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A. HYLAND
not a person."
is the purposeof this essay to take some first steps towarddispelling the popular conception, exemplified by the two above
quotations, that there is little or no difference in Plato's dialogues
and
ptL?.1
32
p@,
is a possible predicate of
for reference step one, that desire (&VnQua4x)
'
"This
it
desires.
that
desires
and loves, does it
thing
'Epco.3 EpG.;
gcwv ocaur6
oi5
desire and love it having it or not having it?" (H6orepov
2 Plato, Theaetetus, 184c. Translation by F. M. Cornford.
' I do not mean to imply by the use of the term "steps" that these are necessarily
logical steps, that, say, step four follows logically from step three. I am simply
distinguishing the stages in the argument relevant to my paper.
33
s7rLOu)e
'r
xaXIpI,
elZ'
I
tnUlIeZ
xre X pI
O, II
oV;).4
"Probably
not having," says Agathon. This I shall call step two, that 'Epod
both desires and loves, in other words, that love is in a way selfpredicative, and that besides this it also desires.
"Consider," says Socrates, "whether, rather than probable, it is
not necessary that desire desires what it lacks, or does not desire if it
0' Z'7rLOLouv
does not lack." (x67nC 8&1,avXL'lo eLX6toqe M&vcyxzou'r
'
Here we have
'MtOU1?LV &&v -? C' ae; i;).5
OVi?VW; '=LV,
OtWVLU.ZV
step three, which states only (as opposed to step two) that desire
desires what it lacks. An important element in step three then, is
that it says nothing explicitly about 'Epw;. To this Agathon assents.
Socrates next enters upon some examples which both illustrate and
expand his point. The object of the examples is this: if someone who
is strong wishes to be strong, or if someone who is healthy wishes to
be healthy, what he really wishes is to continue to be strong or healthy
in the future, something which he at present lacks.6 But in the course
of these examples, a new word is introduced to express that element
of desire, namely ouXecaOL.It may seem at first that 3ou'caootand
e7rLtieZv are used interchangeably in this passage, but if this were so,
Socrates could be accused of ignoring the obvious difference that
e7r&LOtLdvis primarily, if not exclusively, a passion, whereas PoUAeaOvL
has the more intellectual connotation of "wishing" or "willing." But
he does not, I think, ignore this. Thus Socrates says at 200d, "Consider, then, whether whenever you say that 'I desire things now
present,' you mean anything else than this, that 'I wish to possess
the things I now have in the future also."' This suggests that the
desire for present possessions in the future somehow loses the passionate force of a present desire (ChLOupdc) so that the more intellectual
is appropriate. Let us call this introduction of Poi'Xo,oa? to
PoU'Xo,uim
refer to desire for future possession step four.
Socrates then switches back to "?p&-v"to draw his conclusion from
the examples. "But this is to love that which is not yet ready at hand
for one, nor in one's possession, the possession and preservation of
these things in future time."7 Step five seems to establish that "Epwg
&adv 0o8e
ou'nwco?tOL[LOV MUrT45
xodt nop6vro;"
34
"This man and anyone else who desires," says Socrates, "desires
what is not ready at hand nor present to him, and what he does not
have, and what he is not himself and what he lacks, such are the
kinds of things of which desire and love are."8 Step six thus asserts
that both "Ep(o and
ZatLOufL
9 Ibid., 200e8.
10Liddell and Scott, under "&1=0u[&" say that "'r IntOu?.ov ... equals &tOU[Eda."
Although this may at times be debatable, it serves the point here; step three is
not 'Epw,.
about kMOu)imd,
35
246ff.
18 See D. N. Levin, op. cit. (n. 1), pages 9-10 for a discussion of this.
36
want to say that if one simply desired, he would also befriend. 'ETLOutLCx,as the lower passion, would hardly deserve such a close association
with the more rational
yLX(c.
