Anna Marmodoro Aristotle On Perceiving Objects

4/6/2015
MetaphysicalFoundationsofPerceptionOxfordScholarship
UniversityPressScholarshipOnline
OxfordScholarshipOnline
AristotleonPerceivingObjects
AnnaMarmodoro
Printpublicationdate:2014
PrintISBN13:9780199326006
PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:August2014
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
TheMetaphysicalFoundationsofPerception
AnnaMarmodoro
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.003.0002
AbstractandKeywords
Aristotleaddressestheproblemofthestructureandthefunctionalityofthefacultyofperceptionasametaphysical
problem,andresolvesitthroughmetaphysicalinnovation.HisinnovationisgiveninthePhysicsinhisaccountof
causationintermsofactivationofcausalpowers.Thekeyfeaturesoftheaccountareasfollows.Causationisanactivity
involvingtwo(ormore)causalpowers,whichbelongtodifferentsubstancesorpartsofsubstance(s).Eachofthe
activatedpowersengendersanactivationofadifferenttype,butthetwo(ormore)typesareinterdependent,coexisting
partneractivities.
Keywords:Aristotle,perception,causation,causalpowers,activation,Physics
Introduction
OneofthecornerstonesofAristotlestheoryofperceptionisthattheworldistrulyascolorfulasitlookstous,asnoisyas
itsoundstous,etc.Bygeneralization,Aristotleholdsthatweperceivetheworldthroughthesensesasitisinother
words,thecontentsofourperceptionsarejustliketherealpropertiesoftheexternalobjectsweperceive. 1Whilethereis
scholarlyconsensusonAristotlesrealismwithrespecttoperceptiblequalities,avarietyofwaysofinterpretingithave
beenputforwardintheliterature.Thisbookmakesanoriginalcontributiontothedebatebymotivatingtheviewthat
Aristotlestheoryofperceptionisalignedwithoneofhismostfundamentalpositionsinmetaphysics,namelythatall
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001/acprof9780199326006chapter2?print
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propertiesarecausalpowers(,potentialities),andthatcausationistobeaccountedforintermsofpowersand
theiractivation(or,actuality).2Thus,inthecaseofperceptiontheperceptiblequalitiesofobjectsare
realpowersoftheobjecttointeractcausallywiththeperceivers,andperceptionitselfistheactivationoftherelevant
powersintheperceiverbytheobjectsofperception.Theactivationoftheobjectsperceptiblequalitiesandtheactivityof
thecorrespondingperceptualexperienceintheagentaremutually(p.4) dependentinavarietyofways,whichare
uniquetoAristotlesperceptualrealism.
Beforeexploringthisviewinmoredetail,itwillbehelpfultobrieflyintroducethekeytermsthatwillberelevantforthe
followingdiscussion.TheAristotelianscholarmightindeedalreadybesurprisedbymyuseofthetermspowerfor
potentialityontheonehand,andactivationforactualityontheother.Theseareinterpretativechoices,andinsome
waysdeparturesfromthereceivedtraditionIwillexplainthempresently.TheGreekterm
, asAristotleusesit,
referstoapropertywhosenatureisdefinedintermsofthechangeitcanbringabout,orwhichitcanallowitsbearerto
suffer.ThemostcommonEnglishtranslationof
thusunderstoodispotentiality.Thistranslation,albeitwell
established,isunhelpfulwhenweembarkonaninvestigationofAristotlesviews,forthreemainreasons.Firstly,itblurs
theconceptualdistinctionbetweenthepropertyitself,thatis,thecausalpower,andthestateitisin,becausetheyboth
endupbeingreferredtoaspotentiality.Secondly,itobscurestherelevanceofAristotlesviewtocontemporary
metaphysics:thetermpotentialitydoesnotfigureinthecontemporarydiscourse,althoughwhatitreferstoinAristotleis
verymuchatthecenterofcurrentdiscussioninmetaphysics. 3Thirdly,itgeneratesunnecessarydifficultiesforour
understandingofwhatanactivatedpoweris.Ithusproposetousethetermpowerasatranslationof
whenit
referstocausalpowers,andtousethetermpotentialitywhenreferringtothestatethatcausalpowersareinwhennot
activated.
Somepowers,forAristotle,existinnatureorandothersor.Forthese
expressionsIusethecurrenttranslationinpotentialityorpotentially,andinactualityoractually,respectively.While
keepingtothestandardtranslation,Iofferhoweveranoriginalinterpretationofwhatitisforapowertobeinactuality.I
arguethattheactualityofapoweristo(p.5) beinterpretedasitsstateofactivationitsexercisingpowerfulness.For
Aristotle,apowerdoesnotceasetobepowerfulwhileactivated,norisitspowerfulnessreducibletomerepotentiality,as
wewillseeinmoredetaillater.Thepowerfulnessofapoweriseitherthepotentialitytobringaboutchange,orthe
actualityofbringingaboutchange.Thatthepowerfulnessandthepotentialityofapowerarenotreducibleonetothe
othercanbederivedfromthefollowingstanceAristotletakes.Hedifferentiatesthreestatesasubjectsmaybeinin
relationtoapower:smayhaveapowerinpotentiality(asinthecaseofachildhavingthepowertolearntoplaysoccer)
smayhaveapowerinfirstactuality(whenthechildhaslearnedtoplaysoccer)andsmayhaveapowerinsecond
actuality(whenthechildisplayingsoccer). 4ForAristotlesomepowersretaintheirpotentialityonlyuptothestateoffirst
actuality,butnotinsecondactuality.Forexample,whenwaterisfreezingandbecominganicecube,inthefirststagesof
thisprocesstheicecubeinthemakingisnotactuallyfragilebutcanacquirethecapacitytobreakifitcooleddownmore.
Whenitiscooleddownmoretheicecubebecomesharderandbrittle,andcanpotentiallybreak(e.g.bybeingcrushed).
Crushingitactivatesitsbrittleness,namelyitspowertobreak.Whentheicecubeisactivelybreakingitlosesthe
potentialitytobreak.Bycontrast,otherpowersretaintheirpotentialitywheninsecondactualityforinstance,thechilds
potentialitytoplaysoccerispreservedwhileplayingsoccer,namelywhilethepowerisactivated.Aristotleexplains:
Eventhetermbeingacteduponisnotusedinasinglesense,butsometimesitmeansakindofdestructionof
somethingbyitscontrary,andsometimesratherapreservationofthatwhichispotentialbysomethingactual
whichislikeit,aspotencyisrelatedtoactuality.Forwhentheonemerelypossessingknowledgecomestoexercise
it,heisnotaltered(forthedevelopment(p.6) isintohisrealselforactuality),orelsethisisadifferentkindof
alteration(DA417b27)
,,
,
,()
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.
Apowerispowerfulbecauseofitsrelationtochangeitcanleadtochange,oritengagesinchangethatpreservesit. 5
1.1AristotlesPowerOntology
Aristotlespowerontology,asbrieflysketchedthusfar,bearsonhistheoryofperception.Forhim,theperceptible
qualitiesthatcharacterizetheworldaroundusarerealcausalpowersobjectshave,aswewillseeinthenextchapters.
WhyarepowerssocentraltoAristotlesmetaphysics,andconsequentlytoalldomainsofhisinvestigation,including
perception?Howdidhereachthisview?Aristotleaimsatarationalexplanationoftheworldallthewaydowntothe
bedrockofreality.IntheDeGenerationeetCorruptionehestatesthatatthisfundamentallevelofrealitythereare
propertiesandbodies,andthereisarationaletothenumberofbodiesandthewaythepropertiesaredistributedamong
them.Hewrites,
The[fundamental]differences[i.e.,properties]arereasonablydistributedamongtheprimarybodies,andthe
numberofthelatterisconsonantwiththeory.
(GC330b67,myemphasis)
,.
(p.7) Inthinkingaboutthepropertiesthatcharacterizetheprimarybodies,Aristotlenarrowsdownthecandidatesfor
thisroleoffundamentalpropertytothetangiblecontrarieties(GC329b69),whichforhimare:
[Properties]...capableofacting[and]beingaffected...saidofthingsinvirtueoftheiractinguponsomethingelseor
beingacteduponbysomethingelse.
(GC329b2122)
..........
ClearlythenforAristotlethesepropertiesarepowers:theyarepropertieswhosenatureistobringaboutorallowtheir
bearertosufferchange.Aristotlegoesthroughananalysisofthelistoftangiblecontrarieties,andconcludesthattheyare
allreducibletofourprimaryorfundamentalones.Theseprimarypowersareheat,cold,wetness,anddryness:
Itisclear...thatalltheotherdifferencesreducetothefirstfour,butthattheseadmitofnofurtherreduction...Hence
thesemustbefour.
(GC330a2429)
.......
.
Theseprimarypowersdonotexistseparatelyeachonitsowntheypairupandconstitutethefoursimpleelements:
namelyfire,air,water,andearth:
Fireishotanddry,whereasAirishotandmoist...andWateriscoldandwet,whileEarthiscoldanddry.
(GC330b35)
,...,
.
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(p.8) Aristotleholdsthattherearenootherprimarypropertiesthatanyofthesimpleelementspossessesinadditionto
thetwocontrarypowerseachsimpleelementisqualifiedby.Thesimpleelementscanreciprocallytransformintoone
anotherbygainingorlosingtheirpowers. 6Forexamplethesimpleelementswaterandfirehavetwocontrarietieseach,
andwhentheycomeincontacttheinteractionbetweenthemresultsintheheatoffireoverpoweringthecoldnessofthe
waterwhilethewetnessofwateroverpowersthedrynessoffire,givingrisetowhatishotandwet,namelyair.Andwhen
airlosesitsprimarypowerofheat,whichisreplacedbythepowerofcold,ittransformsintowateragain.Aristotlewrites:
Forthesebodies[Fire,Waterandthelike]changeintooneanother(theyarenotimmutableasEmpedoclesand
otherthinkersassert,sincealterationwouldthenhavebeenimpossible),whereasthecontrarietiesdonot
change.
(GC329a35b3,myemphasis)
,(),
.
TherewillbeAir,whenthecoldoftheWaterandthedryoftheFirehavepassedaway(sincethehotofthelatter
andthemoistoftheformerareleft)whereas,whenthehotoftheFireandthemoistoftheWaterhavepassed
away,therewillbeEarth,owingtothesurvivalofthedryoftheFireandthecoldoftheWater.So,too,inthesame
wayFireandWaterwillresultfromAirandEarth.FortherewillbeWater,whenthehotoftheAirandthedryof
theEarthhavepassedaway(sincethemoistoftheformerandthecoldofthelatterareleft)whereas,whenthe
moistoftheAirandthecoldoftheEarthhavepassedaway,therewillbeFire,owingtothesurvivalofthehotof
theAir(p.9) andthedryoftheEarthqualitiesconstitutiveofFire.
(GC331b1424)
,(
),,,
.
,(),
,,,.
Thesimpleelementscancombinebetweenthemindifferentproportionstomakeupmorecomplexkindsofstuff.Thusthe
(instantiated)primarypowersaretheprimitive(orbasic)andfundamentalbuildingblocksofreality.Theprimarypowers
areprimitivebecausetheyarenotconstitutedofanyfurtheritemsastheirbuildingblocks.Therearenoitemsconstituting
theprimaryproperties,andthereforetherearenofurtheritemsconstitutingthesimpleelementsair,water,earth,and
fireapartfromtheirprimarypowers.Ontheotherhand,theyarefundamentalbecausetheprimaryproperties,towhich
theotherpropertiesarereducible, 7interactwitheachotherinthecyclicaltransformationsoftheprimaryelementsthey
constitute, 8therebymakingupastructureofinteractingpowersthatisthefoundationofallthereisinnature.Inviewof
thefactthatforAristotleeverythinginphysicalnatureisbuiltoutofthefoursimpleelementsandtheirmixtures,andthe
simpleelementsarebuiltoutoftheprimaryproperties,itfollowsthatallthereisinnatureisbuiltoutofpowers.All
physicalchangesinnaturederivefromchangesinthecombinationsoftheprimarypowers.Since,onAristotlesview,
powersrequireotherpowerstoactivatethem,thisgivesrisetoanetofinterdependentpowers,(p.10) which,ultimately,
constituteeverythinginnature.Itisastructureofdependences,notofrelationsbetweenpowers.Norisitastructureof
relationsthatconstitutepowersdependencedoesnotintroducerelationsormakepowersrelationalentitiesintheir
constitution.Furthermore,asweshallsee,forAristotlethemanifestationofeachpowerisintrinsictothepoweritself.
Beingactivatedissimplyexercisingthepowerfulnessthatdefineswhatthepoweris. 9
1.2TheNatureofCausalPowers
Ingeneralterms,forAristotle,apowerisfirstandforemostthecapacitytobringaboutchange:
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Allpotentialitiesthatconformtothesametypearestartingpointsofsomekind,andarecalledpotentialitiesin
referencetooneprimarykind,whichisastartingpointofchangeinanotherthingorinthethingitselfquaother.
(Met.1046a911,myemphasis)10
,,,
.
ItisimportanttonotefromthestartthatAristotlesveryexplanationofpowersasbeingsourcesofchange,andnothing
otherthanthat,commitshim,albeitimplicitly,totheviewthatallthereistoapoweriswhatitcando,orisdoing.
Nothinginertorimpotentisneededinthepowersnaturetoanchorthepowertoreality. 11Thiscommitment(whichis
sharedbyanumberofcontemporarypowermetaphysicians)12isnotuncontroversial13however,itiscrucialtofree
Aristotlespowerontologyfromanyoftheregressesthatensueforotherpowerontologies,aswewillseelater.
(p.11) Inadditiontotheprimarytypeofpowersjustmentioned,thatistheactiveoneswhichcaninitiatechange,for
Aristotlethereexistpassivepowersthatarecapacitiestosufferchange:
Foronekindisapotentialityforbeingactedon(i.e.,theprincipleintheverythingactedon)whichmakesit
capableofbeingchangedandactedonbyanotherthingorbyitselfregardedasother.
(Met.1046a1113)
,.
Examplesofsuchcapacitiesorpowersare,forexample,fragility,ormalleability,orflexibility,etc.ForAristotlebeing
abletochangeisasmuchacapacityorpowerasbeingabletoeffectchange,ashestates:
Inasensethepotentialityofactingandofbeingactedonisone(forathingmaybecapableeitherbecauseitcan
beactedonorbecausesomethingelsecanbeactedonbyit),butinasensethepotentialitiesaredifferent.Forthe
oneisinthethingactedonitisbecauseitcontainsacertainmotiveprinciple,andbecauseeventhematterisa
motiveprinciple,thatthethingactedonisactedon...forthatwhichisoilyisinflammableandthatwhichyields
inaparticularwaycanbecrushedandsimilarlyinallothercases.Buttheotherpotencyisintheagent(e.g.heat
andtheartofbuildingarepresent,oneinthatwhichcanproduceheatandtheotherinthemanwhocanbuild).
(Met.1046a1928)
(
),.(,
,(p.12) ...,
),,,
AnotionthatisdistinctivetoAristotlesaccountisconceivingofpassivepowersasoriginativesourcesofchange(see
Met.1046a1113a23).Itisnaturalforustothinkthatanoriginativesourceofchangeisapowertobringaboutchange
butitisnotasnaturaltothinkthatanoriginativesourceofchangeisacapacitytosufferchange.YetAristotleseesboth
activeandpassivepowersasoriginativesourcesofchange,theoneasasourcethatchangessomething,andtheotheras
asourceofsufferingchange.Infact,Aristotlegivesseveralexamplesoforiginativesourcesofsufferingchangetomake
hispointclear,suchas,forexample,oilorbrittlematter. 14BothactiveandpassivepowersarementionedinAristotles
definitionofpowerinMet.V12:
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Thingswhicharecalledcapable(
)inonesensewillbethosewhichoriginatechangeoralteration...in
otherthingsorquaotherinanothersense,ifsomethingelsepossessessuchcapacityoverthem.
(Met.1019a33b1)
...,
.
TheformeristheprimarycaseforAristotletheothersarecalledcapableeitherfromsomethingelsespossessinga
capabilityofthatkindoverthem,orfromitsnotpossessingit,orfromitspossessingitinaparticularway(Met.
1020a24).
AsIwillarguebelow,itisafundamentaltenetforAristotlethatpowersaredependentonotherpowersinordertobe
activated.For(p.13) examplethesolubilityofsaltrequiressalttobeplacedinanappropriateliquidinorderforitto
dissolve.ThepositionwasfirstputforwardbyHeraclitus,endorsedbyPlato, 15andthendevelopedbyAristotle
interestinglyitisgainingconsensusamongcontemporarymetaphysicianstoo. 16ButitisadistinctiveAristotelianview
(andfarfrombeingapointofconsensusamongcontemporarypowermetaphysicians)thatactivepowersdependon
passivepowersfortheiractivation(andviceversa).Aristotledefinesanactivepowerasonethatexercisesits
powerfulnessonacorrespondingpassiveone. 17AsIwillarguebelow,thedistinctionbetweenactiveandpassivepowers
ispivotalforasoundaccountofcausation,foritgivesmetaphysicalunderpinningtoitsasymmetry. 18
1.3CausalPowersinActuality
Powersarecapacitiesforchangethechangeistheend(
)theyaredirectedtoward. 19Forapower,reachingitsend
isexercisingitspowerfulness,andtherebybecomingactual.Mostimportantly,forAristotletheactualityofapowerisits
activation,namelyatransitiontoadifferentstatusofthepoweritself. 20Thisnewstagereachedbytheactivatedpoweris
thecausalactivitythepowerisengagedin.Forexample,thepowertoheatwhenactivatedisheatingsomethingelse.
Aristotleinfactdistinguishesbetweenpowerswhoseactivationisanactivityinthestrictsense(,),and
otherswhoseactivationisaprocess(
).Thepowerswhoseendsareactivitiesarerealizedinstantaneously,suchas
inthecaseofthepowertoseeatanyonemomentoneseesandhasseen.Thepowerswhoseendsareprocessesare
realizedinstages,suchasinthecaseofthepowertobuildahousewhileoneisbuildingahouse,onehasnotbuilta
house.Processeshaveanaturalcompletionpoint:whentheendoftheprocessisreached,suchasthecompletionofthe
(p.14) houseactivitiesdonothaveanaturalcompletionpoint(e.g.,inthecaseofseeing).StrictlyspeakingAristotle
associateschangewithprocessesonly,becauseinthecaseofprocessestheresultingstateisqualitativelydifferentfrom
theinitialstateasforinstanceinthecaseofheating(process),butnotofseeing(activity). 21TomakeAristotlespoint
evenclearerwemightsaythatprocessesonlyhaveanoutput,whilebothprocessesandactivitieshaveaneffect.
AristotlesdistinctionsaremainlypresentedinthefollowingtextfromtheMetaphysics:
Sinceoftheactionswhichhavealimitnoneisanendbutallarerelativetotheend(e.g.,theprocessofmaking
thinisofthissort)andthethingsthemselveswhenoneismakingthemthinareinmovementinthisway(i.e.,
withoutbeingalreadythatatwhichthemovementaims),thisisnotanactionoratleastnotacompleteone(forit
isnotanend)butthatinwhichtheendispresentisanaction.Forexample,atthesametimeweareseeingand
haveseen,areunderstandingandhaveunderstood,arethinkingandhavethought:butitisnottruethatatthe
sametimewearelearningandhavelearned,orarebeingcuredandhavebeencured.Atthesametimeweare
livingwellandhavelivedwell,andarehappyandhavebeenhappy.Ifnot,theprocesswouldhavehadsometime
tocease,astheprocessofmakingthinceases:but,asitis,itdoesnotcease:wearelivingandhavelived.Ofthese
processes,then,wemustcalltheonesetmovements(),andtheotheractualities().Forevery
movementisincompletemakingthin,learning,walking,buildingthesearemovements,andincomplete
movements.Foritisnottruethatatthesametimewearewalking[toadestination]andhavewalked[tothe
destination],orarebuildingandhavebuilt,orarecomingtobeandhavecometobeitisadifferentthingthatis
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beingmoved(p.15) andthathasbeenmoved,andthatismoving[toalocation]andthathasmovedbutitisthe
samethingthatatthesametimehasseenandisseeing,oristhinkingandhasthought.Thelattersortofprocess,
then,Icallanactuality(),andtheformeramovement().What,andwhatkindofthing,theactual
is,maybetakenasexplainedbytheseandsimilarconsiderations.
(Met.1048b1836)
,[][],
,,
<>[].<,><
,>,.
,.,,,
.<>,.,
,.,
,,[]
,.,.
,.
Fromtheabovetextwelearnthatpowersareactualized,accordingtoAristotle,aseitheractivitiesorprocesses.The
differencebetweenthemisthatprocesseshaveabeginningandanendwhicharedifferentfromeachother,so
completingtherealizationoftheendrequiresqualitativelydifferentstagesinaprocesswhileinanactivitythebeginning
andtheendarethesame,ina(p.16) continuousrealizationoftheend.Sincewhileaprocessistakingplaceithasnot
reacheditsendpointyet,itcanbethoughtofasapowerintheprocessofbeingactualized,whichishowAristotlethinks
aboutit.Aprocessisanactuality,becausetheunfoldingrealizationofitsdifferentstagesishappeningbutatthesame
timeitisnotfullyrealized,insofarasithasnotreacheditsendyet.Inthatsenseachangeisanactualprocessin
progress,realizingitsremainingpotentialstages,asAristotleexplainsinthePhysics:
Theactualityofthepotential,quapotential,ischange(e.g.,theactualityofwhatisalterableasalterable,is
alterationofwhatisincreasableanditsopposite,decreasable(thereisnocommonnameforboth),increaseand
decreaseofwhatcancometobeandcanpassaway,comingtobeandpassingawayofwhatcanbecarried
along,locomotion).Thatthisiswhatchangeis,isclearfromwhatfollows:whenwhatisbuildable,insofaras
wecallitsuch,isinfulfillment,itisbeingbuilt,andthatisbuilding.
(Phys.201a918,transl.slightlymodified)
,,,,,,
(),
,.,.
,,,,
Someconfusionmightariseinreadingthepassage:itmightappearthatapowerispotentialbeforeitisactualized,and
againpotentialafteritisactualized,asiftherewereunactualizedandactualized(p.17) potential.Toavoidconfusionit
isimportanttobearinmindthedistinctiondrawnbyAristotlebetweentheactivationofapowerthatis,itsrealization
andthecompletionoftheprocessofitsrealization.Thus,thepowerofhousebuildingbecomesactualwhenactivated
atthebeginningofthehousebuildingprocess,andcontinuestobeinactualityuntilallthestagesofhousebuildingare
completed.Althoughinactivitiestheendisreachedassoonastheactivityoccurs,andsetsnolimitstothedurationofthe
activity,inthecaseofchangestheendiscomplextheprocesshastobeinitiatedandcontinueactivateduntiltheend
pointoftheprocessisreached,completingtheprocess:
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Whileinsomecasestheexerciseistheultimatething(e.g.,insighttheultimatethingisseeing,andnoother
productbesidesthisresultsfromsight),butfromsomethingsaproductfollows(e.g.,fromtheartofbuildingthere
resultsahouseaswellastheactofbuilding),yetnonethelesstheact[ofseeing]isintheformercasetheendand
inthelatter[theactofhousebuildingis]moreofanendthanthemerepotentiality[tobuild]is[evenifitislessof
anendthanthecompletionofthehouse].
(Met.1050a2328)
(,
),(),
,
Thecontrastisbetweenthepotentialityforbuildingahousewhennothingisbeingbuilt,andthepotentialityforbuilding
ahousewhileahouseisbeingbuilt.Thelatterpotentialityistheactivationoftheformerpotentiality,andhasanend
pointthatmarksitsfullactualization.Thisiswhattheactualityofthepotentialqua(p.18) potentialistheactual
processofbuildingthehouse.Duringthebuildingprocess,thepowertobuildisasactivated(andasactual)asisthe
powertoseewhenoneisseeing.Thus,whenthepowerisactivelydoingwhatitisinitsownnaturecapableofdoing,
thenthepowerisactualized.Priortothisitexistsbutinapotentialstate.Thustheactualityofapower,whetherforan
activityoraprocess,istheactivationofthatpower:22
Thatwhichisintheprimarysensepotentialispotentialbecauseitispossibleforittobecomeactual(e.g.,Imean
bycapableofbuildingthatwhichcanbuild,andbycapableofseeingthatwhichcansee).
(Met.1049b1216)
,(,
,,
Aristotlefurtherdistinguishestheactivationofapowerfromtherealizationofthepowersend.Theendofapoweris
giveninthepowersdefinition:
Thatwhichiscapableiscapableofsomethingandatsometimeinsomewaywithalltheotherqualifications
whichmustbepresentinthedefinition.
(Met.1047b351048a2)
.
Asmentionedabove,forAristotle,theactualityofapowerisnotanewpropertythatcomesabout. 23Rather,itisthe
activationofthepower,eitherasitisexercisingitscausalinfluenceonthepassivepowerorasthepassivepoweris
sufferingthatinfluence.Forexample,ifapeachhasthepowertoripenintheheat,theripeningistheactualization
(p.19) ofactiveandpassivepowersatplayintheenvironmentandinthepeach.Theripestateofthepeachthatcomes
aboutistheaftermathoftheactivationofthepowers,nottheirmanifestation,whichistheripeningprocess.Similarly,in
thecaseofabuilderwhohasthepowertobuildahouse,thebuilthouseistheoutputoftheactivationoftheactiveand
passivepowersinplayinthecircumstances.
ForAristotleapowerinpotentialityisthesamepowerasthatpowerinactuality(i.e.,whenitisactivated).Inother
words,thedifferencebetweenpotentialandactualpowerisnotanumericaldifference.Thisisaveryimportantand
distinctivetenetofAristotlesmetaphysics,whosephilosophicalsoundnessshowsupclearlyifweconsideritinrelation
tothreedebatesintherecentliteratureonpowermetaphysics.Inbrief,theseissuesare:firstly,whetherpurepower
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ontologiesofthekindAristotleendorses(wherethereisnothingcategoricalanchoringthepowerstoreality)are
committedtoaworldofmerepotentialitysecondly,whetherpowershaveanessentiallyrelationalnatureandthirdly,in
whatsenseapowersdirectednesstowarditsmanifestationisintrinsictothepoweritself.Ishallnowexamineeachof
thesedebates,showingineachcasehowAristotlesviewmakesafreshcontribution,andadvancesthecontemporary
debate.
Tobeginwith,isAristotlesaccountvulnerabletothecriticismthatallthereisorcanbeispotential,andthatchangeis
simplyatransitionfromonepotentialstateoftheworldtoanothersuchstate?Thisisaproblemfacedbymany
contemporarypowerontologies,sometimesreferredtoastheAlwayspacking,nevertravellingproblem. 24David
Armstrongformulatestheproblemthus:
Givenpurelydispositionalistaccountsofproperties,particularswouldseemtobealwaysrepackingtheirbagsas
theychangeproperties,yetnevertakingajourneyfrompotencytoact.(1997,80)
(p.20) Theproblemstemsfromthepositionheldbycontemporarypowerontologistswherebythemanifestationofa
powerisanewpower. 25Thispositioncommitsthemtoanetworkofpowersinpotentiality,astheactivationofeach
powerinpotentialityisatransitiontoanewpowerinpotentiality.Thus,nothingeverseemstobeactualized.Avoidinga
commitmenttoworldsofmerepotentialityispreciselytheworrythatAristotlespositionavoids.Onhisview,andin
contrasttoalternativeviewsinthecontemporaryliterature,thetransitionapowermakesfrombeinginpotentialityto
beinginactualitydoesnotamounttobringingaboutanotherpowerinpotentiality.Itisratheratransitionthepower
makestoitsownactivatedstate.Anactivatedpoweristheverysamepowerasthepowerinpotentiality,butisnow
manifesting(e.g.,thepowertoheatactivelyheatingsomething).Atheoryofpowersthatdidnotallowthemwhen
activatedtoexercisetheirpowerfulnesswouldberatheroddindeed.ForAristotlepowersthatareexercisingtheir
powerfulnessareactivelybringingaboutchange,andresultinanewconfigurationofpowers.Buttheexerciseof
powerfulnessisnottheresult,butrathertheprocesstowardtheresult.FromthisdiscussionitfollowsthatforAristotle
thepowerfulnessofapowerisnotreducibletomerepotentiality.(Thisaddressesthefirstofthethreeissuesin
contemporarymetaphysicaldebatementionedabove).Powerfulnessisthepotentialitytobringaboutorsufferchange,but
alsotheactivityofbringingaboutorsufferingchange.Additionally,theactivationofapowerisneithertheendofthat
power,nordoesitrenderthepowerinert.Onthecontrary,thepowerisactivelybeingpowerfulbyengenderingchangeor
sufferingchange.
Thus,therelationbetweenapoweranditsactualityisintrinsictothepoweritself,inthewaythat,forexample,the
relationofagirltothewomanshebecomesisintrinsictothatperson. 26Itisacommonassumption,afterAristotle,that
powersaredefinedintermsoftheiractuality.Contemporarypowerontologiestakethemanifestationofapowertobea
furtherpower,therebyestablishing(p.21) anetworkofrelationswherebyeachpowerisdefinedintermsofitsrelations
tosomethingdifferentfromitself,namelyotherpowers.Bycontrast,onAristotlesviewtheactualityofapowerisnot
anotherpowerthattheoriginalpowerisrelatedto.(Theactualityofthepowertoheatisthepowersheatingup
somethingelseandnotanotherpower.)ItfollowsthatAristotlesontologyisnotrelationalapowerisnotdefinedin
termsofitsrelationtootherpowers.Rather,apowerisdefinedintermsofitsownstateofactivation,whichisan
intrinsicstateofthepoweritself.
ItremainsnowtoinvestigatewhetherpowersforAristotlehaveanessentiallyrelationalnatureonaccountoftheir
dependenceonotherpowersfortheiractivation.Toconsiderthispoint,weneedtolookattheconditionsforactivationof
powersthatAristotlesetsout.ForAristotle,theactivationofcausalpowersrequirestwosetsofconditionstoobtain.On
theonehandthereisavarietyofwhatwewouldcallenablingconditionspertainingtotherighttime,therightsituation,
therightexternalconditions.Aristotlesummarizestheminsayingthatthemoveriscapableofsomethingatsometime
insomeway(withalltheotherqualificationswhichmustbepresentinthedefinition)(Met.1048a12).Ontheother
hand,hecollectivelydescribeswhattriggerspowersintherightcircumstancesintocausalactivitygenerically,intermsof
contactbetweenpowers:
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Toactonthemovableassuchisjusttomoveit.Butthisitdoesbycontact,sothatatthesametimeit[themover]is
alsoactedon.Hencemotionisthefulfilmentofthemovableasmovable,thecausebeingcontactwithwhatcan
move,sothatthemoverisalsoactedon.
(Phys.202a59)
,,,
,,,.
(p.22) Whatwelearnfromthispassage(andothersalreadyquoted)isthefollowing.First,powersforAristotleare
dependententities.Aswewillseeinmoredetaillaterinthischapter,forAristotlepowersarecoactivatedwiththeir
partnerpowers.ForexampleAspowertoheat(p)requiresBscapacitytogethotter(p)inordertobeabletoachieveits
manifestation,thatis,heating.Hence,everypowerisdependentonotherpowersforactualizingitsnaturebyreachingits
fullactivationstate.Butdependenceisnotarelationitisratheraconditionforexistence. 27Thus,aswewillseelaterin
thechapter,powersarenotforAristotlerelationsorrelationalproperties.Secondly,contactisthetriggeringcondition,
withalltheotherconditionsmentionedinthedefinitiondeterminingtheenablingconditionsforcausalefficacytotake
place.Itisthereforeimportanttounderstandwhatisinvolvedinthecontactbetweentheactivepowerandthepassive
poweritoperateson.Aristotletellsusthat:Thingsaresaidtobeincontactwhentheirextremitiesaretogether(Physics
226b23).Hefurtherexplainsthat,Thingsaresaidtobetogetherinplacewhentheyareinoneprimaryplaceandtobe
apartwhentheyareindifferentplaces28(Physics226a213).Sothingsthatareincontacthavetheirextremitiesinthe
sameplace.Forthepurposesofcausation,havingtheextremitiesinthesameplacewillhavetobeunderstoodaseither
touchingorbeinginproximity.(Itmusthavebeenascleartoeverybodyinantiquityasitistousthatthereiscausal
impactevenwhenthingsaremerelyproximate,namely,inthesameplaceinthesenseofsamespatialregion.)For
example,proximitytoafireissufficientforheating,andevenforcatchingfire.SoforAristotlecontactisakeyfactorfor
causalefficacy.Itdoesentailatypeofproximityorsamenessofplace,butmoreimportantly,inacausalcontext,ithas
cometomean,forhim,triggerofthechange,allowingthatthereissomekindoftouchingeveninsituationswherethe
touchingisnotphysicalandnotevenreciprocal:(p.23)
Ifanythingimpartsmotionwithoutitselfbeingmoved,itmaytouchthemovedandyetitselfbetouchedbynothing
forwesaysometimesthatthemanwhogrievesustouchesus,butnotthatwetouchhim.
(GC323a3133)
,,
,.
Torecapitulate,theconditionsunderwhichtheactualizationofpowerstakesplacearedeterminedintheverydefinition
ofthepowers.Thedefinitionofapowerspecifiesthetypeofpoweritis,namelywhatitisthatitcanbringaboutorsuffer
theappropriateoccasiononwhichthepowercandothisthewayinwhichitcandoitandanyotherconditionsthat
needtoobtainforittodowhatitdoes.Whenalltheconditionssetoutinthedefinitionaremet,includingtheappropriate
pairofpowerscomingintocontact,intherelevantsenseofcontactforthetypeofpowertheyare,thennecessarilythe
agentpoweractsonthepassivepowerandbringsaboutitseffect:
Sincethatwhichiscapableiscapableofsomethingandatsometimeinsomewaywithalltheother
qualificationswhichmustbepresentinthedefinition,...asregardspotentialitiesof[thosethingsthatarenon
rational,(e.g.,fire)]...whentheagentandthepatientmeetinthewayappropriatetothepotentialityinquestion,
theonemustactandtheotherbeactedon...Forthenonrationalpotentialitiesareallproductiveofoneeffect
each.
(Met.1047b351048a8myemphasis)
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,
,,
(p.24) ,,
,,
Themodalityisnaturalnecessity,stemmingfromthenatureofthepowersthemselves.WhenAristotlesays,inthe
quotationabove,thatwhentheagentandthepatientmeetinthewayappropriatetothepotentialityinquestion,theone
mustactandtheotherbeactedonheisstatingwhatisineffectamostgenerallawofnature.Thatis,heisstatingwhat
apowerisintermsofhowitbehaves.Whennaturefollowsitscourse,accordingtoAristotle,itdevelopsasitspotentiality
dictates,unlesssomethingexternalinterferes.Hesaysaboutthenaturaldevelopmentofanorganism(e.g.,anacorn)in
BookVIIIoftheMetaphysics:
Inthecasesinwhichthesourceofthebecomingisintheverythingwhichcomestobe,athingispotentiallyall
thosethingswhichitwillbeofitselfifnothingexternalhindersit.
(Met.1049a1214)
[],[]
.
Thisishownatureoperates:therearephysicaltendencies,whichunfold,unlesssomethinggetsintheirwayand
preventstheircourse.Thismayhappeninthecaseofcausalinteraction,orinthecaseofthenaturaldevelopmentof
organismsaccordingtotheirnature.ThisiswhyAristotledescribesthelatterasbeingsuchandsuchforthemostpart
inBookVIoftheMetaphysics:
Physicsmustbeatheoreticalscience,butitwilltheorizeaboutsuchbeingasadmitsofbeingmoved,andabout
substanceasdefinedforthemostpart.
(Met.1025b2628)
(p.25) ,,
...
Bothchangeanddevelopmentaretheresultsofunfoldingpotentialities,whichfollowtheirowncourse,forthemostpart,
ifnothinghinders.
Aristotlescharacterizationofthistypeofphysicalmodalityisalandmarkinmetaphysics,demarcatingwhathascometo
bethoughtofasphysicalnecessity. 29AgainintheMetaphysics,Aristotleexplainsthenotionofbeingforthemostpart,
contrastingittoabsolutenecessity,asfollows:
Since,amongthingswhichare,somearealwaysinthesamestateandareofnecessity(notnecessityinthesense
ofcompulsionbutthatwhichweassertofthingsbecausetheycannotbeotherwise),andsomearenotofnecessity,
noralways,butforthemostpart...Forinstance,ifinthedogdaysthereiswintryandcoldweather,wesaythisis
anaccident,butnotifthereissultryheat,becausethelatterisalwaysorforthemostpartso,butnottheformer.
(Met.1026b2735,myemphasis)
,
,,,
...
,,,.
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Whatcharacterizesthenotionofbeingforthemostpartisregularity,thetypeofregularitythatonefindsinnature,under
thedomainofnaturallaws,whicharenotexceptionless. 30
(p.26) Torecapitulatethediscussionsofar,causalchangeforAristotleinvolvesthemutualactivationofactiveand
passivepowers,broughtaboutbythecontactbetweenontologicallyinterdependentpairsofpowers,suchaswhatcan
heatandwhatcanbeheated.Themutualactivationofinterdependentpowersmayresulteitherinactivity(e.g.seeing)or
inaprocessofchange(e.g.,beingheated)AllthathappensinAristotlesworldisthatpowersinpotentialitycometobe
activated,eitherasagentsofchangeoraspatientsofchange.Whatisdistinctiveabouttheview(incontrastwiththe
versionsincontemporarymetaphysics)isthatittakestheactivationofacausalpowertobetheexerciseofthatpower
(i.e.,anactivityorprocess).
1.4RelationsandRelatives
PowersforAristotlearenotrelationalproperties.Thereisno(external)relationconnectingapowerinpotentialitytoits
actuality(rather,theactualityistheverysamepowerinadifferentstate,namelyengagedinanactivity).Therearegood
reasonsfornottreatingpowersasrelations,evenifAristotledoesnotdiscussthemexplicitly.Ontheonehand,ifapower
isdefinedintermsofitsactuality,wherethedefinitiondefinesthepowersnature(e.g.,thepowertoheat)itshouldbethe
casethatthepowerisonewithitsessentialnaturetheessentialnatureofapowershouldnotbeadifferententityto
whichthepowerisrelated.ThisweknowfromAristotlesargumentsinMetaphysicsVIII6.Norshouldapoweronly
tendtowardsitspowerfulnessasifitspowerfulnesswereexternaltothepoweritselfbecausethislatterviewwouldnot
makephilosophicalsense.Thatis,itwoulddivideapowerfromwhatitis.Furthermore,thereisnorelationconnecting
mutuallydependentpowers.Rather,forAristotlepowersarerelatives.Aristotlespowersaredependentonotherpowers
inordertobeactivated,butontologicaldependenceisgrounded(p.27) onmonadicproperties,suchasybeingafather
andxbeinganoffspring,thatbelongtointerdependententities.Aristotlespowersarenotrelatedtootherpowers
throughpolyadicrelations,suchasxbeingthefatherofy.Aristotleexplainedtheontologicaldependencebetween
relativesreductively,asacounterfactualdependence(e.g.,ifthereisnomasterthereisnoslave). 31Ifweapplythis
understandingofontologicaldependencetothecaseofcausalrelata,itfollowsthattakingcausalrelataasontologically
interdependentamountstotheviewthatifthereisnopatientofchange,thereisnocauseofchange(thereisnopowerto
heatifthereisnopowerforbeingheatedup). 32IwillbeginbyofferingwhatIthinkistherationaleforthisapproach,by
sketchinganintuitionthatstemsfromAristotelianmetaphysicalprinciples. 33Isubmitthatthisrationalemotivates
Aristotlesreductiveaccountofrelationsintermsofmonadicproperties.
WeknowfromAristotlesCategories(chapter1)andfromtheMetaphysics(bookVIIchapter4)thatevenincidental
properties(e.g.,beingpale,orbeinghot)haveessencesanddefinitions.Furthermore,propertiescannotexistunattached,
ontheirown,buttheyhavetobelongtoasubject(seeCategorieschapter2).Ifwethenconsiderarelationbetweentwo
things,forexample,MarcobeingthefatherofPietro,andwetrytothinkofthisrelationasasinglepolyadicpropertythat
conjoinsthetwo,MarcoandPietro,decisivedifficultiesfollow.Ontheonehand,thispolyadicpropertywouldbelongto
bothsubjects,sinceitcanonlyexistbybelongingtosomething(s)assubject,andbothsubjectshaveaclaimtoitbybeing
conjoinedbyit.Ontheotherhand,althoughMarcoisrelatedtoPietroasafather,PietroisnotrelatedtoMarcoasa
father,butasasonhence,eitherthepolyadicpropertywouldbelongtoPietrowithoutbeingtrueofhimorthepolyadic
propertywouldhavetwodifferentnatures,endowingeachofthetwoconjoinedentitieswithdifferentqualifications,of
beingafatherandbeingason,whichisincompatiblewiththepropertybeingoneandthesame(p.28) property(i.e.,
relation).Theasymmetryoftherelationintroducesapluralityofnaturestherelationisthesenatures,andthisplurality
underminesitsoneness.ConceivingofrelationsaspolyadicpropertieswasnotevenentertainedbyAristotle.For
Aristotle,whatweconsiderrelationsareaccountedforintermsofmonadicpropertiesthatareontologically
interdependentthatis,relatives.Theyaremonadicpropertiesofaspecialkind,whichhecalledtheprosti(thetoward
something)typeofproperty:suchpropertiesinthemselvespointtowardsomethingotherthanthemselves.Thus,
Aristotlesays:
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Wecallrelativesallsuchthingsasaresaidtobejustwhattheyare,oforthanotherthings,orinsomeotherway
inrelationtosomethingelse.Forexample,whatislargeriscalledwhatitisthansomethingelse(itiscalled
largerthansomething)andwhatisdoubleiscalledwhatitisofsomethingelse(itiscalleddoubleofsomething)
similarlywithallothersuchcases.
(Cat.6a36b2)
,
,,
,.
(Aristotledoesnotdistinguishbetweenrelativesandrelations.Itakeitthisisforthereasongivenabove:thatneither
relativesnor(asymmetric)relationscanbesinglepolyadicpropertieswithasinglenaturebelongingtoeachofthetwo
relataitistrueof.)WhatdoesAristotlemeanbytakingrelativestobeprostitowardsomething?Heexplainsitas
follows:
Allrelativesarespokenofinrelationtocorrelativesthatreciprocate.Forexampletheslaveiscalledslaveofa
masterandthemasteriscalledmasterofaslave
(Cat.6b2830)
(p.29) ,
...
Prostipropertiesaremonadicpropertiessuchthattheirmanifestationoractivationdependscounterfactuallyonthe
activationoftheircorrelatives.Someoneisactuallyamasteronlyifthereisaslaveofwhomheismaster,andviceversa
fortheslave.Therelationbetweenthereciprocatingcorrelativesisnotalinguisticorasemanticrelation.Itisan
ontologicalinterdependence,asAristotlestatesclearly:
Ifthereisnomaster,thereisnoslaveeither...Whenthereisaslavethereisamasterandsimilarlywiththeothers
[sc.otherrelatives]Also,eachcarriestheothertodestructionforifthereisnotadoublethereisnotahalf,andif
thereisnotahalfifthereisnotadouble.Sotoowithothersuchcases.
(Cat.7b522)
....
,
.
SothepointingnatureofrelativesisAristotleswayofdepictingontologicaldependence.Thisiswhatbindsmonadic
propertiesintoreciprocalpairsfortheiractivation(e.g.,beingamasterandbeingaslave).Butontologicaldependenceis
notapolyadicrelationbetweenrelata.Justasthereisnopolyadicconnectionbindingaspeciestoitsgenus,inspiteof
theirontologicalinterdependence,similarly,forAristotle,thereisnopolyadicconnectionbindingoneactivatedmonadic
propertytoitscorrelativeproperty. 34Thesameholdsfortherelationbetweenmatterandform,andsubjectandproperty,
whereAristotleisexplicitthatthereisno(polyadic)(p.30) entityunifyingthemintoone. 35Therelationbetweenthe
reciprocatingcorrelativesisnotalinguisticorasemanticrelation.Itisanontologicalrelationofinterdependence,as
Aristotlestatesclearlyinthelastpassagequoted.SothepointingnatureofrelativesisAristotleswayofdepicting
ontologicaldependence.Thisiswhatbindsrelativemonadicpropertiesintoreciprocalpairs(e.g.,beingamasterand
beingaslave):thatthecorrelativesareontologicallyinterdependent.Thelastquotationaboveisimportantfor
understandingAristotlesnotionofdependence,asitappliestorelata.Hesaysthateachrelatumcarriestheotherrelatum
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todestruction.Heisthereforeclearlydescribinganexistentialdependencebetweenrelata:ifthereisnomasterthereis
noslave.(Somedependenciesareexpressedingenericterms,andsomeinspecificterms,withthedependenciesspecified
respectively.)36
1.5CausationWithoutGlue
ThetwopillarsofAristotlestheoryofcausationarehisaccountofpowersandhisreductiveaccountofrelations.Ina
nutshell,forAristotle,causationistheactivationofreciprocalcausalpowers.Aristotleconsiderscausalpowersas
relativesnamely,theagentandpatientinacausalpairarecausalrelatives.InMetaphysicsbookVAristotleexplains
thetermrelativeorrelationasfollows:
Thingsarerelative[prosti](1)asdoubletohalf,andtrebletoathird,...andthatwhichexceedstothatwhichis
exceeded(2)asthatwhichcanheattothatwhichcanbeheated,andthatwhichcancuttothatwhichcanbecut,
andingeneraltheactivetothepassive(3)asthemeasurabletothemeasure,andtheknowabletoknowledge,
andtheperceptibletoperception.
(Met.1020b2632,myemphasis)
(p.31) ,...
,
.
Causalexamplessuchasheatingandbeingheatedareincludedintheaboveamongrelativessuchasdoubleandhalf,
andtheyarecollectivelygroupedunderthedescriptionofbeingactiveandbeingpassive.Itfollowsthatgenerally,for
Aristotle,themoverandthemovablenamely,theactiveandthepassivepowersincausalinteractionsareengagedina
causalrelationwhich,accordinghistheoryofrelations,involvestwomonadicpropertiesratherthanapolyadicone.In
thecausalcases,thetwomonadicpropertiesarethepowersthemselves,namelytheactivepowerandthepassivepower.
Usingtheexamplejustgiven,itwouldbetheheatingpowerandthepowertobeheated,thecuttingpowerandthepower
tobecut,thepowerofperceptiontothepowerofbeingperceived,andgenerallytheactiveandthepassivepowers.
AccordingtoAristotlesaccountofrelations,then,theactiveandpassivepowersaremonadicpropertiesthatare
ontologicallyinterdependent.
WesawthatAristotleexplainedtheontologicaldependencebetweenrelataasanexistentialdependence(e.g.,nobodyis
aslaveifthereisnomaster).Similarlytheontologicaldependencebetweenthecausalrelataentailsthatthereisno
moverifthereisnomovable.Butherethequestionariseswhethertheontologicaldependencedeterminesthepotentialor
theactivatedstateofthepowersinquestion.Clearly,ifthereisnothingthatcanbeaffected,thenthemoverwillnotbring
aboutanyeffectthereisnoactualmovingchangingifthereisnothingthatcanbemovedchanged.Forinstance,if
nothingcanbeheated,noheatingwilltakeplaceeither.(p.32) Butcantherebeamoverinpotentiality,evenifthereis
nothingthatcouldbemoved?Couldtherebe,forexample,aknifeinaworldwherenothingcouldbecut?Wealreadysaw
thatthedefinitionofapowermentionstheendtowardwhichthepowerisdirected:whatthepoweriscapableofbringing
about(Met.1047b351048a8).Butifthereisnothingthatcanbesoaffected,howcantherebeapowerwhosenatureis
tobringaboutthateffect?AristotlebelievesinsomeformofthePrincipleofPlenitudenamely,thatwhatispossiblewill
happen. 37Ifso,thenitfollowsthathebelievesthattheendofeachpowerinpotentialitymustberealizable.So,there
couldbenomover,eveninpotentiality,inaworldwhereitwasnotpossibleforittomoveanything.Hence,wemust
assumethattheontologicaldependencebetweenactiveandpassivepowersappliestotheirpotentialstate,asmuchasto
theiractivatedstate. 38
CausationisthusaccountedforbyAristotleintermsofpairsofcausalpowers(anactiveandapassiveone)thatcometo
beactivatedinmutualdependenceoneachother.Thismutualdependencebindsthecauseandeffecttogether,butwithout
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reifyingarelationbetweenthem.ThislatterconclusionfollowsfromAristotlestheoryofrelativesthatwehaveexamined
intheprecedingsection.WhatmakesAristotlestheoryofcausationuniqueinthehistoryofphilosophyisthatitis
groundedinhisaccountofrelationsintermsofmonadicproperties,whichareontologicallyinterdependent.Onthis
view,powersdependfortheiractivationontheactivationoftheirmutualpartnerpowers.Becauseoftheirmutual
dependenceforactivation,partnerpowersrealizetheirnaturesinactivitiesthatarecodetermined,covarying,andco
extensiveintime.Thus,onthisaccountthereisreciprocityincausation.ConsiderthecausalscenariowhenAcausesB
tobecomehotter.OnAristotlesaccount,AspowertoheatisactivateditsmanifestationisheatingBup.Butthiscan
takeplaceonlyifBspowertobeheatedisactivatedtooandmanifestsitselfinBsgettinghotter.AsheatingandBs
being(p.33) heatedaremutuallydependentinavarietyofwaysandeachactivitylastsaslongastheotherlasts.Inthe
DeAnimaAristotlewonderswhythesensesdonotperceivethemselvessincetheyperceiveotherthingsmadeof
perceptibleelementsandtheythemselvesaresocomposedofsuchelements(DA417a17).Heconcludesthatthepower
ofsenseisparalleltowhatiscombustible.Forthatneverignitesitselfspontaneously,butrequiresanagentwhichhas
thepowerofstartingignition(DA417a710).Theexternalagentisperceptionspartnerpower,whichactivatesit.By
developinganaccountofcausationastheactivationofcausalpartnerpowers,Aristotleputsforwardarealisttheoryof
causationthatdoesnotreifytheinteractionofthecausalpartnersintoarelation. 39
Thatcausationisthemutualactivationofcausalpowersisaviewthatisgainingconsensusincontemporary
metaphysics. 40However,thereisanimportantfeaturetocausationthatisleftoutinthecontemporaryviewsofthiskind,
namelyagencyanditsomissionleavesimportantmetaphysicalworkundone.Aristotlesanalysisoftheinteraction
betweenmutuallyactivatingcausalpowersisdifferentfromthoseadvancedinthecontemporarydebate,inthatitdoes
justicetotheintuitionthatthereisagencyincausation.Aristotledrawsadistinctionbetweenthecausalagentand
patient,associatingagencywithwhatbringsaboutchangeandpatiencywithwhatchanges.Accountsthatdonotdraw
thisdistinctionprovidenoargumentthatcausationneedstobesymmetricwithrespecttochangeandfurthermore,they
wouldnotbeabletoexplainthepossibilityoftheexerciseofapowerthatdoesnotitselfchange(unlessbychangethey
understandthemeremanifestationofapower).BychangeImeanthattheresultingpower(property)isdifferentfrom
theoriginalone,asinthecaseofheating.Aristotledoesnotconsiderthemereexerciseofapowerachange(e.g.,when
thefloorissustainingmyweight,theweightdoesnotchangebutitiscausallyexercisedonthefloor).
(p.34) Iwillnowturntoexaminethenatureofthecausalagencythatanactivepowerexercisesonapassivepower.
Therearetwoaspectsofcausalagencythatrevealitsnature.Thefirstiswhatitbringsabout,andtheotherishowit
achievesit.Inthinkingabouttheinteractionbetweencausalagentandpatient,itmightbenaturalorintuitivetothinkof
itasatransmissionofpowerfulness.Theideathatcausationhappensbecauseofthepassingaroundortransmissionof
propertiescanbetracedbacktoanancientGreekconceptionknownintheliteratureastheContagionModelof
causation.Aristotletootalkedofthetransmissionoftheformoftheagentspowerontothepatientspower. 41But,even
forAristotle,aswewillsee,thisisafigurativewayofdescribingthepowerinteraction.Thetransmissionofpowerfulness
isawayofdescribingwhatisbroughtaboutbycausation,asifthepatientreceivedthepowerfulnessoftheagent.
Nothingisactuallytransferredfromtheagenttothepatientwhattakesplaceisnotthetransmissionofanything.On
Aristotlesview,allthereistopowersinteractingistheirmutualactivationthereisnoexchangebetweenthem,no
transmissionofanything,andnorelationbridgingthetwo.Theinterdependenceoftherelativepowerstranslatesinto
theirmutualqualitativetransitiontoexercisingtheirpowerfulness,whichiswhattheircausalinteractionconsistsin.
Mutualmanifestationisthesimultaneoustransitionofeachofthepartnerpowerstotheiractivatedstates(e.g.,heating
andbeingheated). 42
LetusnowlookmorecloselyatAristotlestalkofcausationintermsoftransmission,andathowwecangainabetter
insightintocausationitself.InthePhysics,Aristotledescribeswhatthemoverdoestothemovableintermsof
transmissionoftheformofthemovertothemovable:
Themoverwillalwaystransmitaform,eitherathisorsuchorsomuch,which,whenitmoves,willbethe
principleandcause(p.35) ofthemotion(e.g.,theactualmanbegetsmanfromwhatispotentiallyman.).
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(Phys.202a912)
,,,,
.
Thetransmittedformmightbeasubstantialform,asinthecaseofthetransmissionoftheformofahumanbeingtothe
menstrualfluidsinthegenerationofanembryooritmightbeaquality,asuch,asforinstanceofheatorofweight,etc.
So,ingeneralterms,thecausalactionoftheactivepoweronthepassiveoneconsistsinthetransmissionofaformfrom
anagenttoapatient.Thetransmittedformisthenthecausetheprivationoftheforminthepatientiswhatallowsforthe
formsreception,andthephysicalprocessfacilitatingthetransmissionoftheformiswhatgroundsthecausalchange
(e.g.,inbuildingthemovementsofthebuildershandsfacilitatethetransmissionoftheformofthehousetothe
constructionmaterialsforafire,contactfacilitatesthetransmissionoftheformtotheobjectheated).Aristotlewantsto
findawaytoexplainthechangethatisbroughtaboutbytheactivepower,andthisisonewayinwhichtalkof
transmissionmaybehelpful.Intheexampleabove,thegenerationofanewhumanbeingisaccountedforbythe
transmissionoftheformofahumanbeing,whichistheprincipleandthecauseofthemotion.Theformtransferredis
theformthatdeterminestheend()ofthepotentialityinthemovingpowersdefinition.Thusaparenthasthe
potentialitytogenerateahumanbeing,andapainterthepotentialitytogenerateapaintingoncanvas.Thesearethe
endsthatthemoverspowersaredirectedtowards,intheirpotentialstate(e.g.,theendsthattheparentandthepainter
haverespectively).Theyexpresswhatthepowerscanbringaboutwhenactualized.
(p.36) Whatdoesitmeantosaythattheformofthemovingpoweristransmitted?Onceagain,Aristotlesexplanation
ofcausationintermsofthetransferenceofaformfromtheactivepowertothepassiveoneshouldnotbetakenasaliteral
description.Aristotleisnotreifyingtheformofthepowerintoanactiveagentofitsown,overandabovethepoweritself.
Thereisnohomunculusformthatistransmittedfromtheparenttotheoffspring.Thereareonlymotionstransmitted
fromtheparenttothemenstrualfluidsbythespermthatisimplantedinthembutthetransmittedmotionshaveaform
(theyareshaped)thustheheatintheparentsspermgeneratesthemotionsinthefluids,whichgraduallyshapethe
embryo,asAristotletellsusexplicitly. 43Similarly,thereisnoformofastatuethatisliterallytransferredfromthesculptor
tothemarbleasculptortransferstheformofafigureinhermindtothemarblethroughthemovementsofherhandsand
chisel.Nevertheless,talkoftransmittedformsmightbethebestwayavailabletoAristotletodescribecollectivelythetype
ofeffectthattherespectivemovingpowershaveonthepassiveones.Themovementsgeneratedfromtheheatofthesperm
inthefirstcase,andfromthehandsofthesculptorinthesecond,bringaboutchangesofparticulartypes,whichare
determinedbythekindofactivepowerthatisactingonthepassiveone.Theresultingchangeisasifthesperm
transferredaformontothemenstrualfluids,whichenformedthemandshapedthemintoanembryoandasifthe
sculptortransferredaformontothemarble,whichenformeditintoastatue.ThereaintnomagicAristotlesaccountis
realisticandintuitive.Physicalmacrochangesemergefrommicrochangesbroughtaboutbythefundamentalpowers
(i.e.,thehot,thecold,thewet,andthedry,aswehaveseen),whichaffecttheirpassivecorrelates.Evenifonetook
Aristotletobesayingthat,literally,thereisa(reified,matterless)formthatistransmittedtothepassivepower,this
wouldstillnotexplainhowcausationtakesplace.Wewouldwanttoknowhowthatformdoesitwhatcausal(p.37)
efficacyaformcanhaveonapassivepower.AssumingAristotleislookingforananswerastohowonepoweraffects
another,addingafurtheritemtothecausalserieswouldnotofferanexplanation.Itwouldonlycontinuetheregress
generatedinthesearchforthemechanismofcausalefficacy.Thenhowdoescausalefficacyoperate?Evenifmacro
powersdependonmicropowerstobringabouttheireffects,howdomicropowersexerttheircausalefficacyonother
micropowers?Aswehaveseen,Aristotleavoidstheregressiveseriesofintroducingfurtherintermediariesbyassuming
theefficacyofanactivepoweronapassiveoneallthathappensisthatwhentheagentandthepatientmeetintheway
appropriatetothepotentialityinquestion,theonemustactandtheotherbeactedon(Met.1048a67seealsopp.21
4).Thisisthelevelatwhichthereadinessofactiveandpassivepowersinappropriatecircumstancesengenderscausal
efficacy.Thereisnofurtherunderlyingmechanismtouncover.HerewereachtheexplanatoryrockbottominAristotles
theory.Thetransferenceoftheformoftheactivepowertothepassiveoneisnotadescriptionofthemechanismofcausal
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efficacy,butonlyofthetypeofqualitativechangethattakesplaceinthepassivepower.Aristotlehasidentifiedaground
levelactivitythatcannotbeexplainedbymoreprimitiveontologicaltools. 44
Aristotlesviewcanthusbecontrasted,despiteapparentsimilarities,withthepassingaroundmodelforcausationput
forwardbyMumfordandAnjum(2011).TheydevelopthismodelasananswertotheAlwayspacking,nevertravelling
argumentdiscussedbefore(pp.1921).Theyintroducethemodelthus:
Onreflection,theideaofcausationasapassingaroundofpowers,especiallyforapandispositionalist,startsto
lookextremelyattractive(Mumford2009).Someexampleswillillustratethis.Youcomeinfromthecoldandsit
bythefire.Yousitbythefirebecauseitishot,whichforthepandispositionalistmeansthatit(p.38) hasthe
powertowarmyourbody.Causationoccurswhenthefirewarmsyourbody,changingitfromcoldtohot.
