialmilitary
adversaries.80
The idea thatstatesseekpoweris notnewinrealistthought;
itprovidedthefoundationfortheclassicalrealismofMorgenthau,
RienholdNiebuhr,
andothers.Is the
realistconception
ofpoweras thedominant
actors
postclassical
goal ofinternational
fromtheclassicalrealistunderstanding?
In practice,
a crucialdifferdistinguishable
enceexistsbetweenthetwoapproaches
theirviewofpower.Specifically,
concerning
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
Forthisinterpretation
ofGilpin'sanalysis,see Grieco1990,39.
Gilpin1981,19.
Gilpin1981,22 (emphasisadded).
Mastanduno,
Lake,andIkenberry
1989,462.
See Gilpin1981,194-97;andKennedy1987;see also Wohlforth
1994-95.

462 International
Organization
forpower,
systemas a competition
althoughboththeoriesregardtheinternational
thatthepursuit
ofpowerwilltake.
theydisagreeas totheformandintensity
todominate
striving
others:
Classicalrealismviewsdecisionmakersas constantly
arecharacterized
as beingguidedbya rapaciouslustforpower.Within
policymakers
classicalrealism,therefore,
poweris regardedas an end in itself:forMorgenthau,
one's "lustforpowerwouldbe satisfied
onlyifthelastmanbecametheobjectofhis
As a result,statesareviewedas alwaysactivelyseekinganypossible
domination."'8'
ofweaker
meanstoadvancetheirpoweroverothernations,
takingmilitary
advantage
stateswhenever
theyhavethechance.82
perspective:
statedecisionmakers
Postclassicalrealismadvancesa verydifferent
do notmaximizepowerbecauseof an insatiabledesireto dominateothers;rather
in achieving
statespursuepowerbecausedoingso allowsformaximumflexibility
In otherwords,postclassicalrealismholdsthat
thenation'sinstrumental
interests.
decisionmakerspursuepowerbecauseitis themechanism
bywhichto achievethe
state'soverriding
Statesare seen as seekingto enhancetheirshareof
objectives.83
for
economicresources,and hencetheirpower,becauseit providesthefoundation
be
because economicresourcescan themselves
military
capacity,and furthermore
used to influence
actors.Because poweris viewedas a mechaotherinternational
nism,and notan end in itself,statesare expectedto pursuepowersubjectto costIn thisrespect,Gilpinarguesthat"therehavebeenmanycases
benefit
calculations.
in whichstateshave forgoneapparentopportunities
to increase
throughout
history
theirpowerbecausetheyjudgedthecoststo be too high."84Comparedto classical
realism,therefore,
postclassicalrealismenvisionsstatesas beingmoredeliberative
intheirpursuit
ofpower.
The postclassicalrealistassertionthatstatespursuepowerdoes notmeanthat
statesareseenas necessarily
engagingin conquest.Engaginginconquestinorderto
captureeconomicresourcescontrolled
byotherstatesis a methodtoincreasepower,
butitis nottheonlymethod.Statescanalso enhancetheirrelativeshareofeconomic
andhencetheirpower,through
nonmilitary
means,suchas: (1) byactively
resources,
tradepatterns;85
moreefficient
(2) bycreating
instiseekingchangesin international
tutionsto reducetransaction
costsand betterensureproperty
rights;86
(3) by using
raw materialsand othersupeconomicleverageto securesuppliesof inexpensive
nonproductive
expenditures
tofreeup
pliesfromweakerstates;87
and(4) byreducing
The postclassicalrealistconception
ofinterresourcesforeconomicadvancement.88
81. Morgenthau
1946,193.
ofpowermaximization
as
82. Some modernrealistshavereturned
to thisclassicalrealistconception
atleastas appliedtocertainstates;see Zakaria1992,194;andSchweller1994,
beinga usefulassumption,
104-105.
on power,see Gilpin1996,6; andGilpin1975,23.
83. Forthisperspective
84. Gilpin1981,51.
1993;andGowa 1994.
85. See, forexample,Krasner1976;Lake 1984;Huntington
oftheNew Institutional
86. Thisis thefoundation
Economics;see, forexample,North1990;Altand
Shepsle1990;andKang 1995,563-66.
87. See, forexample,Hirschman
1980;andKrasner1978.
88. See, forexample,Kennedy1987;andGilpin1981.

