Diego Farren - Thesis Short

ZU KOLN
UNIVERSITAT
Violence, Self-Control and Morality: A

Dual-System Perspective
by
Diego Farren
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of

Master of Science (M.Sc.)
in the
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultat (WISO)
Institut f
ur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (ISS)
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Clemens Kroneberg
October 2014
Sometimes I am two people.

Johnny is the nice one.
Cash causes all the trouble.
They fight.
- Johnny Cash
ZU KOLN
UNIVERSITAT
Abstract
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultat (WISO)
Institut f
ur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (ISS)
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Clemens Kroneberg
Master of Science (M.Sc.)
by Diego Farren
An exercise of theoretical elaboration (Thornberry 1989) from a control perspective is

pursued using mainly inputs from the General Theory of Crime (GTC; Gottfredson
and Hirschi 1990), the Situational Action Theory (SAT; Wikstrom et al. 2012; Wikstrom 2006), the Model of Frame Selection (MFS; Kroneberg 2006), and the ReflectiveImpulsive Model (RIM; Hofmann et al. 2009; Strack and Deutsch 2004). The capability
of the final model of action proposed to predict acts of violence is tested through multilevel analyses using data from the International Self-Report Study of Delinquency 2
(ISRD-2; Enzmann et al. 2010; Junger-Tas et al. 2012, 2010). The results point in the
expected direction, i.e. action can be modeled through the suggested framework. Theoretical, methodological and policy implications derived from the adoption of the proposed
model are discussed. Limitations of the analyses applied and ideas to overcome them in
future researches are also presented.
ii
Acknowledgements
The biggest thanks of all to my boss and friend Dirk Enzmann for all the dedication,
discussions, good advice, good sense of humor and unconditional support.
Also thanks to my college Ilka Kammigan and to the whole Uni Hamburg crew, lead
by Peter Wetzels and Sylvie Billon - thanks for fitting me in, for your support, and for
creating such a nice atmosphere.
Thanks to those who enlighten my way in those dark moments of doubt, whether its
with theory or with statistics or with Stata and R - thanks to Clemens Kroneberg,
Alexander Schmidt and Bernd Wei.
Also thanks to Hans-J

urgen Andre, Ravena Penning and Hawal Shamon for the amazing two years of profound learning I had as a tutor.
A big thanks to all my friends around the world and especially to my Kumpel David
Bruder, my beloved classmates, and to all the amigos at the Mauer in Koln. And my
special gratitude to Birgit Kastner and Lena Taube for accommodating me in the last
phase of this project, when I no longer had a home.
Last but not least, I thank my family for their support, example and wisdom. Mother
and father, you are both my favorite people in the world.
iii
Contents
Abstract
ii
Acknowledgements
iii
List of Figures
List of Tables
vi
Abbreviations
vii
1 Introduction
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Theoretical integration . . . . . . . .
2.2 Dual-system perspective . . . . . . .
2.3 Conceptualization and measurement
2.4 Research question and hypotheses .
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3
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3 Methods
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3.1 Data source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2 Operationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3 Statistical analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4 Results
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5 General Discussion and Conclusion
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Bibliography
63
Appendix A: Correlations
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iv
List of Figures
1.1
Study goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1
2.2
2.3
SAT & MFS complemented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Clusters of attributes associated with dual systems of thinking . . . . . . 12
The Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
Histogram: impulsive determinants of behavior

Histogram: reflective determinants of behavior
Histogram: school disorganization scale (agg.) .
Mediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Observable and unobservable outcomes . . . . .
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27
36
39
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
Predicted probabilities (95% CI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Marginal probability effects (95% CI) of impulsive determinants of behavior
Predicted probabilities (95% CI) over intoxication . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Discrete probability change (95% CI) over intoxication . . . . . . . . . . .
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49
50
5.1
RIM and SAT/MFS compared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
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List of Tables
2.1
Impulsive and controlled outcomes: four scenarios
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3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
Sample description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Violence related prevalences by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Descriptive statistics: impulsive determinants of behavior (scale)
Descriptive statistics: reflective determinants of behavior (scale)
Descriptive statistics: life-time intoxication (scale and items) . .
Descriptive statistics: school disorganization scale . . . . . . . . .
Descriptive statistics: control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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21
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28
Regression results (main regressions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Explained variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Predicted probabilities (95% CI) over impulsive determinants of behavior
compared (M1 vs M4 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4 Marginal probability effects (95% CI) of impulsive determinants of behavior compared (M1 vs M4 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5 Predicted probabilities (95% CI) over intoxication compared (M2 vs M4 ) .
4.6 Discrete probability change (95% CI) over intoxication compared (M2 vs
M4 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.7 Regression results (KHB mediation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.8 Mediation analysis with impulsive determinants of behavior as treatment
variable (counterfactuals; no interactions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.9 Mediation analysis with school disorganization as treatment variable (counterfactuals; no interactions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
variable (counterfactuals; with interactions; intoxication = 0) . . . . . . .
variable (counterfactuals; with interactions; intoxication = 1) . . . . . . .
4.12 Mediation analysis with school disorganization as treatment variable (counterfactuals; with interactions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43
44
A.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations: self-control/impulse related items .

A.2 Descriptive statistics and correlations: violence attitude/reflective determinants of behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A.3 Descriptive statistics and correlations: school climate related items (school
disorganization) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A.4 Descriptive statistics and correlations: neighborhood climate related items
A.5 Descriptive statistics and correlations: family bonding related items . . .
A.6 Correlations of all variables used in the regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . .
74
4.1
4.2
4.3
vi
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48
48
48
52
53
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54
75
75
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76
76
Abbreviations
GTC
General Theory of Crime
ISRD
International Self-Report Study of Delinquency
MFS
Model of Frame Selection
RIM
Reflective-Impulsive Model
SAT
Situational Action Theory
vii
Dedicated to my father Fernando Farren
viii
1. Introduction
A dual-system perspective is proposed to test the hypothesis that acts of violence can
be modeled as an outcome that depends mainly on self-control, morality, situational
moderators, and their interplay. Theoretical elaboration (Thornberry 1989) from a control perspective is applied to develop an action theory that can serve to understand and
predict acts of violence. Data from the International Self-Report Study of Delinquency
2 (ISRD-2; Enzmann et al. 2010; Junger-Tas et al. 2012, 2010) representing populations
of grade 7 to grade 9 (mostly 12 to 14 years students) from 30 different countries is
analyzed. Statistical methods used belong mainly to the family of multilevel logisitc regression models. Also a counterfactual perspective is adopted to test hypotheses about
mediation (see e.g. Imai, Keele and Tingley 2010).
This study has three goals (see Figure 1.1): first, a discussion of the conceptual meaning
of self-control and its place in crime causation. Inputs from different theories in criminology and social-psychology will be taken into consideration with the goal of contributing
to a theory of action that can be used as a roadmap for the development of valid measures and understanding of the variables of interest. An important part of this goal is to
integrate approaches of different disciplines, in this case psichological and criminological
theories (also referred as a postmodernist perspective on integration Barak 2010). In
order to be clear about the type of integration proposed, part of the theoretical chapter
is dedicated to clarifying the meanings of theoretical integration and its state of the art.
Figure 1.1: Study goals
THEORY
ANALYSIS
Goal 1:
Theoretical
model
Goal 2:
Measuring
instruments
Goal 3:
Statistical
analysis
Once the proposed theory of action has been explained, the next step is to give guidelines
on how to measure the most relevant concepts involved in it. The second goal of this
study is, accordingly, to critically revisit the existent measuring instruments for the key
concepts of the described theory of action. The logical conclusion at this stage, would
be to choose the best measures or to develop new ones and analyze them. Nevertheless,
the data in this case has already been collected, so that no changes to the measuring
1
Introduction
instruments can be made. That is, although a critical revision of the instruments being
used to measure the concepts of interest can be done, the data analyses must still rely
on existing instruments. The main intention of the second goal is then, to state the ideal
conditions under which the theoretical model developed in goal one should be tested.
In this sense, the theory of action to be proposed is expected to set the standards for
the measurement of its main concepts. This is considered a relevant goal to avoid misunderstandings about the meaning of relevant concepts in the guiding theory of action.
Finally the model proposed in goal one will be statistically tested using state of the art
multilevel models. The results will be described and interpreted with special emphasis
on their theory, methodology and public policy implications. It is of main importance to
keep theoretical abstraction and methodological sophistication connected to the pragmatic goals of public policy. In other words, particular attention will be payed to the
consequences of the proposed theory and methodology for policies to reduce crime and,
specifically, acts of violence.
The next chapter presents the necessary discussion about theoretical integration that
should give the reader a general notion about the meaning of such an exercise and its
relevance for the development of social science. A proposition for theoretical integration
follows, using inputs from relevant criminological and psychological theories. First the
original theories are summarized and then the proposed integrated theory of action is
explained in detail. The chapter ends with the explicit exposure of the research question
and hypotheses to be tested in order to check the predictive power of the action theory
as developed in the previous section.
The methodological chapter presents a short description of the data to be used to test
the model proposed. Also the operationalization of the variables is explained and measures of reliability are presented. The chapter ends with a general description of the
statistical methods implemented to test the hypotheses.
The results chapter presents the statistical analyses and tests of hypotheses. The findings
are critically discussed in the concluding chapter. The consequences for criminology
theory, methods of data collection and analysis, as well as for public policy, will be
discussed in the final chapter as well.
2. Theoretical Background
The analysis of crime has been characterized by many competing, and at times conflicting perspectives on crime and delinquency (Elliott et al. 1979, 3) that deal with
different aspects and levels of reality. Control theories are an important part of criminological studies. With all the changes they have gone through, they share the same main
proposition: everyone is capable of committing crime and control prevents him/her from
doing so (Bernard et al. 2010, 203f.).
Since the publication of A general theory of crime (GTC; Gottfredson and Hirschi
1990), control theories have placed special attention on self-control. Much has been
discussed about self-control as a predictor of crime (see e.g. Goode 2008; DeLisi and
Vaughn 2007; Geis 2000). Although many scholars criticize this theory, the fact is that
studies including its measure more often than not prove it as a significant predictor of
problematic conduct (for a meta-analysis see Engel 2012).
It seems clear that self-control plays a key role in crime causation. But there are at
least two critical points to be clarified. First, the meaning of self-control is still controversial and should be refined. It is now a commonplace in criminology to state that
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) failed to precisely define self-control, and just rested on
a description of behaviors that reflect intrinsically low self-control (e.g. Wikstrom and
Treiber 2007, 243; Tittle et al. 2004, 147).1 Moreover, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990)
tend to ignore the potential inputs of the conceptualization given by psychological theories of self-regulation. The problem of conceptualization is a critical one, because any
comprehensive test of a theory relies on the congruence between theoretical derivation
and operationalization (Marcus 2004, 35f.). Because Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990)
give no operational definition of self-control (Akers 1991, 204), researchers have been
forced ... to interpret the concept of self-control in their own manner, ... and come
up with their own measures of self-control. (Piquero 2008, 26f.). Although Hirschi
1
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) define low self-control as the tendency to pursue immediate gratification while not taking possible negative long-term consequences into account. They characterize people
having low self-control as being impulsive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-taking,
short-sighted, and nonverbal (p. 89f.).
Theoretical Background
and Gottfredson (1993) do manifest preference for behavioral measures of self-control

(p. 48), Akers (1991) makes the point that if offenses themselves were used as measures
of self-control, this would create a problem of tautology (p. 204).
The second critical point refers to integrating self-control theory with other explanatory theories that have proved to be good predictors of crime. Theoretical integration
has been fueling discussion for a long time in criminology (see e.g. Bernard et al. 2010,
327f.; Bernard 2001; Bernard and Snipes 1996; Messner et al. 1989). Those in favor of
it (e.g. Elliott et al. 1979) see it as an alternative to theoretical competition and falsification, as this last strategy has failed to reduce the number of criminology theories
(Bernard 2001, 335). However, those opposed to it (e.g. Hirschi 1979) see no compatibility between the basic models of delinquency theories -i.e. control, strain, and cultural
deviance models (Kornhauser 1978, 21ff.)- and therefore no possibility of theoretical integration.
In this chapter the state of the art in the debates about these two critical points is
presented. First the problem of theoretical integration in criminology is revisited to
conclude that a theory of action is needed. Next, a dual-system perspective is proposed
as a suitable theory of action to be applied on acts of crime and violence. In order to
support this statement, a summary of already existing dual-process theories in criminology is presented and a dual-system model of self-control derived from psychology is
described. The theoretical and methodological benefits of such a perspective are summarized and a revision of existent measuring instruments is presented. Finally, through the
adoption of a dual-system model of self-control, the research questions and hypotheses
will be derived.
2.1
Theoretical integration
Theoretical integration is defined by Thornberry (1989) as the act of combining two

or more sets of logically interrelated propositions into one larger set of interrelated
propositions, in order to provide a more comprehensive explanation of a particular phenomenon. (p. 52, italics from original). The essential and most difficult aspect of
this task is that theoretical integration can only be achieved when many theories form
a new theory that retains the premises of each theory (Bernard and Snipes 1996, p.
308). According to Liska et al. (1989) there are two types of theoretical integration:
propositional and conceptual.
Conceptual integration is when the theorist equates concepts in different theories, arguing that while the words and terms are different, the theoretical meanings and operations
of measurement are similar and is seen by the authors as useful only as a means to
propositional integration (p. 15). Bernard and Snipes (1996) put this nicely into
words: conceptual integration is nothing but playing games with words and meanings
(p. 308).
Hirschi (1979) defines three forms of propositional integration: end to end different
theories get sorted in a sequential order, so that the dependent variable in some prior
theory, becomes the independent variable in a new more general integrated theory (p.
34f.) , side by side the dependent variable of interest is divided into disjunctive parts,
e.g. different types of crimes that can each be explained by different theories (p. 35f.)
and, up and down there is one main theory, and other theories can be subsumed to
it (p.36) . These three types of integration can be further applied to the micro-level,
macro-level, or cross-level (Liska et al. 1989, 5).
Because of the difficulty of achieving propositional integration, some authors have proposed changes or even alternatives to it. Liska et al. (1989) describe the possibility of
a middle range integration, i.e. a more flexible form in which propositions of different theories are used to build a new theory, without necessarily retaining all the main
premises or the original definitions of the concepts from each original theory:
We can easily borrow ideas (concepts and propositions) from different theories and explore how they fit. Some propositions of different theories may be
incompatible because they are tightly linked to incompatible assumptions.
Other propositions, however, may not be so tightly linked to such assumptions, and some propositions of different theories may be deduced from a
common set of assumptions, even if they were originally derived from incompatible assumptions. (p. 17)
Thornberry (1989) even comes up with an alternative to theoretical integration, i.e.
theoretical elaboration:
Rather than starting with multiple theories and attempting to reconcile their
differences to generate a comprehensive model, theoretical elaboration explicitly starts with a particular theoretical model. Accepting its assumptions,
level of explanation, and causal structure, it attempts to build a more and
more comprehensive model by the logical extention of the basic propositions
contained in the model. (p. 56)
Finally, Bernard and Snipes (1996) defend a substantial reinterpretation of criminology

