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sathishkumar R
I.
INTRODUCTION
are
cryptographically enforced.In
many cases, the concept of attributebased encryption (ABE) is a
promising approach that fullls the
requirements for secure data retrieval
in DTNs.The problem of applying the
ABE to DTNs introduces several
security and privacy challenges. Since
some users change their associated
attributes at some point (for example
moving their region), for each
attribute is necessary inorder
to make systems secure. In
CP-ABE, the key authority generates
private keys of users by applying the
authoritys master secret keys to users
associated set of attributes.
II.
FEASIBILITY STUDY
Existing System
The concept of attribute-based encryption
(ABE) is a promising approach that fulfills
Disadvantages
This issue is difficult, especially in ABE
systems, since each attribute is shared by
multiple users. In CP-ABE, the key
authority generates private keys of users
by applying the authoritys master secret
keys to users associated set of attributes.
The next issue is the coordination of
attributes that are issued from different
authorities. Here the multiple authorities
manage and issue their attributes keys to
users independently with their own master
secrets, the access policies issued from
different attributes could not be easily
determined.
Advantages
Data confidentiality: Unauthorized users
do not have enough credentials that satisfy
the access policy from accessing the plain
data in the storage node.The unauthorized
users from the storage node or the key
authorities should be prevented.
Collusion-resistance: When multiple
users collide with each other, they decrypt
a ciphertext by combining their attributes
even if neither of the users could not
decrypt the ciphertext.
Backward and forward Secrecy: In the
context of ABE, backward secrecy means
that any user who
holds an attribute
should be prevented from accessing the
plaintext of the previous data exchanged
before holding the attribute. On the
contrary, forward secrecy means that any
user who drops an attribute should be
prevented from accessing the plaintext of
the subsequent data exchanged after he
drops the attribute, the other valid
attributes that satisfy the access policy.
Proposed System
In this paper, we propose an attributebased secure data retrieval scheme using
CP-ABE for decentralized DTNs. The
immediate attribute revocation enhances
backward or forward secrecy of
confidential data by reducing the windows
of vulnerability. Encryptors define a finegrained access policy using any monotone
access structure under attributes issued
from any chosen set of authorities. Then
the key escrow problem is resolved by an
III.
SYSTEM STUDY
FEASIBILITY STUDY
requirements
of
the
ECONOMICAL
EASIBILITY
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY
ECONOMICAL FEASIBILITY
must
have
modest
are
required
for
IV.
ARCHITECTURE
Decrypt process
V.
ALGORITHM
Homomorphic
encryption allows
computations
to be carried out on
ciphertext, generating an encrypted result
which, and when decrypted,it matches
the result of operations performed on
the plaintext.
This is sometimes a desirable feature in
modern
communication
system
architectures. Homomorphic encryption
would allow the chaining together of
different services without exposing the
data to each of those services, for sample
a chain of different services from
different companies could 1) calculate the
tax 2) the currency exchange rate 3)
shipping, on a transaction without
exposing the unencrypted data to each of
those services. Homomorphic encryption
schemes are malleable by design. This
enables their use in cloud computing
environment
for
ensuring
the
confidentiality of processed data. In
addition the homomorphic property of
various cryptosystems can be used to
create many other secure systems, for
example secure voting systems, collisionresistant hash
functions, private
information retrieval schemes, and many
more.
There are several partially homomorphic
cryptosystems, and also a number of fully
homomorphic cryptosystems. Although a
cryptosystem which is unintentionally
malleable can be subject to attacks on this
basis, if treated carefully homomorphism
can also be used to perform computations
securely.
In
the
following
examples,
the
notation
is used to denote the
encryption of the message x.
Unpadded RSA
If the RSA public key is modulus
and
exponent , then the encryption of a
message is
given
by
.
homomorphic property is then
The
message x is
,
for
somerandom
The homomorphic property is then
Paillier
ElGamal
In the ElGamal cryptosystem, in a cyclic
group of order with generator , if
the
public
key
is
where
, and is the secret key,
then the encryption of a message
is
. The
, for some
random
homomorphic property is then
The
VI.
GoldwasserMicali
In the GoldwasserMicali cryptosystem,
if the public key is the modulus m and
quadratic
non-residue x, then the
encryption
of
a
bit b is
some random
The homomorphic property is then
for
.
IMPLEMENTATION
Key Authorities
They are key generation centers that
generate public/secret parameters for CPABE. The key authorities consist of a
central authority and multiple local
authorities. We assume that there are
secure and reliable communication
channels between a central authority and
each local authority during the initial key
setup and generation phase. Each local
authority manages different attributes and
issues corresponding attribute keys to
users. They grant differential access rights
to individual users based on the users
attributes. The key authorities are assumed
to be honest-but-curious. That is, they will
honestly execute the assigned tasks in the
system; however they would like to learn
information of encrypted contents as much
as possible.
Benaloh
Storage node
In the Benaloh cryptosystem, if the public
key is the modulus m and the base g with
Sender
This is an entity who owns confidential
messages or data (e.g., a commander) and
wishes to store them into the external data
storage node for ease of sharing or for reliable
delivery to users in the extreme networking
environments. A sender is responsible for
defining (attribute based) access policy and
enforcing it on its own data by encrypting the
data under the policy before storing it to the
storage node.
Map Task
The executions of sets of tasks are
synchronized into a map stage followed by
a reduce stage. In the map stage, the entire
dataset is partitioned into several smaller
chunks in forms of keyvalue pairs, each
chunk being assigned to a map node for
partial computation results. The map stage
ends up with a set of intermediate keyvalue pairs on each map node, which are
further shuffled based on the intermediate
keys into a set of scheduled reduce nodes
where the received pairs are aggregated to
obtain the final results.
User
This is a mobile node who wants to access the
data stored at the storage node (e.g., a soldier).
If a user possesses a set of attributes satisfying
the access policy of the encrypted data defined
by the sender, and is not revoked in any of the
attributes, then he will be able to decrypt the
ciphertext and obtain the data.
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