Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.
http://www.jstor.org
and Obedience
Socrates
GARY
YOUNG
I. The problem
Students of Plato have long puzzledoverwhatseemsto be a contradiction in the views expressed by Socrates in Apology and Crito.
In Apology, Socrates asserts:
(I) I shall not give up philosophy, even if the city commands me to
doso. (Ap.29d)1
But in Crito,Socrates asserts or implies:
(II) Every citizen (including myself) should obey every command
of the city. (Cr. 50 a-53 a)2
From these two claims, it follows fairly straightforwardly3 that
Socrates will give up philosophy and will not give up philosophy, if
the city commands him to give up philosophy.
This contradiction4 has called forth two responses from commentators:
This reading rests upon the crucial phrase neia%,ut 8l sLaXXov'rjci ,
4 l.....
n O)vesLOt 9?0,oaoqP&v29 d 3-5, which makes it clear (i) that Socrates is
Oi)
envisioning a conflict between what the city says and what the god says,
i3...) the
for otherwise he would not have to obey one rather than (aLFtXXov...
other; (ii) that therefore Socrates must be supposing the city to have told him
to do something that requires him to disobey the god, and this, as the context
makes clear, is to cease doing philosophy - it is not, as 29 c 5-dl might otherwise
suggest, either to cease philosophy or to submit to death; (iii) that Socrates will
obey or be persuaded by the god, hence will not be persuaded by (will disobey)
the city - note the emphatic double negative. Of course the city never actually
commands Socrates to give up philosophy.
2 For evidence of this claim in Crito, see note 18.
3 The derivation requires two further assumptions: Roughly, that Socrates
will do what he says in (I) he will do, and that Socrates will do what he should do.
' It is not strictly speaking a contradiction, for it has the form 'If P, then Q
and not-Q.' But since it is possible that P, it follows that it is also possible
that Q and not-Q, and this follows whether or not the city ever actually commands Socrates to give up philosophy. So Socrates seems at least committed
to the position that it is possible that both Q and not-Q, even though he may
never be confronted with the problem of both giving up and not giving up
philosophy, both at the same time. Even if Socrates is not guilty of believing
a contradiction, he surely seems to hold that an inconsistent proposition (Q
and not-Q) is consistent, which is bad enough. To simplify matters, I shall
talk throughout this paper as though we were dealing with a contradiction.
1
(1) The contradiction between (I) and (II) is merely verbal or apparent; that is, Socrates is not really contradicting himself in
asserting (I) and (HI),because he has in mind a qualification of
either (I) or (II) [usually (II) is picked for this role], which
has the effect of limiting the applicability of (I) to one set of
cases, and the applicability of (II) to a wholly different set of
cases, so that (I) and (II) could never both apply to the same
situation.5
(2) The contradiction between (I) and (II) is not merely apparent;
it is ineluctable. No reconciliationbetween (I) and (II) is possible,
and Socrates holds contradictory views.6
But neither (1) nor (2) is satisfactory. (1) is unsatisfactory because
none of the distinctions purported to resolve the contradiction between (I) and (II) can be found in either of the dialogues, at least
in such a way as to indicate that Socrates would use them to resolve
the contradiction.7 All the variants of view (1) thus far suggested,
to my knowledge, impose upon Socrates a position he did not hold,
so far as our evidence shows. Unfortunately, to reject (1) seems to be
to embrace (2), and (2) has decidedly unpleasant consequences.
For (2) ascribes to Plato - or at least to Socrates - an inconsistency
so obvious and bothersome that it is hard to believe that Plato and/or
Socrates could have overlooked it, or, if they did not overlook it,
could have left it standing.
Now (1) and (2) agree on one crucial assumption: That the two
dialogues are meant to be literal expressions of the views of Plato
and/or Socrates. Both views restrict themselves to considering what
Socrates says in the dialogues - his very words - and both views
assume that when Socrates says something in either dialogue, he (or
Plato) means it, i.e. he (or Plato) believes that it is true - with the
exception of a few obvious jokes and ironies, such as his statement,
at the start of Apology, that his accusers spoke so persuasively that
they almost persuaded him. In other words, both (1) and (2) agree in
taking (I) and (II) to be assertions that Socrates regards as true;
5
view (1) then attempts to find meaningsfor (I) and (II) such that the
two propositions are not inconsistent, and view (2) denies that this
can be done.