DuelingRealisms 463
whenthefirststrategy,
nationalbehaviorassertsthatin situations
conquest,is the
mostcost-effective
meanstoincreasepower,stateswillbe pronetouse military
force
in ordertoenhancetheirpower.In contrast,
in situations
whenone ora combination
oftheearliermentioned
nonmilitary
strategies
providesthemostcost-effective
means
willstillbe endemic,butstateswillnot
to increasepower,international
competition
theirpower;rather,
as is thecase today
be proneto use military
forceto further
amongthemajorindustrialized
powers,stateswill relyon nonmilitary
meansto
enhancetheirpower.In comparison
to neorealism,
therefore,
postclassicalrealism
viewof whether
advancesa muchmoreconditional
incentives
formilitary
aggression existin the system;thisconditionalassessmentundergirds
thepostclassical
realistview thatstateswill notmakeworst-caseassumptions
butwill,instead,be
conditioned
bytheprobability
ofconflict.
In summary,
postclassicalrealismregardsstatesas ultimately
seekingto increase
theirshareof economicresourcesand,hence,theirpower.This focuson power
resembles
classicalrealism,butpostclassical
realismhasa verydifferent
understandingofhowandwhystatespursuepowerin theinternational
system.
ImplicationsforRealistTheory
Givenrealism'sfocuson competition
in theinternational
system,it is curiousthat
realistshave so farrefrained
fromengagingin intellectual
witheach
competition
otherregarding
theirtheory'sassumptions.
Thus,althoughrealistshave frequently
debateswithnonrealists
aboutstatebehavengagedinspirited
regarding
assumptions
ior,89
theyhave notyetsimilarly
directedtheirsightsin an inwarddirection.
The
framework
advancedhereshouldpromote
somemuchneededdebateamongrealists
theirtheory's
regarding
underlying
assumptions.
As willbe seen,theassumptions
suchas
undergirding
theanalysesof neorealists
WaltzandMearsheimer
whereas
lead to one setofhypotheses
aboutstatebehavior,
thecontrasting
of postclassicalrealismresultin a rivalunderstanding.
assumptions
Forreasonsofspace,theempirical
intended
analysishereis an abridgedcomparison
to underscore
theimportance
ofexplicitly
takingintoaccountthevarianceinrealist
aboutstatebehavior.Throughout
thissection,I do notmeanto imply
assumptions
thatrealist-based
analysesof thephenomenain questionprovidetheonlyuseful
is a usefulexerthesecontrasting
realisthypotheses
explanation,
justthatexploring
cise.
Neorealismadvancesveryfewhypotheses
aboutstatebehavior;thethreeprincipal
are: (1) balancingbehaviorconstantly
hypotheses
recurs,(2) stateswill be constrainedfromengagingin cooperation,
and (3) statescopytheadvancesmadeby
rivalpowers(the"samenesseffect").The current
ofthese
empiricalmanifestations
threeneorealist
hypotheses-and
thecontrasting
realistunderstandingpostclassical
are outlinedhere.These cases werethuschosenbecausetheyprovidea rangeof
89. An excellentrecentexampleis therelative/absolute
gainsdebate;see Powell 1994.

464 International
Organization
scopeofneoexamplesthatis broadbutfallswellwithintherestricted
explanatory
realisttheory.
1. BalancingHypothesis:
TheFutureBehaviorofGermany
andJapan
is thatbalancingbehaviorconstantly
recurs.90
With
Neorealism'smainhypothesis
incentiveswill
respectto thecurrent
environment,
neorealistsargueinternational
andJapantorisetogreatpowerstatustobalancetheUnitedStates'
compelGermany
For neorealists,
"thehegemon'spossessionof actualor
military
preponderance.91
latentmilitary
capabilitieswill resultin balancingregardlessof its intentions."92
theinterests
of
Thus,even if theUnitedStatesdoes notactivelyseek to threaten
Germanyor Japan,neorealistsarguethatbalancingbehaviorwill occurneverthetheirmilitaries
in orderto
less.93ThisviewthatGermany
andJapanwillstrengthen
thattheUnitedStatesmightactcoercively
clearly
guardagainstthemerepossibility
worst-case
reflects
neorealism's
perspective.
criticizesthosewho arguethatGermanyandJapan
Christopher
Laynepointedly
in favorof economicpower."94
He arguesthat"eliwill "eschewmilitary
strength
andhence
giblestatesthatfailtoattaingreatpowerstatusarepredictably
punished,"
willstrivetobecomemilitary
thatJapanandGermany
powerseventhoughpursuing
economiccosts.95In thisrespect,neorealists
such a policywill entailsubstantial
thatGermanyand Japanwillnotcontinuedownthepaththeyhavetaken
maintain
sinceWorldWarII-namely, focusingon economiccapacitywhileavoidinglarge
on military
expenditures
security.
Forpostclassicalrealism,in contrast,
Germany
andJapanwillnotlikelybalance
theUnitedStates.Even if Germanyand Japangroweconomicallyin thefuture,
forcecapable of crediblydeterring
theeconomicallymuch
developinga military
orJapanto
tobe verycostly.A choicebyGermany
largerUnitedStateswillcontinue
forcesto balancetheUnitedStateswouldalso entailconsiderbolstertheirmilitary
able economicopportunity
costs:each wouldriska reduction
bothin theirsubstantialinternational
Given
exportmarketsand in theiraccess to certaintechnologies.
theselargeeconomiccosts,postclassical
realismassertsthatbalancingbehaviorwill
occuronlyif thereexistsa significant
as
probability-andnotjust thepossibility,
neorealists
military
capabilities
in
argue-thattheUnitedStateswilluse itssuperior
a coercivemanner.In theend,postclassicalrealismdoes notexpectGermanyand
sincetheeconomicconstraints
ofdoingso are
Japantomoveina unilateral
direction,
moresalientthantheprobability
ofmilitary
exploitation
bytheUnitedStates.
It is perhapstoosoontodefinitively
theneorealist
concludewhether
orpostclassical realistunderstanding
is relatively
moreuseful.However,
thelatestevidencefavors
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
Waltz1979,especially118-21,128.
See Waltz1993;andLayne1995.
Layne1995,fn.34.
Waltz1991,669.
Layne1995,fn.12.
Layne1995,134-35.