theories (p. 332). They argue that criminology theories should be interpreted and
classified in terms of their location of independent variation and direction of causation
giving raise to two categories of criminology theories: individual difference theories
and structure/process theories (Bernard et al. 2010, 338f.).2 Under this perspective,
full integration could be achieved through a single theory of crime that incorporates
the structural conditions that are associated with higher crime rates, the processes that
explain why normal individuals who experience these structural conditions are likely
to engage in crime, and the individual characteristics that make it more or less likely
that an individual will engage in crime regardless of structural conditions. (Bernard
and Snipes 1996, 342). They also state that although such a full integration should
be theoretically possible, it may not necessarily be desirable, so that it may be best
to attempt integration only within each category of theories, and not between them
(Bernard and Snipes 1996, 304).
The last argument does not mean that theories at one level can not include arguments of
other levels, on the contrary this may be desirable. With respect to individual difference
theories that include macro variables, Bernard and Snipes (1996) declare:
While integrating previously existing theories across levels of explanation
may be undesirable, new theories that incorporate arguments at both of
these levels of explanation may be both useful and feasible....
Such theories explain individual-level variation in criminal behavior using
both individual differences and the interaction between individual differences and structural position. When explaining individual differences with
a combination of individual and structural explanations, it is easy to avoid
committing an ecological fallacy. (p. 343)
As can be concluded from the exposition so far, what is meant by theoretical integration is already not always agreed and rarely made explicit (see e.g. Liska et al. 1989,
1; Thornberry 1989, 52). A truly propositional cross-level integration can be thought
as the gold standard. Nevertheless, achieving such an integration is very unlikely and
probably not worth the investment. In other words, cross-level integration in the terms
of Bernard and Snipes (1996) -i.e. a full integrated theory capable of explaining variation in both crime rates and individual likelihood of engaging in criminal behavior- may
2
In the same direction, Nagin and Paternoster (1993) write that [c]riminological theory has developed
along two separate and distinct tracks: in one time-stable individual differences distinguish offenders
from nonofenders, while other theories attribute crime to circumstances and situations in the social
setting that are external and proximate to the offender (467f.).
be too complex at the moment and not necessarily useful (p. 342f.).3 But at the same
time, development of theories at the level of the individual needs to account for the
impact that the environment has on the individual differences (Wikstrom et al. 2010,
56). In other words, a general theory of crime should not only explain why people have
different probabilities of committing crime, but need to also account for the role that
the environment has in influencing individual differences and as a trigger that allows
probabilities to become action.
The alternatives to the most purist views on theoretical integration already discussed
here, seem to be closely related to the actual stand of theoretical progress in criminology.
By relying on theories of action, newly developed theories of crime causation integrate
the statements of many existing theories into one theoretical frame. By doing so, they
do not necessarily retain the premises of each original theory. Integration through the
reliance on a theory of action seem much more flexible than a propositional integration
and allows e.g. some modifications to the original concepts and propositions taken from
existing criminology theories.
The next section describes two newly developed theories of action that have been applied to the explanation of crime. Finally, a dual-system perspective is presented and
promoted as a suitable theory of action to explain acts of violence.
2.2
Dual-system perspective
The demand for a theory of action in social science is not a new one. Coleman (1986)
critically revisited post-Parsonian social theories, and concluded by declaring that a
theory of purposive action that can relate individual actions to systemic functioning
is needed (p. 1332). In criminology, Bernard (1989) made the case for relying on the
relations that different component theories have to a theory of action as a way of integrating them (p. 140). As stated by Wikstrom et al. (2012), explaining the actual
causal process that directly links a person (crime propensity) and a setting (criminogenic
exposure) to an act of crime ... requires the integration of causally relevant personal and
environmental factors and analysis of their interaction within the context of an adequate
3
Bernard and Snipes (1996) state: The integration of individual difference and structure/process
theories is theoretically possible but remains a long-range goal pending the development of more advance
theoretical arguments and statistical techniques. (p. 304). Although such a full integration is not the
intention of this study, it is worth mentioning two examples of statistical and theoretical developments
that might point at the advance meant by Bernard and Snipes (1996).
In the statistical field, Goldstein et al. (2009) present a multivariate-multilevel model that allows for the
inclusion of more than one dependent variable at more than one level of analysis.
In the theoretical field, Messner (2012) made a proposal for a cross-level integration between Wikstr
oms Situational Action Theory (e.g. Wikstr
om et al. 2012; Wikstr
om 2006) and his and Rosenfelds
Institutional Anomie Theory (e.g. Messner and Rosenfeld 2007, 2001).
action theory. (p. 5f.), so that an action theory is a theory that details the process
(the mechanism) that produces action. (p. 8).
Understanding the mechanism that produce action, means understanding how society
models individual perception and, in turn, how individual action models society (i.e.
the macro-micro-macro relations, see Coleman 1986, 1322ff.). Rational choice theory is
considered to be the first theory of action to integrate person and situation in a convincing way (Lindenberg 2008, 669). Classical criminology has also relied on a reasoning
actor who can estimate costs and benefits when deciding to (or not to) commit crime
(see e.g. Bernard et al. 2010, 14ff.). But because actors do not always act in a rational
way, psychologists have been developing theories that can explain action as the result
of a process that only sometimes follows a rational calculation (see e.g. Chaiken and
Trope 1999; Kahneman 2003; Smith and DeCoster 2000). In criminology this has lead
to some attractive discussions and propositions about the role of human agency in crime
causation (see e.g. Gottfredson 2011; Kroneberg et al. 2010; McCarthy 2002; Paternoster
and Pogarsky 2009; Wikstr
om and Treiber 2007). As a consequence, some new theories
of action have been lately proposed that share the reliance on what has been called
variable rationality (see e.g. Kroneberg 2006, 2).
Psychological theories explaining variable rationality are usually labeled as dual-process

theories (see Chaiken and Trope 1999). According to Smith and DeCoster (2000) what
these theories share, is that they all try to explain three main components: how people
process in quick-and-dirty fashion, how they process when willing and able to engage in
extensive thought, and what conditions encourage such effortful processing (p. 108).
On the other side, the main difference between dual-process theories is the temporal and
logical relation assumed between types of process, i.e. whether they occur simultaneously or in a sequential way or even in an alternative way (p. 125).
In criminology, Wikstr
om and colleagues developed their own theory of action: the Situational Action Theory (SAT; see e.g Wikstrom 2006; Wikstrom et al. 2012). SAT defines
two perception choice processes that precede action: habit and rational deliberation (Wikstr
om et al. 2012, 19ff.). The situation is seen as the core unit of analysis
in criminology, and defined as the perception of action alternatives and process of
choice that follow from the interaction between person and setting (environment is
understood as everything outside the person, so that the analysis should be limited to
the setting, i.e. the part of the environment that is accessible through senses to the
person; Wikstr
om et al. 2012, 15). The situation then demarcates how much agency
an actor may apply to the process of action selection, i.e. the situation determines the
likelihood of an action followed by habit or by rational deliberation.
If the situation is at the center of interest, the next step would be to disentangle the
essential elements that conform it. According to Wikstrom et al. (2010) these are: at
the level of the person its crime propensity and, at the level of the setting its criminogenic exposure. Both elements can be further decomposed into morality and control.
If the morality of the person and the morality of the context correspond (i.e. both
encourage or both discourage an act of crime4 ), then the likelihood of an action in the
same direction as the correspondence is high. If the setting encourages acts of crime but
the persons morality discourages it, self-control comes into play. Finally if the context
discourages acts of crime but the persons morality encourages it, then social control in
the form of deterrence plays a role (p. 61).
Following Wikstr
om and Treiber (2007), morality is the key individual aspect that filters
what action alternatives an actor will take into consideration in a given situation. If the
setting is familiar to the actor, he or she will tend to act out of habit. But if the setting
is not familiar to the actor, he or she will tend to choose an action after some deliberation and self-control may be a part of this process. especially, as stated previously,
when there is a conflict between the moral rules of person and setting in the form of a
setting that encourages an act of crime and a person whos moral rules discourage it,
self-control will be involved in the process of deliberation (p. 245ff.).
In sum, SAT understands that the primary way in which morality causally affects crime,
is by filtering what action alternatives a person will perceive in a given situation, and
only in a secondary order (i.e. when already involved in deliberation) it also affects (together with controls) the way in which a person chooses between alternatives for action
(Wikstr
om 2010, 222).
Another newly developed theory of action that has been applied to crime, is Kronebergs
Model of Frame Selection (MFS; see e.g. Kroneberg 2006, 2007; Kroneberg et al. 2010).
The MFS has emerged as an answer to the absence in social science of a clear definition
of the situation and of variable rationality within a model of action (Kroneberg
2006, 9). Similarly to SAT, it specifies under what conditions behavior follows from
a cost-benefit calculus and under which it will be the result of an automatic reaction
(Kroneberg et al. 2010, 265). This is done by identifying three selections that precede
behavior in any given situation. First an actor needs to make a frame selection in
4
Wikstr
om (2006) defines act of crime as the act of breaking a moral rule defined in criminal law,
where a moral rule is a prescription of what is right and what is wrong in a given context (p. 63).
10
order to define the situation. That is, through situational objects an actor must get an
idea of in what kind of a situation he or she finds him-/herself. Once the actor has a
general idea of where he or she is, he or she must do a script selection. In this step he
or she searches for possible actions to choose from a list of actions that correspond to
the already selected frame and to his or her interpretation of how he or she is expected
to behave (i.e. that correspond to his definition of the situation). Finally follows an
action selection, i.e. he or she must choose to act (or not to) by selecting one of the
alternatives the chosen script presents (Kroneberg 2006, 10f.).
According to Kroneberg (2006), the way in which each of these selections is done can be
more or less conscious, so that the level of elaboration needed to produce action may vary.
This variation in levels of elaboration is dependent on the modes of information processing (or mode selections in short), which can follow either an automatic-spontaneous
mode (i.e. as-mode) or a reflecting-calculating mode (i.e. rc-mode). Depending on variables of the situation, the selection will tend to be made in an as-mode or in a rc-mode.
For example, a higher level of familiarity with the situation promotes an automatic answer (i.e. ready-to-use programs are easy to access). Also pressure for a fast reaction will
result in less elaborated selections. On the contrary, being highly motivated to choose
wisely because e.g. of the cost of wrongdoing, will promote the use of the extra effort
needed to apply selections in a rc-mode (p. 11f.). In the case of crime acts, strongly
internalized moral norms will lead to automatic answers (Kroneberg et al. 2010, 261).
MFS and SAT share many arguments and many differences are only terminological. For
example, the modes of selection described by the MFS are equivalent to the forms of
action defined by the SAT. That is, habitual form of action and deliberation in
SAT equate the as-mode and rc-mode in MFS, respectively (Messner 2012, 13).
Also both theories assume that only when values are not strongly internalized, people
proceed to evaluate the possibility of committing crime (Kroneberg et al. 2010, 264).
In this sense, according to both theories action or inaction is primarily an automated
response that depends on the socialization of the individuals and only secondly on variable characteristics of individuals and contexts (Kroneberg et al. 2010, 261).
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the connection between individual and environment is
already very convincingly explained by the SAT with its definition of the situation. One
particularly interesting consequence of the SAT is that it faces in a very convincing
way the problem of linking self-control with social control as stated by Taylor (2001).
This is done by defining self-control not as a trait -like Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990)
do in their GTC- but as a situational variable (Wikstrom and Treiber 2007, 243). As
11
Figure 2.1: SAT & MFS complemented
Environmental
Characteristics
Criminogenic
Exposure
causes of the causes
-moral rules of setting

-level of enforcement
(deterrence)
social/self
control link
SAT
(situation)
(crime propensity)
Morality/Norms
situational self-control
(executive capabilities)
Mode Selection
MFS
(variable rationality)
behavioral
outcome
Frames/Scripts
stated previously, according to the SAT self-control is the capability to resist temptation
in a situation where the contexts morality promotes an action that conflicts with the
individuals belief of what is good or bad. According to Wikstrom and Treiber (2007),
self-control will vary depending on the situation, but what remains mostly constant is
the trait responsible for the ability to exert self-control, i.e. the executive capability (p.
251). The representation of the environment the person creates is particularly dependent on this capability, too, so that the perception of deterrence will be influenced by
the levels of self-control an individual possesses in a given situation (p. 253).
One essential contribution that the MFS adds to the SAT is a deeper explanation of the
process through which action alternatives get filtered (Messner 2012, 13). The process
which is triggered by Morality/Norms in Figure 2.1 takes place inside the head of
a person. The frames and scripts as defined by MFS are to be found here. The way in
which selections are made, is a consequence of the situation, i.e. depends on characteristics of the setting and of the person. The individuals morality operates as a filter
of the frames and scripts that a person is going to consider in his selection process, and
also of the way in which these selections will be done (i.e. in a rc-mode or as-mode).
In social and cognitive psychology different dual-process and dual-system models have
been proposed to deal with variable rationality (see e.g. Chaiken and Trope 1999; Evans
2008; Kahneman 2003; Smith and DeCoster 2000). Dual-process theories share the idea
that there are two ways of processing information, with one being slow, conscious and
deliberative, and the other being rapid, unconscious and automatic (Evans 2008, 256).
12
Whether only different processes are recognized or also different underlying cognitive
systems, distinguishes dual-process from dual-system theories. One of the most influential works in this area is the one by Kahneman (2003). The author refers to both
systems as system 1 and system 2 (see Figure 2.2). While the names of the systems vary
between theories, the main idea is that system 1 is the more automatic one and system
2 the more reflective one.
Figure 2.2: Clusters of attributes associated with dual systems of thinking
Cluster 4
(Indiv. diff.)
Cluster 3
(Functional charact.)
Cluster 2
(Evolution)
Cluster 1
(Consciousness)
System 1
System 2
Unconscious
(preconscious)
Conscious
Implicit
Explicit
Automatic
Controlled
Low effort
High effort
Rapid
Slow
High capacity
Low capacity
Default process
Inhibitory
Holistic, perceptual
Analytic, reflective
Evolutionarily old
Evolutionarily recent
Evolutionary rationality
Individual rationality
Shared with animals
Uniquely human
Nonverbal
Linked to language
Modular cognition
Fluid intelligence
Associative
Rule based
Domain specific
Domain general
Contextualized
Abstract
Pragmatic
Logical
Parallel
Sequential
Stereotypical
Egalitarian
Universal
Heritable
Independent of
general intelligence
Linked to
general intelligence
Independent of
working memory
Limited by working
memory capacity
Source: Evans 2008, 257
One very interesting theory in this field, is Stracks and Deutschs Reflective-Impulsive
Model (RIM; see e.g. Strack and Deutsch 2004). The authors base their model on
the statements of Smith and DeCoster (2000), who identify two different memory systems that store different information and also operate in divergent ways. According to
the authors, there is the slow-learning system that operates through an associative
processing mode, and a fast-learning system that operates through a rule-based
13
processing mode (p. 110). Although the associative processing mode depends only on
the slow-learning system, the rule-based processing mode depends on both systems (p.
111). The general idea of RIM is that by defining two different systems that operate in
parallel and that may operate in accord or conflict with each other, variable rationality
can be explained (Strack and Deutsch 2004, 221f.).
According to Hofmann et al. (2009) the impulsive system is generating impulsive behavior that is the result of the activation of an associative cluster in the long-term memory.
The reflective system, on the other hand, complements the functions of the impulsive
system by adding higher order mental process, like the ones involved in executive functions and deliberation. The RIM also states that in a final step, both systems access the
motor cortex to activate behavior. So that both system are in a constant competition
to trigger behavior and who wins this competition will be decided in this final step and
depends on the strength of the activation of each system and on situational moderators
that may shift the degree of activation in favor of one system (p. 164f.).
In sum, the RIM as defined by Strack and Deutsch (2004) states that behavior follows
from the activation of determinants in an impulsive system or in a reflective system (p.
222). While the impulsive system is always activated and is responsible for automatic
answers applied to familiar settings, the reflective system may be disturbed through
situational moderators (p. 223). Hofmann et al. (2009) conducted a few experiments
to show under what conditions the capability of the reflective system to restrain standards may be altered. They show that the self-regulatory resources the reflective system
possesses at a given moment can be depleted through repetitive use. This implies that,
keeping everything else constant and within a close time period, with each new similar
impulse that has to be inhibited, the self-regulatory resources get reduced and the likelihood that a new impulse can be inhibited decreases. The authors also show that alcohol
consumption alters the functioning of the reflective system but not of the impulsive one,
so that under the influence of alcohol restraint standards may be affected (p. 168ff.).
2.3
Conceptualization and measurement
One of the influences that the SAT and the MFS have generated is that more and more
studies including some measure of morality or acceptance of norms and also some measure of deliberation, like self-control or cost-benefit calculation, are been published in
criminology (see e.g. Cops and Pleysier 2014; Kroneberg et al. 2010; Pauwels and Svensson 2011; Pauwels 2013; Pauwels and Svensson 2011; Pauwels 2013; Svensson et al. 2010;
van Gelder and deVries 2014; Wikstrom 2009; Wikstrom and Svensson 2010; Wikstrom
14
2012). Self-control and morality tend to be measured through self-reports (for the operationalization applied by Wikstrom and colleagues in most of their publications, see
Wikstr
om et al. 2012, 132ff.). Self-control is mostly analyzed using adapted versions of
the scale proposed by Grasmick and colleagues (Arneklev et al. 1993; Grasmick et al.
1993). Morality on the other side, tends to be measured with much more heterogeneous instruments. Usually, people are asked how good or how bad they find a
given behavior and/or how ashamed they would feel if getting caught doing something wrong (see e.g. Wikstrom and Butterworth 2006).
The problems of self-reports, especially when it comes to measuring sensible topics