loves (4p) also befriends (pXct) is more difficult, but probably contains the crux of our problem. I offer the following suggestion: it
begins to look as though qLX6must be more closely associated with
'Epw; than with C'mOulA.A hierarchy begins to emerge, with &rLOu.daC
at the bottom and (pLXL
at the top, and these two terms mediated,
as it were, by 'Epwg, which contains elements of both. The criterion
of this hierarchy clearly is involved with the degree of rationality
implicit in the terms. 'E=Oufao, the lower passion, contains virtually
no rationality. In fact, it is a constant hindrance to reason, as we learn
in the Phaedrus.'L'Ep&s, as we learn from Diotima's revelation,
contains a considerable element of reason or deliberative ability. It
acts as the mediator between gods and men.16 In its mythical presentation as the son of Poros and Penia, it is described as "... plotting
after beautiful things and good things, being manly and energetic
and impetuous, a clever hunter, always weaving plots, desirous of
thoughtfulness, inventive, a philosopher throughout its life.. ".17
Moreover, in the famous "ascent passage",'8 we leam that as the
degree of reason in 'Epcs increases, whereby one turns his attention
to increasingly higher objects of love, 'Ep&q becomes transformed,
in its highest manifestation,
37
38
&ItLOuji(
its object; it desires not good drink, but simply drink. Poueaott,
on the other hand, suggests the deliberative or rational element
whereby we assess the object of our desire as worth having in the
future. Socrates' examples in the present passage are instructive in
in
this regard. His examples of things which we wish for (3ouX6,eOoc)
the future are strength, health, and wealth.23Evidence for my view
that these things require some deliberation before one seeks them
(and are not simply objects of erLu&.do)is that these are precisely
the three examples which Glaucon uses at Republic 357c to convince
Socrates of a "third class" of goods which require activities painful
and unpleasant in themselves (exercise, being healed, working) but
which are tolerated and considered good because of their good consequences.
As step five indicates, this reasoned desire for present possessions
in the future qualifies as `Epw4. "This is to love that which is not
present to one, and which he does not have..." ('Ouxo5vroi5t6y'ea'sV
Oc-rx
~xexsou9pV, 8 O57rcW
-IarV oi &ZXeL...),24This too suggests
JroL[Lov
lifts
that the introduction of the deliberation involved in Po'X?rOoct
the status of the merely passionate &97c&4doto the level of "Ep&g.
Again we can argue that central to the distinction between es;tu41(a
and 'Epcs is the presenceof rationality in 'Epw;.
Thus, concludes Socrates in step six, both desire and love are of
what one does not have, of what one is not, and of what one lacks.
This is consistent, because as we have seen, both"Epco and e&irLQt
desire, and one desires what one lacks. This conclusion, then, concerns
Socrates
only the fundamental similarity between "Epto and Our?LEa
does not state explicitly the difference between these terms. That
remainsthe enterpriseof the reader.
In the summary of his discussion with Agathon, Socrates ceases
22
23
'4
39
mentioning both 'Ep; and krOupia and concludes exclusively concerning"Epw. This is because the stated topic of conversationis 'Epcoc
too in this discussion,
not C'Ovudca.We have learned about &7rLOutLm
as well as about cpOEm,but the explicit purpose in the context of
mOu,i(mand ypLX(m.
The first thing to notice is the first step: "It is necessary"says Diotima,
"for one rightly pursuing this business to begin when he is young by
pursuing beautiful bodies, and first if he is rightly led by his leader,
he will love one body and in it he will beget beautiful speeches."25
25
Ibid., 210a4.
40
We see here that although Plato begins the erotic ascent to philosophy
on a much more concrete level than many philosophers would be
willing to grant, he has still not begun at the most concrete level.
For Plato has Diotima begin this ascent at what is already a fairly
advanced stage of development; the young person in question has
already discerned the beauty of the physical body, and picked out
that quality as worthy of love. The higher level of this first step is also
indicated by the manner of generation which results; the lover will
generate not human children, or even sexual gratification, but "beautiful speeches" (?o6youxocXoi))in the soul of the beloved. A prior stage
of development, then, would have been an undiscerning or indiscriminate desire for the possession of the physical body, a desire whose
generative issue would have been sexual gratification, or at best (if
the affair were heterosexual) human children. But what else would
that desire be but &7rLOuutO
? This ascent is an ascent of "Ep&o,and
therefore does not begin with the absolutely lowest level, which would
be &7rOu,(ac.A complete ascent would necessitate a beginning with
pure i'mOultm,or desire for the possession of a physical body, that is,
for sexual intercourse. Plato has given us that beginning in an earlier
ascent just prior to the present one, which was stated in terms of
the desire (ZhrOudoc)
for generation.26There, the ascent began with the
lOUpd for procreation, which was characteristic even of beasts, and
ascended to such higher procreations as the works of Homer and
Hesiod, and the laws of Solon and Lycurgos. If we were now to juxtapose these two ascents, we would see that the first ascent constituted
the absolute beginning, whereas the beginning of the second ascent,
the one now in question, already represents a certain stage of development. And what precisely is that stage? It is the stage of discriminating or reasoning capacity which our earlier analysis suggested
differentiates'Epoc from Cr&LOdcu.