DuelingRealisms 465
havedeclinedin absoluteterms
postclassicalrealism.Germandefenseexpenditures
everyyearsince 1990.96In November1995,theJapaneseCabinetapproveda new
Gercuts.97
Furthermore,
neither
military
spending
significant
defenseplanoutlining
weakening
by
respectively
U.S.
influence
free
of
has
sought
to
break
nor
Japan
many
havesoughttoreafbothcountries
Treaty;rather,
NATOortheU.S.-JapanSecurity
it
Laynenotwithstanding,
withtheUnitedStates.98
commitments
firmtheirsecurity
andJapanhavedecidedthattheycanbestadvancetheirinterappearsthatGermany
strength.
toenhancetheireconomic,andnotmilitary,
bycontinuing
nationalinfluence
Hypothesis:UkraineandNuclearWeapons
2. "SamenessEffect"
willbe
thatconflict
is thatthe"possibility
hypothesis
neorealist
Thesecondprincipal
towardsthesamenessof thecompeticonductedby force... producesa tendency
ortechnological,
tors,"-thatis,rationalstateswillimitatesuccessfulinternational
powers.99
and otheradvancesthathave been adoptedby competing
ganizational,
illustration
themostimportant
Withrespecttothecurrent
international
environment,
thattherewilllikely
is theneorealist
argument
ofthis"samenesseffect"hypothesis
in thepost-ColdWarera.'??The mostprominent
be significant
nuclearproliferation
thatUkrainewouldretainthe
1993 argument
case in pointconcernsMearsheimer's
itinherited
thebreakupoftheSovietUnion.'0'
following
nucleardeterrent
Mearsheimer
likelyadvancedhis unequivocalclaimwithrespectto Ukrainefor
reasons:first,
atthattimeUkrainealreadypossessednuclearweapons;
twoprincipal
with
threat
fromRussia,a country
security
and second,Ukrainefaceda substantial
resourcesat itsdisposalandwithwhichUkrainehas a
military
substantially
greater
particularly
borderdisputes,
oftenserelations,
includingseveralunresolved
history
a nucleardeterrent
wouldhavebeenveryexpenoverCrimea.However,maintaining
a substantial
portionof Ukraine'sgrossdomesticproduct.Furthersive,requiring
a nuclearpowerwerenotlimitedto direct
more,thecoststo Ukraineofremaining
outlays,sincedecisionmakershadto considertheeconomicopportunity
budgetary
fromRussia
financial
compensation
costsofpursuing
namelyforgone
proliferation,
withneorealism'sconceptionof
and loss of Westernaid and markets.Consistent
economiccostswould
deniedthatthesesubstantial
statepreferences,
Mearsheimer
102
a nucleardeterrent.
dissuadeUkrainefrommaintaining
Mearsheimer's
rebutted
WithrespecttotheUkrainian
case,StevenMillerdirectly
realist
an argument
thatis consonant
withthepostclassical
byemploying
hypothesis
96. SIPRI 1995,390.

97. NewYorkTimes,29 November1995,A9.
of StateDispatch,22 April1996,200; and Far Eastern
98. RegardingJapan,see U.S. Department
of
see Smyser1994;andWeekly
Compilation
Germany,
EconomicReview,2 May 1996,14-16.Regarding
1995,216-24.
13 February
Presidential
Documents,
99. Waltz1979,127.
1990;andWaltz1993.
100. See Mearsheimer
1993,58, 66.
101. Mearsheimer
maintained
that"The UnitedStatesshouldrecognizethatUkraineis goingto be a
102. Mearsheimer
1993,66.
nuclearpower,irrespective
ofwhattheWestdoes"; Mearsheimer