Armstrongretortsthatsuchcausation,forpandispositionalism,consistsinthemerepassingaroundofpowers.In
thepresentcase,thatwouldmeanthattheheatofthefire,whichconsistedinithavingthepowertowarmsome
otherobject,hasbeenpassedontoyou.Butthatsoundsquiteright.
(2011,56,myemphasis)
ThedifficultyIhavewiththepositionadvocatedbyMumfordandAnjumisthatthenotionofthepassingaroundof
powerscanexplainthetransferofenergybetweenobjects(e.g.,heat)butnotcaseswherethecausaleffectalsoinvolves
qualitativechange.Forexample,thebrokenvasethatreceivedthehammersblowhasnotbecomemorepowerfulinthe
waythebodynearthefirehasbecomehotterrather,itshattered.Passingaroundforcedoesnotdescribebeinginpieces,
bycontrasttopassingaroundheat,whichdescribesbeinghot.Thisisimportantbecauseitshowswhatwecanand
whatwecannotexplainfurtherincausation.Thetransferofparcels,whetherofenergyorparticlesormatter,cannotbe
allthereistocausation,becausetransferencedoesnotexplainqualitativechange.Aristotleexplainswhathappensin
causationnotasatransmission,atthebottomlevel,butasthemutualactivationofinterdependentpowers.Ontheother
hand,thelanguageoftransmissionishelpfulingivingusawayoftalkingoftheactivationoftheagentquaagentasthe
transmissionoftheform,andoftheactivationofthepatientquapatientasthereceptionofthatform(resultinginthe
effect).Inotherwords,thelanguageoftransmissionhelpscapturethedifferencebetweentheactivationoftheactiveand
passivepowersinvolvedinacausalinteraction.Thedifferenceneedstobeexpresses,somewhatAristotlemakesthis
pointinthePhysicsthus:
Itiscontrarytoreasontosupposethatthereshouldbeoneidenticalactualizationoftwothingswhicharedifferent
in(p.39) kind.Yettherewillbe,ifteachingandlearningarethesame,andagencyandpatiency.
(Phys.202b13)
,
.
TobrieflyrecapitulatesomeoftheconclusionsreachedsofarregardingAristotlesaccountoftheactivationofcausal
powersininteraction:theiractualitiesareessentiallydifferentactivitieswemightcallthemcausingandsuffering
respectively,wherethesufferingistheactivationofthepassivepower,whilethecausingistheactivationoftheactive
powerinvolvedinthecausalinteraction. 45Thecausaleffectistheactualityoractivationofthepassivepower,whichisa
change. 46Giventhatincausationboththeactiveandthepassivepowersareactivated,andeachhasitsowntypeof
actuality,onemightwanttopressthequestionofwhyonthisaccountthecausalchange(i.e.,theeffect)isidentifiedwith
theactualityofthepassivepower.ThisisbecauseinAristotlesaccountthepassivepowerisactivatedasarecipientof
change(i.e.,itchanges)whiletheactiveoneisactivatedasanagentofchange.Thisdivisionofrolesbetweenactiveand
passivepowersisnotfurtherexplainedbyAristotle,butIbelieveisrequired.
Iwouldliketobrieflynotehere,withoutargument,adifferenceIfindinthewayAristotlethoughtofcausationandthe
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waycontemporarysciencedoes.Aristotlethoughtthereisqualitativechange,whichincorporatedquantitativechange
(i.e.,asqualitativechangewithrespecttoamount).Thuswhenthereis,forexample,lossofbodyheat,Aristotlewould
explainthisasatwowayqualitativechange(i.e.,twoprocessesofcausalinteraction:thehotbodywarmsuptheairin
itsenvironment,whilethecoldaircoolsdownthebody).Accordingtocontemporaryscience,thiscausalprocesswould
beexplainedasaquantitative(p.40) changeanexchangeofenergybetweenthebodyandtheairaroundit.
Ultimately,contemporaryscienceaimstoreduceallchangetoquantitativeenergyorparticleexchanges.Isubmit
qualitativechangecannotbefullyreducedtoquantitativechange.Ifthisisright,Aristotlespowerontologywouldprove
explanatorilystrongerinexplainingchangebecausequalitativeinfluencebetweenpowerswouldaccommodate
quantitativechange,butnottheoppositewayaround.
Thatcausationhasadirectionisagenerallysharedintuition. 47Theorthodoxviewonthedirectionofcausationhasbeen
thatitreducestothedirectionoftime:causesoccurpriortotheireffects.Butthetemporalviewhasfallenintodisfavorof
late, 48again, 49andanumberofalternativeshavebeensuggested.Aristotlesaccountdoesjusticetotheintuitionthat
causationhasadirectionnotreducibletothedirectionoftime.ForAristotleapoweraimsatastateotherthanits
presentone.Thedistinctionbetweenagentandpatientincausationispivotaltoaccountingforthedirectionof
causation,andthusitsasymmetry. 50Thus,togobacktothepicturesketchedinPhysicsIII3,forAristotlethinking(at
leastfiguratively)oftheoperationofthemoveronamovableastransmissionofformfromthemovertothemovableisa
wayofunderpinningcausaldirectionmetaphysically.
Ontheotherhand,thereisnoreasonwhycausingcouldnotbeintwodirectionsatonce,wherebothpowersactas
agentsandpatientsofchange(e.g.,asinthecaseofacubeoficeinaglassoflemonade,whentheoneiscoolingandthe
otherisgettinghotter).Aristotleacknowledges,forexampleinPhysics202a512,thatinmostcausalinteractionsin
naturethechangeismutual.Theagentchangesthepatientandthepatientchangestheagent.Beinganagentora
patientofchangearerolesthepowersplayinmostcases,Aristotlethinksthateachpowerisatthesametimebothactive
andpassive,sincepowersoperateoneachother.Theoccurrence(p.41) ofmutualchangeincausationisnotevidence
againstAristotlesagentpatientmodelofcausation.Casesofcausalinteractioninwhichbothagentandpatientundergo
achangearetobeunderstoodsimplyastwopairsofsimultaneousinteractions.Forexample,wheretwoplayingcards
restagainsteachother,eachplayingcardactsontheother,andeachofthemsufferstheothersagency.
Aristotleslanguageoftransmissionofformishelpfulforpresentinganotherofthefundamentalfeaturesofcausation,
thatis,itsincompleteness.Aswehaveseen,causalinteractionbeginswithcontactbetweentheagentandpatient
(Physics202a57,seesection1.3).Thecontactfacilitatesthetransmissionoftheformfromthemovertothemovable.
Transmissionisaprocessthattakesplaceintime.Whileitlaststhetransmissionhasnotbeencompleted.Theunfolding
ofthestagesoftransmissionmarkstheincompletenessofthecausalprocess(e.g.,buildingastructure).Oncethe
transmissioniscompleted,thecausalinteractionisnottakingplaceanymore.Theagentisnotactingonthepatient,
whichnowpossessesthetransmittedform.Sotheprocessofrealizationoftheagentscapacitytotransmittheformand
thepatientscapacitytoreceivetheformisthecausalprocess,whichlastsuntilthetransmissioniscompleted.The
activitytakesplacethroughtime,duringwhichperiodtheprocessisdrivenbythenotyetfullyfulfilledpowersoftheagent
totransmittheformandofthepatienttoreceiveit.Sothecausalprocessoftransmissionisactualwhilethesepowersare
active,priortothetimeatwhichtheyarefullycompleted.Inthatsense,thecausalprocessisactualonlywhilethepowers
thatdriveitarestilltransmittingtheform(i.e.,whilethetransmissionisstillincomplete).AristotlewritesthatMotionis
thoughttobeasortofactuality,butincomplete,thereasonbeingthatthepotentialwhoseactualityitis,isincomplete
(Phys.201b3133,translationslightlymodified). 51
Finally,thinking(figuratively)oftheoperationoftheactivepoweruponthepassiveoneintermsoftransmissionis
helpfulin(p.42) bringingoutfurtherfeaturesofAristotlesaccountofcausation,someofwhichareparticularlyrelevant
tohistheoryofperception,aswewillseeinchapter1.Transmissibilityrequires(i)thatthereisasuitablepatientfor
receivingtheform(ii)thatatthetimeoftransmissiontheformispresentintheagentinactuality(iii)thattheformis
possessedbytheagentinawaythatissuitable,giventhecircumstancesinwhichtransmissionhastotakeplace,andthe
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typeofpatientwhowillreceiveit(namely,theagentpowerofthattypecanfunctioninitsenvironment)(iv)thatthereis
contactbetweenmoverandmoved(asdiscussedon,pp.214).Conditions(ii)and(iii)requirefurtherinvestigation.That
theformhastobepresentintheagentinactualityatthetimeoftransmissioniscapturedbyAristotleinaclearexample:
Theactualmanbegetsmanfromwhatispotentiallyman(Physics202a10,addedemphasis).Insomecases,theagent
possessestheforminactualityinunusualways,andpossiblyinmorethanonewaywhenthetransmissionoccurs.
Considerasculptorhavingtheformofthestatueinmind,whichisawayofpossessingtheforminanontransmissible
way,inherimagination,andalsohavingtheformembodiedinthemovementofherhandsthroughwhichshesculpts
thestatue,whichisawayofpossessingtheforminatransmissibleway.Orfurtherconsiderthemathematicsteacher
havingthedemonstrationofatheoreminmind,andhavingitwrittenontheblackboard.Byanalogytothecaseinwhich
themathematicsteacherhasthedemonstrationofatheoreminmind,inthecaseofcolorAristotleholdsthatanobjectin
thedarkhascoloronlyinfirstactualitythisistheobjectspotentialitytohavevisiblecolor.Thecolorpropertyisthe
same,evenbeforethecolorbecomesvisible:
Everycolorhasinitthepowertosetinmovementwhatisactuallytransparentthatpowerconstitutesitsvery
nature.Thatiswhyitisnotvisibleexceptwiththehelpoflightitisonlyin(p.43) thelightthatthecolorofa
thingisseen.
(DA418a31b3myemphasis)
,.
,.
Aswewillseeinchapter3,itisclearthatitisthesamepropertythatisinthedark,capableofactingonthetransparent,
aswhenactivatedbyactingonthetransparent.Theobjectpossessesvisiblecolorthatis,colorinsecondactualityonly
whenitisilluminatedactivatingthetransparent:withoutthehelpoflightcolorremainsinvisible(DA419a9).The
colorisvisibleinsuchconditionsbecauseitcanbeseenonlywhenitisinsecondactuality.Whenthecolorisactually
seen,itactualizesitspotentialityforvisibility.Thisisinasenseitsthirdactuality,butAristotleneverusesthis
expression.Yet,itisagainthesamepropertythatbecomesactuallyseen,aswesawinthequoteabove:itisthecolorof
theobjectthatisseen.(Iwillnotcontinuetousetheexpressionthirdactualityinordernottocomplicatefurthermy
discussionofthetextorofothercommentatorsonperception.Rather,Iwillconsidervisiblecolorasthefirstactuality,
andseencolorasthesecondactualityofthepower.)Analogouslywithsound,thereareunperceiveddisturbancesinthe
airthatcouldbeheardifaperceiverwaspresent,andtherearesuchdisturbancesthatarealsoperceived(i.e.,
soundings).Anobjectssoundinglastsonlywhileaperceiverhearsit,andthehearinglastsonlyaslongasthe
sounding:
Itispossibletohavethecapacitytohearandnottohear,andthatwhichcanproducesoundsisnotalwaysdoing
so.Butwhenthatwhichcanhearishearingandthatwhichcanproducesoundisproducingit,thenhearingin
actualityandsoundinginactualitycometobeatthesametime,andonemightcall(p.44) theonehearingand
theothersounding.
(DA425b28426a1,mytranslationandemphasis).
,,
,,
.
Sincetheactualitiesofthesensibleobjectandofthesensitivefacultyareoneinactuality,whiledifferentintheir
modesofbeing,actualhearingandactualsoundingappearanddisappearfromexistenceatoneandthesame
moment,andsoactualsavorandactualtasting,etc.,whileaspotentialitiesoneofthemmayexistwithoutthe
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other.Buttheearlierphilosophersofnaturedidnotstatethematterwell,thinkingthatthereiswithoutsight
nothingwhitenorblack,norflavorwithouttasting.Forinonewaytheywererightbutinanotherwrongforsince
theperceptionandtheperceptiblearesospokenofintwoways,aspotentialandasactual,thestatementholdsof
thelatter,butitdoesnotholdoftheformer.Thisambiguitytheywhollyfailedtonotice.
(DA426a1526,mytranslationandemphasis)
,,
,,
,
,.,
,,,
..
(p.45) Tosumupandgeneralize,transmissibilityrequiresthattheformispossessedbytheagentinawaythatis
suitable,giventhecircumstancesinwhichtransmissionhastotakeplace,andthetypeofpatientthatwillreceiveit.
Transmissioniscontextrelative.Considertheteacherwhopossessesknowledgeofatheorem,butonlyinalanguage
thatherpupilwouldnotunderstand.Possessingknowledgeofthetheoremdoesnotmakeherintoateacher(ofthe
theorem)untilsheembodiesthisknowledgeinthespokenEnglishwordsthattransmitittothestudent.Secondlyandfor
thesamereason,namelythattheformmustbetransmissibletoaparticulartypeofpatientandinaparticularsetof
circumstances,notypeoftransmissionismoreprivilegedthanothersnonehasmoreclaimtobecalledcausationthan
anyother.Thismeansthatnotypeofpossessionoftheformbytheagentismoreprivilegedthanothers.Thus,whether
thelessonisinalectureorinanarticle,neitherismoregenuinelythelessonthantheother.Theteacherpossessesthe
lessonindifferentwaysinhermemory,herlecture,andthearticle.Allofthemaretransmissibleforms,eachfitting
differentcircumstancesinwhichtransmissioncouldtakeplace.ThishasimportantconsequencesforAristotlestheoryof
perception,aswewillseeinchapter3.
1.6TheCausalPowersModelinPhysicsIII3
Inlightoftheabovediscussion,wearenowinapositiontounderstandAristotlesprogrammaticstanceatthebeginning
ofPhysicsIII3:accountingformotion/change52doesnotrequireappealingtoanynew,primitivecategoryofbeing:
Thereisnosuchthingasmotionoverandabovethethings.Itisalwayswithrespecttosubstanceortoquantityor
toqualityor(p.46) toplacethatwhatchangeschanges.Butitisimpossible,asweassert,tofindanything
commontothesewhichisneitherthisnorquantitynorqualitynoranyoftheotherpredicates.Henceneitherwill
motionandchangehavereferencetosomethingoverandabovethethingsmentionedforthereisnothing,over
andabovethem.
(Physics200b32201a3,myemphasis)
,,,
,
.
ThisisinlinewithAristotlescommitmentnottoreifycausationintoarelation.Insteadofintroducingnewmetaphysical
buildingblockstoexplainmotion(andmoregenerallycausation),Aristotlemakesuseofhisthreewellknownprinciples:
theform,theprivationofform,andthesubstratumthatremainsthroughchange.Inaddition,heappealstohis
distinctionbetweenbeinginpotentialityandbeinginactuality,whichisaprimitivedistinctionofwaysinwhichthings
are, 53andplaysacrucialroleinaccountingfortheconnectionbetweencauseandeffect,aswewillseeinwhatfollows.
AristotledescribeshisaccountofcausationintermsofcausalpowersinsomedetailinPhysicsIII3,wherehelooksat
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theinteractionbetweenamoverandamovableinthecaseofmotion(
).Wethuslearnmoreabouttherelationof
dependencebindingtogetheractiveandpassivepowers.Aristotleputsfleshonthebonesofhisaccountofthedependence
betweenactiveandpassivepowersinacausalpairduringtheiractivation.Duringthecausalinteraction,themover
movesinactuality,andthemovableisactuallymoved.Thesetwoactualitiesarenotcasuallycoincident.Theoccurrence
ofthefirstrequirestheoccurrenceof(p.47) thesecond.Therelationbetweenthetwoactualitiesisexploreddialectically,
inwhatIcalltheActualitiesofMotionDilemma.Inbrief,Aristotleconsiderstwopossibilities:thatthetwoactualitiesof
themoverandthemovablearedifferent,andthattheyareoneandthesame.Iftheyaredifferent,eitherbothactualities
occurinoneofthetwo,eitherthemoverorthemoved,oroneoccursineach.Ifboththeactualitiesoccurinoneofthem,
then,first,oneofthemwillnothaveitsownactualityrealizedinit(e.g.,theactualityofthemoverwilloccurinthe
moved,notinthemover)buthowcouldthatbe,thattheactualityofthemoverwillbeinthemoved?Andsecondly,
whateverhasbothactualitiesinitwillchangeintwodifferentwaysinrelationtooneform. 54Ifontheotherhandthe
actualityofthemoverisinthemover,andtheactualityofthemovableisinthemovable,theneitherthecausalagencyof
themoverwillimpactonthemoveritself,butnotonthemovable,oritwillimpactonnothing,inwhichcaseitisnot
beingamoverinactuality.Finally,iftheactualitiesofthemoverandthemovedarethesame,thenwereachabsurdity,
sinceagencyandpatiencycannotbethesame.Inwhatfollows,IwillfirstgiveanargumentanalysisoftheDilemmain
itsentirety,andthenselectivelydiscusstheclaimsthatarethemostrelevantforthereconstructionofAristotlesaccount
ofcausation.
TheActualitiesofMotionDilemma
Inthestructuredrepresentationoftheargumentbelow,theconventionIfollowistoindentundertheconclusionthe
premisesorthesubargumentspertinenttothesupportofthatconclusion. 55Thepremisesjustifyingorobjectingtoa
conclusionaregroupedatthesamelevelofindentation.IindicateinparenthesesthepremisesIhavesuppliedfor
completenessoftheargument,inadditiontowhatisfoundinAristotlestext.
(p.48) CTherealizationoftheagentsandthepatientscapacitiesareneitherthesamenordifferent.(Supplied).
P1Becauseitisimpossiblethattherealizationoftheagentscapacityisdifferentfromtherealizationofthe
patientscapacity.(Supplied).
P2Becauseiftherealizationoftheagentscapacityisdifferent(innumber)fromtherealizationofthepatients
capacity,oneofthefollowingdisjunctsistrue:
(2.1)eitherbotharerealizedinthepatient
(2.2)orbotharerealizedintheagent
(2.3)oroneisrealizedintheagentandoneinthepatient(e.g.therealizationoftheagentscapacity
takesplaceintheagentandtherealizationofthepatientscapacitytakesplaceinthepatient).(See
Phys.202a257)(2.2)and(2.3)aresupplied.)56
P3Butnoneofthedisjunctsistrue.
P4Because(2.1)isimpossible.Namely,itisimpossiblethattherealizationoftheagentscapacityandthe
realizationofthepatientscapacityarebothinthepatient(Supplied).
P5Becauseiftherealizationoftheagentscapacityandtherealizationofthepatientscapacityarebothinthe
patient,thenbothconsequencesfollow:
(5.1)theagentscapacitywillnotberealizedinthesubjectthathasthecapacity,theagent
(5.2)thesamesubject,thepatient,willundergotherealizationoftwo[opposite]capacitiesatthesame
timeinrelationtooneform.(See202a336.)
P6But(5.1)isnonsense(202a36).
P7And(5.2)isimpossible(202a36).
P8Andmutatismutandisfor(2.2).(See202a2930.)
(p.49)
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P9Anditisimpossiblethattherealizationoftheagentscapacitytakesplaceintheagent,andrealizationofthe
patientscapacitytakesplaceinthepatient(Supplied).
P10 Becauseiftherealizationoftheagentscapacityandtherealizationofthepatientscapacityareeachin
each,thenoneofthefollowingdisjunctsistrue:
(10.1)eithereveryagentwillalsobeactedupon
(10.2)ortheagent,havingcausalefficacy,willnotbecausallyefficacious.(See202a28b1).
P11But(10.1)isfalse,andleadstoinfiniteregress(Supplied).
P12And(10.2)isfalse(Supplied).
P13Anditisimpossiblethattherealizationoftheagentscapacityisoneandthesamewiththerealizationof
thepatientscapacity(202a36b2).
P14Becausethenagencyandpatiencywouldhavethesameactuality,andsoactingandbeingacteduponwould
bethesamething.(See202b25fortheexample).
P15Butagencyandpatiencyarenotthesameactuality(Supplied.).
P16Becauseagencyandpatiencyaredifferentinessence(Supplied).
P17Becausetheagentscapacitytoactandthepatientscapacitytosufferareessentiallydifferentthings.(See
202a20and201b1.)
P18Andtheessenceofanactualityisthesameastheessenceofitscapacity(Supplied).
P19Anditisnonsensethattwothingsdifferentinessence(e.g.theagentsactingandthepatientsbeingacted
upon)haveoneandthesameactuality.(202a36b2).
P20 Becausetheactualityofsomethingistheinstantiationofitsessence.(Supplied.)
(p.50) IndiscussingtheDilemma,IshallbeconcernedmainlywiththewayAristotleunderstandstherelationofmover
tomovable(whichisnotreifiedbyAristotle).Iwillfirstidentifythequestionshethinksneedtobeaddressed,andthen
examinethesolutionshegives,therebydevelopinghisowntheoryofcausation.Iwillbeginbyconsideringtheroleofthe
form(),whichistheprincipleandcauseofthemotioninAristotlesaccountofcausation.Therearethree
interrelatedsubthemestobeinvestigated.First,thereisthetransmissionoftheformfromthemovertothemovable
(202a912).Secondly,theactualityofthemoverandtheactualityofthemovedareinrelationtooneform,the
transmittedone.57Andfinally,thesetwoactualitiesareofdifferenttypes. 58
Inviewofwhathasbeensaidaboutthetransmissionoftheformsofar,weareinthepositiontounderstandthe
transmissionoftheformasawayofdescribingcollectivelythetypeofchangethatiseffectedbythemoveronthemoved.
Theformthatistheprincipleandcauseofthemotionistheformthatistransmittedfromthemovertothemovable.For
example,thecausalefficacyoffireconsistsinitstransmittingtheformofheattothepot.Itfollowsthatthemotion
sufferedbywhatismovableconsistsinthereceptionoftheformthatistransmittedtoit.Sothemoversbeingamover
andthemovablebeingmovedwillbeachievedinrelationtooneform.Butsincethemovertransmitsandthemovable
receivestheform,theirachievementsareofdifferenttypes, 59becausetheyrelatetothesameformdifferently.Thus,in
figurativeterms,theactualityofthemoverasamoveristhetransmissionoftheform,andtheactualityofthemovableas
movableisthereceptionofthatform.
ThesecondissuethatarisesoutoftheDilemmaoftheActualitiesofMotionisthedistinctionAristotlemakesbetweenthe
subjectstheactualitiesoccurin,andthesubjectstheybelongto.HereAristotlesmetaphysicalintuitionsaretestedtothe
extreme,andhefinallyoptsforanaccountthatopensnewgroundinthe(p.51) areaofcausation.Aristotleaskswhere
theactualitiesofthemoverasmovertheactionandofthemovableasmovablethepassionare(i.e.whetherthey
areinthemoverorinthemovable(inwhat?,202a25)).Byaskinginwhattheactionoftheagentandthe
passionofthepatientare,hedistinguishesinoneandthesamequestiontwometaphysicalrelations:belongingtoa
subjectandoccurringinasubject.60Weneedtoexaminewhythisdistinctionariseshere,andhowitcanbe
understood,forthisdistinctionwillplayanimportantrole,especiallyinAristotlestheoryofperception.Letusfirstlook
atAristotlesownattempttojustifythedistinction.Hewrites:Sincethentheyareboth[theagentsactionandthe
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patientspassion]motions,wemayask:inwhatarethey?(202a25).Hethenproceeds:
Itisnotabsurdthattheactualizationofonethingshouldbeinanother.Teachingistheactivityofapersonwho
canteach,yettheoperationisperformedinsomethingitisnotcutadriftfromasubject[theteacher],butisofone
thing[theteacher]inanother[thelearner].
(Phys.202b58)
(,,
,)
InthefirstbriefquotationAristotlemakesageneralpoint:hetellsusthatinrelationtomotionswecanaskwherethey
takeplace.Thus,mywalkcantakeplaceinthepark,andmytanningattheseashore.ButinneithercaseamIdoing
something(atleastinanywaysignificant)to,orchangingthatinwhichmymotiontakesplace.Mywalkandmy
tanningareexternaltotheparkandtheseashore.Theyareintheminalocalsense,whichmustnotbewhatAristotle
meanshere,ifheisnottoconflate,forexample,mytanningtakingplaceintheseashorefromitstakingplaceinme,who
tans. 61Thesecond(p.52) passageclarifiesthetypeofdistinctionthatAristotlehasinmind.Heconcentratesononeof
thetwoactualities,theagents,andsaysthatteachingisperformedbytheteacherinsomething.Ifthisistobemore
illuminatingthanthefirstpassage,wemusttakeAristotletobesayingsomethingotherthanthatteachingtakesplacein
aclassroom.Indeed,hedoestellusthatteachingtakesplaceinthelearner.Buthowisthistobeunderstoodand
generalized?AclueastowhatAristotlemeansbytalkingofwhereanactiontakesplacecanbefoundinasubargument
intheDilemma(P912),inthefollowingdialecticalmove:
[Suppose]theagencyisintheagentandthepatiencyinthepatient.[Then]...themotionwillbeinthemover,for
thesameaccountwillholdofmoverandmovable.Henceeithereverymoverwillbemoved,or,thoughhaving
motion,itwillnotbemoved.
(Phys.202a2631)
,...(
),,.
Thekeyideasinthisargumentarethatwheretheactivityofthemoverasamoveriswillalsobewherethemotionisand
thethingthemotionisinissetinmotion.Aristotlesjustificationforthefirstclaim,thatmotionfollowstheactivationof
themoverasmover,isthattherationaleinthecaseofthemovermustbethesameasinthecaseofthemovable.Because
if,aspertheinitialhypothesis,theactionofthemovermovesthemovable,thenitmustbethattheactionofthemover
generatesmotion.Butiftheactionofthemoverisinthemover,thegeneratedmotionwill,forthatreason,alsobeinthe
mover.Butthenthemoverwill(p.53) beinmotion,forotherwisethoughhavingmotion,itwillnotbemoved,whichis
treatedasabsurdandclosesthisbranchoftheargument.Sothemotioniswheretheactualityofthemoverasmoveris,
andwhateverthemotionisin,itsetsthatthinginmotion.Inthatcasewecaninterpretthequestion(inwhat?,
202a25)asaskingwheredoesthemotionbringaboutthechange?.Teachingisinalearner,asheatingisinacolder
object,becauseitistheseobjectsthataresetinmotionbythemovers.Sotheactualityofthemoverasmoverisinthe
patient,generatingthemotioninit.Thewayitisinthepatientislikethewaytheformisinmatter.62
Ontheotherhand,theactualityofthepatientaspatientisalwaysinthepatient,becausethepatientalwayssuffersthe
motionthatcomesabout.Thepicturewhichemergesfromthedistinctionofthetwometaphysicalrelations,belongingto
asubjectandoccurringinasubject,isthatthereisamotionthatisthecoincidenceoftwoactivities,theagentsandthe
patients,inthepatient. 63ImmediatelyfollowingtheActualitiesofMotionDilemma,Aristotledeniesthreeofits
premises:
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[1]
Itisnotabsurdthattheactualizationofonethingshouldbeinanother.
[2]
Thereisnothingtopreventtwothingshavingoneandthesameactualization.
[3]
Norisitnecessarythattheteachershouldlearn,eveniftoactandtobeactedonareoneandthesame,
providedtheyarenotthesameinrespectoftheaccountwhichstatestheiressence...butinrespectofthatto
whichtheybelong(),themotion.(Phys.202b521,translationslightlymodified)
(p.54) ThisleadsAristotledirectlytothediscussionofhisownposition,whichhehadalreadysketched,justbefore
enteringtheDilemma,asfollows:
Thesolutionofthedifficultyisplain:motionisinthemovable.Itisthefulfillmentofthispotentialitybytheaction
ofthatwhichhasthepowerofcausingmotionandeventheactualityofthatwhichhasthepowerofcausing
motionisnototherthantheactualityofthemovableforitmustbethefulfillmentofbothfor,itisonthemovable
thatit[themover]iscapableofacting.Hencethereisoneandthesameactualityofboth.
(Phys.202a1318,translationslightlymodified)
,[]
.
,,,.
IwilloutlineAristotlespositionbeforediscussingitindetail.Causalinteractionconsistsintheactivationofboththe
activeandpassivepowersinvolvedintheinteraction(e.g.beingabletoteachandbeingabletolearn)itisfiguratively
describedastransmissionoftheformindicatingthetypeofactivitythatisengenderedbytheactivepowerandsuffered
bythepassivepower.Theactivationofthesepowersisaprocess(e.g.,themovementsofthesculptorsarmsandchiselon
thewood)that,atoneandthesametime,constitutesthecausingandeffecting.Theprocessisbothacausingandan
effecting,whicharedifferent,interdependent,activatedasymmetricpowers.Theirasymmetryliesinthefactthatthe
activepowerisrealizedinthebearerofthepassivepowers,producinganeffectinwhatisactedupon.
(p.55) Thechallengeistoexplainthenatureofthespecialbondbetweenthetwopowers(ortheirbearers)engagedin
causalinteraction.Aristotlessolutionistomakethemotionofthecausallyinteractingsubstancesthesame.Their
motion,beingoneandthesamebutbelongingtobothsubstances,bindsthetwosubstancestogether.Buthowcanthe
motionoftheagentbethesameasthemotionofthepatient?
Itiscontrarytoreasontosupposethatthereshouldbeoneactualization[]oftwothingswhichare
differentinkind.Yet,therewillbeifteachingandlearningarethesame,andagencyandpatiency.Toteachwill
bethesameastolearn,andtoactthesameastobeactedontheteacherwillnecessarilybelearningeverything
thatheteaches,andtheagentwillbeactedon.
(Phys.201a35202b5)
,
,,
.
Aristotledoesnotdrawbackfromhissolutioninviewofthisproblem,butisledtoinnovate.Hewillkeeptheonenessof
themotion,butaccountforitstwonessinametaphysicallynovelway,whichfollowsdifferentprinciplesfromhis
essentialismaboutsubstances.Aristotletellsusthatthemotionthatisinthemovable,broughtaboutbythemover,
...isthefulfillmentofthispotentiality[ofthemovableasmovable]bytheactionofthatwhichhasthepowerof
causingmotion[themover]andtheactualityofthatwhichhasthepowerofcausingmotion[themover]isnot
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otherthanthe(p.56) actualityofthemoveableforitmustbethefulfillmentofboth.
(Phys.202a1416)
[].
Thetermstranslatedasfulfillmentandactualityareandrespectively,whichareused
interchangeablyinthiscontext.64Clearly,sodescribed,thesolutionfacestheprimafacieobjectionweencountered
abovethatteachingwillbethesameaslearning,andthattheteacherwilllearnwhatsheteaches.SoAristotleproceeds
torefinehisanswerbyaseriesofexamples.Beforelookingattheexamples,itmaybehelpfultosaythatheisonly
elucidatingtheviewhehasalreadystated,andnotalteringthisvieworproposinganewtheory.Thisissurprisingsince
onewouldhaveexpectedhisanswertousedifferentterminologyinviewoftheclarificationhemakes.ButAristotledoes
notchangetheterminologyofhissolution,despitethefactthathehastheopportunitytodosowhenherepeatsit(at
Phys.202b9).Indeed,hissolution,enrichedbytheexamples,doesavoidtheobjection,asIshallarguebelow.Butone
wouldhaveexpectedaredescriptionofhissolutionthatdidnotretaintheobjectionablesamenessofthetwoactualities,
whichhissolutiondoesnotrequireandismisleadingforthereader.Aswedonotgetaredescription,wemustconclude
thatAristotleisusingthetermsandbroadlyhere,tomeanbyactualizationtheactivityinwhichthe
agentandpatientaremutuallyengaged,ratherthanthenaturesoftheiractivities.Aristotlegivesfourexamplesto
elucidatehisview.Hesetsuptheproblembystatingtheexplanandumfirst:
Athingiscapableofcausingmotionbecauseitcandothis,itisamoverbecauseitactuallydoesit.Butitisonthe
movablethatitiscapableofacting.
(Phys.202a167)
(p.57) ,,.
Theactionofthemovercanberealizedonlybyactingonthemovable.ThisrequiresAristotletoexplainhowthemovers
capacityisboundupwiththemovable.Followinghisstatementoftheproblem,herestateshissolutionandelucidatesit
withthefirsttwoexamples:
Hencethereisoneandthesameactuality[]ofboth[themoverandthemovable]alike,justasonetotwo
andtwotoonearethesameinterval,andthesteepascentandthesteepdescentareone.
(Phys.202a1820)65
,
.
Aristotleexplainsthesamenessinvolvedintheseexamples:Fortheseareoneandthesame,althoughtheirdefinitions
[
]arenotone.Soitiswiththemoverandthemoved(Phys.202a20).Thisisimportantbutincomplete.Itis
importantbecauseitblockstheobjectionthatteachingwouldbethesameaslearning,bystatingthattheyhavedifferent
essentialnatures.Butiftheyhavedifferentessentialnaturestheyarenotoneandthesameentitydescribedintwo
differentways.Whateveritisthatisoneandthesamebetweenthetwointervalsorbetweentheascentanddescentmust
havetwodifferentdefinitions/natures.Themajorityofthecommentators,ancientandmodern,whoread
as
account/descriptionratherthandefinition,taketheexamplestointroduceasinglecommonentityineachcase(e.g.,
theunitvalueone,ortheinclinedroadorthenondirectionalrelationbetweentheextremes). 66Bycontrastwiththe
majorityview,myreadingofAristotlesexamplesandexplanationtakes
at202a2021tomeandefinition.
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(p.58) Theontologicalcomplexofthetwodirectionalintervalsandtheirground,orthecomplexofthetworoutesand
theirground,arenotanyofthefamiliartypesofentityinAristotelianontology(althoughtheircomponentsare).
Aristotleishereengaginginanovelexplorationofontologicaldependence,notofmatterandform,orsubjectand
property,orpotentialandactual,butoftwointerdependentnatures.WhenAristotlesaysthatthereisasingleactuality
()ofboththemoverandthemovable(asthereisbetweenthetwointervalsorthetworoutes),hemustmean
thatthemoverandthemovablearesorelatedintheiractivityastobeoneinsomesense,butnotoneinthedefinitions
thatdescribewhateachofthemdoesorsuffers.Whatmakesthedefinitionsofthevectorlinesfrom1to2andfrom2to1
twoaretheiroppositedirectionsbutwhatisitthatmakesthesevectorlinesone?Itisthenondirectionalinterval
betweenoneandtwothatisthesameforbothvectorlines.Theintervalwouldnotbethesame,forexample,between
vectorlines1to2and4to3(onaline).Similarlywiththeuphillanddownhillroutes:theyaredifferentbecauseoftheir
opposeddirections,butareboththesamestretchofland,asopposedtotworoutesondifferentsidesofthehillthat
sharenocommonstretchofland.Althoughtheseexamplesandthisexplanationgosomewaytowardsexplainingwhat
Aristotlemeansbyclaimingthattheactualityofthemoverandthemovableisthesame,hispositionisnotasexplicitas
intheexplanationweshallfindinhisnextsetofexamples,towhichInowturn.AftertheDilemma,Aristotlestateshis
ownposition,resolvingthepuzzlesencounteredinthecourseoftheDilemmaitself.Ontheissueweareexamininghere,
hewrites:
Norisitnecessarythattheteachershouldlearn,eveniftoactandbeactedonareoneandthesame,provided
thattheyarenotthesameinrespectoftheaccount[]whichstatestheiressence[<>](as
raimentanddress),butare(p.59) thesameinthesenseinwhichtheroadfromThebestoAthensandtheroad
fromAthenstoThebesarethesame,ashasbeenexplainedabove.
(Phys.202b1014)
,,
<>,,
,
Theuseofthetechnicalexpression,coinedbyAristotlehimself,foressence,<>,settlestheissueasto
whetherbyaccount,,hemeansdescriptionordefinitionofnature.67Thisisfurthersupportedbyhisimmediate
exampleofthingsthathavethesameaccount,namelyraimentanddress.Raimentanddressareindeedonething,
undertwonamesordescriptions,butwithonedefinitionwhichexpressesitsessence.InTopicsI7,103a257,Aristotle
saysthatwhateverisoneinessenceisoneintheprimarysense(
),andindeedwefindtheretheverysameexample
oftheraimentanddresstoillustratethistypeofonenessthisisnotthecasewiththetworoutes,butitwouldbeifthe
descriptionsweretheroadfromAthenstoThebesandtheroadwetravelledonlastweekfromAthenstoThebes.The
routefromThebestoAthensdiffersindefinitionfromtheroutefromAthenstoThebessincetheyarenot,asAristotletells
us,likeraimentanddress.Thereferencebacktowhathasbeenexplainedaboveinthelastquotationistothepassage
justexamined,202a1920,ontherelationoftheuphillroutetothedownhillonethatdiffersinaccount,
hence
there,too,Aristotleintends
tobethedefinitionofessence.Thereisfurtherevidencethathere
isthedefinition
ofessence,andnotameredescription.ThiscomesinanunexpectedmetaphysicalobservationthatAristotlemakesinthe
linesimmediatelyfollowing.Thisobservationalsomakesit(p.60) evidentthatAristotlesaiminthetwopassageswe
areexaminingistointroduceasenseofqualifiedsameness,asensedifferentfromidentity,bymakingsuchstatementsas
thatmoverandmovableareoneandthesame,orthatoneactuality...mustbethefulfillmentofboth,orthattoactand
tobeactedonareoneandthesame:68
Foritisnotthecasethatallthesamepropertiesbelongto[]thosethingswhichareinany
waythesamerather,thisisthecaseonlyforthosethingstobewhichisthesame[].(202b146,
mytranslation)
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,.
Theexpressionmustrefertoattributesofsubstances,andnottothesubstratumunderlyingasubstancefor
itwouldbeextremelyunnaturalforAristotletosaythattheunderlyingsubstratumbelongsto()asubstance.
Furthermore,althoughheonlytalksofthingstobewhicharethesame(literally,thathavethesamebeing,
),Itakeitthathemeansthingswhoseconstitutionisthesame.Onecouldtakethistobelimitedonlytoforms,since
theirbeingexhauststheirconstitutionandsothesamebeingentailsthesameproperties.Butonecouldtakeitmore
liberallytomeanembodiedbeing,sothatsubstanceswhoseembodiedformisthesamehavethesameproperties.69
Thereareotherpossiblereadings,butforourpurposesthesafereadingofmereformsgivesusaneatcontrasttothecases
weareexamining.Whatitistobeanagentisdifferentfromwhatitistobeapatienttheirdefinitionsaredifferent
(202a20,202b22),andwiththemtheirkind(202b1).Thedefinitionsstatingtheiressencearedifferent(202b12),butto
actandtobeactedonareoneandthesame(202b11).Aristotlesexampleshavealreadypreparedusforunderstanding
thisstatement.Thereisakindofsamenessthattheroute(p.61) fromAthenstoThebeshaswiththeroutefromThebes
toAthens,becausetheseroutesarerealizedonthesameroad.Thelinefrom1to2isrealizedonthesameintervalasthe
linefrom2to2.Inallsuchcases,theirgroundofrealizationisoneandthesame,althoughthetwopowersdifferinkind,
andthustheiractualitiesdifferinkind,too. 70Aristotlefinallystatesthisexplicitly:
Togeneralize,teachingisnotthesameintheprimarysense[]withlearning,norisagencywithpatiency,
butthattowhichthosebelong[][scilicetisthesameforboth],namelythemotion[]forthe
actualization[]ofthis[teaching]inthat[learning]andtheactualization[]ofthat[learning]
throughtheactionofthis[teaching]differindefinition.
(Phys.202b1922,translationslightlymodified)71
,,
.
Themotiontowhichteachingandlearningbelongisthesubstratumofthetwoactualitiesoftheactivatedpowers.Itis
theinteractionbetweenthetwosubstancesthatactivatesbothpowerse.g.theactivepowertoteachandthepassive
powertolearn(202a13and202a16,a18).Teachingcauseslearning.Neithercanhappenwithouttheother.Theteacher
isnotteachingifthelearnerisnotlearning,andthelearner72isnotlearningiftheteacherisnotteaching.Thetwo
powerstoteachandtolearncanbeactivatedonlytogether.Theirinterdependenceiscapturedbythefactthattheyare
activatedbyoneandthesameactivity,whichcannotbeseparatedintotwo.Bothofthemthereforecharacterizethat
activity,essentially,whichinthiscaseisaninstanceofteachingandlearning.Theactivitybears(p.62) thetwoforms
inthewaythatmatterbearstheessentialforminasubstance,beingenformedbyit.Onlyhere,thetwoformscome
togetherinmutualinterdependencetheactivityisessentiallybothteachingandlearning. 73Thisispossibleonlybecause
theactivityiscomposedoftheactivitiesoftwodifferentpowerfulentities(e.g.,substances).Theactiveandpassive
powersineachcausalpairareinterdependentindifferentways,suchasbeingcoexistentandcovariant,whichis
securedbytheirmutualdependenceontheunderlyingactivity.Thus,forexample,thephysicalmovementofthe
carpentershandsandchiselonthehardwoodconstitutethecarpenterscarving,andthelogsbeingshapedintoa
statue. 74
Torecapitulateandgeneralize,whencausationoccursthereisacommonactivitythatconsistsoftheactivationofthe
activepowerandtheactivationofthepassivepower,bothofwhichhappensimultaneously,andwhicharedifferent
typesofactivity. 75Theactivitytakesplacewherethechangeoccurs:inthebearerofthepassivepower.Inthecaseofthe
interactionofanactiveandapassivepower,forinstancewhenwaterdissolvessalt,thechangehappensinthesalt,
whichpassivelydissolvesundertheagencyofwater.Thischangeisthecommonactivityofthetwopowers,which
renderswaterasolventandthesaltasolute.(InAristotlesperceptualexample,aswewillseeinchapter2theactivityis
thehearingofthesounding,consistingoftheearhearingandthesoundsounding.)
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ConcludingRemarks
Aristotlewilladdresstheproblemofthestructureandthefunctionalityofthefacultyofperceptionasametaphysical
problem,andwillresolveitthroughmetaphysicalinnovation.Hisinnovationisgiveninhisaccountofcausationin
termsofpowers.Themaincharacteristicsofhissolutionarethefollowing.Causationisanactivity(p.63) involvingtwo
powers,whichbelongtodifferentsubstancesorpartsofsubstance(s).Thiscausalactivityconsistsoftheactivitiesof
eachofthetwopowersthataremutuallyactivated.Eachoftheactivatedpowersengendersactivationofadifferenttype,
butthetwotypesarecomplementarypartneractivities.Inconsequence,theactivitybetweenthetwopowersisa
composite(third)activityexemplifyingtwodifferenttypesofsubactivity.Thus,themutuallyactivatedpowersmakeupa
complexcausalactivityofagencyandpatiency,whichsustaineachotherinexistence.TheAristotelianactivityor
activationofapowershouldnotbeunderstoodasnecessarilyinvolvingmovement(e.g.,inthewaythatcarvingastatue
orwritingdoes).Heatingforexampleinvolvesonlyqualitativechange,evenifthechangespreadsgraduallythroughthe
heatedbody.Theactivationofthepowertoheatdoesnotconsistinthepropagationofheatintheheatedbodybutonlyin
theincreaseintemperature,whichisnotamovement.
Aswesaw,Aristotledoesnotintroducerelationsinhisontology,butaddressestheneedforrelationsthroughmonadic
relatives.Oneoftheobstaclestoadmittingrelationsinontologyisthenatureofasymmetricrelations,whichhasbeen
andremainsaprobleminmetaphysics,becauseoneandsameentitycannothavedifferentnaturestoimpartto
asymmetricrelata.InhisaccountofcausationwefindAristotleinnovating,bypositingasingleactivityoftwodifferent
naturesagencyandpatiency.Whythennotasymmetricrelationswithdualnatures,ifcausalactivitiescanhavedual
naturesandbesingle,buttwoinbeing?Theansweristhatcausalactivitiesarecomposedofactivitycomponents.
Specifically,theyconsistoftheactivated(correlative)activeandpassivepowers.Thetypesofbeingcharacterizingwhata
compositeentityiscanvary,sincecompositiondoesnotrequiredefinitionalunityofitsformwhichiswhatsubstantial
andincidentalformshaveinAristotlescategorialontology.Theunityofacompositecouldbemerelyphysical,not
(p.64) derivedfromformalunity,butmerelyfromthemechanismofthecomposition(e.g.,aglassofoilandwaterisone
bycompositionofstuffhavingdinneronaflightisacompositionofactivities).Inthecaseofpowers,themechanismof
compositionofthecausalactivityisthemutualactivationofpartnerpowers,andtheresulting(composed)activityis
respectivelytwoinbeing.
Notes
Waterlow(andalsoKosman,1975,499519at514)inanalyzingtheanalogouscaseofhearingandsoundingidentifies
themultiplydescribedentityasasingleevent,asinglechangethatisbothteachingandlearning:
His[Aristotles]argumentproceedsonthefollowingassumption:theonlyreasonanyonecouldhaveforsupposingthat
beingachanger(anactualchanger)entailschangeinthatchanger,restsonafalseviewofthedifferenceregardingthese
(insomegiveninstance,suchasteachingandlearning)asdifferentconcreteevents,thatonecouldbemisledinto
thinkingthatthechangerassuchundergoesachange.Butonceitisseenthatthesearedifferentwaysofdescribingthe
sameevent,theproblemdisappears,leavingonlyonechange,whichistobelocatedinthepatient...Thepointofcrucial
importancethatAristotleemphasizesagainandagain...isthatXsteachingisnotadifferentconcreteeventfromYs
learning.Theseareoneandthesameactualityundertwodescriptions(1982,1802).Waterlowassociatesthissingle
eventthatistheentitytowhichthetwodescriptionsapplywithaneutralverbstemdeterminablebyactiveandpassive
voices...wemaysay(a)thatteachingisapredicateofYaswellasofXand(b)thatteachingappliestoYina
determinateform(thepassive)whichisperfectlyconsistentwiththestatementYdoesnotteach(1982,182).Iam
arguingherethattheontologyofcausationforAristotleismorecomplexthanthatofoneeventundertwodescriptions.
Hussey,whoalsoholdstheoneentitytwodescriptionsview,considersthatAristotlespositiveargumenttoshowthat
thechanges[oftheagentandpatient]arethesamemaybethatanoperationmustbesomethingthathappensovera
periodoftime,andthatifwelookattheminimalcaseofchange,inwhichtheagentiscompletelyunaffected,thereis
nothinghappeningexceptthechangeofthepatient.Hence,theoperationoftheagentmustbethechange(1983,66).
AccordingtotheanalysisIamdevelopinghere,thechangeisnotoneinsofarastwoessentialnaturesareinvolvedinits
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occurrence:agencyandpatiency.Thechangeinvolvesthetransferenceofaform,andAristotlefindsthistobean
irreduciblycomplexactivityofgiveandtaketherearenotwodistinctactivities,noronlyone:anindivisiblephysical
processgroundstwoessentialnaturesofactionandpassion.Soevenintheminimalcasedescribedinthequoteabove,
theagenttransmitsandthepatientsufferstheform.Thechangesintheagentdependonwhatisrequiredineach
instancefortheformtobepossessedbytheagentinatransmissiblemode,whichisthecausallyactivefactor.
Idonotagreethat,becausetheagentstransitivechangeofthepatienthappensovertime,withinasmallperiodoftime
theagentdoesnotsufferanychange.ToputitinAristotelianterms,somebutnotalloftheformthatisbeingtransmitted
willbetransmittedwithinashortinterval.
Notes:
(1).ItfollowsthatforAristotlethesensesareinfallibleatleastwhenperceivingtheirspecialsensibles(see,e.g.
Metaphysics1010b1921).Theinfallibilityofthespecialsenses,withreferencealsotoAristotlesaccountofillusionand
hallucination,willbeaddressedinchapters2and3.
(2).AttheendofhisaccountofefficientcausationintermsofpowersinthePhysicsAristotleremarksthatAsimilar
definitionwillapplytoeachoftheotherkindsofmotion(202b29)perceptionisacaseofmotion(i.e.,changeofthe
senseorganoftheperceiver)aswillbediscussedinchapter2.
(3).TheuseofthetermpoweriswellestablishedinscholarlydiscussionsofAristotlespsychologyforarecent
example,see,T.K.Johansen,ThePowersofAristotlesSoul(2012).Establishingacommonframeworkofdiscussionfor
Aristotlestheoryofpowersandcontemporarypowerontologiesisimportantforreasonsthatwillemergeinthechapter.I
shareEsfeldsconsideration,madeinadifferentcontext,thatwhilefromastrictlyphilologicalpointofviewusing
modernterminologytodiscussAristotlestheoryofperceptionmightbequestionable,whenitcomestoAristotles
significancefortodaysphilosophy,theinterestisinwhatwecanlearnfromthestudyofhistextsforthosepointsthat
continuetobeanissuetoday(2000,321).
(4).ForthedistinctionbetweenfirstandsecondactualityseeDAII.1(412a1011,2127cf.II.5417a2229,417b216).
(5).DAII.1(412a1011,2127cf.II.5417a2229,417b216).
(6).Propertiesarenotsubjecttochange.Thepropertyofheatcannotnotbecomethepropertyofcold.Sinceproperties
themselvesdonotchange,whenchangeoccursitistheentityqualifiedbyapropertythatischanging,byacquiringanew
propertyinplaceoftheformerone,(e.g.,whenthehotisreplacedbycold,itiswhatishotthatchanges,nottheproperty
ofbeinghot,whichisinfactlost).Ofcourse,languagecannotmatchtherichnessofqualitativevariationintheworld
withcorrespondinglydifferentdescriptions.Insteadlanguagehastoemploygeneralization,whichmaymisleadusinto
thinkingthatpropertiessurvivechange.
(7).SeeGC330a2429.
(8).SeeGC337a26:Alltheotherthingsthethings,Imean,whicharereciprocallytransformedinvirtueoftheir
qualitiesandtheirpowers(e.g.,thesimplebodies)imitatecircularmotion.ForwhenWateristransformedintoAir,Air
intoFire,andtheFirebackintoWater,wesaythecomingtobehascompletedthecircle,becauseitrevertsagaintothe
beginning.
(9).IcallthismetaphysicalpositionPowerStructuralism.Thepositionwasfirstputforwardinmyresearchstatement
submittedtotheEuropeanResearchCouncilinDecember2009(awardnumber263484).
(10).Thequalificationthatchangemightbebroughtaboutinsomethingelse,orinthebearerofthecausalpoweritself
asifitwereanotherthing,isaimedatincludingintheaccountcomplexentitieswhichhavethecapacitytobringabouta
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changeinapartorthewholeofthemselves(e.g.,anathletetrainingherself).
(11).Incontemporaryparlance,Aristotleholdsapurepowerontology.Contrastthiswithcontemporaryviewsinwhicha
powerhasacategoricalbasis(e.g.,Armstrong,2004,13892000,1341997,80Crane1996).AlthoughIreachedmy
interpretationindependently,IhavefoundadditionalsupportforitinBroackesAristotle,Objectivity,andPerception.
BroackesarguesthatthereisnocategoricalbasisinAristotlespowersthus:
Aradiatorwillheatthingsbecauseitisactuallyhot:theactionisduetoitsactuality.ButthatdoesnotinitselfI
thinkrequireAristotletogiveanondispositionalbasistoheat.ThereisnothinginAristoteliandoctrinetosaythat
itisdeeperorhiddenactualitiesthatgiverisetopowers....Heatandsimilarlylightness,weight,andcoldmight
forallthathasbeensaidbepowersultimateandungrounded.(Broackes1999,86seealsofootnote45,page79).
(12).Forexample,Bird(2007),Holton(1999),Shoemaker(1984),Mellor(1974).
(13).Thecommitmenttoanontologyofpowersonly,withnocategoricalproperties,hasbroughtaboutinsomequarters
theworrythatisexpressed,forexample,intheDominoargumentasformulatedbyJohnHeil:
Despiteitsappealinsomequarters,manyphilosophershavebeenstruckbythethoughtthatapropertiesas
powersviewleadstoadebilitatingregress.SupposeAsarenothingmorethanpowerstoproduceBs,Bsare
nothingmorethanpowerstoproduceCs,CsarenothingmorethanpowerstoproduceDs...andsoonforevery
concretespatiotemporalthing.Howisthissupposedtowork?Imaginearowofdominosarrangedsothat,when
thefirstdominotopples,ittopplesthesecond,whichtopplesthethird,andsoon.Nowimaginethatallthereisto
thefirstdominoisapowertotoppletheseconddomino,andallthereistotheseconddominoisapowertobe
toppledandapowertotopplethethirddomino,andsoon.Ifallthereistoadominoisapowertotoppleorbe
toppledbyanadjacentdomino,nothinghappens:nodominotopplesbecausethereisnothingnothingto
topple.(Heil2003,98,myemphasis).
Ibelievetherearedifficultieswiththeframingofthisexample,whichsurfaceasparadoxesinitsconclusion.The
framingdifficultiesderivefromthedescriptionofadominoasnothingbutthepowertotoppleortobetoppled.But
giventhisassumption,nothingmoreisrequiredinordertogeneratetheconcludingparadox(i.e.,noassumption
aboutthenatureofpowersisneededfortheparadox).Thereasonisthatthetoppling,thatistheconceptusedto
describethetypeofpowerintheexample,makesanimplicitreferencetoastructurethatisexternaltothepower
itisnotthepower(ofbeingtoppled)thatistoppled.Butsayingthatsomethinghasthepowertobetoppledorto
toppleandthatthereisnothingmoretoitthanthesepowersgeneratesaparadox,becauseweattributetothisitem
powersthatpresupposetheveryexternalstructurethatisdeniedoftheitem.Evenifeachofthesepowershada
categoricalbaseoraspecttotheirnatures,andwerenotjustpowerfulness,theparadoxwouldremainunaffected
sincetherewouldstillbenodominotobetoppled.Thereisthereforenoreasongivenbythedominoargumentfor
thinkingthatapowerhassomethingmoretoitsnaturethanpowerfulness.
(14).Ofcoursethecriterionofbeingacausethatistheoriginativesourceofchangewouldrequiretoberelativizedtoa
context,forotherwiseonecouldtracebackendlesslyoriginsofchange.Aristotledoesnotmentionthisissueinthe
passagequotedabove,butitisaconsiderationheissensitiveto,asweseefromhissubsequentdiscussionofmatterand
theintroductionoftheconceptofproximatematter:
Itseemsthatwhenwecallathingnotsomethingelsebutofthatsomethingelse(e.g.,acasketisnotwoodbutof
wood,andwoodisnotearthbutmadeofearth...),thatsomethingisalwayspotentially(inthefullsenseofthat
word)thethingwhichcomesafteritinthisseries.Forexample,acasketisnotearthennorearth,butwooden
forwoodispotentiallyacasketandisthematterofacasket.
(Met.1049a1823myemphasis)
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Incausalseriesofchanges(e.g.,whenthewoodbecomesacasket)adjacentitemsareonepotentiallytheother.
Theearthisnotpotentiallyacasket,becausethereisanintermediatestepbetweenearthandcasketintheseriesof
changesfromearthtowoodtothecasket.Soitisthewoodthatisstrictlyspeakingpotentiallythecasketinthe
presentcontext,despitethefactthatthewoodcomesfromearth,andhencethecasketcomesfromearth.
Correspondingly,inanygivenchange,theoriginofthechange(i.e.itscause)willbetakentobetheimmediate
causeofthisparticularchangeinquestion,ratherthananantecedentoneinthecausalhistoryofthischange.
(15).SeePlato,Theaetetus152a160e.
(16).See,forexampleMartin1992,Martin2008,andMartinscontributiontoCrane1996MumfordandAnjum(2011)
Heil2003.
(17).Idiscussthisfurtherinsection1.3.
(18).ContemporarymetaphysicianswhoholdadistinctionsimilartoAristotlesbetweenactiveandpassivepowersare,
forexample,Shoemaker(1998)whotalksofforwardandbackwardlookingconditionalpowers.
(19).Seesection1.3.
(20).Contrastwith,forexample,MumfordandAnjum:Themanifestationofapowerwill...beitselfafurtherpoweror
clusterofpowers(2011,5,myemphasis).
(21).Inourcommonsenseconceptionofchange,bothprocessandactivitycountaschanges.WhatAristotlewishesto
capturebytreatingonlyprocessaschangeisthatactivitydoesnotaltertheconstitutionalmakeupoftheactiveagent,but
onlyputstheexistingconstitutiontowork.SeealsomyAristotelianPowersAtWorkReciprocityWithoutSymmetryin
CausationinJonJacobs(ed.)PuttingPowerstoWork,forthcomingOUP.
(22).Bycontrast,theactualityoftheoutcomeresultingfromachange(e.g.,theactualityofahouse)issomethingother
thanbeyondthechangeitself.
(23).ThisisanimportantdifferencebetweenAristotlesaccountofpowersandthecontemporaryones(e.g.,Bird(2007).
Onthelatter,themanifestationofapowerisanewpowerthatcomesabout(e.g.,anicecubespowertocoolthe
lemonadeintheglassismanifestedinthenewlowertemperatureofthelemonade).Itisanimportantdifference
becauseitallowsAristotlesontologynottofallpreytotheAlwayspacking,nevertravellingargument.Italsohasvery
importantconsequenceswithrespecttoAristotlestheoryofperception,asweshallseeinchapter3.
(24).Theexpressionalwayspacking,nevertravellingisfirstusedbyMolnar(2003,173).
(25).Forexample,seeBird:Theessenceofapotencyinvolvesarelationtosomethingelseifinertialmassisapotency
thenitsessenceinvolvesarelationtoastimulusproperty(impressedforce)andamanifestationproperty(acceleration).
(2007,107)
(26).C.B.Martin(2008)alsotakesthedirectednessofapowertowarditsmanifestationtobeintrinsictothepower,but
hispositiondiffersfrommineinthathedoesnotmakethemanifestationaswellintrinsictothepowerseeforexample
hisTwoTrianglesmodel:
Youshouldnotthinkofdispositionpartnersjointlycausingthemanifestation.Instead,thecomingtogetherofthe
dispositionpartneristhemutualmanifestation:thepartneringandthemanifestationareidentical.This
partneringmanifestationidentityisseenmostclearlywithcasessuchasthefollowing.Youhavetwotriangle
shapedslipsofpaperthat,whenplacedtogetherappropriately,formasquare.Itisnotthatthepartneringofthe
trianglescausesthemanifestationofthesquare,butratherthatthepartneringisthemanifestation.(2008,51,
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emphasisintheoriginal)
ThisisanimportantdifferencebetweenAristotlesviewandMartins,inthatforhim,althoughthedirectednessis
intrinsictowhathasit(thepowers),whatitisdirectedtoward(themanifestation)isnotintrinsictowhathasit
(thepoweritself).Withreferencetotheexampleinthequoteabove,thesquareisnotintrinsictoeitherofthe
trianglesthatconstituteit.Bycontrast,onmyviewthepowerthatisdirectedtowardsheatingisactivatedwhenit
isinfactheatingsomething.Heatingistheexerciseofthepowerfulnessofthepowertoheat,whichisastate
attainedbythepowertoheat.