through surveys, are quite known (see e.g. Tourangeau 2000, 255ff.). Also particular
problems with the Grasmick et al. (1993) self-control scale and with other instruments
used in criminology to measure self-control, have been largely acknowledged (see e.g.
Marcus 2004; Piquero 2008; Schulz and Beier 2012; Tittle et al. 2004). The first step in
developing good measures is to clearly define the concepts of interest (see e.g. Groves
2004, 50ff.). If the main interest lies in the interaction of some concepts, then both concepts need to be clearly defined as well as their interaction. The SAT makes a nice work
in defining individual morality and self-control and also how they interact. According
to Wikstr
om and Treiber (2007) when an actor exerts self-control in the process of deliberation, his or her executive capabilities in conjunction with situational variables will
define the levels of self-control he or she possesses, and these executive capabilities reside
in the brains prefrontal cortex. The prefrontal cortex can be further subdivided into
two parts responsible mostly for habit -i.e. the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)and another responsible mostly for deliberation -i.e. the orbital frontal cortex (OFC)(p. 253). These two subdivisions are then jointly responsible for the level of agency an
actor will put into action.
Keeping the interaction between propensity and exposition as explained by SAT, RIM
adds a different interpretation of the interaction between self-control and individual
morality. Explained through RIM, what is always activated is the impulsive system
or the long-term memory. The associations created by this system are slowly learned
through the history of the organism and provide quick answers to the environment depending on its needs and learning experiences (Hofmann et al. 2009, 164f.). In other
words, the learned associative clusters are primarily dependent on experience and repetition and only secondarily on the reflective adherence to moral norms. In this sense, the
tendency to impulsive behavior is closer to the perspective of Gottfredson and Hirschi
15
(1990) on self-control as a trait responsible for criminality.5
The premise made by Smith and DeCoster (2000) that the reflective system operates
as a rule-based processing mode means that the reflective system uses symbolically
represented and intentionally accessed knowledge as rules to guide processing (p. 111).
These internalized rules are socially learned and culturally shared (p. 112), so that they
can be in part equated to the morality and norms in the SAT and the MFS, respectively.
What people believe to be good or bad (independent of their actual behavior) is stored
in this system. The reflective system is also responsible to inhibit impulsive behavior
when necessary (Hofmann et al. 2009, 165), so that the executive functions defined by
SAT (i.e. as the capability to apply self-control when the morality of an actor contradicts the morality of the setting) would be part of this system (see also: Hofmann et al.
2012). That is, self-control as defined by SAT would be the result of operations by the
reflective system, while self-control (or low self-control) as seen by the GTC would be a
consequence of how the impulsive system operates.
In opposition to SAT and MFS, RIM defines no moral filter but an always activated
impulsive system that may or may not trigger behavior depending on the strength of the
activation of both systems and on situational moderators. In other words, there are two
ways of processing information that operate in parallel. Whether the action selection
process follows an automatic response or deliberation will normally depend on which system triggers action. The impulsive system is responsible for automatic responses while
the reflective is responsible for deliberation and may be more easily disturbed through
situational moderators (Strack and Deutsch 2004, 223).
The last statement can be seen as contradictory with regard to SAT and MFS, because
according to RIM moral norms get stored in the reflective system that is responsible
for deliberation, whereas the SAT and the MFS state that strongly internalized moral
norms would predict automatic action selection. This contradiction might be explained
through a theoretical and a methodological argument.
From a theoretical point of view, the reflective system relies on the impulsive one to
operate (but not the other way around; Strack and Deutsch 2004, 223). This means
that the reflective system is in part defined by the impulsive one. Strong internalized
values are expected to be stored in both systems (for a very nice in deep discussion
about how rational contents can get stored in the impulsive system and still be seen
5
It should be noted that according to Hofmann et al. (2009), trait self-control and impulsive determinants of behavior are two different things (p. 170). Nevertheless Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) include
impulsive behavior as one of the manifestations of low self-control (p. 90).
16
as rational, see: Sauer 2012). And even in cases of modifying routines, according to
the RIM the links made in the impulsive system are stable but can be changed gradually
through learning (Strack and Deutsch 2004, 223). This can be achieved through repetition and through a process that is referred as the process of consolidation, i.e. the
process through which newly formed memory is transferred by repeated presentation
from the fast binding to the slow-learning system (Smith and DeCoster 2000, 110).
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) also make the case for the transmission of contents
between systems: complex cognitive operations eventually migrate from System 2 to
System 1 as proficiency and skill are acquired (p. 51).
It can be hypothesized that newly learned moral norms can get strongly internalized
through this process of consolidation that changes the impulsive system. Consequently,
it would be expected that someone who strongly supports right and wrong as defined by
society should also have low impulsivity with respect to the particular behavior, which
leads to the methodological argument. In order for a measure of impulsivity to be valid
it needs to be specific to the temptation of interest, in this case violence, and each system should be measured by employing different instruments (Hofmann et al. 2009, 167f.).
Figure 2.3: The Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM)
Environmental
Characteristics
Situational
Moderators (SM)
situation
Reflective
System (RS)
RS*IS*SM
(state self-control)
variable
rationality
process of
consolidation
social/self
control link
self-control
outcome
Impulsive
System (IS)
(trait impulsivity)
The model to be tested in this study is summarized in Figure 2.3. In short, the impulsive
system produces impulsive behavior that can be restrained by the reflective system.
The outcome of this fight is also affected by situational and dispositional moderators
(Hofmann et al. 2009, 168ff.). The trait responsible for the ability to exert self-control
are the executive capabilities as defined by SAT. The trait responsible for the tendency
to act impulsively, is the trait of impulsivity and can be equated to the underlying
17
definition of self-control in GTC.6 Impulses (as opposed to trait of impulsivity) arise

when a latent motivation ... meets an activating stimulus (Friese and Hofmann 2009,
796). This implies that measures of impulsive determinants of behavior need to be
specific to the temptation of interest (Hofmann et al. 2009, 167). In the same way, state
self-control is dependent on the characteristics of the situation. Ideal measures of the
complete RIM should point at all these elements and their interplay so that states and
their determinants can be assessed and their effect on crime understood.
2.4
Research question and hypotheses
The perspective on integration adopted in this study follows SATs and MFSs example,
i.e. integration is pursued through the adoption of a theory of action, and not through the
more pure forms of theoretical integration (like a propositional integration respecting
each central argument of the component theories, and a cross-level integration capable of
explaining crime at the level of individuals as well as crime rates). Of the alternatives to
integration revisited in the previous pages, the one to be applied in this study resembles
what Thornberry (1989) defines as theoretical elaboration because a control perspective is chosen as a starting point. The dependent variable to be explained stays at the
level of individuals but environmental and individual characteristics, proved by criminology theories to predict crime, are to be linked through a dual-system theory of action.
The theoretical framework to be applied centers on the interaction between individual

and setting as explained by the SAT. However the interpretation of the interaction between self-control and individual morality differs in the RIM. Although the concepts of
self-control and morality and their operationalizations are similar to the ones applied by
most previous studies and also by the SAT, the framework used here changes the order
in which these factors predict acts of crime. The measure of self-control will be used
as a proxy to impulsive determinants of behavior, while morality is considered to be a
measure of the reflective determinants of behavior.7
The main focus in this study is on the predictive capability of the measures of both
systems (reflective and impulsive) and their interaction as shown in Figure 2.3. Acts of
violence are to be predicted. Accordingly, the main research question is:
6
In order to prevent confusion, any use of the word control should be avoided when referring to
the impulsive system, because the reflective is the one that restrains. Nevertheless, whether to define
this trait as self-control or impulsivity is more a question of focus, because both look at the same coin,
but from a different perspective (Friese and Hofmann 2009, 796).
7
It should also be stressed that according to the RIM impulsive determinants of behavior should
not be measured using self-reports. In this study classical measures of self-control are considered to be
proxies to the determinants of impulsive behavior, but one should be cautious as to its assumptions.
18
Can acts of violence be explained as outcomes of self-control that depend mainly on the
interplay of three determinants: reflective and impulsive determinants of behavior and
situational moderators?
The first hypothesis to be tested is that the interaction between determinants of both
systems predict acts of violence better than their non-interacted measures. This hypothesis relies also on the assumption that each system has a significant effect on acts of
violence. With respect to the role of situational moderators, the effect of intoxication
will be tested. It is expected that it has a significant effect on acts of violence and
that the interaction between the determinants of behavior in both systems is moderated by this situational variable. Taking into account the arguments of SAT, MFS and
RIM, this study considers four possible combinations between reflective and impulsive
determinants of behavior that may lead to either more automatically or more controlled
action selection (see Table 2.1). When the norms are strongly internalized (as verbalized
through self-report) and the impulsivity is low, an automatic adherence to the moral
rules of society is expected. When there is rejection to the norms of society and also high
impulsivity, an automatic response is expected in the form of acts of violence. In the two
remaining cases, i.e. strong acceptance of moral norms and high impulsivity, or strong
rejection of moral norms and low impulsivity, a fight between systems is expected in
order to decide who triggers action. As a consequence, a more influential moderation of
situational variables is expected for these last two combinations. The second hypothesis
deals with this idea.
Table 2.1: Impulsive and controlled outcomes: four scenarios

high impulsivity
low impulsivity
pro violence
automatic (+)
fight (social control)
against violence
fight (state self-control)
automatic ()
Because according to the RIM the impulsive system is always activated while the reflective system may be disengaged from processing information (asymmetry as defined
by Strack and Deutsch 2004, 223) and the associative processing mode draws solely on
the slow-learning system, [while] the rule-based processing mode uses both memory systems, not just the fast-learning one (Smith and DeCoster 2000, 111), it is assumed that
the information stored in the impulsive system should precede the information stored
in the reflective system. In other words, it is expected that the effect of the impulsive
determinants of behavior is mediated by the reflective ones. This will be tested in the
third hypothesis.
19
With respect to the role of the environment, it has been largely argued that characteristics of the context, like school climate, have an impact on acts of crime (see e.g.
Gottfredson 2001; Siegmunt 2012). In this study it is assumed that the school setting
should have a direct effect on the reflective determinants of behavior but not on the impulsive ones. Specifically this means that characteristics of the environment, should have
a direct effect on the morality of pupils (i.e. their opinion about right and wrong) and
their morality should have a causal effect on acts of crime (moderated by self-control).
This is the fourth and final hypothesis.
Formally, the following hypotheses will be tested:

H1: Reflective and impulsive determinants of behavior interact to predict selfcontrol outcomes.
H2: Intoxication moderates the interaction between impulsive and reflective determinants of behavior.
H3: The effect of impulsive determinants of behavior is mediated by the reflective
ones.
H4: School climate effect on acts of violence is mediated by reflective determinants
of behavior.
3. Methods
In this chapter the data used is described, the operationalization of variables is explained and measures of reliability are investigated. Finally the statistical techniques
implemented are generally described.
3.1
Data source
Data from the second International Self-Report Delinquency (ISRD-2) study is used
(Enzmann et al. 2010; Junger-Tas et al. 2012, 2010). The ISRD-2 is the follower of the
ISRD-1 (Junger-Tas et al. 2003). The ISRD project is a cross-national survey with a
comparative design that collects data on juvenile delinquency and victimization (Marshall and Enzmann 2012a, 21ff.). In its second wave, comparability standards have been
improved and assessed (see e.g. Enzmann 2013).
The sampled population are classes of grade 7 to grade 9 (students mostly between 12
and 14 years old) in schools of 30 different countries (see Table 3.1 for the descriptive
values of the general sample and each country). The sampling units are the classes,
weighted by number of pupils. Representation at the level of cities and not of countries
is pursued, with a goal of at least two medium to large cities by country (with exception,
see Table 3.1). In order to keep the results of the different countries comparable, a
standardized self-report survey is applied with emphasis on standardization of meaning
and not of words (see e.g. Harkness et al. 2010). One of the main objectives of the
ISRD-2, is the explanation of delinquent and criminal behavior through the test of
criminological theories (Enzmann et al. 2010, 161).
3.2
3.2.1
Operationalization
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the life-time prevalence of at least one of three acts of violence:
assault, group fight, carrying a weapon. The prevalences for each question and for the
20
Methods
21
Table 3.1: Sample description
Country
Cities
Schools
Classes
% Included
N Included
Armenia
Aruba
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia/H.
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Lithuania
NL Antilles
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Slovenia
Spain
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
USA
Venezuela
5
1
7
4
2
5
3
1
3
1
3
7
2
1
7
15
5
2
17
3
7
3
5
5
4
2
3
3
4
5
15
10
45
43
37
16
91
65
100
44
23
68
101
26
37
95
47
33
40
41
46
57
41
41
80
87
74
70
15
47
93
29
125
149
85
102
160
81
129
77
66
158
109
32
73
273
93
100
114
83
90
120
121
117
80
111
119
205
148
94
.977
.833
.956
.900
.875
.858
.941
.879
.889
.999
.893
.941
.939
.927
.884
.956
.939
.919
.946
.867
.937
.944
.954
.936
.904
.900
.894
.969
.888
.758
1,997
587
2,863
2,077
1,764
1,981
3,055
1,210
2,320
1,363
2,141
3,271
2,069
548
1,381
5,064
2,042
1,583
2,204
1,468
1,366
2,470
2,206
2,091
1,617
2,158
2,040
3,531
2,132
1,760
Total
135
1,535
3,336
.919
62,359
prevalence of at least one of the three acts (called violence) can be seen in Table 3.2. The
valid cases for each question vary, because of omissions of only particular questions. The
final violence prevalence includes each case that answered at least one of the violence
related questions. The questions were formulated as follows (in the english version for
USA):
assault: Did you ever threaten somebody with a weapon or to beat them up, just
to get money or other things from them?
gr.fight: Did you ever participate in a group fight on the school playground, a
football stadium, the streets or in any public place?
weapon: Did you ever carry a weapon, such as a stick, knife, or chain (not a
pocket-knife)?
Methods
22
Table 3.2: Violence related prevalences by country
Country
assault
valid
gr.fight
valid
weapon
valid
violence
valid
Armenia
Aruba
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia/H.
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Lithuania
NL Antilles
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Slovenia
Spain
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
USA
Venezuela
.014
.028
.022
.020
.009
.018
.006
.013
.018
.007
.023
.043
.011
.009
.026
.015
.009
.020
.030
.014
.010
.005
.011
.007
.010
.013
.015
.013
.021
.011
1,996
577
2,855
2,048
1,759
1,965
3,047
1,202
2,311
1,363
2,128
3,251
2,057
547
1,367
5,034
2,034
1,575
2,196
1,466
1,363
2,456
2,204
2,079
1,600
2,134
2,024
3,493
2,112
1,724
.184
.125
.115
.131
.112
.124
.109
.116
.074
.072
.190
.130
.089
.059
.249
.151
.086
.081
.154
.057
.073
.088
.084
.068
.096
.069
.074
.086
.094
.077
1,983
584
2,850
2,046
1,748
1,938
3,036
1,194
2,300
1,363
2,106
3,252
2,038
546
1,361
5,028
2,033
1,562
2,194
1,466
1,359
2,454
2,195
2,077
1,605
2,133
2,017
3,485
2,117
1,732
.057
.107
.061
.104
.029
.026
.072
.110
.095
.076
.080
.099
.061
.057
.122
.050
.081
.078
.098
.057
.069
.036
.053
.052
.048
.067
.064
.077
.096
.028
1,994
582
2,850
2,059
1,752
1,951
3,041
1,199
2,313
1,363
2,124
3,247
2,046
547
1,369
5,047
2,031
1,568
2,192
1,463
1,360
2,464
2,200
2,084
1,609
2,137
2,020
3,499
2,116
1,743
.198
.174
.146
.184
.120
.132
.158
.179
.152
.125
.218
.191
.129
.099
.285
.171
.141
.137
.201
.089
.119
.109
.117
.105
.119
.113
.111
.135
.154
.090
1,997
587
2,863
2,077
1,764
1,981
3,055
1,210
2,320
1,363
2,141
3,271
2,069
548
1,381
5,064
2,042
1,583
2,204
1,468
1,366
2,470
2,206
2,091
1,617
2,158
2,040
3,531
2,132
1,760
Total
.016
61,967
.110
61,802
.069
61,970
.149
62,359
3.2.2
3.2.2.1
Independent variables
Impulsive determinants of behavior
Impulsive determinants of behavior will be measured through a shortened version of the

self-control scale by Grasmick et al. (see Grasmick et al. 1993; Arneklev et al. 1993
for the original scale and Marshall and Enzmann 2012b,a for a detailed description of
the psychometric properties of the questions included in ISRD-2). Although impulsive
determinants of behavior should not be measured through self-reported data (Hofmann
et al. 2009, 167f.), it is expected that the self-control scale can serve as a proxy. The
exercise presented here should be considered as a preliminary test of a dual-system
perspective. The questions and subscales are as follow (answer categories: 1.agree fully;
2.agree somewhat; 3.disagree somewhat; 4.disagree fully):
Impulsivity (IM):
1. I act on the spur of the moment without stopping to think.
Methods
23
2. I do whatever brings me pleasure here and now, even at the cost of some
distant goal.
3. Im more concerned with what happens to me in the short run than in the
long run.
Risk-taking (RT):
4. I like to test myself every now and then by doing something a little risky.
5. Sometimes I take a risk just for the fun of it.
6. Excitement and adventure are more important to me than security.
Self-centeredness (CE):
7. I try to look out for myself first, even if it means making things difficult for
other people.
8. If things I do upset people, its their problem not mine.
9. I will try to get the things I want even when I know its causing problems for
other people.
Volatile temper (TE):
10. I lose my temper pretty easy.
11. When Im really angry, other people better stay away from me.
12. When I have a serious disagreement with someone, its usually hard for me
to talk about it without getting upset.
First the four sub-scales previously presented are constructed through simple row mean
calculation. In order for a respondent to get a valid value in each of the sub-scales, he
or she must have answered at least two of the three composing questions. The final
impulse scale is the simple row mean of the sub-scales. For the final scale, only cases
with valid answers in all the sub-scales are included. Finally the impulse scale is median centered and rescaled to standard deviation unit (see Table 3.3 for the descriptive
statistics of the final scale before and after being standardized, and Figure 3.1 for the
scales histogram; the correlations between items including the final scale is shown in
the appendix in Table A.1). The scale reliability coefficient (Cronbachs ) of the final
scale is .823.
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics: impulsive determinants of behavior (scale)

Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Q.25
Median
Q.75
Max
impulse
impulse (std)
2.165
-.002
.601
1.000
1.000
-1.940
1.750
-.693
2.167
.000
2.583
.693
4.000
3.048
Methods
24
Figure 3.1: Histogram: impulsive determinants of behavior
percent
mean = .002
2
controlled
3.2.2.2
3
impulsive
Reflective determinants of behavior
As a measure of the reflective determinants of behavior, pro-violence values have been

asked through 5 items (see Marshall and Enzmann 2012a, 57; answer categories: 1.agree
fully; 2.agree somewhat; 3.disagree somewhat; 4.disagree fully):
1. A bit of violence is part of the fun
2. One needs to make use of force to be respected
3. If one is attacked, one will hit back
4. Without violence everything would be much more boring
5. It is completely normal that boys want to prove themselves in physical fights with
others
The reflect scale is generated by calculating the simple row mean of the five items. Only
cases with three or more valid answers are included. The reflect scale is then median
centered and rescaled to standard deviation unit (see Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2 for a
description of the final scale; the correlations between items and final scale is shown in
the appendix Table A.2). The scale reliability coefficient (Cronbachs ) is .705.
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics: reflective determinants of behavior (scale)

Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Q.25
Median
Q.75
Max
reflect
reflect (std)
2.998
-.305
.661
1.000
1.000
-3.326
2.600
-.907
3.200
.000
3.400
.302
4.000
1.210
Methods
25
mean = .305
percent
10
15
Figure 3.2: Histogram: reflective determinants of behavior
3
accept viol.
3.2.2.3
1
reject viol.
Situational moderators
Situational variables are those that may influence the fight between systems. In other
words, variables that may shift the likelihood of triggering action in favor of one of both
systems. Characteristics of the situation like friends pushing a classmate to do something
wrong may be considered. In this study a variable measuring life-time intoxication is
included under the assumption that the consumption of alcohol and/or drugs should
alter the inhibiting capabilities of the reflecting system. A value of one or yes, is
assigned to someone who has been at least one time drunk (2 items) or has taken drugs
(4 items). Cases having answered at least one of the items are included (see Table 3.5
for the descriptive statistics).
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics: life-time intoxication (scale and items)
Variable
life-time
life-time
life-time
life-time
life-time
life-time
3.2.2.4
prev
prev
prev
prev
prev
prev
intoxication (scale)
drunk beer/wine
drunk spirits
hash
XTC
L/H/C/her/co
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
62,359
61,641
61,556
61,917
61,863
61,879
.274
.234
.163
.088
.013
.010
.446
.423
.369
.283
.115
.100
Environmental variables
School climate related characteristics (i.e. school disorganization) will be included, aggregated at the level of the school. These characteristics should be capable of influencing
the pro-violence values of the pupils -i.e. their reflective system- and also on the long
Methods
26
run -through the process of consolidation- their impulsive system. The following four
items are included (answer categories: 1.not at all true; 2.not true; 3.true; 4.very true):
1. There is a lot of stealing in my school.
2. There is a lot of fighting in my school.
3. Many things are broken or vandalized in my school.
4. There is a lot of drug use in my school
A scale at the level of pupils is first generated through row means of cases with three
or more valid answers. This scale has an value of .748. A linear multilevel regression
is estimated with this scale as dependent variable and no predictors, in order to get the
value of the scale or its ecological reliability (Raudenbush and Sampson 1999). The
following formula is used:
=
.152
u2
=
= .874
N
2
2
u + (e / n )
.152 + (.407/ 61,913
)
3,336
where u2 is the between variance, e2 the within variance, N the size of the complete
sample included in the analyses, and n the number of clusters. This scale is further
aggregated at the level of classes using group means. The final scale at level of classes is
then median centered and standard deviation rescaled (see Table 3.6 and Figure 3.3 for
the descriptive statistics of the scale and Table A.3 for the correlations between items).
Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics: school disorganization scale
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Q.25
Median
Q.75
Max
school disorg. (L1)

school disorg. (L2)
school disorg. (L2; std)
61,913
62,359
62,359
2.127
2.127
.058
.746
.414
1.000
1.000
1.000
-2.663
1.500
1.833
-.651
2.000
2.103
.000
2.500
2.409
.739
4.000
4.000
4.580
3.2.3
Control Variables
To avoid spurious relations between the dependent variable and the independent variables of interest, control variables will be included. The controls represent all relevant
variables in the prediction of acts of violence at hand and also of the reflective determinants of behavior. This is because of the mediation analyses (see the next section).
Controls included are:

Characteristics of individuals:
gender: Are you male or female? (1 = male; 0 = female).
age: How old are you? (continuous; between 11-18).
Methods
27
Figure 3.3: Histogram: school disorganization scale (agg.)
percent
mean = .043
order
4
disorder
migration: Generated out of three questions (cases with at least one valid
answer included): Where you born in this country?; In what country was
your mother born?; In what country was your father born? (1 = at least one
member of family born in another country; 0 = else).
Family related variables:
violence at home: Have you ever experienced any of the following serious
events? Repeated serious conflicts or physical fights between your parents,
by parents we also mean step- or adoptive parents (1 = yes; 0 = no).
traditional family structure: Are you living with your own mother and
father? (1 = Yes, I live with my own mother and father; 0 = other).
family bonding: Scale out of two questions (cases with at least one valid
answer included): How do you usually get along with the man you live with
(father, stepfather....)?; How do you usually get along with the woman you
live with (your mother or stepmother)? (1 = not well at all, 2 = not so well,
3 = rather well, 4 = very well; row mean, median centered and rescaled to
standard deviation unit).
Others:
neighborhood disorganization: Scale out of five questions (cases with at
least three valid answers included): There is a lot of crime in my neighborhood; There is a lot of drug selling; There is a lot of fighting; There are a lot
of empty and abandoned buildings; There is a lot of graffiti (1 = not at all
Methods
28
Table 3.7: Descriptive statistics: control variables
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Q.25
Median
Q.75
Max
male
migration
age
violence at home
family bonding
family bonding (std)
family structure
grade
neigborhood disorg.
neigborhood disorg. (std)
.486
.230
13.948
.110
3.642
-.669
.732
8.019
1.631
.329
.500
.421
1.146
.313
.535
1.000
.443
.817
.704
1.000
.000
.000
11.000
.000
1.000
-5.612
.000
7.000
1.000
-.568
.000
.000
13.000
.000
3.500
-.935
.000
7.000
1.000
-.568
.000
.000
14.000
.000
4.000
.000
1.000
8.000
1.400
.000
1.000
.000
15.000
.000
4.000
.000
1.000
9.000
2.000
.852
1.000
1.000
18.000
1.000
4.000
.000
1.000
9.000
4.000
3.691
true, 2 = not true, 3 = true, 4 = very true; row mean, median centered and
rescaled to standard deviation unit).
school grade: Meta-data (categorical variable; 7th -reference-, 8th , 9th )
3.3
3.3.1
Statistical analyses
Multilevel analysis
ISRD-2 data is of a multilevel nature. At least five levels can be recognized, from the
lowest to the highest these are: pupils, classes, schools, cities, countries. Also country clusters could be defined, for example with respect to decommodification (EspingAndersen 1990). In this study, the dependent variable is the life-time prevalence of
acts of violence, i.e. the outcome of a Bernoulli trial or a dummy variable. Therefore
nonlinear models are the better choice. Because non-linear models are already complex,
extra complexity should be avoided. In this case, random intercepts only at the level of
schools are included. By clustering at the level of schools, a very big sample size at each
level can be achieved and a better homogenization of the environmental conditions (see
e.g. Oberwittler and Wikstr
om 2009).
Following Guo and Zhao (2000), the reliance on multilevel models has at least four advantages: first multilevel analyses is the adequate framework for analyzing multilevel
data, second it corrects for possible biases resulting from the clustering nature of the
data, third it also corrects for standard errors, and fourth it allows to decompose the
total variances of the dependent variable into variance explained at each level (p. 444f.).
Methods
29
The estimator used in this study is maximum likelihood (MLE; see Winkelmann and
Boes 2006, 44ff.).8 Under random sampling it is possible to assume independence between observations and that all observations come from the same data generating process, so that they are identically independent distributed (iid). The probability of observing yi given the unknown parameters can be described as the probability or density
function of yi , i.e. f (yi ; ). Because the observations are independent of each other, the
joint probability function of the sample is the product of the individual probability funcQ
tions, i.e. f (y1 , ..., yn ; ) = ni=1 f (yi ; ).
MLE changes the function of the random sample y1 , ..., yn given , for a function of
given the random sample y1 , ..., yn . This leads to the likelihood function:
L() = L(; y) =
n
Y
i=1
L(; yi ) =
n
Y
f (yi ; )
i=1
where L(; yi ) is the likelihood contribution of a given observation and L() = L(; y) =
L(; y1 , ..., yn ) is the likelihood function of the whole sample.
Once the likelihood function is defined, the estimation process consists of finding the pa that produce the maximum value for the likelihood function.
rameter estimates (i.e. )
The bigger the value of the likelihood function, the better the estimated parameters
fit the sample. If the assumptions made for the maximum likelihood estimation are
right, then maximum likelihood is consistent, asymptotic normal, and efficient (see e.g.
Amemiya 1985, 115ff.).
In the case of non-linear models, the reliance on multilevel models when the data is
of a multilevel nature is more important than in linear models. The reason is that for
non-linear models estimated with maximum likelihood, the consistency of the estimator
depends on the likelihood function being specified correctly (see e.g. Greene 2012, 712ff.).
In other words, heteroskedasticity in non-linear models does not only affect the standard
errors, but also the consistency of the coefficients. Relying on robust standard errors is
not really an option for non-linear models, because in the presence of heteroskedasticity
the likelihood function is not specified correctly. While robust standard errors may correct the standard errors, the coefficients may still be inconsistent. That is, while using
robust standard errors for non-linear models that are correctly specified is not necessary,
their use in models that are wrongly specified could produce an appropriate asymptotic
8
For the ease of explanation, a one level empty model is explained here (i.e. yi instead of yij and
no covariates included). The same results applied here work if covariates are included (i.e. f (yi |xi ; )).
The extra difficulties of multilevel models are discussed later.
Methods
30
covariance matrix for an estimator that is inconsistent (see Freedman 2006).
At least two different formulations are commonly used to describe non-linear models: as
random utility models for individual choice and as a latent regression model. Here the
latent formulation is explained (taken mostly from Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 475ff.;
Goldstein 2011, 111ff.; Greene 2012, 686ff.; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012, 520ff.;
Snijders and Bosker 1999, 223f.; Winkelmann and Boes 2006, 95ff.). The description
that follows is limited to random intercept models only, i.e. each cluster (school) may
differ with respect to the intercept but the slopes are fixed across clusters.
Because the observed outcome is a binary response variable that has a Bernoulli probability function, i.e.:
y
f (yij |xij , uj ) = ijij (1 ij )1yij
yij = 0, 1
where ij = P (yij = 1|xij , uj ), a link function is needed that allows to link the
predictions in the observed outcome to the expected value of a latent (unobserved)
continuous variable:
yij
= x0ij + uj + eij
where x0ij = 0 + 1 x1ij + ... +k xkij and xij can be a variable at the level of individuals
or at the higher level (i.e. x.j or generally in the literature zj ).
The different models for binary response variables, differ in the way that ij is parameterized through the assumption about the distribution of eij . The link between latent
and observed models can be seen as follows:
1 if y 0
ij
yij =
0 if y < 0
ij
the latent one. It follows:
where yij is the observed binary variable and yij
ij = P (yij
0|xij , uj ) = P (x0ij + uj + eij 0|xij , uj )
= P (eij (x0ij + uj )|xij , uj )

= 1 P (eij < (x0ij + uj )|xij , uj )
where the last equality is valid for symmetric distributions and shows that the observed
variable is used to model the probability of the latent equation of exceeding the threshold
Methods
31
of zero9 . When assuming that eij has a standard logistic distribution, i.e. a logistic
distribution with mean 0 and variance 2 /3:
P (eij < a) =
exp(a)
= (a)
1 + exp(a)
a multilevel logit model is relied on. The conditional function of the logit model is given
by:10
1 P (eij <
(x0ij
exp(x0ij + uj )
exp[(x0ij + uj )]
=
+ uj )|xij , uj ) = 1
1 + exp[(x0ij + uj )]
1 + exp(x0ij + uj )
so that
ij = G(x0ij + uj ) =
exp(x0ij + uj )
= (x0ij + uj )
1 + exp(x0ij + uj )
Applying some algebra,

ij =
exp(x0ij + uj )
1 + exp(x0ij + uj )
ij + ij exp(x0ij + uj ) = exp(x0ij + uj )
ij = exp(x0ij + uj ) ij exp(x0ij + uj )
ij = exp(x0ij + uj )(1 ij )
ij
= exp(x0ij + uj )
1 ij

ij
ln
= x0ij + uj
1 ij
The logit link function is then defined as logit(ij ) = ln(ij /(1 ij )).
This is only one of many possible functions G(x0ij +uj ). For example, assuming that eij
has a standard normal distribution, leads to the probit model with the function (x0ij +
uj ). Independently of the assumption about the distribution of eij , the likelihood of
cluster j would be
nj
Y
[G(x0ij + uj )]yij [1 G(x0ij + uj )]1yij
i=1
If the random intercepts uj were observed, this likelihood would be enough to estimate
the parameters in the model. But because they are unobserved, a solution is needed to
solve for the fact that ij is conditional on uj , i.e. that ij = G(x0ij + uj ) = P (yij =
9
Using zero as a threshold is an innocent assumption, as far as the model contains a constant term
(Greene 2012, 686).
exp(a)
1
10
Keep in mind that,
.
1 + exp(a)
1 + exp(a)
Methods
32
1|xij , uj ). Treating the uj as an unobserved normally distributed and uncorrelated random variables, i.e. uj N(0, u2 ),11 and relying on the theorem from Bayes,12 allows to
integrate the random intercepts out, so that ij is no longer conditional on uj (this solution is known as the Butler and Moffitts method and is also applied to estimate random
effects non-linear panel models; see e.g. Greene 2012, 582). Formally, the joint probability of all responses for cluster j conditional on the random intercept and covariates is
given by:
Z
P (yj |xj ) =
P (yj |xj , uj )(uj )duj
However the density unconditional on uj , i.e. P (yj |xj ), has no closed expression. Different options exist to solve for this problem, e.g. numerical integration relying on
quadrature approximation (like Gauss-Hermite). In this study mean-variance adaptive
GaussHermite quadrature is used (the default in Stata), which has the advantage of
relying on the maximum likelihood estimation, so that fit measures based on maximum
likelihood can be used after estimation (e.g. BIC and AIC criterion).
The marginal likelihood is finally given by the product of the marginal joint probabilities
of the responses in each cluster:
L(, u2 )
N
Y
P (yj |xj )
j=1
With respect to the results presented in this study, three considerations should be kept
in mind. First, multilevel models can produce predictions of: only the fixed part, only
the random part, or both. In this study only the fixed part is included to estimate
predicted probabilities and marginal effects. This implies fixing the random intercept at
zero, its theoretical mean value.
Secondly, the model is non-linear multiplicative (while OLS is linear additive), which
implies that marginal effects are conditional on the values of the variable of interest and
also on the values of all the other covariates in the model (see e.g. Winkelmann and
11
The assumption that E(uj ) = 0 produce no loss of generality as long as an intercept is included in
the model (see: Wooldridge 2010, 612).
12
The theorem from Bayes states that, for two random variables X, Y , the conditional density of X
given Y = y, equals the joint density of X, Y divided by the marginal density of Y (see e.g. Mosler and
Schmid 2006, 27ff.). Formally,
fxy (x, y)
fx|y (x, y) =
fy (y)
so that,
fxy (x, y) = fx|y (x, y)fy (y)
Methods
33
Boes 2006, 104f.). For continuous variables this looks as follows:13
G(x0 )
=
= g(x0 )h
xh
xh
where g(x0 ) is the first derivative of the function G(x0 ). For discrete changes, the
difference in the predictions before and after the discrete change should be used, i.e.
G(x0 + xh h ) G(x0 ). In the case of binary response variables, this is equal to the
difference in the predictions with and without the coefficient associated to the dummy
variable. For logit models the marginal probability effects for continuous variables can
be written as,
exp(x0 )
(x0 )
= (x0 )[1 (x0 )]h =
h
xh
[1 + exp(x0 )]2
This means that there is no one unique marginal effect to interpret. In order to produce
one single expected effect for a typical person, two types of expectations are possible. One option is to estimate the expected marginal effect, i.e. Ex [g(x0 )]h , using
the prediction of each unit in the sample with their given values for the covariates, and
P
then calculate the average over the individual effects, i.e. N 1 g(x0 )h . The second
option is to estimate the marginal effect for the expected values of the independent variables, i.e. g(E(x)0 )h , relying on the mean values of the covariates in the sample, i.e.
g(
x0 )h . In this study the second option is applied, although some covariates may be
fixed on specific values.
In the case of two-way interactions in non-linear models, marginal effects are