Organization
466 International
that"despitethemyththatnuclear
of statebehavior.Millerunderscored
conception
weaponsare cheap,theyare in factquiteexpensiveformoststates"and "given
to minitherewill surelybe incentives
Ukraine'seconomicneedsand constraints,
andthesumsassociatedwitha mediumnuclear
mizetheresources
devotedtodefense,
was
capabilitywill surelybe painfulforKiev."103Retainingthenucleardeterrent
inparticular,
theliquidfuelforUkraine's
requirements;
costlyduetohighmaintenance
troublesome
andcostly
ballisticmissilesmadethemparticularly
SS-19intercontinental
104The economiccostswerenotrestricted
outlays;as
todirectbudgetary
tomaintain.
wouldalso mean"prospectsforaid from
proliferation
Milleremphasized,
pursuing
implications
and tradewiththeWestwouldbe harmed,a setbackthathas security
105 In theend,the
to nationalpower."
of economicstrength
giventheimportance
assistanceto Ukraineto
UnitedStatespledgedover$900 millionin directfinancial
toaid
andresources
as wellas additional
equipment
itsnuclearweapons,106
renounce
its nuclearstockpile.107Russia also offered
Ukrainein theprocessof dismantling
forgiveness
to forgoproliferation,
including
Ukraineextensiveeconomicincentives
Ukrainewas
ofUkraine'smultibillion
dollaroil andgas debttoRussia.'08Moreover,
ata valueof$1 billion)
ofnuclearfuel(estimated
future
transfers
pledgedsubstantial
withRussiaand theUnited
agreement
foritscivilianreactorsas partof a trilateral
a decisionto maintainUkraine'snucleardeterrent
therefore,
States.'09Ultimately,
inthecountry's
economiccapacitydue
ina significant
reduction
wouldhaveresulted
to (1) directbudgetary
outlays,(2) loss of aid fromRussia and theWest,and (3)
intoglobalmarkets.
integration
forgone
the
tensionswithRussiawerecertainly
considerable,
In theend,although
security
wereapparently
a nucleardeterrent
hugeeconomiccoststo Ukraineofmaintaining
Ukrainehas nowceasedtobe a nuclearpoweraltogether-in
evenmoresignificant.
nuclearwarheadsweresenttoRussia
hundred
earlyJune1996thelastofitsnineteen
0 This Ukrainiandecisionto renounceits nucleardeterrent
to adfordestruction."
vanceitseconomiccapacityis a markedanomalyforneorealism.
3. Cooperation
RegionalTradeBlocs inthe
Hypothesis:
DevelopingWorld
tocoopis thatstateswillbe veryreluctant
neorealist
hypothesis
The third
important
As Waltzargues,"States
erateduetofearsabouthowthegainswillbe distributed."'I
in situations
of increaseddependence.In a selfdo notwillingly
place themselves
of securitysubordinateeconomicgain to political
help system,considerations
103. Miller1993,77.
104. Reiss 1995,107,126
105. Miller1993,79.
106. See NewYorkTimes,4 March1994,A3; andNew YorkTimes,23 November1994,A8.
107. ArmsControlToday,October1994,21.
108. Reiss 1995,117,129.
109. ArmsControlToday,Jan.-Feb.1994,12-20.
8 June1996,6.
110. Economist,
111. Waltz1979,104-107.

DuelingRealisms 467
regardinternahowever,
to saythatneorealists
interest.""112
It wouldbe a caricature,
constrained.
as impossible-theymerelyviewitas greatly
tionalcooperation
Withrespectto current
the neorealistperspective
suggeststhat
circumstances,
especiallygiven
will be veryunlikelyto pursuecooperation,
developingcountries
Yet,manycooperative
thatsecurity
issues are oftenquitesalientin thisregion.113
efforts
have been initiatedin thedevelopingworldin recentyears,includingthe
SouthernCone CommonMarket(Mercosur),theAndeanPact,theASEAN Free
TradeAgreement
(AFTA),andtheCentralAmericanCommonMarket(CACM), to
name a few."14Significant
securityissues existwithinall of theseorganizations:
in
hostilities
(1) within
theAndeanPact,PeruandEcuadorengagedindirectmilitary
have increaseddramatically
late 1994; (2) withinASEAN, defenseexpenditures
most
inrecentyearsandseveralseriousterritorial
disputesexistamongitsmembers,
ofstrongmilitary
notablyovertheoil-richSpratlyIslands;and(3) thereis a history
withinMercosurandalso betweenEl Salvador
rivalry
betweenBrazilandArgentina
and Hondurasin CACM. The decisionof thesedevelopingcountriesto initiate
neocontradicts
at cooperation
despitethesesecurity
issues significantly
attempts
realism.
from
In contrast,
althoughpostclassicalrealismsees statesas beingconstrained
whensecurity
is stillregardedas being
issuesare salient,cooperation
cooperating
thanthepotential
feasibleifthegainsineconomiccapacityareevenmoresignificant
risks.Formanydevelopingcountries,
itdoes appeartheeconomicbenefits
security
cominternational
environment
ofcooperation
aresignificantly
higherinthecurrent
negotiofa bloc: (1) augments
beinga member
paredtoearlierperiods.Specifically,
trade
largereconomicactorsthatadvanceassertiveunilateral
atingpowervis-'a-vis
couldserveas alternative
policies;(2) actsas a "safetynet"-regionaltradepartners
iftheEuropeanUnionand/or
theNorthAmerican
FreeTradeAgreeexportmarkets
mentturnaggressively
foreign
protectionist;
(3) enhancesthechanceof attracting
costsandacand (4) allowsmemberstatesto reducetransaction
directinvestment;
have
andefficiency
ofexporters
quireeconomiesofscale at a timewhenthenumber
in recentyears.For manydevelopingcountries,
engagingin
increaseddramatically
For the
can thushelppromoteinternational
competitiveness.
regionalcooperation
economicbentradepactsmentioned
thesefourpotential
earlier,
developing
country
efitsof cooperationappearto supersedetheconstraining
impactof relativegains
makingcooperation
possible.
concerns,
thereby
withpotential
The decisionof thesedevelopingcountries
to pursuecooperation
aboutstatebehavwithneorealism's
assumptions
rivalsis incompatible
underlying
withtheview
ior.In contrast,
forpostclassicalrealism,suchbehavioris consistent
and will favoreconomiccapacityoversecurity
thatrationalstatesmaketrade-offs
wherethepotentialforenhancedeconomiccompetitiveness
concernsin situations
theprobability
ofsecurity
losses.
fromregionalcooperation
outweighs
112. Ibid.,107.
113. Powellarguesthatstateswillbe concerned
aboutrelativegains"whenthepossibleuse offorceis
atissue"; Powell 1991,1316.
114. See Haggard1995.