(27).Theviewhasthefollowingcorollary:becausepowersdependonfurtherpowerstoactualizewhattheyare,theyare
notquiddities.Wecannotswaptheirpowerfulnessandexpecttheirnaturestoremainthesame.Hence,
epistemologically,thenaturesofpowersareonoursideoftheveilofignorance.SeeforreferenceBird2007,chapter4.
(28).Aristotledefinesplaceastheinnermostmotionlessboundaryofwhatcontains(Physics212a2021).
(29).ItakeitthatthisiswhatMumfordandAnjumholdtoo,whentheywrite:
Dispositionalityisaprimitive,unanalyzablemodalitythatisintermediatebetweenpurepossibilityand
necessity...becauseofitsspecialmodalnature,noanalysisthatfailstoinvokeitcansucceed.Itwillbesubjectto
counterexamplesbecauseitwillattempttoreducedispositionalitytosomethingelse,suchasnecessity,which
therebymissesthesubtletyandflexibilityofdispositionality.Inparticular,itwouldmissthekeyelementthat
dispositionscanbesubjecttopreventionandinterference.Thismodalfeatureisessentialtodispositionality:itis
whatmakesitdistinctfromeverythingelse(2011,193).
(30).Aristotledidnottalkoflawsofnature.Yet,itisclearfromthenormativityexpressedinthepassagequotedabove,
thatthedefinitionofapowerdeterminestheconditionswhosesatisfactionistheinstantiationoflawsofnature.This
pointtooisfurtherdevelopedinmyAristotelianPowersAtWorkReciprocityWithoutSymmetryinCausationin
JonathanJacobs(ed.)PuttingPowersatWork,forthcomingwithOUP.
(31).SeeCat.6b2830.
(32).Additionally,inmyview,theontologicaldependencebetweenactiveandpassivepowersappliestotheirpotential
state,asmuchastotheiractivatedstate.Ontheotherhand,themanifestationpartnersneednotbeactual,solongas
theyarepossible.
(33).Aristotlehimselfdoesnotexplainwhatmotivateshisapproach.
(34).Aspeciesisontologicallydependentonitsgenus,andyetthereisnoentityasitwerestretchingbetweenthemthe
sameholdsforrelataeveniftheirontologicalinterdependenceisdifferentinkindthanthegenusspeciesone.
(35).SeeMetaphysics1045b816b2122.
(36).ForahelpfuldiscussionofexistentialdependenceanditsparticularorgenericformulationsseeLowe
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dependenceontological/accessedon20/02/2014.
(37).SeeMakin(2006,84).
(38).NotethatthisdoesnotundermineAristotlesrealismwithrespecttoperceptiblequalities.Forcolorinitsfirst
actualityforexamplethecorrelativepowerislight.Therecanbecolorswithoutperceivers.Andthesameholdsforall
perceptiblequalities.Seealsochapter3.
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(39).ForadiscussionofnonefficientcausationinAristotleseeMarmodoroPotentialityinAristotlesMetaphysics,inK
EngelhardandMQuante(eds.)TheHandbookofPotentiality,Springer,forthcoming.
(40).Seee.gHeil(forthcoming)andMumfordandAnjum(2011).
(41).SeePhysics202a911.
(42).Incontemporaryphysics,virtualparticlesarepositedasforcecarrierstoexplainhowelementaryparticlesacton
oneanother.(Forcecarriersarewhatwemightcallpurequantitiesofpower.)Thus,elementaryparticlesexertforceson
eachotherbyexchangingsuchvirtualparticles(e.g.,thegaugebosons).Onemightthinkthat,byintroducingvirtual
particlestocarryforcesfromparticletoparticle(e.g.,tocarrytheelectromagneticforceortheweakforce)contemporary
physicshassolvedtheproblemofcausalefficacybyreplacingcausalefficacywithadditionorsubtractionofforceinthe
constitutionoftheparticles(e.g.,more,orless,weakforce),therebyavoidingqualitativeinteractionbetweenparticles
butthisisnotthecase.Virtualparticlesofdifferenttypesinteractwithoneanotherqualitativelytoo.Forinstance,vector
bosonscanbeproducedbyquarkantiquarkannihilation.Insuchcases,Icontend,thequalitativechangeisnotfurther
explainedinelementaryphysicsbeyondthatsuchchangeoccursinthesecircumstances.Similarly,ontheAristotelian
accountIwanttomotivate,theactivationofpartnerpowersisnotfurtherreducibletoanyactivity.
(43).SeeAristotle,GenerationofAnimalsII.23.
(44).Iholdthistobeatthelimitofourunderstandingofthenatureofcausation,andnotjusthowAristotlesawit,
althoughIwillnotargueforthisclaimhere.
(45).EffectingisatermintroducedinthecontemporarydebateofcausationbyHeil(forthcominginJacobs(ed.)
PuttingPowerstoWork,OUP)butPlato(intheTheaetetus)andAristotle(intheDeAnimaandinthePhysics)usedit
first.
(46).Thechangemaybeaprocess,suchasbecominghotteroranactivity,suchasseeingseepp.
(47).Whilethereisgeneralagreementthatcausationhasadirection,peopledodisagreeonwhatunderpins
metaphysicallycausaldirection(see,e.g.,Schaffer(2007)foranexcellentaccountofthespectrumofpositions):
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causationmetaphysics/,accessedFebruary20,2014.Thosewho,likeHeil,deny
agencyincausationandclaimthatcautionissymmetricareleftwithoutawayofaccountingforcausaldirection.
(48).Schafferreckonssixmainargumentsintheliteratureregardingtherelationbetweenthecausalandtemporal
directions,andfourconcludethattheydonotcoincide.Seehttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causationmetaphysics/,
accessedFebruary20,2014.
(49).ThefirstperiodofdisfavorwasundertheinfluenceofAristotlestheory.
(50).Iargueforwhyitismetaphysicallyvaluabletoholdontotheintuitionthatcausationisasymmetricalin
AristotelianPowersatWork:ReciprocityWithoutSymmetryinCausationinJonathanJacobs(ed.)PuttingPowersto
WorkforthcomingwithOUP.
(51).,,.
(52).Aristotlesdefinitionof
(see,e.g.Physics201a910201a279201b45202a134)isfairlybroad,andit
allowsforagreatvarietyofcasestocomeunderthemovermovablerelation,includingsuchcasesasagingorripening,
whichwewouldconsideruntypicalcasesofcausation.Butitincludesuncontroversialinstancesofcausation,suchas
building,heating,doctoring,etc.
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(53).Wehavedistinguishedinrespectofeachclassbetweenwhatisinfulfilmentandwhatisinpotentiality(Physics
201a910).
(54).Forexampleitwillbecomemoreandlesshotatthesametime.
(55).TheargumentanalysisisreprintedfromMarmodoroTheUnionofCauseandEffectinAristotlePhysicsIII3
OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress(2007,23031).
(56).Latertranslations(theArabLatinone),andcommentaries(e.g.Themistius)take(2.2)tobepartoftheoriginal
AristoteliantextSimpliciushasitasavariantat202a26.Ross(1979,540),afterPhiloponus(1987,370,line20),
commentsthatthefullerreadingistheresultofalaterendeavortomakeaformallycompletedisjunctionwithoutregard
totheactualcourseofdiscussion...Aristotleevidentlyomitsaspatentlyimpossibletheviewthatbothactivityand
passivityareembodiedintheagent.
(57).ThistenetispresupposedbytherhetoricalquestionAristotleasks:Howwilltherebetwoalterationsofqualityin
onesubjecttowardsoneform?(202a356).SeeP(5.2)intheDilemma.
(58).SeePhysicsIII3,202b15.HereAristotledistinguishesteachingfromlearning,notbecausethecontentofthe
lessonisdifferent,butbecausetheoneactivityisteaching,andtheotherislearning,thesamelesson.Contrast,for
exampleThemistius(1900,78,923),whoinhisinterpretationconfusesthecontentofteachingandlearningandthe
commonunderlyingsubstratumforboth.Themistiustalksabouttheverysametheorembeingtaughtandlearnedasan
exampleofthecommonsubstratumofteachingandlearning,andassimilatesittothestretchofpathfortheroadsfrom
AthenstoThebesandfromThebestoAthens.Butthismistakeswhatiscommonintheformsofmovingandbeingmoved
withwhatunderliestheactivitiesofmovingandbeingmoved.
(59).Itiscontrarytoreasontosupposethatthereshouldbeoneidenticalactualizationoftwothingswhicharedifferent
inkind.Yettherewillbe,ifteachingandlearningarethesame,andagencyandpatiency(202b13).SeeP15inthe
Dilemma.
(60).BeinginasubjectinthecontextofPhysicsIII3shouldnottobeunderstoodalongthelinesofinherenceinthe
Categoriesas,forinstance,redinheresinanapple.ThereasonisthattheCategoriesinherenceinthesubstanceentails
belongingtothatsubstanceassubjectwhereas,asweshallsee,here,forexample,heatingsomethingbelongstothefire
butoccursinthepot.
(61).ContrastHusseyadlocumwhoholdsthatthereisnothingtosuggestthatanythingotherthanalocalsenseofin
isintended(Hussey,1983,65).
(62).SeePhysicsIV3,210a201.
(63).Beforewecometothis,aclarificationisneededregardingwhetherthemoveritselfisinmotion.Aristotle
distinguishesthemotionofthemover,duetonecessarycontactwiththemovable,fromthemotioninthemovabledueto
themoverscausalefficacy.Thefirstisinthemoverandthesecondinthemovable.InthesubargumentoftheDilemma
examinedabove(pp.),thefalsehoodthatclosesoneofthebranchesisthateverymoverwillbemoved(202a30).See(P
10.1)intheDilemma,Thisfollowsfromtheassumptionthatthemoversactuality,asamover,isinthemoveritself.
Then,duetotheirselfimposedcausalefficacy,allmoverswouldmove,whichistreatedasafalsehood,andsoitisdenied
thatthemoversactualityisinthemover.Butalthougheverymoverwillbemovedistreatedasafalsehoodinthe
Dilemma,Aristotlehasearlierstatedthateverymoverismoved(202a3).Thedifferencebetweenthestatementsisthat
thesecondrangesovermovablemoversonly,whilethefirstrangesoverallmovers,includingGod,whoisimmovable,
whichfalsifiesthestatement.Duringthecausalinteractionthemoverandthemovedbecomeactuallysuchwithoutthis
involvinganadditionalchangeineitherofthemthantheonesmentionedabove.Ofcoursethisargumentdoesnotblock
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thepossibilityofselfdirectedmotion,asinthecaseofadoctorhealingherself,wherethemoverandmovedarethesame.
(64).Gilloffersaveryinformeddiscussionoftheetymologyof,itspossibletranslations,andthedebated
issueofitssynonymywith.Gilldevotesparticularattentiontothetextualobservationthat:Aristotles
argument...provesthattheoftheagentandthepatientisone,butintheargumentAristotledoesnot
explicitlyclaimthatmotionistheofboth.Gillfindsitanattractivesuggestiontoexplainthetextual
observationthus:theclaimwouldbethattheoftheteacherandthelearneristhesamebutwhatitistobe
thatfortheteacherisanactivity,namelyateachingoftheteacherinthelearner,andachangeinthelearner,
namelyalearningofthelearnerbytheteacher.ButshedismissesthisasAristotlesviewinlightof202b19ff,because
shefindsnoindicationofanontologicalasymmetrybetweenagencyasactivityandpatiencyaschange(Gill,1980,134
35).
(65).Thefirstexampleisambiguous.Ontheonehandtheintervalfromonetotwocanbetakentobethesameasthe
intervalfromtwotoone,beingeitheranarithmeticalunitofvalueone,orageometricalmagnitudeofvalueone.Onthe
otherhand,thetwointervalscanbetakentobedifferent,suchasvectorswithoppositedirections,orthepositiveand
negativevaluesofthenumberone.Itaketheexampleinthelatterwaybecause,asweshallsee,themetaphysicsofthe
twointervalsrequirethemtohavedifferentessentialnatures,asoppositevectorsdo,orasthepositiveandnegativeunit
valuesdowhereastakenintheformerwaythetwointervalsareoneandthesame,describedintwodifferentwaysfrom
onetotwo,andfromtwotoone.Theancientandmedievalcommentatorsinterpretthisexampleintwoways,bothof
whichbelongtotheoneentitytwodescriptionsfamilyofinterpretations.Theyvacillate(oftenindiscriminately)between
tworeadingswithintheoneentitytwodescriptionsfamily:eitheroneintervaldescribedintwodifferentwaysintermsof
itsendpoints,oronerelationdescribedfromthepointofviewofeitherrelatum.Readingtheexampleasoneinterval
describeddifferentlyintermsofitsendpointsisfoundforexamplein:Simplicius(446,312)Philoponus(1897,370,
line7375,line26376,line5)Aquinas(Physics,147).Readingtheexampleasonerelationthathastworelata,and
accordinglytwodescriptions(e.g.,therelationofprocreation,withfatherandsonasthetworelata,andbeingthefather
ofandbeingthesonofasthetwodescriptions),isfoundforexamplein:Simplicius(439,34bis37448,30ffonthis
readingofSimpliciusseealsoC.Luna,LarelationchezSimplicius,inSimplicius,savie,sonoeuvre,sasurvie,Actesdu
colloqueinternationaldeParis(28Sept.1Oct.1985),DeGruyter,BerlinNewYork,1987.Averroes(AristotelisDe
PhysicoAudituLibriOcto(Venezia156274),92v.IL94r.E95r.A)Aquinas(Physics,145tobecontrastedwith
147).Ibelievethatthereasonforthecommentatorsvacillationbetweenthetworeadingsisthatat202b179Aristotle
describestheexample,speakingloosely,bothasaninterval()betweentwopoints,andastherelationof
distance()ofeitherpointfromtheother,asiftheywereequivalentwaysofformulatingtheexample.The
moderncommentatorsdonotfallpreytothispossibleconfusion,butyetmostofthemfollowtheoneentitytwo
descriptionsinterpretation.See,forexampleRoss(1979,361362540)Gill(1980,140143)Waterlow(1982,182
191),Hussey(1983,6970).WaterlowandHusseysharetheviewthatAristotlehassomeinsightintoFregesdistinction
betweensenseandreference.Ishallcomebelowtotheargumentstheyofferinsupportoftheirinterpretation.
(66).Ihavealreadydiscussedabovethepositionoftheancientandmedievalcommentatorsinnote67.Iwilllimitmyself
heretopresentingtworecentandveryinterestingaccountsthathavebeenofferedforthesameentityviewoneisby
Waterlow(1982,18082),andtheotherbyHussey(1983,66).
(67).Nodoubtisrecordedinthemoderneditionsontheexpressionat202b12onlythetwoimmediately
precedingarticles<>havehadalessfirmtransmissioninthemanuscripts,asRossdocumentsintheapparatusad
locum:wefindonlyinIJonlyinE,andneitherinF.Itwaseasyforoneortheotherarticletodropby
haplographyduringthetransmissionprocess.Bonitzprintsbotharticlesaspartofthetext.Rosschoosestoprint
<>asalacunatobecompletedbysense.
(68).[].(202a145)
(202a18)[scilicet](202b89).
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(69).Ofcourse,ifbeingpicksoutonlytheuniversalformtheentailmentwouldnotfollow.AristotlesaysinMetaphysics
V6:
Somethingsareoneinnumber,othersinspecies,othersingenus,...innumberthosewhosematterisone,in
speciesthosewhosedefinitionisone....Thelatterkindsofunityarealwaysfoundwhentheformerare(e.g.,
thingsthatareoneinnumberarealsooneinspecies,whilethingsthatareoneinspeciesarenotallonein
number).
(1016b316,myemphasis)
Soforourpresentpassage,202b146,weneedtoassumeembodimentifthisistheparticularizingprinciple,securing
thenumericalidentityoftheindividuals.IfoneattributestoAristotleadifferentparticularizingprinciplethanmatter,
thenthatprinciplewillbeinplayinthepresentpassage.
(70).Becausetheagentsandthepatientscapacitiesareessentiallydifferent,theonebeingthecapacityoftransmitting
theformandtheotherbeingthecapacitytoreceivethetransmissibleform,therealizationofthetwodifferentcapacities
isalsoessentiallydifferent.CharlesshowsonthebasisofinvestigationofvariouspassagesofthePhysicsthat:
Aprocessisoneinnumberonlyifitisoneinessence...buttheessenceofeachthingisdefinedwhenonesays
whatitistobethatthing(1017b213).Ifso,processesareoneinnumberonlyifthedefinitionsofwhatitistobe
thatthingareidentical...Aristotelianprocessesareessentiallyrealizationsofgivencapacitiesofgivensubjects:
theiressentialpropertiesincludethesubjectofchangeandtheendpointofthetypeofchange(i.e.itsgoal).They
aredistinctiftheydonotshareallessentialproperties...ItfollowsthatinIII3teachingandlearningmustbe
numericallydistinctprocessessincetheydifferinessence.(Charles,1984,101118).
(71).Sincethereisdisagreementbetweentheinterpretersonthetranslationofthispassage,Ireportheretheoriginal
text:
,,
AsHusseynotes,therearetwowaysofunderstandingthepassage:
((i))thechangeinwhichthesethingsarepresent(i.e.,ofwhichitistruethatitisanactinguponandabeing
actedupon)isthesameasbeingactedupon
((ii))thechangeinwhichthesethingsarepresent(i.e.,ofwhichitistruethatitisbothanactinguponanda
beingactedupon)isthechange(1983,72)
Thelatter(ii)isthewayinwhichthemajorityoftheinterpreters,includingmyself,readthepassage(e.g.Philoponus
(1987,383,lines212),Ross(1979,362),andGill(1980,137).Hussey,though,optsfor(i)(1983,6),andsodoes
Charles(1984,14).For,Husseyremarks,in(i)theextrapointismadethatchangeisindeedthesameindefinitionas
thebeingactedupon(forchangehasbeendefinedastheactualityofthechangingthing).Husseydoesnotdevelopthis
pointfurther,butCharlesdoes,ashegroundsontheselineshisinterpretationofthechapter,differingfromthatofthe
majority.Ishalldevotethediscussionheretotheargumentsinsupportof,andagainst,translation(i),anddiscuss
Charlesinterpretation.BothHusseyandCharlesacknowledgethatonlinguisticgroundsbothreadings(i)and(ii)ofthe
passageareequallypossiblethereasonswhytheypreferreading(i)to(ii)aremostlyinterpretative.Charlessays:
Irejectthistranslation(sc.theequivalenttoHusseys(ii))because(a)itgivesuptheessentialconnectionon
whichAristotleelsewhereinsistsbetweentheprocessandthesuffering(202a146,b257)(b)itpostulatesa
processwhichisnondirectional(andnonrelational)andthusconflictswithAristotlesgeneralviewofthe
essencesofprocessesastherealizationofgoaldirectedcapacities(201a168)(c)thegrammarof202b1922
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seemstorequirethattheclausetheprocessisthesameintheprimarysensetakesoverboththenotioninthe
primarysensefromb20,andalsothegrammaticalobjectwithwhichitisthesameinthissense:namely,the
learning,suffering.
(1984,145)
Inanswerto(a)Isubmitthatitisnottruethatbytaking
asthegroundoftheinstantiationforactionand
passion,theessentialconnection...betweentheprocessandthesufferingisgivenuprather,morethanoneessential
connectionisallowed,namelytherelationtoagencyandalsotopatiency.Inanswerto(b),inmyinterpretation,the
natureofmotionistobefound,notintheunderlyingphysicalactivity,butinthetwobeingsthatthisactivitygrounds,
agencyandpatiency.Neitherofitsnaturesistruerofthemotionthantheother,anymorethaneitherdirectionofthe
routebetweenAthensandThebesistrueroftheunderlyingroadthantheother.Aristotlesdefinitionofchangedoesnot
favortheoneovertheother.Changeisnomoretheunfoldingactualityofthepotentialityofthepatientasapatient,than
itistheunfoldingactualityofthepotentialityoftheagentasanagent.Inanswerto(c)Iwishtodefendmyreadingofthe
textonthegroundthatitisactuallythemostnatural:ittakesbeingoneintheprimarysensetoberetainingthesame
meaningthroughout,andworkingasapredicatethathasasitslogicalsubjectsontheonehandteachingandlearning
(asapair)andactionandpassion(asapair),andontheotherhandthattowhichthesethingsbelong,namelythe
underlyingprocess.
(72).InthecontextofthisargumentAristotletakeslearnertorangeonlyoverthosewhoaretaught.
(73).Husseyoffersaverydifferentaccountofthesamenessofthemotionoftheagentandthepatient.Hesays:
WhatthenisAristotlespositiveargumenttoshowthatthechanges[oftheagentandthepatient]arethesame?It
mightbejustthatanoperationmustbesomethingthathappensoveraperiodoftime,andthatifwelookata
minimalcaseofchange,inwhichtheagentiscompletelyunaffected,thereisnothinghappeningexceptthe
change(Intransitive)ofthepatient.Hence,theoperationoftheagentmustbethechange(Intransitive).(1983,
66)
(74).Thus,incontrasttoothercontemporarypowerbasedaccountsofcausationsuchasHeils,Martins,andMumford
andAnjums,forAristotlecausationinvolvetwomanifestations,namelythemanifestationoftheactivepowerofthe
agentandthemanifestationofthepassivepowerofthepatient.Seefollowingnote.
(75).Thereisaninterestingparallelbetweenthemetaphysicsofthecommonactivityoftwopowersandthemetaphysics
ofarelationbetweentworelata(inthecontemporarynonAristotelian)conceptionofarelation.Asingleinstanceofa
relationbelongstotworelata,eachofwhichisdifferentlycharacterizedbyitthus,asingleinstanceofarelationrenders
CarolamotherandLindaadaughter.SimilarlyinAristotle,asingleactivityenablestheeartohearandthesoundto
sound.Butthereisalsoadifferenceintheirmetaphysics:whatiscommonbetweentwosubjectsincontemporarytheory
istheentity(e.g.,arelation)thatcharacterizeseachrelatumdifferentlywhilewhatiscommonbetweentwopowers(or
theirbearers)inAristotleisanactivitysubstratumthatconstitutesdifferentactivitiesineachpower(e.g.,hearing,
sounding).
PRINTEDFROMOXFORDSCHOLARSHIPONLINE(www.oxfordscholarship.com).(c)CopyrightOxfordUniversityPress,2015.AllRightsReserved.Underthetermso
aPDFofasinglechapterofamonographinOSOforpersonaluse(fordetailsseehttp://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacypolicy).Subscriber:LibertyUnive
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Accessbroughttoyouby: LibertyUniversity
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AristotlesCausalPowersTheoryofPerceptionOxfordScholarship
AnnaMarmodoro
PrintISBN13:9780199326006
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
AristotlesCausalPowersTheoryofPerception
AnnaMarmodoro
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.003.0003
AbstractandKeywords
ForAristotleperceptiontakesplacewhentheperceiverandtheobjectofperceptioncausallyinteract,andtheirrespective
powerscometobeactivated.AsdiscussedinDeAnima,perceptionthroughthefivesensesrequiresanagentcapableof
beingaffectedandanobjectcapableofaffectinghim/her.Sothepowerthatactivatesperceiving,theperceptiblequality,
comesfromwithoutthesenseorgans.Theperceiverexperiencestheperceptible,andtheperceptiblebecomesmanifestto
theperceiver,invirtueof,andforthedurationoftheirmutualinteraction.Inperceptiontheperceiverssenseorganis
madeliketheperceptibleobject,throughtheimpactoftheobjectsperceptiblequalitiesonthesenseorgan.
Keywords:Aristotle,perception,fivesenses,perceptiblequality,senseorgan,DeAnima
Introduction
ThereiscleartextualevidencethatAristotleendorsesacausaltheoryofperceptiontheinterpretationofthetheory
howeverhasgeneratedmuchdebate.Thischapterwillcontributetotheongoingdebateafreshinterpretationthatbrings
Aristotlespowerontologytobearonhisaccountofperception.ForAristotleperceptiontakesplacewhentheperceiver
andtheobjectofperceptioncausallyinteract,andtheirrespectivepowerscometobeactualized.Itthusrequiresanagent
capableofbeingaffectedandanobjectcapableofaffectinghim/her. 1Thesecapabilitiesarewhyabeeperceivesthe
fragranceofaroseandastonedoesnot:thestoneisincapableofbeingaffected.Thepowerthatactivatesperceiving,the
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perceptiblequality,comesfromwithoutthesenseorgans.Theperceiverexperiencestheperceptible,andtheperceptible
makesitselfmanifesttotheperceiver,asaresultandforthedurationoftheirmutualinteraction.Inperceptionthe
perceiverssenseorganismadetobeliketheperceptibleobject,bytakingonsomehowitsperceptiblequalities. 2What
doesAristotlemeanbytheseclaims?ThischaptersetsoutAristotlesfundamentalassumptionswithrespecttothe
number,natureandoperationofthefivesenseshumansareendowedwith.
(p.79) 2.1TheFacultyofPerception
Perceivingisanactivityofthesoul.Aristotleinvestigatesthenatureofthesoul(
)anditsactivitiesprimarilyinthe
DeAnimaandinacollectionofshorttreatisesknownasParvaNaturalia.Hisapproachisguidedbytwopowerful
insights(whichmighthoweverfeelforeigntous).FirstAristotleconceivesofthesoulastheprincipleoffunctional
organizationofalltheactivitiesofalivingnaturalbody.Thus,thedomainofhisinquiryintothenatureofthesoulis
muchbroaderthantheremitofmodernpsychology,andspansalllivingbeings:notmerelyhumans,butalsoplantsand
animals.Secondly,whatguidesAristotlespsychologicalinquiryishisgeneralinterestintheexplanationofthe
phenomenaweexperience,orthoseweassociatewiththesoul.Hispsychologicaltheoryaddressesquestionssuchas:
Howisthesoulrelatedtothebody?Isthesoulimmortal?Canthementalbeexplanatorilyreducedtothephysical?What
accountsfortheactionsoflivingbeings?Aristotleseestheseandrelatedquestionsaspartofhismoregeneral
investigationintothenatureofthings,searchingforwhatmakessomethingwhatitisandforaccountsofchange.Itis
thereforenotsurprisingthatinhisaccountofthesoulAristotleappliesconceptsdrawnfromhisbroadermetaphysical
theory:bothhispowerontologyandhishylomorphism.OnAristotleshylomorphicaccountofrealityallthings,
manmadeornaturemade,canbeanalyzedintotwoconstituents:theform,whichistheprincipleoffunctional
organization,andthematterinwhichsuchaprincipleisimplemented. 3Substantialforms(e.g.,beingaman)account
forwhatthingsare,andincidentalforms(e.g.,beingpale)accountforasubstancesqualitativechange.Thus,Aristotle
understandsthesoulasthesubstantialformofanorganicbody,andthebodyasthematterofthesoul.Thesoulbody
relationisonlyaspecialcaseofthegeneralformmatterrelationship.Forexample,theroundshape(p.80) ofaballis
differentfromthemattertheballismadeof,butcannotexistassuchwithoutbeingimplementedinmatter.Byanalogy,
thesoulisdifferentfromthebody,butcannotexistwithoutthebody.Thedifferencebetweenanorganismandtheballis
thatthesoulquaorganizationalprincipledeterminesthenatureofthematterofthebodyallthewaydown,by
transformingthemenstrualfluidsprovidedbythemotherintofleshandbonesinthegenerationofaneworganism.By
contrast,neithertheshapeofaballnoritsfunctiondeterminesitsmatterallthewaydown,foraballcanbemadeof
differentmaterials.Ifthesoulistheprincipleoforganizationofthebodysactivities,thestudyofthesoulincludesthe
studyofallsuchactivitiesandoftherelevantpsychicfaculties.Aristotledistinguishesthefollowingfaculties:nutrition,
perception,intellect,anddesire.Thefacultyofnutritioniscommontoallnaturallivingbeingsanimalshaveperception
inaddition4andhumansalonehaveintellect.Iturnnowtohowthe(human)facultyofperceptionoperatesviathefive
senses.
2.2TheFiveSenses
ForAristotletheworldisgiventoourexperienceasdiversifiedbyfivefundamentaltypesofperceptiblequalities:colors,
odors,sounds,tastes,andthetangibles.Thesequalitiesarerealcausalpowerspowerstointeractwiththeperceptual
powersoftheperceiver. 5Itisbecausetheworldisdiversifiedbyfivefundamentaltypesofqualitativefeaturesthat
animals,andhumansinparticular,areendowedwithfivesensestoperceivethese.Thepowertoperceive,definedmore
generally,istheabilityofthesensestobecausallyacteduponbyperceptibleobjectsintheworld. 6Thisabilitytobeacted
uponbyaperceptiblequalityisfoundonlyinmatter.Thisiswhyanimalsneedsenseorgans.Thesenseorgansarethe
(p.81) seatofthefacultiesofperception,oneorganforeachfacultyforexampletheeyeisthematterofsight(DA
412b20).InDeAnimaII1Aristotleexplicitlysaysthatthesenseorgansstandtothefacultiesofperceptionasmatterto
form,oraspotentialitytoactuality. 7
Fromthisthesis,thatitisbecausetherearefivetypesofqualitiesthatwehavefivefacultiesofperception,followsa
centralassumptioninAristotlesaccountofthesenses:eachtypeofperceptiblequalityintheworld(i.e.,eachtypeof
specialsensible)individuatesadifferentsense:aspecialsense(sightforcolor,hearingforsound,etc.),withitsown
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senseorgan.Aristotlewrites,
Indealingwitheachofthesensesweshallhavefirsttospeakofthesensibleswhichareperceptiblebyeach...I
callbythenameofspecialsensibleofthisorthatsensethatwhichcannotbeperceivedbyanyothersensethan
thatone...inthissensecoloristhespecialobjectofsight,soundofhearing,flavouroftaste(DA418a613)
...
....
Forexample,Aristotleusesthisindividuationcriterionexplicitlyinthefollowingargument:
Sincebloodlessanimalsdonotbreathe,theymust,itmightbeargued,havesomenovelsense[inplaceofsmelling
whichdependsonbreathing]notreckonedamongtheusualones.Ourreplymustbethatthisisimpossible,since
itisscentthatisperceivedasensethatapprehendswhatisodorousandwhathasagoodorbadodorcannotbe
anythingbutsmell.
(DA421b1923,translationslightlymodified)
(p.82) ,,.,
.
Sotheperceptiblequality,inthiscaseodor,individuatesthesenseofsmellifitisodorthatisperceived,itisthefacultyof
smellthroughwhichtheperceivingisdone. 8
Whatisitthatweperceive?WhentalkingabouttheobjectofperceptionAristotleappearstovacillatebetweentakingthe
objectofperceptiontobetheperceptiblequality,andtakingittobetheentityinworldpossessingthatperceptible
quality. 9MytakeonthisissueisthattheshiftdoesnotmattertoAristotle,forhethinksthattheobjectofasenseis
somethingexternalwhichstimulatesthesense:itisanyinstanceoftheperceptiblequalitycorrespondingtothatsense.
Instancesofformsorqualitiescanbeindividuatedatwill,byabstraction.Aninstanceofaformisthepropertyitself
spatiotemporallylocatedorthesubjectthatimmediatelypossessesthatproperty(forexample,inthecaseofcolor,the
surfaceofanobject)ortheobjectthatpossessesthatproperty.Alloftheseitemsinvolvetheinstantiationoftherelevant
quality,whichmakesthemperceptiblebythatsense,andthusitsobjects.Becausetheobjectsthatpossessaperceptible
qualityareperceptibleaspossessorsofthatquality,thereisnofurthernatureofeachsuchobjectthatisrevealedbyits
beingperceptibleassuch.Thus,theobjectsofasenseareinstancesofaperceptiblequality,whateveritisthatis
individuatedasinstantiatingthequality,namelyeitherthepropertyinstanceitselforthewholeobjectthatpossessesthat
instance.Aristotlewrites:
Theobjectofsightisthevisible,andwhatisvisibleis(a)colorand(b)acertainkindofobject[i.e.,thevisible
kind]which(p.83) canbedescribedinwordsbutwhichhasnosinglename...Whateverisvisibleiscolorand
coloriswhatliesuponwhatisinitsownnaturevisible[e.g.,asurface]initsownnatureheremeansnotthat
visibilityisinvolvedinthedefinitionofwhatthusunderliescolor,butthatthatsubstratumcontainsinitselfthe
causeofvisibility.
(DA418a2630,translationslightlymodified)
,,,
...,,
.
FromtheanalysisIhavedevelopedabove,itfollowsthatevenwhentheobjectofthesenseistakentobetheperceptible
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quality(ratherthantheobjectpossessingit),itisthequalityasembeddedinaspatiotemporallocation,ratherthanthe
qualityinabstraction,thatcanstimulatethesenseorganandhenceistheobjectofthatsense.
Perceptiontakesplacewhentheperceiverandtheobjectofperceptioncausallyinteract,andisanalterationofthe
perceiverssenseorganbytheobjectofperception. 10HereishowAristotledefinesit:
Perceptionconsistsinbeingmovedandactedupon...for,itseemstobeasortofqualitychange(DA416b3335,
mytranslationseealso418a36).
....
Theissueofwhatisthenatureofthealterationthesenseorganundergoeshasdividedancientandmodernscholarsand
requirescarefuldiscussion,whichIpostponetosection2.6.FirstIwanttofocusononeofthecornerstonesofAristotles
accountof(p.84) perception,theclaimthatthereisaonetoonecorrespondenceamongthetypeofaninstantiated
perceptiblequality,thetypeofthecorrespondingalterationofthesenseorgan,andthetypeofthecontentoftheresulting
perceptualexperience(e.g.,acorrespondencebetweenthetypesof:thisdeskscolor,themodificationofmysenseorgan
ofsightstimulatedbythisinstanceofcolor,andthecontentofmyexperienceofthecolor).Aristotleputsitthisway:
Itisimpossiblethatwhatisoneandthesame[i.e.,asense]shouldbemovedatoneandthesametimewith
contrarymovementsinsofarasitisundivided,andinanundividedmomentoftime.Forifwhatissweetbethe
qualityperceived,itmovesthesenseinthisdeterminateway,whilewhatisbittermovesitinacontraryway,and
whatiswhiteinadifferentway.
(DA426b29427a9)11
,.
,,,.
Additionally,inSenseandSensibiliawereadthat:
Inoneandthesamefacultytheperceptionactualizedatanysinglemomentisnecessarilyone,onlyone
stimulationorexertionofasinglefacultybeingpossibleatasingleinstant....Hence,itisnotpossibletoperceive
twodistinctobjectssimultaneouslywithoneandthesamesense(SS447b1719,translationslightlymodified).
,.
(p.85) Thisdescriptionoftheprinciple,andofwhatmotivatesit,lendsitselftoageneralphysicalinterpretation. 12One
andthesamephysicalthingcannotsufferdifferentandevenincompatiblechangesatthesametime. 13Thisisrelevantto
perceptionbecauseforAristotlewebecomeawareofaperceptiblequality(e.g.,ofblue)asthesenseorganofsight
becomessomehowaffectedbytheexternalquality,resultinginitsbecominglikethatquality. 14Butitisimportanttonote
thatthegeneraljustificationfortheprinciplecomesfromAristotespowerontologyasappliedtohistheoryofperception:
theactivityofasinglepowerataninstantisasingletypeofactivity.Thecorrespondenceprinciplefollowsfromthis.
Eachsenseisaperceptualpower,withadistinctivetypeofactivitythatdefinesitthisiswhythepowerofsightcannotbe
activatedbyseeingand,forexample,hearing.
Aristotleassociatesinfallibilitywiththeperceptionofthespecialsensiblesbytheirspecialsense,sayingforexample
that:
Eachsensehasonekindofobjectwhichitdiscerns,andnevererrsinreportingthatwhatisbeforeitiscoloror
sound(thoughitmayerrastowhatitisthatiscoloredorwherethatis,orwhatitisthatissoundingorwherethat
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is).Suchobjectsarewhatweproposetocallthespecialobjectofthisorthatsense.
(DA418a1417)
,,,
..
Thus,forexample,sightcannotbemistakenaboutwhetheritisperceivingcolorornot.Theargument(whichAristotle
doesnotsupply)mustbethatthisissobecauseitisonlycolorthatcanstimulatethesenseorganofsight,sosightcannot
bemistakenaboutthat. 15Anythingbeyondthetypeofsensibleitismightbesubject(p.86) tomisperception.Yetitis
notclearfromthetextwhetherAristotlethinkstheagentcanmisperceivewhichcolorsheisperceiving.Hedoesallow
thattheagentcanbemistakenaboutthetypeofobjectsheisperceiving(otherthanitbeingacoloredobject).Hedoesnot
commentonwhethertheperceivercanmisperceivetheparticularcolor,orsound,etc.Iftheargumentfortheinfallibility
ofperceptionistheoneIsuppliedabove,thenitdoesnotapplytotheidentityoftheperceptiblequality(i.e.,which
particularcolororwhichsoundoneisperceiving).Thereasonisthatdifferentcolorscanstimulatethesenseorganof
sight,andsotheagentcaninfalliblyperceivecolor,andyetbemistakenaboutthehueorshadeofit. 16Butonthepicture
sketchedsofar,evenifperceptionofthesensiblesthatarethespecialobjectsofthespecialsensesisinfallible,itwill
revealtotheperceiverrelativelylittleabouttheworld.Itwillscarcelytelloneanythingabouttheworldsfurniture.Itwill
giveoneawarenessonlyofcolors,sounds,etc.,andonlyinsimpleperceptualcontents.OfcourseAristotleisawarethata
fulltheoryofperceptionisrequiredtoaccountformuchmoreinformationabouttheworldthanthis.
2.3ThePower(s)toCausePerceptualExperiences
PerceptionforAristotleisaninstanceofcausation,which,aswesawinchapter1,heexplainsastheactivationofa
passiveandanactivepower,heldtogetherasitwerebymutualdependence,butnotbyareifiedrelation. 17Inthecaseof
perceptionthetwocausalpowersaretheperceptiblequalityofanobjectandthecorrespondingpoweroftheperceiverto
experiencethattypeofproperty.OnAristotlesviewtheperceptiblequalityoftheobjectistheactivepowertheperceivers
perceptualpoweristhepassiveone.Inperceptionthe(p.87) perceptiblequalityactivatesthesenseorganofthe
perceiver,whoseperceptionwouldotherwisebeonlypotential.Aristotleexplains:
Weusethewordperceiveintwoways,forwesaythatwhathasthepowertohearorsee,seesorhears,even
thoughitisatthemomentasleep,andalsothatwhatisactuallyseeingorhearing,seesorhears.Hencesense
toomusthavetwomeanings,sensepotential,andsenseactual.Similarlytobeasentientmeanseithertohavea
certainpowerortomanifestacertainactivity.
(DA417a1014)
(,,
),,,.
,.
[S]
enseandthesensibleobjectareambiguousterms(i.e.maydenoteeitherpotentialitiesoractualities).
(DA426a2324)
,.
Inactivatingthesenseorganoftheperceiver,theperceptiblequalitydoesnotchangethesense,butonlyenergizesitinto
action,byanalogywithwhathappens(e.g.,whenoneplaysanotebypluckingaguitarsstring,withoutchanging
physicallythestringitself).IntheDeAnimaAristotleexplainsthatinperceptionthesenseorgangetsengagedinthe
activityofperceivingtheperceptible,thus:
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Inthecaseofsenseclearlythesensitivefacultyalreadywaspotentiallywhattheobjectmakesittobeactuallythe
facultyisnotaffectedoraltered.Thismustthereforebeadifferentkindofmovementformovementisanactivityof
whatisimperfect,(p.88) activityintheunqualifiedsense(i.e.thatofwhathasbeenperfected)isdifferent.
(DA431a48)
.
,,.
Inperceptiontheperceptiblequalitiesoftheobjectsintheworldgetactivatedtoo,astheyarecausalpowersofobjects.
Recallnowthatcausalpowersareprostiorrelativessoperceptiblequalitiesarealsorelatives.IntheCategories(aswe
haveseeninchapter1)Aristotleexplainsthatperceptionandtheperceptibledifferfromotherrelativesinthattheyarenot
bynaturesimultaneous(as,forexample,slaveandmasterare),buttheperceptibleispriortoperception. 18Aristotlein
factholdsthatthatperceptiblequalitiesarenecessarilypriortoperception,andjustifiesthisbyappealingtotheircausal
roleinrelationtotheperceiversexperienceofthem.ForAristotleobjectshaveperceptiblequalities(e.g.sounds,colors,
etc.)whethertheyareperceivedornot.Thesequalitiesareofthisorthattype,independentlyoftheperceivingsense. 19
Forexample,intheMetaphysicsAristotlewrites:
Forinpointoffactperceptionisnotofitself,butofsomethingelsebesidestheperceptionthatisnecessarilyprior
totheperceptionforthatwhicheffectschangeispriorbynaturetothatwhichischanged.
(Met.1010b3536)20
,,
ThereisplentyoftextualevidenceforAristotlescommitmenttotherealexistenceintheworldoftheperceptiblequalities
of(p.89) objects.Ihighlightheresomeadditionalkeypassageswherethecommitmentisevident.InDeAnimaII8,
420a17,Aristotleclaimsthatsoundisexternalandnotprivate()inDAII5,417b201he
reiteratesandgeneralizesthepointbyclaimingthatthevisibleandtheaudible,whichproducetheactivityofperception,
areexternal,liketherestoftheobjectsofperception, 21andherepeatsthepointthattheobjectsareexternalat417b289.
AnotherstatementofAristotlescommitmenttotherealexistenceofperceptiblequalities,whetherperceivedornot,isto
befoundintheDeSensu.Hethereraisesthefollowingquestion:
Onemightask:ifeverybodyisinfinitelydivisible,areitssensiblequalitiescolor,savor,odor,sound,weight,
coldorheat,heavinessorlightness,hardnessorsoftnessalsoinfinitelydivisible?Or,isthisimpossible?(DS
445b37translation)22
,,,
,,,,.
Aristotlessolutionisthatperceptiblequalities,whenembodiedininfinitesimallysmallquantitiesofmatter,arerealand
potentiallyperceptible,butnotactuallyso:
Itisowingtothisdifference[betweenpotentialandactual]thatwedonot[actually]seeitstenthousandthpartin
agrainofmillet,althoughsighthasembracedthewholegrainwithinitsscopeanditisowingtothis,too,that
thesoundcontainedinaquartertoneescapesnotice,andyetonehearsthewholestrain,inasmuchasitisa
continuumbuttheintervalbetweentheextremesounds[thatboundthequartertone]escapesthe(p.90) ear
[beingonlypotentiallyaudible,notactually].So,inthecaseofotherobjectsofsense,extremelysmallconstituents
areunnoticedbecausetheyareonlypotentiallynotactually[perceptiblee.g.]visible,unlesswhentheyhavebeen
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partedfromthewholes...Butyetthis[smallobject]istobeconsideredasperceptible:foritisbothpotentiallyso
already[i.e.,evenwhenalone],anddestinedtobeactuallysowhenithasbecomepartofanaggregate.(445b31
446a14,translationmodified)
,,
,
.,,
,.
,
.(
),.
,.
,,,.
,,
,.
Aristotlesrealismwithrespecttoperceptiblequalitiesishowevernotwithoutqualification.InwhatfollowsIwillargue
thatforAristotlethingsarenotsweetorloudorbrightindependentlyof(p.91) perception.Butnoraretheymadesuchby
perception.Aristotlesrealismismorecomplexandsubtle.Whenperceptiblequalitiesareperceived,theyreachtheir
secondandfullestactuality,whichisonlyachangeinmetaphysicalstatusofthequalitiesthemselves,ratherthanan
identitychangeoftheproperties.(Thisthesiswillbeexpoundedandarguedforinchapter3).
2.4AristotlesCausalPowersTheoryofPerception
Aristotledescribesthecausalinteractionbetweentheobjectofperceptionandtheperceiverinamuchdebatedpassageof
DeAnima,intheseterms:
Theactualityoftheperceptibleandoftheperceptualexperienceisoneandthesame,althoughtheirbeingisnot
thesame.Imean,forexample,thesoundinactualityandhearinginactualityforitispossiblethatthatwhich
hasthecapacitytoheardoesnothear,andthatwhichcanproducesoundsisnotalwaysdoingso.Butwhenthat
whichcanhearishearingandthatwhichcanproducesoundisproducingit,thenhearinginactualityand
soundinginactualitycometobeatthesametime,andonemightcalltheonehearingandtheothersounding(DA
425b26426a1,mytranslationandemphasis)
,
,
,,
,.
(p.92) TheabovetextisofcrucialimportancebecauseitistherethatAristotlestateshisviewsontheontologicalstatus
ofperceptiblequalitiesandhowperceptioncomesabout,butitalsocontainsaformidableinterpretativechallenge.How
arewetounderstandtheclaimthattwoessentiallydifferententities(theperceptiblequalityandthecorresponding
experience)haveoneandthesameactuality?Primafacie,thisstatementfliesinthefaceofallweknowaboutAristotles
essentialism.AccordingtoAristotleswellknownviews,differenttypesofactivityeachhavetheirownnature,oressence,
whichdeterminestheirrespectiveactualities.Inwhatsense,then,couldtwodifferentactivitiessharethesameactuality?
Toexplainthisandotherpuzzlingclaimsinthepassageabove,weneedtodrawonhisaccountofcausationinthe
Physics(seechapter1).ItisAristotlehimselfwhodirectsusthere. 23Whentalkingaboutperceptionandperceptible
propertiesinDeAnimaIII2,hedoesnotexpoundonhissubtlerealism24andhismetaphysicalaccountofit,but
explicitlyrefersbacktohisargumentsinPhysicsIII3.IntheDeAnimahewrites:
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Ifitistruethatthemovement(i.e.theacting,andthebeingactedupon)istobefoundinthatwhichisacted
upon,boththesoundandthehearingsofarasitisactualmustbefoundinthatwhichhasthecapacityofhearing
foritisinthepassivefactorthattheactualityoftheactiveormotivefactorisrealizedthatiswhywhatcauses
movementisatrest(DA426a26,translationslightlymodified,myemphasis)
(),
.
(p.93) TheconceptualconnectionsbetweenthePhysicsandtheDeAnimaareevidentalsointhefollowingpassages
(whichwillbeinvestigatedinlatersectionsofthischapter):
thesame.
(DA425b2627,mytranslation)
,
modesofbeing(DA426a1517,mytranslation)
,.
Motionisinthemovable.Itisthefulfillmentofthispotentialitybytheactionofwhathasthepowerofcausing
motionandtheactualityofthatwhichhasthepowerofcausingmotionisnototherthantheactualityofthe
movableforitmustbethefulfillmentofboth.Athingiscapableofcausingmotionbecauseitcandothis,itisa
moverbecauseitactuallydoesit.Butitisonthemovablethatitiscapableofacting.Hencethereisasingle
actualityofbothalike.(Phys.202a1318,myemphasis)
,[]
.
,,,.
ItisthusclearthatPhysicsIII3andDeAnimaIII2discusstwodifferentinstancesofcausation,towhichthesame
metaphysical(p.94) accountapplies.Inanutshell,intheinterpretationIamarguingfor,Aristotletakesthedistinctive
viewthattheactivationofbothpowerstakesplaceinthesenseorganoftheperceiver(onthemodelofmoverandmoved,
andteachingandlearninginPhysicsIII3seechapter1).
Forastheactingandbeingacteduponistobefoundinthepassive,notintheactivefactor,soalsotheactuality
ofthesensibleobjectandthatofthesensitivesubjectarebothrealizedinthelatter.
(DA426a911)
,
.
Theperceptualqualitiesofobjectsandthecorrespondingcapacitiesoftheperceivertoexperiencesuchqualitiesaretied
togetherbymultipledependencies. 25ThisisbecauseforAristotletheperceiveristhegroundforthefullestrealizationof
theperceptiblequalitiesofobjects.Inchapter1weexaminedthefollowingmutualdependencies:(i)theactivationofthe
onecannottakeplacewithouttheactivationoftheother(ii)theiractivationsaretemporallycoextensive26(iii)thereis
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covariationbetweenthemanifestationoftheperceptiblequalityandtheperceiversexperienceofit.Aristotleexpresses
allthesedependenciesbysayingthattheactualityofthetwopowersisone:Theactualityoftheperceptibleandofthe
perceptualexperienceisoneandthesame(DA425b2627,mytranslation). 27
Thetwopowersinvolvedinperceptionareintimatelyengagedwitheachother,astheoneactivatestheother.Yettheyare
essentiallydifferent(onecanevenbephysical,whiletheotherismental).Also,Aristotleisconcernedtoclarifythattheir
interengagementdoesnotdeterminewhatsubjecteachpower(p.95) belongstotheybelongtodifferentsubjects.The
activatedperceptiblequality(e.g.,sounding)isapropertyoftheobject,notoftheperceiverevenifitsactivationtakes
placeintheperceiver. 28Aswewillseeinwhatfollows,thisisaveryimportanttenetinsecuringAristotlesrealiststance
regardingperceptiblequalities.Thus,hewrites:
Norisitnecessarythattheteachershouldlearn,eveniftoactandtobeactedonareoneandthesame,provided
theyarenotthesameinrespectoftheaccountwhichstatestheiressence(asraimentanddress),butarethesame
inthesenseinwhichtheroadfromThebestoAthensandtheroadfromAthenstoThebesarethesame,ashas
beenexplainedabove.
(Phys.202b1014)
,,
<>,,
,.
Similarlyherealso:
Athingiscapableofcausingmotionbecauseitcandothis,itisamoverbecauseitactuallydoesit.Butitisonthe
movablethatitiscapableofacting.Hencethereisasingleactualityofbothalike,justasonetotwoandtwoto
onearethesameinterval,andthesteepascentandthesteepdescentareonefortheseareoneandthesame,
althoughtheirdefinitionsarenotone.Soitiswiththemoverandthemoved.
(Phys.202a1620)
,,,
,(p.96)
,.
Fromthesepassages(andtheanalysisofPhysicsIII3giveninchapter1)welearnthatforAristotlethesamenessof
teachingandlearningdoesnotidentifyteachingwithlearningitdoesnotentailthattheteacherislearning.(Hence
theirsamenessneednotdeterminesamenessofagentseitheri.e.,oftheteacherandthelearner).Similarly,the
samenessofthewaysfromAthenstoThebesandfromThebestoAthensdoesnotentailthatsomeonewhoisontheroad
fromAthenstoThebesisgoingtoAthens.Rather,thesamenessissamenessofsubstratumitisthesameroadthat
constitutesthetwodifferentways,toThebesandtoAthens.Itiscorrespondinglythesameactivitythatconstitutesthe
teachingandlearningthesameactivityis(aninstanceof)teachingbytheteacher,and(aninstanceof)learningbythe
pupil.JustasthetravellersengagedifferentlywiththeroadwhengoingtoThebestothewaytheyengagewithitwhen
goingtoAthens,similarlytheteacherengagesdifferentlywithherlecturethanthepupildoes.Hence,theteacherteaches
andthepupillearns.YetthereisanimportantdifferencebetweenthevariouscasesAristotlepresents(theroadfrom
AthenstoThebes,themagnitudecase,andtheteachingandperceptioncases).Thedifferenceisthattheactivitiesofthe
twopowersengagedinperceptionandinteachingaresimultaneouswhilethisisnotsointheothertwocases.For
instance,onecanwalkfromThebestoAthenswithoutanyonewalkingfromAthenstoThebesbutonecannotseeif
nothingisseen.Thereasonforthedifferenceisthattheothertwocasesshareamaterialsubstratum,whereasinthe
perceptionandtheteachingcasesthetwopowersshareanactivityasasubstratum,wheretheactivityresultsfromthe
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interactionofthepowers.Therefore,theactivitysubstratum,whichrequirestheactivation(p.97) oftheperceptible
andperceivingpowers,existsonlywhenthetwopowersareactivelyengagedwithoneanother,andnototherwise.
Hence,theperceivingandbeingperceivedobtainonlyduringtheirmutualinteraction.Aswehaveseenabove,Aristotle
makesthepointthus:
moment,andsoactualsavorandactualtasting,etc.,whileaspotentialitiesoneofthemmayexistwithoutthe
other.
(DAIII2,426a1519,mytranslation)
,,
,,
ForAristotleitisonlyinthecontext(andfortheduration)ofthecausalinteractionwithaperceptualsystemthatthe
perceptualqualitiesofanobjectssurfacecanberealized.Theperceiversperceptualsystem,thoughexternaltothe
coloredobject,isanecessaryrealizationgroundfortheperceptualqualitiesoftheobject.Tounderstandthisdependence
onexternalconditions,consideracar.Itcanreachitsmaximumspeedonaflatroadsurface.Thecausalinteraction
betweenthecarandtheroadistherealizationgroundforthespeedofthecar.Theflatnessoftheroadis(inthiscase)a
necessaryexternalconditionforthecartorealizeitsspeedpotentialinthecourseofthecausalinteractionbetweencar
androad.Takeafurtheranalogy:thesameblowofthehammerwillbeactualizeddifferentlyifitimpactsonawall,on
water,oronplastic.(p.98) Whatisactualizedisadifferentphysicalphenomenonineachcase(e.g.,adent,asplash,a
bounce).Theactualizedendofthepoweroftheblowisdifferentineachcase,butthisdoesnotmakethepower
different. 29Yet,aperceptualqualityisapropertyoftheexternalobjectsconstitution,despiteitsdependenceonexternal
conditionsforitsrealization.Itisaconstitutivepropertyoftheobject,whoseactualizationisgroundedonacausal
interactionwiththeperceiver.Thedependenceonaperceiverdoesnotrendertheactualityofcolorfulnessofthecolorany
moresubjective,ormental,thantheactualitythecolorattainsbyinteractingwithlight.Usinganexamplefrom
contemporary(orDemocritean)physicaltheory,whensomegasisreleasedintoacubiccontainer,thecubicshapeofthe
volumeofgassupervenesonthelocationoftheindividualgasmoleculesthatareincausalinteractionwiththecontainer.
Thisshapeofthevolumeofgaslastswhilethegasscausalinteractionwiththeexternalconditionspersists.Yet,the
cubicshapeisaconstitutivepropertyofthevolumeofgas.Likewise,theperceptualqualityisaconstitutivepropertyofthe
objectssurface,althoughitisactualizedonthegroundof,andforthedurationof,thecausalinteractionoftheproperties
oftheobjectssurfacewiththevisionsystemoftheperceiver. 30
ThespecificityandexplanatoryvalueoftheinterpretationIamdefendingisfurtherbroughttolightifcontrastedwiththe
alternativebutrelatedinterpretationsdefendedrecentlybyAlanSilverman(1989)andJustinBroackes(1999).Silverman
holdsthatthedependenceoftheperceptiblequalitiesofobjectsonourperceptualsystemsisnotessentialtothe
perceptibles,butrathermerelynecessary,followingfromtheiressence.Hewrites:
[T]
h esensetakingonofthesensibleformiswhatAristotledescribesastheactualizationofdistinctpotentialities
ofthe(p.99) senseandofthesensible:theformofthesensibletakenonisnotidenticalwiththeessenceofthe
sensiblebutitisratheranecessaryaccidentofthatessence(thatis,thesensibleformofredtakenonin
sensationstandstotheessenceofredasbeingreceptiveofgrammarstandstotheessenceofman(Top.102a18
22).(1989:271,myemphasis)31
AsIarguedabove,therearemanycoefficientsthatcomeintotheactualizationofapower,andvariationinanyofthese
coefficientschangestheeffectofthepowerineachcontext.Forinstancethereisvariationevenintheactivationofthe
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transparentlightbyacolor,dependingontheintensityofthelight.Hence,therecanbenoprecisioninthedefinitionof
theessenceofapower,determiningwhatisessentialandwhatisanecessaryaccident.Althoughitisnotexplicitinthe
text,Aristotleisclearlyoperatingwithsomenotionoftheusualconditionsunderwhichtheessenceofapoweris
determined. 32Evidenceforthisisthefactthatheisnotstrictaboutwhathetakestobetheessenceofapower.For
instance,acolorisattimesdefinedasaimingattheactivationofthetransparent(DA418a31b2),andatothertimesas
aimingattheactivationofthesenseorgan(DA424b56).Ithereforedonotthinkwehaveastrictcriterionfor
determiningwhichendisessentialtoapowerandwhichismerelyanecessaryaccidentofit.
BroackeshasadvancedaninterpretationsimilartoSilvermansindistinguishingtheessenceofaperceptiblepowerfrom
itsvisibility.Hewrites:
Colordefinesthenatureofsight,whichinturnallowsustocallittheseeablebutithasamorebasicnaturethan
thatofbeingtheseeable.DeAnimaitselfmarksthepriorityofcolortosight,nearthestartofchapter7:coloris
thecauseofvision,butitisnopartofitsdefinitionthatitbevisible.
(p.100) Broackesdoesnotdescribevisibilityasanecessaryaccidentofcolor(asSilvermandoes),butexplainsitas
beinggroundedontheactivationofthetransparentbythecoloroftheobject:
Sowhatof(o),thesuggestionthatcolorsarepowerstoproduceperception?...HowcanAristotletalkinDA3.2as
iftheactivityofcoloristobeperceived,ifhealsobelievesthatcolorsare,fundamentally,featurescapableoffull
existenceintheabsenceofperceivers?...Supposeweusethepredicateredpforthingswiththepowertoproduce
perceptionsofredwhennormallyviewed,andthepredicateredg forthingswiththeobjectivelycharacterizable
groundofthatpower(e.g.acertaindegreeoftransparency)andsupposewetalksimilarlywithrespecttoother
colorsandcoloringeneral.Colorsparepowers,inactualitypreciselywhenproducingperception.Bycontrast,
colorsg arenotpowers,andthereisnoneedtosaythattheiractualityistobeperceived.Yetthetwoareclosely
connected:somethingwillhaveacolorpiffithasacolorg ,andAristotlecouldeasilyhaveappliedthewordcolor
(or)toboththesethings.Ifsomethinglikethisisright,wewouldhaveaniceexplanationofthevarietyin
Aristotlescharacterizationofcolor.(o)willbeaplausibleaccountofcolorsp,(3)[where(3)isAristotles
explanationoftherelationofthetransparenttocolor:Thecolorofanobjectis(a)theratioofwhitetoblackinit,
oroflighttodarkor,moregenerally,(b)itsdegreeoftransparency(cf.439b810)]aplausibleaccountof
colorsg .(1999,67)
MyresponsetoSilvermansinterpretationappliestoBroackesaswellitisclearthatAristotlemovesfromone
characterizationofcolortotheotherquitereadilyinhiswritings.Ontheotherhand,Broackesusesthisinterpretationto
explaininfurtherdetailthe(p.101) metaphysicalimpactofcoloronthesenseorgan,withwhichIhaveadifficultyto
register:
ThisdistinctionalsohelpsresolveapuzzleinAristotlestalkofactualitiesandpotentialities.Inaccordancewith
thegeneraltheoryofcausation,inperceptionathingwhichisalreadyactuallyfmakesthesenseorgan,which
waspotentiallyf,actuallyf(DA2.5,418a42.11,424a12)DeAnima3.2,however,seemstoimplythatthe
senseobjectisinactivityonlywhileitisbeingperceived...Anattractivesolutionisnowavailable:theroseis
actuallyredg beforeaffectingtheeye...yetit[therose]countsasactuallyredponlyafteraffectingtheeye(inthat
onlythenisitspowertolookredinactivity).Whenthetheoryofcausationdemandsthatactualrednessbe
propagatedthoughthemediumandtotheeye,thiscanonlyberednessg :onecouldhardlydemandthe
propagationofrednesspinactivitywithoutsecuringthateveryeyethatsawredwassomehowitselfseentobered.