Both (1) and (2), by proceeding in this way, ignore the dramatic
setting of the dialogues. They focus on Socrates' very words, and
ignore the fact that Socrates addresses those words to two different
audiences with two presumably different purposes in mind. This
consideration opens up the possibility that Socrates does not believe
both (I) and (II), that his uttering of (I) and/or (II) is to be explained
at least in part in terms of the audiences and purposes he has in
the two dialogues, and not merely in terms of a desire or intention
to speak what he believes to whomever he is addressing.8In order to
S There is a fourth approach to our problem, besides (1), (2), and the one proposed here, but I think it too should be rejected. On this interpretation, which
Grote seems to have held, (I) and (II) are regarded (correctly) as inconsistent;
but instead of letting the inconsistency stand as an implicit indictment of
Socrates and/or Plato, as does position (2), or explaining the inconsistency as a
function of Socrates' different audiences and purposes in the two dialogues,
as does my interpretation, this fourth approach explains the inconsistency as
the result of Plato's different purposes in writing the dialogues. According
to Grote, Crito "appears intended by Plato - as far as I can pretend to guess-at
his purpose - to set forth the personal character and dispositions of Sokrates
in a light different from that which they present in the Apology. In defending
himself before the Dikasts, Sokrates had exalted himself into a position which
would undoubtedly be construed by his auditors as disobedience and defiance
to the city and its institutions ... In the judgment of the Athenian Dikasts,
Sokrates by using such language had put himself above the laws; thus confirming
the charge which his accusers advanced, and which they justified by some of
his public remarks... Xenophon in his Memorabilia recognises this impression
as prevalent among his countrymen against Sokrates, and provides what he
thinks a suitable answer to it. Plato also has his way of answering it; and such
I imagine to be the dramatic purpose of the Kriton" (Plato [London, 1875],
I, 300-302).
It is not clear whether Grote would go so far as to say that the question of
whether Socrates believed (I) and (II) is irrelevant, on the ground that the
Socrates of Apology is a different character than the Socrates of Crito, so that
there is no one Socrates of whom the question could be asked. If Grote would
go that far - and I think this would be the most consistent development of his
position - then he has an interpretation of the two dialogues that is a competitor
to (1), (2), and my own. These three interpretations all assume that there is
sufficient dramatic or historical continuity between the Socrates of the Apology
and the Socrates of the Crito that this question is intelligible.
If Grote too assumed this, however, he would have to take a stand on the
question of whether Socrates believed (I) and (II), which means, since he
thinks (I) and (II) are inconsistent, that he has to take a stand on whether
show that this is the case - that, as I wish to argue, Socratesdoes not
believe(II) - we cannot, of course, depend merely upon the possibility
that he would speak differently to different audiences and with different purposes. We must explain in detail what it is about Socrates'
audiences and purposes in the two dialogues that might reasonably
lead him to misrepresent his beliefs in one dialogue or the other.
The following is an attempt to analyze the dramatic and argumentative structure of Critoin such a way as to explain this.
II. Critoand themany
To test our interpretation, we must arrive at some reasonable opinion
about Socrates' audience and purpose(s) in Crito: in other words, we
must find out who Crito is (or, what I shall take to be the same, who
Socrates thinks Crito is), and what Socrates is trying to do in speaking
with Crito as he does. I shall ignore evidence concerning Crito to be
found outside Crito and Apology.
Just before the middle of the dialogue, Socrates states the question
he and Crito are to answer: Is it dikaion (48 b) for Socrates to try
to get away without the permission of the Athenians? Socrates, but
not Crito, thinks it is not, and the rest of the dialogue is devoted to
his presentation of arguments purporting to establish this opinion.
How did this question arise? Earlier in the dialogue Crito had
my interpretation or (2) is correct. In this case, his interpretation (that the
inconsistency is a result of Plato's purposes in writing the dialogues) is not a
competitor, but complementary, to either (2) or my position.
But whether or not Grote makes this assumption, his account of Plato's
purpose in writing Crito is unacceptable. Only the speeches of "the laws"
support Grote's claim that the purpose of Crito is that Socrates "be brought
back within the pale of democratical citizenship, and exculpated from the
charge of incivism" (Grote, p. 303). Grote recognizes that the first half of the
dialogue is at odds with this account: "It is thus that the dialogue Kriton
embodies, and tries to reconcile, both the two distinct elements - constitutional
allegiance, and Sokratic individuality" (Grote, p. 304). But what Grote calls
"Sokratic individuality" (and astonishingly enough identifies as the Protagorean
doctrine of homo mensura, p. 305), is just the familiar contrast that Socrates
draws between himself and the many, to the detriment of the many. Grote
says that Plato wrote Crito to exculpate Socrates from the charge of incivism,
and thus Plato must have addressed the dialogue to those most likely to make
such a charge, namely the many. What Grote fails to explain is why Plato
should then make Socrates begin the dialogue with an all-out attack upon the
opinions of the many. (Cf. Paul Friedlander, Plato [New York, 1964], II, 172.)
view that "it is not living which we should consider most important,
but living well," where 'living well' is given Socratic content (44 d,
48 b). Therefore Socrates will presumably present Crito with as close
an approximation to the Socratic position as will succeed in easing
Crito's sorrow, for that will most ease his sorrow.