G(x0 )
= g(x0 )(1 + 12 x2 )
x1
P
where G(x0 ) = G(1 x1 + 2 x2 + 12 x1 x2 + h h xh ). For logit models this translates
to:
(x0 )
exp(x0 )
= (x0 )[1 (x0 )](1 + 12 x2 ) =
(1 + 12 x2 )
x1
[1 + exp(x0 )]2
Three-way interactions look as follow:
G(x0 )
= g(x0 )(1 + 12 x2 + 13 x3 + 123 x2 x3 )
x1
where,
G(x0 ) = G(1 x1 + 2 x2 + 3 x3 + 12 x1 x2 + 13 x1 x3 + 23 x2 x3 + 123 x1 x2 x3 +
13
h h xh )
As stated previously, only the fixed part is included in the estimation of marginal effects. For
simplicity, ij subscripts are omitted in the presentation that follows.
Methods
34
The marginal probability effect for three-way interaction in logit models is then:
(x0 )
= (x0 )[1 (x0 )](1 + 12 x2 + 13 x3 + 123 x2 x3 )
x1
exp(x0 )
=
(1 + 12 x2 + 13 x3 + 123 x2 x3 )
[1 + exp(x0 )]2
In the last years many authors have cautioned on the reliance of statistic programs
that ignore the form of marginal effects in non-linear models that include interactions,
estimating them as in the case of linear models (see e.g. Ai and Norton 2003; Greene
2010; Powers 2005). Ai and Norton (2003) propose a way of interpreting the marginal
effect of the interaction term itself, which in the case of a two-way continuous interaction
is:
2 G(x0 )
= 12 g(x0 ) + (1 + 12 x2 )(2 + 12 x1 )g 0 (x0 )
x1 x2
where g 0 (x0 ) is the second derivative of the function G(x0 ). In the case of the logit
model,
2 (x0 )
1 exp(x0 )
12 exp(x0 )
= (1 + 12 x2 )(2 + 12 x1 )exp(x0 )
+
x1 x2
[1 + exp(x0 )]3 [1 + exp(x0 )]2
The result of this equation should resemble the coefficient for the interacted term in
linear regression, i.e. the difference in the slope for the interacted variables. Whether
the obtained result is different to zero, could be directly tested. Greene (2010) is skeptic
about the interpretation of this cross derivative and the test about its significance. He
suggests to interpret the predictions of models with and without the interactions and
their respective marginal effects using graphs instead of abstract statistical tests. In this
study Greenes perspective is shared and implemented.
The third aspect to keep in mind, is that the estimates of non-linear models are rescaled
to produce the assumed level 1 variance (1 by probit and 2 /3 by logit). This normalization is necessary to identify the models (a very nice description of this issue using probit
model can be found in: Winkelmann and Boes 2006, 101; a more detailed presentation of
this issue in particular for logit models can be found in: Train 2003, 53ff.). Nevertheless,
for all models the same assumption about the level 1 variance is made, so that all models
are rescaled to produce the same level 1 variance. This implies, e.g., that there would
be no explained level 1 variance between nested models. More importantly, because
the coefficients and higher-level variances of different (nested) models are rescaled to
produce the same level 1 variance, they can not be compared between models (see e.g.:
Hox 2010, 133ff.).
Methods
35
In order to make the variances comparable between nested models, Fielding (2004)
proposes to consider the total variance as the sum of the variances at each level and the
explained variance, i.e. the variance of the predicted values using only the fixed part of
the model:
2
2
M
= e2 + u2 + x
k
2 is the total variance of model k. This resembles OLS in that the total variance
where M
k
of a variable can be separated into explained and unexplained variances. In an empty

2 ) is by construction zero. So the total
model, the variance of the predicted values (x
2 = 2 + 2 . According to Fielding (2004) it is
variance of the empty model is only M
e
u
0
possible to rescale the variances of nested models in order to make them comparable.
The scale correction factor (SCF) is equal to the total variance in the empty model
divided by the total variance in model k but using the within and between variances of
the empty model. Formally,
SCF =
2
2
e;M
+ u;M
0
0
2
2
2
e;M
+ u;M
+ x;M
0
0
k
2
2
where e;M
and u;M
are the within and between variances in the empty model respec0
0
2
tively, and x;M
is the variance of the predicted values from the fixed part of model k.
k
The variances in model k should then be multiplied by this scale in order to make them
comparable to the empty model.
In this study the scale correction factor proposed by Fielding (2004) is used in each model
to make their variances comparable. This allows to make statements about explained
variance at each step, i.e. with the inclusion of extra covariates. Even when comparing
two nested models where the restricted one is not the empty model, both models get
rescaled with respect to the empty one.
3.3.2
Mediation analysis
Mediation analysis has been applied relying mostly on structural equation models. Nevertheless, this technique is limited to linear models (see e.g. Imai, Keele and Tingley
2010, 309f.). Path analysis is also generally inappropriate when the independence assumption is violated, which is the case if the data is hierarchical (see e.g. Bauer et al.
2006; Krull and Mackinnon 2001). Lately two ways of measuring mediation effect that
allow for the use of non-linear and/or multilevel models have been proposed: the KHB
method (see e.g. Breen et al. 2013) and techniques following the counterfactual way of
thinking (for a complete summary, see: Pearl 2013). A short summary of the mediation
problem with non-linear model and of two techniques that can be applied to them is
Methods
36
presented.
Figure 3.4: Mediation

Mediator (M)
Predictor (T)
Outcome (Y)
The typical mediation problem reads as follow (see Figure 3.4): there is one dependent
variable yi (the outcome to be explained), a predictor ti (for simplicity a binary treatment/control variable), and a mediator variable mi (in this case, a continuous variable).
The hypothesis to be tested is that the effect of ti on yi is partly mediated by mi . The
intention of the mediation analysis is to disentangle the total effect of ti on yi into its
direct (i.e. non-mediated) and indirect (i.e. mediated) effects. In the linear case, three
equations make it clear how total effect gets divided into direct and indirect effects:14
yi = ti + mi + e1i
(3.1)
mi = ti + e2i
(3.2)
yi = ti + e3i
(3.3)
where is the direct effect, the indirect effect, and = + is the total effect of
ti on yi . The difference is enough to compute the indirect effect .
In the non-linear cases, the previous decomposition of the total effect into the difference
does not hold, because (as discussed previously with respect to comparing estimated variances) the estimated coefficients in non-linear models get rescaled to produce
always the same assumed level 1 variance. So that for non-linear models the difference
would not only represent the real difference in the effect of ti on yi without and
with mi in the equation, but also the differences in the rescaling factor. Contrary to
linear regressions, in the extreme case that ti mi (i.e. ti has a correlation of zero with
mi ), would still be different to only because of rescaling (see e.g. Breen et al. 2013,
5ff.).
14
For simplicity intercepts and control variables are excluded. If all variables are centered, the intercept
is by construction zero, so the equations as presented here hold. If the variables in the models are not
centered, intercepts should be added to the equations. In the case that the main regression of interest
(3.1) contains control variables, these should also be included in the auxiliary regression (3.2) and in the
restricted equation (3.3).
Methods
37
In order to solve for the problem of comparing coefficients between nested non-linear
models, Karlson et al. (2012) propose an approach that allows to hold the scale and
fit of the error term constant between nested models. Breen et al. (2013) adapt this
approach to mediation analysis with the so called KHB method. The KHB method
(the name refers to the initials of the three authors developing it, i.e. Karlson, Breen,
and Holm) goes as follows: first the regression of interest (3.1) has to be estimated, with
logit or probit (the observed version of the latent continuous equation, as discussed
previously); then the auxiliary linear regression (3.2) should be estimated and the residuals of this auxiliary regression should be saved (i.e. e2i the part of mi that is orthogonal
to ti ); finally, instead of equation (3.3), the following equation needs to be estimated:
i +
yi = t
e2i + e4i
(3.4)
Equation (3.4) makes it clear that including the estimated residuals of (3.2) into (3.3),
allows to follow the same logic as in linear models. In other words, (3.4) produces the
same fit as (3.1) and also is equally rescaled, so that the coefficients of ti may be compared. is the total effect of ti on yi using the same rescaling factor as in (3.1), i.e.
can now be compared to . The proportion of the mediated effect can be calculated
The hypothesis of whether this proportion is different
as: Prop. mediated = ( )/.
from zero, can also be stated as 6= 0, so that a Hausman test between (3.1) and
(3.4) should be adequate.
The KHB method is straightforward, computationally non-demanding and allows to test

for whether the mediated proportion is significantly different from zero. Nevertheless,
KHB has not yet been extended to multilevel models.15 In this study KHB is applied
in the same way as in one-level regressions, but relying on multilevel logistic regression
and on multilevel linear regression for the auxiliary regression. That is:
logit(ij ) = tij + mij + uj
(3.5)
mij = tij + ij
(3.6)
logit(ij ) = tij + ij + uj
(3.7)
where ij = uj +eij , i.e. the estimated residuals in (3.6) represent the difference between
mij and its prediction including only the fixed part (i.e. mij
tij ). By doing so, the
exact same fit for models (3.5) and (3.7) is obtained and also the exact same coefficient
for mij in (3.5) and for ij in (3.7). Using the difference between m and its fitted values
from (3.6) including the random intercepts (i.e. mij (
tij + u
j )), produces differences
15
Wiepking and James (2013) apply the KHB method to panel data, but it is not made explicit what
kind of residuals they estimate after the auxiliary regression with the mediator as outcome.
Methods
38
in the fit and in the coefficients between (3.5) and (3.7).
There is one problem with the KHB method. Because the whole procedure is a way of
replicating the mediation analysis in linear models (i.e. by keeping the rescaling factor
between (3.5) and (3.7) constant the linear effect of tij on logit(ij ) can be compared
in the same way as in linear regression because the effects on the logits are linear), the
same restrictions as in the linear case should apply. Two assumptions need to hold in
the linear case in order to produce valid results. First, the error terms of equations
(3.5), (3.6), (3.7) need to be uncorrelated, so that there is no problem of endogeneity
in the models. This is an untestable assumption that always has to be relied on in
regression analysis and depends on theoretical argumentation. The second assumption
is the reliance on linearity and, in particular, on a property of linear systems called
effect constancy (or no interaction) (Pearl 2013, 7). In other words, tij may not be
interacted with other variables including mij in (3.5). This limitation is also recognized
by the authors of the KHB method (see: Breen et al. 2013, 17f.).
The second way to approach mediation analysis when non-linear models are applied, is
by relying on the counterfactual way of thinking. The counterfactual analysis of causality may be explained as follow: in an ideal scenario, if it would be possible to collect
information about a dependent (outcome) variable for the same cases whit and without
experiencing a given event (measured by a predictor), then the causal effect of the independent variable could be estimated. In other words, if it would be possible to arrange
an experiment with treatment and control groups, and it would also be possible to record
the values of the outcome variable for the same case when being part of each group, then
the difference (or ratio) in the outcomes for that case would be the individual causal
effect of the treatment.
The problem in observational studies is that the values of dependent and independent
variables are already given and fixed. What would have been (the what if question)
the value of the dependent variable for a given person if he/she would have experienced
a different value of the independent variable, is unobservable and is the fundamental
problem of causal inference (Holland 1986, 947). Consider the case of a dependent
variable Y and an independent variable T . For simplicity T is binary, so that16
1
T =
0
if treatment
if control
16
For the presentation of the counterfactual perspective, the writing style of Morgan and Winship
(2007) is adopted, i.e. upper case always represents variables and lower case represents their realization.
Methods
39
Then four possible scenarios exist (as shown in Figure 3.5):

Y 1 |T = 1
outcome of treated unit from treatment group (observable)
Y 1 |T = 0
outcome of treated unit from control group (counterfactual)
0 |T
=1
outcome of non-treated unit from treatment group (counterfactual)
0 |T
=0
outcome of non-treated unit from control group (observable)

Figure 3.5: Observable and unobservable outcomes
Y1
Y0
X=1
Y 1 |T = 1
Y 0 |T = 1
X=0
Y 1 |T = 0
Y 0 |T = 0
Source: adapted from Morgan and Winship 2007, 35
The interest lies on the differences Y 1 |T = 1 Y 0 |T = 1 and Y 1 |T = 0 Y 0 |T = 0, but

only Y 1 |T = 1 and Y 0 |T = 0 are observed. In other words, only half of the information contained in the underlying potential outcome variables is revealed (Morgan and
Winship 2007, 35). The first consequence of this limitation, is that the focus must be
changed from the level of individuals to the aggregated level or to average causal effects
(i.e. E[Y 1 ] E[Y 0 ]). But even at the aggregated level, the estimation of E[Y 1 ] E[Y 0 ]
is not straightforward, because while E[Y 1 |T = 1] E[Y 0 |T = 0] is easily estimable,
this equation must not result in the same value as E[Y 1 ] E[Y 0 ] (Holland 1986, 948).
Counterfactual analysis deals with the problem of the unobserved pieces of information
by developing mechanisms that can infer the counterfactual quantities (i.e. E[Y 1 |T = 0]
and E[Y 0 |T = 1]) so that the information of the potential outcomes is complete. Rubin
(1974) proposes as a solution to match units of the different groups with respect to
extra information (p. 691; this solution is known as Rubins model for causal inference), so that the equality E[Y 1 ] E[Y 0 ] = E{E[Y |T = 1, X] E[Y |T = 0, X]} can
hold (Imai et al. 2011, 768). The matching of units can be done through some algorithm,
the most common one being the propensity score, i.e. the conditional probability of
assignment to a particular treatment given a vector of observed covariates (Rosenbaum
and Rubin 1983, 41).
For mediation analysis the same logic applies, only that the counterfactuals arise not
only from the causal effect of T on Y , but also from the causal effect of T on M . Imai,
Keele and Tingley (2010) have developed a procedure that relies on a quasi-Bayesian
Monte Carlo Algorithm to simulate these effects from their sampling distributions in
the regressions (3.5) and (3.6). This procedure allows to simulate the average causal
mediation effect (ACME) as E[(Y |T = t, M 1 , X) (Y |T = t, M 0 , X)], i.e. the expected
difference in the potential outcome given the value of the mediator with and without
Methods
40
treatment, but keeping treatment status constant in the outcome regression. Also the
average direct effect (ADE) is simulated as E[(Y |T = 1, M t , X) (Y |T = 0, M t , X)], i.e.
the expected difference in the potential outcome keeping the mediator constant (under
T=t) and comparing the effect of treatment versus control in the outcome regression.
The average total effect (ATE) represents then the average sum of this two simulated
results.17
In order for this procedure to be valid, both regressions, i.e. with Y and M as potential
outcome respectively, should not suffer from endogeneity. This is often called the sequential ignorability assumption, although more or less strict definitions of it exist (see
Pearl 2013, 14ff.). According to Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010), while independence
of treatment assignment to potential outcomes and mediators hold by construction in
experimental settings, in observational studies pre-treatment covariates need to be controlled for to achieve independence (p. 312). In other words, relevant variables that may
influence the assignment to control or treatment group should be accounted for. In this
study, as many controls as possible are included related to family climate, because as
previously discussed with respect to the GTC, they should have the strongest effect on
the impulsive determinants of behavior (which is the treatment variable in hypothesis
3). Also the disorganization of the neighborhood is taken into account, because it may
also influence the impulsive determinants of behavior and the selection of school (i.e.
the treatment variable in hypothesis 4).
The independence between treatment assignment and potential outcomes of Y and M , is