(1999,678)
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WhereasBroackesholdsthatgenerallycolorsg arenotpowers,hedescribestherosesredg asifitwasapower.Ibelieve

thisproblemstemsfromthefactthatBroackesimplicitlyattributestwopropertiestoaredobject:redg andredp.Theresult
isthatheisforcedtomakeredg thecolorthatgivesrisetotheperceptionofredhetalksoftheformofredg aspropagated
throughthemediumandtotheeye(1999,68),sincetheeyeisnotredpbeforeperceptionoccurs,soastotransmitredps
form.Thismove,however,raisestwoproblemsforBroackesreadingittreatsredg asapower,whichBroackesdoesnot
wanttodoanditpresentsredg asboththecauseofredpandasthegroundofredg andredp.AlthoughIagreewith
BroackesthatAristotlespositioninDeAnimaIII.2isthatrednesspisinactivityonlywhileitisbeingperceived,I
disagreewiththeimplicationthat(p.102) therearetwopropertiesinvolved,redg andredp.OnmyreadingofAristotle,
redg andredparesimplythesamepower.ThisinterpretationissupportedbywhatAristotlewritesintheDeAnima:
Theearlierstudentsofnatureweremistakenintheirviewthatwithoutsighttherewasnowhiteorblack,without
tasteorsavor.Thisstatementoftheirsispartlytrue,partlyfalse:senseandthesensibleobjectareambiguous
terms(i.e.,maydenoteeitherpotentialitiesoractualities):thestatementistrueofthelatter,falseoftheformer.
(DA426a2025)
,,
.,
,,,
.
AsIunderstandAristotlespositionisthat,werenoperceivertoseeit,arosewouldnotbeactivelyred(asitisactivelyred
whenweseeit),buttheroseisinfactpotentiallyredindependentlyofbeingseen.ForAristotlethecolor,say,thatan
objectachieveswhilebeingperceivedisahighdegreeofactivationoftheobjectscolor,ratherthanamere
representationoftheobjectascolored.Moregenerally,forAristotleperceptiblequalitiesareintheworldsuchaswe
perceivethem,butonlywhileweperceivethem,becausetheyrequireaperceiverinordertoreachtheirfullest
actualization.AshorthandwaytocharacterizeAristotlespositionisassubtleperceptualrealism.(Thepointofcontrast
withrobustrealismliesinthefactthattheperceptiblequalitiesarenotfullyactivatedatalltimes,butonlywhen
perceivedbytheperceiver).IwillreturntoafullerdiscussionofAristotlessubtleperceptualrealisminchapter3.
(p.103) 2.5AlternativeInterpretationsofDeAnimaIII2
MyinterpretationofAristotlescausalpowerstheoryofperceptionhasdrawnsupportespeciallyfromDeAnimaIII2,
whichisapivotaltextforunderstandingAristotlestheoryofperception.Itisalsoatextthat,notsurprisingly,has
exercisedanddividedthecommentatorssinceantiquity.Inwhatfollows,Iwilldiscussthreealternativeviewsofhow
thepassagehasbeenunderstood,anddiscussthedifficultiesraisedbyeach.Thiswilllend,albeitindirectly,additional
supporttotheviewIhavebeendefendingintheprevioussectionsofthischapter.ThethreeviewsIwillexaminearethose
ofAryehKosman(1975),ThomasJohansen(1998),andVictorCaston(2002). 33Iwillfocusontheirproposed
interpretationofthealreadyquotedcentralclaiminDeAnimaIII2:
thesame(DA425b2627,mytranslation).
Kosmanskeyideaisthatinperceptionanumericallyoneeventoccurs:anactivitythatisatoncetherealization(an
actingoutsee1975,506)ofboththenatureoftheperceivedpropertyandthenatureoftheperceptualexperience.
However,animportantdifficultyforthislineofinterpretationisthatAristotletreatsactivitiesasbelongingtosubstances,
ratherthanasentitiesintheirownrightthus,howcanoneactivitycharacterizeboththesubjectofexperienceandthe
objectintheworld?Woulditbeamentaloraphysicalactivity?Kosmaniselusiveincallingithearing/sounding(sic
1975,514).Whatdoestheslashsignsignify?Isitsupposedtobeexplanatory?Inwhichway?Bywayofclarifyinghis
interpretation,Kosmanillustratesitwiththediagrambelow(reproducedfrom1975,514):
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(p.104)
Yet,evenwhenvisuallyrepresentedasabove,the
accountthatKosmanproposesnomorethanstatesthe
problemratherthansolvingit.Howcantheactualityof
themental(theperceptualexperience)andtheactuality
ofthephysical(theobjectsperceptiblequality)beone
thing?Kosmanaddsthat,
Figure2.1
Whatitistoseeisnotthesameaswhatitistobeseen,
butwhenseeingandbeingseentakeplace,thereisonly
oneeventwhichoccurs.Eyesandobjectsthusexhibit
firstactualitieswhoserealizationinsecondactualityisoneandthesamething(comparetheabilityofthebuilder
tobuildandofthebrickstobebuiltintoahouse,ortherespectivepowersoflearnerandteacher).Thisrealization
istheactivityofsensing,beingsenseditself,inwhichthesenseisactingoutitsnaturequasensitive,andthe
sensedobjectisactingoutitsnaturequasensible...Onthesubjectivesideistheearandits(powerof)hearing,
andcorrespondingtothemontheobjectiveside,thebellandits(unheard)soundingbothhearingandsounding
arerealizedinthesamesecondactualitywhichisoneandthesameactualhearing/sounding.
FromthispassageweseethatKosmansinterpretationleavesunexplainedthemetaphysicalrelationthatwhatitisto
seeandwhatit(p.105) istobeseenbeartothesingleeventthatoccurswhentheyoccur.Yetthisisthemain
metaphysicalinnovationinAristotlesaccountofperception,andthemainchallengeforhisinterpreters.Withoutan
explanationofthis,wehavenounderstandingofhowperceptiontakesplace.InadditionKosmanshiftsbetween
soundingandbeingheard,andcoloringandbeingseenasiftheyweretwopairsofsynonymousexpressions.Thisis
evidentinthefollowingparagraph,forexample,whereKosmansfirstexampleinvolvesseeingandbeingseenandthe
secondhearingandsounding,insteadofbeingheard:
Whatitistoseeisnotthesameaswhatitistobeseen,butwhenseeingandbeingseentakeplace,thereisonly
oneeventwhichoccurs...[B]
othhearingandsoundingarerealizedinthesamesecondactualitywhichisoneand
thesameactualhearing/sounding.
(1975,5134)
Kosmanmovesfreelyfromidentifyingthesecondactualitywiththesoundsbeingheardtoidentifyingitwithits
sounding.Andyet,onKosmansaccountthebellissoundingevenwhenitisnotbeingheard.So,howcanheswitch
fromsoundingtobeingheardasiftheywereinterchangeableexpressions?Finally,theclaimthatsoundingmight
occurwithoutbeingheardraisesthequestionofwhatAristotlethinksiscoinstantiatedwiththehearingofthesound.
Simplysayingthattheonesoundingisandtheotherisnothearddoesnothelpusunderstandtheirontological
difference.
IturnnexttoJohansensaccount.Johansenexplainstherelationoftheactualitiesoftheperceivingexperienceandthe
perceptiblequalityonthemodelofthepotentialityofthehottoheatup...[being]actualizedtogetherwiththepotentiality
ofthecoldtobeheatedup(1998,266,myemphasis).Beingactualizedtogetherhoweverdoesnotexplainthe
metaphysicalonenessofthe(p.106) perceptiblequalityandtheperceptionofitJohansenaddsmorecontenttohis
interpretationbyfurtherexplainingtheironenessintermsofcolocation(presumably,intherelevantsenseorganofthe
perceiver),thus:
Theactualityofthesenseobjectandtheactualityofthesensefacultyareoneandthesamebecausetheyhappen
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inthesameplace.
Yet,onewouldwanttolearnmorefromJohansenabouthowcolocationjustifiesonenessofactualities,asmanythings
maybecolocatedbutnotcausallyrelatedorontologicallydependentorcoexistentintime,etc.Inotherwords,the
relationofcolocationismetaphysicallytooloosetoaccountforthevariousdependenciesthattieperceptiblequalities
andperceptualexperiencestogether(seeabovesections2.3and2.4).Additionally,coincidenceinspacecannotjustify
coincidenceintime,asJohansenseemstoassumesoifwetookJohansenslineofinterpretationwewouldcommit
Aristotletoanonsequitur.Johansenreturnstotheexplanationoftheonenessoftheactualitiesoftheperceptible
qualitiesandtheircorrespondingperceptualexperienceswithwhatseemstobeadifferentapproach:
Butifyouareinterestedinhowitisthattheactualityofsoundingcanbesaidtocoincidewiththeactualityof
hearingwhilstalsocausingtheactualityofhearing,thenhereisyouranswer:soundisanactivepotentialityto
causehearing.Thereasonwhytheactualityofsoundingcoincideswiththeactualityofhearingisthathearingis
thepassivepotentialitycorrespondingwiththesoundsactivepotentiality.Thatisjustlikethewayinwhichthe
potentialityofthehottoheatupisactualizedtogetherwiththepotentialityofthecoldtobeheatedup.(p.107)
Thereisnothingspecialgoingoninperceptionhere.
Notethattheclaimthat[t]
h eactualityofthesenseobjectandtheactualityofthesensefacultyareoneandthesame
(1998,254)differscruciallyfromtheclaimthattheactualityofsoundingcanbesaidtocoincidewiththeactualityof
hearing(1998,266).Beingoneandthesameisnotthesameascoinciding.Perhapsthisslideisunintentionalanddue
toanattempttoaccommodatebothAristotlesclaimofonenessandthestrengthofonesgeneralintuitionsaboutthe
differencebetweensensiblepropertyandperceptualexperience.Alternatively,Johansenmightpositivelymeanto
interpretbeingoneandthesameasbeingcoincident.Butifthelatteriswhatheproposes,therearereasonsnotto
endorseit.IntherelevantpassageoftheDeAnimaAristotleassertstheonenessoftheactualities,andthenproceedsto
maketheironenessdoexplanatoryworkfortheircoincidenceintime.Aristotlewrites:Theactualityoftheperceptible
andoftheperceptualexperienceisoneandthesame,althoughtheirbeingisnotthesame(DA425b2627),andthen
proceedstoarguethat,
moment,andsoactualsavorandactualtasting.
(DA426a1518)
Additionally,aswehaveseenintheabovequotation,onJohansensinterpretationthereisnothingmetaphysically
specialcharacterizingthecaseofhearingandsounding,orperceptioningeneral.Indeed,Johansensuggeststhatthe
caseofhearingandsoundingismetaphysicallyonaparwiththecaseofxactivelyheatingupyandy(p.108)
beingheatedupbyx.Hetakesthetwoschemasbelow
(reproducedfromhis1998book,page264)torepresentthe
samemetaphysics.
Johansencommentsontheschemathus:
HerethearrowfromHotstovetoColdwater(1)
representstheactionofthehotonthecold.Thearrow
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fromColdwatertoHotwater(2)representsthechange
thatthewaterundergoesfromhottocold.
(1998,2645myemphasis)
Letusfocusonthemetaphysicalrelationofheatingupto
beingheated.Arethesethesameactivityordifferent?
Johansenwouldneedthemtobethesameactivityifheisto
usethemtoexplain,throughtheactiveandthepassive,the
onenessoftheactualityofthesensibleandthesensitive.If
schemas(A)and(B)aboverepresentedthesame
metaphysics,Johansenwouldbesayingthattheactualities
ofthesensibleobjectandofthesensitivefacultyareone
actualityastheactiveandthepassiveformsofthesame
action.Butthiscannotberight,aswehavealsoseenin
examiningKosmansviews.
Figure2.2
Mymoregeneralconcerniswiththebreadthofontologicalimplicationsoftheactivepassiverelation.Ontheonehand,
theactiveandthepassivecouldbedescribingaCambridgechange.Forinstance,Icanthinkofmydeceasedgrandfather
whowilltherebybethoughtofbyme,withoutchanging.Butontheotherhand,the(p.109)
activeandpassivecanbeusedtodescribearealchange,as
thatofateacherteachingandthepupillearning,as
AristotledoesinPhysicsIII3. 34Herewhattheteacheris
doingdiffersfromwhatthepupilissuffering.Aristotleis
emphaticthatiftheteachingwasactingontheteacher
(ratherthanonthepupil)theteacherwouldbelearning,
whichhethoughtabsurd.HenceAristotledoesnotconsider
teachingthesameaslearning,butthinksthattheteacher
doesonethingandthelearneranother.Soexplainingthat
theactualityofthesensesandwhatissensedarethesame
astheactiveandthepassiveformsofoneandthesame
activityleavestheproblemunanswered,becausetheactive
passivedoesnotalwaysdescribeasingleactivitythereisa
variationintherangeoftheactivepassivewithrespectto
Cambridgeorrealchange,andconsequently,variationwith
respecttotheonenessoftheactiveandpassiveactivities.
Figure2.3
ConcludingouroverviewofinterpretationswithCastonsposition,heexplainsthemetaphysicsofhearingandsounding
withthemodelofarticulatedstructure(2002,777)which,heargues,Aristotleusesforaccountinghowweperceivethat
weperceive. 35ForCaston,perceivingthatweperceiveisanexampleofarticulatedstructure,whereasingletokenmental
stateinstantiatesdifferentcontenttypes.Hedescribeshismodelthus:(p.110)
Thereisahigherordercontentperceivingthatweperceiveaswellasthefirstordercontentoftheoriginal
perception.Butthisisindependentofhowmanytokenmentalstatesareinvolved...[Aristotle]believesthatno
othertokenstateisrequiredtomaketheoriginalstateconscious.Theoriginalstateinstantiatesbothlowerand
higherordercontents.
(2002,777)36
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Castonextendshismetaphysicalmodelfromthecaseofperceivingandperceivingthatweperceivetothecaseofhearing
andsoundinginDAIII2hisexampleisseeingazureandlookingazure:
AccordingtoAristotle,thereisasingletokeneventthatisbothanactivityofazureandanactivityofsightit
instantiatesbothtypesofactivity.
(2002,785)
WhileIshareCastonsapproachtothetextsinquestion,Castonseemstoassumetheonenessoftheobjectsandthe
perceiversactivities,andfromthishederivestheclaimthatthetwoareintheperceiver(hedoesnotexplaininwhich
senseofin)andthattheyhavecoextensivelifespans.Hewrites:
Theobjectsactivity,incontrast,isthesameastheperceptionoftheobjectandsoispresentintheperceiver(
,426a911),comingintobeingandperishingatthesametimeastheperception(
,426a1526).
(2002,783)
Iarguedintwojournalpublications(2006)and(2007)foradifferentdirectionofexplanation:inmyinterpretation,itis
becausethetwoactivities,whicharenotidentical,haveacommongroundofrealization,whichhappenstobeinthe
perceiver,thattheyare(p.111) boundbymutualdependences(includingcoextensionintime).Thebestwayofpointing
outthedifferencebetweenCastonsandmyreadingsoftheontologyofperceivingandbeingperceivedisthefollowing.
Castontakesperceivingandbeingperceivedtobeasinglestateoreventthatinstantiatestwotypes,whereasIseeitasa
singleactivitythatconsistsoftwotypesinthewaythatanasymmetricrelationconsistsoftwotypes,whichqualifyits
relata(e.g.,theasymmetricrelationbeingshorterthanqualifiesonerelatumastallerandtheotherasshorter).
ConcludingRemarks
InthischapterweexaminedthefoundationsofAristotlestheoryofperception,withparticularreferencetokeytextssuch
asDeAnimaIII2.Thechapterintroducedthefivespecialsensesanaccountofhowthesenseorgansarecausally
impacteduponbytheperceptiblepropertiesandtheonetoonecorrespondenceprincipleholdingbetweenthetypeofan
instantiatedperceptiblequality,thetypeofthecorrespondingalterationofthesenseorgan,andtypeofthecontentofthe
resultingperceptualexperience.Additionally,thischapterpresentedtheargumentsthatmotivateAristotletopositthat
theperceptiblequalitiesofobjectsarerealpropertiesoftheirs.Thenextchapterwillinvestigatetheuniquetypeofrealism
Aristotleiscommittedtoinperception.
Appendix:HowDotheSensesTakeOnPerceptibleQualities?
WhenAristotlewritesthatwhatcanperceiveispotentiallysuchastheobjectofsenseisactually(DAII5,418a34),he
seems(p.112) tocommithimselftotheclaimthatasenseorganinonewayoranotherbecomeslikeitsobjectwhenit
perceivesit.Howarewetounderstandthislikeness?Theissuehasdividedcommentatorsitwillbehelpfultolayoutthe
mainviewsunderdiscussion.Suchviewsarealternativewaysofthinkingoftheinteractionbetweentheobjectof
perceptionandthesenseorgansoftheperceiverwhichIexplainedinthischapterasamutualactivationofcausal
powers.Theywillalsoberelevanttothediscussionoftheroleofthemediuminperception,whichIaddressinchapter3.
Atoppositeendsofthespectrumtherearetwowellknowninterpretations.Accordingtooneofthem,Aristotlebelieves
thatpsychologicalchangesarealwaysgroundedinunderlyingphysicalchanges,includingperception.Accordingtothe
other,perceivingisnotgroundedinanythingfurther,butinsteadconstitutesabasicformofanimalinteractionwiththe
world. 37Ontheformerapproach,whichhasbecomeknownintheliteratureastheliteralistreading,whatittakesfora
persontoperceiveisforhertocometoexemplifytheperceptiblequalitiesthatcausallyimpactonhersenseorgans.So,
forexample,onthisapproachapersonperceivesrednesswhenshehasaneyemadeofsuitablygelatinousstuffsuchthat
whenitisexposedtoacolorinitsenvironmentitbecomes,invirtueofthisexposure,itselfred.Soonthisinterpretation,
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likenessbetweenthesenseorganandtheobjectofperceptionissharedpropertyexemplification. 38Thesenseorgan
undergoesarealchangeinperception.Sorabji(1974)wasthefirstcontemporaryproponentofthisapproach 39a
representativequotationfromhisworkfollows:
Theorganiscoloredduringtheperceptualprocess(425b2225)...Thiscolorationisaphysiologicalprocess,
whichcouldinprinciple,evenifnotinpractice,beseenbyotherobservers,usingordinarysenseperception...Four
passages[scilicetDA(p.113) 424a710425b2224427a89435a2224]suggestaliteraltakingonof
color...Oneadvantageofassumingaliteraltakingonofcoloristhatthisexplainshowshapesandsizescanbe
receivedintheorgan.Thecoloredpatchesintheeyejellyhaveshapesand(smallscale)size.
Bycontrast,othersunderstandAristotleasclaimingthatnophysiologicalormaterialchangetakesplaceduring
perceptionperceptionispurelyaspiritualchange(touseThomasAquinasexpressiontorefertothisview).Whatdoes
itmeantosaythatthesenseorgansundergoaspiritualchangeinperception?ThisinterpretationassumesthatAristotle
didnotconceiveofbiologicalmatterasbeinginanimate,contrarytohowweconceiveofit,followingonthesharp
Cartesiandivisionbetweenmaterialsubstanceandmentalsubstance.Rather,forAristotleperceptualpowers,aswellas
othermentalpowers,areprimitivepropertiesofbiologicalmatter.Perceptualpowersareasprimitiveastheweightorthe
warmthofbiologicalmatter. 40Thus,inperceptiontheseprimitivepowersoftheanimatebiologicalmatterthatmakesup
thesenseorganaresimplyactivated.AmongtheGreekcommentatorsoflateantiquity,Philoponushadalreadycastdoubt
ontheliteralistinterpretations(inDA303.3).NonliteralistinterpretationsextendatleastasfarbackasBrentano
(1867),whohadbeeninspiredbythestillearlierapproachofAquinas.IncontemporarytimesBurnyeathasbeenthe
mostadeptdefenderofthespiritualistapproach. 41Thefollowingquotationsarerepresentativeofhisview:
ThephysicalmaterialofwhichAristoteliansenseorgansaremadedoesnotneedtoundergoanyordinary
physicalchangetobecomeawareofacolororasmell.Onemightsaythatthephysicalmaterialofanimalbodies
inAristotlesworldisalreadypregnantwithconsciousness,needingonlytobeawakenedtored(p.114) or
warmth...WhatproducestheperceptionofredorofmiddleCisnotlightstrikingtheretinaorthemovementofair
strikingtheearitisredandmiddleC.Allofwhichisfurthergroundsforthinkingthattheunordinarychange
producedbythisunordinaryagency,thetakingonofsensibleform,isnotredinyoureyeormiddleCinyourear,
inthesensethattheSorabjireadingrequires,butsimplyawarenessofredandmiddleC.
Weareforcedtoconcludethattheorgansbecomingliketheobjectisnotitsliterallyandphysiologicallybecoming
hardorwarmbutanoticingorbecomingawareofhardnessorwarmth.Allthesephysicalseemingdescriptions
theorgansbecomingliketheobject,itsbeingaffected,actedon,oralteredbysensiblequalities,itstakingon
sensibleformwithoutthematterallthesearereferringtowhatAquinascallsaspiritualchange,abecoming
awareofsomesensiblequalityintheenvironment.
(1992,21,myemphasis)42
Theadvantagesanddisadvantagesofthetwoapproacheshavebeendiscussedingreatdepthintheliteratureseefor
exampleShields(2007,29398),andCaston(2004,265300).Inviewofthedifficultiesthatbothlinesofinterpretation
havebeenshowntoface,inmorerecentyearsAristotelianscholarshavebeenworkingondevelopingalternatives.Iwill
hereconsiderthreerepresentativeones,inorderofpublication:theencodingmodel,inScaltsas(1996)thesame
proportionsmodel,Caston(2004)andthesamestructuremodel,inShields(2007).
Scaltsas(1996)arguesthatAristotletakeseachsenseorgantohaveaphysiologythatallowsittobeamean,andreceive
stimuliwhichdonotphysicallychangetheorgan,butareinsomewayregisteredintheorgansform.Anaturalmodel
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forsuchasenseorganwouldbethechordofalyre.ScaltsaspointsustoAristotlesviewthattohavethecapacityto
perceive,istohaveamean(p.115) []...[or]afirstprinciple[]ofakindsuchastoreceivetheformsof
objectsofperception(DA424bl2,mytranslation).Onthebasisofthisdefinition,Scaltsasarguesthat,
[Aristotle]doesnotexplainwhatitistoreceiveaformintheprincipleofthesenseorgan,buthedoesthenextbest
thing,viz.,hegivesanexampleofsomethingwithaprincipleandamean.Theexampleisthatofalyre,inwhich
thetensionofthechordssecurestheirconsonance(
)andcorrectpitch(
, 424a3132).This
examplegivesusarudimentarymodelofwhatAristotlehasinmindwhentalkingofasenseorganhavinga
principle.Wecanthinkofthesenseorganasalyrewhosechordsaretunedinaccordancewithaprincipleof
consonanceandcorrectpitch.Thelyremodelwillprovideawayofunderstandingwhatitistoreceivetheformin
theprincipleratherthaninthematter.Whatthelyremodelprovidesisthepossibilityofexplainingthatmore
thanphysicalchangeoccursinperception.Strikingthestringsofalyredoesproduceaphysicalchange,namely,
themovementofthestrings,butthatisnotallthatoccurs.Whatmore,orwhatelse,occursdependsonthe
relationbetweenthemovementofthestringsandtheconcordantchord...[T]
h eharmonioussoundthatis
produced...resultsfromtheconsonanceandpitchofthestrings.
ThisisthelineofinterpretationIfollowwithrespecttotheactivationofthesenseorganinperception.Thedisturbance
causedbyaperceptiblequalityinthesenseorgandoesnotbringabouta(persisting)changeinthesenseorgan.Rather,
thesenseorgan,whichhasitsownform,registersthedisturbancebroughtaboutbytheperceptiblequalitybyablending
interactionbetweenitsownformandthedisturbancesuffered.Wecanthinkofthisblendingofformsbyelaboratingthe
exampleabove.Consideratunedlyre,andasoprano(p.116) singinganaria.Thevibrationscausedbytheariawill
resoundinthechordsofthelyre.Thisreverberationisablendoftheformoftheariaandtheformoftheattunedchordsof
thelyre.Suchablendofforms,oneencodedinthedisturbancederivingfromtheperceptible,andtheotherofthesense
organ,constitutestheexperiencebytheperceiveroftheperceptible.(Aswewillseeinthefollowingchapters,theprocess
isinfactsomewhatmorecomplex,insofarastheformofthecommonsenseisalsoinvolvedintheperceptualexperience,
butthisonlyaddscomplexitywithoutchangingthephenomenon.)
AdifferentlineofinterpretationisofferedbyCaston(2004),whoarguesthatwhathappensinperceptionis
transduction,thatisconversionofqualitativeproportionsfromonetypeofmattertoanother.Hewrites:
Perceptiblequalitiesarethusdefinedasproportionsofaspecificpairofcontraryqualitiesalongthesamerange.
Sowhilecrimsonandspicymightsharethesamenumericproportion,theywillstillbeproportionsofdifferent
contraries:oneisaproportionofwhiteandblack,theotheraproportionofsweetandbitter...somethingmight
takeontheproportionsofagivenperceptiblequality,suchascrimson...butindifferentcontraries,andsoitneed
notproduceareplicaoftheperceptiblequality...thereisaclearandprecisesenseinwhichtheorganbecomeslike
theobjectandhasitsformwithinit,withoutreceivingthematterandhencewithoutproducingareplica...The
organtakesonthedefiningratiooftheperceptiblequality,withoutexemplifyingitinthesamecontraries...
(2004,314,myemphasis)...Theresultingstatesoftheorgan...concretelyembodytheproportionsofthequalities
oftheobjectintheirowncontraries.(2004:315,myemphasis)...Thatisjustwhatitisforaformtobereceived
withoutthematter:informationabouttheobjectistransmittedbypreserving(p.117) onlycertainaspectsofits
form,thuseffectingatransduction.(2004,316)43
Castonoffersadetailedinterpretationofthetranslationoftheformoftheperceptibleintothelanguageoftheformof
thesenseorgan,intermsoftheproportionofthecontrariesintheforms.Thismaywellhavebeenthemechanismin
termsofwhichAristotleconceivedofthereceptionoftheformoftheperceptiblebytheformofthesenseorgan.Although
inprinciplethisiscompatiblewiththepositionIhaveadoptedabove,itisamorespecificconceptionofthereceptionof
theformthantheoneIgaveconversely,myownallowsformorediversityandcomplexityinthetypeofreceptionofthe
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form.Forbrevityofcomparison,thedifferencebetweenhisaccountandminecanbesummarizedthus:ontheonehand,
onecanthinkofthereceptionoftheformoftheperceptiblealongthelinesofthetransductionoftheproportionof
oppositesinitintothesameproportionofoppositesinformofthesenseorganontheother,onecanthinkofthe
receptionoftheformasbeingmorecomplex(e.g.,aswhenvoiceresonanceisproducedinthereverberatingchordsofa
lyre)whichresonance,neednotbeexplainableintermsofsamenessofproportionsofoppositesinthevoiceandthe
chords.
Finally,Shields(2007)tooanalyzesthesenseorgansreceptionofperceptiblequalitiesintermsofproportionsof
opposites,focusingonthefollowingdescriptionbyAristotleofthereceptionprocess:thesenseisaffectedbywhatis
coloredorflavoredorsoundingnotinsofaraseachiswhatitis,butinsofarasitisofsuchandsuchasortandaccording
toitsform(DA424a2224).ShieldsexplainsAristotlesclaimthus:
Theideaherecorrespondstothewayinwhichanewsynagogue,ascalemodelusedforfundraisingbeforethe
(p.118) templewasbuilt,andatwodimensionalblueprintareisomorphic.Althoughneitherablueprintnora
modelisitselfa(nonhomonymous)synagogue,eachisisomorphicwiththeother.Importantly,theblueprint
representsthebuildingthoughitisinatwodimensionalmedium.Inthiswayofthinkingofperception,the
perceivercomestoperceivetheobjectnotbyrealizingthesensiblequality,butbycomingtobeinastate
representingit,bymanifestinganisomorphismcausedtooccurbytheobjectperceived.Thus,theeyesdonot
becomecrimsonwhenaperceiverviewsaMr.Lincolnhybridtearosenordotheearsbecomesomehow
cacophonouswhenlisteningtoShostakovichsballetTheAgeofGold.Rather,onecomestosharethestructureof
theseobjects,withoutexemplifyingthem.
Heretoothecorrespondenceistakentobeanisomorphism,althoughnotexplicitlyoftheproportionoftheopposites.In
myowninterpretation,thereceptionoftheformofaperceptiblebytheformofthesenseorganisproportionate,without
necessarilybeingisomorphic.
Notes
Notes:
(1).Inaddition,anappropriatemediumisrequired.Thenatureandtheroleofthemediumarediscussedinchapter3.
(2).Seee.g.DA418a36andDA424al2.
(3).FormyowninterpretationofAristotlesviewsonthematterformrelationship,seeMarmodoro(2013)Aristotles
hylomorphismwithoutreconditioning,PhilosophicalInquiry,Volume37,Issue1/2,2013
(4).Asthefacultyofperceptioniscommonbetweenhumansandanimals,Aristotledevelopsanaccountofcomplex
perceptualcontentsuchthatitscomplexityisnottheresultoftheinterventionofahigherintellectualfaculty(which
animalsdontpossess).Animalswillnothaveallthetypesofcomplexcontentthathumanshave,buttheymustbeable
to,forexample,chooseonaparticularoccasiononefruitratherthananotherbecauseofwhattheysmell,ortolookfor
foodbecausetheysmellit.
(5).ThisconceptionofperceptiblepropertiesasrealcausalpowerscommitsAristotletoaveryinterestingtypeof
perceptualrealism,whichwillbeinvestigatedinchapter3.
(6).Forwhichthingscount,forAristotle,asperceptibleobjects,seethissection,below.Forwhatbeingcausallyacted
uponconsistsin,seesection2.4ofthischapter.
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(7).Johansen(1998)arguesthatthetopdownaccountinPhysicsII9oftherelationshipbetweenformandmatter
underliesAristotlesaccountofthesenseorgans.Ifthesenseorgansaretoprovidethenecessarymatterforthe
realizationoftheformsandendsofthesenses,thenwecanonlyunderstandwhythesenseorgansarecomposedinthe
waytheyarefromthepointofviewofthedefinitionsoftheirformsandends(1998,40).Johansenoffersforeach
facultyofperceptionadetailedaccountofhowthematerialfeaturesofasenseorgancanbeseenasnecessaryoruseful
forthefundamentalfunctionofthesenseorgans,whichistohelpusperceive.(1998,24)Forexample,inthecaseof
sight,westartoutbyconsideringsightfromthepointofviewofitshighestactuality.Thisistheendorfunctionofsight.
Thehighestactualityofsight,actualseeing(),istobechangedbycolorsoastobecomeactuallylikeit.Thisis
whatAristotlecallsthesecondactualityofsight.Sight()itselfisanability,thefirstactuality,tobesochanged.This
abilityrequirestransparency,buttransparencyisrealizedonlyincertainsortsofbody,water,orair(1998,36)
(8).ThisargumentalsorevealsAristotlesrealismaboutperceptibleformssuchascolors,odors,tastes,etc.,whose
identityisusedasthecriterionfortheidentificationoftheirrespectivesenses.Seealsochapter3.Onadifferentissue,itis
importanttonotethatAristotlesindividuationofsensesintermsofthespecialsensiblesisnotunproblematic,althoughI
willnotdwellonthistopichere.Asanexampleofthistypeofproblem,hereisJohnstonesdiscussionofthedifficulties
relatedtoflavorandodor:
Thesestrikingsimilaritiesandconnectionsbetweenflavorandodorthreatentocreateaseriousdifficultyfor
Aristotlestheoryofsmell.Thisisbecauseifbothodorandflavorresultfromtheactionoftheflavoreddryonthe
moist,itquicklybecomesunclearwhattheultimatedifferencebetweenodorandflavorissupposedtobe....The
answertotheproblem...isthatonAristotlesaccounttaste,unlikesmell,involvesamixtureoftheflavoreddryin
themoist...Inthecaseofdistancesensessuchassmellbycontrast,thesenseobjectdoesnottraveluptothe
senseorgan,butratheroperatesatadistancethroughamedium....SohowdoestheflavoreddrythingIsmellata
distanceinteractwiththemoistinterveningmediumofairorwater,ifnotbymixingwithit?Theanswer...isthatit
doessobydryingit,tosomeextentandpresumablyinsomehighlydeterminateway.
(2012,1669)
(9).Forexamplein422a1011Aristotlewrites:Thebodyinwhichtheflavorresides,theobjectoftaste,isinmoisture
asitsmatter(,,)(mytranslation).ButinotherpassagesAristotle
talksoftheperceptiblequalityitselfastheobjectofsense(e.g.,inDA424b56):Iftheobjectofsmellissmell,then
smellmustproduce,ifanything,smelling.
(10).Aristotleassumesitisacausalinteractionbutdoesnotgiveargumentsforit.Seethediscussionofalternative
interpretationsoftheresultingalterationofthesenseorganintheappendixtothischapter.
(11).ThisandtheabovequotationfromtheDeAnimawillbediscussedinchapter4.
(12).Isthefactthatthisdescriptionoftheprinciplelendsitselftoageneralphysicalinterpretationevidencefora
literalistreadingofAristotlestheoryofperception(seeAppendix)?IsubmititisntasweseefromtheAppendixevenif
thesenseorgandoesnotsufferaliteralphysicalchangeinperceiving,neverthelessitissubjecttoadisturbance(an
activationofitsperceptualpower),towhichtheprincipleaboveapplies.
(13).TheemphasisinthetextsIquotedisonsimultaneousperceptionofmultipleperceptiblequalitiesbuttheoneto
onecorrespondenceprincipleraisesdifficultiesmoregenerallyforcomplexperceptualcontentandalltheperceptual
activitiesthatpresupposeit,ofwhichsimultaneousperceptionisonlyoneamongmany,asIwillelucidateinchapter4,
inparticularinsection4.1.
(14).Seee.g.DA418a36:Thesentientsubjectispotentiallysuchastheobjectofsenseisactually.Duringtheprocess
ofbeingactedupon[bytheobjectofsense]itisunlikeit,butbytheendoftheprocessithasbeenmadeliketheobjectand
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islikeit.SeealsoDA431b28ff,andDA429a1318:Ifthinkingislikeperceiving,itshouldconsistinbeingactedupon
bywhatisthoughtaboutorinsomethingelseofthiskind.Soitmustbeimpassive,andreceptiveoftheform,and
potentiallyofthesametypebutnotidenticalwithit,andrelatedtotheobjectsofthoughtasthefacultyofsenseisto
sensibleobjects.ThemeaningofbecominglikeinthiscontextisdiscussedinthechaptersAppendix.Someofthe
assumptionsofAristotlestheoryofperceptionherementionedwillbefurtherdiscussedinrelationtotheMixedContents
Modelinchapter6.
(15).FortheinfallibilityofspecialperceptionseealsoDA3.6.430a26b3and3.8.432a1112cf.withCat2.1a1619and
4.2a410andDeInt10.19b1112.Seealsochapter3.
(16).AnargumentcanbeofferedonAristotlesbehalffortheinfallibilityofthespecialsenseswithrespecttothe
identificationofwhichparticularsensible(e.g.redorcrimson)oneisperceiving,groundedinthemetaphysicsof
Aristotlesaccountofcausation.Briefly,theperceptionofthespecialsensiblesistheprocessthatalsoactualizesthemfor
example,thecolorofanobjectisactualizedinbeingperceivedtheactualizedcolorisnottheperceptualexperienceofthe
agent,butitiscorrelativetoitanddependentonitinthewaythatwhatistaughtiscorrelativetoanddependsforits
realizationonwhatthestudentlearns,butisnotthelearning(seePhysicsIII3).Seechapters1and3andmyItsa
ColorfulWorld,AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly,2006,pp.7180.
(17).DoesAristotlesaccountofcausalpowersworkforallthefivesenses?HeillustrateshiskeypointinDAIII2with
theexampleofhearing,whichheprobablychoosesbecausetherehappenstobeaspecificwordinGreekformakinga
soundthatisactuallyheard(
, sounding)butthereisnosuchspecificwordinthecaseofcolororflavor(ashe
notesat426a1315).TherearegoodtextualreasonstobelievethatAristotlethoughtthathiscausalmodeldevelopedin
PhysicsIII3andDAIII2appliedtoallperceptualpropertiesandthecorrespondingperceptualfaculties.Hesaysso
explicitly:Thesameaccountappliesalsototheotherperceptualexperiencesandperceptibles(DAIII2,426a89).Itis
farfromobviousthattheaccountcanbegeneralized,ascertainsolutionsthatcanbeemployedinthecaseofcolorsand
soundsdonotautomaticallytransfer,forinstance,toodors.ThisproblemhasnotbeendiscussedintheAristotelian
literature.
(18).Cat.7b368a12:Forthedestructionoftheperceptiblecarriesperceptiontodestruction,butperceptiondoesnot
carrytheperceptibletodestruction.Forperceptionsaretodowithbodyandinbody(),andif
theperceptibleisdestroyed,bodytooisdestroyed(sincebodyisitselfaperceptible),andifthereisnotbody,perception
tooisdestroyed...Butperceptiondoesnotcarrytheperceptible.Forifanimalisdestroyedperceptionisdestroyed,but
therewillbesomethingperceptible,suchasbody,hot,sweet,bitterandalltheotherperceptibles.Moreover,perception
comesintoexistenceatthesametimeaswhatiscapableofperceivingananimalandperceptioncomeintoexistenceat
thesametimebuttheperceptibleexistsevenbeforeperceptionexistsfireandwaterandsoon,ofwhichananimalis
itselfmadeup,existevenbeforethereexistsananimalatall,orperception.Hencetheperceptiblewouldseemtobe
priortoperception.
(19).SeealsoDA3.2.426a30b3,3.4429a31b3and3.13.435b79.Additionaltextualevidencethatperceptiblequalities
existwhethertheyareperceivedornotistobefoundatDAII12,424b68DAIII2,425b27ffMetaphysicsIX3,
1047a5Meteor.4.8,385a4.
(20).Additionaljustificationfortheviewthatperceptiblepropertiescanexistswithoutaperceivercomesfromthe
empiricalobservationthat,forexample,aharshsoundcandestroythefaculty:Thisenablesustoexplainwhyexcesses
inobjectsofsensedestroytheorgansofsenseifthemovementsetupbyanobjectistoostrongfortheorgan,theform
whichisitssensorypowerisdisturbeditispreciselyasconcordandtonearedestroyedbytooviolentlytwangingthe
stringsofalyre.(DA2.12424a2832)
(21).DA417b2021:,,.
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(22).Aristotleproceedstoinvestigatetherationaleofthequestionthus:
Sinceifitwerenotso,[ifitssensiblequalitieswerenotdivisible,paripassuwithbody],wemightconceiveabody
existingbuthavingnocolor,orweight,oranysuchqualityaccordinglynotperceptibleatall.Forthesequalities
aretheobjectsofsenseperception.Onthissupposition,everyperceptibleobjectshouldberegardedascomposed
notofperceptibles[butofimperceptibles].Yetitmust[bereallycomposedofperceptibles],sinceassuredlyitdoes
notconsistofmathematical[entities,andthereforepurelyabstractandnonsensibleentities].Again,bywhat
facultyshouldwediscernandcognizethese[hypotheticalrealthingswithoutsensiblequalities]?IsitbyReason?
ButtheyarenotobjectsofReasonnordoesreasonapprehendobjectsinspace,exceptwhenitactsinconjunction
withsenseperception.Atthesametime,ifthisbethecase[thattherearemagnitudes,physicallyreal,butwithout
sensiblequality],itseemstotellinfavoroftheatomistichypothesis.(445b1118,myemphasis,translation
slightlymodified)
(23).Commentatorstakethisconnectiontobeevidentseee.g.,Osborne1983,403,footnote11.
(24).Seechapter3.
(25).Themultipletiesaregroundedonontologicallyinterdependentmonadicpropertiestheyarenotbridgesbetween
them(asexplainedinchapter1).Aristotlesays:ofthethingsperceptibleinthemselves,thespecialobjectsareproperly
calledperceptibleanditistothemthatinthenatureofthingsthestructureofeachseveralsenseisadapted(DA
418a235,myemphasis).
(26).Atthesametime,,DAline425b31.
(27).Alternativeinterpretationsofthisclaim,whichhasbeentheobjectofmuchcontroversyinthesecondaryliterature,
arediscussedintheAppendix.
(28).SeethedistinctionbetweenbelongingtoandbeinginthatAristotledrawsinPhysicsIII3,discussedinchapter1
andalsothefollowingrelevantpassages:
Ifitistruethatthemovement(i.e.,theacting,andthebeingactedupon)istobefoundinthatwhichisactedupon,
boththesoundandthehearingsofarasitisactualmustbefoundinthatwhichhasthefacultyofhearingforitis
inthepassivefactorthattheactualityoftheactiveormotivefactorisrealizedthatiswhythatwhichcauses
movementcanbeatrest(DA426a26,myemphasis).
Forastheactedandbeingacteduponistobefoundinthepassive,notintheactivefactor,soalsotheactualityofthe
sensibleobjectandthatofthesensitivesubjectarebothrealizedinthelatter(DA426a911).
(29).Thisprinciple,towhichAristotleiscommittedbyhisaccountofpoweractualization,islessinnocentthanit
mightseem.Fromthisitfollowsthateverycausalinteraction,withitsspecificityandidiosyncraticcontextuality,
determinestheconditionsofactualizationofapower.Thesearetheconditionsthatdefinethepowersend,andhencethe
natureofapower(i.e.,whatthepoweris).Yet,itisimpossible,epistemologically,tohaveaclassificationsystemthat
individuatespowerssofinely.Ithereforeadoptthepractice,inexplainingAristotlessystem,ofgroupingtogether
familiesofactualizationswhichcanbeactualizedinmanydifferentwaysdependingontheactualizationcontext,and
treatingeachfamilyasasinglepower.
(30).SeeMarmodoro(2006,734).
(31).Silvermanssupportingargumentsareasfollows:
Apropersensible...isnotdefinedintermsofitsrespectivesense...Thebeingofthesensiblesisthussomehow
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priortoandindependentofthebeingofthesense(s),thoughthesensiblearenonethelessrelatedessentially
()tothesenses(415a1422,418a25,Cat7,esp.7b238a12,MetV15)(1989,271)...[Topreservethe
positionabove]Insteadofdefiningtheessenceofred,forinstance,intermsofitssecondactuality,beingseen,he
treatsthesecondactualityastherealizationofwhatinthePosteriorAnalyticsandMetaphysicshecallsa
necessaryaccident:apropertybelongingtoasubjectinvirtueofitsessencebutnotfoundintheaccountofthat
essence...
(1989,2723)
(32).Iwillcomebacktothisissueinchapter3.
(33).OtherviewssuchasSilverman(1989)andModrak(1987)havebeendiscussedearlier.
(34).Physics202b1920.
(35).FormyinterpretationofAristotlesviewsonthisproblem,seechapter5.
(36).Seealsothefollowingrelevantquotations:
Becauseahigherordercontenttypeisinvolved,consciousnessisstillintentionalandhencerelational.Butinso
farasonlyonetokenisinvolved,itmustbeareflexiverelation:inadditiontobeingdirecteduponanexternal
object,suchasanazuresky,thetokenactivitywillbedirecteduponitself.Suchawarenessisimmediate.Itis
unmediatedbyanyfurthertokenactivity,letalonearepresentationofitselfnoristhereisanytransitionbetween
theperceptionandtheawarenessofit,andhencenoinferenceorcausalrelationbetweenthem.Therelationis
moreintimate:bothaspectsareessentialtoanytokenperception.(2002,778)
TheintimacyofthisrelationisglossedbyCastonas:Thehigherorderstateandthelowerorderstatearenotdistinct
existences.(2002,781)
Andyetthereremainsakindofindirectnessaboutit.Wearenotawareoftheactitselfinthesamewaythatweareaware
ofitsprimaryobject.Thus,whilewecanbesaidtoperceivethatwesee,itwillnotbeexactlylikeperceivinganobject.
(2002,787)
(37).IherefollowCastonswayofarticulatingthedifferencebetweenthetwoviews(2004,246).
(38).Shieldscharacterizesthepositionintheseterms.Seehttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle
psychology/suppl3.htmlaccessedonFebruary20,2014.
(39).AlessrefinedpurelymaterialistliteralistreadingisalreadyinSlakey(1961).Otherdefendersofaliteralistreading
areThorp(1980,583)andEverson(1997).
(40).TheexamplesarefromScaltsas1996,25.
(41).TheviewisfurtherdevelopedinBurnyeat(1995),andsupported,forexample,byJohansen(1997).Broadie
(1993,145)sayssheissympatheticwiththeview.Manyothershavealsoenteredthedebatesincethen.
(42).Seealso:Thereceptionofsensibleformsistobeunderstoodintermsofbecomingawareofcolors,sounds,smells,
andothersensiblequalities,notasaliteralphysiologicalchangeofqualityintheorgan.(1992,212)
(43).SeealsoCaston(2004,247):Inperception,thematterofoursenseorganscomestosharethesameproportions
thattheperceptiblequalityexhibits.Buttheorgancanrealizethisproportionindifferentcontraries,andsowithout
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necessarilyreplicatingtheperceptiblequalitywithinourselves(myemphasis).
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AristotlesSubtlePerceptualRealismOxfordScholarship
AnnaMarmodoro
PrintISBN13:9780199326006
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
AristotlesSubtlePerceptualRealism
AnnaMarmodoro
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.003.0004
AbstractandKeywords
PerceptionforAristotleisaninstanceofcausalinteractionbetweenthepropertiesofobjectsintheworldandthe
perceiverssenseorgans.Itisthemutualactivationoftherespectivecausalpowersintheobjectandtheperceiverthat
comprisesperceiving.Theperceiverexperiencestheperceptible,andtheperceptiblebecomesmanifesttotheperceiver,in
virtueof,andforthedurationoftheirmutualinteraction.Inperceptiontheperceiverssenseorganismadelikethe
perceptibleobject,throughtheimpactoftheobjectsperceptiblequalitiesonthesenseorgan.Thepowerthatactivates
perceiving,theperceptiblequality,comesfromwithoutthesenseorgans.ForAristotle,theperceiversuppliesthemeans
forthefullestactivationoftheperceptiblepropertiesofobjectsintheworldactivatedassensiblepropertiesofobjects,
ratherthanasexperiencesofperceivers.ThisisAristotlessubtlerealistviewofperception.
Keywords:perception,causation,subtleperceptualrealism
Introduction
Whatisitthatweperceive?Aristotletakesperceptiblequalitiestoberealintrinsicpropertiesoftheobjectstheybelongto
likeallpropertiesforAristotle,theyarecausalpowers.Thisconceptionofperceptiblepropertiesasrealcausalpowers
commitsAristotletoaveryinterestingtypeofperceptualrealism,whichwillbeinvestigatedinthepresentchapter.This
chapterwillalsohighlighttheheuristicvalueofAristotlesuseofhispowerontologyinhistheoryofperception.The
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investigationofthemetaphysicalstatusofperceptiblequalitiesleadsAristotletotheinnovativeviewthattheyaremulti
trackandmultistagepowersandthisaddsfurthersophisticationtohispowerontology.Whatweperceivearepowersin
theirsecondactuality.Butthesecondactualityofapower,althoughdifferentfromitsfirstactuality,issimplyanother
stateoftheverysamepower.Finally,itmightbethoughtthattheroleofthemediuminperceptionunderminesarealist
viewofAristotlestheoryofperception,becausethemediuminterruptsthecontinuityofthecausalchainfromthe
perceptiblequalitiesofobjectstotheperceptualexperienceoftheperceiver.Thischapterwillshowwhythisisnotthe
case.
(p.126) 3.1PerceptibleQualitiesinSecondActuality
RecallAristotlesgeneraldefinitionofpowersintheMetaphysics:apowerisfirstandforemostthecapacitytobring
aboutchange:
Allpotentialitiesthatconformtothesametypearestartingpointsofsomekind,andarecalledpotentialitiesin
referencetooneprimarykind,whichisastartingpointofchangeinanotherthingorinthethingitselfquaother.
(Met.1046a911)1
,,,
.
Thechangethatapower(oritsbearer)isabletobringaboutorsufferiswhatdefinesthenatureofthepoweritself.So,if
perceptiblepropertiesarecausalpowers,whatchangesdotheycause,andiftheybringaboutmorethanonechange,
whichonedefinestheirnature?Aretheypowersthatessentiallymaketheworldcolorful,noisy,tasty,etc.,orarethey
powersthatessentiallymakeusperceivetheworldascolorful,noisy,tasty,etc.?Oraretheypowersthatessentially
causebothkindsofchange?Oneitherofthetwoformeroptions,Aristotlewouldbecommittedtothinkingofpowersas
singletrackwithessentiallyonetypeofmanifestation2onthelatter,asmultitrackpowers. 3Multitrackpowersareso
defined:
Multitrackdispositions...correspondtomorethanonepairofstimulusconditionandmanifestation(seeRyle
1963,p.114Bird2005a,p.367Bird2007,pp.2124Ellis&Lierse1994,p.29).Thethoughtisthatexactlythe
sameconventionaldispositionsmaybepickedoutbymultiplecharacterizationsintermsofstimulusconditionand
manifestation.(Choi2012)4
(p.127) Takeforexampletheperceptiblequalityred:ifitwereamultitrackpower,itwould,forexample,beidentified
bythestimuluslightandthemanifestationappearingred(inabsenceofperceivers),aswellasbythestimulusbeing
seenandthemanifestationlookingredtotheperceiver.Bycontrast,singletrackpowersarepickedoutuniquelybya
stimulusandamanifestationtypethatis,twodifferenttypesofmanifestationssuchasappearingredandlookingred
tosomeonewouldidentifytwodifferentproperties.InwhatfollowsIwillarguethatperceptiblequalitiesforAristotleare
notsingletrackpowers,contrarytowhatotherscholarshavesuggested.Rather,Aristotleholdsauniquepositionand
thinksofperceptiblequalitiesasmultitrackandmultistagepowers,whereapowerthatisnumericallyonehasdifferent
possibletypesofmanifestationanddifferentstagesofactivation,thesecondandfulleststagedependingonthefirst.
Becauseofthedependencyofthesecondactivationonthefirst,thetwoactivationsviewdoesnotamountsimplytoa
multitrackview. 5Beforepresentingmyowninterpretation,Iwillreviewanddiscussalternativeones.
3.1.1TheSingleTrackPowersView
Therearetwowaysofdevelopingtheinterpretationofperceptiblequalitiesassingletrackpowers.Onemightthink,as
SarahBroadie(1993)does,thatperceptiblepropertiesarepowerstocause(only)ourperceptionofthemorthattheyare
powerstoaffect(only)theexternalmedium(forexamplethesurroundingairinthecaseofcolor), 6alongthelinesof
whatAlanSilverman(1989)arguesforinrelationtocolor.
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Broadie(1993)explicitlyholdsthatforAristotleaperceptiblequalitysuchasrednessissimply(thebasisof)apowerto
produceperceptionanditisresponsiblefornothingotherthanourperceptualexperienceofit(1993:145ff).Shecallsthis
AristotlesPrinciple(p.128) oftheRestrictedEfficacyoftheSensibilia,meaningthatperceptiblequalities(withthe
exceptionofthetangibleones)arecausesofonlyasingletypeofeffect:theperceptionofthembyanimals(1993,146). 7
BroadiefindstextualevidencefortheprincipleinthelaterpartofDAII12.Inreply,JustinBroackeshasalreadyargued
inpressthat[Aristotle]oftentalksinfactintermsincompatiblewiththeprincipleofRestrictedEfficacy.Heallowssmell
toaffectotherthings:oilandwinetakeonthescentofwhatisnearby(deInsomniis2,460a29).Somesmells,inaddition
tobeingperceivedbyus,aredestructive(Desensu5,444b30)manyinsectsareactuallykilledbythesmellofbrimstone
(HA4,8,20). 8Inadditiontothetextualevidencebeingfarfromcompelling(becauseotherpassagespointinadifferent
direction),theviewthatperceptiblequalitiesaresingletrackpowerswouldcreatetroubleforthecoherencyofAristotles
theoryofperception.Initsstrictestform,theRestrictedEfficacyprincipleimpliesthatnothingcanmediateperception. 9I
shareBroackesviewthat,
Ifrednessisstrictlyapowertomakepeopleseered,andifthatpowercanproducenothingbutthedefiniteeffect,
thentherewillbenoroomforastoryaboutprocessesmediatingperception,eitherinthemediumorintheeye.
(1999,78)
ButthiswouldbecontrarytowhatAristotleholdsexplicitly(seesection3.3ofthischapter).Ithusconcludewith
BroackesthatBroadiesversionofthesingletrackpowersviewisnotattractive.Thereishoweveranotherlineof
interpretation,totheeffectthatAristotleholdsthatperceptiblequalitiesaresingletrackpowers.Silverman(1989)
emphasizesthatforAristotle,Whatacoloris,itsessence,isthecapacitytocauseacertainmovementintheactually
transparent(1989,279).Whilethereissometextualevidencethatmightbetakentosupportthisreading,thedifficulty
forSilverman(p.129) ishowtoexplainthegenerationofperceptualexperienceinawaythatisconsistentwith
Aristotlesgeneraltheoryofperception.Silvermanwrites:
Itisanecessaryaccidentofred,givenwhatredis,thatitbepotentiallyvisible(i.e.,thatitbeabletobeseen,and,
whenthatpotentialityisrealized,thatitbeseen).(1989,280)10
Colors,invirtueofbeingabletocausemovementsintheactuallytransparent,havethenecessarypropertyofbeing
visible,notofbeingseen.Thesensibleformastakenoninsensationis,therefore,therealizationofanecessary
accidentoftheessenceofcolor.Whatisnovelisthattherelationshipoffirsttosecondactualityisunderstoodas
therelationshipofessencetonecessaryoressentialaccident.(1989,280)
Thus,onSilvermansinterpretationofAristotle,color,wheninfullactuality,isvisible,notseen.Butifso,onthisview
thereisnorealconnectionbetweenthenatureofthingsandtheperceptiblequalitieswebringintoexistencewhen
perceivingthem.ThisweakensAristotlesperceptualrealismsignificantly,andallowsadegreeofProtagoreanrelativism
intotherelationoftheperceptibletothecontentoftheperceptualexperience.OnSilvermansaccount,perceptual
qualitiescomeintoexistencebybeingperceivedbutthisistheviewAristotlecriticizestheMegariansforinMetaphysics
IX3,wherehealsoaddsthattheupholdersofthisviewwillhavetomaintainthedoctrineofProtagoras(1047a67).In
conclusion,Silvermandescribesanexternalrelationoftheperceptiblequality(insecondactuality)tothefacultyof
perception,whichdoesnotdeterminehowtheperceptiblequalitybecomessuchasitis.Silvermancannotthereforejustify
hisclaimthattherelationheintroducesbetweentheperceptiblequalityandthefacultyofperception(namelythatof
beinganecessaryaccident)allowsthe(p.130) sensibletobecomesuchasthesensibleactuallyis(1989,279).By
contrast,aswesawinchapter2,forAristotletherelationbetweentheactualizedperceptiblequalityandwhatisseenis
moreintimatethanthatofbeinganecessaryaccidentitisconstitutional. 11Inconclusion,thesingletrackpowers
interpretationofAristotlesperceptiblequalitiesispreytodifficulties,whetheritisdevelopedinthewayBroadieor
Silvermandid.Inthenextsection,Iwillargueforanalternative.
3.1.2TheMultiTrackandMultiStagePowersView
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Aristotleclearlytakestheperceptionofperceptiblequalitiesastheultimateandfullestactivationofthesepowers.In
discussingtheviewsofhispredecessorshesaysthattheactualityofaperceptibleisitsbeingperceived:
Buttheearlierphilosophersofnaturedidnotstatethematterwell,thinkingthatwithoutsightthereisnothing
whiteorblack,norflavorwithouttasting.Forinonewaytheywererightbutinanotherwrongforsincethe
perceptionandtheperceptiblearesospokenofintwoways,aspotentialandasactual,thestatementholdsofthe
latter,butitdoesnotholdoftheformer.
(DA426a2025,mytranslation)
,,
.,
,,,
.
Thisisinlinewithhisexplanationofthetemporalcoincidenceofproducingasoundandbeingheard:(p.131)
Itispossibletohavethecapacitytohearandnottohear,andthatwhichcanproducesoundsisnotalwaysdoing
so.Butwhenthatwhichcanhearishearingandthatwhichcanproducesoundisproducingit,thenhearingin
actualityandsoundinginactualitycometobeatthesametime,andonemightcalltheonehearingandtheother
sounding.
(DA425b28426a1,mytranslationandemphasis)
,,
,,
.
IntherelevantDeAnimapassagesAristotledoesnotspelloutthedifferencebetweensoundandsoundingexplicitlyin
termsoffirstandsecondactuality, 12butthisdistinctionisilluminatinginthiscontext.Aswesawinchapter1,thereare
threestatesasubjectmaybeinwithrespecttoapoweritalreadypossesses.Inthecaseofthecapacitytomakeasound,a
subjectmayhavethiscapacitywithoutexercisingititmaymakeanaudiblesound,inabsenceofanyonehearing(first
actuality)oritmaybesounding(secondactuality)whileandonlywhilebeingheard.Thus,soundingisanobjects
capacitytoproducesound,insecondactuality.Whileanobjectscapacitytoproducesoundcanbeactivated
independentlyofanyoneperceivingit, 13anobjectssoundingdependsontheactivationofthecorrespondingperceptual
powerintheperceiver.Whensomethingstrikesthesurroundingair(andtheairisnotdispersed),thatobjectactivatesits
capacitytoproducesound,butinfirstactualityonly:
Whatisrequiredfortheproductionofsoundisanimpactoftwosolidsagainstoneanotherandagainsttheair.
Thelatter(p.132) conditionissatisfiedwhentheairimpingedupondoesnotretreatbeforetheblow(i.e.,isnot
dissipatedbyit).Thatiswhyitmustbestruckwithasuddensharpblow,ifitistosound.