468 International
Organization
WhatShouldNeorealistsDo Now?
the
to demonstrate
theusefulness
ofpitting
Thisbriefempiricalreviewis intended
twobranches
ofrealismagainsteachotherina directdebate,giventhattheyproduce
hereis notdesuchdifferent
hypotheses.
Although
theempiricalanalysispresented
shouldrespond,especiallygiven
finitive,
one mightreasonablyask howneorealists
of neorealism's
thatthecases reviewedrepresent
current
empiricalmanifestations
threeprimary
hypotheses.
thetheory'sproponents
should
Althoughthesecases do notsupportneorealism,
in lightofempiricalevidencethat
notrespondbyengagingin posthoc explanations
contradicts
neorealism's
doingso greatly
constrains
theoretical
progress.
expectations;
toexplainwhymanystatesarenowemphaWaltzengagesinsucha posthocattempt
thanneorealdegreevis-'a-vis
military
security
sizingeconomiccapacitytoa greater
ismwouldlead us to expect.Waltzpointstotheimpactofnuclearweapons,arguing
on
thatthey"makebalancingeasytodo" andenablestates"to concentrate
attention
115By arguingin thismanner
forces."
theireconomiesratherthanon theirmilitary
thatmanystatesarecurrently
focusingon economiccapacitybecausenuclearweapeasierto achieve,Waltzthusadherestotheoriginal
onshavemademilitary
security
and avoidstheneedto considerwhether
neorealistconceptionof statepreferences
statesmaybe emphasizing
economiccapacitybecauseitcan,in fact,
manycurrent
inimportance.
rivalmilitary
security
Waltz'snuclearweaponsargument
is ultimately
Even ifWaltzis
unsatisfactory.
will
reduce
the
of
concernsand
correctthatnuclearweapons
importance security
allowstatestofocusmoreoneconomics,
thefactremainsthata greatmanystatesare
economiccapacitytoa greater
degreethanneorealism
suggestsdespite
emphasizing
The
ofthisfact.
a
nuclear
deterrent.
cases
outlined
earlier
are
clear
examples
lacking
are
on
but
do
not
and
economic
capacity
possessnuclear
Germany Japan focusing
to
did
not
Ukraine's
decision
economic
capacity
resultfromthe
weapons.
pursue
nuclear
the
to
advance
of
method
economic
stabilizingimpact
weapons-rather,
in
of
centered
around
Ukraine's
unilateral
nuclear
relinquishment
priorities
was, fact,
of
the
who
are
have
none
countries
now
cooperating
weapons.Finally,
developing
It wouldseemthedepennuclearweapons,yettheyarenevertheless
collaborating.
dentvariablethatWaltzseeks to explain-namely,thedecisionof manycurrent
statesto focuson economiccapacityto a greater
extentthanneorealist
would
theory
lead us to expect-has occurred
beforehisprimary
independent
variable-thepresence of nuclearweapons-has come intoplay.Ultimately,
Waltz'spost
therefore,
hocexplanation
is empirically
implausible.
Do neorealists
haveanyotheroptions?Faced withempirical
irregularities,
a logiA
cal neorealist
responsewouldbe to askformoretimetoevaluatetheirhypotheses.
neorealist
verydifferent
responsewouldbe toconcedethatstatesareactingcontrary
buttodeclarethatsuchstatesare(1) actingcontrary
to
totheirtheory's
expectations
havenegativerepercusincentives
and(2) thatthesedecisionswillultimately
system
115. Waltz1993,74, 52.

DuelingRealisms 469
sionsdue to thecompetitive
tenetsof theinternational
system.However,bothof
thesepotential
neorealist
responsespose a considerable
danger:neorealism's
proponentscouldemploysucharguments
in ordertoindefinitely
extendthetesting
period
of neorealism'shypotheses.
In thisrespect,LaynearguesthatGermanyand Japan
willbalancetheUnitedStateswithina "reasonablyshorttime,"buthe thengoes on
to pointout thatwe mayhave to waitforup tofityyearsto see thebehaviorhe
In theend,itis incumbent
expects.116
on neorealists
toprovidea meansbywhichto
assess theusefulnessof thetheory'shypotheses;
neorealists
cannotsimplyask for
moretimewithout
ofthetrends
identifying
indicators
thattheyforesee.
mightrespondbyarguingthattheirtheory
Finally,neorealists
is veryparsimonious andhencecannotbe expectedtobe empirically
accurate.Sucha claimwouldbe
problematic
in tworespects.First,theprecedingempiricalanalysisinvolvescases
thatdirectly
addressneorealism's
does noteven
primary
hypotheses;
yet,neorealism
identify
thecorrect
tendency
intheseexamples.Second,as StephanHaggardargues,
"theclaim forsuperiority
of a theoryon thebasis of its parsimony
cannotstand
alone.Whatuse is a parsimonious
thatis wrongorthatexplainsonlya small
theory
ofthevariance?Theissue,therefore,
portion
is notoneofparsimony
perse butofthe
17 Postclassicalrealismdoes
trade-off
betweenparsimony
and explanatory
power."'
a stepawayfromWaltz'ssparsearchitecture,
represent
butitis nota dramatic
shift
away fromparsimony.
Specifically,
postclassicalrealismis parsimonious
in three
important
respects:(1) it focuseson materialfactorsthatfunction
of
independently
sharedsocial understandings
and institutional
characteristics;
(2) it operateswitha
actorassumption;
state-centric,
and(3) although
unitary
nota structural
theory,
postclassicalrealismis systemic,
sinceitfocuseson international-level
factorsanddoes
notexaminedomesticpoliticalvariables.Hence,ifthepreceding
empiricalanalysis
is anyindication,
thegainin explanatory
powerof a postclassicalrealistapproach
mayturnouttomorethancompensate
fortherelativeloss ofparsimony
comparedto
neorealism.
ImplicationsforNonrealistTheories
I conducted
Although
thisanalysiswithintheconfines
ofrealism,therepercussions
extendtononrealist
theories
as well.Recognizing
thepossibility/probability
distinctionwithin
realismhelpstoexplainwhythedebatewithnonrealist
hasso far
theories
been couchedin highlycompetitive
termsand also indicatespotentialfora more
productive
future
dialogue.
Liberalismand Constructivism
Up to thispointtheexchangebetweenneorealismand nonrealist
theoriessuchas
constructivism
andliberalism
has notbeenveryproductive.
The essentialreasonis
116. Layne1995,142,176.
117. Haggard1991,417.