We have now reached a position from which we can profitably
return to our initial problem, the inconsistency between Apology and
Crito. The foregoing considerations show, I believe, that to prove
that Socrates regards (II) as true, it is not enough to point to the fact
that he asserts (II) in his talk with Crito. This is not enough, because
Socrates' intent in talking with Crito is not to explain to Crito why he
(Socrates) is not going to flee, but to move Crito to accept Socrates'
decision not to flee. And to do this, Socrates will have to use at least
some arguments that he himself does not find compelling. To show
that Socrates regards (II) as true, therefore, we would have to show
that (II) is not one of the considerations aimed merely at persuading
Crito, not one of the considerations directed to the many. Later (in
Section XII) I shall argue that (II) is introduced by Socrates for
no other reason than to persuade Crito.
One might object that on the one hand we have said that Socrates
invokes Socratic principles to persuade Crito, yet we have also said
that Crito, one of the many, does not understand those principles
sufficiently to be persuaded by them. On this reading of the dialogue,
it seems, Socrates' attempt to persuade Critoshould be an ill-conceived
failure. But though Socrates does invoke the Socratic principles in
Crito, those principles play much less of a role in the arguments of
Critothan a reading of 49 a-e might lead one to suspect. I shall attempt
to show this below by an analysis of the arguments given by the laws.
The Socratic principlesare less important as premissesin the arguments
of the laws than as touchstones for the quality of Crito's soul.
Now let us turn to the second half of Crito,where we expect to find
an attempt to answer the question of whether it is dikaion for Socrates
to flee.
V. The twoprinciples concerning to dikaion (49 a-e)
The question, Crito agrees with Socrates, is whether it is dikaion for
Socrates to try to escape from prison and Athens without the permission of the Athenians (48 b-d). Socrates immediately asks Crito
to consider the archi (principle or beginning) of the inquiry, and lays
down a pair of propositions to which Crito gives quick assent.
9
Cf. A. E. Taylor, Plato (London, 1929), p. 171, note 1; also Paul Shorey,
"Notes on Plato, Crito 49 e-50 a," Classical Journal, vol. II (1906), p. 80.
I would deny the last assertion Taylor makes here, that "we see in the sequel
'compact'
by which
Socrates
is pledged
of Athens involves nothing but what is strictly licitum." See the last paragraph
of Section X.
10
xoclT6 xmov6vrr 7t46Xew50 a), and after that point Crito has
silent. But they do not take his place. Rather, Socrates takes Crito's
place and opinions, and the laws take Socrates' place. Instead of
Socrates questioning Crito, now the iaws question Socrates. But
of course this is a misleading way to describe what goes on: in fact,
Socrates, playing the laws, questions Socrates, pretending he is about
to flee Athens.
The entry of the laws has at least a double effect upon Crito. First,
Crito,never a strong dialectician, is no longer pitted against Socrates in
the discussion; he is taken off the hook. Socrates, not Crito, will
defend Crito's opinion, insofar as it gets a defense at all (in fact, it
gets very little defense, for Socrates merely sets himself up as a target
for the laws' arguments, and never seriously attempts to respond to
those arguments). Second, the laws and the city are presumably more
awesome in Crito'seyes, endowed with a more impersonaland a higher
authority, than Socrates. That the laws object to Crito's proposal
will seem to him a much weightier reason to give it up, than that
Socrates disagreeswith it.
For both these reasons, Socrates' introduction of the laws is a clever
move. But we might suspect still a third motive at work. "The laws"
are Socrates' creatures; they say what he makes them say. This is
true even though it is easy while reading the dialogue to imagine
that one is really listening to the laws of Athens talk. Why doesn't
Socrates say in his own person what he makes "the laws" say? Perhaps
merely because of the effect "the laws" have upon Crito. But perhaps
he puts these speeches into the mouths of the laws also because
Socrates himself does not hold all the opinions they express. In any
event, it would seem to require some evidence to show that what
Socrates imagines the laws to say is what Socrates himself believes.
(One might suppose that Socrates' speech at 54 d (in his own person)
provides the needed evidence; I shall consider it in Section XII).
VII. The argumentsof the laws
The laws present four distinct arguments to show Socrates that he
should not carry out his supposed intention to flee Athens. That is,
Socrates presents Crito with four distinct arguments against Crito's
proposal that Socrates flee Athens:
(A) By running away Socrates intends to destroy the city and its
laws (50 a-c).