(DA419b1922)
.
.,
Theairitselfissoundless()becauseitiseasilydispersed.Butwheneveritispreventedfromdispersing,
themovementinitisasound(DA420a79,mytranslation)
,.
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Analogously,somethingmayhavethecapacitytolook,forexample,red,butbewithoutlightitmayhavethecapacityto
lookredinappropriatelightconditionsbuttheremaybenoperceiverpresent(firstactuality)oritmaylookredtoa
perceiver(secondactuality).Lightissufficienttobringanobjectscolorinpotentialityintoactuality.Aristotlesays:Ina
waylightmakescolorswhicharepotentialintoactualcolors(DA430a1617,mytranslation).Butcolorinthelightis
colorinfirstactualityonly.Inconclusion,perceptiblequalitiesmaybeactivatedintotheirfirstactualityintheabsenceof
anyperceiver,iftheconditionsintheenvironmentareappropriatebuttheyareactivatedintotheirsecondactualityonly
whenthecorrespondingperceptualcapacityofaperceiveriscoactivated.Perceptualqualitiesinfirstactuality(e.g.,
visibleblue)arepowerfulinthattheycanaffecttherelevantexternalmedium14whentheycometobeinsecondactuality,
theyaffecttheperceiverssenseorgan. 15
Thus,ontheinterpretationIwanttomotivate,aperceptiblequality(e.g.thecolorofanobject)hasdifferentstagesof
(p.133) activation,dependingonwhatisavailableinitsenvironment.Whatcharacterizesafurtheractualityas
opposedtoanewfirstactuality,accordingtoAristotlesdistinction,iswhethertheactualityofthepowerchangesthe
subjectitbelongstoornot.Forinstance,ifasurfaceispaintedgreen,itissubjecttoachangeincolorif,afterhaving
beenpaintedgreen,thesurfaceisilluminatedbybrightclearlight,itsappearanceisalteredsomewhatthewayinwhich
itlooksgreenisdifferentbutitscolorhasnotchanged.Similarly,beingseenisasecondactualityofthecolorofthe
greensurface,notachange.Aswesawinchapter2already,forAristotleperceptiblequalitiesfullyactualizetheirnature
byinteractingwiththeagentsperceptualpowers,attainingtherebywhatonlytheagentsperceptualsystemcan
actualizeinthecaseofcolor,theircolorfulness,inthecaseofsound,itssounding,etc.Thecolorwesee,orgenerally
thequalitiesweperceive,revealwhatthesequalitiescanbe,andare,whenperceived.Theinteractionbetweenobject
andperceiveraffordsallthenecessaryconditionsfortheobjectsattainmentofthefullactivationofitsperceptible
properties.Itisinthisstateoffullactivationofitsrelevantpropertiesthattheobjectpossesses(e.g.,thecolorweseeitas
having).Thustheobjectsperceptiblequalitiesinsecondactualityarejustwaystheperceptiblequalitiesareactivated,
andnotdifferentpropertiesoftheobject.Colorsdependonperceiverstoachievetheircolorfulness,butitistheir
colorfulnessthatisactualized,andnotonlythephenomenalpropertiesoftheperceiversexperience.(Iwantthereforeto
stressthatAristotlesaccountisnotcommittedtopowersofpowers,namely,secondorderpowersthatarerealizedin
differentcircumstances.Rather,objectspossesspowers,eachofwhichcanhaveavarietyofactualizationsbecauseof
theirdependencyforactualizationontheconditionsoftheenvironment.)
(p.134) 3.2ObjectivityofContentandSubjectivityofExperience
3.2.1AristotlesSubtlePerceptualRealism
Aswesawintheprecedingsection,perceptiblequalitiescanbeindifferentstatesofactivation.Theyareactivatedwhen,
inappropriatephysicalconditions(e.g.,colorinthelight),theymanifestthemselves,evenintheabsenceofany
perceiver.Yet,thereisafurtherlevelofengagement,betweenobjectandperceiver,whichenablestheperceptibletoattain
afulleractivation.Thisfurthestlevelofactivationofperceptiblepowersgivesadimensionofuniquenessand
sophisticationtoAristotlesperceptualrealism.Perceptionbringsoutanaspectofthepowerfulnessof,forexample,color
thatisdormantwhenthecolorisinthelightbutunperceived. 16
Theinterdependencebetweenanobjectsperceptiblepowerandtheperceptualpowerofaperceiverfortheirmutual
activationraisesthequestionoftheobjectivityofperception.Iftheperceiversexperience,whichdependsonthesense
organ,influencestheactivationoftheperceptible,thenvariationsinthesenseorganordifferencesbetweenthe
respectivestatesofdiverseperceiverswillresultinqualitativevariationsintheactivationsoftheperceptible.Ifthe
perceptualfacultyoftheperceiverisnotfunctioningwell,saybecausetheperceiverisill,thentheactivationofthe
perceivedqualitywillbequalitativelydifferentthanitiswiththehealthyperceiver.Forexample,Aristotleexplainsthat
thesamewinemightseem,if...onesbodychanged,atonetimesweetandatanothertimenotsweet(Met.1010b1926).
Eachperceiverperceivesthesameperceptiblequality(i.e.,causallyinteractswiththesamepowerintheworld),butwhat
theyperceive(theactivationsofthatpower)maybedifferent.Butifso,whichoneofthemultiplepossiblecontentsof
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perceptionisveridical?Whatisitforthecontentof(p.135) perceptualexperiencetobeveridical?Theansweris
complex,butitwillbringoutthemetaphysicaloriginalityofAristotlesposition.
Aswesawinchapter2,theinteractionandactivationofthetwopowers,oftheperceptibleandtheperceiver,results(i.e.,
constitutes)intheappearanceoftheperceptibleandthecorrespondingexperienceoftheperceiver[e.g.,asounding
(appearance)andahearing(experience)],whichlastduringtheinteractionoftheringingbellandtheearseepp.102
6].ThisiswhyAristotlesaysthattheirinteractionistwoinbeing:
Whenthatwhichcanhearishearingandthatwhichcanproducesoundisproducingit,thenhearinginactuality
andsoundinginactualitycometobeatthesametime,andonemightcalltheonehearingandtheother
sounding.
(DA425b29426a1,mytranslationandemphasis).
,
,.
Aristotlealsotellsusthattheperceptiblequalitymakesthesenseorganbeliketheperceptibleisinactuality. 17Wesaw
thatthiscannotmeanthatthesenseorganbecomesqualifiedinthewaythattheperceptibleobjectisqualified.Sowhat
doesitmean?MyreadingofthisAristotelianpositionisthattheperceptiblealwaysmakesthesenseorganlikeit,
becausethisiswhattheperceptibledoeswhenitinteractswiththesenseorgan.Butthedegreeofsimilaritythatresults
betweenthemisnotalwaysthesame.Thedegreeofsimilaritydiffersaccordingtothestateoftheperceptibleandofthe
organ.Wecanthink,forexample,ofthingsmakingamirrorliketheyarethisiswhatthingsdowhentheyinteract
withmirrors.Butthedegreeofsimilaritybetweenathinganditsmirrorreflection(p.136) dependsonthestateofthe
thingandthemirror.Thehighestdegreeofsimilarityiswhentheconditionsareoptimalamplelightingnodust,dirt,
orrustonthemirrornofogintheair,etc.WhatisimportantforunderstandingAristotlespositionontheobjectivityof
perceptionisthatalthoughtheperceptiblealwaysmakesthesenseorganlikeit,onlysomeoftheseinteractionsare
objective,whentheperceptibleandtheorganareinanappropriatecondition.BythatImeanthatwhenthewineseems
bittertothesicktaster,inthiscasetoothewinesperceptiblequalitiesmakethesenseorganofthetasterlikethewine
butduetotheabnormalconditionofthesenseorganoftasteofthesickagent,thetasteisnotveridical:thewineseems
bittertotheagent.Thinkofthiscasebyanalogytoamirrorthatisnotclearorcleanandthusreflectsasomewhat
distortedimageofthereflectedthing.Bycontrast,thehealthytasterperceivesthesweetnessofthewine,justasaclear
mirrorreflectstheimageofthethingcorrectly.Althoughtheformalwaysmakesthesenseorganlikeit,itisveridically
likeitonlywhentheperceptible,theenvironment,andthesenseorganareinnormalconditions.Perceptionis
trustworthythenwhenittakesplacesinstandardornormalconditions.Aristotledoesnotdescribeexplicitlywhathe
takesstandardconditionstobebutwecaninferwhathethinkstheyarebylookingatthecasesinwhichhethinksthat
whatappearstotheperceiverisnottrustworthy,becausethecircumstancesinwhichperceptiontakesplacesarenot
standard.Tobeginwith,theperceptiblemustbeappropriateforthesense.Henotesthatinthecaseofflavor,tasteisthe
appropriatesensefordiscernmentandnotsight:
Andagain,amongsensationsthemselvesthesensationofaforeignobjectandthatoftheappropriateobject,or
thatofakindredobjectandthatoftheobjectofthesenseinquestion,arenotequallyauthoritative,butinthecase
ofcolorsight,not(p.137) taste,hastheauthority,andinthecaseofflavortaste,notsight.
(Met.1010b1518,translationslightlymodified)
,
,,,.
FurthermoreAristotleconsiderscaseswheredistanceplaysaroleinthewayweperceivemagnitude,ontheonehand,
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andcolorsontheother.Ontheperceiverssideasitwere,heconsidershowthingsappeartoobserverswhoarehealthy,
asopposedtothosewhoaresick,orcasesofhowheavythingsappeartopeoplewhoarestrong,ortothosewhoare
weakadditionallyheraisestheissueofhowthingsappearindreamstothesleeping,andhowtothewaking.Inthe
Metaphysicshewrites:
Regardingthenatureoftruth,wemustmaintainthatnoteverythingwhichappearsistruefirstly,becauseevenif
sensationatleastoftheobjectpeculiartothesenseinquestionisnotfalse,stillappearanceisnotthesameas
sensation.Again,itisfairtoexpresssurpriseatouropponentsraisingthequestionwhethermagnitudesareas
great,andcolorsareofsuchanature,astheyappeartopeopleatadistance,orastheyappeartothosecloseat
hand,andwhethertheyaresuchastheyappeartothehealthyortothesick,andwhetherthosethingsareheavy
whichappearsototheweakorthosewhichappearsotothestrong,andthosethingstruewhichappeartothe
sleepingortothewaking.
(Met.1010b110)
,,<><>
,.,
(p.138) ,
,,
.
Aristotleisexplicitthattheexperienceitselfeachperceiverhasofaperceptibleisasubjectivementaleventforeach
perceiveritscontentisobjective,insofarasitisqualitativelythesameastheperceptibleforallnormalperceiversin
standardconditions,stemmingfromthesameobject.Aristotlediscussesthesequestionsoftheobjectiveandthe
subjectiveaspectsofperceptionintheDeSensu:
Inperceivingtheobjectwhichfirstsetupthemotion(e.g.,abell,orfrankincense,orfire)allperceiveanobject
numericallyoneandthesamewhile,ofcourse,inthespecialobjectperceivedtheyperceiveanobjectnumerically
differentforeach,thoughspecificallythesameforall...thesethings[theperceptualcontent]arenotbodies,butan
affectionorprocessofsomekind...thoughontheotherhand,theyeachimplyabody
(DeSensu6,446b2126)
,,
,,...,
....
WethushaveevidencethatAristotleiscarefulindistinguishingthesubjectivityofexperiencefromtheperceptual
contentsqualitativeandreferentialobjectivity(instandardconditions).Aquestionweneedtoinvestigateinrelationto
Aristotlesperceptualrealismiswhetherhisviewthatperceptionalwaysrequiresthepresenceofanappropriatemedium
inanywayundermineshisstancethatweperceivewhatisreallythere,intheworld.Aristotleholdsthatperception
(p.139) cannottakeplacebydirectcontactbetweentheobjectsofperceptionandthesenseorganshewritesfor
examplethatIfoneplacessomethingthathascolorupontheeyeitself,itwillnotbeseen(DA419a1213,my
translation)hesays,weperceiveallthingssurelythroughamedium(DA423b7,mytranslation).Thisviewis
somewhatsurprisingatthisstageinourinvestigationofAristotlestheoryofperception.If,necessarily,ourperceptions
oftheworldarealwaysmediatedbysomethinginbetweentheobjectsofperceptionandthesenseorgans,whatisitthat
weactuallyperceive?Isittheobjectsperceptiblequalities,orwhateveritisthatstandsinbetweenthemandusand
facilitatesourperception?IfAristotleiscommittedtotheformerview,whydoesheintroduceamediumofperception?
Andhowdoesheavoidthatthemediummakestroubleforhisrealisttheoryofperception?Thefollowingsection
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addressesthesequestions.
Aristotlessubtlerealisminperception,asdescribedsofar,isinlinewithhismoregeneralreliabilisttheoryoftruth.
Thereisnoprivilegedaccesstorealitythatconferstruthonperceptualcontentthereareonlyreliableobservationsbya
wellplacedandwellfunctioningperceiver,whoseexperiencesareveridicalinthesamesenseinwhichunobjectionable
receivedopinionsinsociety(endoxa)aretrue.ThedifferencebetweenveridicalandnonveridicalperceptionforAristotle
isnotadifferencebetweenhavingaccessandnothavingaccesstorealityrather,itisadifferencebetweenappropriate
andinappropriateconditionsofinteractionwithreality.Eveninthecaseofhallucinations,itistheinappropriate
stimulationofthesenseorganbyexternalperceptiblesthatgivesrisetothehallucinatoryexperience.Tounderstand
Aristotlesposition,letuslookatanexampleofcausalinteractionfromPhysicsIII3(seechapter1):ateachercanteach
alessontoawholeclass.Letusassumethatthewholeclasslearnsthelessoncorrectly.Evenso,whattheyhavelearned
isnotidenticalbetweenthem,duetotheirindividualintellectualdifferencesandthe(p.140) particularwayeachstudent
listenedtothelesson.Whateachofthemlearnedisaresultoftheteacherslessonmakingtheircognitivestatelikeit.
Eachindividualteacherlearnerinteractiondeterminedthecontentofitsownspecificknowledgetransmission.All
transmissionscountasveridicalteaching,buteachinstanceoflearningis(everso)slightlydifferent,andconsequently
eachinstanceofteachingisslightlydifferent,aswell,evenifresultingfromthesamelecture.Inthatsense,thereare
(eveneversoslight)differencesinourperceptionsofthecoloroftherosewearelookingat,andsoalso(eveneverso
slight)differencesinthefullactivationofthecoloroftheroseweeachengenderintheworld.
3.2.2AristotleandMcDowell
ToexplicateAristotlesuniquepositionfurther,wemayverybrieflycomparehisviewwiththatofthecontemporary
philosopherJohnMcDowell,whohasdevelopedarealistbutsubjectivistviewofcolors18verymuchinlinewithwhatI
callAristotlessubtlerealism.ForMcDowell,beingintheworldandbeingobjectivearetwonotionsthatcanbeteased
apart(1998,129)perceptiblequalitiesareintheworldandyettheyaresubjective,inthefollowingsense:
Anobjectsbeingsuchastolookredisindependentofitsactuallylookingredtoanyoneonanyparticular
occasionsonotwithstandingtheconceptualconnectionbetweenbeingredandbeingexperiencedasred,an
experienceofsomethingasredcancountasacaseofbeingpresentedwithapropertythatisthereanyway
independentlyoftheexperienceitself.
Ihavealreadyargued,indiscussingDeAnimaIII2(inchapter2),whyItakeAristotletoargueforthedependenceofan
objects(p.141) looking,forexample,redwhenitisbeingperceivedasred:theperceptibleitselfisfullyrealizedinthe
perceiver,foraslongasitisbeingperceived.Soonmyaccount,AristotledivergesfromMcDowell,inthatMcDowell
holdsthatthingslookredindependentlyofbeingperceivedasredwhileonAristotlessubtlerealism,beingperceivedas
redisanecessaryconditionforlookingred.Inotherwords,therednessofthecolorinfullactualityisnotthereanyway,
butitcomesaboutwhenthecolorinteractswiththeperceiver.Ontheotherhand,thereisanaspectofMcDowells
positionthatbringsthetwoaccountsveryclosetooneanother.Hewrites:
Secondaryqualitiesarequalitiesnotadequatelyconceivedexceptintermsofcertainsubjectivestates,andthus
subjectivethemselvesinasensethatthatcharacterizationdefines.
Thedependenceoftheperceptiblesfullactivationontheperceiver,onmyaccountofAristotlessubtlerealism,doesnot
makethecolorsresultingappearanceprivate.Buttheconditionsofthefullactivationfromwhichitresultsaretypicallya
uniqueinteraction.
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3.3TheRoleoftheMediuminPerception
Weknowthat,indevelopinghisaccountofperception,Aristotleisbuildinghisexplanatorytheorywithinanontology
thatisnotcorpuscularian.Histheoryofperceptiondoesnotincludeanythinglikephysicalcarriersofinformation(rays
orparticles)fromtheobjectsintheworldtothesenseorgansoftheperceiver.Rather,Aristotleaccountsforperceptionby
meansoftheactivationofcausalpowersintheperceiverandintheobjectofperceptionandtheactivationof(p.142)
causalpowersisforhimaqualitativechangeinthestatusoftherelevantpowers.Ontheotherhand,Aristotleisalsovery
muchdrivenbyhisempiricalobservationoftheperceptualprocess. 19Aclearindicationofthisishisderivationofthe
needforamediuminperception,whichappearstobebasedonempiricalconsiderations.Hearguesthatwithouta
mediumtherecannotbeperception,thus:
Forseeingtakesplacewhenthatwhichcanperceiveisaffectedbysomething.Nowitisimpossibleforittobe
affectedbytheactualcolorwhichisseenitremainsforittobeaffectedbywhatisintervening,sothattheremust
besomethingintervening...,Thesameaccountappliestobothsoundandsmell.Fornoneoftheseproducessense
perceptionwhenittouchesthesenseorgan,buttheinterveningmediumismovedbysmellandsound,andeachof
thesenseorgansbythisinturn.Andwhenoneputsthesoundingorsmellingobjectonthesenseorgan,it
producesnoperception.Thesameappliestotouchandtaste. 20(DA419a1731,mytranslation)
,...
,,
,
..
ForAristotleallmodalitiesofperceptionrequireanappropriatemedium.Despitethenontrivialphysiologicaldifferences
betweenthesenses,Aristotleisconcernedtoestablishthatperceptionisasinglephenomenondifferingonlyinmaterial
implementation.Thisisless(p.143) obvioustohiminthecaseoftouchthanitisinthecasesofsight,hearing,and
smelling,wheretherespectivesenseorganstheeye,theear,thenosearephysicallyseparatedfromtheperceptible
qualitiestheyareperceptuallyengagedwithwhileperceptionistakingplace.Inthecaseoftouchthisisnotevident
throughobservation.Yet,Aristotleissoconvincedoftheuniformityofthephenomenonofperceptionthatheconcludesto
theconformityoftouchfromtheanalysisoftheothersenses.Heclassifiestastewithtouchinthisdiscussionbecauseof
thecommonroleoffleshinthesetwosenses.Heargues:
Ingeneral,fleshandthetonguearerelatedtotheorgansoftouchandtaste,asairandwateraretothoseofsight,
hearing,andsmell.Henceinneithertheonecasenortheothercantherebeanyperceptionofanobjectifitis
placedimmediatelyupontheorgan(e.g.,ifawhiteobjectisplacedonthesurfaceoftheeye).Thisagainshows
thatwhathasthepowerofperceivingthetangibleisseatedinside.Onlysowouldtherebeacompleteanalogy
withalltheothersenses.Intheircaseifyouplacetheobjectontheorganitisnotperceived,hereifyouplaceiton
thefleshitisperceivedthereforefleshisthemediumoftouch.
(DA423b1726)
,,
.
,.
.
,.
Wearenotawareofthesenseorganoftouch.Weareawareofthefactthatweperceivethetangibleandtheflavorful
uponcontact(p.144) betweenthesensibleitemandflesh(fortouch)andthetongue(fortaste).Thiscouldhavesignaled
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adifferencebetweentheoperationofthesetwosensesandthatoftheotherthree.Aristotlecouldhaveconcludedthatin
thecaseoftouchandtaste(asopposedtosight,hearing,andsmelling)thereisnomediumrequiredthatfleshisthe
senseorganoftouchandthetongueisthesenseorganoftaste.Inthatcasedirectcontactbetweenthesensibleandflesh
orthetonguewouldexplainthegenerationofperceptualexperiencesoftouchandtaste.Yet,thisisnottheroutethat
Aristotlechooses.Theassumeduniformityofthepowerofperceptionincludes,forAristotle,acommonstructureofthe
phenomenonspanningthefivesensesmodalities.Hence,Aristotleconcludesthatfleshandthetonguemustbethe
media,notsenseorgans,fortherespectivesenses,byanalogywiththeothersensesthathaveamediumbetweenthe
sensibleandthesenseorgan. 21
Recallthatinchapter1,wesawhowcontactfacilitatestheactivationofcausalpowers.IfAristotleholdsacausalpowers
theoryofperception,ishenowcontradictinghimselfwhensayingthatperceptioncouldnottakeplaceiftheobjectof
perceptionandthesenseorganwereindirectcontact?Aclarificationwillhelpdispeltheimpressionofcontradiction.As
wewillseeinthissection,Aristotlestheoryofthemediumandofitsroleinperceptionbringsouttheexplanatory
strengthandrichnessofhistheoryofpowers.Imeanthat,whereasthepredominantmodelofcausationAristotle
inheritedfromhispredecessorswasroughlylikecauseslike,byframinghisowntheoryintermsoftheactivationof
powers,Aristotleallowedhimselftwoalternativecoursesfortheactivationofcausalpowers:mereactivationofapower,
oractivationcumchangeofapower.ThetheoryoftheperceptualmediumtakesthisdistinctionfromAristotlespower
ontologytoahigherlevelofcomplexityandsophistication.Wecanoutlineitasfollows.Thecolorofanobjectcausally
engagestheactuallytransparentair(i.e.,themedium)(p.145) withoutchangingit.Theairinturncausallyengagesthe
senseorganofsight,theeye,withoutchangingit,butgivingrisetotheperceptualexperienceoftheobjectscolor.Sothe
perceiverperceivesthecoloritself,becauseherexperienceofitistheresultofachainofactivationsofcausalpowers,
withoutchange,startedbythecoloritself(similarlywithalltheothersenses).Buttheaccountisnotyetcomplete:by
positingthatthereisalwaysamediuminperception,Aristotleistherebyalsointroducinganadditionaltypeofcausal
engagement,overandabovechangeandactivationofpowers. 22IntheDeAnimaAristotlewrites:
Itsbeingcoloratallmeanspreciselyitshavinginitthepowertosetinmovementwhatisactuallytransparent,
andtheactualityofwhatistransparentisjustlight.
(DA419a910)
,,
.
AlittlefurtheronAristotleexplains:Colorsetsinmovementwhatistransparent(e.g.theair)andthat,extending
continuouslyfromtheobjectoftheorgan,setsthelatterinmovement.(DA419a1315).Thus,inperceptioneveninthe
presenceofthemediumthechainofcausationisnotinterruptedbytheadditionofanyfurtherlinksthecoloraffectsthe
mediuminitsactivatedstateoftransparencydirectly.ThisisAristotlespointbelow,whichIwillelucidateinamoment:
Coloriscontinuouswiththelightandthelightwiththesight.Andthesameistrueofhearingandsmellingfor
theprimarymoverinrespecttothemovedistheair.Similarly,inthecaseoftasting,theflavoristogetherwiththe
senseoftaste.Anditisjustthesameinthecaseofthingsthatareinanimateand(p.146) incapableofsense
perception.Thus,therecanbenothingbetweenthatwhichundergoesandthatwhichcausesalteration.
(Phys.,245a511)
,.,.
.
..
.
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Lightisthestateoftransparencyofwhatispotentiallytransparent(e.g.,airorwater).Indaytime,theairistransparent
inactuality,whileatnightitisonlypotentiallytransparent.Itissurprisingherethatcoloraffectstheactuallytransparent
butdoesnotchangeitsocoloraffectswhatisalreadyactivated.Itdoessowithoutchangingthelightsstateof
transparency,orchangingthetransparentairintocoloredair.So,whattypeofactivationistheactivationbycolorofthe
activelytransparentair?TheanswercanbederivedfromAristotlesdescriptionofthecausalchainofperceptioninthe
passagejustquoted.Colorsetsthetransparentairinmotion,andthisinturnsetsthesenseorganofsightinmotion,
beingincontactwithboththecoloredsurfaceandthesenseorgan.Theroleofthemediumthenistobeacausalbridge
betweenthesensibleandthesenseorgandetectingit,forthetransmissionofwhatIcalladisturbance.Thecolor
disturbstheactivelytransparentmedium,withoutchangingit,andthisdisturbanceistransferredtothesenseorgan,
withoutchangingit,butgivingrisetotheexperienceoftheperceiver.Thedisturbancethatcolorgeneratescannotbe
merelyacausalengagementwith,forexample,theair,sinceitcannottakeplacewithoutlight.Adisturbancemaybe
eitherphysicaldislocationorqualitativeengagementwithoutchange.Forexample,thebendingofatreesleavesinthe
wind,orthereflectionofan(p.147) imageonashinymetalsurfacearequalitativecausalengagementsoftheleavesor
themetalsurface,withoutchange(intherelevantAristoteliansense).Eitherway,acolorengagescausallywiththe
actuallytransparentmediumairorwaterandthroughthismediumitengagesthesenseorganofsight,producingthe
experienceofcolor.
ItisplausiblethatAristotleconceivesofthewayasensibleengagesthemediumandthesenseorgananalogouslytothe
wayhethinkssubstancesmix,intheDeGenerationandCorruptione.Inmixingthereisqualitativealterationofthe
mixants,withoutchange,inthesensethat,forexample,saltdissolvedinwaterisentirelyretrievable.Inthesameway,
whateverhappenstothemediumandthesenseorganduringinteractionwithaperceptiblequality,theinitialstateofthe
senseorganisrecoverableexceptincasesofviolentperception,aboutwhichAristotlewrites:
Excessesinobjectsofsensedestroytheorgansofsenseifthemovementsetupbyanobjectistoostrongforthe
organ,theformwhichisitssensorypowerisdisturbeditispreciselyasconcordandtonearedestroyedbytoo
violentlytwangingthestringsofalyre.
(DA424a2932)
(
,
)
Thewaythattheperceptiblequalityiscommutedtothesenseorganthroughthemediumis,asImentionedabove,
peculiartotheadditionaltypeofeffectsuchcausalpowerscanbringaboutwhatIcalleddisturbance,whichisnota
changeoractivationoftheengagedpower.Thatis,thepowerofthemediumcarriesthe(p.148) formoftheperceptible
tothesenseorganwithoutbeingchangedbyit.Aristotlestatesexplicitlythatthetransmissionofaperceptibleform
throughamediumisfundamentallydifferentfromtheembodimentoftheformi.e.,frombeingqualifiedbythatform(for
examplebybecomingthornyorsaline,etc.whiletransmittingtheseforms).Whilediscussingtaste,Aristotle
distinguishestransmittingfromembodyingaperceptiblequalityintheseterms:
Hence,evenifwelivedinwaterweshouldperceiveasweetobjectthrownintoitbuttheperceptionwouldnothave
cometousthroughamediumbutbecauseofthemixtureoftheobjectwiththemoisture,justasinadrink.But
colorisnotseeninthiswayastheresultofadmixture,northrougheffluences.
(DA422a1015,mytranslation)
,,,
,.,.
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Supposethesweetobjectissoluble:thewaterbecomessweetwhenmixedwithit.Insuchacasethewaterisnot
operatingasaperceptualmedium,despitethefactthatitservestobringthesweetnesstotheperceiver,becausethewater
isqualifiedbythesweetnessitembodiesit.Bycontrast,themediumtransferstothesenseorganthedisturbancethe
perceptibleformgeneratesinit,withoutcomingtoembodythatform:Theinterveningmediumismovedbysmelland
sound,andeachofthesenseorgansbythisinturn.(DA419a2728,mytranslation).Thisfurtherexplainswhythe
causeofperceptionisnotthemedium,buttheperceptibleobjectwhoseformistransmittedthroughthemedium(by
contrastwiththesweetwaterintheexampleabove,whichisthecauseofourperceptionofsweetness,whiletheobject
thatmadethewatersweetisnotthe(p.149) causeofourperception).Insum,Aristotleallowsthatinperceptionthe
mediumiscausallyaffected(thereissee,forexampleDA419a2728),buttheeffectisonlythecommutingof
theformoftheperceptible.Theperceptibleformisneitherperceivedbythemedium,nordoesitcometobelongtothe
mediumasasubject(inthewayitbelongstotheobjectofperception):themediumsuffersonlywhatisrequiredtoenable
theperceptibleformtobecommutedtotheperceiver.
MygenerallineinterpretationoftheroleofthemediumthusfollowsScaltsas(1996):thewaythemediumisaffected,he
argues,isbyencodingtheperceptiblequalityandthustransmittingittothesenseorganthatiscausallyimpactedinto
generatingtheperceptualexperience.Scaltsasexplainshisencodingmodelbyanalogywithhumanprocreation,thus:
Myproposalisthattheperceptibleformistransmittedthroughthemedium,beingencodedinthemovementof
themedium,ratherthanbeingembodiedinthemedium...ThemodelIamguidedbyinunderstandingthe
encodingofforminamediumisfoundinAristotlesexplanationofhumanprocreation,wherethehumanformis
transmittedencodedinthemovementsinthesperm.Inprocreation,thehumanformistransmittedthroughthe
sperm,whichshapesthemenstrualfluidintoanembryo.Thespermisnotahumanbeing,noristhehumanform
presentinit.Yet,thespermtransmitshumanformtothemenstrualfluids,andthustheembryoiscreated.My
suggestionisthatthetransmissionofaperceptibleformtoasenseorganthroughitsmediumcanbeunderstood
alongthesamelines.Thesensemediumcorrespondstothesperm,andthecreationofanembryotothe
perceptionofaformbythesenseorgan.Justasthespermisnotahumanbeing,butittransmitstheformofa
humanbeing,thusthemediumisnothardorsharporpink,(p.150) butittransmitstheseformstothesense
organ.
ThislineofinterpretationappearstosharesomefeatureswithanalternativeofferedbyJohansen(1998),butthereisan
importantdifferencebetweenthem.AccordingtoJohansen,themedium,whentakingontheperceptiblequalitythatis
beingperceived,undergoesaphenomenalchangeofthissort:
[T]
h emediumischangedbythesenseobjectinsofarasthesenseobjectappearstotheperceiverthroughit.
Unlikethekettlewhichitselfhadtobecomehottomediatetheheattothewater,themediumonlybecamecolored
insofarasthecolorappearedthroughthemediumtoaperceiver...themediumonlytookonthecolorinsofaras
thecoloractedonthesensefacultythroughthemedium.
AccordingtoJohansensphenomenalapproach,thereis:
nodescriptionofthechangeinthemediumapartfromreferringtotheeffectthatthischangehasorwouldhaveon
aperceiverattheendofthecausalchain,namelythesenseobjectsbecomingapparenttoaperceiverin
perception.Themediumchangesonlyinsofarasthesenseobjectbecomesapparenttoaperceiverthroughit,
andthistooisjusthowwewoulddescribethechangeintheperceiver.Boththemediumandtheperceiverchange
insofarasthesenseobjectappearstotheperceiver(1998,124myemphasis)....
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[T]
h isisnotthekindofchangeinthemediumthatcansupportamechanicalexplanation,foritisnotbasedon
therebeinganycausalsequencethatwecouldrecognizeashavingamechanicalexplanation.(1998,126)
(p.151) OneofthestrengthsofJohansensinterpretationisthatitmakesitclearthatitistheobjectofperception,and
notthemedium,whichactscausallyontheperceivertobringabouttheperceptualexperience.Ontheotherhand,his
interpretationfacesthedifficultythatitrendersthechangeundergonebythemediumintoaCambridgechange.Yet,
Aristotlegoesintophysicaldetailsofthepathwayoftheeffectofthesensibleformonthemedium:Hewhoisnearer
perceivestheodorsooner[thantheonefartheraway],andthesoundofastrokereachesussometimeafterithasbeen
struck.
(DeSensu446a2425)Suchanobservablygradualphysicalprogressionoftheeffectofthesensibleformonthemedium
cannotbeexplainedasmereappearingthroughthemedium.
Finally,theinterpretationofthemediumIwanttomotivatemightbefurtherexplicatedbycontrastwiththeoneCaston
(2002)hasdevelopedwithreferencetoDeAnimaII12.Castonwrites:
AttheendofOntheSoul2.12,forexample,heaskswhetherperceptiblequalitiescanbringaboutanychanges
otherthanperception.Asmell,byitsveryessence,isthesortofthingthatbringsaboutsmelling(424b39).Butit
alsocanhaveaneffectoninanimatebodiesnot,hestresses,simplyinvirtueofconcomitantpropertiesthatits
materialbasishappenstohave,butpreciselyinsofarasitisasmell(b1012).Asmell,heconcludes,canalso
makeairsmelly,thatis,maketheairsomethingthatcanprovokefurtherincidentsofsmelling(b1416)....What,
then,issmellingbesidesundergoingacertainchange(424b17).Hisuseofbesides(
)heresharpensthe
difficulty.Itpresupposesthatachangeisundergone(
, b17)whensomeonesmellsjustasmuchaswhen
theairtakesonanodor(,b16).HadAristotlemeanttocontrastsmellingwithundergoingachange
outright,hewouldhaveusedinsteadof().Onthecontrary,hisworrystemspreciselyfromthefactthat
(p.152) undergoingacertainkindofchangeiscommontobothcases,thatthereisaunivocalsenseinwhich
bothcanbesaidtochangeinthisway.Otherwise,theproblemevaporates.Ifperceivingisaspecialcaseof
undergoingachange(Burnyeat(1992)1995,p.25),itcanonlybebecauseofwhatelseistrueoftheevent,andnot
becauseitinvolvesadistinctsenseofundergoingachange.Thedifferencebetweenthesetwochangesmust
thereforebeexplainedbysomefurtherdifference.
(2002,7556)
Iunderstandthe(acutelydebated)textinquestionthatis,DeAnima2.12,424b1418asfollows.Aristotlestatesthere
thatsmellsandsoundsaffectallbodies.Theyaffectthemquabodies,whethertheyareanimateorinanimate.So,asound
maymakeatreeleafvibrateifitisloudenough,andforthesamereason,maymakethewholebodyofasmallbirdvibrate
tooincludingitsperceptualorgans.Whenbodiesthatareloosely,ifatallformed,areimpacteduponbythese
perceptiblequalities,theytakethemon(i.e.,embodythem)forinstance,whenairisaffectedbyascentitbecomes
odorous.Herethecontrastisbetween,forexample,astoneundertheinfluenceofascentandairunderitsinfluence:the
stonedoesnotsufferchangebecauseitsownformisfartoopowerfulforthescentthatisoperatingonit,whiletheair
doessufferchangefromthescentoperatingonitandbecomesodorous.Butnoneofthisissmelling.Rather,overand
abovethescentscausaloperationoneverybodyaroundit,whichinsomecasesmakesthingsodorous,smellingis
perceivingthescent.Smellingdoesnotresultfromtheubiquitouscausalactivityofthescentoneverybody,butfromthe
transmissionoftheperceptibleformofthescentthroughthemediumtothesenseorganofsmell.AlthoughAristotles
textdoesnotfacilitateourextractingthisclaimfromit,onmyunderstandingitispossiblethatthesamebodymaybe
bothaffectedquabodybytheperceptibleformanddisturbedquamediumbythatform.
(p.153) Inconclusion,thisreviewofdifferentinterpretationsofAristotlesviewsonthemediumbringsoutinwhich
waystheoneIofferisoriginal,andmoreapttoexplainhowthecausalroleofthemediuminperceptionfitswith
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Aristotlesmoregeneraltheoryofcausation.Whenhepositsthatwithoutthemediumperceptionisimpossible,Aristotle
appearstobedrivenbyempiricalconsiderations.Ontheotherhand,theseempiricalconsiderationsactuallyleadhimto
innovateinmetaphysics,byintroducinganewtypeofeffectthatcausalinteractionamongpowerscangiveriseto,
namelydisturbance.Itwouldbeoutsidethescopeofthepresentinvestigationtoexplorefurtherthemetaphysicsofthis
specialtypeofchangethatthemediumundergoesinperceptionbutitsimportanceinenrichingAristotlestheoryof
causationshouldnotbeunderappreciated.
ConcludingRemarks
ThischaptercontributestoourongoinginvestigationofAristotlestheoryofperceptionanaccountofthesubtlerealist
stanceAristotletakesregardingwhatitisthatweperceive.Weperceiverealfeaturesoftheworldviatheircausalimpact
onoursenseorgans.Thiscausalengagementbetweenusandtheworldgivesrisenotonlytoourperceptualexperience,
butalsotothefullactualizationofthequalitiesofobjects:theworldistrulycolorful,butonlyifandaslongasweare
lookingatit.Additionally,thischapterhighlightsinwhichwaysAristotlestheoryofperceptionismorethanadirect
applicationofhisgeneraltheoryofcausationintermsofactivationofcausalpowersthatwediscussedinchapter1.In
accountingfortheroleofthemediumforexample(whichisintroducedonthebasisofempiricalconsiderations)Aristotle
breaksnewgroundwithrespecttohowmanytypesofactivationcausalpowersmayundergo.
Notes
Notes:
(1).Thequalificationthatchangemightbebroughtaboutinthesomethingelse,orinthebearerofthecausalpower
itselfasifitwereotheraimsatincludingintheaccountcomplexentitieswhichhavethecapacitytobringabouta
changeinapartorthewholeofthemselves(e.g.,anathletetrainingherself).
(2).Silverman(1989)andBroadie(1993)havearguedso,butwithoutusingtheterminologyIuse.
(3).Broackes(1999)lendsitselftothisreading.
(4).Forexample:Beingelectricallycharged,anelectronisdisposedtoexperienceanelectrostaticforceFinresponseto
beingplacedatadistancedawayfromanelectricchargeqbutitisalsodisposedtoexperienceanelectrostaticforceF*in
responsetobeingplacedatadistanced*awayfromanelectricchargeq*.Similarly,itmightbeplausiblyclaimedthat
fragilityisamultitrackdispositionwithmanydifferentstimulusconditions:xsbeingstruck,xsbeingstressed,xs
beingtwisted,xsbeingshaken,andsoon(fromSunghoChoi,2012at:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/),
accessedFebruary20,2014.
(5).Intuitivelywecanthinkofamultitrackpowerashavingparalleldefinitions,eachdoingthesameworkofpicking
outthepowerwhilewecanthinkofamultistagepowerashavingdefinitionsarrangedasaseries,whereanyoneofthe
stagesintheseriespicksoutthesamepower.Aristotlespowersarebothmultitrackandmultistage,sothatpickingout
thepowerbyoneofitslaterstagesofactivationservesasanalternativedefinitionaltrackoftheverysamepower.
(6).Theroleofthemediuminperceptionwillbediscussedinsection3.3ofthischapter.
(7).Seeearlierdiscussionofcontactinchapter1.Broadieallowsforasecondinterpretationoftheprincipleaccordingto
whichperceptionmaybemediated,butonlybyprocessesthatoccurjustasandwhenitisnecessarytoproduce
perceptions(1993,151).
(8).SeealsoDeCaelo2.9,290b33.
(9).Broadieallowsalsoforamodifiedversionoftheprinciple:perceptionmaybemediated,butonlybyprocessesthat
occurjustandwhenitisnecessarytoproduceperceptions(1993,151)Broackeshasargumentsagainstthisversionof
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theprincipleaswell.
(10).Silvermanexpoundshisviewinmoredetailsthus:Specialsensation...isanessential()relationbetween
thesensibleandthesense.Sincethesenseandthesensiblecannotbedefinitionallyrelated,(i.e.,thedefinitionofeach
cannotmentiontheotherbecausethebeingofthesenseandsensiblearedistinctandthesensiblesareontologically
priortoandindependentofthesenses),weneedadifferentrelationbetweenthesenseandthesensible,a
relationwhichbothallowsthesensibletobecomesuchasthesensibleactuallyisandsimultaneouslypreservesthe
distinctessencesofboth.Thereissuchanalternativewayforapropertytoholdofasubject,namelythewayin
whichnecessary(oressential)accidentsarerelatedtosomething.Soforinstance,invirtueofwhatmanismanhas
thepropertyofbeingabletolearngrammar(1989,279).
(11).Aswewillseeinsection3.3ofthischapter,themediumdoesnotinteractcausallywiththeactivatedtransparent,
lesttheperceiverseenottheobjectscolor,butthemedium.Themediumdoesnotserveasacausallinkbetweenthe
transparentmedium,activatedby,forexample,thecolorandthesenseorgan,butasavenueforthetransmissionofthe
activationofthetransparent.
(12).SeeDAII.1,412a1011,2127,cf.II.5417a2229,417b216.
(13).Thefirstactualizationofanobjectspowertoproducesoundisalsodependentontheactualizationofanother
correspondingpower,inappropriateconditions.Seechapter1.
(14).Seesection3.3ofthischapter.
(15).Seetheearlierargumentinchapter1totheeffectthatpowersalwaysretaintheirpowerfulness,evenwhen
activated.
(16).Itisnotthecasehoweverthatperceptionrevealsahiddenaspectofcolor,inthesenseinwhichthefarsideofthe
moonishiddenfromviewandrevealedonlybytravellingtoit.ForexampleAristotlewritesintheDeAnima:Asmellis
justwhatcanbesmelt,andifitproducesanyeffectitcanonlybesoastomakesomethingsmellit...whatcansmellcan
beaffectedbyitonlyinsofarithasinitthepowertosmell(similarlywiththeproperobjectsofalltheothersenses)(DA
424b510).
(17).Whatcanperceiveispotentiallysuchastheobjectofsenseisactually(DAII5,418a34).
(18).See,forexample,McDowell,SecondaryQualitiesandValuesandAestheticValue,Objectivity,andtheFabricof
theWorldinMind,ValueandReality(1998)HarvardUniversityPress.
(19).SeeJohansen,AristotleontheSenseOrgans,1998,andespeciallyhisexcellentdiscussionofthemediumin
chapter2.
(20).Experiencetellshimthatcontactoftheeyewiththeobjectdoesnotgeneratesight,anymorethancontactofa
smellyobjectwiththenosegeneratessmell.
(21).Despitetheanalogywiththeothersenses,Aristotlevacillatesbetweenfleshbeingamediumandasenseorgan(PA
653b2426).
(22).Recallfromchapter1thattheactivepowergetsactivatedthepassiveonegetsactivatedandchangedinthecausal
interaction.
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ProblemofComplexPerceptualContentOxfordScholarship
AnnaMarmodoro
PrintISBN13:9780199326006
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
TheProblemofComplexPerceptualContent
AnnaMarmodoro
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.003.0005
AbstractandKeywords
ForAristotleouronlymeansforperceivingtheworldarethefivesenses,eachindividuatedbythetypeofperceptible
qualitiesitissensitiveto:colorsforsight,soundsforhearing,etc.Doweperceiveonlyoneperceptiblequalityatatime?
Areperceptualqualitiesgivenindividually,separatelyinperception,evenifcontemporaneously?Ifthiswerethecase,we
wouldnotperceiveobjects,ordiscriminateandcomparetheirqualities.Butwedoperceiveobjectsanddiscriminateand
comparetheirqualities.Howisitthatwecanbecomeawareofperceptualcontentthatdoesnotconsistofisolated
perceptiblequalitiesatatime?Howdoweachievecomplexperceptualcontent?
Keywords:Aristotle,perceptiblequalities,fivesenses,complexperceptualcontent,objectsofperception
Introduction
InAristotlestheoryofperceptionthefivesensesenableustoperceivetherealcolors,sounds,fragrances,etc.,that
qualifytheworldlyobjectsofourexperience.Weperceivesuchqualitiesastheyare,for,inasense,byperceivingthemwe
makethembewhattheyare.ThisisAristotlesdistinctivesubtlerealistviewofperception,whichweexaminedinchapter
3.Ourperceptualexperienceoftheworldwouldbehoweverextremelylimitedifitreliedonlyontheoperationofthefive
sensesasdescribedthusfar.Thisisbecauseeachsensecanperceiveonlyitsownspecialsensibles(sightcolors,for
example)andnosensecanoperateinmorethanonemodalitynoneofthefivesenseswouldallowustoperceivesweet
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yellowhoneyforexample:wewouldseetheyellowandtastethesweet,butindifferent,unrelatedperceptualcontents.
Generalizing,iftheperceptualinputofeachsensemodalitycomesindifferentcontents,allwewouldperceivewouldbe
arraysofdisjointperceptibles.Unlessourperceptualfacultysomehowcandomore,itsservicetouswillberatherpoor.
Aristotleexplicitlyacknowledgesanumberofperceptualoperationsthatthefivesensesindividuallycannotperform:
simultaneousperceptionoftwodifferentspecial(p.157) sensiblesatoncesecondly,incidentalperceptionofone
specialsensiblebyasenseotherthanitsspecialoneandfinally,perceptionofthesocalledcommonsensibles
(movement,shape,etc.)whichdonotfallundertheremitofanyofthespecialsenses.Yet,alltheseoperationsare
integraltothewayweexperiencetheworldanditsobjects.ThedifficultyforAristotleliesinthefactthatallthese
perceptualoperationsrequirecomplexperceptualcontent(i.e.contentcomprisingmultimodalinput).Howcanthe
perceiveracquiresuchinput?ThequestionexercisesAristotle.Hissolutionistopositthesocalledcommonsense,in
additiontothefivespecialones.Thecommonsensedoesnothaveitsownsenseorganorspecialsensiblesyet,it
performsitsownoperations,operationsthatthefivesensescannotperforminsum,thecommonsenseenablesto
perceivertohavecomplexperceptualcontent.HowdoesAristotleaccountforthis?Thisandthefollowingchapters
motivateametaphysicallyrobustinterpretationofthecommonsense:thecommonsenseistheperceptualsystemasa
whole,comprisingthefivesensesbutempoweredwithextraperceptualcapacities,whichenabletheperceivertohandle
complexperceptualcontent.HowthefivesensescomposethecommononeisforAristotleanexercisingquestion,which
willbeaddressedinchapters6and7thepresentchapterexamineswhatmotivatesAristotletopositinthefirstplacethat
thereisacommonsenseinadditiontothefivespecialones.
4.1TheCommonSenseandthePerceptionofComplexPerceptualContent
Aristotlestheoryofperceptionisbuiltaroundafewcentral,wellknownassumptions,whichhavebeenpresentedinthe
earlierchaptersofthisbook.Aswesawinchapter2,forAristotleeachtype(p.158) ofperceptiblequalityidentifiesa
differentsense:aspecialsense,withitsownsenseorgan(sightforcolor,hearingforsound,etc.).Eachperceptible
qualitycangenerateacausalchangewithinthesensethroughwhichitisperceived.Theperceptiblequalitysimpacton
thesensegivesrisetotheperceptualcontentoftheperceiversexperience.Aristotletakesitforgrantedthatperceptual
awarenessoccursasperceptualcontentisgeneratedbythecausalactivationofasensebyaperceptiblequality. 1For
Aristotlethereisaonetoonecorrespondenceamongtheobjectsperceptiblequality,theactivation/alterationofthe
senseorgan,andthecontentoftheperceptualexperiencearisingfromit(e.g.,acorrespondencebetweenthisdesks
color,themodificationofmysenseorganofsightstimulatedbythisinstanceofcolor,andthecontentofmyexperienceof
thecolor).Inchapter2IintroducedtwokeyrepresentativestatementsbyAristotleasevidencefortheonetoone
correspondenceprinciple,fromtheDeAnimaandSenseandSensibiliarespectively,wherewereadthat,
qualityperceived,itmovesthesense...inthisdeterminateway,whilewhatisbittermovesitinacontraryway,and
whatiswhiteinadifferentway(DA426b29427a1,translationslightlymodified)...,
,.
,,,.
stimulationorexertionofasinglefacultybeingpossibleatasingleinstant.
(SS447b1719)
(p.159)
,.
Onthebasisofthisonetoonecorrespondenceprinciple,eachsensecanonlyallowtheperceiverasingle,simple(that
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is,unimodal)perceptualcontentatonetime.ThequotationsfromSenseandSensibiliaandtheDeAnimawellillustrate
the(primafacie,aswewillsee)impossibilityarisinginthecaseofonesenseperceivingatoncemultiplespecial
sensiblesofthesametype(e.g.,tasteperceivingsweetandbitteratonce)butthesamedifficultyarisesifhypothetically
onesenseweretoperceiveatoncemultiplespecialsensiblesofdifferenttypes.TheDeAnimapassagehasisfactalready
prepareduswithanexampletoseethatthedifficultygeneratedbytheonetoonecorrespondenceprincipleisnot
restrictedtotheperceptionofspecialsensiblesofthesametype,suchassweetandbitter,butextendstothecaseofa
senseperceivingmultiplespecialsensiblesofdifferenttypes,suchassweetandwhite.Thispointwillbeimportantin
drivingAristotleinvestigation,aswewillseeinthechapterstofollow:(anticipatingsomewhattheresultsofthe
forthcomingdiscussion)Aristotledoespositthatthereisasense,thesocalledcommonsense,thatenablestheperceiver
toperformperceptualoperationsinvolvingmultiplespecialsensiblesofdifferenttypesatonce.Isthecommonsensetoo
quasensegovernedbytheonetoonecorrespondenceprinciple?2Yes,itis.Wefindagenericformulationofthedifficulty
whichwellappliesbothtothespecialsenses(perceivingmultiplespecialsensiblesofthesametypeatonce)andtothe
commonsense(perceivingmultiplespecialsensiblesofdifferenttypesatonce)intheSenseandSensibiliawhere
Aristotlestatesconclusively:Hence,itisnotpossibletoperceivetwodistinctobjectssimultaneouslywithoneandthe
samesense(SS447b2021).How,then,cantherebesimultaneousperceptionof(p.160) multiple(typesof)
perceptiblequalitiesinoneperceptualcontent?Ifasense(whetheritisaspecialoneorthecommonone)wasnotdivided
intomanysensingpartsnamelypartseachofwhichcan,onitsown,perceiveaqualitythenitcouldperceiveonlyone
qualityataninstantsinceitcannotbeactivatedmultiply.Inthiscase,thedifficultywouldbetoaccountforhow
simultaneousperception(andthusmoregenerallycomplexperceptualcontent)ispossibleatall.If,ontheotherhand,
thesense(whetheritisaspecialoneorthecommonone)wasdividedintomanysensingparts,thiswouldfacilitate
simultaneousperception.Buthowcouldtherebeinthiscaseasinglecontentofawarenessenjoyedbyasingle
perceivingsubject?3
ItishereimportanttonotethattheabovequotationsfromtheDeAnimaandtheSenseandSensibiliaemphasizethe
(primafacie)impossibilityofsimultaneousperceptionofmultiplespecialsensiblesbyasinglesense.Butasalready
mentionedinchapter2,theproblemofsimultaneousperceptionofmultipleperceptiblequalities(ofthesameorof
differenttypes)inasingleperceptualcontentisanaspectofthemoregeneralchallengeAristotlestheoryofperception
hastoaddress,thatis,howwebecomeawareofcomplexperceptualcontent. 4Withouttheabilitytoperceivecomplex
perceptualcontent,wewouldnotbeabletoperceiveobjects,butonlydisjointinstancesofdifferentqualitiesinseparate
perceptualcontents:sounds,colors,texturesneverentitiesqualifiedinsuchandsuchaway.Ifallwecouldperceive
weredisjointarraysofproperties,thesenseswoulddoaratherpoorservicetous.Thisiswhythechallengetoaccountfor
howtheperceivercanacquireviathesensescomplexperceptualcontentissopressingforAristotle.Complexperceptual
contentisinvolvedinavarietyofoperations,whichAristotleexplicitlyidentifies:
Simultaneousperception(withinonesensemodalitye.g.,seeingthebluenessoftheskyandthewhitenessofthe
cloudsand(p.161) alsoacrosssensemodalitiese.g.,seeingthebluenessoftheseaandhearingthesoundof
thewavesseee.g.DA426b1719)
Perceptualdiscrimination(withinonesensemodalitye.g.,tellingyellowfromgreenandalsoacrosssense
modalitiese.g.,tellingwhitenessfromsweetnessseee.g.DA426b1014)
Crossmodalbinding(e.g.,perceivingasweetwhiteitem,suchaswhendrinkingmilkseee.g.DA425a30
425b3)
Additionally,objectshaveperceptiblequalitiesthatarenotexhaustedbythefivetypesthatfallundertheremitofthe
specialsenses:objectsareunifiedclustersofproperties,theymove,theyarecontinuousinspaceandtime,etc.perception
ofthesefeaturesoftheworldalsorequiresatheoryofperceptionthatincludesmorethantheoperationofthefivespecial
sensesinisolationfromeachother.Thuswecanaddtothethreelistedoperationswherecomplexperceptualcontentis
involvedthefollowingonetoo:
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Perceptionofcommonsensibleswhicharemultimodallycomposedperceptiblequalities(e.g.,feelingandseeing
theshapeofatree,orthemovementofadropofrainononeshandsee,forexample,DA425a1516).
Allthesetypesofexperiencesultimatelyenableustoperceiveobjects,butrequirethepossibilityofacquiringcomplex
perceptualcontent.BeforemovingforwardtoinvestigatehowAristotleexplainscomplexperceptualcontent,itis
importanttoemphasizehiscommitmenttotheviewthatweperceivemodallycomplexobjects.Analternativeposition
availabletoAristotle,andindeedendorsedbyPlato,wouldhavebeentoarguethatwegraspmodallycomplexobjectsof
perceptionbyinvolvingahighercognitivefacultythanthesenses.ThisisPlatosstanceintheTheaetetus,wherehe
drawsadistinctionbetweenourperceptionofbasicsensible(p.162) qualities,andthecognitiveprocessofgrasping
commonfeatures(suchassamenessanddifference),whichPlatoassimilatestothinking. 5IncontrasttoPlato,Aristotle
holdsthatweperceiveobjectsandtheirqualitativedifferences,similarities,continuity,andbehaviorforhimwedonot
assembleobjectstogetherbymeansofahigherfacultyofthesoul.Aristotlesgeneralmotivationforthisviewisto
explainthecomplexcognitiveabilitiesofanimalswithoutappealingtothecapacitiesoftheintellectivepartofthesoul,
becausethisisuniquetohumansandnotcommontoallanimals. 6
HowthencantheperceiverbeawareofcomplexperceptualcontentforAristotle?Thegeneraldirectionhepursuesisthat
perceptionofcomplexperceptualcontentrequiresextrapowersoverandabovetheonesthatthespecialsenseshaveand
activatewhenengagedintheperceptionoftheirspecialsensibles.Thespecialsensesareendowedwiththeseadditional
powerswhenactingtogetherasone,thatiswhenactingasintegratedpartsofaperceptualsystem.Theperceptual
systemasawhole,whichisendowedwiththeseextrapowers,iswhatAristotlecallsthecommonsense(
).Theperceptualoperationsthatallowtheperceiverawarenessofcomplexperceptualcontentconsistinthe
activationofsuchextrapowersbytheexternalobjects.Wecanclassifythepowersintothreegroupsaccordingtothe
operationstheyenabletoperceivertoaccomplish:
Powersrelevanttoperceptualdiscriminationwithinonemodality,andactivatedwhenwediscriminate(e.g.,white
fromblueorcoldfromwet)theyoperateoncomplexcontentofonetype
Powersrelevanttoawarenessofmodallycomplexcontent,thatisinvolvingmorethanonetypeofmodality(e.g.,
whenweperceivesweetandwhitesugar)
Powersthatenabletheperceiversawarenessofmultimodalcontentcommontomorethanonesense(e.g.,
movement).(p.163) Thesearethepowersrelevanttotheperceptionofthecommonsensibles,aswewillseeshortly. 7
InwhatfollowsIwillarguethatthereareessentialperceptualoperationsthatonlythecommonsensecanperform,
becauseitallowstheperceivertohavecomplexperceptualcontent,withoutwhichperceptionofobjectswouldbe
impossibleonAristotlestheory.Iwilldefendametaphysicallyrobustinterpretationofthecommonsense:itisanentity
initsownright,individuatedbytheperceptualfunctionsitcanuniquelyperform.Ontheotherhand,itisnotan
additionalsense.Itisratherthewaythespecialsensesoperatewhenengagedalltogetherinperception.Thequestionfor
Aristotlethereforebecomesthatofexplaininghowthespecialsensesachievetherequireddegreeofunitythatallows
themtoperformtheirintegratedoperations.Ontheonehand,Aristotlethinksthereisempiricalevidencethatweperform
perceptualoperationsthatinvolveunifiedcomplexperceptualcontent,andthisindicatesthattheremustbeaunified
commonsense.Ontheother,hederives(metaphysically)theunityofitsperceptualcontentfromtheunityofthecommon
sense.IntheremainingpartofthischapterIwillintroducethecasesofcomplexperceptualcontentAristotleinvestigates
andIwillshowwhereandhowthecommonsenseisessentialtosuchperceptions.InthesubsequentchaptersIwill
addressthemetaphysicalquestionsregardingtheconstitutionofthecommonsensethatareleftunaddressedinthe
secondaryliterature,andIwillmotivateanewaccountofAristotlesposition.
4.2SimultaneousPerception
Thereareanumberofcasesofcomplexperceptualcontenttobedistinguished.Complexperceptualcontentobtainsfor
examplewhentwomodallydifferentperceptiblequalitiesareperceivedby(p.164) twodifferentspecialsensesatthe
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sametime,thusbecomingpresenttotheperceiversawarenessatonce(e.g.,whenItastebittercoffeewhilelookingatthe
bluesea).Thetwoexperiencesareinsomewaysunified,becausetheyhappenatthesametime.Thisisofcourseaweak
senseofunity,asitisderivedfromtheexternalconditionsinwhichtheperceptionstakeplace.Yetitgivesrisetoasetof
questionsthat,asweshallsee,willdriveAristotlefurtherinhisinvestigationofthemetaphysicsofperception.Aristotles
ownexampleisofavisiblequalityandagustatoryqualityperceivedatthesametimethroughdifferentsenses,visionand
tasterespectively:
[Inthecaseofour]perceptionofwhatissweetbyvision...[W]
ehaveasenseforeachofthetwoqualities[e.g.
whiteandsweet],invirtueofwhich,whentheyhappentomeetinonesensibleobject[e.g.milk],weareawareof
bothcontemporaneously.
(DA425a2224,myemphasis)
...,
.
Aristotlegivesotherexamplestoo,inwhichtheperceptiblequalitiesperceivedsimultaneouslybelongtooneandthesame
objectalso,examplesofqualitieswhichoneperceptuallydiscernsandwhichmaywellbelongtodifferentobjects.
Aristotlealsomakesastatementthatsuggestshemighthavebeenawareofthepossibilitythatthereissimultaneous
perceptionofqualitieswhicharenotperceivedinthesameperceptualcontent:
For,assuredly,...itisnotbytaste,orsight,orbothtogetherthatonediscernsthatsweetthingsaredifferentfrom
whitethings.