Organization
470 International
thatdebatewithsuchprobabilistic,
focusguarantees
thatneorealism'spossibilistic
cannotrecogexercise.Neorealists
be a zero-sum
willnecessarily
theories
nonrealist
the
as influencing
theoriesidentify
nize thevalidityof anyof thefactorsnonrealist
To admitthatsuchfactorshave credencewouldbe a tacit
of conflict.
probability
assumption.
ofneorealism's
ofthedeficiency
recognition
leads to a zerofocusautomatically
Recognizingthatneorealism'spossibilistic
theories
helpstoexplainwhy,forexample,
nonrealist
sumcontestwithprobabilistic,
peace
have been so averseto acceptingthevalidityof thedemocratic
neorealists
Signifiofthisfinding.118
evenas empiricalevidencemountsin support
proposition,
suchas BruceRussettdo notarguethatwar
peace proponents
cantly,democratic
betweendemocraciesis impossible,butratherthatshareddemocracysignificantly
is
ofwar.119
Liberalsalso do notpositthatshareddemocracy
reducestheprobability
factor
thelikelihoodofconflict,
justthatitis an important
influencing
theonlyfactor
to
is unimpressive
120 The democratic
peace finding
thatmustbe takenintoaccount.
therelevant
focus.Forneorealists,
becauseoftheirpossibilistic
neorealists
precisely
but
of conflict,
questionis notwhethershareddemocracyreducestheprobability
thatdemocraciesmightengagein warcontinuesto
thepossibility
insteadwhether
of
whytheexistenceofevena smallnumber
exist.Thismakesiteasiertounderstand
as
is regardedby neorealists
peace proposition
potentialoutliersto thedemocratic
Russettdoes notruleout thepotential
Significantly,
such a seriousdeficiency.121
thatitshouldbe "enoughtosay... thatwarsbetween
asserting
existenceofoutliers,
"122For neorealists,
however,the
rareevents.
democraciesare at mostextremely
outliers
existenceof even a smallnumberof potentialoutliersis all thatmatters;
wouldmeanthatwarbetweendemocraciesis stillpossibleand hence,in neorealthatstateswillcontinueto focuson thecapabilitiesof
framework,
ism'sworst-case
forall
tobe prepared
characteristics
ofinstitutional
irrespective
aggressors
potential
contingencies.
focusof postclassicalrealismis moreamenableto
In contrast,
theprobabilistic
Analysesbasedon postclassicalrealtheories.
discussionwithnonrealist
productive
andconstructheories
suchas liberalism
ism,ontheonehand,andthoseofnonrealist
in important
they
respects,notablyas to whether
tivism,on theotherhand,differ
thatthe
factors.
Yet,thisshouldnotovershadow
emphasizematerialor nonmaterial
twosidesask similarquestionsand areunitedin theviewthatfactorsexistbesides
ofconflict
tosystemthatcausetheprobability
ofmilitary
thedistribution
capabilities
albeitfromdifferent
ofneorealism,
perspecaticallyvary.Bothsidesarethuscritiques
orconstructivism
realismandthoseofliberalism
tives.The analysesofpostclassical
theothers
arenotnecessarily
indeed,eachmayturnoutto complement
antithetical;
different
elementsoftheanswersto certainquestionsthatno single
bycontributing
critiques,
see,forexample,Russett1993,1995.Forneorealist
peace argument,
118. Forthedemocratic
1990,49-51; andWaltz1993,78.
see,forexample,Layne1994;Mearsheimer
119. Russett1996,178.
120. Russett1995,166.
1990,51; andLayne1994,40-44.
121. See Waltz1993,78; Mearsheimer
122. Russett1995,169.