(B) Socrates stands to the city and laws as slave to master and as
12
child to parent, and therefore he must submit to them (50 c-51 c).
(C) Socrates has made an agreement with the laws, an agreement
whose terms require that Socrates stay to meet his death (51 c53 a).
(D) Socrates' flight will have bad effects upon his friends, himself,
and his children (53 a-54 b).
At or near the end of each of these arguments but the first, Crito
agrees, in response to a question from Socrates, that the laws have
established their point. However, when the laws have presented their
first argument, Socrates suggests that one might rebut them by pointing out that "the city wronged me and did not judge the case rightly";
Crito seizes upon this objection.
From the way the dialogue has developed to this point, we might
expect that these arguments will all turn upon (a), (a') and (b).
(D) is wholly independent of (a), (a') and (b). (A) relies upon (a'),
(B) upon (a), and (C) upon (b). But in none of these arguments are
(a), (a') or (b) stated explicitly. "The laws" seem interested in playing
down these principles, and turning Crito's attention elsewhere. Let
us now turn to these arguments, to see what indications, if any, we
can find of Socrates' intent in giving them.
VIII. Argument(A): Destructiono/ thecity (50 a-c)
The laws say:
Are you not intending, by this thing you are trying to do, to
destroy us, the laws, and the entire city, so far as in you lies?
Or do you think that that city can exist and not be overturned,
in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force but
are disregardedand undermined by private persons? (50 a-b)
Filling in several more or less obvious unstated steps, the argument
seems to proceed as follows:
1. If the decisions made by the courts of a city are disobeyed,
then the city and its laws will be destroyed.
2. If Socrates runs away, he will disobey the decision made by the
courts of Athens that he should die.
3. From 1 and 2: If Socrates runs away, he will be destroying
Athens and its laws, so far as he is able (t4 a&6,uepos).
(a'). One must not do harm, even when harmed oneself.
4. To destroy something is to harm it.
5. From 3, (a'), and 4: Socrates must not run away.
13
Only 1 and 3 are stated in the text. On this analysis, the conclusion
follows from 1, 2, (a'), and 4. Step 2 is unobjectionable. Thus any
criticism of the argument must turn on the question of its validity
and on the question of whether 1, (a'), and 4 are acceptable.11
(A) is the only argument of the laws to which Socrates and Crito
object in any way. The objection, suggested by Socrates and quickly
accepted by Crito, is that "The city wronged (+&xet)me and did not
judge the case rightly (6pXio) (50 b-c). (Crito at this point utters
one of the two oaths he makes in the dialogue, Tauta ne Dia, 50 c, cf.
43 b.) But what does this objection mean? To what step in the argument is it directed?
The objection can be taken in either of two ways, against either
(a') or 1. Taken as an objection to (a'), it says: Because the city
wronged or harmed Socrates, Socrateshas the right to returnharmto the
city. Taken as an objection to 1, it says: Because the city wronged
or harmed Socrates, his failure to follow the commando/ the city will
not tend to destroy the city. The text favors neither interpretation;
the objection is dropped as soon as it is made, and Socrates moves
on to argument (B). If Socrates were to accept this objection (it is
unclear whether or not he does), he would have to regard it as an
objection to step 1; his commitment to (a') is too strong for him to
reject it. But we might suspect that Crito seizes on it so eagerly because he regards it as an objection to (a'); we recall that Crito's
acceptance of (a') is shaky.
If we take the objection to be directed against (a'), we encounter a
problem that runs throughout the last half of Crito: understanding
what (or who) "the laws" are. Later in the dialogue, Socrates has
I pointed out earlier that (a') gives no content to the notion of to dikaion,
and therefore is no help in determining whether it is dikaion for Socrates to
flee, which is the question we wish to answer. In argument (A), content is given
to the notion of dikaion by step 4. (Compare step 3 of argument (B), and 7
in (C).) For (a') is just another way to say
(a) One must not do wrong (adikein), even when wronged;
and similarly, then, it would seem that 4 is equivalent to
4'. To destroy something is to do wrong (adikein),
from which we get
4". To destroy something is not dikaion.
From 3 and 4" it follows that it is not dikaion for Socrates to flee, which with
(a) gives 5. But step 4 is unargued; we are not given any reason to suppose
that destruction is never dikaion, and such a claim seems absurd on the face
of it. Do we - and does Socrates - wish to accept:
4"'. From 4": To destroy something bad to make something good is not dikaion.