(DS455a1719myemphasis)
(p.165) ......
ThisseemstosuggestthatAristotleenvisagesthepossibilitythatoneisawareofsweetandwhitebytasteandsight
sensingtogether,butnotdiscerningthesesensiblesinasingleperceptualcontentthiswouldbesimultaneous
perceptionthatisnotinasinglecontent.
Sincetheperceivercanhavesimultaneousperceptions,wecanassumethatforAristotletheperceivertherebyhas
simultaneousawarenessoftheperceptions. 8Buthowisitthatperceptualawarenessisactivatedinmorethanonesense
atonceratherthan,forexample,beingactivatedseriallyineachsenseinturn?Andwhatistheoutcomeofperceptual
awarenessbeingactivatedinmorethanonesenseatonce?Whatdoestheperceiverexperience?Theanswertothese
questionsistobefoundinthemetaphysicsofthecommonsense,whichwillbeinvestigatedinthechapterstofollow.
4.3IncidentalPerception
Aristotleacknowledgesthatperceptiblequalitiesfallingwithintheremitofonespecialsensemaybeperceivedthrough
anotherspecialsensetoo.Importantly,Aristotleconsidersthisacaseofindirectorincidental()
perception.9Hedescribesincidentalperceptionthus:
Thesensesperceiveeachothersspecialobjectsincidentally...thisincidentalperceptiontakesplacewhenever
senseisdirectedatoneandthesamemomenttotwodisparatequalitiesinoneandthesameobject(e.g.tothe
bitternessandtheyellownessofbile).
(DA425a30b2)
(p.166) ...
,()
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Aristotlesexampleisperceptionofwhatissweetbysight:
[Inthecaseofour]perceptionofwhatissweetbyvision...[w]
ehaveasenseforeachofthetwoqualities[e.g.,
whiteandsweet],invirtueofwhich,whentheyhappentomeetinonesensibleobject[e.g.,milk],weareawareof
bothcontemporaneously.
...,
.
Incidentalperceptionofthesweetbyvisionhappenswhenthewhiteandthesweetareperceivedthroughvisionatthe
sametime.Thus,generalizing,incidentalperceptionrequiressimultaneousperceptionofmodallydifferentqualities.It
hasasecondrequirementaswell:thattheperceptiblequalitiespertainingtodifferentmodalitiesbelongtothesame
objecte.g.,whiteandsweettomilk. 10Thesweetnessperceivedbysightisthesweetnessofthemilk,whosewhitenessis
seenatthesametime.Thusinperceivingthewhite,sighttherebyperceivesincidentallywhatissweet. 11Thisraisesthe
questionofwhethertheperceiverneedsbeawarethatthewhiteandthesweetaretwoqualitiesofthesameobject.It
seemsthattobeawarethatsheisperceivingincidentally(e.g.,thesweetthroughsight),theperceivermustbeawarethat
thetwoperceptiblequalitiesbelongtothesameobject.So,howdoestheperceiverbecomeawareofthis?Aristotlewrites:
Thesensesperceiveeachothersspecialobjectsincidentallynotbecausethepercipientsenseisthisorthatspecial
sense,(p.167) butbecauseallformaunity:thisincidentalperceptiontakesplacewheneversenseisdirectedat
oneandthesamemomenttotwodisparatequalitiesinoneandthesameobject(e.g.tothebitternessandthe
yellownessofbile)theassertionoftheidentityofbothcannotbetheactofeitherofthesenses.
(DA425a30b2myemphasis)
,,,
,().
Itisnotanyoneofthespecialsensesthatcandiscernthatthetwoperceptiblequalitiesbelongtothesameobject,
becausenospecialsensehasaccesstomorethanonetypeofperceptiblequalityofanyobject.Whichsense,then,is
Aristotlereferringtointhispassage(l.425b1)?Itmustbedifferentfrombothsightandtaste,and,generalizing,from
anyoneofthespecialsenses.Hence,somefurthermechanismisrequiredtogivetheperceivertheinformationthatthe
twoperceptiblequalitiesbelongtothesameobject(,425b23),thatforexamplethebitteristheyellow.In
thepassageunderdiscussionAristotlesaysthatitisthesensethatisconstitutedofthespecialsensesoperatingquaone
thatdetectstheonenessoftheyellowandthebitter.Thisiscrucial,becausethecoincidenceoftheyellowwiththebitteris
notperceptuallyaccessibletothespecialsenses,butisaccessibletothesensetheyconstitutetogether.Hence,thesense
thespecialsensesconstitute,thecommonsense,candetectmorethantheycanindividually,evenifitisconstitutedby
themandreliestotallyontheinputtheyprovide.Ifthecommonsensecanperformmorefunctionsthanthespecial
senses,itfollowsthatithasmorepowersthanthesensesindividuallyhave.Buthowdothesenses,allofthemactingqua
one,perceivetheonenessofanobject,ifnoneofthespecialsensesthroughwhichtheworldisperceivedcan?12
(p.168) 4.4PerceptionoftheCommonSensibles
Inadditiontothespecialsensibles,Aristotleacknowledgesafurthersetofobjectsofperceptionthathecallsthecommon
sensibles.(Themeaningofcommoninthiscontextwillbeexplicatedshortly).TheyareintroducedinbookIIoftheDe
Animathus:Commonsensiblesaremovement,rest,number,figure,magnitude(418a1718). 13Withrespecttothe
perceptionofthecommonsensibles,Aristotleholdsthatwhiletheyarentspecialsensiblesofanyofthefivesenses
thesearenotspecialtoanyonesense,(418a1819)thereisnospecialsensededicatedtothecommonsensibles
either.Hewritesthatitisclearlyimpossiblethatthereshouldbeaspecialsenseforanyoneofthecommonsensibles
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(e.g.movement)(DA425a2021seealso425a14).So,howarethecommonsensiblesperceived?Theytoorequirethe
operationofthecommonsense,asIwillargueinthissection.
Thespecialsensesmusthaveaccesstothecommonsensibles,otherwisethecommonsensibleswouldnotbeperceivedat
all,astheylacktheirownspecialsense.Aristotlefirstmakesareductivemove,bysayingthattheperceptionofallthe
commonsensiblesisachievedbytheperceptionofthespecialsensibles,theperceptionofmovement,andtheperception
ofcontinuity:
For,allthese[commonsensibles]weperceive[1]
bymovement(e.g.magnitudebymovement)andthereforealso
figure(forfigureisaspeciesofmagnitude),whatisatrestbytheabsenceofmovementnumberisperceived[2a]
bythenegationofcontinuity,and[2b]bythespecialsensiblesforeachsenseperceivesoneclassofsensible
objects.
(DA425a1620)
[],(),
(p.169) ,,(
)
Wethenwanttoknow:howismovementperceived?Andhowiscontinuity?Astomovement,Aristotlewrites:Thereare
certainkindsofmovementwhichareperceptiblebothbytouchandbysight(DA418a1920). 14Thisclaimmightberead
indifferentways.IsAristotlesaying,bymeansoftheexampleofmovement,thateachcommonsensibleisperceptibleby
eachoneofthespecialsenses?Orisheclaimingthateachcommonsensibleisperceptiblebymorethanonespecial
sense?Orthatacommonsensibleisperceptiblebyallthesensesoperatingtogether(i.e.,doingsomethingincommon)?
Orthateachcommonsensibleisperceptiblebymorethanonespecialsenseoperatingtogetherwithothers?Aristotles
claimthatcertainkindsofmovementareperceptiblebytouchandbysight(forexample,themovementofadropofrain
ononeshandcanbeperceivedbysightandtouch)makesthesecondreading,thateachcommonsensibleisperceptible
bymorethanonespecialsense,moreplausiblethantheotherthree.Thatnotallmovementsareperceptiblebysightalso
followsfromexperiencethatwouldhavebeenevidenttoAristotle(forexample,themovementofthewindcannotbeseen
directly,evenifonecanseeitseffectse.g.,seeingtheshufflingoftheleaves).Additionallytheproposedreadingisthe
onethatfitstheGreektextbest.
So,forAristotlethecommonsensiblesaresuchthattheyaresomehowperceptiblebymorethanonesense.Hehowever
appearstovacillatebetweensayingthatthespecialsensesperceive,withnoqualifications,thecommonsensibles(in
BookIIoftheDeAnima),andthatthespecialsensesperceivethemonlyincidentally(inBookIIIoftheDeAnima).If
shapeisdetectedthroughsightandthroughtouch,doweperceivevisibleshapeandtactileshapeasdifferentsensibles?If
not,howisitthenpossibletoperceivevisibletactileshape,(p.170) sincenoneoftherelevantsensescancrossover
intothedomainoftheothersensessoastoperceivethewholemultimodalsensible?(Thereasonwhynosensecancross
overthedomainofanothersenseistheprinciple,discussedinchapter2,thatforAristotlethereisonesenseforeachtype
ofsensiblequalityforthetypeofqualityindividuatesthesense).AtDA418a1920Aristotlesaysthatinthecaseof
movement,bothtouchandsightperceiveit(unqualifiedly).Isthisinconsistentwithhisgeneralclaimherebelowthatthe
specialsensesperceivethecommonsensiblesincidentally?
Therecannotbeaspecialsenseorganforthecommonsensibleseither(i.e.,theobjectswhichweperceive
incidentallythroughthisorthatspecialsensee.g.,movement,rest,figure,magnitude,number,unity).
(DA425a1416)
,,
,,,,
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BeforeaddressingthequestionofwhetherAristotlesstatementsareconsistentornot,weneedtoinvestigatehowwe
oughttounderstandtheincidentalperceptionofacommonsensible.Recallthataspecialsenseperceivesitsownspecial
sensibleandincidentallyothertypesofsensible,whichmighthappentobecompresentinthesameobjectofperception
andwhichcanbeperceivedbyanotherspecialsense.Forexample,sightperceivesthesweetqualityofmilkincidentally,
byperceivingthemilkswhitecolor.IfAristotlewantedtoexplaintheincidentalperceptionofacommonsensibleonthe
samemodelastheincidentalperceptionofaspecialsensible,hewouldhavetosaythatsight,forexample,incidentally
perceivesmovementbyperceivingacolorthatiscompresentwiththemovement,whichmovementsightdoesnotperceive
directly,butwhichisperceivedbyanothersense.Yetthisothersense,which(p.171) issupposedtoperceivemovement
directly(byanalogywithwhathappensinthecaseofincidentalperceptionofthespecialsensibles)couldnotbeaspecial
sense,sinceifthiswerethecase,sighttoo,quaspecialsense,oughttobeabletoperceivesomecommonsensibledirectly,
andnotonlyincidentally.Ifthisothersensecannotbeaspecialsense,whatsensewouldtherebethatperceivesthe
commonsensiblesdirectly?TheanswerforAristotleisthatnospecialsensecanperceivemovement,thesinglesensible
thatiscommontoamovingcolorandamovingtickle(e.g.,whenadropofmilktricklesdownourhand).Thereasonis
thateachsensecanperceiveitsowntypeofsensibleandnotsensiblesoftheothersenses.Wearethenbacktothe
question:howarewetounderstandthewayinwhichspecialsensesincidentallyperceivethecommonsensiblesifnot
alongthemodelofthewayeachspecialsenseincidentallyperceivestheobjectsoftheothersenses?Inwhatfollows,I
willarguethatthespecialsensesperceivethecommonsensiblesincidentally,butnotaccordingtothewhitesweetmodel
ofincidentalperception,wherebothqualitiesbelongtothesameobject.
Isubmitthateachspecialsenseneitherfailstoperceiveacommonsensible,norsucceeds.Rather,eachspecialsensehas
onlyapartialgraspofthecommonsensiblesaspecialsensedoesnothavethecapacitytofullydiscernandidentifya
commonsensible.Aswewillseeshortly,afullgraspofthecommonsensiblesispossibleonlyinthecontextofallthe
perceptionsofthecommonsensiblessuppliedbythespecialsensesactingasone.Supportforthisinterpretationistobe
foundinaninterestingthoughtexperimentAristotleperformsregardingthenumberofoursenses:hewonders,
Itmightbeaskedwhywehavemoresensesthanone.Isittopreventafailuretoapprehendthecommonsensibles
(e.g.,movement,magnitude,andnumber)whichfollowonthespecialsensibles?(DA425b46,translation
modified)
(p.172) ,.
,
Fromthequotationabovewelearnthatnoneofthecommonsensibilesistactile,orvisual,oracoustic,etc.Rather,the
commonsensiblesarequalitiesthatfollowonoraccompany(,l.425b5)thespecialsensiblesofthe
specialsenses(e.g.,movementaccompaniescolor).Theyaccompanythespecialsensiblesintwoways.Firstly,the
commonsensiblesarecoinstantiatedwiththespecialsensibles(forexample,coloreditemsmove,andarecontinuous,
andhaveashape,size,andareoneormoreinnumberandcorrespondinglywithsoftitems,withsweetones,etc.).
Secondly,thecommonsensiblesareperceivedwiththespecialsensibles(e.g.,weperceivemovementbyperceivinga
coloreditemthatismoving).Thegreaterthevarietyoftypesofspecialsensiblethecommonsensiblesareobservedto
accompany,themorefullywecandiscernwhateachcommonsensibleis,andwhatitisnot.(Crucially,asIwillexplain
inwhatfollows,itisnotthatwithaspecialsenseinisolationweperceive,forexample,partialmovementratherwe
perceivemovementbutwithlimitedinformationaboutit.)
AristotleconceivesofwhatIcalltheWhiteWorldthoughtexperimenttofurtherexplainthenatureofourperceptionof
thecommonsensibles,andthesenseinwhichtheyaccompanythespecialsensibles.Theexperimentgoesasfollows:
Hadwenosensebutsight,andthatsensenoobjectbutwhite,they[sc.thecommonsensibles]wouldhavetended
toescapeournoticeandeverythingwouldhavemergedforusintoanindistinguishableidentitybecauseofthe
concomitanceofcolorandmagnitude. 15
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(DA425b69)
(p.173) ,,
.
IntheWhiteWorldthecommonsensibleswouldaccompanythespecialsensibles(whiteobjectswouldhavemovement,
magnitude,number,etc.,justastheydoinourworld),buttheywouldescapeournotice,andallwewouldperceivebyour
singlesensewouldbewhite.Additionally,allwewouldperceivewouldappeartoustobeone,becausewewouldhaveno
perceptualaccesstodifferentiatingfeaturessoastodistinguishbetweenthings.Bycontrast,inourworld,Aristotle
argues,wecandetectmovement,becausewecan,forexample,perceivedifferentlycoloreditemsmovingagainsttheir
backgroundcoloreditems,andhencewecandifferentiatecolorfrommovement,etc.andthesamefortheothersense
modalities.Aristotlewrites:
Asitis,thefactthatthecommonsensibles[e.g.,movement]aregiven[embedded]intheobjectsofmorethanone
sense[e.g.,incoloredandharditems]revealstheirdistinctionfromeachandallofthespecialsensibles.
(DA425b911)
,.
Insum,Aristotlespositionisthatwhenweforexampleseeacoloreditemthatismoving,wealsofeelbytouchamoving
item.Eachspecialsensetakesnoteofthecommonsensible,inthiscasemovementbutthespecialsensesareunable,
withtheinformationavailabletoeach,tofullydiscernthecommonsensibles.Sightforexamplecantellmovingcolors
fromcolorsatrest,butitcannottellthatthemovementofacoloristhesamesensibleasthemovementofatangibleitem,
anditisunabletorecognizemovementwhenitisnotfollowingoncolor. 16
(p.174) Inconclusion,whenthespecialsensesperceivethecommonsensibles,eachspecialsensehasonlyapartial
epistemicholdoneachofthecommonsensibles.Itfollowsthataspecialsenseneitherperceivesnorfailstoperceive
thecommonsensibles.Thiscaseisnotthesameasthecaseofincidentalperceptionofaspecialsensiblebyaspecial
sense,where,forexample,sightfailstoseethesweet,whichitperceivesincidentallywhenitiscoinstantiatedwiththe
white.Inthepresentcasesightdoesseemovementinseeingamovingcoloredthing.Afterall,ifthespecialsensesdid
notregistermovementoranyoftheothercommonsensiblesatall,thenthecommonsensibleswouldbemissed
altogetherbytheperceiver,sincethereisnoothervehicleofperceptualinputforthemthanthroughthespecialsenses.
Thespecialsensesdoperceivethecommonsensibles,buttheydiscernthempartially,andwithvaryingdegreesof
accuracy.Thefullgraspofthecommonsensiblesisacommonperceptionresultingfromtheworkingtogetherofthe
specialsenses.Torecapitulatetheoverallargumentofthissectionsofar:wehaveseenthattheindividualspecialsenses
arepartlyawareofthecommonsensibles,whicharefullyperceived17onlywhenthespecialsensesoperateasone(and
thushaveadditionalperceptualpowers).Thespecialsensesperceivethecommonsensiblesonlyincidentallybecause
eachspecialsensedoesnotdiscernthecommonsensiblesassuch.Ontheotherhand,sincethespecialsensesare
individuallypartlyawareofthecommonsensibles,Aristotlereasonablysaysthatthespecialsensescanperceivethe
commonsensibles.
Thenextquestiontoaddressisthis:howdothespecialsensesoperateasonewhenperceivingthecommonsensibles?
Aristotletakestheviewthat,Inthecaseofthecommonsensibleswealreadyhaveacommonperception[
],whichisnotincidental(DA425a2728).Theexpressionat425a27referstotheperceptionof
thecommonsensiblesachievedthroughthespecialsensesactingasonei.e.,asthecommonsense.Butwestilldo
(p.175) nothaveaclearunderstandingofwhatitisforthespecialsensestoperceive,notquathemselves,butquaone.
Oneoftheinterpretativeconclusionsestablishedsofaristhatthesensesquaonehaveaccesstoalltheperceptualinput
thateachofthespecialsensesreceives.Thisinitselfmakesitpossiblefortheoverallperceptualsystem,orcommon
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sense,toachievecognitivetasksthatarenotpossiblefortheindividualspecialsenses.IgaveAristotlesreasonswhythe
commonsensemustbeendowedwithextraperceptualpowersoverandabovetheonesthespecialsenseshave.Inwhat
followsIwillarguethattheperceptionofthecommonsensiblesresultsfromtheoperationofthecommonsenseonthe
perceptualcontentmadeavailablebythespecialsenses.ThismakesAristotlesaccountoftheperceptionofthecommon
sensiblesverydifferentfromhisaccountoftheperceptionofthespecialsensibles.Thisresultishowevertobeexpected,
inviewofthefactthatthecommonsensehasnosenseorganofitsown,butreliesforitsperceptualcontentsontheinput
fromtheindividualspecialsenses.Myproposedunderstandingoftheworkingsoftheperceptualsystemfindssupportin
thedescriptionoftheperceptualprocessAristotlegiveshere:
Theairmodifiesthepupilinthisorthatwayandthepupiltransmitsthemodificationtosomethirdthing(and
similarlyinhearing),whiletheultimatepointofarrivalisone,asinglemean,withdifferentmannersofbeing.
,,,,<>
,.
Nocommonsensibleisperceivedthroughthisorthatspecialsenseorgan.Rather,acommonsensiblescausalimpacton
theperceiverisarticulatedinthealterationsofthedifferentsenseorgansthat(p.176) perceivethespecialsensiblesthat
acommonsensibleaccompanies.Forexample,movementwillimpactontheperceiverbygenerationofavisual
perceptionofthecoloroftherollingball,andatangibleperceptionofthehardnessoftherollingball,etc.These
compartmentalizedalterationsofthespecialsensesbyacommonsensiblecometogetherinthecommonsenseitself,
complementingeachother.Itisonlyinthecontextofalltheinputavailabletothecommonsensethatthecommon
sensiblesareproperlydiscernedforwhattheyare,anddistinguishedfromtheirconcurrentspecialsensibles.Thus,itis
onlythecommonsensethatcandiscernthecommonsensiblesassuch,bydissociatingthecommonsensible(e.g.,
movement)fromallotherperceptiblequalitiesofwhatismoving.Thecommonsense,anditalone,perceivesmovement
asasinglesensible.Themovementthesubjectperceivesthroughthecommonsenseviadifferentsensemodalitiesisone
becauseitisoneandthesamesensiblethatoneperceivesthroughtwoormorespecialsenses(forinstanceinthecaseof
themovementofadropofrainononeshandwhichoneperceiveswithsightandtouch).Thisisdifferentfromthecase
wehaveseenaboveoftwosensibleswhichareonebecausetheycoincideinathirditem(e.g.whiteandsweetinalump
ofsugar),inwhichcase,Aristotletellsus,weperceivetwodisparatequalitiesinoneandthesameobject(DA425b1,my
emphasis).
Animportantqualificationisneededhere.Inclaimingthatthecommonsensiblesaccompanythespecialsensibles,
Aristotleisnotsuggestingthatthecommonsensiblesappeartotheperceiversawarenessasfurtherqualitieswhenthe
specialsensiblesareperceived.Forexample,thenumberofanobjectisnotafurthersensiblethattheobjectpossesses,
overandaboveitsotherperceptiblequalitiesnoraresizeandshapesensibleslikecolororscentnoristheobjectsbeing
atrestsuchasensibleeither. 18Thecommonsensiblesareconstituted,ratherthanelemental,qualitativefeaturesof
objects. 19Inasense,thecommonsensiblesarewaysinwhichthe(p.177) specialsensiblesareclusteredtogether:
waysinwhichthespecialsensiblesareorbehaveintheirspatiotemporallocationsasbeingatrest,ormoving,orbeing
thusdistributedinspace,orbeingcontinuous,orseparate,etc. 20Thereforeperceptionofthecommonsensiblesmakesa
crucialcontributiontowardstheperceiversawarenessandidentificationofobjects,ratherthanarraysofdisjointed
perceptiblequalities.
Interpretershaveaccountedforthecapacityofthecommonsensetodetecttheonenessoftheobjectofperceptionin
variousways,fromwhichmyinterpretationdeparts.ForexampleCatherineOsborne(1988)andPavelGregoric(2007)21
sharetheviewthat,inOsborneswords:
Thesensecorrespondsinafundamentalwaytotheobjectstowhichitisattuned,andwhiletheindividualsenses
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arespeciallyadaptedtotheirownclassofthepropersenseobjects,thesensefacultyasawholeislikethetotal
objecttowhichitisattuned,anditrecognizesthatobjectasaunity,invirtueofitselfbeingsuchaunitywith
sensitivitytoallthevariousclassesofsensiblequalitiesthattheobjectpossesses.
OsbornesinterpretativeproposalisthatAristotlepositsa(primitive?)likeness(innumber?)betweenthemultimodally
composedsenseandtheobjectofperception,andthisiswhatexplainsthespecialsensitivityofthesensetoobjectsas
wholes,ratherthandisjointedperceptiblequalities.Buttheprinciplethatthemultimodallycomposedsenserecognizes
anobjectasaunitybecausethesenseitselfisaunityisnotunproblematicfor,bythesamereasoning,thesenseoughtto
perceiveallcooccurringperceptiblequalitiesasone,sincetheirunityasobjectsisderivedfromtheunityofthesense
itself.In(p.178) otherwords,anythingthatthesenseperceivesoughtbeperceivedasonebecausewhatwouldmakeit
oneistheunityoftheperceivingsense.DavidCharles(2000)ontheotherhandoffersanalternativeexplanationby
appealingtotheprincipleofcausalassimilation(becomingalike)betweensenseandobjectofperception.Hewrites:
Perceptionwouldbeofthisoneyellow,bitterobject(425b13)providedthatitwasbroughtabout,inappropriate
conditions,bythisoneobject.Causalassimilationtoonecrossmodalmovingobjectexplainswhyperceptionisof
onesuchobjectratherthanof(e.g.)onevisualobjectandonetactileobject(inwhichcasefurtherinferencewould
berequiredtoreachthediscriminationofonecrossmodalobject).(2000,125)
ThedifficultywithCharlesaccountisthatthemodelofcausalassimilationwithrespecttothespecialsensespresupposes
thatthesenseorgan(e.g.,theeyejelly)becomesliketheperceptiblequalitythatthesenseisperceiving.Butinthecaseof
acrossmodalobject,touseCharlesterminology,thereisnoonesenseorganthatperceivesit(DA425a1416),and
whichcanbecomelikeit.Sothecausalassimilationmodelcannottransferfromthecaseofthespecialsensiblestothe
caseofthemultimodalobjectsofperception.Iwillarguethatourabilitytoperceiveobjectsisbasedonourabilityto
perceivethecommonsensiblesthroughthecommonsense,towhichweshallcomeinthefollowingsection.
4.5FromthePerceptionoftheCommonSensiblestothePerceptionofObjects
Wesawinsection4.4thatwhen,forexample,sightperceivesmovementincidentally,quaspecialsenseitperceivesonly
some(p.179) informationaboutmovement(e.g.,itsvisibility)themovementmightalsobenoisy(e.g.,thesightand
soundofafly),butsightdoesnotperceivethat.Thisissimilartothecaseofaspecialsenseperceivingtheproper
perceptibleofanothersense(e.g.,sightincidentallyperceivingsweetbyperceivingwhite)whiteisanaspectofthe
perceivedwhitesweetobject,saymilk,aswesawinsection4.3.Thereishoweveranimportantdifferencebetweenthe
incidentalperceptionofcommonsensiblesandtheincidentalperceptionofaspecialsensiblebyaspecialsense:the
visiblemovementthatsightperceivesisthesamesensibleasthemovementthatisalso,forexample,audible,ortangible
whereasthewhitethatsightperceivesisnotthesamesensibleasthesweetthattasteperceives.Inotherwords,the
specialsensesperceiveincidentallythecommonsensiblesbyperceivingaspectsofthesesensibleswhileeachspecial
senseperceivesincidentallyaspecialsensiblebyperceivingmodallydifferentspecialsensiblesthatarecoinstantiatedin
thesameobject.Sotherelevantunityfortheincidentalperceptionofacommonsensibleistheunityofthecommon
sensibleitselfwhereastherelevantunityfortheincidentalperceptionofspecialsensiblesistheunityoftheobjectin
whichthesespecialsensiblesareinstantiated.Thisiscrucial.ItisthekeytounderstandingAristotlesexplanationof
howweperceiveexternalobjectsasobjects,asopposedtoasclustersofproperties:thecommonsensiblesaremultimodal
sensiblesperceiveddirectlybythecommonsense.
Theagentperceivesaunifiedobjectbyperceivingtheunifiedcommonsensiblesthatqualifyit(e.g.,itsshape,size,
number,movement).Sheperceivesdirectlyviathecommonsensethemultimodallyunifiedcommonsensiblesthat
qualifyobjectsintheworld.Thisgroundsherrecognitionoftheunityandonenessoftheexternalobjectitself.Thusfor
example,IperceivedirectlyviathecommonsensetheshapeoftheballIseewithmyeyesandfeelwithmyhandsasone
shapeandIsocanattributethecolorandtextureofthatshapetotheballwhich(p.180) Itherebyperceiveasasingle
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object.IemphasizethatAristotledoesnotsay,andheneednotsay,thattoperceivetheshapeoftheballtheperceiver
needstofirstbeawarethatthecolorandtexturebelongtothesameobject.Rather,theperceiverperceivesdirectlyviathe
commonsensetheballsshape,ascolorandtextureunifiedinacertainspatiotemporallocation.IntheMetaphysics
Aristotleremarksontheroleofperception(aswellasofknowledge)thus:
Knowledge...andperception,wecallthemeasureofthings...becauseweknowsomethingbythem...Evidently,
then,beingoneinthestrictestsense,ifwedefineitaccordingtothemeaningoftheword,isameasure,and
especiallyofquantityandsecondlyofquality.Andsomethingswillbeoneiftheyareindivisibleinquantity,and
othersiftheyareindivisibleinquality.
(Met.1053a31b8)
......
,,,
,.
Thecommonsensiblesarenotindivisibleinthestrictestsense,anymorethanobjectsare.Buttheperceptionofthe
commonsensiblesisthemeasureoftheonenessofobjects.Theindivisibilityofacommonsensiblemeasuresthe
onenessofanobject.ThusforAristotle,thedirectperceptionofthecommonsensiblesgroundsourawarenessofunified
objects(i.e.,oftheirbeingone).Thereforethecommonsenseisascognitivelyprimitiveasenseasitsconstituentspecial
senses.
Inconclusion,intheinterpretationIamproposingthecommonsense(i.e.,thespecialsensesnotquathemselves,but
qua(p.181) one)(DA425a31),isunifiedandhasaccesstomuchmoreperceptualinputthananyofthespecialsenses
has.Thisinformationallyenrichedcontextallowstheperceiver,viathecommonsense,tobeawareofthecommon
sensibles(andhenceofobjects).Forthistohappen,itmustbepossiblethattheperceiverisawareoftheinputfromany
onespecialsenseinthesameunifiedperceptualcontentastheinputfromanyotherspecialsense.Thisisadifficult
problemforAristotle.Anaccountofthecompositionandoperationoftheoverallperceptualsystemisrequired.In
differentpartsofhisworkAristotleoffersavarietyofdifferentmetaphysicalexplanationsoftheperceptualsystemasa
whole,whichwillbeexaminedinchapters6and7.
ConcludingRemarks
InthischapterweexaminedtheconsiderationsthatleadAristotletoposittheexistenceofacommonsenseoverand
abovethefivespecialones.Thereisavarietyofperceptualoperationsthatthefivesensescannotperform,fortheyall
presupposeunifiedmodallycomplexperceptualcontent.Thesearesimultaneousperceptionofdifferentperceptible
qualitiesatonceincidentalperceptionofaperceptiblequalitywithasensethatisnotitsspecialoneperceptual
discriminationbetweendifferentperceptiblequalitiescrossmodalbindingofdifferentqualitiesinonecontentand
finally,directperceptionofmodallycomplexsensibles(i.e.,perceptiblequalitiesthatessentiallyfallundertheremitof
morethanonesenseatonce,andcannotbeperceivedbyanyspecialsenseoperatingindividually).Aristotleisthus
driventoenrichhistheoryofperceptionwithacommonsense,whosemetaphysicswillbeexaminedinchapters6and7.
(p.182) Appendix:VarietiesofIncidentalPerception
Aristotleinvestigatesinhisworkthreecasesofincidentalperception,whicharequitedifferentfromeachother.This
appendixteasesthemapart,forthefactthatAristotleusesthesamewordingtorefertothesethreedifferentcasesmight
generatesomeconfusioninthereader.Aristotletalksaboutincidentalperceptionwhenaspecialsenseperceives
incidentallythespecialsensibleofanothersense.Thistypeofincidentalperceptionrequiressimultaneityofperceptionof
thetwomodallydifferentperceptiblequalitiesbelongingtothesameobject.Weexamineditinsection4.3.Inaddition,
Aristotlereckonsthatthespecialsensescanperceiveincidentallynotonlythespecialsensibleofanothersense,butalso
thecommonsensibles(e.g.,movement,shape,size).Theseareperceptiblequalitiesofobjectsthatdonotfallunderthe
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remitofanyofthespecialsensesbutneverthelessthespecialsensesperceivethem,incidentally.Wediscussedthiscase
insection4.5.BoththefirstandthesecondcaseofincidentalperceptionarerelevanttothestudyofhowAristotle
accountsforcomplexperceptualcontentandultimatelytheperceptionofobjects,aswesawinsection4.6.Thereisalsoa
thirdcase:Aristotlecallsincidentaltheawarenessofanonperceptiblequality(e.g.,beingCleonsson)thattheagent
maygainbyperceivingaperceptiblequality(e.g.,white)viaaspecialsense.Aristotletalksaboutitinthefollowing
terms:
Wehaveasenseforeachofthetwoqualities[whiteandsweet],invirtueofwhichwhentheyhappentobeinone
sensibleobjectweareawareofbothsimultaneously.Ifnot[i.e.,ifwewerenotawareofbothqualities
simultaneously]ourperceptionwouldalwaysbeincidental,asforexampleintheperceptionofCleonsson,where
weperceivehimnotasCleonsson(p.183) butaswhite,andthewhitethingwhichwereallyperceivehappensto
beCleonsson.
(DA425a2327)
,.,
(,,
)
InthecaseheredescribedtheperceiverincidentallyperceivesthesonofCleonbyperceivingthroughsightthewhite
objectwhichisthesonofCleon.Whatisinterestingaboutthisexampleisthatonecannotperceivethepropertyofbeing
thesonofbutsinceonecanperceivethewhite,andthewhiteisCleonsson,onetherebyincidentallyperceivesbysight
thesonofCleon.Inthisexample,itisexplicitthatsighthasaccesstotheotherwiseimperceptiblepropertybeingtheson
ofCleoninvirtueofthefactthatwhatsightperceives,thewhite,isthesonofCleon.Aristotlemakesasimilarpoint
elsewhereintheDeAnima:
WespeakofanincidentalobjectofsensewhereforexamplethewhiteobjectwhichweseeisthesonofDiares
herebecausebeingthesonofDiaresisincidentaltothewhite,wespeakofthesonofDiaresasbeing
(incidentally)perceivedorseenbyus.
(DA418a2023)
,
,,.
Inconclusion,wesawabovethatwecanperceivethewhiteandsweetsimultaneously,where,generalizing,simultaneous
perceptionrequirestheperceptionofmodallydifferentqualitiesatthesametime.Aristotleisinterestedinthecaseswhere
the(p.184) simultaneouslyperceivedqualitiespertainingtodifferentmodalitiesbelongtothesameobject(e.g.,white
andsweettomilk).Hisinterestinisolatingthesecasesisthattheygiverisetoincidentalperception,whichdoesnot
ariseinthecaseofmeresimultaneousperceptionofpropertiesthatdonotbelongtothesameobject.Aristotlethenmoves
toincidentalperceptionoftheimperceptible.Wecanperceiveobjectswithmultifariousproperties,perceptibleornot,
whichareincidentallyperceivedbyourperceivingtheperceptiblepropertiesoftheseobjects.Hecallsallthesecasestoo
incidentalperception.
Notes
Notes:
(1).MyremarksareofcoursenotintendedtosuggestthatforAristotletherearemanycentersofperceptualawareness
(i.e.,asmanyasthespecialsenses).Thereisonlyonecenterofawareness,theperceptualsystemasawhole,which
gathersperceptualcontentthroughthespecialsenses.
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(2).Theonetoonecorrespondenceprincipleappliestothespecialaswellasthecommonsense.Thecommonground
fortheapplicationtotheprincipletobothisthattheactivityofasinglepowerataninstantisasingletypeofactivity.
Thecorrespondencefollowsfromthis.Eachsenseisaperceptualpower,withadistinctivetypeofactivitythatdefinesit.
(3).Aswewillseeintheconcludingchapter,Aristotlesfinalsolutiontotheseproblemsisthatthecommonsenseisa
singleperceptualsystem,whichdoesnothavedifferentperceivingparts,butdifferentimplementationsofoneandthe
sameperceptualfunction.Howaretheperceptualpowerssocomposedtoachievesuchunity?Aristotlesbreakthroughis
torecognizethattheperceptualsystemisunified,notbottomup,buttopdown.Theinclusionofvarioussimultaneous
awarenessesintoasinglecomplexperceptualcontentdoesnotresultfromthecoinstantiationofchanges(activations)
inasinglesenseorgan.(Thecommonsensedoesnotevenhaveasenseorgan).Itisratheraresultofafunctional
unificationoftheactivityofthevariousspecialsenseorgans.Theperceptualsystemisnotunifiedphysicallybut
functionally,wheretheactivityofthevarioussenseorgansrealizesoneandthesameperceptualfunctionofthesubject.Is
thissolutionadeviationfromtheonetoonecorrespondenceprinciple?Itisnot.Theonetoonecorrespondence
principlestillholds.Theperceptualsystemissoboundtogetherphysicallythatthesenseorgansimplementthesame
perceptualfunctionality.Thisistheunityofthecommonsense,wherehearing,seeing,tasting,etc.,aredifferentwaysof
serving,eachandalltogether,thesameperceptualfunction.Theseissuesareexaminedinchapters6and7andinthe
overallConclusions.
(4).PossiblyAristotlegivesemphasistotheproblemofaccountingforsimultaneousperceptionofmultiplesspecial
sensibles(ofoneordifferenttypes)inonecomplexperceptualcontent,becauseinawaythismakesthechallengeeven
moreperspicuous:evenifasensewassensitivetomorethanonetypeofsensiblequality,andcouldenabletheagentto,
forexample,seeandhear,itwouldstillbechallengingtoexplainhowitcanbeactivatedsimultaneouslybytwodifferent
typesofactivitiesatonce.SeethefootnoteimmediatelyprecedingthisoneforabriefaccountofhowAristotleaddresses
theproblem.
(5).AsP.Gregoric(2007,3,note1)reports,thisissuggestedbytheuseofat185a4,9,b7at
186a11,c3and,186d3.At187a28Platoevenproposestocalltheprocess.Further,at184d15
Socratescommendstheideaofseeingwiththesoulbymeansoftheeyes,ratherthanwiththeeyes(accordingtothe
latterview,itwouldbelikeseveralsensesweresittinginusasinawoodenhorse).
(6).Gregoric(2007,6)notesthat[t]
h efarreachingconsequencesofthispremisehavebeenrightlyemphasizedby
Sorabji(1992,1961993,720).SorabjistressesthatAristotle,duetohisdenialofreasoningandbelieftoanimals,must
accountfortheirabilities(forexampletoconnectasceneandadirection)byassigningpredicativepowerstoperception,
thenceexpandingitscontentbeyondtherudimentaryleveltowhichPlatohadreduceditinTheaetetus.Accordingly,
Aristotledoesthreethings.First,hetidiesuptheconceptofreason(logos)inthedirectionoftheTheaetetus,bybringing
allofdoxa(belief)underit(DA428a1924,seebelow).Secondly,hegivestoperceptualcontentoneofthemostmassive
expansionsinthehistoryofGreekphilosophy.Thirdly,despiteexpandingtheroleofperception,hemaintainsPlatos
denialthatperceptioninvolvesbelieforisafunctionofreason(Sorabji1992,196).
(7).Additionally,Aristotleattributestoeachspecialsenseawiderrangeofdiscriminatorypowers,evenpowersthatare
notassociatedwithspecificobjectsofsensesuchasthepowerofsighttodetectlightordarkness.SeeDA425b21.See
alsoDA422a2031:
Justassightapprehendsbothwhatisvisibleandwhatisinvisible(
)(fordarknessisinvisibleandyetitisdiscriminatedbysightso,inadifferentway,whatisover
brilliant),andashearingapprehendsbothsoundandsilence,ofwhichtheoneisaudibleandtheotherinaudible,
andalsooverloudsoundorviolentsoundassightdoeswhatisbright,etc.
(8).ThereisnoevidenceinthetextsthatAristotleofferedanexplanationoftheperceiverssimultaneousawarenessbut
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itisplausibletothinkthathewouldhavehadsomethingtosayaboutthisissue,giventhesophisticatedunderstanding
heshowsofperceptionseeforexampleDA425b2022.
(9).InwhatfollowsIshalluseindirectandindirectlyassynonymsofincidentalandincidentally.
(10).ThefactthatAristotlespecifiesthatthereisincidentalperceptiononlywhenwhiteandsweetarecompresentin
thesameobjectmarksthedifferencewithmeresimultaneousperception,whenonemayhappentoperceivethewhiteand
thesweetindifferentobjects,atthesametime.
(11).Aristotlesclaimthatthespecialsensesperceiveeachothersspecialsensiblesincidentallyisamajordifficultyfor
CorciliusandGregoricsviewthatitistheperceptualcapacityofthesoulthatreceivesallkindsofsensibleformswithout
matter.Thefivespecialsensesarejustnamesforitsabilitytoreceivefivedifferentkindsofsensibleforms(2011,112,my
emphasis)AU:XrefsourceinReferencesisdated2010..Ifthefivesensesarejustnamesofthesameabilityofthesoulto
perceive,howcantherebeincidentalperception,whichAristotleunequivocallyclaimsthereis?SeeK.CorciliusK.andP.
Gregoric,Separabilityvs.Difference:PartsandCapacitiesoftheSoulinAristotle,OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,
39(2010).
(12).ForadiscussionofallcasesofincidentalperceptionAristotleconsiders,seetheappendixattheendofthischapter.
(13).Ross(1961,239)referstotheinclusionofotherobjectsascommon:SS437a317alsomentionsroughnessand
smoothness,andMem.450a910,alapseoftime.Further,RosstracesbacktheoriginofthedoctrinetoTheat.158a8
186a1,whilewarningthatnumberistheonlyobjectfoundbothinPlatoslistandAristotlesandthatPlatoascribes
awarenessofsuchobjectstothesoulandnottosensation.
R.Polanski(2007,256)remarks:
Roughness,smoothness,sharpness,bluntness,andtimeareofferedascommonsensiblesinDeSensu442b57
andDeMemoria450a910and451a1617).ThoughAristotledoesnotmentiondirectionorplaceasacommon
sensible,eachofthefivesensesiscognizantofdirectionality,andhenceheallowsthatwecanbemistakenabout
wherethepalethingorthesoundingthingis(see418a1516)....Perhapsthereasonhedoesnotreferexplicitlyto
othercommonsensiblesisthattheycanbeunderstoodintermsofthefivetypesnamed.
(14).
(15).ThisisallAristotlesays,butforthedesiredconclusiontofollow,weneedtocompletehisthoughtexperimentby
assumingnotonlythatwhiteistheonlycolorwecouldsee,butthatwhite(ofasinglehue,saturation,andintensity)is
theonlycolorinaworldwherethereisnobrightnessorshadow,etc.orassumethatallcolorsareseenbyusaswhite,
andthattherearenopatchesofcolorlessnessintheworld,whichwouldallowustoseemovement,magnitude,shape,
number,etc.
(16).Interestingly,AristotlesWhiteWorldthoughtexperimentintheDeAnimaisverysimilartoanargumentinPlatos
Theaetetusconcerningtheinadequateindividuationofanentity.IntheTheaetetus,Platoarguesthatonedoesnothave
knowledgeofasyllableifonecancorrectlyidentifythesyllableinonecontextbutnotinanothercontext:
WhenapersonatthetimeoflearningwritesthenameofTheaetetus,andthinksthatheoughttowriteanddoes
writeThandEbut,again,meaningtowritethenameofTheodorus,thinksthatheoughttowriteanddoeswriteT
andEcanwesupposethatheknowsthefirstsyllableofyourtwonames?
(Theaetetus207e208a)
InthecasePlatoconsiders,thespellerfailstorecognizethatthesyllableTheisthesameinitstwooccurrencesintwo
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differentnames.Becauseofthisfailure,PlatoarguesthatthespellerdoesnothaveknowledgeofthesyllableThe.Itis
notthecasethatthepersonhasnocognitivecontactatallwiththesyllableThe.Infactshespellsitcorrectlyinwriting
thefirstname,Theaetetus.Rather,thespellerhasonlypartialknowledgeofthesyllable,becausesheidentifiesit
correctlyinsomeoccurrences,butfailstoidentifyitinotheroccurrences.AristotlesargumentintheWhiteWorld
thoughtexperimentisverysimilartoPlatos,inthatinAristotlesthoughtexperimenttheperceiverdoesseethemoving
whiteitems,amongalltheotherwhiteitemsbutshecannottellthemovingitemsapartfromtheonesatrest.Thusinthe
WhiteWorld,Aristotlesays,movementwouldhavetendedtoescapeournoticeandeverythingwouldhavemergedforus
intoanindistinguishableidentitybecauseoftheconcomitanceofcolorandmagnitude(DA425b79).Thecaseis
similartoPlatossyllablecase:therethepersonspellsThecorrectlyinwritingonename,butinwritingtheothername
shedoesnotrecognizeitisthesamesyllableintheWhiteWorldthoughtexperiment,sheseesthemovement,butcannot
recognizeitisdifferentfromsizeandshape,andhencefromrest.
(17).Thatis,fullinformationaboutthemisacquired.
(18).ThisisalsowhyAristotlesaysthatweperceivemagnitudeandfigurebyperceivingmovement,andrestby
perceivingtheabsenceofmovementwhileweperceivenumberbythenegationofcontinuity(DA425a1619).
(19).ItisimportanttobearinmindthatonAristotleswayofthinking,thecommonsensiblesarenotconstructedby
abstractionfromthecontributionsofthespecialsenses.Rather,theyareperceptuallyrevealedtotheperceiverinthe
contextofalltheperceptualinputwhichreachesthecommonsense.
(20).ThisiswhyAristotlesaysthatnumberisperceivedbythenegationofcontinuityandbythespecialsensibles(DA
425a19myemphasis).Howisnumberperceivedbyperceivingthespecialsensibles?Itisfoundinthewaythespecial
sensiblesclustertogether.
(21).SeeGregoric(2007,138).
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UnityofSubject,Operation,Content,andTimeOxfordScholarship
AnnaMarmodoro
PrintISBN13:9780199326006
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
UnityofSubject,Operation,Content,andTime
AnnaMarmodoro
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.003.0006
AbstractandKeywords
Aristotlearguesthatthereareanumberofperceptualoperationsthatareessentialforafullperceptualgraspoftheworld
anditsfurniture,whichcannotbeperformedbyanyoneofthespecialsenses.Allsuchoperationsrequirethepossibility
ofcomplexperceptualcontent.Eachsenseisdefinedbyitssensitivitytoatypeofperceptiblequalities(sighttocolors,
etc.).Toaccountforthecomplexityofperceptualcontent,Aristotlearguesforacommonsense.Thecommonsenseisa
perceptualpowerthatmakespossibleawarenessofmultimodalcontent.Thecomplexityofthecontentderiveseitherfrom
theworld,orfromtheoperationsofthecommonsenseitselfonthecontent,enablingperceptualdiscrimination,cross
modalbinding,etc.
Keywords:complexperceptualcontent,commonsense,crossmodalbinding,perceptualdiscrimination,multimodalcontent
Introduction
Aristotlereckonsthatthereareanumberofperceptualoperationsthatareessentialforafullperceptualgraspoftheworld
anditsfurniture,butcannotbeperformedbythespecialsensesinisolationweexaminedtheminchapter4.Theyall
requirethepossibilityofcomplexperceptualcontent,thenatureofwhichisinvestigatedinthischapter.Complex
perceptualcontentcannotbewhatanyofthespecialsensesisawareof,foreachsenseisdefinedbyitssensitivitytoa
narrowdomainofspecialperceptiblequalities(sighttocolors,etc.).ThusAristotlepositsacommonsense,thatgathers
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complexperceptualcontentandcanoperateonit,enablingtheperceivertoperformperceptualdiscrimination,cross
modalbinding,etc.ThischapterexaminestheconstraintsAristotleplacesonthecommonsensefortheperformanceof
suchoperations.Thecommonsenseisasuigenerissense,notonlybecauseitdoesnothaveitsownsenseorgan,but
alsobecauseitisindividuateddifferentlyfromthespecialsenses.Theseareindividuatedbythetypeofperceptiblequality
theyaresensitivetobycontrastthecommonsenseisindividuatedbythetypeofperceptualcontentitisawareof.Finally,
itisclearthatthecommonsenseneedstohaveaunityofitsown,in(p.190) ordertosatisfytheaboverequirementsand
beabletoperformtheperceptualoperationsAristotleascribestoit.Theseconsiderationsmotivatearobust
interpretationofthecommonsense,whosemetaphysicswillbeinvestigatedinchapters6and7.
5.1PhysicalConstraintsonComplexPerceptualContent
Wesawinchapter4thatsimultaneousperception,incidentalperceptionandperceptionofthesocalledcommon
sensiblesrequiretheoperationofthecommonsense,astheycannothappenbymeansofanyofthespecialsenses.There
arefurtherperceptualoperationsthatpointtowardthesameconclusion,astheypresupposethattheperceiverisawareof
multipleinstancesofspecialsensiblesatonce,inasingleunifiedperceptualcontent.Theseoperationsareperceptual
discrimination(withinonesensemodality,forexampletellingyellowfromgreenandalsoacrosssensemodalities,for
exampletellingwhitenessfromsweetness)andcrossmodalbinding(e.g.,perceivingasweetwhiteitem,suchaswhen
drinkingmilk).Ontheotherhand,aswesawinchapter2,akeybackgroundassumptionforAristotleisthatthe
receptionofeachperceptiblequalitygeneratesacausalmovementoralterationwithinthesensethroughwhichitis
perceived.Theperceptiblequalitysimpactonthesenseorgangivesrisetotheperceptualcontentintheperceivers
experience.Thereisaonetoonecorrespondencebetweenaninstanceofaperceptiblequality,thecausalchangeit
bringsaboutinthesenseorgan,andtheperceptualcontentwhichresults.ForexampleAristotleclaimsthat,
stimulationorexertion(p.191) ofasinglefacultybeingpossibleatasingleinstant...Hence,itisnotpossibleto
perceivetwodistinctobjectssimultaneouslywithoneandthesamesense.
(SenseandSensibilia447b1719)
....
Therestrictiontoonestimulationorexertionateachmomentintimeisdrivennotbymental,butbyphysicalorder
considerations.ThechallengethatAristotlefacesinaccountingforcomplexperceptualcontentisthusthat:
qualityperceived,itmovesthesense...inthisdeterminateway,whilewhatisbittermovesitinacontraryway,and
whatiswhiteinadifferentway.
(DA426b29427a9)
,
.,...,.
Oneandthesamephysicalitemcannotsuffercontrarychanges,orevendifferent(andincompatible)changes.Thisis
relevanttoperceptionbecauseforAristotlewebecomeawareofaperceptiblequality(e.g.,ofblue)asthesenseorganof
sightsomehowbecomesaffectedbytheexternalquality,resultinginitsbecominglikeit. 1Aristotlestatestheproblem
explicitly:
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Itisnotpossibletobeatoncewhiteandblack,andthereforeitmustalsobeimpossibleforathing[e.g.,asense
organ]to(p.192) beaffectedatoneandthesamemomentbytheformsofboth.
(DA427a59)
,.
Thisargumentaimsatgeneratinganaporeticstanceregardingthepossibilityofacomplexperceptualcontentinthe
experienceofasinglesubject.Thephysicalimpossibilityofadoubleeffectonthesenseorgan(e.g.,bywhiteandblackat
once)correspondstothe(supposed)mentalimpossibilityofdoubleawareness:itisimpossibleforonetobeawareof,for
example,whiteandblackatthesametime,sincethesenseorganofsightcannotbestimulatedbybothperceptible
qualitiesatthesametime.Thenumberofthementalappearstofollowthenumberofthephysical.Differentperceptible
qualitiesstimulatetherelevantsenseorgandifferently,givingrisetodistinctperceptualcontents.Ontheprinciplethat
thenumberofthementalfollowsthenumberofthephysicalsensibles,fortwoperceptiblequalitiestobeperceivedina
singlecontentAristotlemustexplainhowthedifferentphysicalalterationstheygenerateinthesenseorgan(s)canbe
unified.Theirunificationseemsprimafacieimpossible:inthecaseofmultipleperceptiblequalitiesofthesametype
becausetheybringaboutmutuallyincompatiblealterationsinonesenseorganandinthecaseofmultipleperceptible
qualitiesofdifferenttypes,becausetheyarephysicallydistributedindifferentsenseorgans.Aristotleneedstothinkof
noveltypesofphysicaloneness,toexplaintheonenessofcomplexperceptualcontent.Atitsheart,thedifficultythat
Aristotlehastoresolvehereisnotjusttocombinecomplexitywithunity,whichhehassuccessfullyachievedinhis
accountofsubstanceintheMetaphysicsandelsewhere.Itisalsotomirrorthecomplexityofthephysical(thealterations
ofthesenseorgans)ontothecomplexityofthemental(thearticulatedperceptualcontent).Assumingthatsuch(p.193)
unificationofmodalinputsintocomplexcontentsispossible,accordingtowhatprinciplesandprocessesdoesthis
unificationtakeplace?
5.2TheUnityofSubject,ofOperation,andofTime
Aristotleholdsthatperceptionsinvolvingcomplexcontentmustbeperformedbyasinglesubject, 2atoneandthesame
time.Therecannotbetwotimeintervals,anowandalater,forthediscrimination,forexample,ofwhitefromsweetto
occurnorcanthediscriminationbetheexerciseoftwodifferentpowers(e.g.,thevisualpoweractivityandthetaste
poweractivity).Hewrites:
[D]
iscriminationbetweenwhiteandsweetcannotbeeffectedbytwoagencieswhichremainseparateboththe
qualitiesdiscriminatedmustbepresenttosomethingthatisoneandsingle...Whatsaysthattwothingsare
differentmustbeoneforsweetisdifferentfromwhite.Thereforewhatassertsthisdifferencemustbeself
identical,andaswhatasserts,soalsowhatthinksorperceives.Thatitisnotpossiblebymeansoftwoagencies
whichremainseparatetodiscriminatetwoobjectswhichareseparate,isthereforeobvious...Boththe
discriminatingpowerandthetimeofitsexercisemustbeoneandundivided.
(DA426b1729,translationslightlymodified)
,...
,
,...
.
(p.194) Thispassagedescribesthemetaphysicalproblemthatneedstoberesolvedinordertoestablishthataperceiver
hasthepowertodiscriminatebetween,forexample,whiteandsweet.First,althoughwhiteandsweetareperceived
throughsightandtaste,andareperceivedcontemporaneously,thediscriminationofthetwosensiblescannotbe
achievedthrougheitherofthetwosenses.Ontheonehand,sincesighthasnodirectaccesstothesweetitem,andtaste
nodirectaccesstothewhite,theirparallelsimultaneousoperationwillbethatoftwodistinctagencieswhiteis
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perceivedthroughoneofthem,andsweetthroughtheother.Thetwoagencieshavetwodistinctperceptualcontents,
unrelatedtooneanother,andsodiscriminationbetweenthetwosensiblesseemstobeimpossible.Evenifthetwo
perceptualagencies,sightandtaste,belongtothesameperceiver,itstilldoesnotfollowthatperceptualdiscrimination
cantakeplacebythesimultaneousperceptionofthetwosensibles.Itisnotsimplythatthesameagentmustbeawareof
them.Itisthattheagentmustbeawareoftheminthesameactofawarenessinordertodiscriminatebetweenthem.
Aristotlesjustificationofthisclaim,essentialtohisaccountoftheperceptualsystem,isnotbasedonmetaphysical
arguments,butoncommonsensereasoning.Hewritesthatboththequalitiesdiscriminatedmustbeapparentto
somethingthatisoneandsingle(DA426b1718).Thatis,acomparisonmustbebasedonthepossibilityofconsidering
allitemsinvolvedinthesameviewingcontext.Thisisaprinciplethatweobserveineverydaylifewhenevaluatingor
selecting:thecontextofcomparisonmustbecommon,andtheymustallbeviewableandviewedwithinit.This
requirementisrelatedtotheunityoftimeone:therecannotbetwotimeintervals,perceivingwhitenowandsweetlater,
forthediscriminationofwhitefromsweettooccurthetwomustbecomparedinasingleviewing,asingleperceptual
awareness.Nor,forthesamereason,canthediscriminationbetheexerciseoftwodifferentpowers,forexample(p.195)
thevisualpoweractivityandthetastepoweractivity.Theactofawarenessofthediscriminationmustnotbedividedin
anyway.Boththeagentandthecontentcanbecomplex,comprisingtheexerciseofmorethanonepowerbutthe
discriminatingactivitymustbenumericallyoneandundivided.
5.3NoDuplicationofPerceptualAwareness
Theunityofsubjectandunityofoperation,inordertoachieveunifiedawarenessofvisual,auditory,tangible,etc.inputs
inasinglecomplexperceptualcontent,excludesthetheoreticalpossibilitythatoperationssuchasperceptual
discrimination,crossmodalbinding,etc.areperformedbyaclusterofcentersofperceptualawareness.Ofimmediate
relevancetotheviewthatthereisonlyonecenterofawarenessinperceptionisAristotlesNoDoubleVisionArgumentin
theDeAnima. 3Theargumentrunsasfollows:
Sinceitisthroughsensethatweareawarethatweareseeingorhearing,itmustbeeitherbysightthatweare
awareofseeing,orbysomesenseotherthansight.Butthesensethatgivesusthisnewsensationmustperceive
bothsightanditsobject,namelycolor:sothateithertherewillbetwosensesbothpercipientofthesame
sensibleobject,orthesensemustbepercipientofitself.Further,evenifthesensewhichperceivessightwere
differentfromsight,wemusteitherfallintoaninfiniteregress,orwemustsomewhereassumeasensewhichis
awareofitself.Ifso,weoughttodothisinthefirstcase.
(DA425b1218,myemphasis)
,,.
(p.196) ,.
,.
Inrelationtoourinvestigationintowhataccountsfortheunityoftheperceptualsystem,thisargumentgivesonly
Aristotlesinitialposition.Itdoesnottellushowasensecouldbeawareofitself.Itsconclusionisthatifonewantsto
accountforperceptualselfawareness,byexercisingontologicalparsimonyandnotmultiplyingsenses,onemayjustas
wellattributethepowerofselfawarenesstothespecialsensesthemselves.(IshallgivemyinterpretationofhowAristotle
explainshowselfawarenessisachievedinchapter7).ForthemomentIwanttohighlightanimportantprinciplethat
theNoDoubleVisionArgumentmentions:thattherecannotbetwosensesbothpercipientofthesamesensibleatthe
sametime(DA425b1417).Thisprinciplehasgeneralityofapplication.Itregulatesnotonlytheperceptionofthespecial
sensible,butalsocasesofnonstandardperceptionsuchasperceptualselfawarenessandperceptionofdarkness(see
below),andperceptualdiscriminationofdifferentsensiblesatonetime.Itisafundamentalprinciplefortheverystructure
oftheperceptualfaculty,functioningasanormofontologicaleconomy.Inthepresentcontextitpointstowardeachof
thespecialsenseshavingthecapacityofselfawarenessratherthantherebeingadedicatedmetasenseofself
awarenessfollowingoneachofthespecialsensestofacilitateawarenessofthatsensesoperation.Thesignificanceof
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theprincipleforAristotlebecomesevencleareroncewecometoinvestigatethedifficultiesthatAristotlehimselfidentifies
forhisowntheory,asarisingfromthatprinciple.Yet,evenwhenencounteringsuchdifficulties,Aristotledoesnot
abandonorrevisetheprincipleratherhetriestoaddressthedifficultiesand(p.197) mitigatetheirimpact.Hereiswhat
hewrites,immediatelyfollowingthequotationabove:
This[i.e.,theprinciplethatasensewillbeawareofitsownoperation]presentsadifficulty:iftoperceivebysight
isjusttosee,andwhatisseeniscolor(orthecolored),thenifwearetoseethatwhichsees,thatwhichsees
originallymustbecolored.Itisclearthereforethattoperceivebysighthasmorethanonemeaningforeven
whenwearenotseeing,itisbysightthatwediscriminatedarknessfromlight,thoughnotinthesamewayaswe
distinguishonecolorfromanother.Thatiswhyevenwhenthesensibleobjectsaregonethesensingsand
imaginingscontinuetoexistinthesenseorgans.