DuelingRealisms 471
arewilling
somenonrealists
solveonitsown.In thisrespect,
theory
cansatisfactorily
tohavean invaluableroletoplay.123The
analysescontinue
toadmitthatrealist-based
ofpostclassicalrealismmakefeasibletheadoptionof a
underpinnings
probabilistic
theories.
stancewithrespecttononrealist
reciprocal
Explanations
Domestic-level
have couched
neorealists
As withthedialoguewithliberalismand constructivism,
zero-sumterms.In large
withdomestic-level
theoriesin essentially
theinterchange
in thismanner
theorieshas beencharacterized
part,thedebatewithdomestic-level
perfocus.Neorealism'sworst-case
becauseofneorealism's
policyoptions:states
spectiveleads to theviewthatstateshavehighlyconstrained
military
secuaggressors,
ofpotential
capabilities
alwaysseektobalancethemilitary
existsbetween
ritytrumpsothergoals (such as economiccapacity)whereconflict
no needto look at domesticthem,and so on. Neorealismthusadmitsessentially
regarding
to haveminimaldiscretion
levelprocessesbecauseactorsareunderstood
theonlyconsequential
thestrategies
theyadopt.Withintheneorealistframework,
thestatefromtakingsteps,suchas
impactdomesticpoliticscan haveis to prevent
security.
This explainsthezero-sumnatureof the
balancing,to maximizemilitary
admitsthatdomesticfactorsare
debatewithdomestic-level
theories-neorealism
to internaonlyto theextentthattheypreventthestatefromresponding
important
tionalincentives.
In contrast,
postclassicalrealismviews statesas havinga widerrangeof policy
betweendifferent
priorioptions;it is emphasizedthatstatesoftenmaketrade-offs
As a result,
andeconomiccapacity.
postclassibetweenmilitary
security
ties,notably
understandnon-zero-sum
rolefordomestic-level
cal realismacceptsan important,
willoftencausestatestodiscern
constraints
Systemic
ingsundersomecircumstances.
a clearstrategy
objectives;thiswillespeciallybe thecase
toadvancetheiroverriding
whenthestateis
on statesareverystrongand/or
whentheinternational
influences
topursue
tothesesystemic
factors.
Atothertimes,thestrategy
susceptible
relatively
wherethe
thestate'sprimary
objectivesmaybe moreambiguous.In circumstances
is unclear,
policiesareselected
themechanism
bywhichparticular
strategy
preferred
124 In suchsituations,
influenced
bargaining.
by domestic-level
maybe significantly
realismmayneedtobe supplemented
bydomesticthesystemic
focusofpostclassical
behavior.In thisrespect,
international
comprehend
level analysesto sufficiently
for
MichaelMastanduno,
David Lake,andG. JohnIkenberry
advancea framework
how decisionmakersbalancethepursuitof poweragainstdomestic
understanding
forachievingthisobjective.125
strategies
therolethat
Neorealismandpostclassicalrealismthusdiffer
markedly
regarding
international
behavior.Forpostclassidomestic-level
havein explaining
arguments
123. See, forexample,Russett1996,176.
incentivesas well as domestic-level
124. That strategy
choice will oftenreflectbothinternational
is theessenceofPutnam'sargument
two-levelgames;Putnam1988.
bargaining
regarding
125. Mastanduno,
Lake,andIkenberry
1989.

Organization
472 International
at thesystemic
level,and
in stages:first,
cal realism,analysesshouldbe undertaken
and extendedat thedomesticlevel.An essential
complemented
then,if necessary,
the
of itsown limitations;
withneorealismis thatit is notself-conscious
difficulty
Ratherthan
analysesin stagesinthismanner.
admitsno needforundertaking
theory
inusefulclarifying
devices,neorealists
analysesas potentially
unit-level
regarding
or
to neorealism
as eithercompetitive
steadtendto regarddomesticunderstandings
inunderandimpedeprogress
aretooextreme
Bothperspectives
spurious.
essentially
onceonerecareunderstandable
butthesereactions
behavior,
international
standing
focusleads it to view statesas
ognizesthatneorealism'sworst-case/possibilistic
theirchoiceofstrategies.
regarding
possessinglimiteddiscretion
Thisis notto suggestthatWaltzis wrongto assertthatfocusingon international
meanthat
focusis useful,butthisdoes notnecessarily
forcesis valuable;a systemic
foradoptfactorsshouldbe ignored.A morereasonablejustification
domestic-level
forcesoftenprovidesa
first
on international
focusis thatconcentrating
inga systemic
bothforanalystsas well as forpolicymakers.
of behavior,
understanding
sufficient
on its
wherea systemicanalysisis insufficient
Moreover,in thosecircumstances
stillusefulbecauseithelpsensureas deown,suchan initialfocusis nevertheless
pressureson actors.Ultias possibleof theinternational
tailedan understanding
constraints
ofexternal
is, as Keohaneemphasizes,
a thorough
understanding
mately,
behavioratthedomesticlevel.'26
to analysisofinternational
an essentialprecursor
Conclusion
realismintotwobranchesbyrevealinglatentdisputeswithin
My analysispartitions
realaboutstatebehavior.In particular,
a seriesofassumptions
thetheory
regarding
decision
conditions
of conflict
themerepossibility
whether
ismdivergesregarding
making,as neorealismassumes,or whetheractorsdecidebetweenpolicyoptions
view
realismasserts.Neorealists
as postclassical
ofconflict,
basedontheprobability
incontrast,
forsecurity;
postclascompetition
theinternational
systemas a relentless
in theinternational
system:
competition
security
sical realismis agnosticregarding
to
according
fluctuates
ofsecurity
pressures
within
realism,thestrength
postclassical
ofcapabilities,
namelytechnolbesidesthedistribution
ofmaterialfactors
a variety
This possibility/probability
economicpressures.
and international
ogy,geography,
views
realism.First,neorealism
within
harbors
tworelateddisagreements
distinction
postclassito a greater
degreethanis assumedwithin
thefuture
statesas discounting
emneorealism
statepreferences:
cal realism.Second,realismis dividedregarding
whereaspostclassicalrealism
as theoverriding
priority,
security
phasizesmilitary
thatstatesultimately
maintains
pursuepower-a conceptthatcontainsan inherent
whereneither
goal is necandeconomiccapacity,
tensionbetweenmilitary
security
totheother.
essarilysubordinate
126. See Keohane1984a,25-26; andKeohane1984b,16.