It is also worth noting that the highest stage of the earlier ascent
(of desire for procreation),laws and politics (exemplifiedby Solon and
Lycurgus),27 is but a middle level in the more famous ascent of the
love of beauty.28 Whatever the deeper reasons for this, it reveals
that m7rOu[Aoc
and 'Ep&4overlap, but 'Ep(o has higher manifestations
than does 'LmOu[da,in particular the two highest steps on the philosophic ascent, love of knowledge (popOL,a6E)
and love of Beauty
26
27
28
Ibid., 207-210.
Ibid., 209d.
Ibid., 210c.
41
pL?Wafor
aop6x.For in the next to the last step, the love of the beauty of all
knowledge (ZhUaTn[), the aspirant is partaking "in unencumbered
philosophy" (v pXoaoptoc
aOp06v),30 and of course, in the last step,
the glimpse of Beauty Itself, one is at the level of philosophy too.
This also supports the results of our earlier analysis; the difference
between "Ep&gand cpcaois one of degree. And the degree in question
is the degree of reason which is present in one's "Ep&g.Thus the
''ascent passage" is entirely consistent with the results of our earlier
analysis, both in regard to the orderof the hierarchy (efLQu[dc-'EpwqypaLXL)and
as the Symposium suggests, rather prevents both the lover and his
beloved from pursuing "divine philosophy."32It is clear throughout
these first two speeches that "Epc is interpreted, and censured, as
This is why both speeches
irrationaland harmfulsexual lust, or ehr&tLta.
advocate that one avoid relationships with lovers. Yet Socrates
29
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
al Plato,
32 Ibid.,
20
210b.
210d6.
Phaedrus, 238b7.
239b.
42
the black horse, is the lowest and most unruly faculty of the soul, a
constant danger to its higher functions. 'Epcoq,however, is divine
madness which pervades the whole soul. Indeed, one crucial difference
between 'Epw~ and inOuti?M is the relation of each to the charioteer,
reason. 'En&sL'o.c,the black horse, resists and disobeys the charioteer
whenever possible.35'Ep&o, on the contrary, finds its fulfillment (in
philosophy) only when the charioteer is in proper command. Pervading the whole soul, "Epwqcontains in its nature desire, spirit, and
reason. But its fulfillment requires that the reason which is part of
its nature exhibit its presence and control over its ?tnLOU[.da36 This
should be sufficient to show that it is only when reason is sufficiently
present and active in 'Ep&qthat 'Epw; can achieve its highest manifestation, in philosophy. Remembering that at this highest maniwe can see that this passage alsois
festation, "Epcosis indeed a cpLXEa,
consistent with the distinction, however slight, between "Epwqand
tEoc,a distinction of which Plato indicates he is aware at Phaedrus
255e, where the young beloved mistakes his feelings of "Ep&gfor
cpLXt.Thus all the distinctions which we found present in the Symposium are also present in the Phaedrus; 'Epco, kbrOupdo, and cpLtX
are all differentiated, and the principle of differentiation is the presence and degree of reason.
I wish now to turn briefly to the Republic where support is also
present for my view. It will be remembered that one stage in my
88
84
Ibid., 242e4.
Ibid., 243c5.
Il This is a constant theme throughout the speech. See especially the remark of
of Socrates at 256a8.
43
the use of "and again" (xot oa5),we see that that distinction is held
consistently in this dialogue too.38Again, this by way of support for
the difference between 'Epw and ehr&u,uL,Socrates at 438a is satisfying Glaucon that desire, qua desire, is only of its object, with no
furtherqualifications. He warns Glaucon,
"'Let no one then,' said I, 'disconcert us when off our guard with the objection
&X
that everybody desires not drink but good drink (4g oC8clg7noTro5&ntLOu"Zt
and not food but good food because all men desire good (7r6iv'T?
Xp
ro'roo3)
ln&rOto5atv)and so if thirst is desire it would be of good
yip &pa-r&v&yaxO&v
drink or of good whatsoever it is; and so similarly of other desires."'"8
38
44
48
44
45
Trinty College,Hartford,Connecticut.
46