(DA425b1826)
,,,
.,
,.
.
Onthehypothesisthateachspecialsenseisendowedwiththeadditionalcapacitytobeawareofitsownoperation,the
difficultythatfollowsisthatifeachsenseisdefinedbythespecialobjectsthatcanbeperceivedthroughit,theneach
sensemustbethesameinkindasitsownspecialobjects.So,forsighttobeawareofitsownoperation,thatitisseeing
thecolored,sightitselfmustbecolored.Thisisthedifficultythatseemstoarise.ImmediatelyAristotlerespondswiththe
solutionthateachsensecandomorethanperceiveitsownspecialsensibles.Thus,sightcanalsotellthatitisdark,
wheredarkness,hereassumedtobelackoflight,isnotacolor.Thisdoesnot(p.198) indicatethatthereisadifferent
capacityorpowerotherthansight,whichcanperformthesefunctions,butonlythatsightsrangeofobjectsiswiderthan
color.Interestingly,havingjustexplainedhowthedifficultymightbeaddressed,Aristotlethengoesbackonhisproposed
solutionbyindicatingthatmaybeitisnotneeded.Hemakesthepointthatthesensesareindeedinpossessionofthe
specialsensiblestheycaneachdetect:
Further,inasenseeventhatwhichseesiscoloredforineachcasethesenseorganiscapableofreceivingthe
sensibleobjectwithoutitsmatter.
(DA425b2324)
.
ThepointAristotlemakesandthepositionhethusproposesareclearlynotmotivatedbyhowthesensesappeartobe(our
noseisnotitselfsmelly,ourearsnotnoisy,etc.).ItratherfollowsfromAristotlesaccountoftheoperationofthesenses.
Ifasensereceives,throughitsmedium,theperceptiblequalitiesthatareitsspecialsensibles,andifthisiswhatthesense
isabletodetect,thesenseoughtbeabletodetectitselfassomehowhavingthoseperceptiblequalitieswhenithas
receivedthem.Therearedifficultieswiththismove,whichmustbewhyAristotledoesnotrevokethesolutionhehasjust
offeredofeachsensehavingawidescopeofoperation,andwhyhedoesnotpursuetheimplicationsofthenewposition
ofeachsensepossessingitsspecialsensible.Oneofitsimplicationsisthatthereshouldbeavantagepointofobservation
forthesensetoobserveitselfinoperation.Butitisnotatallobvioushowthesenseorgancanfunction,sotospeak,
reflexively.Secondly,Aristotlehasclearlyexplainedthatonhisaccountthesenseorgandoesnotreceiveandtakeon
perceptiblequalitiesinthewaythattheobjectperceivedpossesses(p.199) suchqualities. 4ItakeAristotlespointat
lines425b2324tobeonlyspeculative.
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InconclusionwhattheNoDoubleVisionargumentcontributestotheinvestigationofAristotlesaccountofthe
metaphysicsofthecommonsenseisthatthereisonlyoneactofperceptualawarenessthroughwhichasinglesubject
gathersmultimodalperceptualinputandistherebyawareofit.
5.4ARobustInterpretationoftheCommonSense
Intheprecedingsectionsweestablishedtherequirementsthatneedtobesatisfiedsothataperceivercanacquirecomplex
perceptualcontent.Buthowdoessheacquireit?Aristotlewrites:
Eachsenseisrelativetoitsparticulargroupofsensiblequalities....[But]sincewealsodiscriminatewhitefrom
sweet,andindeedeachsensiblequalityfromeveryother,withwhatdoweperceivethattheyaredifferent?Itmust
bebysenseforwhatisbeforeusissensible.
(DA,426b815myemphasis)5
...
,..
Sinceitisthroughsensethatonecandiscriminatewhitefromsweet(andgenerallyperformoperationsinvolving
complexperceptualcontent),thequestionis:throughwhichsense?Itcannotbeaspecialsense,butonthegivencriterion
forsenseindividuation,thereseemtobenoothersensesthanthespecialones.Althoughwhiteandsweetareperceived
throughsightandtaste,andareperceived(p.200) simultaneously,thediscriminationofthetwosensiblescannotbe
achievedthrougheitherofthetwosenses.Itcannotbethroughsightsincesightissensitivetocolorsbutnotflavors,and
correspondinglyfortaste.Sincesighthasnodirectaccesstothesweet,nortastetothewhite,therecanonlybeparallel
simultaneousoperationwhiteisperceivedthroughoneofthem,andsweetthroughtheother.Thetwofacultieshavetwo
distinctperceptualcontents,unrelatedtooneanother,andsothediscriminationbetweenthetwosensiblesseemsprima
facieimpossible.Evenifthetwoperceptualfaculties,sightandtaste,belongtothesameperceiver,itstilldoesnotfollow
thatperceptualdiscriminationcantakeplacethroughthesimultaneousperceptionofthetwosensibles.Howcouldany
oneofthefivesenses,eachofwhichisdedicatedtoamodallydifferenttypeofperceptiblequality,deliverasinglemodally
complexcontent?Thisisanotherofthedomainsofperception(inadditiontothoseinvestigatedinchapter4)thatcannot
beexplainedthroughtheoperationoftheindividualspecialsenses,butwhichthecommonsense(i.e.,thesensesacting
asone)iscalledupontofacilitate.Thecommonsenseisthesensethatcangathermodallycomplexperceptualcontent,
anduseit,forexample,forperceptualdiscrimination.
Onthebasisoftheseconsiderations(whichIwillfurtherdevelopespeciallyinchapter6)Iproposearobust
interpretationofthecommonsense,asunifiedandempoweredwithitsownperceptualabilitiesandfunctionality.Ithus
makeadeparturefromtheviewtaken,forexample,byPavelGregoric(2007),whoofferedoneofthemostrecent
comprehensivestudiesofthetopic.GregoricexaminesalltheoccurrencesoftheexpressioncommonsenseinAristotles
works,andclassifiesthemintothreeuses:
i)anadjectivalusewhichappliestooneormoreindividualsenses,indicatingthattheyaresharedbyanimalsof
differentspecies(HAI3,489a17Met.I1,981b14)
(p.201)
ii)anadjectivalusewhichappliestoalltheindividualsenses,andindicatestheirsharedsensitivitytoatypeof
featureintheworldwhichAristotlecallscommonperceptiblee.g.,shape,movement,number,etc.(DAIII
1,425a27)
iii)anounuse,referringtothecommonsense(PAIV10686DM450a10DAIII431b5).
Onthebasisofhisveryscholarlysurveyofthetexts,GregoricarguesthatnotalltheperceptualfunctionsAristotleis
traditionallytakentoassigntothecommonsenseareinfactperformedbyit.WhenAristotlesaysthatthosefunctions
involvecommonsense,heusestheexpressionsometimesasanounbutsometimesasanadjectivalqualificationforthe
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individualsenses.Gregoricmakestwomainoriginalinterpretativepoints.Firstly,heholdsthatperceptionoftheso
calledcommonsensibles(movement,shape,number,etc.)andcrossmodalperceptionshouldnotbetakentobe
functionsperformedbythecommonsenseevenifthisiswhatcommentatorshavetraditionallythought.Gregoricargues
thatintherelevantcontextsAristotleusestheexpressioncommonsenseonlyadjectivally.Buthereacheshisconclusion
onmerelytextualandlinguisticgrounds,withoutpausingtoexaminethephilosophicalviewheistherebyattributingto
Aristotle.GregoricthusattributestoAristotletheviewthatperceptionofthecommonsensiblesdoesnotrequireanything
overandabovetheindividualsensesithappensinvirtueoftheappropriatesensitivitythattheindividualsensesshare
(thatiscommontothem).Buthowdoesithappen?Whatisitthattheindividualsensesshareontologicallythatendows
themwithacommonfunction?Whatdoestherequiredsharedsensitivityconsistin?Isitmovingcolorsormoving
coloredobjectsthatsightsees,andisthiscanitbethesameasthesensitivitytohearingmovingsoundsormoving
soundingobjects?(Iarguethatisinvirtueofextrapowersthatthesensesoperatingasonehavethattheycanperceive
(p.202) thecommonsensiblesandnotinvirtueofasharedsensitivity).Asforcrossmodalperception,Gregoric
appearstohaveevenlessofanexplanationtoofferonbehalfofAristotlehewritesthat:
Evenifwesupposeforthesakeofargumentthatcrossmodalperceptionisperformedbythecommonsense,Ido
notthinkweshouldconsideritafunctionofthecommonsense.Rather,itseemstobeacoincidenceofhavinga
perceptualcapacityofthesoulwhichisaunitywithsomeinternalcomplexity.(2007,201)
Astotheotherperceptualfunctionsatissue,GregoricsharesthetraditionalviewaccordingtowhichforAristotlethe
commonsenseisresponsibleforsimultaneousperception,perceptualdiscrimination,activationanddeactivationofall
thesensesinwakingandsleep,andperceptualawareness(whichGregoricunderstandsasmonitoringoftheactivityand
inactivityofthesenses).Ontheotherhand,thesecondmainoriginalinterpretativeconclusionGregoricoffersisthat,of
theaforementionedperceptualfunctions,somepertaintotheperceptualcapacityofthesoul,andothers,whichrequire
theinvolvementofimagination,tothesensorycapacityofthesoul.Gregoricwarnsusagainsttwointerpretativemistakes
thathetakesallcommentatorstohavemadesofar.Thefirstistoassignbothtypesofperceptualfunctions(whetherthey
involveimaginationornot)toasinglecapacityofthesoul.Thesecondmistaketraditionallymade,hetellsus,istotake
thesinglecapacityofthesoulthatsupposedlyperformsbothtypesoffunctionstobetheperceptualcapacityofthesoul,
whichiswhatwe(mistakenly,forhim)designatewiththeAristoteliannotionofthecommonsense.WhatAristotle
designateswiththenounuseoftheexpressioncommonsenseisrather,accordingtoGregoric,thesensorycapacityof
thesoul.Thesensorycapacityofthesoulisitsnonrationalcognitive(p.203) poweranditcomprisestheperceptualand
theimaginativecapacities.Gregoriccommentsthusontheresultsofhistextualanalyses:
Weshouldnotsupposethatvariousfunctionswhichgobeyondtheindividualsensestakenseparatelyareachieved
allbythesamething(2007,205)...Thisisaconclusionwhoseimportanceforoursubjectcanhardlybe
exaggerated(2007,204)...ThisshouldcomeasagreatrelieftointerpretersofAristotlesnotionofthecommon
sense,becausethediversityofitsfunctionshaspresentedthemwithanacuteproblem...Fortunately,wedonot
needtosaddleAristotlewithsuchaproblem(2007,205)...InthatwaywesaveAristotlefromanincoherent
notionofthecommonsense.(2007,206)
Amethodologicalissuefirst:Identifyingwhatfunctionsthecommonsenseperformsinordertounderstandwhatthe
commonsenseis,certainlyamoveintherightdirection,inkeepingwithAristotlesownphilosophicalmethodology.But
itisdisappointingthatindescribingatgreatlengththefunctionsofthecommonsense,Gregoricdoesnotderivefromthe
textsheanalyzes,norgiveusanunderstandingof,whatisrequiredinthemakeupofthecommonsenseforittoperform
thesefunctions.Thereisanairofironyinthefortunate(hiswords)overallconclusionGregoricconsidersthemain
achievementofhisinvestigation.For,afterthereaderhasgonethroughmanypagesofmeticulousscholarshipthatare
supposedtoclearthegroundfromconfusionandmisinterpretationsofAristotlestexts,hereiswhatthereistolearn:On
Gregoricsview,Aristotlesaccountfortwooutoffourfunctionsofthecommonsense,simultaneousperceptionand
perceptualdiscrimination,isultimatelynotsatisfactory(207),disappointing(208),andnotpromisingwithrespectto
whatitcandotoexplaincrossmodalbinding(208).Furthermore,twootherfunctions,namely(p.204) perceptionof
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thecommonsensiblesandcrossmodalperception,arenotaccountedforatall,asseenabove.
GregoricsinterpretationofAristotlesaccountofthemetaphysicalconstitutionofthecommonsensemaybeputina
nutshellthus:thecommonsenseisasinglething,althoughcomplex.Ontologically,itisasingleunifiedwhole(2007,
213,etal.)Itscomplexityisonlyinnotion:itspartsareonlyconceptual,orlogicalparts(2007,25).Ishalllabelthe
metaphysicalaccountGregoricoffersforthecommonsensepresumedholism.Itispresumedratherthanexplained,for
itoffersnoanswerstothefollowingcrucialquestions:whatisitthatisunifiedattheontologicallevelifthepartsareonly
conceptual?Isthecommonsenseunifiedoratomicallyone?(Atomshavepropertiesthatcanbeconceptuallybutnot
ontologicallydistinguishedintheatom.Ishearingrelatedtoseeing,andbothtoimagination,asweightisrelatedtosize
inanatom?WouldwewanttoattributesuchapositiontoAristotle?Whattextualevidencewouldjustifyit?)Eitherway,
howdoesthisonenessperformtheverydiversefunctionsthatthecommonsenseperforms?Thepresumedholismmodel
isnotderivedfromthetextsorfromthefunctionalrequirements(unityandcomplexity)thecommonsensehastomeet.
Rather,itisdrawnbyanalogytothestructureofthesoul,whichGregoricmerelyassumes.Likewise,thestructural
analogybetweenthesoulanditsownlowerlevelcapacitiesisjustassumed.InGregoricsownwords:
Isubmitthattheunityoftheperceptualcapacityofthesoulisachievedinthesamewayinwhichtheunityofthe
soulisachieved...Thesoulisasinglethingdividedonlyconceptually,inthesensethatwecananalyzeitinto
differentpartsoraspectsaccordingtothemostsalientactivitiesoflivingbeings...howeverinrealitythereisonly
onesoul...whichiswhatensuresintegrationandcooperationofvariousparts(p.205) oraspectsofthe
soul...Likewise,onlyatalowerlevel,theperceptualcapacityofthesoulisonesinglethingdividedonly
conceptually,inthesensethatwecananalyzeitintodifferentsensesaccordingtodifferentkindsofthespecial
perceptibles...However,thereisreallyonesingleperceptualcapacityofthesoul,whichensuresthatitcan
operatenotonlyasthisorthatindividualsense,butalsoasone.
Thesoulallowsonlyforaconceptualdivision,andsuchadivisionguaranteesboththeunityofthesoulandthe
unityofthelivingbody.Nowthesamesortofdivisioncanbeappliedatalowerlevel,thatis,onthecapacitiesof
thesoulthemselves....Theperceptualpartofthesoul...turnsouttobeitselfconceptuallydivisibleintocapacitiesof
alowerorder,namelytheindividualsenses...Theperceptualcapacityofthesoulisnotanaggregateofthe
individualsenses,butaunifiedwhole(2007,27,myemphasis).
TheabovequotationsillustrateGregoricsposition,butalsobringoutitsinadequacies.Whataccountsfortheunityofthe
commonsense?Claimingonlyconceptualdivisionofthesoulguaranteesnothingaboutitsunity,anddoesnottellsus
anythingaboutitsoneness(paceGregoric,2007,29)itratherdemandsexplanationoftheunitypresumption.Positing
thatthesoulsperceptualcapacityisonesinglething(2007,39)andnotanaggregate(ofwhat?)(2007,27)isnota
solution,becauseanaccountofitsinternalconstitutionalcomplexityisstillmissing.RemarkingthatAristotles
frameworkoperateswithaseriesofrelatedbutdistinctnotions(2007,205)doesnotfurtherourunderstandingofthe
commonsensesunity.
JohansenarguesalongthesamedeflationarylineasPavelGregoric(2007).Thestanceisclear:thecommonsense
[responsible(p.206) formultisensoryperceptualcontent]doesnotpointtoacapacityoverandabovetheindividual
sense,evenonethatissomehowconstitutedbytheindividualsenses(2012,178).Buthowthenismultisensory
perceptualcontentacquired?Johansenanswers:commonperceptionpointstoanabilitythateachofthesenseshave(in
thissense,theircommonpower),byanalogywiththeabilitythateachoftheplayers[ofafootballteam]hastocontrol
theball,ontopofthedifferentspecializedabilitiesthatmightbecharacteristicofthegoalkeeper,thestriker,orthe
defenderassuch(2012,179).Butafootballplayersabilitytocontroltheballisinfactmorebasicthanthecapacityfor
striking,defending,goalkeeping,etc.Ifwefollowtheanalogythrough,multisensoryperceptionanditscorresponding
capacityoughttobethemostbasicperceptualactivityofeachsense,morebasicthanthespecializedperceptualactivity
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andabilityofeachsense.ButneitherAristotle,norJohansenItakeit,wouldagreetothis.TheproblemIfindwith
Johansensexplanationoftheroleofthecommonpowerofeachsensethroughtheanalogyoftheabilityoftheplayersto
controltheballisthattheplayersabilityisnotanextraabilityeachplayerhas,butthegenericclassificationofeach
playersabilityquastriker,defender,andsuch.Butthecommonperceptualpowereachsensehasisnotthegenusofthat
sensesperceptualability.Assumingthatitisleadstotheresultsmentionedafewlinespreviously.
ThereisafurtherdifficultywiththemoregeneralstanceJohansentakesonthecommonpowerofeachsense.Hetakesit
thateachofthesensescanperceivethecommonsensibleslikenumber,shape,movement,etc.,throughthecommon
powerithas(2012,179).Butthecommonsensiblesareperceptuallycomplexsensibles.Thatis,forAristotle,shapeis
tactileandvisualitisnotthatanobjecthastactileshapeandalsovisualshaperather,theshapeoftheobjectisoneand
thesame,anditcanbeperceivedthroughmorethanonesense.If,asJohansenbelieves,forAristotleeachsenseis
capableof(p.207) perceivingthecommonsensiblesthroughitscommonpower,thensightoughttobeabletoperceive
asensiblethatistactile,namelyshape.Butsightcannotdothis,becauseitislimitedtoperceivingthroughitssense
organ,whichisnotsensitivetotactilesensibles.Ingeneral,thecommonpowerofeachsensecannotbesensitiveto
multisensorysensibles,becauseitdependsonthespecificsenseorganoftherespectivesense.Rather,Aristotles
introductionofthecommonpoweristofacilitateacooperationbetweenthesenses,givingrisetoaperceptualfaculty
whoseabilitiestranscendthoseofeachsense.
ThedeflationaryapproachtothestatusofthecommonsenseappearsequallyproblematicwhenJohansencomesto
givinganaccountoftheperceptualdiscriminationof,forexample,yellowfrombitter.HewritesthatAristotlesaysthat
theindividualsensesperceivethattheyellowisthesameasthebitterbyvirtueofbeingone,ratherthanthemselves....He
isnotsayingthatanothercapacitythantheindividualsensesperceivetheincidentalperceptibles,butthattheindividual
sensesperceiveasoneratherthanasindividuals(2012,183).Johansenfurtherexplainsthesensesperceivingasone
shouldbeunderstoodasfollows:Toreturntoourfootballanalogy,thesensesarenowconsiderednotliketheindividual
playerswhohavethesameskillbutasplayerswhohaveaskillbyvirtueofplayingtogether,liketheskillofwinning
matches.Thisisnotaseparatecapacitybutacapacitythecapacitieshavebyvirtueofworkingtogether(2012,183).But
howdotheygetthiscapacitymerelyfromtheirtogetherness?Theonenessofthesensesworkingtogethermustbe
explainedmetaphysicallyforittohaveexplanatoryforceinmultisensoryperception.Considerthefollowingscenario:a
monolingualFrenchwomanandamonolingualEnglishwomanareeachreadingadocumentintheirownlanguage.Is
thereawayinwhichtheycouldcooperatetotellwhetherthecontentsofthetwodocumentsarethesameordifferent,
withoutrequiringan(p.208) extracapacityotherthantheirowncapacitiestounderstandtheirrespectivetexts?How
cantheanalogyoftheplayerswhohaveaskillbyvirtueofplayingtogetherhelpusunderstandhowthetwowomencan
discernsamenessordifferenceintheirtexts,iftheydonotunderstandeachotherslanguage?Howcantheanalogyhelp
usunderstandhowsenseswithdifferenttypesofsenseorgansworktogethertoperceivemultisensorycontents?
ItakeitthatincidentalperceptionisthekeytoJohansensinterpretationofAristotle.Althoughhedoesnotexplainthis
explicitly,ItakeitthatJohansenseesincidentalperceptionascorrespondingtotheabilityoftheplayerstopasstheball
toeachother.AccordingtoJohansen,Aristotlesaccountofincidentalperceptionishiswayofenrichingtheperceivers
perceptualrangeJohansenwrites:Accidentalperceptionallowsperceptiontobeevenricherincontentthandoes
commonperception.Wecanseethatthewhiteissweetbyaccidentalperception,thoughsightassuchdoesnotinformus
ofsweetness,andwecanseethatthisisthesonofDiares,thoughnospecialsenseassuchisprimedtograspthiskindof
information(180).ButisthiswhatAristotlesays?FollowingJohansenstranslation,oneperceivesthis[thesonof
Diares]accidentallybecausethis[thesonofDiares]whichisperceivedbelongstowhite,andthatiswhynothingsuffers
bytheperceptibleassuch[assonofDiares](418a204)(2012,181).SoAristotlesaysthatweperceivethesonofDiares
byperceivingthewhite.HedoesnotsaythatweperceivethatthisisthesonofDiares(myemphasis).Wecouldnt
perceiveit,becausenosenseorganissensitivetobeingthesonofDiares.Nordoessightseethatthewhiteissweet
(180,myemphasis)itcouldnot,butcanonlyseethesweet,becausethewhitehappenstobesweet.Thelinkis
ontological,notperceptualexternal,notpartoftheperceptualcontent.Moregenerally,forAristotle,incidental
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perceptiononitsowncannotallowformultimodalperception,forthereasonthat(p.209) eachsense,byitself,canbe
awareofonlycontentsofasinglesensorymodality.SupposethattheFrenchandtheEnglishwomenreadthesametext,
eachinherownlanguagetranslation.WecouldsaythattheFrenchwomanunderstoodthetexttheEnglishwomanwas
reading,butnotthatsheunderstoodthatshewasreadingthesametextastheEnglishwoman.
Ipresentedinchapter4Aristotlesargumentsforwhythespecialsensesareinadequatetoperceivethecommon
sensibles,andthusobjects,unlesstheyareunifiedinaperceptualsystemendowedwithextraperceptualabilities.Iwont
repeattheargumentsherebywayofcontrastwithmine,IhaveherehighlightedthelineJohansenandGregorictake,
whichIsubmitleavesthesensessimplybereftofthecapacitytohavecomplexperceptualcontent.
5.5ANewIndividuationPrinciplefortheCommonSense
Thecommonsenseisthesensethroughwhichwegainawarenessofmultimodallycomplexcontents(whichincludethe
commonsensibles).Itisclearthatitisasuigenerissense.InthissectionIshallcallattentiontosomeofitsunique
featuresquasense.IntheDeSensuAristotlewrites,
Ifthen,asisthefact,thesoulwithonepartperceivessweet,withanother,white,eitherthatwhichresultsfrom
theseissomeonepart,orelsethereisnosuchoneresultant.Buttheremustbesuchaone,inasmuchasthe
generalfacultyofsenseperceptionisone.Whatoneobject,then,doesthatonefacultyperceive?Forassuredlyno
oneobjectarisesbycompositionofthese.Wemustconclude,therefore,thatthereis,ashasbeenstatedbefore,
someonefacultyinthesoulwith(p.210) whichthelatterperceivesallitspercepts,thoughitperceiveseach
differentgenusofsensiblesthroughadifferentorgan.
(SS449a510)
,.
..
,,.
Thistextgivesevidenceoftheintroductionofanewcriterionfortheindividuationofasense.Inthecaseofthespecial
senses,wesawinchapter2thatitistheirspecialsensibles(color,sound,flavor,etc.)thatindividuatethesenses(seee.g.
DA418a2425).Thenatureofthecommonsense,ontheotherhand,isnotdeterminedbyitssensitivitytoanyspecial
typeofsensible.SoAristotleintroducesforthecommonsenseanew,intensionalcriterionofindividuation:thecommon
senseisindividuatedbythetypeofperceptualcontentitisawareof,ratherthanbythetypesofsensibleobject.
Wehavealreadyseenthatthecommonsensedoesnothaveaspecialsenseorganforthecommonsensibles(e.g.,inDA
425a1416).Additionally,inhisaccountofselfawareness,Aristotletakesthepositionthattherecannotbetwosenses
bothpercipientofthesamesensible(DA425b1417).Soitcannotbethat,forexample,ablueitemisperceivedthrough
bothsightandthroughthecommonsense,separately,whenoneisawarethatoneisseeingblue.Andhowcouldthe
commonsenseperceiveonitsown,asitwere,sincethecommonsensedoesnothaveasenseorgan?Ithastorelyonthe
senseorgansofthespecialsenses,throughwhichonlythespecialsensiblescanbeperceived.Sohowdoesthecommon
sensebecomeawareofblue,andofanyotherspecialperceptibleform?TheclaimsAristotle(p.211) makese.g.inDA
427a25andSS449a510thatthecommonsenseisallthespecialsensesoperatingasone,pointstowardsa
constitutionalexplanationofwhywhatisperceivedthroughthespecialsensesisalsoperceivedthroughthecommon
sense.Thecommonsenseinotherwordsisconstitutedbythespecialsenses.Thisiswhatwewillinvestigateinthe
forthcomingchapters.
ConcludingRemarks
Weexaminedinchapters4and5anumberofperceptualoperationsthatpresupposethepossibilityofcomplexperceptual
content.Fortwoperceptiblequalitiestobeperceivedinasingleperceptualcontent,Aristotleneedstoexplainhow
different(contraryoratanyratemutuallyincompatible)physicalmovementscanbephysicallycompresent,andinfact
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somehowunified.Additionally,foranyoperationinvolvingcomplexperceptualcontenttheagent,thetimeofthe
operation,andtheoperationitselfneedtobeone.Afinalconstraintontheaccountofcomplexperceptualcontents
concernsthewaythatthecommonsenseaccessestheperceptualinputofthespecialsenses.Itdoesnothaveitsown
senseorgan.AllthesearephysicalconstraintsthatwillplayaroleinAristotlesthinkingaboutthemetaphysicsofthe
commonsense,asweshallseeinchapters6and7.Also,Aristotleintroducesadifferentindividuationprincipleforthe
commonsensefromtheoneheusedpreviouslyforthespecialsenses:notfromtheuniquenessoftheobjectofsense(asin
thecaseofthespecialsenses),norfromtheuniquenessofthesenseorgan(asthecommonsensedoesnothavean
organ),butfromtheonenessofthecomplexperceptualcontenttotheonenessoftheperceivingsenseinthiscasethe
commonsense.
Notes
Notes:
(1).Forthemeaningofbecomingliketheobjectofperception,seetheappendixofchapter2.
(2).Heretheunityofthesubjectdoesnotrefertotheunityofconsciousnessofaperson,buttotheunityofawarenessin
perception.Thus,thequestiondrivingtheinvestigationisnothowyesterdaysthoughtisrelatedtotodaysfeelings,soas
tobelongtothesamesubjectrather,itishowthesubjectcantell,forexample,thatthetoothacheshefeelsisdifferent
fromtheheadachesheisalsoexperiencing.
(3).Theargumenthasbeenmuchdiscussedinthesecondaryliterature.Sincethereareexcellentanalysesofitalreadyin
press,hereIwillonlybrieflycommentonhowtheargumentisrelevanttoourpresentinvestigation.Thereadermight
wanttopursuethetopicbystudying,forexample,VictorCastonAristotleonConsciousness,Mind,111:751815(2002)
andThomasJohansenInDefenseoftheInnerSense:AristotleonPerceivingthatOnePerceives,Proceedingofthe
BostonAreaColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy21:23576(2005).
(4).Seechapter2.
(5).TheterminologyAristotleusesinthepassageshouldnotmisleadus.ForAristotle,itisnotthesensesthatperceive,
buttheagentthesoulthroughthesenses.Hence,lookingforasensethatcanhaveacomplexperceptualcontent,asin
discerningwhitefromsweet,heislookingforthesubjectthatperceivesthesesensiblesinasingleperceptualexperience.
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MixingtheManyandPartitioningtheOneOxfordScholarship
AnnaMarmodoro
PrintISBN13:9780199326006
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
MixingtheManyandPartitioningtheOne
AnnaMarmodoro
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.003.0007
AbstractandKeywords
WhatdoesAristotlemeanwhensayingthatthespecialsensesformaunitywhichisthecommonsense?Canthis
explainperceptionofthecommonsensiblesandofcomplexperceptualcontent?Aristotlesfirstattemptsexploretwo
modelsdrivenbytheideathatphysicalunitymightdeliverunityatthementalleveloftheexperience.ThesearetheMixed
ContentsModelandMultipleSensorsModel.Aristotlefurtherexploresathirdmodel,basedontheideathatqualitatively
differentthingsaremanyintypesofbeing,butareyetunifiedbythesamenessoftheanalogiesofthedifferencesthey
display.ThisistheRatioModel.
Keywords:MixedContentsModel,MultipleSensorsModel,RatioModel,DeSensu,DeAnima
Introduction
Aristotlessolutiontotheproblemofhowweperceivecomplexperceptualcontentistopositthesocalledcommonsense
astheonlycenterofperceptualawareness, 1operatingontheinputsreceivedfromallthespecialsenses.Themetaphysics
ofthecommonsenseisanexerciseincomplexityinunityforAristotle,forwhichhetriestodevelopavarietyofmodels.
WhatAristotleislookingforisawaytounderstandhowtheperceptualsystemoperatesasaunifiedwhole,with
enhancedperceptualabilities,despitethemultiplicityofthespecialsensesinvolved.UltimatelyAristotlesposition,aswe
willseeinthefollowingchapters,isthatthecommonsenseisnotanadditional,sixthsenserather,itistheperceptual
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systemasconstitutedbythefivespecialsenses,butnotmetaphysicallyreducibletothem.Itisnotreducibletothem
becauseithasadditionalperceptualpowersthatthespecialsensesdonothave. 2Theseadditionalpowersenablethe
commonsensetoperformthoseoperationsinvolvingcomplexperceptualcontentthattheindividualsensesinisolation,
asitwere,couldnotperform.TheconstitutiverelationbetweencommonandspecialsensesfacilitatesAristotlesgeneral
stancethatawarenessthroughthespecialsensesistherebytransparentlyawareness(p.214) throughthecommon
sense.Aswesawinchapter5,thereisnointernalhomunculusoradditionalinnerfacultyofawarenessobservingthe
perceptualcontentsproducedbythespecialsensesandbringingaboutawarenessofthem.Thereisonlyoneactof
awarenesswhenwe,forexample,seewhiteanddiscernitfromsweet.
Thequestionsthischapterandtheforthcomingonewillinvestigatearethese:whatdoesAristotlemeanwhensayingthat
thespecialsensesformaunitywhichisthecommonsense?Howdoesthisunificationofthesensesintooneperceptual
systemexplainnotonlyperceptionofthecommonsensibles,butalsothegenerationofcomplexperceptualcontent?In
examiningAristotlesanswerstosuchquestions,myapproachwillbeproblemorientedthusIwilldrawfromdifferent
worksofAristotles,withoutfollowingthechronologicalorderinwhichtheyarethoughttobewritten. 3Iwilldistinguish
sixdifferentmodelsAristotleinvestigates,aspossiblecandidatesfortherequiredaccountoftheunityandcomplexityof
thecommonsense.IwillfirstpresenttwomodelsthatexploretheexplanatoryvalueofintuitionsthatappeartoAristotle
relevanttotheproblemunderconsideration.Indiscussingthesefirsttwomodels,Aristotledoesnotpresenthimself
explicitlyasexploringcommonsenseviewsorappealingtocommonsenseintuitionsontheotherhand,itseemsvery
plausiblethathewouldproceedinthiswaywithhisphilosophicalinquiryaboutthecommonsense,followinghisusual
practice,evenwhensuchendoxaorintuitionsmightultimatelybenonstartersfromhisownphilosophicalpointofview.
Thefirsttwomodelsappeartobedrivenbytheideathatphysicalunity(oftheobjectofperceptioninthefirstmodel,orof
thecommonsenseinthesecondmodel)willdeliverunityatthementalleveloftheexperience.IshallcallthemtheMixed
ContentsModelandtheMultipleSensorsModel,respectivelytheyarebothpresentedintheDeSensu.Ultimately
howeverneithertheMixedContentsModelnortheMultipleSensorsone(p.215) candeliveraphilosophicallyadequate
solutiontotheproblemofthestructureandoperationofthecommonsense.ThusintheDeAnimaAristotleexploresa
moreabstractapproachtothequestionofhowwhatisonecanbemanytoo,resultingintwonewmodels.Icallthefirst
theRatioModel:itpursuestheideathatqualitativelydifferentthingsaremanyinbeingbutsomehowunifiedbythevery
qualitativedifferencethatdividesthem.Aristotledrawsontheideathataratiohasasinglevalue,whichrunsthroughan
equationofsuchratiosasthecommonsingleidentitysharedbyalltheratiosintheequation,unifyingtheequationinto
onenotwithstandingitsmultiplecomplexity.Themodeloffersaveryabstractwayofthinkingoftheunityofthe
perceptualsystemandofcomplexperceptualcontentbutultimatelynometaphysicalaccountofit.Thuselsewhereinthe
DeAnimaAristotlemakesafreshstart,driventhistimebyexplicitlymetaphysicalconsiderations.Onemightthink,
reasonsAristotle,thatthedifficultyinaccountingforunityandcomplexityofthecommonsenseanditscomplex
perceptualcontentstemsfromthefactthattheyaresupposedlysomehowlikeasurfacethatisalloverblackandwhiteat
once. 4Inthecaseofcomplexperceptualcontent,thesameperceptualinputisboth,forexample,visualandtactilethe
samesense(thecommonsense)isboth,forexample,sightandtouch.Butthisisclearlyimpossibleitseems.Orisit
not?Aristotleestablishestheviabilityofgivingametaphysicalaccountofthecommonsensebybreakingnewgroundin
metaphysics,byarguingfortherelativeidentityofthefivesenses,thataremanyinbeingandoneinnumber,byanalogy
withthecaseofasinglepointthatisthelimitsofmanysemilines.Yet,theRelativeIdentityModel,whichIwillexamine
inchapter7,doesnotcaptureanessentialfeatureofthecommonsense,namelythatitisendowedwithadditionalpowers
ofitsownthatenableittoperformoperationsontheperceptualinputsgatheredviathespecialsenses.Ultimately
thereforenoneofthefourmodels(p.216) introducedthusfarprovidesbyitselfthefullrequisiteaccountofthe
metaphysicsofthecommonsense.ThismotivatesAristotletopursuetheinvestigationfurther,withtwonewmodels,
whichIshallexamineinchapter7.ThesewillbetheSubstanceModelandtheCommonPowerModel.Anumberof
insightsderivingfromtheRelativeIdentityModel,theSubstanceModel,andtheCommonPowerModelwillcontributeto
Aristotlesfinalaccountofthecommonsense,asIshallargueinmyoverallconclusions.Forpresentationpurposes,I
dividethemodelsintwogroupsthefirstthree(theMixedContent,MultipleSensorsandRatioModels)areinvestigated
inthischaptertheotherthree,whichcontributemoresubstantiallytoAristotlesfinalaccount(theRelativeIdentity,
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Substance,andCommonPowerModels),areexaminedinthenextchapter.
6.1TheMixedContentsModel
AristotlesinvestigationoftheproblemofcomplexperceptualcontentintheDeSensubeginswithanobservationfrom
everydayexperience:twodifferentcausesmixedtogetherhaveajointcausalimpactandbringaboutasingleeffect.For
examplecoldandhotwatermixedtogetherinasinglestreamwouldfillaswimmingpooloflukewarmwater.Soin
perception,twodifferentperceptiblequalities,ifsomehowmixedbeforebeingperceived,whenimpactingcausallyonthe
sameorganatthesametimewouldbringaboutasinglecontentofexperience.ThisiswhatIcalltheMixedContents
Model.Aristotlesstartingpointinthinkingaboutthismodelishisoftreiteratedcommitmentthat,
[T]
h eperceptionactualizedatanysinglemomentisnecessarilyone....Henceitisnotpossibletoperceivethe
possibilityof(p.217) perceivingtwodistinctobjectssimultaneouslywithoneandthesamesense.
(SS447b1721)
....
.
WhydoesAristotlethinkthis?Hedoesnotofferanyargumentinthepresentcontext,but,asweknowfromthewayhis
theorywassetup(seechapter2),hisreasonmustbethatitisphysicallyimpossibleforthesenseorgantobeaffectedby
twodifferentperceptiblequalitiesatthesametimeifthequalitiesarenotmixed.RecallhowAristotleconceivesofthe
alterationofthesenseorganbytheactionoftheperceptiblequalityofanexternalobject:ontheliteralistandthe
disturbanceinterpretationsofwhatsortofalterationthisis,itisevidentthatthesenseorgancannotbechangedintwo
differentwaysatthesametime. 5Thereforeitseemsplausibletothinkthatthecauseofperceptionmustbeoneiftheeffect
isone,namelyifthereisoneperceptualcontent.Butiftheobjectsofperceptionaretwodifferentperceptiblequalities,
howcantheybeasinglecause?Aristotlesuggeststhattheycanactasasinglecauseiftheyaremixed:
Itisimpossibletoperceivetwoobjectssimultaneouslyinthesamesensoryactunlesstheyhavebeenmixed,for
theiramalgamationinvolvestheirbecomingone,andthesensoryactrelatedtooneobjectisitselfone....Hence,
whenthingsaremixedweofnecessityperceivethemsimultaneously:forweperceivethembyaperceptionactually
one.
(SS447b921,myemphasis)
(,,
),,
....(p.218) ,.
.
Thus,Aristotleseeksanaccountoftheunityoftheexternalobjectofperception,togroundinthattheunityofthe
perceptualexperienceofit.Wouldthinkingofcomplexcontentintermsofamixtureofperceptualqualitiesbeasolution
fortheproblemofcomplexperceptualcontent?Aristotletakesthispossibilityseriously,andtherearereasonswhyhe
doesso.TounderstandwhyhethoughtthattheMixedContentsModelmightaddressthequestionofhowweperceive
complexperceptualcontent,weneedtolookatAristotlestheoryofmixing. 6Accordingtothistheory,assetoutin
GenerationandCorruption,whentwoitemsmix,theysurvivemixingAristotlemakesthepointthus:
Sincesomethingsthatare,arepotential,andsomeactual,itispossibleforthingsaftertheyhavebeenmixedin
somewaytobeandnottobe.Someotherthing[themixture]whichcomestobefromthemisactually,whileeach
ofthethingswhichwere,beforetheyweremixed,stillis,butpotentially,andhasnotbeendestroyed.
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(GC327b2325)
,,
,,
Itisthesurvivalofthemixeditems,albeitinpotentiality,thatmakesmixingrelevantandpossiblyexplanatorily
valuableinrelationtotheproblemofthecomplexperceptualcontent.IfforAristotleeachoftheoriginalitemssurvivesin
theirmixture,theneachofthe(hypothetically)mixedperceptiblequalitiesmaybethoughttosurviveintheperceptual
contenttheywouldjointly(p.219) bringaboutwhenmixed.Ifso,thenthemixedperceptualcontentwouldincludethe
twomixedperceptiblequalitieswithoutdestroyingthem,thusallowingforperceptualoperationssuchasdiscrimination,
crossmodalbindingetc.
Evenifthisseemsapromisingstart,AristotledoesnotfinallyconcludethattheMixedContentsModelwillprovidethe
answertotheproblemofhowitisthatweperceivecomplexperceptualcontent.Hedoesnotexplainhisviewsexplicitlyin
theDeSensu,but,onceagain,wecanderivethemfromhistheoryofmixing.Heholdsthatwhentwoitemsaremixed,
theirqualitiesaffecteachotherandcometobethesame,astheyoperateoneachother,equalizingtheirdifferences
midwaybetweenthetwooriginalforms.So,hotwineandcoldhoneybecomelukewarmhoneywinewhenmixed,andthe
resultingmixtureisuniform.Aristotlewritesthat,
whenthetwoaremoreorlessequalinstrength,theneachchangesfromitsownnatureinthedirectionofthe
dominantone,thoughitdoesnotbecometheotherbutsomethinginbetweenandcommontoboth.
(GC328a2831)
,,
,.
Inthesameway,saythesweetandbitterinacocktail,orthelowandhighpitchsoundsofapianowouldmixintoa
singleperceptiblequality,intermediatebetweenthetwoextremes,bittersweetintaste,ormediumpitchinsound.Thus
mixingperceptiblequalitiesresultsinasingle(qualitativelyintermediate)qualitycausallyimpactingonthesenseorgan,
whichgivesrisetotheperceptionofonequalitativelysimpletasteorsound,intermediatebetweenthetwooriginalones.
Thetwooriginalperceptiblequalitiesineachcaseareinawayperceived,becausetheysurviveinpotentialityinthemixed
(p.220) content,buttheyareperceivedasone,asaperceptualcontentwithoutarticulationandqualitativecomplexity.
Ontheotherhand,itispreciselythisarticulationthatisrequiredforcomplexperceptualcontent.Inconclusion,the
MixedContentsmodelwillnotprovideawayofunderstanding,forexample,perceptualdiscrimination,suchasbetween
bitterandsweet,redandblue,sweetandwhite,etc.forthis,thereneedstobequalitativecomplexityinthecontentof
experience.Mixedsensationdoesnotproducecomplexperceptualcontent,becausetheperceptualstimuliaremixed,so
theireffectonthesenseorganisasonehomogeneousstimulus.
6.2TheMultipleSensorsModel
ElsewhereintheDeSensuAristotleexploresadifferentwayofaddressingtheproblemofcomplexperceptualcontentand
theunityofthecommonsense.Whatthisandthepreviousmodelhaveincommonistheimplicitassumptionthatunityat
thephysicallevelwouldguaranteeunityatthementallevel.Whilethepreviousmodelinvestigateswhetherthedifferent
perceptiblequalitiesthesubjectperceives(e.g.,indiscriminatingwhitefromblue)mightbeinsomewayunified,asa
mixedstimulusimpactingonthesense,thepresentmodelinvestigateswhetherthesenseitselfmightbepartitionedinto
manywhilealsoremainingone.IcallthistheMultipleSensorsModel.Therelevanttext,SS448b18449a5,isdifficultto
interpret,becausetheargumentsaredense,andoccasionallythetextlendsitselftoambiguities.Neverthelessitisan
importanttexttoconsiderbecauseoftheoriginalityofAristotlessuggestions,andbecauseitgivesusinsightsintohow
Aristotleconceivedoftheproblemofcomplexperception.Thisleadstoafurtherwayofexploringthequestion,driving
Aristotlesinvestigationtowardsafinalresolution.Aristotleasks,(p.221)
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WhetheritispossibleorimpossibletoperceiveseveralobjectssimultaneouslybysimultaneouslyImean
perceivingtheseveralobjectsinatimeoneandindivisiblerelativelytooneanother.
(SS448b1820)
.
.
Heproceedstoexplorethefollowingpossibility:
First,then,isitpossibleinthisway,thatoneperceivesdifferentthingssimultaneouslybutwithdifferentpartsof
thesoul,andinsuchanindivisiblewayasallbeingcontinuous?(SS448b2021,mytranslationandemphasis)7
,,,[]
Inaddressingthisquestion,Aristotlebeginsbynarrowingthescopeoftheinvestigationtothecaseofasinglesense,and
takessightashisexample.Thestartinghypothesisisthat,[w]
eassumeit[sc.sight]toperceiveonecolorwithonepart
8
andanotherwithanother(SS448b2324). Aristotlesstatementmightbetakentomeanthatsighthasdifferentparts
(i.e.,senseorgans),allsensitivetocolors,butwhichmighthappentoperceivedifferentinstancesofcolorataparticular
time.Alternatively,itmightbetakentomeanthatsighthasdifferentparts(i.e.,subsenseorgans)eachdedicatedtothe
perceptionofaparticularcolor.Thelatterreadingwouldallowsighttodiscriminatebetween,forexample,redandblack:
thetwoperceptualqualitieswouldimpactondifferentsenseorgansofsight,andyetbeinoneandthesamevisual
content(withoutmixing).ItakethistobetheintendedmeaningofAristotlesstatement,becauseotherwiseitwould
requireaverycomplexphysicalaccounttoexplainwhythis(p.222) partofthesenseorganofsightseesonlythegreen
ofleavesofthetreeandthispartonlythewhiteofthetreesbark.SuchanaccountisnotprovidedanywherebyAristotle
infactitisfarfromclearthatitwouldbeavailablewithinAristotlesphysics.Inaddition,difficultieswouldfollowifthe
principlewereappliedtocaseswhereamultiplicityofstimuliisnotphysicallydistributedintheworld(e.g.,flavorsina
drink).Insuchcasestherecouldnotbeisomorphismbetweenthedistributionofqualitiesintheobjectandtheircausal
impactondifferentpartsofthesenseorgan,becausetherewouldnotbedistributionofpropertiesinthefirstplace.
EvenifwetaketheMultipleSensorsModeltosuggestthatsighthasdifferentparts(i.e.,senseorgans),allequally
sensitivetocolors,butwhichmighthappentoperceivedifferentinstancesofcolorataparticulartime,themodelisnot
freefromdifficulties.Aristotlehimselfoffersanobjection:onthishypothesis,hethinks,thesensefacultywillhave
severalpartsthesameinkind.Forwhatitperceivesisthesameingenus(SS448b245myemphasis).Thedifficulty,in
otherwords,isthatthepartitioningofthesenseorganwillachieveonlyanunnecessaryduplicationofthesense,rather
thanunificationofitscontenteachpartwillstillfunctionlikethesenseitself,eachwithitsowncontent.Thegoal
howeverwastoshowhowtheperceiverseesdifferentcolorstogether,inasinglecomplexcontent.TheMultipleSensors
Modelonlyshowshowonecouldseedifferentcolorsthroughdifferentsenseorgansofsight,butevenifthedifferent
colorswereperceivedatthesametimebythesedifferentsenses,theywouldnotbeinasingleperceptualcontent.This
conclusionisnotstatedexplicitlyinthetext,butitcanbeinferredfromthenextstepAristotletakesintheargument.He
considersthesuggestionthatthedifferentpartsofsightmightbeoperatinginthewaythattwoeyesoperate,asonesense
organ:
Astherearetwoeyes,theremaybeinthesoulsomethinganalogousthatequallyfromthesepartssomeoneorgan
isformed,(p.223) andhencetheir[i.e.,thepartsinthesoulthatfunctionliketheeyes]actualizationin
perceptionisonebut9ifthisissointhesoul,then,insofaraswhatisformedofboth[perceivingpartsofthe
soul]isone[senseorgan],theperceivingsubjectalsowillbeone.
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(SS448b2629,withminoralterationsofthetranslation)
,,[]
,,
ThissuggestionismeanttoaddresstheproblemIjusthighlightedarisingfrompartitioningeachsensefaculty.Aristotle
notesthattwoeyesfunctioncollaboratively,notseparately,thuswithoutduplicatingthesense.Eachoftheeyesis
supposedtobeadifferentpartofthesenseofsight, 10butthetwoeyesoperateasasingleorganandtheiractualizationin
perception(i.e.,seeing)isone.Thismoveallowsforsomeprogressintherightexplanatorydirection,butyetanother
difficultyariseswiththetwoeyessuggestion(whichagain,Aristotlehimselfdoesnotmakeexplicit).Althoughtheir
sharedactualizationentailsasingleperceptualcontent,theresultisnoimprovementonthephilosophicalproblemunder
consideration.Thisisbecausethetwoeyesmakeuponesenseorganandhavethesameperceptualcontentbutthisdoes
notaccountforhowtheycouldperceivedifferentperceptiblequalitiesinoneandthesamecontent.Nothinginthetwo
eyesexampleindicatesthattheyprovideamechanismfortheperceptionofdifferentcolorsinthesamecontent.That
thismustbeAristotlesultimatestanceregardingtheMultipleSensorsModelissupportedbythechoicehemakesforhis
nextstepintheargument,namelythedenialthatthepartsofthesenseoperateliketheeyes,asoneorgan.Hewrites:if
thetwopartsofsoulremainseparate,theanalogywiththeeyeswillfail(,)(SS448b2829).
HereAristotlereturnstotheideahestartedwith,thatthepartsofasenseoperateasdifferentsenses(ofthesametype),
perceivingdifferentqualities.Butinthis(p.224) casetheanalogyofthetwoeyeswillnotapply,sincethetwoeyesdo
notfunctionlikeseparatesenses,andsotheproblemofhowthedifferentpartsofeachsenseperceivetheirdifferent
perceptiblequalitiesinthesameperceptualcontentremains.
Showingthetwoeyesanalogytobeultimatelyunhelpfultowardresolvingtheproblemofhowthedifferentpartsofa
sensecanoperateasdifferentsensespreparesthegroundforAristotlesnextobjectiontothesuggestionofthe
separatenessofthepartsofasense.So,Aristotlecontinues,ifthepartsofasensewhichperceivedifferentperceptible
qualitiesoperateseparately,ratherthanfunctionliketheeyesasonesense,then,
Eachofthesenseswillbemany,asifweshouldsaythattheywereeachasetofdiversesciencesforneitherwill
anactivityexistwithoutitsproperpower,norwithoutactivitywilltherebeasensation.
(SS448b30449a2,modifiedtranslation)
,
,
Thereasoneachsensewillbemanyisthattheactivityofperceivingrequiresacorrespondingpower(aswehaveseenin
theearlierchapters).Hence,eachpartofthesoulthatperceivesadifferentcolorwillexerciseitsownpower,haveitsown
perceptualactivity,andbeaseparatesense,evenifofthesamegenusastheotherpartsofthesense. 11Thecodathat
immediatelyfollows(SS449a25),whichcompletesthislineofargument,ispuzzlingtocommentators,aswellasto
translatorsalthoughthelanguageitselfisnot.Aristotlewrites:
Butifthesouldoesperceiveinoneandthesameindividualtimesensiblesofthesamesense,thusafortioriit
perceivessensiblesofdifferentsenses.Foritismoreconceivablethatit(p.225) shouldperceiveapluralityofthe
formertogetherinthiswaythanapluralityofheterogeneousobjects.
(SS449a25,withminoralterationsofthetranslation)
,
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Asitstands,thetextappearstostatethatifmultipleinstancesofspecialsensibles(ofonemodality)areperceivedinone
andthesameperceptualcontent,thenevidentlyspecialsensiblesofdifferentmodalitiesareperceivedinthesame
perceptualcontenttoo,becauseitismorelikelythatsensiblesofthesamespecialsenseareperceivedtogetherthan
sensiblesdifferingingenus.Thebecauseclause(atl.449a3)seemsunproblematic:differentsenseshavedifferenttypesof
senseorgan,whichmakesitmoredifficultfortheirspecialsensiblestobeperceivedtogether.Theinitialclausesonthe
otherhandaresurprisingfirst,becausetheyseemtoassumethatspecialsensiblesofthesamesenseareindeedperceived
togetherinonecontent,whichhasnotbeengranted12second,becauseevenifthisweregranted,itwouldnotshowthat
specialsensiblesofdifferentsensesareperceivedtogetheraswell,letaloneevidentlyso.Indeed,howwouldthedifferent
partsofeachsense,which,saysAristotle,differbetweenthemlikedifferentsciences,perceivetheirspecialsensibles
togetherwhen,asAristotlesaidintheprevioussentence,eachparthasitsownperceptualpoweranditsowntypeof
perceptioncorrespondingtotheexerciseofthatpower(SS449a12)?ItmustbethiswayofreasoningthatledAlexander
ofAphrodisiastoemendthetextbyaddingthenegationnotinthefirstclauseofthequotation,sothatitreads:
Butifthesouldoesnotperceiveinoneandthesameindividualtimesensiblesofthesamesense,afortioriitisnot
thusthatit(p.226) perceivessensiblesofdifferentsenses.Foritismoreconceivablethatitshouldperceivea
pluralityoftheformertogetherinthiswaythanapluralityofheterogeneousobjects.
(SS449a25,withminoralterationsofthetranslation)
<>,
ToseehowAlexandersemendationsolvesthedifficultyweneedtoassumethatthedifferentpartsofasense,whichare
likedifferentsciences,differfromeachotheronlyinspecies.Ifso,thepassagetellsusthatitismorelikelythat
perceptiblequalitiesdifferingonlyinspecies(i.e.,fallingundertheremitofonesense)willbeperceivedtogether,than
thatperceptiblequalitiesdifferingingenus(i.e.,fallingwithintheremitofdifferentsenses)willbeperceivedtogether. 13
Yet,eveniftheamendedtextreadsbetter,thereisnoimprovementinthephilosophicalimportoftheoverallargument.
Inconclusion,theMultipleSensorsModeldoesnotprovideanexplanationofthemetaphysicsofthecommonsense.If
thesensorsare,forexample,twoeyesfunctioningasonesenseorgan,thenthereisnoexplanationofhowtheyperceive
differentcolorsatthesametimeandiftheyfunctionasorgansofdifferenttypes,thenthereisnoexplanationofhowthe
perceivedqualitiesareperceivedinthesameperceptualcontent.Thedifficultycomesfromtheonetoonecorrespondence
principlebetweensensibleandperceptualcontent(seechapter2),whichtheMultipleSensorsModeldoesnotchallenge.
Infacttheonetoonecorrespondenceprincipleisreinforcedinthiscontextbytheassociationoftypeofsensationtotype
ofperceptualactivitythathasitsowntypeofperceptualpower(seeSS449a12).Thearticulationofeachsenseintomany
partsonlyreplicatestheproblem,becausetheparts(p.227) areshowntobemerelysubsenses,withnoextra
connectivitybetweenthem. 14
6.3TheRatioModel
IntheDeAnima,Aristotleexploresanewapproachtothequestionofwhichmetaphysicsmightdelivertherequiredunity
andcomplexityatthesametimeforthecommonsense.Thestartingpointisthefollowingthought:thingsaresaidtobe
analogouswhentheyareequalinsomerespecttheyarenotequalonetoone,astowhateachis,buttheyareequal
betweenpairsofthemwithrespecttosomedifferenceinwhateachis(e.g.,as1isto3so4isto12).Icallthemodel
AristotledevelopsfromthisideatheRatioModel.Itisaveryunusualbutsophisticatedandoriginalmodelforentitiesthat
aremanyinone.Itsingenuityisameasureofthedegreetowhichthemetaphysicalcompositionofthecommonsense
exercisedAristotle.
Consideraratiothatisthesameacrossmanyanalogicalrelations,asforexamplebetween536/1072,and77/154,etc.,
namely,1/2.Intheexample,everyfractionhasitsownconstitution,involvingdifferentnumbersthantheotherfractions.
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Eachofthesefractionsisthusadifferentfraction,withdifferentproperties.Buteachofthesemanyfractionsisalsoone
withtheotherfractionsintheequation,becauseallofthemstandforthesameratio.Thus,Aristotlereasons,supposea
perceiverdiscernswhitefromsweetonavarietyofoccasions.Eachtimesheisawareofaperceptualcontentthatis
numericallydifferentfromtheothertimes.Buttheseperceptualcontentshavesomethingincommon,namelytheyall
representthesamedifferencebetweenperceptiblequalities(e.g.,betweenwhiteandsweet).Thisdifferencecanbe
thoughtofasaratioaspecificrelationofdissimilaritybetweentwowaysofbeing,whiteand(p.228) sweet.Then,on
thismodelwhenaperceiverdiscriminatesbetweenwhiteandsweetonthedifferentoccasionsoftheirperceptual
discrimination,hercomplexperceptualcontentoneachoccasionwillrepresentthesameratioofwaysofbeing.More
generally,complexperceptualcontentsrepresentingthedifferencebetweenvisualandflavorfulitemsareallinstancesof
justthisratio,ofthevisualtotheflavorful.Byextension,thesensesofvisionandtastecanbethoughtofasbeingrelated
toeachotherbythesameratio,sincethenatureofeachsenseisdeterminedbytheperceptiblequalityitissensitiveto. 15
AristotledescribestheRatioModelthus:
Theultimatepointofarrival[i.e.,thecommonsense]isone,asinglemean,withdifferentmannersofbeing.With
whatpartofitselfthesouldiscriminatessweetfromhotIhaveexplainedbeforeandmustnowdescribeagainas
follows:Thatwithwhichitdoesso[i.e.,thecommonsense]isasortofunity,butinthewayaboundaryisand
thesethings[sc.sweetandhot]beingonebyanalogyandnumerically,areeachtoeachasthose[sc.the
correspondingperceptualmodifications,orperceptualcontents,orsensesorevenwhiteandblack]aretoone
another(forwhatdifferencedoesitmakewhetherweraisetheproblemofdiscriminationbetweendisparatesor
betweencontrariese.g.,whiteandblack?).LetthenC[sc.perceptualcontentofwhite]betoD[sc.perceptual
contentofblack]asA,whiteistoB,black:itfollowsalternandothatC:A::D:B.IfthenCandAbelongtoone[sc.
typeofsensible],thecasewillbethesamewiththemaswithDandBDandBarethesameandone,with
differentmodesofbeingsotoowilltheformerones.ThesamereasoningholdsifAbesweetandBwhite.
(DA431a19b1,myemphasis)
,<>,...,
(p.229) ,.,,,
,<>
,,
[].,,,
,.,
.
Thetextisbriefandellipticalitlendsitselftomanyalternativeinterpretations.Iwillnotgiveadetaileddiscussionofthe
alternativeshere,norofwhatadvantagesordifficultieseachversionoftheargumenthas,asthishasalreadybeendone
intheliterature. 16Rather,IwilladvanceanewreadingthatmakesacontributiontowardsunderstandinghowAristotle
addressesthequestionthathesetoutwithinthepassagequoted.Thisisthequestionofthenatureoftheperceiving
subject,specificallythecommonsensethatperceivescomplexperceptualcontents.