only the first part of the sequential ignorability assumption. As already stated, through
the inclusion of control variables, the compliance with this part of the assumption may
be made credible. The second part of the assumption states that the mediator given
treatment and control variables should be independent from the main outcome. In other
words, for those sharing control and treatment values, the values of the mediator can be
seen as randomized. This second part is according to Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010)
untestable and sensitivity analyses should be applied instead (p. 313). While Imai,
Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto (2010) developed a program to run this sensitivity analysis, it does not yet allow for multilevel models. Therefore, in this study no sensitivity
analysis is run to test the sequential ignorability assumption, so caution should be advised when interpreting mediation results (hypotheses 3 and 4).
17
Note that the notation used here is a simplification, because the potential outcomes can not be
described as fixed conditional expectations. Nevertheless, in the counterfactual literature almost each
author uses his own notation. For comparisons see Pearl (2013, 10f.) and Imai, Keele and Yamamoto
(2010, 4f.).
Methods
41
The procedure developed by Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto (2010) works as follows
(for a general description see Imai, Keele and Tingley 2010, 317; for a detailed description
see Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto 2010 and Tingley et al. 2013):
1. the non-linear model (3.5) and the linear model (3.6) have to be estimated
2. the parameters of these models get simulated from their sampling distribution
3. the following three steps must be repeated: a) simulation of the potential values of
the mediator, b) simulation of the potential outcomes given the simulated values
of the mediator, c) computation of the causal mediation effects
4. computation of the summary of the simulations, i.e. point estimates and confidence
intervals
The mediation analysis proposed by Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010) is also very attractive, first because of the reliance on the conterfactual way of thinking that adds a
scientific language and understanding of the problem at hand and is also winning more
and more adepts in the last years. It also supports the use of multilevel models and
the authors have made a program available (see Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto
2010; Tingley et al. 2013). Moreover, This technique explicitly allows for the inclusion
of interactions between T and M and/or between T and any other control variable (see
Tingley et al. 2013, 8ff.). Nevertheless, the computational demand of the simulations
is quite high, especially for a big sample size as the one used in this study. While the
default number of simulations is set to 1000, a maximum of 200 could be run with the
data and computer at hand.
In sum, both mediation techniques presented will be tested in this study. Because the
KHB method does not allow for interactions, the models are simplified when running it.
The same simplified models are tested with the method proposed by Imai, Keele, Tingley
and Yamamoto (2010), in order to compare results. Finally the mediation analysis with
the complete model, i.e. including interactions, is run using only the second method.18
18
All analyses in this study were done with Stata. Nevertheless, the mediation analysis proposed by
Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010) can only be implemented in Stata for simple models. This analysis is
therefore run in R (see codes for Stata and R in appendix).
4. Results
In order to test hypotheses 1 and 2, five multilevel logit models are estimated with
life-time prevalence of acts of violence as dependent variable. The models are:
M0 : Empty model (ICC)
M1 : All level 1 variables included (compositions effect)
M2 : Adds an interaction between reflective and impulsive determinants of behavior to
M1 (hypothesis 1)
M3 : Adds a three-way interaction between reflective and impulsive determinants of
behavior and life-time intoxication to M1 (hypothesis 2)
M4 : Includes level 2 variable school disorganization into M3 (hypothesis 4)
Formally:
M0 : logit(ij ) = 0 + uj
M1 : logit(ij ) = 0 + 1 idij + 2 rdij + 3 ixij +
h h chij
+ uj
P
M2 : logit(ij ) = 0 + 1 idij + 2 rdij + 3 ixij + 4 idij rdij + h h chij + uj
M3 : logit(ij ) = 0 + 1 idij + 2 rdij + 3 ixij + 4 idij rdij + 5 idij ixij + 6 ixij rdij +
P
7 idij rdij ixij + h h chij + uj
M4 : logit(ij ) = 0 + 1 idij + 2 rdij + 3 ixij + 4 idij rdij + 5 idij ixij + 6 ixij rdij +
P
7 idij rdij ixij + 8 sdj + h h chij + uj
where (see section 3.2),
ij : P (avij = 1|xij , uj )
avij : acts of violence

idij : impulsive determinants of behavior (also referred as low self-control with higher
values meaning lower self-control)
rdij : reflective determinants of behavior (also referred as morality with higher values
meaning higher internalization of against violence values)
ixij : life-time prevalence of intoxication
sdj : school disorganization (aggregated variable at level 2)
chij : control variables
42
Results
43
Table 4.1: Regression results (main regressions)

M0
Coeff.
(Std.Err.)
M1
Coeff.
(Std.Err.)
M2
Coeff.
(Std.Err.)
M3
Coeff.
(Std.Err.)
M4
Coeff.
(Std.Err.)
-.390***
(.016)
.362***
(.017)
1.160***
(.029)
1.094***
(.029)
.158***
(.032)
-.038*
(.018)
.249***
(.039)
-.118***
(.013)
-.094**
(.030)
.247***
(.013)
.056
(.039)
.045
(.050)
-.488***
(.017)
.489***
(.019)
1.147***
(.029)
1.092***
(.029)
.155***
(.032)
-.040*
(.018)
.241***
(.039)
-.115***
(.013)
-.089**
(.030)
.255***
(.013)
.048
(.039)
.036
(.050)
.157***
(.012)
-.484***
(.022)
.569***
(.025)
1.167***
(.037)
1.089***
(.029)
.155***
(.032)
-.041*
(.018)
.242***
(.039)
-.116***
(.013)
-.088**
(.030)
.254***
(.013)
.048
(.039)
.036
(.050)
.204***
(.016)
.016
(.034)
-.192***
(.038)
-.110***
(.025)
-3.010***
(.234)
-2.978***
(.234)
-2.951***
(.234)
-.483***
(.022)
.567***
(.025)
1.167***
(.037)
1.088***
(.029)
.144***
(.033)
-.043*
(.018)
.242***
(.039)
-.117***
(.013)
-.083**
(.030)
.249***
(.013)
.047
(.039)
.032
(.050)
.204***
(.016)
.018
(.034)
-.192***
(.038)
-.110***
(.025)
.099***
(.020)
-2.921***
(.233)
Random part
u2
.347***
(.023)
.290***
(.022)
.290***
(.022)
.288***
(.022)
.280***
(.022)
Rescaled variances
u2
.347
e2
2 /3
.196
2.230
.188
2.135
.184
2.102
.178
2.091
Scale correction factor (SCF)

2
x
0
1.728
SCF
1
.678
1.968
.649
2.056
.639
2.087
.635
Fit measures
log likelihood -25696
aic
51396
bic
51415
-20319
40668
40804
-20304
40645
40808
-20292
40623
40795
Fixed part
reflect(rd)
impulse(id)
intoxic(ix)
male
migration
age
viol at home
family bond
trad fam str
nhood disorg
8.grade
9.grade
rd*id
ix*rd
ix*id
ix*rd*id
schl disorg
Constant
-1.861***
(.021)
*** p value < .001

** p value < .01
* p value < .05
-20407
40842
40969
Results
44
In this chapter, models and variables will often be referred by their abbreviations. For
the variables subscripts are dropped, i.e. id and rd mean impulsive and reflective determinants of behavior respectively while ix refers to intoxication.
The main results of the regressions estimated to test hypotheses 1 and 2 can be seen
in Table 4.1. From M0 it is possible to estimate the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient
(ICC) which should give information about the necessity of using multilevel models:
ICC =
.347
u2
=
= .095
2
2
u + e
.347 + 2 /3
According to the estimated ICC, an amount of approximately 10% of the variance in

acts of violence is between variance. While this value may be seen as low, in the case of
binary outcomes much higher values are not usual. Also the interpretation of variances
in non-linear models should be taken only as an approximation, because the level 1
variance is assumed (see subsection 3.3.1).
Table 4.2: Explained variance

Models
M1
M2
M3
M4
M4
M4
M4
vs
vs
vs
vs
vs
vs
vs
M0
M1
M2
M0
M1
M2
M3
e2
u2
.434
.043
.022
.487
.093
.053
.031
.322
.043
.016
.365
.063
.021
.005
LR-test
DoF
10578.05*
176.19*
29.38*
10807.62*
229.58*
53.39*
24.01*
12
1
3
17
5
4
1
* p value < .001

DoF = Degrees of Freedom
M1 allows to estimate the composition effect, i.e. the amount of between variance that
can be explained by including level 1 variables.19 In this case:
Composition Effect = 1
u;M
1
2
u;M
0
=1
.196
= .435
.347
Already an approximately of 43% of the between variance can be explained by including

variables at the level of the individuals, i.e. through compositions effect. At the individual level, 32 percent of the variance could be explained. In Table 4.2 the proportion
of explained variance between models is summarized. The logic to calculate explained
2 /
2
variance between models is always the same, i.e. 1
full
restricted
, and the rescaled
variances are always used (see subsection 3.3.1).

19
In the pages that follow, the explained variance concept is used always referring to the rescaled
variances following the procedure described in subsection 3.3.1.
Results
45
.25
.25
Figure 4.1: Predicted probabilities (95% CI)
.2
Pred. Pr(av|x)
.1
.15
.05
0
.05
Pred. Pr(av|x)
.1
.15
.2
reflect=1.8
reflect=0
reflect=.9
1.5
.5
.5
controlled
1.5
1.5
impulsive
.5
.5
controlled
.2
Pred. Pr(av|x)
.1
.15
.05
0
.05
Pred. Pr(av|x)
.1
.15
.2
.25
(b) M2 : with two-way interaction
.25
(a) M1 : without interaction
1.5
impulsive
1.5
controlled
.5
.5
1.5
impulsive
(c) M3 : with three-way interaction
1.5
.5
.5
controlled
1.5
impulsive
(d) M4 : with L2 variable
Hypothesis 1 stated that the effects of the id and rd interact in the prediction of acts of
violence. The inclusion of this interaction improves the fit of the model significantly, as
can be seen in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. The inclusion of this interaction only, reduces
the between variance by approximately 4% and the within variance by the same amount
(M1 versus M2 ). From these results hypothesis one seems confirmed, i.e. the null hypothesis that the interaction does not improve the model significantly, may be rejected
(statistical values are given in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2).
The prediction of the probabilities change significantly between the model without interaction and the rest of the models (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.320 ). The inclusion of the
2-way interaction implies that the predicted probabilities for those who accept violence
(i.e. for rd = 1.8 the value representing the percentile 10) get significantly higher than
20
Because according to the fit of the four models (see Table 4.1) and the tests comparing them (see
Table 4.2) M4 is the best model, its results are used as reference (i.e. as full model) for testing the impact
of including interactions, although M4 also includes other extra variables. Nevertheless, the graphs show
the impact of the inclusion of an extra interaction (or set of interactions) also for when this is the only
change between models. In the comparison of variances (see Table 4.2) also the models changed only by
the inclusion of an extra interaction (or set of interactions) are shown.
Results
46
in the model without interaction (M1 ). At the same time the slope for the effect of id
becomes less pronounced for this group (see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.4). The groups with
lower violence acceptance (i.e. rd = 0 the median, and rd = .9 the percentile 90) do
not change their predicted probabilities in such a drastic way. Nevertheless, for higher
values of impulsivity, their prediction tends to be significantly higher. In other words,
the slope of the effect of impulsive determinants of behavior for these groups becomes
especially high with higher values of impulsivity.
Table 4.3: Predicted probabilities (95% CI) over impulsive determinants of behavior compared (M1 vs M4 )
Refl.
Imp.
M1
M4
M1
M4
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
.079(.087).094
.095(.103).110
.113(.120).128
.134(.141).149
.157(.165).172
.183(.191).199
.211(.221).231
.042(.045).048
.050(.053).056
.060(.063).066
.072(.075).078
.085(.089).093
.099(.105).110
.116(.123).130
.030(.032).034
.036(.038).040
.043(.045).048
.051(.054).057
.060(.064).068
.071(.076).081
.083(.090).097
.114(.127).139
.127(.138).150
.141(.151).161
.155(.164).173
.170(.179).187
.185(.194).203
.200(.210).221
.034(.037).039
.044(.047).050
.057(.060).063
.073(.077).080
.092(.097).101
.115(.122).129
.143(.152).162
.017(.019).021
.024(.026).029
.034(.037).039
.048(.051).054
.065(.070).075
.088(.095).103
.117(.129).140
.039*
.035*
.030*
.023*
.014
.002
-.010
-.008*
-.006*
-.003
.001
.008
.017*
.029*
-.012*
-.011*
-.008*
-.002
.005
.019*
.039*
* p value < .05

all other covariates fixed at mean
While the increased effect of impulsivity for those with median to low violence acceptance may lead to pessimism, because we assume impulsivity is much more difficult to
change than the attitude towards violence (see chapter 2), these groups do never get
a predicted probability significantly higher than the proportion of those reporting acts
of violence in the sample (i.e. .149, the horizontal line drawn in the graphs showing
predicted probabilities). On the other hand, the predictions for those reporting violence
acceptance (rd = 1.8) cross this critical line at already a median value of impulsivity.
In other words, being able to change the violence acceptance from high to median, already puts the predicted probabilities below the proportion of violence reported in the
sample, even with very high values of impulsivity. From this point of view, the result
may be seen with optimism.
Results
47
.08
.08
Figure 4.2: Marginal probability effects (95% CI) of impulsive determinants of behavior
Marg.Eff. id on Pr(av|x)
.02
.04
.06
0
.02
.04
.06
reflect=1.8
reflect=0
reflect=.9
1.5
.5
.5
controlled
1.5
1.5
impulsive
.5
.5
controlled
.04
.06
0
.02
.02
.04
.06
.08
.08
1.5
impulsive
1.5
.5
.5
controlled
1.5
impulsive
1.5
.5
.5
controlled
1.5
impulsive
Hypothesis 2 states that a three-way interaction (including all lower interactions and
main effects) between rd, id and ix should improve the model. In Table 4.1 can be seen
that the inclusion of this interaction improves the AIC value but not the BIC value,
which penalizes more drastically the inclusion of more variables (i.e. the effect on parsimony). Nevertheless, the M3 has a significantly higher likelihood value according to
the likelihood-ratio test in Table 4.2.
While the results regarding changes on fit as a consequence of the inclusion of the threeway interaction should not be seen as definite, is interesting to see that the predicted
probabilities change especially for the values of id and rd that represent a fight between systems (see chapter 2). As can be seen in Figure 4.3 the predicted probabilities for
those that have been intoxicated at least once in their life, are not significantly different
between these groups presenting a conflict between systems before the inclusion of the
three-way interaction (see Figure 4.3a and Figure 4.3b). Nevertheless, the predictions
for these groups become significantly different after including the three-way interaction
(see Figure 4.3c and Figure 4.3d). In other words, before the inclusion of the three-way
Results
48
Table 4.4: Marginal probability effects (95% CI) of impulsive
determinants of behavior compared (M1 vs M4 )
Refl.
Imp.
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
M1
id
.027(.028).030
.031(.033).035
.035(.038).041
.040(.043).047
.045(.049).054
.050(.056).061
.055(.062).068
.014(.015).016
.017(.018).019
.019(.021).023
.022(.025).027
.026(.029).032
.029(.034).038
.034(.039).044
.010(.011).012
.012(.013).014
.014(.015).017
.016(.018).020
.019(.021).024
.022(.025).029
.025(.029).034
M4
id
.019(.022).025
.020(.024).027
.021(.025).030
.022(.027).033
.023(.029).035
.024(.031).038
.025(.033).041
.017(.018).019
.021(.023).024
.027(.029).031
.033(.036).039
.040(.045).049
.049(.055).061
.058(.066).074
.011(.012).013
.016(.017).018
.022(.024).026
.029(.032).035
.038(.043).049
.050(.058).065
.064(.075).086
M4
M1
id
id
-.006*
-.009*
-.012*
-.016*
-.020*
-.024*
-.028*
.002*
.004*
.007*
.011*
.015*
.021*
.027*
.001
.004*
.008*
.014*
.022*
.032*
.045*
* p value < .05