11
14
the laws say to him that "you will go away wronged (i&xqkiuvo4),
if you do go away, not by us, but by men" (54 b-c). If this is correct,
then in running away Socrates would not fall afoul of (a') by doing
harm to those who harmedhim (i.e. retaliating), but merely by doing
harm: He has been harmed by the citizens, and he intends to harm
the laws and the city, which are not the same as the citizens. And
then the objection that "the city wronged or harmed Socrates"
is either false (if by 'city' we do not mean the citizens of Athens)
or irrelevant to the claim that one should not retaliate (if by 'city'
we mean the citizens of Athens).
But are the city and laws different from the citizens? Moreprecisely,
are the laws and the city sufficiently different from the citizens that the
fact that the citizens, using valid legal procedures,wronged Socrates,
does not entail that the city and laws wronged Socrates?And is it true
that the city and laws are not harming Socrates? At 51a, the laws suggest that they are attempting to destroy Socrates, because they think
it dikaion (which here should perhaps be understood as "required");
and (A)4 tells us that this is to harm Socrates, which by (a') is something one should not do. At 54 c, the laws say that if Socrates runs
away, he will return wrong for wrong and harm for harm (&vt8LxTJaOC
LC xocl &vTLxxxoupy
which implies that either the laws have
'),
Socrates
and
harmed
(and he is retaliating against them),
wronged
or that in fleeing Socrates will wrong and harm the citizens, who have
wronged and harmed him (and hence that he may not be harming or
wronging the laws). Finally, notice that although the question posed
by Socrates was whether it is dikaion for him to flee "without the
permission of the Athenians" (48 c, 48 e), the question is changed at
49 e-50 a to whether they are harming anyone or breaking any
agreements if Socrates flees without permission of the city (polis),
and the arguments of the laws from that point on refer only to the
city and laws, not to the Athenian citizens. Either there is no difference
between the two, or else Socrates' original question is never answered
by the laws. None of these indications is decisive, of course; yet the
evidence in the dialogue is far from showing that the laws are not
harming Socrates, and there is even some question as to the difference
between the citizens, i.e. the many, and the laws and city.
To return to the objection to argument (A), if we take it to be directed against step 1, it has the point that 1 should be reread as follows:
1'. If the right decisions made by the courts of a city are disobeyed,
then the city and its laws will be destroyed; but if the wrong
15
decisions are disobeyed, the city and its laws won't be destroyed.
Then, to reach 3, we must change 2 to:
2'. If Socrates runs away, he will disobey a right decision made by
the court of Athens, viz. the decision that he should die.
In this form the argument can be stopped by the objection that the
court's decision was wrong. But if 1 is true, it will be irrelevant that
the court's decision was wrong.12
IX. Argument(B): Citizenas child and slave (50 c-51 c)
The argument is roughly this:
1. The laws gave birth to Socrates, nurtured him and educated
him.
and born slave (goUo~)
2. From 1: Socrates is the offspring (Zxyovo~)
of the city and its laws.
3. What is dikaion for the father (inocp) or master is not the same
as (iE taou etvcL)what is dikaion for a child or slave.
4. From 2 and 3: What is dikaion for the laws and city is not the
same as what is dikaion for Socrates.
playing
5. From 4: If the laws and Socrates' fatherland (7rocrpEq,
on 7ccr'p) undertake to destroy Socrates, thinking it dikaion,
it is not dikaion for Socrates to retaliate (0v6nroteZv) by trying
16
All the steps are explicitly stated except for 6, 7, (a) and 8, which are
needed to finish the argument.'3
For our purposes, two points should be made. First, (B)3 is unargued
in the dialogue. As stated, it leaves open the question of precisely
what dikaia are referredto. Do the laws (i.e. Socrates) mean that the
slave-child(-citizen) has no rights? Or do they mean only that we
cannot in/er from the fact that the master-parent(-city) has a certain
right, that the slave-child (-citizen) also has it? On the latter interpretation, 3 would not help the argument, for it could not be used to
determine whether the case of Socrates is one of those in which Socrates
lacks a right the city has. But step 5 makes it clear that the laws
have no doubt that in the present case the city has a right Socrates
lacks, and they derive 5 from (inter alia) 3. Thus it seems we must
interpret 3 in the first way, i.e. so that it means:
3'. Children and slaves have no rights vis a vis their parents or
masters.
or in terms of dikaion:
3". Nothing is dikaion for children or slaves vis 'a vis their parents
or masters that is not permitted them by their parents or masters.
That this is the correct interpretation of 3 is further suggested by the
extreme nature of Socrates' case: if it is not dikaion for Socrates to try
to avoid death from the city, then it is unlikely that anything else
Socrates might wish to do vis it vis a city without its permissionwould
be dikaion. Death is the greatest evil the city can do to a person,
although it may not be the greatest evil a person can suffer.