DuelingRealisms 473
In differentiating
thesetwobranchesof realism,I do notmeanto implythatthe
splitintotwocamps;however,at this
needsto be permanently
theorynecessarily
because,as thisarticleshows,realism
pointthetwobranchesmustbe distinguished
aboutstatebehavior.As longas realists
does nothave a unifiedsetof assumptions
thetheory
setsof assumptions,
fromdifferent
continueto derivetheirhypotheses
mustbe dividedinordertobe clearaboutexactlywhatis beingtested.
thetwobranches
withinrealismbecomesapparent,
divergence
As theunderlying
whichsetof assumptions
mayengagein an empirical"duel" in orderto determine
thetwo branchesof
mostuseful.Alternatively,
aboutstatebehavioris relatively
fromengagingin an extendedempiricaldebate.Untilnow,the
realismmayrefrain
of neorealismhave been hiddenfromview
underpinnings
relationsscholarsInternational
and have thusfarescaped criticalexamination.
manyneorealists-maysimplycometo viewthisworst-case/possibilistic
including
as beingtooinflexible.
perspective
is tooreassumption
If neorealists
do concludethattheirworst-case/possibilistic
focusis moreuseful-thiswouldnotmeanthat
strictive-andthata probabilistic
wrong.To be clear,to say
current
viewof statebehavioris completely
neorealism's
ofconflict
doesnotdenythatactorswill
thatactorsareconditioned
bytheprobability
manner,
that
undersomecircumstances
behaveina highlycautiousandconservative
Neorealism
security.
their
military
to
ensure
is, takeextensiveand costlymeasures
intermsofhowoften-andnotwhetherandpostclassical
realismaredifferentiated
manner:the
actorsare expectedto behavein a highlycautiousand conservative
not
formersays always,thelatter,sometimes.Neorealismappearsunsatisfactory
conception
ofstatebehavioris wrongall ofthetime,butrather
becausethetheory's
underall circumis operative
claimsthatthisperspective
becausethetheory
inflexibly
is
perspective
decidea shifttowarda probabilistic
stances.If,in theend,neorealists
neorealism.
cometo subsume
realismwouldessentially
postclassical
appropriate,
realisttheoryas suggestedholdsouthope forprogressin threerePartitioning
ofthe
spects.First,dividingrealismshouldlead to a morepreciseconceptualization
of thevaryingimpactof different
theoryand help providea betterunderstanding
on statebehavior.
material
factors
makesiteasiertounderstand
realisminthismanner
exactlywhy
Second,dividing
and suggeststhe
withnonrealist
theorieshave been so disappointing
interchanges
future
ofmoreproductive
dialogue.Ifrealismweretosettleon a probabipossibility
assert
thatrespectively
listicfocus,itwouldbe possibleto movebeyondarguments
andto startexplorexplanations
theuniversalprimacyofeitherrealistornonrealist
howtheycan
underwhicheachis moreorlesshelpfuland,inturn,
ingtheconditions
eachother.
sometimes
usefully
supplement
to thepessimismthatis typicalof
Finally,theanalysisservesas a counterpoint
realisttheory.Neorealism'sworst-casefocusand emphasison capabilitiesto the
to see littlehope forprogressin
exclusionof othervariablesleads its proponents
to concludethatall realist
international
relations.However,it wouldbe premature
of relentless
security
relationsas necessarily
consisting
analysesviewinternational
inwhichdefensive
aggression.
vigilanceis theonlyhopeforforestalling
competition

Organization
474 International
the
as influencing
The rangeof materialfactorsthatpostclassicalrealismidentifies
tensions
forlow security
quitefavorable
currently
arearguably
likelihoodofconflict
therefore,
postclassicalrealismproamongthemajorpowers.Unlikeneorealism,
relations
positivestateof security
videssomereasonto be sanguinethatthecurrent
anomaly.
betweenthemajorpowersneednotbe merelya temporary
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Dueling Realisms

Author(s): Stephen G. Brooks

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The "PostclassicalRealist" ConceptionofStateBehavior

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See, forexample,Glaser1994-95;Buzan 1993;andWalt1987.

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96. SIPRI 1995,390.

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126. See Keohane1984a,25-26; andKeohane1984b,16.

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