Table 4.5: Predicted probabilities (95% CI) over intoxication compared (M2 vs M4 )
Refl.
Imp.
Intox.
M2
M4
M4
M2
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
-1.2
-1.2
1.4
1.4
-1.2
-1.2
1.4
1.4
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
.091(.100).110
.241(.261).281
.152(.160).169
.362(.376).390
.016(.017).019
.048(.053).059
.077(.085).092
.210(.226).243
.090(.102).113
.231(.259).287
.150(.160).170
.359(.374).390
.013(.015).017
.058(.068).078
.089(.100).111
.176(.195).215
.001
-.001
-.000
-.001
-.002
.014
.015
-.030
* p value < .05

Table 4.6: Discrete probability change (95% CI) over intoxication compared (M2 vs M4 )
Refl.
Imp.
-1.8
-1.8
-1.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
-1.2
0.0
1.4
-1.2
0.0
1.4
-1.2
0.0
1.4
M2
id
.147(.160).173
.174(.186).197
.204(.215).227
.057(.062).067
.095(.102).108
.155(.165).176
.032(.036).040
.065(.071).076
.130(.141).152
M4
id
.127(.157).187
.164(.183).203
.198(.214).229
.070(.080).090
.097(.105).114
.111(.129).147
.043(.053).062
.066(.075).085
.073(.095).116
* p value < .05

M4
M2
id
id
-.002
-.002
-.001
.017*
.003
-.036*
.016*
.004
-.046*
Results
49
.4
.4
Figure 4.3: Predicted probabilities (95% CI) over intoxication
.35
.3
0
.05
.05
.1
.1
Pred. Pr(av|x)
.15
.2
.25
Pred. Pr(av|x)
.15
.2
.25
.3
.35
impulse=1.2, reflect=1.8
impulse=1.2, reflect=.9
impulse=1.4, reflect=1.8
impulse=1.4, reflect=.9
no
yes
no
lifetime prevalence intoxication
yes
.35
.3
Pred. Pr(av|x)
.15
.2
.25
.1
.05
0
.05
.1
Pred. Pr(av|x)
.15
.2
.25
.3
.35
.4
.4
no
yes
no
yes
interaction the predicted probabilities for those with high impulsivity and low violence
tolerance (i.e. id = 1.4, the percentile 90, and rd = 1.8, the percentile 10) and for
those with low impulsivity and high violence acceptance (i.e. id = 1.2, the percentile
10, and rd = .9, the percentile 90) are not different from each other, but they become
significantly different when the three-way interaction is included (this is for those having
been intoxicated at least once in their life).
Although the previous result points in the expected direction, i.e. that intoxication
should be especially relevant for those involved in a conflict between systems, the
inclusion of the three-way interaction mainly reduces the effect of ix for those impulsive
and against violence. From the theory it would be expected that for this same group
the effect of intoxication should be higher, because alcohol should alter the reflective
but not the impulsive system (see chapter 2). While the predicted probabilities of M2
(i.e. a model including two-way interaction between id and rd but not the three-way
interaction) and M4 are not significantly different (see Table 4.5), the discrete change
of intoxication changes significantly for extreme values of impulsivity (see Table 4.6 and
Results
50
.25
.25
Figure 4.4: Discrete probability change (95% CI) over intoxication
.2
Marg.Eff. ix on Pr(av|x)
.1
.15
.05
0
.05
.1
.15
.2
reflect=1.8
reflect=0
reflect=.9
controlled
median
impulsive
controlled
impulsive
.2
.1
.15
.05
0
.05
.1
.15
.2
.25
.25
median
controlled
median
impulsive
controlled
median
impulsive
Figure 4.4).
Hypothesis 2 can not be convincingly confirmed (null hypothesis rejected), nevertheless the three-way interaction is kept for the model including the school disorganization
variable (M4 ). The reasons for the unclear effect of intoxication may be related to the
way it has been measured. While a situational measure is appointed at, i.e. it is
assumed that the person was intoxicated while committing the act of violence, such an
assumption may be difficult to sustain. Adequate measures of situational variables are
discussed in the next chapter.
In order to test hypotheses 3 and 4, three new models are estimated for applying the
KHB method. These are:
P
M40 F : logit(ij ) = 0 + 1 idij + 2 rdij + 3 ixij + 4 sdj + h h chij + uj
P
M40 A : rdij = 0 + 1 idij + 2 ixij + 3 sdj + h h chij + ij
P
M40 R : logit(ij ) = 0 + 1 idij + 2 ij + 3 ixij + 4 sdj +
h chij + uj
h
Results
51
where M40 F is the version of M4 without interactions and M40 R is the restricted version of M40 F because the residuals of M40 A are included instead of rdij , the mediator.
M40 A is the auxiliary regression needed to produce the estimated residuals of rdij .
If the method has been applied correctly, the fit of M40 F and M40 R should be the same.
Also the coefficients for rdij in M40 F and for ij in M40 R need to be the same. M40 A is
only estimated to produce the necessary residuals ij to be included in M40 R instead of
rdij (see subsection 3.3.2 for more details). In Table 4.7 the coefficients of the models
with acts of violence as outcome are presented (the output of the auxiliary regression
is omitted). As can be seen, the two criteria are fulfilled, i.e. the coefficients for rdij
in M40 F and for ij in M40 R are the same as well as the fit of the models (see the loglikelihoods and the AIC and BIC values). The proportion of mediated effect for id is
then the difference of its total effect (i.e. its coefficient in M40 R ) minus its direct effect
(i.e. its coefficient in M40 F ) divided by its total effect. With the given models the
proportion of mediated effect for id is
Prop. Mediated (idij ) =
.925 .599
T Eid DEid
=
= .352
T Eid
.925
(4.1)
where TE is the total effect and DE is the direct effect. According to this result approximately 35% of the effect of id on acts of violence is mediated by rd. This proportion is
significantly different from zero as tested with a hausman test comparing models M40 R
and M40 F (result not shown).
In the case of the school disorganization the proportion of mediated effect is as follows:
Prop. Mediated (sdj ) =
T Esd DEsd
.110 .098
=
= .109
T Esd
.110
(4.2)
approximately 11% of the effect of school climate on acts of violence is mediated through
the reflective determinants of behavior.
The same M40 F and M40 A are also analyzed with the method proposed by Imai, Keele
and Tingley (2010) in order to compare results. As can be seen in Table 4.8 the results
for impulsive determinants of behavior are the same, i.e. .352 or approximately 35%
of the average effect of id is mediated. This proportion is significantly different from
zero. For the case of school disorganization, Table 4.9 shows that the results are also
very similar to the results obtained through the KHB methos, i.e. approximately 11%
average proportion of mediated effect.
Results
52
Table 4.7: Regression results (KHB

mediation)
M40 F
Coeff.
(Std.Err.)
Fixed part
reflect(rd)
impulse(id)
intoxp
male
migration
age
viol at home
family bond
trad fam str
nhood disorg
8.grade
9.grade
schl disorg
-.586***
(.024)
.599***
(.028)
1.159***
(.029)
1.094***
(.029)
.147***
(.033)
-.040*
(.018)
.249***
(.039)
-.119***
(.013)
-.090**
(.030)
.243***
(.013)
.055
(.039)
.041
(.050)
.098***
(.020)
Constant
-2.404***
(.260)
M40 R
Coeff.
(Std.Err.)
.925***
(.024)
1.215***
(.029)
1.225***
(.029)
.176***
(.033)
-.035*
(.018)
.247***
(.039)
-.118***
(.013)
-.083**
(.030)
.283***
(.013)
.059
(.039)
.012
(.050)
.110***
(.020)
-.586***
(.024)
-5.033***
(.239)
Random part
u2
.282***
(.022)
.282***
(.022)
Fit measures
ll
-20396
aic
40821
bic
40957
-20396
40821
40957
*** p value < .001

** p value < .01
* p value < .05
Results
53
Table 4.8: Mediation analysis with impulsive determinants of behavior as treatment

variable (counterfactuals; no interactions)
ACME (control)
ACME (treated)
ADE (control)
ADE (treated)
Total Effect
Prop. Mediated (control)
Prop. Mediated (treated)
ACME (average)
ADE (average)
Prop. Mediated (average)
Estimate
95% CI Lower
95% CI Upper
p-value
.020
.024
.039
.043
.063
.319
.384
.022
.041
.352
.018
.022
.035
.039
.059
.282
.347
.020
.037
.315
.022
.026
.043
.048
.067
.353
.418
.024
.045
.386
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
Table 4.9: Mediation analysis with school disorganization as treatment variable (counterfactuals; no interactions)
ACME (control)
ACME (treated)
ADE (control)
ADE (treated)
Total Effect
ACME (average)
ADE (average)
Estimate
95% CI Lower
95% CI Upper
p-value
.001
.001
.010
.010
.011
.106
.111
.001
.010
.108
.001
.001
.006
.006
.007
.063
.066
.001
.006
.065
.002
.002
.014
.014
.015
.198
.204
.002
.014
.201
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
For the analysis of mediation using M4 and not the simplified version without interactions (M40 F ), only the method by Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010) is used. An extra
auxiliary linear regression needs to be estimated with the mediator (i.e. rd) as dependent
variable. The model is:
M4A : rdij = 0 + 1 idij + 2 ixij + 3 ixij idij + 4 scj +
h h chij
+ uj + eij
The results of M4 (see Table 4.1) and M4A (results not shown) are used in the simulations
to estimate the mediated effects (see subsection 3.3.2). In the analysis of the impulsive
determinants of behavior, the moderator rd is interacted with the treatment variable id
and also with a covariate ix. The interaction between treatment and moderator is recognized by the program automatically (see Tingley et al. 2013, 8). Nevertheless, when
including interactions with other control variables the values of these controls should be
fixed for the simulations (see Tingley et al. 2013, 10). Because ix is a dummy variable,
the simulations are done for values 0 and 1 of ix.
When fixing ix = 0 the average proportion of mediated effect is of about approximately

31% (see Table 4.10) while when fixing the value ix = 1 the average proportion of mediated effect increases to approximately 43% (see Table 4.11). In any case the amount of
Results
54

variable (counterfactuals; with interactions; intoxication = 0)
ACME (control)
ACME (treated)
ADE (control)
ADE (treated)
Total Effect
ACME (average)
ADE (average)
Estimate
95% CI Lower
95% CI Upper
p-value
.020
.015
.043
.038
.058
.347
.265
.018
.040
.306
.018
.013
.038
.033
.054
.309
.224
.016
.035
.266
.022
.018
.047
.043
.062
.392
.308
.020
.045
.345
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
mediated effect is very high for the impulsive determinants of behavior. In both cases
the values are significantly different from zero. These results point in the direction of
confirming hypothesis 3 (rejecting the null hypothesis of no moderation).

variable (counterfactuals; with interactions; intoxication = 1)
ACME (control)
ACME (treated)
ADE (control)
ADE (treated)
Total Effect
ACME (average)
ADE (average)
Estimate
95% CI Lower
95% CI Upper
p-value
.040
.036
.053
.049
.089
.451
.405
.038
.051
.428
.036
.032
.045
.041
.083
.398
.352
.034
.043
.380
.044
.040
.062
.057
.096
.523
.461
.042
.059
.489
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
Table 4.12: Mediation analysis with school disorganization as treatment variable

(counterfactuals; with interactions)
ACME (control)
ACME (treated)
ADE (control)
ADE (treated)
Total Effect
ACME (average)
ADE (average)
Estimate
95% CI Lower
95% CI Upper
p-value
.001
.001
.010
.010
.011
.109
.114
.001
.010
.112
.001
.001
.006
.006
.007
.058
.063
.001
.006
.061
.002
.002
.014
.014
.015
.174
.180
.002
.014
.177
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
For the mediation analysis with school climate as treatment, the results do not change
much with respect to the simplified model M40 F . With the inclusion of interactions the
average proportion of mediated effect for school climate still is approximately 11% (see
Results
55
Table 4.12). While this value is significantly different from zero, it is not as high as in
the case of the impulsive determinants of behavior. Nevertheless, these results seem to
support hypothesis 4.
5. General Discussion and

Conclusion
The results obtained support the hypothesis that acts of violence can be modeled as
outcomes of self-control (see Figure 5.1b). Reflective and impulsive determinants of
behavior as well as situational moderators and environmental variables, seem to have
an effect on the probability of acts of violence. The interaction between both determinants improves the models prediction (hypothesis 1), the same holds for the three-way
interaction with a situational moderator (i.e. life-time prevalence of intoxication; hypothesis 2). The effect of impulsive determinants of behavior seems to be mediated by
the reflective system (hypothesis 3). Finally, the effect of school climate seems also to
be mediated by the reflective determinants of behavior (hypothesis 4).
Consequences of the results point in at least three directions: theory, methods, and policy. From a theoretical point of view, relying on the proposed theory of action should
be useful as a road-map for the prediction of almost any kind of action. Whether the
proposed theory can be considered integrated is an open issue, but it may be easier
(or more conservative) to agree that it presents an exercise in theoretical elaboration
Figure 5.1: RIM and SAT/MFS compared
Environmental
Characteristics
Criminogenic
Exposure
causes of the causes
-moral rules of setting

-level of enforcement
(deterrence)
social/self
control link
SAT
(situation)
(crime propensity)
Morality/Norms
Environmental
Characteristics
Situational
Moderators (SM)
situation
situational self-control
Reflective
System (RS)
Mode Selection
RS*IS*SM
(state self-control)
variable
rationality
MFS
process of
consolidation
(variable rationality)
social/self
control link
self-control
outcome
Impulsive
System (IS)
behavioral
outcome
(trait impulsivity)
Frames/Scripts
(a) SAT & MFS complemented
(b) The Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM)
56
General Discussion and Conclusion
57
(Thornberry 1989) from a control perspective. The RIM as proposed here starts from a
control perspective and adds considerations as to the effects of environment and culture
in general, but the main predictors are still measures of control or variables that alter
control.
Although this is the first study applying the RIM on acts of crime,21 relying on some
of its arguments would be a contribution to criminology. One theoretical gain that can
follow from its incorporation, is that it allows to partially reconcile SATs and GTCs
definitions of self-control within a control framework (by incorporating a more stable understanding of self-control in the form of impulsivity and a more contextual one in the
form of deliberation). While trait self-control defines how the impulsive system operates, executive capabilities do a similar work for the reflective system (with respect to
its capability to restrain impulses), and situational moderators (including social control)
alter the way in which these two traits interact in order to trigger action (especially
when there is a contradiction between the behavior triggered by each system). The final
filter in triggering action would then be what SAT calls situational self-control. From
a RIM perspective, this state self-control is the result of the interaction between the
three key elements on action triggering (id*rd*sm). In other words, state self-control is
indeed the essential predictor of behavior, but it is a variable that is composed of the
main effects of the three basic predictors and their interplay. From a RIM perspective,
measures of state self-control can only be valid if they take this interplay into consideration.
With respect to the demand made by Taylor (2001) for a clear conceptualization of
control that explicitly specifies how the internal and external elements of control interact with one another (p. 384), the SAT argues that the perception of deterrence will
be dependent on the levels of self-control an individual possesses in a given situation
(Wikstr
om 2007, 357f.). The interplay of trait self-control, executive capabilities and
situational moderators (including social control in the form of deterrence) is what forms
state self-control. The three elements are interdependent, so that the perception of deterrence is influenced by a persons executive capabilities (as SAT states) and also by
his/her trait self-control (or trait impulsivity). And at the same time, characteristics
of the environment (like the general reliance on deterrence) influences both systems, so
21
A very recently developed model that focuses on crime and incorporates much of the propositions
of the RIM, is the Hot/Cool Framework by van Gelder and deVries (2014). It is a work in progress but
seems very promising. This framework explicitly incorporates the concepts of self-control and morality,
while associating them to two modes of information process: a cool and a hot one. Behavior is the
result of the interaction of both modes. The model also differentiates between a trait interpretation
of self-control and a more situational one. The authors discuss how trait and state can be reconciled
through the proposed framework (p. 4f.).
58
that the macro-micro-macro relations cannot be escaped (Coleman 1986, 1322ff.).
Another controversial argument in criminology is the age invariance thesis of the GTC
(Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983), according to which differences in (trait) self-control
(and therefore criminality) do not change after the age of about 10-12 (Hirschi 2004,
545). From a RIM perspective, trait impulsivity (i.e. trait self-control) may be difficult
to change because it belongs to the long-term memory, which learns slowly (Smith and
DeCoster 2000, 109). Nevertheless, changes in this system become possible through
repetition and also through the process of consolidation (Alvarez and Squire 1994).
While culture is the main responsible factor to configure the rule-based system, the socially shared knowledge of the cultural system also shapes and tunes the associative
system so that all aspects of the human mind become socially structured (Smith
and DeCoster 2000, 116). This argument implies supporting the role of transitions
according to the life-course perspective proposed by Laub and Sampson (1993). In
other words, changes in the environment can trigger fast changes in the reflective system
and slow changes in the impulsive system through the process of consolidation.
The last argument has public policy consequences: changes in the environment may
trigger changes in the rates of crime. And these changes need not be related with deterrence or social control. If it is possible to change the shared opinion about crime or
about violence in a group, fast changes in the rule-based system are expected (as tested
through hypothesis 4, reflective determinants of behavior seem to mediate the effect of
environmental characteristics) that should improve its ability to restrain impulses (as
tested through hypothesis 3, reflective determinants of behavior seem to mediate the
impulsive ones). On the long run, also changes in the associative system would mean a
more stable change in the individual tendencies to act wrong. In sum, policies focusing
on family and child rearing are still very important (as recognized by the GTC) because
the associations made as a child have a strong influence on behavior and are difficult
to change afterwards. But policies focusing on older or mixed age groups do not need
to limit only to policies affecting opportunities (as stated by Hirschi and Gottfredson
2001, 92). As Smith and DeCoster (2000) state it: [t]he external social world, acting
indirectly through the rule-based processing system, ends up shaping the workings of
the more personal, private, intuitive associative system, importing social influence into
every aspect of our minds operation (p. 116).
The main methodological consequence of relying on the proposed model is that its propositions can only be truly tested if both systems are measured differently. The reflective
precursors of behavior may be measured through self-report, because the content of the
59
reflective system is symbolic and can be communicated to others. But the associations
in the impulsive system can not be truly assessed in the presence of conscious control,
so that self-report would not be adequate to measure it. In words of Hofmann et al.
(2009): a dual-systems perspective on self-control implies that researchers should use
different measurement strategies to tap into the respective processes of impulsive and
reflective behavior determination (p. 168).
Good measures of the impulsive determinants of behavior can be gathered through