From 3' or 3" it follows that:
4". Nothing is dikaion for Socrates vis i vis the city that is not
permitted him by the city.
1 Notice that step 6, which in argument (B) is unstated and unargued, is the
same as step 3 in argument (A), which is explicitly stated and derived from
(A)1 and (A)2. Now if Crito's objection to argument (A) had really been
against (A)1, upon which (A)3 = (B)6 rests, Crito should also object to (B)6.
(For if Crito accepts (B)6= (A)3, then the objection to (A)1 is irrelevant:
The laws need only begin argument (A) with step 3, which Crito ex hypothesi
accepts, and forget about step (A)1.) But Crito says nothing against (B)6.
Either he doesn't realize that argument (B) assumes something to which he
had earlier objected (viz. (B)6 = (A)3), or else his objection was not to (A)1,
but to (a'). In any event, there is no doubt that Crito is persuaded by argument
(B), as he himself indicates at 51 c. Neither he nor Socrates offers the least
objection to this second argument of the laws, although Socrates refrains
from endorsing the argument.
17
What is dikaion for Socrates the citizen is what the city says.
What the many are in Crito'sarguments, the city is in the arguments
of the laws. For Crito, the standard of to dikaion is what people like
him call dikaion; for the laws, the standard of to dikaion is what the
laws say is dikaion. Neither the many nor the city can do the greatest
good or the greatest harm to one, and yet Socrates has warned us to
be alert for that, and nothing less (44 d, 48 b, 49 b). If to dikaion
is concerned with the greatest good, as Socrates claims (48 b), it is
hard to see how the city or laws could provide a standard for to dikaion,
any more than the many could.
The second point to be made concerning argument (B) is this.
In (B) Socrates is analogized to or identified as a child or slave;
yet elsewhere in the dialogue children and slaves are spoken of as
contemptible. Children are frightened by goblins, just as the many
might try to frighten Socrates with death (46 c). If all the conclusions
reached earlier by Socrates and Crito are now to be overturned, the
two men are no better than children (49 b). If Socrates flees, the
laws say, he will be doing what the meanest slave (doulosphaulotatos)
would do (52 d). And if he flees to a place like Thessaly, they say,
Socrates will have to live as an inferior and slave to everyone (53 e).
These passages all exemplify the argument: If you do such-and-such,
you will be like a child or slave; but since you cannot wish to be like
a child or slave, you should not do such-and-such. But the implication
of argument (B) is that it is not so bad to be a child or slave (or like
them) that Socrates should rebel against that status: he should accept
it, with its limitations. This tension, if not outright inconsistency,
might make us wonder if (B) is meant to be as acceptable as we might
at first suppose it is.
2.
3.
4.
5.
(b)
6.
7.
8.
9.
iv)
~ 7reMcmv ?.Lm;
X
7roLeCv
52 a 2-3;
xmx&'0CuasWoX-reeaOox 52 c 2, d 2-3, d 5.
At 51 e-52 a the laws say that the opportunity to try to persuade them is built
into the agreement. They make the same point in the course of argument (B)
(51 b-c): if Socrates cannot persuade his fatherland that its command is wrong,
he must obey it. This statement, with the reference to the agreement Socrates
made with the laws at 50 c, in the middle of argument (B), and the reference
to the laws as parents at 51 e, in the middle of argument (C), make it difficult
to disentangle the two arguments. These three passages may indicate that "the
laws" did not regard the arguments as essentially different, which they are not
in one respect: both arguments try to establish the existence of the same asymmetrical relation between city and citizen. But the arguments do differ in the
ways they go about establishing this. I discuss this later in the text.
19
(b), 6, 7, 8, and 9 are never stated explicitly by the laws, but all are
needed to finish the argument that the laws set in motion with steps
1 through 5.
The laws give most of their attention to steps 1 and 2, and Crito,
at least, is persuaded by their efforts, for at 52 d he agrees that the
laws speak the truth when they assert step 3. Socrates says only "&XXo
I'
Taylor makes this point with respect to (i) and (ii), p. 172 note.
20
16 After
21
23
Will you then avoid the well-governed cities and the most
civilized men? And if you do this will your life be worth living?
Or will you go to them and have the face to carry on - what
kind of conversation, Socrates? The same kind you carried on
here, saying that virtue and justice and lawful things and the
laws are the most precious things to men? ... Or will you keep
24
Crito
(i) (III) therefore (I). (iii) (III) therefore (V). (Cf. (D), part (2).)
(iv) (II) therefore (V). (Cf. (A), (B), (C).)
(ii) (IV) therefore (I).