psychometric instruments. Hofmann et al. (2009) recommend the use of implicit measurement tools for this task (p. 167f.). Especially the Implicit Association Test (IAT)
seems attractive as it has been largely tested in social psychology (for a summary and
description of implicit measurement instruments, see De Houwer 2006; Fazio and Olson
2003). Although criminological studies do not usually apply psychometric measures,
the increase in the use of computer-based surveys in the last years provides with the
possibility to implement psychometric measures easily. Wikstrom and colleagues, for
example, recollect psychometric measures aimed at measuring decision making in their
Peterborough Adolescent and Young Adult Development Study (PADS+; see e.g. Wikstrom et al. 2012, 64ff.).
A theoretical consequence of using implicit measures of the impulsive determinants of

behavior is the possibility to respond effectively to the criticism by Akers (1991) about
the GTC being tautological. If it is accepted that the impulsive precursors of behavior
can be equated to the self-control definition of the GTC, no tautology should be expected when using different instruments to measure acts of crime and self-control. As
the author states it, [t]o avoid the tautology problem, independent indicators of selfcontrol are needed (p. 204). Thus, the problem of tautology is one of measurement,
not theory (Marcus 2004, 42).
Some extra considerations need to be taken into account with respect to the measure
of the determinants of action. While the GTC points at the versatility of self-control
and criminality, i.e. that low self-control (as a trait) is the main predictor of almost
all kinds of actions of crime and that [o]ffenders do not specialize in particular forms
of crime (Hirschi and Gottfredson 2001, 92), the RIM points at the specificity of selfcontrol outcomes. According to the RIM, the strength of activation of the schema in
each system will depend on the temptation of interest. For example, someone may be
very tempted by food but not by crime, or even by some sorts of crime but not by
others. As a consequence, measures of the determinants of behavior need to be specific
60
(Hofmann et al. 2009, 167).
The RIM seems to be a convincing theory of action for the study of crime and criminal behavior. It has the advantage of providing the tools to face some of the main
unsolved theoretical problems in criminology. It also points not only at an integration of
criminological theories, but also at a multidisciplinary integration or what Barak (2010)
calls postmodernist integration. The incorporation of inputs from social-psychology
implies a different understanding and measure of what happens inside the head of
a person between stimulus and action. And by mixing instruments of both disciplines
(criminology/sociology and psychology), measurement errors get diversified (for a nice
summary of common method bias in social science see: Podsakoff et al. 2003). That is,
psychometric measures are not without errors, but these are not equivalent to the errors
that a self-report raises. Moreover, implicit measures are likely to be free of social desirability bias (Fazio and Olson 2003, 300). Even more importantly, the RIM presents an
optimistic view about the possibility of altering crime through policies even at older ages.
Still open questions remain. This study is far from the perfect test of the proposed
theory. Limitations point primary to the way in which the variables are measured. As
already discussed, impulsive determinants of behavior should not be measured through
self-report (for a detailed list of requisites for good measures of both systems, see: Hofmann et al. 2009, 167f.). Next studies can try to incorporate indirect estimates through,
e.g., implicit measures (see: Fazio and Olson 2003; De Houwer 2006). Also the measures
of both systems should be as specific as possible. If the interest is on violence, stimuli
should be restricted to those associated to a violent reaction.
Finally for a good reliability of scales, more items per concept are better than less,
especially for cross-national surveys. Including more items enhances the psychometric
properties of the measures of an abstract theoretical construct (Ferraro and Grange
1987, 75) and also serves as prevention for the under-representation of dimensions or
construct bias (Scheuch 1993, 115; van de Vijver and Tanzer 2004, 125). In this study
e.g., the scale of violence was constructed with only five items. Beside the flaws already
mentioned of using few items, the distribution of the scale may be affected. In this
case, the distribution of the scale for violence (reflective determinats of behavior; see
Figure 3.2) is far from ideal, which can have consequences on i.a. heteroskedasticity.
For linear models that is not a big issue, but for non-linear models, the consequences of
such a violation are unpredictable (Winkelmann and Boes 2006, 115).
61
Measuring situational moderators is also a problem. In this study it is assumed that

someone who has been intoxicated and also has committed an act of violence, was intoxicated when committing it. The fact is that it is very possible that both did not intersect
in time. In other words, someone might be drunk at one day and get involved in a fight
in an another day. In this example, any conclusion about the moderation effect of alcohol on acts of violence, would be biased. This can be in part the reason why from all the
hypotheses stated in this study, the effect of situational variables seems to be the one less
strongly supported (hypothesis 2). Changes in predictions are only marginal, but lead
to statistical significant differences in predicted probabilities for the two groups involved
in the fight that were not significant without the interaction. Moreover, intoxication
seem to strengthen the effect of pro-violence values and not of impulsive determinants
of behavior (see Figure 4.3). This is a different result as expected from RIM, according
to which intoxication should reduce the effect of reflection and strengthen the impulsive
influences on behavior (see e.g. Hofmann et al. 2009, 169).
The question that arises is: Do situational moderators meet in time and space with
acts of violence? Or, how situational can a measure obtained through a cross-sectional
survey be? Here again the study of Wikstrom and colleagues (PADS+) seem exemplary.
They manage to measure the concrete conditions under which an act occurred through
their Space-Time Budget (see e.g. Wikstrom et al. 2012, 67ff.). Nevertheless this is
more an exception than a rule and even in the presence of adequate measures of the
setting (and the same goes for psychometric measures), it is very unusual to find studies
making use of them (one exception is Bernasco et al. 2013).
Two final remarks with respect to methodology. In this study aggregated measures were
used for the higher level of analysis (i.e. classes). This implies i.a. risks of ecological
fallacy (see e.g. Hox 2010, 3). Although some scholars see ecological fallacy following from aggregation as a manageable problem (e.g. Raudenbush and Sampson 1999)
and others even propose solutions for it (e.g. King 1997), it is clear that being able to
recollect truly measures of the higher levels, would be of advantage for multilevel models.
The second remark is that longitudinal studies would be needed to test the hypothesis
about the process of consolidation. This seems relevant because it is an essential hypothesis to back up the potential of interventions at the level of environment. Again
an argument opposed to a statement of the GTC arises, i.e. that [t]he longitudinal
study is not required to study the causes of crime (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983, 579).
Being able to test the validity of the process of consolidation does not only help to better
62
understand the causes of crime, but also the potentials of interventions.
In sum, RIM seems a very promising theory of action to understand crime. Besides facing some longstanding open discussions in criminology, it follows the example of MFS of
pointing at a multidisciplinary integration with special emphasis on the methodological
benefits of it. Future researches interested on further developing RIM for the analysis of
crime, should first focus on refining the tools to measure its main concepts adequately
(many directions are given here).
In a second step, the open question about what kind of interventions can make a change
in the individual probability of acting against society should be faced (here Learning and
Ecological Theories with their policy recommendations may be of help; see e.g. Bernard
et al. 2010, 133ff. & 177ff.). Finding the right intervention is a very difficult task and
should be faced with creativity to avoid stigmatization and opposite reactions. Here
again indirect measures may be the way forward, i.e. interventions against violence
may be best if not dealing openly with violence. From a RIM perspective, changes
in routines should affect the reflective system. So that, e.g., getting a job forces new
interactions that may alter a persons definition of right and wrong without explicitly
condemn previous beliefs. A good example are people moving to a new country: some
conducts that are seen as adequate in their previous culture may not be seen so in the
new one. After a few bad experiences he or she is expected to modify this conduct first
by retaining impulses and at the long run by modifying the impulse. Precondition for
this is integration into the new culture.
Once measures have been refined and interventions proposed, the effect of interventions
can be quantified. That is, the necessary tools for a pragmatic use of public policy,
supported by a theoretical explanation and adequate measures of its premises, would be
at hand.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics and correlations: self-control/impulse related items
74
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
(scale)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
impulse (scale)
1. act on spur of moment
2. act for short pleasure
3. more concerned w/ short run
4. do risky things
5. risk just for fun
6. excitement important
7. look out for myself first
8. dont mind upsetting oths
9. dont mind causing problems
10. lose temper easily
11. people stay away if angry
12. hard to discuss calmly
62,359
62,013
62,045
61,542
62,000
61,996
61,863
61,990
62,014
62,015
61,821
61,956
62,110
-.002
2.631
2.933
2.606
2.660
2.861
3.012
3.033
3.033
3.301
2.797
2.615
2.544
1.000
.999
1.012
1.045
1.086
1.065
.993
.992
1.046
.890
1.046
1.112
1.085
1.000
-.556
-.620
-.487
-.636
-.664
-.628
-.504
-.572
-.631
-.572
-.581
-.551
1.000
.390
.206
.265
.322
.311
.160
.273
.274
.256
.239
.219
1.000
.298
.322
.358
.356
.267
.311
.381
.237
.230
.224
1.000
.293
.229
.234
.199
.156
.211
.195
.171
.205
1.000
.625
.464
.178
.209
.286
.258
.272
.240
1.000
.550
.192
.283
.329
.247
.275
.218
1.000
.219
.295
.340
.217
.240
.196
1.000
.368
.402
.208
.183
.208
1.000
.480
.209
.246
.209
1.000
.287
.280
.252
1.000
.448
.414
1.000
.411
1.000
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
(scale)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
reflect (scale)
1. violence is part of fun
2. use force to gain respect
3. if attacked, hit back
4. w/o violence evrth boring
5. men prove thmslvs w/ viol
62,359
62,105
62,021
61,746
61,337
62,100
-.305
1.676
1.618
2.907
1.582
2.221
1.000
.918
.913
1.029
.902
1.093
1.000
-.720
-.690
-.596
-.712
-.690
1.000
.433
.244
.493
.334
1.000
.234
.424
.312
1.000
.227
.272
1.000
.344
1.000
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics and correlations: violence attitude/reflective determinants of behavior
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics and correlations: school climate related items (school disorganization)
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
(agg.scale)
(L1.scale)
1.
2.
3.
4.
school disorg. (agg. scale)

school disorg. (L1 scale)
1.stealing in school
2.fighting in school
3.vandalism in school
4.drug use in school
61,913
62,359
60,547
61,575
61,819
61,403
2.127
.058
2.248
2.361
2.286
1.612
.746
1.000
1.003
.999
1.036
.900
1.000
.555
.440
.444
.431
.357
1.000
.785
.778
.793
.658
1.000
.497
.486
.372
1.000
.518
.310
1.000
.355
1.000
Table A.4: Descriptive statistics and correlations: neighborhood climate related items
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
(scale)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
nhood disorganization (scale)

1.crime in nhood
2.drug selling in nhood
3.fighting in nhood
4.abandoned buildgs. in nhood
5.graffiti in nhood
62,359
61,999
61,923
61,908
61,934
61,491
.329
1.734
1.497
1.667
1.459
1.790
1.000
.951
.883
.940
.814
1.034
1.000
.802
.791
.828
.624
.743
1.000
.624
.627
.322
.445
1.000
.616
.348
.424
1.000
.388
.494
1.000
.380
1.000
75
Table A.5: Descriptive statistics and correlations: family bonding related items
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
(scale)
1.
2.
family bonding (scale)

1.getting along w/ father
2.getting along w/ mother
62,359
57,716
61,729
-.669
3.602
3.687
1.000
.652
.574
-5.612
1.000
1.000
.000
4.000
4.000
1.000
.878
.849
1.000
.460
1.000
Table A.6: Correlations of all variables used in the regressions
1.violence
2.reflect
3.impulse
4.intoxic.
5.grade
6.sch.cl. (agg.)
7.male
8.migration
9.age
10.home viol.
11.family bond.
12.family str.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
1.000
-.310
.289
.277
.047
.097
.199
.038
.071
.066
-.094
-.048
1.000
-.583
-.249
-.041
-.126
-.235
-.049
-.094
-.062
.088
.046
1.000
.305
.064
.124
.098
.021
.105
.108
-.161
-.062
1.000
.232
.079
.050
-.014
.282
.116
-.145
-.118
1.000
.093
-.010
-.019
.700
.041
-.080
-.011
1.000
.044
.131
.105
.039
-.027
-.068
1.000
.001
.031
-.076
.077
.030
1.000
.050
.054
-.023
-.041
1.000
.076
-.073
-.095
1.000
-.217
-.158
1.000
.142
1.000
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ZU KOLN

Violence, Self-Control and Morality: A

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of

Sometimes I am two people.

An exercise of theoretical elaboration (Thornberry 1989) from a control perspective is

Also thanks to Hans-J

5 General Discussion and Conclusion

SAT & MFS complemented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Histogram: impulsive determinants of behavior

Predicted probabilities (95% CI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RIM and SAT/MFS compared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Impulsive and controlled outcomes: four scenarios

Regression results (main regressions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations: self-control/impulse related items .

General Theory of Crime

International Self-Report Study of Delinquency

Model of Frame Selection

Situational Action Theory

Dedicated to my father Fernando Farren

and Gottfredson (1993) do manifest preference for behavioral measures of self-control

Theoretical integration is defined by Thornberry (1989) as the act of combining two

Finally, Bernard and Snipes (1996) defend a substantial reinterpretation of criminology

Psychological theories explaining variable rationality are usually labeled as dual-process

likelihood of an action followed by habit or by rational deliberation.

causes of the causes

-moral rules of setting

Shared with animals

Conceptualization and measurement

The problems of self-reports, especially when it comes to measuring sensible topics

(1990) on self-control as a trait responsible for criminality.5

definition of self-control in GTC.6 Impulses (as opposed to trait of impulsivity) arise

Research question and hypotheses

The theoretical framework to be applied centers on the interaction between individual

Table 2.1: Impulsive and controlled outcomes: four scenarios

fight (social control)

fight (state self-control)

Formally, the following hypotheses will be tested:

Impulsive determinants of behavior will be measured through a shortened version of the

Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics: impulsive determinants of behavior (scale)

Figure 3.1: Histogram: impulsive determinants of behavior

Reflective determinants of behavior

As a measure of the reflective determinants of behavior, pro-violence values have been

Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics: reflective determinants of behavior (scale)

Figure 3.2: Histogram: reflective determinants of behavior

school disorg. (L1)

Controls included are:

Figure 3.3: Histogram: school disorganization scale (agg.)

covariance matrix for an estimator that is inconsistent (see Freedman 2006).

f (yij |xij , uj ) = ijij (1 ij )1yij

= P (eij (x0ij + uj )|xij , uj )

Applying some algebra,

P (yj |xj , uj )(uj )duj

Boes 2006, 104f.). For continuous variables this looks as follows:13

In the case of two-way interactions in non-linear models, marginal effects are

of a variable can be separated into explained and unexplained variances. In an empty

Figure 3.4: Mediation

The KHB method is straightforward, computationally non-demanding and allows to test

in the fit and in the coefficients between (3.5) and (3.7).

Then four possible scenarios exist (as shown in Figure 3.5):

outcome of treated unit from treatment group (observable)

outcome of treated unit from control group (counterfactual)

outcome of non-treated unit from treatment group (counterfactual)

outcome of non-treated unit from control group (observable)

Source: adapted from Morgan and Winship 2007, 35