(III) and (IV) are not persuasive to the many (Ap. 37 c-38 a). Thus
Socrates' arguments in Apology fail to persuade his jury. Yet had he
used any other arguments - arguments that would appeal to the
many - he would have compromisedhimself and his ability to philosophize in Athens. He had no choice but to speak the truth (Ap. 17 b 4-6).
Now argument (iii) will be no more persuasive to Crito than were (i)
and (ii) to the jury. Because Socrates wishes to reconcile Crito to his
(Socrates') death in Crito, Socrates will use not (iii) - or rather not
each establishing that citizens generally must obey laws and lawful commands
generally, and then particularizing this to Socrates and the command that he
die. In other words, we can regard each of the three arguments as proving (II),
and then from (II) showing that Socrates should not flee. In (A), 1 and (a')
and 4 together are supposed to imply that (IIA) one must obey the decisions
made by the courts of the city; in (B), 1 and 3 (read as 3") and (a) together are
supposed to imply that (II B) one to whom the laws gave birth, etc., must not
do what is not permitted by the laws; and in (C), 1 and (b) and 7 together are
supposed to imply that (IIC) whoever among the Athenians remains in Athens,
etc., ought to do whatever the laws command, if he/she cannot persuade the
laws that their command is wrong. (IIA) - (IIC) are all variants of (II); none
of them allow the exception asserted in (I).
25
merely (iii) - but also arguments that are capable of moving the many.
This is why he uses (iv), i.e. uses arguments (A), (B), and (C), and
also why he has the laws reintroduce in sections (1) and (3) of argument (D) considerations that he had earlier rejected as typical of the
many. This interpretation has the merit of clearing Socrates of the
charge of inconsistency between (I) and (II) - the problem with which
we began - because we can now say that Socrates does not believe
(II), that he uses (II) to reconcile Crito to his death.'9 This is not the
whole story about (II), however; I shall suggest below that Socrates
believes something like (II).
19 Position (1), which claims to provide a resolution of this inconsistency,
has not yet been worked out successfully, to my knowledge. Consider the most
recent defence of (1), by A. D. Woozley, in "Socrates on Disobeying the Law."
(See note 5). Woozley argues that there is no inconsistency between (I) and
(II), because (II) has built into it a "permitted exception," viz. "attempting
to convince the state that it is wrong in the law or command" that it has given
one. And Woozley regards this permitted exception to (II) as identical with
engaging in philosophy, so that when in (I) Socrates says he will never give up
philosophy even if the city commands him to do so, he is only saying in a
slightly different way what (II) says when it (implicitly) allows people to try
to persuade the city that its laws or commands are wrong. (Vlastos, p. 307).
Woozley's argument clearly turns upon (a) the identification of philosophy
with the attempt to convince the state that some law or command is wrong,
and (b) the supposition that in Crito the laws guarantee to the citizen the right
to try to persuade them that they have given an unjust command. It is hard to
know how to respond to (a), it is so surprising. But consider how few of the Platonic dialogues would contain "philosophy" if philosophy were to be defined as
Woozley suggests, and recall the various dialogues in which Socrates opposes
philosophy to persuasion (rhetoric) (Woozley himself refers to the rejection
of rhetoric in Gorgias, at Vlastos, p. 302). As to (b), it is clear that argument
(C), and likely that (B) (see 51 b 3-4, b 9-c 1), give Socrates the alternatives
of either obeying or (successfully) persuading the laws they are wrong. But
this is surely not true of argument (A). Woozley at one point suggests that
(A) also admits this option of persuasion, on the ground that if one disobeys
the laws by attempting to persuade them they are wrong, such disobedience
would not "do violence and injury to the law" (Vlastos, p. 307). But it is not
obvious that such disobedience would have no harmful effect on the law - it
depends on what form the attempt at persuasion takes, on what the laws are,
and on what the citizens are like.
Woozley's account is not the only one that suffers from an erroneous notion
of what Socratic philosophy is; indeed, this seems to be a major pitfall for those
attracted to position (1). For instance, Alexander Meiklejohn, in his account of
the relation between Crito and Apology, identifies the freedom to engage in
philosophy with the freedom of opinion (Political Freedom [New York, 1965],
pp. 21-24).
26
There are several further reasons for accepting this account, besides
the two just mentioned (viz., that it removes the inconsistency from
Socrates' beliefs, and that it is suggested by who Critois and Socrates'
remarks about (III) and (IV)). First, there is the glaring inconsistency
we noted between arguments (B) and (C). If we hold that Socrates
himself (or Plato) gives credence to both these arguments, we must
ascribe to him an inconsistency as serious as that between (I) and (II).
Second, we noticed in discussing arguments (A) and (B) that Socrates' appeal to the laws and city as a standard of to dikaion seems
little better than Crito's appeal to the many. The city seems to be
little more than a way to unify the many citizens, to produce (at least
for the time being) a unity from the manifold opinions held by the
many. In no way can the city avoid the shortcomings of the opinions
of the many, unless the many do not make the laws.20The city cannot
by itself be a standard for to dikaion.
Third, the laws nowhere in their arguments explicitly make use of
principles (a), (a'), or (b). Analysis shows that those principles play a
role in the arguments, but it is a minor role, well hidden, and a number
of other surprising and unargued propositions are given more prominence. Does Socrates have the laws hide these principles from Crito's
attention? This would be surprising, in light of the fact that Cnrto
dropped out of the conversation because he couldn't see how those
principles applied to Socrates' question. We would hope or expect
that Socrates would help Crito by stressing the role the principles
play in the arguments of the laws; instead Socrates seems to have
decided that the principles were not useful for persuading Crito,
that Crito would not understand them no matter how much Socrates
stressed them.
This leaves unanswered the question of why Socrates has the laws
give arguments that even implicitly rely upon those principles.
Isn't this because he thinks those principles should be used in
answering the question of whether he should flee? The shortcoming of
the arguments of the laws is that they make the city and its laws a
measure of to dikaion, not that they implicitly rely upon Socratic
principles. The corrective we must apply to those arguments is to
find a better standard for to dikaion, not to throw out Socrates' principles.
What might this better standard be? At 47 e-48 a, Socrates says
20 This leads directly to Republic 473 c-d and 499 b-c, as well as Seventh Letter
327 a-b.
27
that life is not worth living when that part is injured which is injured
by to adikon and improved by to dikaion. And to live well is to be well
(or at least getting better) in this part, for to live well is to live kalos
and dikaios (48 b). But in Critowe also find the suggestion that what
makes life worth living is conversation about dikaiosune and the
other virtues (53 c-e, cf. Ap. 38 a), i.e. that philosophy makes life
worth living. The implication is that philosophy improves that part of
the soul that is improved by to dikaion, that philosophy is the cause
of living dikaios. Thus, although philosophy or the philosopher may
not be the standard of to dikaion, it seems to follow that only the
philosopheris in a position to perceive that standard. The many cannot
perceive or be that standard (Ap. 37 e-38 b, Cr. 49 d), nor can the
city so long as it is controlled by. the many (which here includes the
oligarchic party). Since arguments (A) - (C) teach that the city and its
laws are the standard of to dikaion, or at least that they always conform to that standard, those arguments must be unacceptable to
Socrates.21
28
does the passage imply or require that Socrates agree with all of what
the laws have said? Couldn't Socrates make the above statement (and
the Phaedo statement) merely on the basis of agreement with the
conclusion the laws have advanced, that Socrates should not flee,
and agreement with argument (D)? The assertion that Crito will
speak in vain against what the laws have said (i.e. against what Socrates has said) can be taken ironically, to mean that Crito, arguing
from the perspective of the many, could not conceivably persuade
Socrates to flee, because Socrates is unmoved by the concerns of the
many.
The only command of the city that Socrates is prepared to disobey,
it seems, is the command to give up philosophy. In all other respects
- even unto the laws' command that he die - he is an obedient citizen;
those of us who advocate disobedience on other matters cannot claim
Socrates as our authority or precursor.22The position Socrates makes
the laws present in Crito- that Socrates should neverdisobey the city is therefore in a sense close to, though inconsistent with, Socrates'
true position. When Socrates makes the laws say what he thinks
will persuade Crito, Socrates does not distort his position except
in one respect: concerning philosophy, a matter of the highest importance, but one which Crito will not understand anyway.
University of Wisconsin - Madison
22 Here lurk two problems that could explode our discussion: First, when
Socrates refused to fetch Leon of Salamis for the Thirty, did he violate a lawful
command? Xenophon, among others, argues that the command the Thirty
gave Socrates was unlawful( Memorabilia IV iv 3). But we might suspect his
motive for claiming this, because he is trying to prove that Socrates identified
to dikaion and to nomimon, the just and the lawful. The problem is to specify
when a command is lawful, and when what purports to be a law is a law, i.e.
is to be obeyed. And although we have seen that if Socrates thought something
were a law or lawful command, he would obey it (with the exception indicated
in (I)), we have not seen what criteria he would use to characterize a law.
Second, why is Socrates prepared to disobey precisely this one command, and
no others? If the polis does not grasp the standard of justice, might it not give
other unjust but lawful commands, besides the command to give up philosophy?
Would Socrates obey such commands? I shall not discuss either of these problems.
29