Thegoalistoshowthatdespitethedistinctnessofthespecialsensesandofwhateachissensitiveto,itispossibleforthe
perceivertohaveawarenessof,forexample,sweetandwhiteinthecomplexperceptualcontent,viatheoperationofa
singleunifiedmultimodalsense,thecommonsense.Sowhatisatissueistheunityand,yes,complexityofthecommon
sense.ThemainclaimsAristotleadvanceswiththeRatioModelarethefollowing:First,thecommonsenseisaunified
sense.Second,thecommonsenseisaunifiedsensedespitebeingconstitutedofamultiplicityofdifferentsensesinthe
wayaboundaryisaunity,despitethemultipleregionsthatindividuateit.Third,perceptiblequalitiessuchassweetand
whitearerelatedtoeachotheranalogouslytothewaytheirrespectiveperceptionsare,andastheirrespectivesense
modalitiesarerelated(p.230) inthecommonsense.ItakeAristotlespointtobethatthetwoperceptiblequalitiescan
thusberelated(andbeinthesameperceptualcontent)eveniftheyarenotspecialsensiblesofthesamesense.The
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justificationforthispointisthatifwhatrelatesthetwoqualitiesistheirbeingqualitativelydifferentfromeachother,
therecanbequalitativedifferencebothbetweenqualitiesofdifferentspecies(e.g.,twocolors)andqualitiesofdifferent
genera(e.g.,acolorandasound).Twoqualitiesofthesamegenusareonthesamequalitativespectrum,and,assuch,
therecanbeaborderlinebetweenthem(betweenhotandcoldsweetandsour,etc.).Ontheotherhand,twoqualities
thatbelongtodifferentgeneraarenotonthesamequalitativespectrum.Buttheprinciplegeneralizes.Generabelong
themselvestohighergenera.Thedifferencesbetweengenerawithinthesamehighergenusallowsforaqualitative
divisionbetweenthemandinthatsense,foraqualitativeboundaryoratleastratiobetweenthem.Anyqualitative
differencecanbeviewedasaqualitativedivisionthatsetsaboundarybetweentwoitems. 17
ThemostimportantconceptualdifficultywiththeRatioModelisthatofunderstandinginwhichsenseananalogyis
unified.Aristotlesaysthatthecommonsenseisunifiedasameanandasaboundaryandthatcomplexperceptual
contentisunifiedlikeananalogyanditisanalogoustothecommonsense.Ishallstartbyprovidinganaccountofthe
unityofaratio,andthenextendittoexplainalsotheunityofananalogybetweenwaysofbeing.Itiseasiertounderstand
theunityofanumericalratiobecauseitcorrespondstoasinglevaluee.g.,theratioof1to2,i.e.,is0.5.Butweneed
notgrasp0.5inordertoseetheunityof,sincetheratioisdeterminateevenwhenitisrelationallyexpressedasthe
ratioof1to2.Therelationalexpressionofaratioisappropriateforanalogiesbetweenwaysofbeing,sincethelatter
cannotbeexpressedasasinglevalueofacommonunitandwithoutacommonunitthereisnonumericalanalogy.What
thequalitativeanalogiesstandforisa(p.231) singlequalitativeformexpressedbytheanalogy.Examplesofqualitative
analogiesarethefollowing:asthecentralprocessingunitistothecomputer,sothebrainistothehumanbeingor,asa
sophismistoreasoning,soacounterfeitnoteistomoney.Inthepresentcase,asthesweetistothewhite,sothecontent
oftheperceptionofthesweetistothecontentoftheperceptionofthewhite,andthesenseoftasteistothesenseofsight.
Thesimplestwaytothinkabouttheanalogyofameanoraboundaryinthiscontextistothinkofafraction,definedby
therelationoftwonumberssoisaboundarydefinedbytherelationoftworegions,andsimilarlyforamean,oran
analogy.Afractionisunifiedandoneinvariousways.First,afractionistheunificationoftwonumbersintoaratio
namely,itisoneasacomplexstructuredentity.Second,afractionisnumericallyoneasavalue,namely,itisoneasa
simpleentity.Thirdananalogybetweentwofractionsisitselfaunificationofthetwofractionsintoanequation,which
isacomplexstructuredentity(e.g.,186/372=).Buttheequalityofthefractionsisakindofsharedidentity,whichis
simpleandnumericallyone.WhatAristotleexpressesthroughtheRatioModel,inmyinterpretation,isthataratiohasa
singlevalue,whichrunsthroughanequationofsuchratiosasthecommonsingleidentitysharedbyalltheratiosinthe
equation,unifyingtheequationintoone,notwithstandingitsmultiplecomplexity. 18Correspondingly,ascoloristosight
sosoundistohearing,andthetangibleistotouch,andscentistosmell,andtasteistothesenseoftaste.Thesingle
identitythatunifiesthecommonsense(bybeingthecommonvaluei.e.,thecommonformoftheratios,throughoutits
structureandconstitution)istheratiobetweenthemodalitiesofthesensesandthemodalitiesoftheircontents
respectively.Eachratioisequaltotheotherratios,butdifferentfromtheminbeing,justasthefractionsinanequation
areequaltooneanotherbutdifferentinbeing.Theequalvalue(i.e.thecommonform)unifiesthecommonsense,and
(p.232) thediversityofbeingoftheratiosofmodalitiesarticulatesthecommonsenseintoitssenses. 19
Inconclusion,Aristotleintendstheonenessoftheanalogytoreflecttheonenessandunityofthecommonsense,from
whichtheunityofcomplexperceptualcontentsisderived.Itisimportanttonotethatwhereasinthecaseofthespecial
sensesitisthecausalimpactofthespecialsensibleonthesenseorganthatdeterminesthestructureoftheperceptual
contentonecausalalterationtoonecontent,ofwhiteorsweet,etc.inthecaseofcomplexcontentitisthestructureof
thecommonsense(whichhasnosenseorganofitsown)thatdeterminesthecomplexcontentoftheexperience
comprising,forexample,whiteandsweet. 20
ItisameasureofthedifficultythatAristotlefindsinaccountingfortheonenessofasubjectperceivingcomplexcontents
thathedevisesexplanationsofthecommonsenseasabstractastheRatioModel.Themodelofferstooabstracta
conceptionofaunitytogiveasatisfactoryaccountoftheway,forexample,twodifferentperceptiblequalitiesmodifythe
samesenseatthesametime.Ontheotherhand,themodelishelpfulbecauseitillustratesafurtherdomainofwhatwe
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maycalltheonenessofdivision.Therearevariouswaysinwhichthisthemecouldbeexploredboundaries,limits,
ratios,etc.andAristotleexploresmostofthem.
ConcludingRemarks
InthischapterIexaminedthreemetaphysicalmodelsAristotledevelopstoaccountfortheunityandcomplexityofthe
commonsenseandofcomplexperceptualcontent.TheMixedContentsModelattemptstosolvetheproblemofcomplex
perceptualcontentbysomehowunifyingthedifferentperceptiblequalitiesthatimpact(p.233) onasenseorgan.They
becomeonebymixing,andyetsurviveinpotentialityinthemixture.Nevertheless,wesawthatthetypeofpresenceina
mixturethatAristotlestheoryofmixingallowsforisnotwhatisrequiredfortheoperationsofthecommonsense.The
MultipleSensorsModelshiftsthefocusoftheinquiryontothecommonsenseitself,fromwhosepartitionthecomplexity
ofitsperceptualcontentissupposedlytobederived.TheMultipleSensorsModelexploreswhetherdifferenttypesof
perceptiblequalitycanbeperceivedbydifferentpartsofasenseorgan,eachpartoperatingasaseparatesense(evenif
genericallyofthesametype),sothatthesenseasawholewouldperceiveacomplexperceptualcontentthroughitsparts.
Ultimatelythismodeltoowasfoundwanting,becauseitdidnotprovideawayofcombiningtheperceptualcontents
gatheredbythedifferentpartsofthesenseintoonesinglebutcomplexcontent.FinallytheRatioModeloffersawayof
thinkingofthecommonsenseasoneandmanybyanalogywiththeratiothatunifiesmanydifferentpairsofdifferent
numbers.Thedrawbackofthismodelisthatitdoesnotprovideanymetaphysicsforthecommonsenseanditsoperation,
butonlyanabstractwayofconceptualizingitsunityandcomplexity.Noneofthesethreemodelsisbyitselfapttoaccount
forthemetaphysicsofthecommonsense,buteachhelpstheinvestigationtomoveforward.
Notes
Notes:
(1).EvenifAristotletalks,forexplanatorypurposes,ofhowthecommonsenseachievesperceptualawarenessofthe
externalobjects,itisclearthatforAristotletheseatofperceptualawarenessisultimatelytheperceiver,andnotthe
senses.
(2).Seetheclassificationofperceptualpowersgiveninchapter4.
(3).DebatesaboutthechronologicalorderofAristotleswritingswerepopularamongscholarsuptotheendofthe1960s
asan(oftenabused)devicetoexplainapparentdoctrinaldiscrepanciesinAristotlesthought(ausefulbriefsurvey
concerningpsychologicalwritingscanbeseeninPreus1968,175).AccordingtoRossview(inspiredbyNuyens),De
AnimashylomorphistconceptionrepresentsthelaststageofAristotlespsychologicaltheory,anditscharacteristic
holismisincompatiblewiththeinstrumentalistdualismsupposedlyentailedbytheattributionofprimaryfunctionstoa
preciselylocalizedpartofthebody,theheart(Ross1955,57,16cf.Block1961,51).Thelatterview,inRossopinion,is
foundnotonlyinDeSomnobutalsoinDeSensuandDeMemoria(Ross1955,167cf.Block1961,52,546).A
criticismofthisviewisofferedbyBlock(1961,5061),whoarguesfortheoppositeviewsandconsidersParvaNaturalia
thelateststageofdevelopmentinAristotlestheory,incompatiblewiththeDeAnima(Block1961,6277,esp.6768).
Contemporaryscholarshipappearstoinclinetowardsaunitarianandcompatibiliststance(seeforexamplePolanski,
2007,256)evenwhenendorsingtheviewthatthethesescontainedinDeSensuconstituteafurtherelaborationofthe
viewspresentedintheDeAnima(cf.Johansen2006,16364).
(4).ThisisonaccountofAristotlesstipulationsonhowperceptionworksinthecaseofthespecialsenses(seechapter
2)whichsufferaphysicaldisturbancewhentakingoneachperceptible.
(5).Ontheliteralistview,nothingcanbecoloredintwowaysatthesametimeinthesamepart.Onthedisturbance
view,Aristotletakeseachsenseorgantohaveaphysiologythatallowsittobeamean,andreceivestimulithatdonot
physicallychangetheorgansothatitembodiestheperceivedqualitybutneverthelesscauseadisturbanceintheorgan.
Onthespiritualistviewpresumablytherewouldbenoproblemifthereweretwodifferentspiritualchangesinthesame
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organatthesametime.Thethreeinterpretationsarediscussedinchapter2.
(6).SeetheveryhelpfuldiscussionofthemetaphysicsofmixtureinScaltsas2009.
(7).ThisistheclosestAristotleevergetstoexplicitlydescribingwhatforusistheperceptualfield.Atthispointinthe
reasoninghehasnotfocusedonasinglesense(asheimmediatelywillwithsightasanexample)soitisnotjustthe
visualfieldhehasinmindbutmorebroadlythecontinuumofperceptsastheycomeinthroughseeing,hearing,tasting,
smelling,andfeeling.InGreek,Aristotleswayofexpressingthispointis:.This
sentencehasbeeninterpreteddifferentlybytranslatorsrenderingiteitherasaboutthetimeofperceptionbeing
continuous(J.I.Beare,inBarnes1984)orthesensingpartsofthesoulbeingcontinuous(Hett1957).Thefirstproposed
readingisdifficulttounderstandasitsuggeststhattheperceptionshappenwithdifferentpartsofthesouldifferent
senseorganswhicharecontinuous:isitpossibletoperceive...withadifferentpartofthesoul,...oneindivisibleinthe
senseofbeingallcontinuous.Whatwoulditmeanforthesenseorganofsighttobecontinuouswiththesenseorganof
taste?Thesecondsuggestionclasheswiththeclaiminthissentencethattheperceptionsaresimultaneous,where
simultaneousisexplainedbyAristotleintheprevioussentenceasoccurringatatimeoneandindivisible(SS448b19)
itwouldalsonotbeobviouswhyAristotlewouldbeinterestedinexplainingperceptionofdifferentsensiblesoveraperiod
oftime,whichiswhatcontinuoustimewouldentail,whenhehasnotyetexplainedperceptionofdifferentsensiblesat
onetime.InsuggestingthisinterpretationIdepartfromD.Frede(1992,283),whothinksthatitisdoubtfulthatfor
Aristotlewecanhavesomethinglikeapanoramicviewofawholesituation,forhedoesnotseemtoincludeanything
likeafieldofvisioninhisexplanations.
(8).
(9).Itakethistobewheretheobjectiontothetwoeyesanalogybegins.Ifitisnotreadinthisway,thentheanalogyof
theeyeswouldnotfaceanyobjections,andwouldneedtobetreatedasapositivecontributiontowardsanaccountof
complexcontent.Butthenwewouldnotbeabletoexplainwhytheverynextsentenceintroducesanobjectionagainst
thesuggestionofthepartsofasensewiththeword,whichsignifiesanadditionalobjection.
(10).AlthoughAristotlementionsthepartsofthesoul,itmustbethatheisstilloperatingontheinitialhypothesisofthe
partsofasinglesense,heresight(SS448b2223).ItisthesepartshebegandiscussingatSS448b24.
(11).InthisargumentAristotleassociatesdifferenceinspeciesbetweenthedifferentpartsofasensewithdifferencein
sensewhereasintheargumentatSS448b2425aswesawheassociatesdifferenceingenuswithdifferenceinsense.
Thisshowsthatthereisagreyareainthecriteriaforindividuatingasense,oncewedivideasenseintoparts.
(12).Unlessonetookthetwoeyesanalogyastheresolutionofthecomplexperceptualcontentproblemforsensiblesof
onemodality,whichwehadnoreasontoassumeabove.
(13).Thetextsays,whichisnotclearlyreflectedinthetranslationasheterogeneous,butwouldbe
betterrenderedasdifferentingenus,asHettdoesintheLoebedition(foritwouldbemorepossibleforittoperceive
severalofthesesimultaneouslythanthingsdifferentingenus).
(14).Forthisreason,AristotleproceedstoadifferentmodelinthemiddleofthisdiscussionintheDeSensu,the
SubstanceModel(discussedinchapter7).
(15).SeeDA418a2425:thespecialobjectsoftheseveralsensesconstitutetheobjectsofsenseinthestrictestsenseof
thetermanditistothemthatinthenatureofthingsthestructureofeachseveralsenseisadapted.
(16).Therearealsoalternativewaysoffillingoutthetext,insertedherebelowwithinsquarebrackets:
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WithwhatpartofitselfthesouldiscriminatessweetfromhotIhaveexplainedbeforeandmustnowdescribeagain
asfollows:Thatwithwhichitdoessoisasortofunity,butinthewayaboundaryisandthesethings[sc.the
sensibles,sweetandhot]beingonebyanalogy[sc.asaratioisarelationallyunifiedwhole]andnumerically[sc.
inthewaythatasenseexperienceisnumericallyone],areeachtoeachasthose[sc.thesensibleforms,sweetand
hot]aretooneanother(forwhatdifferencedoesitmakewhetherweraisetheproblemofdiscriminationbetween
disparates[suchassweetandhot]orbetweencontrariese.g.,whiteandblack?).LetthenC[sensiblewhite?
sight?]betoD[sensibleblack?sight?]asA,white[sensibleform?sensible?]istoB,black[sensibleform?
sensible?]:itfollowsalternandothatC:A::D:B.IfthenCandAbelongtoone[genus?subject?],thecasewillbe
thesamewiththemaswithDandBDandBarethesameandone[ingenus],withdifferentmodesofbeing
[sensibleformversussensible?sensibleversussense]sotoowilltheformerones[CandA].Thesamereasoning
holdsifAbesweetandBwhite.
(DA431a20b1)
Gregoric(2007,158)providesabriefsurveyofthetraditionalreadingsofthispassage.
(17).IamindisagreementonthispointwithCharlton(1981,107)andalsowithGregoric(2007,156),whobaseshis
owninterpretationonCharltonspointthattherecannotbeaboundarybetweenwhiteandsweet.
(18).Theequationiscomplexvertically,asitwere,becauseofthecomplexityofbeingsineachratioandhorizontally,
becauseofthecomplexityofbeingsofeachratiointheequation.
(19).ContrastthiswiththeinterpretationinGregoric(2007,15960):
Letusassumethatsweetandhotareoneinanalogyinthesensethattheyarecospecificperceptibles...[T]
he
perceptionsofsweetandhotareoneinanalogyinthesensethattheyareactsofthesameintensity...they
actualizethecorrespondingsenseswithequalintensity.(Myemphasis)
Gregorichimselfadmitsthathisreadingisnotfoolproof(IwishtostressthattheinterpretationoftheDAIII.7passage
Ihaveofferedisneitherfoolproofnortheonlyonepossible,Gregoric2007:161)butthereisnotextualevidencetobegin
withthatAristotleismakinguseoftheconceptofintensityinthiscontext.
(20).Thispointwillbefurtherdiscussedinchapter6,section6.4.
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OneandManyPerceptualFacultiesOxfordScholarship
AnnaMarmodoro
PrintISBN13:9780199326006
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
OneandManyPerceptualFaculties
AnnaMarmodoro
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.003.0008
AbstractandKeywords
Aristotledevelopsthreeadditionalmodels,whichpointtohisunderstandingofthecommonsense.TheRelativeIdentity
Modelfocusesonhowdifferenttypesoffunctionalitycanbecoinstantiatedinoneandthesamephysicalorgan,by
analogywiththecaseofapointthatisthelimitofmanylines.TheSubstanceModelexplainshowthecommonsensecan
achieveaseamlessmultimodaloperationandaseamlessmultimodalcontent,despitethephysicaldistributionofsensing
indifferentsenseorgans.Finally,theCommonPowerModeloffersanaccountofthecommonsenseasacommonpower,
sharedacrossthespecialsenses,ownedjointlybyallofthem,whichcontrolsthespecialsenses.Thespecialsensesare
typesofperceptualabilityofthecommonsense.
Keywords:Aristotle,RelativeIdentityModel,SubstanceModel,CommonPowerModel,commonsense
Introduction
Inhistheoryofperception,Aristotleiscommittedtoaunifiedcommonsensewithunifiedcomplexperceptualcontent.In
chapter6wesawthatheapproachesthequestionofhowtoaccountmetaphysicallyfortheunityofthecommonsense
andofitsperceptualcontentintwoways:startingfromthemany(manyinputs,intheMixedContentsModelsmany
analogousitems,intheRatioModel)andtryingtounifythemintooneandstartingfromtheone(onefaculty,inthe
MultipleSensorsModel)andpartitioningitintomany.ThislatterapproachguidesAristotleindevelopingafurther
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modelintheDeAnima,inwhichthecommonsenseisoneandmanybyanalogywiththewayinwhichapointcanbe
manylimitsatonce,inrelationtodifferentsemilines.Thislattermodelisametaphysicalbreakthroughasitintroduces
theideaofrelativeidentity.IthuscallittheRelativeIdentityModel.WhiletheMixedContents,theMultipleSensors,
andtheRatioModelshelpinadvancingAristotlesinquiryintothemetaphysicsofthecommonsense,noneofthem
ultimatelycontributesthefinalsolution.BycontrasttheRelativeIdentityModeldoes,asIwillargueintheoverall
conclusions.Butbyitself,eventhismodelisnotfullyadequatetoaccountforthemetaphysicsofthecommonsense.The
reasonisthatitdoes(p.238) notaccountfortheoperationsofthecommonsenseontheperceptualinputsitgathersvia
thespecialsensibles.TheRelativeIdentityModelexplainssuccessfullyhowonethingcanbemanyatoncehowitcan
instantiatemanybeings.Thusthecommonsensecanbeatoncethefacultyofvision,oftouch,ofsmell,etc.Butthisis
notallAristotleneedstoaccountfor.Aswesaw,Aristotlearguesthatperceptionofthemodallydifferentsensibles
togetherinasinglecontentisachievedbymeansofasinglesubject,plusaperceptualmechanismbywhichthedifferent
modificationsofthevarioussenseorgansresultinthegenerationofasingleperceptualcontentforthesubject.
Ultimately,asIwillargueintheoverallconclusions,theunityofthecommonsenseisafunctionaltypeofunity:whatit
doescanbeachievedonlybyanintegratedperceptualsystemconstitutedbythefivesenses,anditsunityisderivedfrom
theunityoffunction.ThisiswhattheRelativeIdentityModelcannotcaptureitcannotexplainhowthecommonsense
functions.ThusAristotleattemptsnewtwowaysofexplainingtheperceptualmechanismofmultimodalperception.Icall
themtheSubstanceModelandtheCommonPowerModel,andIdiscusstheminthischapter.
7.1TheRelativeIdentityModel
IntheDeAnimaAristotlereturnsforasecondtime1tothequestionofhowasensecanatoneandthesametimebe
affectedbydifferentsensiblessuchassweetandbitter,orsweetandwhiteandmakesafreshstart.Heintroducesthe
problemthus:
Itmaybeobjected,itisimpossiblethatwhatisoneandthesame[i.e.,asense]shouldbemovedatoneandthe
sametimewithcontrarymovementsinsofarasitisundivided,andinanundividedmomentoftime.Forifwhatis
sweetbethequality(p.239) perceived,itmovesthesenseorthoughtinthisdeterminateway,whilewhatisbitter
movesitinacontraryway,andwhatiswhiteinadifferentway.
(DA426b29427a1,translationslightlymodified)
,.
,,,
ThesolutionAristotleproposesinthissectionoftheDeAnimatothedifficultyjustraisedisnotuniquetohistheoryof
perception,butisonethatheemploysinvariouscontextswhereheisconfrontingaproblemofunityandmultiplicityin
relationtotheconstitutionofanactivityora(nonsubstantial)entity:itisbeingoneinnumberandmanyinbeing.Icall
thisparticularapplicationofittotheproblemofperceptiontheRelativeIdentityModel.Itisputforwardhere:
Isitthecasethenthatwhatdiscriminates,thoughbothnumericallyoneandindivisible,isatthesametime
dividedinitsbeing?Inonesense,itiswhatisdividedthatperceivestwoseparateobjectsatonce,butinanother
senseitdoessoquaundividedforitisdivisibleinitsbeingbutspatiallyandnumericallyundivided.
(DA427a25)
,[]
,,
ThethoughtAristotleisexploringhereisthatthecommonsenseisalreadybyitsverynaturemanybeingsatthesame
time,whilebeingnumericallyonethereforethemultiplemodificationsofitatoneandthesametimeshouldnotbe
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thoughttoundermineitsoneness.(p.240) Beforeweproceedinfurtherexaminingthemodel,letusconsideravery
subtleobjectionAristotlehimselfraisesagainsthisownproposedsolution:
Butisnotthisimpossible?Forwhileitistruethatwhatisoneandthesameandundividedmaybebothcontraries
atoncepotentially,itcannotbeoneandthesameinitsbeingitmustloseitsunitybybeingputintoactivity.Itis
notpossibletobeatoncewhiteandblack,andthereforeitmustalsobeimpossibleforathingtobeaffectedatone
andthesamemomentbytheformsofboth,assumingittobethecasethatsensationandthinkingareproperlyso
described.
(DA427a59,withminoralterationsinthetranslation,myemphasis)
,,,
,,
ThequestionAristotleexaminesiswhetherthediscriminatingsense(i.e.thecommonsense)ismanyinbeingactually,
atthesametimeorismanyinbeingonlypotentially,whilebeingactuallymanyinbeingonlyatdifferenttimes.The
objectionisthatifthecommonsensewasmanyinbeingonlypotentiallybutnotinactualityatthesametime,thenthe
commonsensewouldnotbeabletosufferdifferentcausalalterationsatatimewhichiswhatisrequiredforcomplex
perceptualcontent.Aristotlerespondstotheobjectionhehasraisedwithanexample,whichaimstovalidatetheRelative
IdentityModelforthecommonsense:
Justaswhatiscalledapointis,asbeingatonceoneandtwo,properlysaidtobedivisible,sohere,thatwhich
discriminatesisquaundividedone,andactiveinasinglemomentof(p.241) time,whilequadivisibleittwice
overusesthesamedotatoneandthesametime.Sofarthenasittwiceoverusesthelimit,itdiscriminatestwo
separateobjectswithwhatinasenseisseparated:whilesofarasitusesitasone,itdoessowithwhatisoneand
occupiesinitsactivityasinglemomentoftime.
(DA427a1014,myemphasis,andtranslationslightlymodified)
,,<>.,
,,,
,,.
Aterminologicalpointfirst:Inthispassage,Aristotlethinksofthepointintwowaysasasubstratum,enteringthe
constitutionofafurtherentity(forexamplealimit,,hasapointasitssubstratum),andasaconstitutedentityin
itself.Heusesdifferentexpressionsforeach:thewordforthepointtakenasalimit,andthewordforthe
pointtakenastheunderlyingsubstratumofthe(orthe).ThusAristotletalksoftheasbeingone
andtwoatthesametime,butoftheasbeingusedtwiceoveratthesametime.Whatthisexampleestablishesis
thatitispossibleforsomethingtohavetwonaturesinactualityatoneandthesametime. 2Theexampledescribesthe
functionofapointasalimit.Considerapointthatdividesalineinhalf.Thepointconstitutestwolimits,aandb,onefor
eachhalfline.Therelationsofthepointtoeachofthehalflinesdetermineitsfunctionandnature,asalimitforeachof
thehalflines.Inthissense,thepointisoneandundividedasapoint,whileitisdividedintotwoinitsfunctionsasa
limit,sincetherearetwodifferentlimitsinstantiatedinitinactualityatthesametime.Soatoneandthesametime,a
andb(p.242) arethesamepoint,buttheyaredifferentlimits.Hereby,Aristotleintroducesinhismetaphysicsthe
conceptofrelativeidentity.
TurningnowtoexaminethephilosophicaladequacyoftheRelativeIdentityModeltoprovideametaphysicalaccountof
thecommonsense,Aristotlereiteratesthatthisiswhatthecommonsenseneedstobecapableofachieving:
Thereforediscriminationbetweenwhiteandsweetcannotbeeffectedbytwodiscriminatorswhichremain
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separateboththequalitiesdiscriminatedmustbepresenttosomethingthatisoneandsingle.Onthissupposition
[thatbothqualitiesarepresenttoonediscriminator],evenifIperceivedsweetandyouperceivedwhite,the
differencebetweenthemwouldbeevident.Whatsaysthattwothingsaredifferentmustbeoneforsweetis
differentfromwhite.Thereforewhatassertsthisdifferencemustbeoneandthesame,andaswhatasserts,soalso
whatthinksorperceives.
(DA426b1722translationslightlymodified)
,
,,
,
Therequirementsforthediscriminationbetween,forexample,whiteandsweetcanbesummarizedasfollows.The
commonsensefunctionsasasense.Itisthesensethroughwhichweperceivecolors,sounds,tastes,etc.Itssenseorgans
arethesenseorgansofthespecialsenseswehaveseenthatthecommonsensedoesnothaveasenseorganthatcan
perceivetheperceptiblequalitiesoverandabovethesenseorgansofthespecialsenses. 3Thusitmustbethat(p.243) the
perceptionofwhitethroughsightsufficesfortheawarenessofwhitethroughthecommonsense,andsimilarlyforthe
otherperceptiblequalities.Hence,whateverisperceptiblethroughthespecialsensesistherebyperceptiblethroughthe
commonsense.Thereisonlyoneinstanceofperceptualawarenessofthewhitethroughsightandthroughthecommon
sense,nottwo.Inotherwords,thereisno(homuncular,orsecondorder)senseinternallyperceivingtheperceptual
contentsproducedbythespecialsenses. 4Therefore,anyaccountofthecommonsensemustbeabletoexplainitscapacity
tofunctionasasensedespitenothavingitsownsenseorganbutrelyingonthesenseorgansofthespecialsenses.
Secondly,anysuchaccountmustbeabletoexplainhowitisthatthecommonsensehasperceptualpowersthatthe
specialsensesdonothave(forexamplethecommonsensecandiscriminatewhiteandsweet).Suchperceptualpowers
requirethatthecommonsensebeasinglecenterofperceptualawareness. 5Hence,themetaphysicalchallengeof
complexperceptualcontentarises.
Thecommonsensehastofunctionaseachofthespecialsensesandadditionallyasasuigenerissenseitself,withinput
throughthespecialsensesandalsowithperceptualpowersofitsown.Doesthepointexampleillustratehowasingle
entitycanfunctioninalltheseways?Theexamplelendsitselftoavarietyofmetaphysicalinterpretations.Specifically,
thepointcanbetakentobethesubstratumthatconstitutesthisorthatlimitdependingontherelationsthatrelatethe
pointtothisorthatlineastheirlimit.Alternatively,thepointcanbetakentobealimit,essentiallyrelatedtotheline
whoselimititis.Butthecommonsensecannotberelatedtothefivesensesinthewaythesubstratumpointisrelatedto
thelimitsitconstitutes,becausethecommonsenseisconstitutedbythespecialsenses,ratherthanconstitutingthem.
Thecommonsensefunctions,itself,asasense,capableofperceivingsensiblesthatnoothersensecanperceivethe
common(p.244) sensiblesandhasawarenessofalltheperceptualinputreceivedthroughthespecialsenses.Itisthe
sametypeofentityaseachofthespecialsenses(i.e.,itisasense)thisiswhyitcannotbetheirsubstratum.Forthese
reasons,Ishallratherturntoexploretheotherpossibleinterpretationoftheexample,takingthepointasalimit.The
exampleofthepointtakenasalimitcanitselfbedevelopedinavarietyofwaysthemorepromisingoneisthereading
accordingtowhichthepointisthecenterofacircle. 6Onthisreading,thecenterpointistheterminusofeachradiusand
theterminusofallofthem.Oneandthesamepointismanylimits(i.e.,manyinbeing)andanalogouslythecommon
senseisoneandmanysensesinactuality.Buttheexamplegoesonlysomewaytowardprovidingthemetaphysical
explanationofthecommonsensethatAristotleislookingfor:thecommonsenseisbasicallyasenseconstitutedbythe
specialsenses.Theexampleisultimatelynotapttocapturethisitisasifwewerelookingforalimitconstitutedbythe
convergentlimitsofthecirclesradii,butthereisnolimitconstitutedoftheoverlappinglimitsoftheradii.The
interpretationofthepointasthelimitoftheradiionlydifferentiatesbetweenitbeingthelimitofoneandbeingthelimit
ofmanyradiiandthusitdoesnotprovideallthemetaphysicalsophisticationthatanaccountofthecommonsense
requires.(Itmightbethoughtthatthepoint,asthelimitofalltheradiiofacircle,becomesthecenterofacirclei.e.,
somethingmetaphysicallydifferentfrombeingalinelimitandthusperhapsdifferentlyempowered.Wouldthismove
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offerawayofaddressingtherequirementthatthecommonsensefunctionsnotmerelyasanyoneofthespecialsenses,
butasadifferenttypeofsense,withperceptualpowersofitsown,ofatypethatthespecialsensesdonotpossess?It
wouldnot.Evenifconsideredasthelimitofalltheradii,thepointhasnomorecausalpowersthanithasifconsideredas
thelimitofeachoftheradii,andcertainlynotpowersthatenableittooperateontheradiithe(p.245) centerconnects.
Aristotleisseekingamodelthatcanexplainhowthecommonsensecanoperateontheverysameinputaseachofthe
specialsenses,butperformdifferentfunctionswithit.)
Inconclusion,IsubmitthatAristotleproposestheexampleofthepointandthelimitsinordertohelpusunderstandhow
differentsortalbeingscanbecoinstantiatedconcurrentlyinactuality,withoutanyincompatibilityarising.Theexample
illustratesthissuccessfullybyshowingthatthelimitsoverlaponthesamepointconcurrently,inactualitywithoutany
incompatibilityarising.Thisishelpfultoaddressthedifficultyraisedwiththeexampleofasurfacethatcannotbeblack
andwhiteatthesametimesimilarly,thecommonsenseissupposedlyunabletobealteredindifferentwaysatthesame
timebytwoormoreperceptiblequalities.Butifso,complexperceptualcontent(andalltheperceptualfunctionsthat
dependonit)wouldbeimpossible.ThesolutiontheRelativeIdentityModeloffersisawayofthinkingofdifferentbeings
ornaturesascoinstantiatedinthesameentityinthewayinwhichdifferentlimitsarecoinstantiatedinthesamepoint.
Inthisexamplethecoinstantiatedbeingsaredifferentfunctionsthatthesamepointcanperform.Thesefunctionsare
generatedanddefinedbyexternalrelationsthatthepointholdswithdifferentsemilinestheyarenotrealchangesthe
pointundergoes.Thus,theexampleofthepointdoesshowushowonethingcanhavemultiplefunctionalroles.Aristotle
doesnotshowhowtheexampleistobeappliedtothecommonsensecasebutthegistisclear:thecommonsensecanbe
numericallyone,butfunctionallymanywithrespecttoperceivingsensiblesofdifferentmodalities.Yet,theexampleofthe
pointandthelimits,andtheRelativeIdentityModelingeneral,donothelpusunderstandhowthepointcouldbecome
endowedwithmorecausalpowers.Whatwehavebeenlookingforisanunderstandingofhowthespecialsensesforma
wholethatisitselfasense,whichhasperceptualcapacitiesoverandabovetheindividualsenses.The(p.246) example
ofthepointisanimportantstepintherightdirectionforunderstandingthemetaphysicsofthecommonsense,evenifit
doesnotgiveusthefullrequisiteaccount.
7.2TheSubstanceModel
TheRelativeIdentityModelhasexplanatoryvalue,towhichAristotlereturnsintheDeSensubeforegivingyetanother
newaccountoftheunityandarticulationofthecommonsenseasaperceivingsubject.IntheDeAnimaAristotlehad
written:
Isitthecasethenthatwhatdiscriminates[complexcontents],thoughbothnumericallyoneandindivisible,isat
thesametimedividedinitsbeing?Inonesense,itiswhatisdividedthatperceivestwoseparateobjectsatonce,
butinanothersenseitdoessoquaundividedforitisdivisibleinitsbeingbutspatiallyandnumericallyundivided.
(DA427a25)
,[]
,,
.
Andhere,intheDeSensuAristotleentertainsalineofthoughtthatechoeshisRelativeIdentityModel.Hewrites:
Maywenot,then,conceivethisfacultythatperceiveswhiteandsweettobeonequaindivisibleinitsactualization
[sc.quacombiningitsdifferentsimultaneousobjectsofperceptioninacontent],butdifferent,whenithasbecome
divisibleinitsactualization[sc.quaperceivingitsobjectsseparatelye.g.,white,sweet,notinthesamecontent]?
(SS449a1013)
(p.247) ,,
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,
ThedescriptionintheDeAnimapassagegivesusmoremetaphysicaldetailthanthedescriptionintheDeSensupassage.
TheDeAnimapassagemakesitexplicitthattheindivisiblestatusandthedividedstatus7ofthecommonsenseare
simultaneoustheperceivingsubjectisone,althoughmanyinbeings(i.e.,thecommonsenseisonesense,whichis
sight,taste,etc.,atonce).Aristotleexperimentswithexplainingtheindivisibleandthedivisibleasdifferentmetaphysical
levelsoftheperceptualfacultyforitisdivisibleinitsbeing,butspatiallyandnumericallyundivided(427a45).Inother
words,Aristotlefindsoneness(indivisibility)intheorganizationofthecommonsenseitisoneperceptualfaculty,and
plurality(divisibility)initsconstituents(i.e.,thespecialsenses).ButwhatAristotleneedsinordertoexplaintheoneness
ofcomplexcontentisunityattheleveloftheactualoperationofthecommonsense(i.e.,inperceiving)ratherthan
merelyinitsorganization.Organizationalunitymaydeliverconnectivityandcommunicationoperationalunity,onthe
otherhand,requiresasinglefieldofoperation,whichinthiscaseisthecontentofperceptualawareness.Afacultythat
isunifiedonlyattheorganizationallevelisone,butcouldbedividedinitsoperations,perceivingwhiteandsweetin
separatecontentsatthesametime).ThisistheverypointthattheDeSensupassageunderconsiderationaddresses:the
commonsenseisdivisibleinitsactualization(i.e.,inperceivingeachofthespecialsensiblese.g.,whiteandsweet
throughdifferentsenseorgans),butalsoindivisibleinitsactualization(indiscerningwhitefromsweetinacomplex
perceptualcontent). 8TheRelativeIdentityModel,whichtosomedegreedevelopedthislineofthought,didnotdelivera
metaphysicsadequatetocapturethesetwocommitments.
(p.248) Howthencanthecommonsensebeshowntobeonequaindivisibleinitsactualization,butdifferent,whenit
hasbecomedivisibleinitsactualization(SS449a1113)?9Advancinganaccountofthecommonsenseas
simultaneouslydivisible(whenthesensiblesareperceivedsimultaneouslybutindifferentcontents)butindivisible(when
thesensiblesareinthesamecontent)initsactualization,isnoeasytask.Sometypeofqualificationneedstobemade,
anditisforthispurposethatAristotlestartsagainwithanewmetaphysicalmodel.RecallthatforAristotle,forthe
contentofperceptiontobeoneitmustbepresenttoasinglesubject(chapter5,section).SoAristotlesecurestheoneness
oftheperceptualsubjectinthepresentaccount,andthenderivestheonenessofthecontentfromit.Theonenessofthe
subjectthatAristotleisproposinginthismodelistheonenessofasubstance.Hence,IcallthistheSubstanceModel.
Aristotlewrites:
Oriswhatoccursinthecaseofthesoulconceivablyanalogoustowhatholdstrueinthatofthethingsthemselves?
Forthesamenumericallyonethingiswhiteandsweet,andhasmanyotherqualitiesforifthequalitiesarenot
separablefromoneanother,theirbeingisdifferentineachcase.
(SS449a1316)
,
,,.
Theproposedparadigmisthatofasubstancewhichpossessesdifferentproperties,eachoneofwhichisdifferentinbeing
fromtheotherproperties(e.g.,beingsweetisdifferentfrombeingwhite),buttheyarenotseparatefromoneanother,asit
isnumericallyoneandthesamethingthatissweetandwhite(forexample,sugar).Correspondingly,Aristotlewrites,
(p.249)
Inthesamewaytherefore,wemustassumealso,inthecaseofthesoul,thatthefacultyofperceptioningeneralis
initselfnumericallyoneandthesame,butdifferentinitsbeing(SS449a1619)
,
.
Inasubstance,eachpropertybelongingtoitisadifferentkindofentityfromtheotherproperties(e.g.,aquality,a
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quantity,etc.).Yet,theirconnectiontoeachotherinasubstanceismetaphysicallyseamless,whichiswhyasubstance
isonething,andnotmany.Thepropertiesthatbelongtoasubstancearenotnumericallydistinct(exceptinabstraction)
theyarefusedinthesubstancetheyqualify.Theyarefusedinitinthesensethattheybecomedependentonit,inthe
waydictatedbyAristotlesHomonymyPrinciple,whichsaysthatseparatingaconstituentofasubstancefromthe
substancegeneratesanewindividual,onlysynonymouslyrelatedtowhatitwaswithinthesubstancebeforebeing
severedfromit,anddifferentfromwhatitwasindefinition. 10Thetypeofdependenceofthepropertiesonthesubstance
isdeterminedbythesubstantialformofthesubstanceitself,whichstructuresthesubstancescomponentsaccordingto
theorganizationprinciplethesubstantialformstandsfor. 11Itfollowsthatintheconstitutionofasubstancethereis
differencewithoutdistinctness.Thedifferentbeings(properties)thatqualifyasubstanceareseamlesslyunitedintoa
numericallyonesubstanceinvirtueofitssubstantialform.Inthecaseofperception,thedifferentbeingsarethe
perceptualsensitivitiesthecommonsensehas,throughthesenseorgansofitsspecialsenses.Whateverisperceived
throughanyofthesensesistherebyperceivedthroughthecommonsense.Yet,eachofthespecialsenseshasadifferent
beingfromtheothers,withrespect(p.250) towhatitisperceptuallyreceptiveof.IntheDeSensuAristotleinfact
differentiatesthebeingsofthespecialsenseswithmoreprecisedescriptionsthaninothercontexts,sayingthatthe
commonsenseisdifferentinitsbeing:different,thatistosay,ingenusasregardssomeofitsobjects,inspeciesas
regardsothers(SS449a1819).Thatis,specialsensescomprisingthecommonsensearedifferentingenusfromone
another,invirtueofbeingperceptuallysensitiveto,forexample,visualandolfactorystimuliadditionally,eachspecial
senseisdifferentinspecieswhenperceivinganddiscerningstimulisuchas,forexample,hotandrough,bothofwhich
aregenericallytactilesensitivities,butdifferentinspeciesfromeachother.
OntheSubstanceModel,thebeingsofthespecialsensesqualifythecommonsenseinthewaythatpropertiesqualifythe
substancetheybelongto.Onthismodelwewouldalsoexpectanaccountoftheseamlessnessof(theawarenessof)the
perceptiblequalitiesunitedintoacomplexperceptualcontent.Butinthecaseofcomplexperceptualcontent,
seamlessnessoughttobeachievednotinvirtueofasubstantialform(asitiswiththepropertiesofsubstances)unifying
alltheperceptualinputsintoone(thatwouldmakediscriminationimpossible)butrather,invirtueoftheoperationof
thecommonsense.Itisthecommonsensethatbringstheperceptiblequalitiestogetherintocomparisons,discernments,
etc.,inastructuredperceptualcontent(thatis,structuredinthewaythat,forexample,whitecanbediscernedfromred).
Thus,theperceptiblequalitiesperceivedthroughthespecialsensesareinvolvedinperceptualactivitiesthatresultinthe
complexperceptualcontentsofthecommonsense.Insum,theSubstancemodelshowsthatmodificationsofthespecial
sensesmaybephysicallydistributed(inthesenseorgansofthespecialsenses)andyettheexperiencesbe
metaphysicallyunified,invirtueoftheirbelongingtothesamesubjectofawareness,thecommonsense.Inthecaseofa
substance,compresenceofpropertiesdoesnotgenerateincompatibleresults(p.251) (e.g.,analmondpossessesthe
propertiesofbeingwhiteandbeingsweetineverypartofitselfcompatibly).Thealmondiswhiteandsweetasthe
metaphysicalsubjecttowhichthesepropertiesbelong.Thesubstanceis,asitwere,ametaphysicalcatalystforthe
onenessofthepropertiestheycometogetherintoaonenessbyfusionintothewholeofthesubstance. 12Byanalogy,the
perceptualexperiencesresultingfromthevariouslydistributedmodificationsofthecommonsensebythesensiblesit
perceivesthroughthespecialsensesallbelongtoasinglemetaphysicalsubjectofawareness:thecommonsense.This
metaphysicalsubjectofawarenessactsasacatalystthatbringstogetherintoonecontenttheawarenessofdifferent
perceptiblequalitiesperceivedthroughthespecialsenses.Thus,theSubstanceModelprovidesawayofexplainingnot
onlyhowthemodificationsofdifferentsensemodalitiesareunifiedintooneconsciouscontentitfurtherexplainshow
theperceptionoftwodifferentsensibles(e.g.,ofblackandwhite)throughthesamesensemodalitycometogetherinthe
samecontent.
AlthoughAristotledoesnotmentiontheexampleofdiscerningblackfromwhiteinconnectionwiththeSubstanceModel,
itwasraisedinthecontextoftheRelativeIdentityModelasthemostchallengingdifficultyfortheonenessofperceptual
awareness(seechapter6).TheSubstanceModelcanbestaddressthischallenge.Thechallengewasthattherecannotbe
unifiedperceptualawarenessofwhiteandblack,becausethiswouldrequirethesenseorgantobemodifiedbyblackand
whiteatthesametime.Nothingcanbecomeblackandwhitealloveratthesametimesimilarlyoneandthesamesense
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organcannotbemodifiedbythembothatthesametime(seeDA427a59)hencenosubjectcandiscernthem.Yetwhat
theSubstanceModelallowsisthat,forexample,achessboardisblackandwhiteatthesametime,eventhoughitisnot
whitealloverandblackalloveritisblackandwhitewhenitssurfaceincludesblackareasandwhiteareas.Thephysical
distribution(p.252) ofthemodifications,evenwhentheyareindifferentpartsofthesamesenseorgan,doesnotimpede
theirbelongingtothesamesubjectofawareness.So,evenifonewouldhavethoughtthatsomethingsbeingblackand
whiteisimpossiblebecausethetwocolorsaremutuallyincompatibleonthesamesurface,ifbeingblackandwhiteis
nottakentomeanthateveryproperpartisblackandwhite,butrather,thatblackandwhitebothqualifydistinctproper
partsofthesamesubject,thenthechessboardcanbeblackandwhitewithoutanypropersubregionofitssurfacehaving
bothcolors.Byanalogy,inthecaseofthediscriminationofblackandwhite,itwillnotbethesameproperpartofthe
senseorganthatwillbemodifiedbytheperceptiblequalitiesofblackandofwhiteatthesametime.Justasthe
substantialsubjectcanbeblackandwhitewithnocoloroverlap,sothesubjectofawarenesscanperceiveblackand
whitewithouttheperceptiblequalitiesbeingperceivedinanoverlappingwaythroughanygivenproperpartofthesense
organ.Thereisaparallelbetweenthephysicsoftheawarenessofperceptiblequalitiesbyasubjectofawarenessandthe
physicsoftheownershipofpropertiesbyasubstantialsubject.
Inconclusion,theSubstancemodel,justasasubstanceisunifiedintoasingleentityunderitskind(e.g.,beinganeagle
oradaisy)whilealsobeingmanyotherkindsofthingtoosaytall,small,fast,beautiful,etc.sothecommonsensecan
beasinglesensewhilehavingavarietyoffunctionsthroughitsmodallydifferentsensitivitiestotheenvironment. 13
WhatisdifferentabouttheonenessofthecommonsenseaccordingtotheSubstanceModel,comparedtotheRelative
IdentityModel,isthatintheRelativeIdentityModelAristotlegroundstheonenessofthecommonsenseinthephysical
substratumoftheperceptualactivity(likethepointunderlyingthelimits)whileintheSubstanceModelheattributesto
thecommonsenseonenessattheleveloffunctionalcomposition.Thenumericalonenessofasubstanceisnotoneness
ofmatter,butonenessofwhat(p.253) isconstitutedofthematter,oftheenformedsubstance.Thus,theadvantageof
thisaccountofthecommonsense,beingmodeledonAristotlesaccountofsubstance,isthatitattributestothecommon
senseunityatthefunctionallevel,thelevelofthesenses,ratherthanspatiotemporalonenessatthephysicallevelof
perceptualactivity.ItisthislevelofonenessthattheRelativeIdentitymodelcouldnotprovide,butwasneededfor
Aristotletoshowthecommonsensetobeconstitutedofsensesanditselfbeoneasasense,awareofcomplexcontents
notperceivablethroughthespecialsensesitisnotsufficienttoshowthecommonsensetobesimplyanaggregateora
networkofsenses,whicharephysicallyinterconnectedandengagedinmerelycoordinatedperceptualactivitiesoftheir
own.
TheSubstanceModelisabreakthroughforAristotle,andamilestoneinthehistoryofthephilosophyofmind.Itisa
breakthroughwithrespecttotheproblemofhowoneandthesamesubjectofawarenesscanperceivedifferentperceptible
qualitiesatthesametime.For,theoverallassumptionhereisthattheonenessofcomplexperceptualcontentrequiresa
singleperceivingsubject,andhence,asingleperceptualactivity.TheSubstanceModelexplainsthattheonenessofthe
perceptualsubjectisnotphysical,butmetaphysical.Thisapproachdoesnotevokeaprimitivelyassumedonenessofthe
mentalsubjectnordoesitreducetheonenessofthementalsubjecttophysicaloneness(oronenessatsomelowerground
level).Rather,itendeavorstoofferanexplanationoftheonenessoftheperceptualsubjectfromAristotleswelldeveloped
accountoftheonenessofasubstance.Thisisonenessarisingfromfunctionalcomposition.TheSubstancemodel
howeverdoesnotexplainallthatAristotleendeavorstoexplainwithrespecttocomplexperceptualcontent.It
successfullyexplainshowwhite,sweet,cold,etc.canallbecompresentinthesameperceptualcontentatthesametime,
withoutmixing.Butitdoesnotexplainhowonecandiscernwhitefromsweet.Discerning,contrasting,comparing,etc.,
areperceptual(p.254) activitiesthatinvolvefunctionsoverandabovemerelybelongingtothesameperceptualsubject
additionalperceptualabilitiestotheonesthespecialsenseshaveareneededtoperformthecommonsensesfunctions.
Wewillhavetolooktothenextmodeltogainafullerunderstandingofhowthecommonsensecanhavepowersin
additiontothoseofthespecialsenses.
7.3TheCommonPowerModel
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TheCommonPowermodel,asIcallit,isthemostgenericmodelAristotledevelops,describingthecommonsensein
termswhicharecompatiblewithsomeofthemorespecificmodelsdiscussedinchapter6andintheprecedingsectionof
thischapter.ThemodelispresentedintheDeSomno,anditmarksadeparturefromtheaccountofthesensesinDe
AnimaIII.2. 14IntheDeSomnoAristotlewrites:
Sinceeverysensehassomethingspecialandalsosomethingcommonspecial,as,forexample,seeingistothe
senseofsight,hearingtotheauditorysense,andsoonwiththeothersensesseverallywhileallareaccompanied
byacommonpower,invirtuewhereofapersonperceivesthatheseesorhears(for,assuredly,itisnotbysightthat
oneseesthathesees,anditisnotbytaste,orsight,orbothtogetherthatonediscernsthatsweetthingsare
differentfromwhitethings,butbyapartcommontoalltheorgansofsenseforthereisonesense,andthe
controllingsensoryorganisone,thoughdifferingwithrespecttowhatitistobeafacultyofperceptioninrelation
toeachgenus,forexamplesoundorcolor).
(DS455a1222)
,,,
,(p.255) ,
,(,
,
,,,
.
Twodescriptionsofthecommonsensearegivenintheabovepassage.Ontheonehand,thecommonsenseispresented
asacommonpartorcommonpowerofthespecialsenses(455a1314:455a16:),whicheachof
thespecialsenseshas,andwhichisinvolvedineachspecialsensesspecificperceptualactivities.Ontheotherhand,the
commonsenseispresentedastheprimarysensoryorganthatisone,butmanywithrespecttowhatitistobeasense
(i.e.,beingsensitivetosoundsorcolors,etc.)(ll.455a2022:,,
,).Primafacieitseemsasiftheformerdescription
presentsthecommonsenseasoneofseveralcomponentsoftheperceptualsystem,thelatterasanallencompassing
perceptualfaculty.Butthetwoaccountsarenotputforwardasalternatives,butratherasasingleaccount,wherethe
descriptionofthecommonsenseasprimarysenseorgansupposedlyjustifiesitsdescriptionasacommonpowerora
commonpart(seetheuseof,atl.20).Thefullpictureisthatofanoverallperceptualfacultywhichisunifiedinits
perceptualfunctions,despitethefactthatdifferentcomponentpowersarededicatedtodifferentperceptualtasks.Itis
importanttoappreciatethatonthisaccountAristotleconsidersthecommonsense,andexplainsitsrole,asaunifierof
thewholeperceptualfaculty.Alltheperceptualpowersareunifiedbythecommonpowerintothe(p.256) common
sense,invirtuewhereofapersonperceivesthatheseesorhears(455a1516)andthecommonsensecandiscerntheir
specialobjects:onediscernsthatsweetthingsaredifferentfromwhitethings(455a19).Bothoftheseperceptual
activitiesrequirethecommonsense(i.e.,thecommonpower)tohaveaccesstothespecialsensiblesperceivedthroughall
thespecialsenses.Throughthemitcandetectthat,forexample,acolorisbeingseentherebybecomingawarethat
seeingistakingplaceandthatthecolorisdifferentfrom,forexample,asoundconcomitantlydetected.
Inpresentingthecommonsenseasaperceptualpowerthatisoverandaboveeachofthespecialsenses,andevenover
andabovethespecialsensestakencollectively(byextensionofbothtogether(l.19)toallthesenses),Aristotleis
pointingtothesupervisoryandregulatoryperceptualfunctions(andcorrespondingperceptualpowers)thatare
characteristicofthecommonsense.Thereisthusadistinctiontobedrawnbetweentwotypesofperceptualpowersthat
eachofthespecialsenseshas:thespecialandthecommonones.Interestingly,inthiscontextAristotledescribesthe
specialpowersintermsoftheiractivity,ratherthantheirspecialobjects(whichishisusualcriterion),bysayingthat,
Everysensehassomespecial[power]...as,forexample,seeingistothesenseofsight,hearingtotheauditory
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sense,andsoonwiththeothersensesseverally(DS455a1215,translationslightlymodified)
,...,,
Thisaccountofthespecialpowersalignsthespecialsenseswiththecommonsense,insofarasthepowerofthe
commonsenseisnotidentifiedthroughspecialobjects,butisratherdescribedinterms(p.257) ofitsfunctions.(Note
thatdefiningthespecialpowerswithreferencetotheirspecialfunctionsratherthanthespecialobjectstheyrangeoveris
actuallyamoreaccuratedefinition,sincetheobjectsofthespecialpowersarealsoaccessiblebythecommonpower,for
examplewhenthecommonsensediscernsredandwhite).Aristotlewrites:
Allareaccompaniedbyacommonpower,invirtuewhereofapersonperceivesthathesees...and...discerns.
(DS455a1517)
,....
Thecommonpoweroftheperceptualsystemasawholeperformssuchoperationsasperceptualselfawareness(e.g.,
beingawarethatoneishearing)discerningbetweenobjectsofdifferentperceptualmodalities(e.g.,betweenthesweet
andthewhitequalityofsomething)andsoon.Recallthat,aswesawinchapter5,intheDeAnimathepowerfor
perceptualselfawarenesswasassignedtothespecialsenses(itisbysightthatweareawareofseeing)(425b1217).By
contrast,intheDeSomnoAristotleemphaticallystatesthatitisthecommonpowerineachofthespecialsensesthatis
responsibleforselfawareness15:
All[thespecialsenses]areaccompaniedbyacommonpower,invirtuewhereofapersonperceivesthatheseesor
hears(for,assuredly,itisnotbysightthatoneseesthathesees...).
(DS455a1517)
,(
...).
Isitthecommonpowerthatispartofsightthatenablestheperceivertobeawarethatshesees,orthecommonpower
thatiscommonto(p.258) allthesenses?Thisquestionisnotrelevantanymore.Aristotlehasshownthatthereisaset
ofperceptualfunctionsthatarecommontoallthespecialsenses,whichunifythewholeperceptualsystemintoone.He
writes:
Apartcommontoalltheorgansofsenseforthereisonesense,andthecontrollingsensoryorganisone,though
differingwithrespecttowhatitistobeafacultyofperception.
(DS455a1922)
,,
ThepointAristotleismakingisthatalltheperceptualpowers(commonandspecialpowers)areunifiedinthecommon
sense,whichisonemultimodalsense.Thecommonpowerisnotmerelycompresentwiththespecialpowersofeach
sense.Thereisafunctionalintegrationamongpowerssointimateandsofundamentalthatitallowsthecommonpower
tobeawareoftheperceptiblequalitiesperceivedthrougheachofthespecialsenses.
What,then,istheaccountofthecommonsenseemerginginDeSomno?Wesawabove(section7.2)thattheSubstance
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Modelprovidesawayofaccountingfortheunityofcomplexperceptualcontent,bymakinguseofthenotionofsubstance
astheunifiedmetaphysicalsubjecttowhichpropertiesbelong.Yet,theSubstanceModelcouldnotexplainhowonecan,
forexample,discernsweetandwhite,comparebluetored,orcontrastloudandsoftsounds.Thereasonisthatthe
SubstanceModelonlyaccountsfortheunityofasinglesubjectofawareness,butdoesnotendowthesubjectwiththe
requisitefunctionalityfortheperformanceoftheperceptualtasksofthecommonsense.Inotherwords,theSubstance
Modelusestheunityofasubjectofpropertiesto(p.259) explaintheunityofcomplexperceptualawarenessbutit
cannotexplainhowthesubjectofawarenessisalsobestowedwiththeadditionalperceptualpowers.Thatthecommon
senseneedsitsownpowerstocarryoutitsperceptualtaskshelpsusunderstandthemotivationAristotlehadfor
investigatingfurthermetaphysicalmodelsofthecommonsense.Thecommonsensecannotbesimplyallthespecial
sensesworkingtogether.Atleastthiscannotbethecaseifeachspecialsenseisdedicatedtotheperceptionofitsspecial
sensibles.Thisisbecauseifeachspecialsensewereawareonlyofitsspecialsensibles,thespecialsensesworking
togetherwouldnotbeabletoperformtheadditionalfunctionsthecommonsenseperforms(e.g.,discerningsweetand
red)sincetherewouldnotbeanyonesensethatwouldperceivethemboth,butonlydifferentsensesworking
cooperatively.Yet,thisseemstobeallthatAristotleintendedinhisdescriptionoftheperceptualsystemintheDe
Anima. 16TheideamotivatingthispositionintheDeAnimaseemstobethatwhenallthesensesformaunity,the
perceiverisawareofspecialsensiblesofvarioustypesatthesametime.Butallthesensesquaonedoesnotentaila
singlesubject,orasinglecontent.WhatismissingfromtheDeAnimaaccountisanexplanationofhowthedifferent
specialsensescanfunctionasasinglesubjectofawareness,giventhattheyhaveincompatibleperceptualsensitivities.
Additionally,recallthatthecommonsenseissupposedtobeendowedwithpowerstodomorethanwhatthespecial
sensescando(e.g.,todiscernthecomponentsofcomplexcontents)sosimplyclusteringthespecialsensestogether
cannotipsofactoaccountforwhatthecommonsensecando.
SomeonemightthinkthatperhapsAristotlespositionintheDeAnimaandintheDeSomnoaretosomedegreein
tensionforintheDeAnima,AristotleattributestothespecialsensessomeofthepowersthatintheDeSomnohe
explicitlyattributesexclusively(p.260) tothecommonsense.Wealreadysaw(pp.)thatintheDeAnimaAristotle
attributesthepowerforselfawarenesstoeachofthespecialsenses,andalsothepowertodiscernmorethanonesensible
ofthesametypeatonce:
Eachsensethenisrelativetoitsparticulargroupofsensiblequalitiesitisfoundinasenseorganassuchand
discriminatesthedifferenceswhichexistwithinthatgroup(e.g.,sightdiscriminateswhiteandblack,tastesweet
andbitter,andsooninallcases).
(DA426b812)
,,
,,
.
Evenso,assumingthateachspecialsenseisendowedwithsuchdiscerningpowers,andevenifallthesenses(somehow)
formaunity,whatsensewillhavethepowertodiscriminatebetweenperceptiblequalitiesofmodallydifferentkinds?
Unlesstheunityoftheperceptualsysteminvolvesmorethanthecooccurringfunctionalityofthespecialsenses,itwill
notdeliverasinglecommonsubjectofawarenesswithmultimodaldiscriminatorypowersofitsown.Thisisjustwhat
hasbecomeexplicitintheDeSomno.Thus,ontheDeSomnoaccount,eachspecialsensehastwotypesofpower:a
specialone(i.e.,sensitivitytoitsspecialobjects)andacommononewithothersenses,inwhichitparticipates.The
commonpowerissuchthatitenablesthesensetoperformtasksthatnospecialsensecanperformonitsown.Ifso,the
commonpowerwillnotbecommonasapowerthatissimplyreplicatedineachofthespecialsenses,sincethiswould
onlyendoweachofthespecialsenses(p.261) withanadditionalsetofcapabilitieseachofthemcanexercise.Rather,
whatAristotleattributestothespecialsensesisacommonpowerthatissharedacrossthespecialsenses,ownedjointly
byallofthem.Thecommonpowerbringstogetherallthespecialsensesintooneperceptualsystemthathasasingular
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functionalityasone.Thusthespecialpowersofthespecialsensesbecomeaspectsofthisunifiedsense,namelytypesof
perceptualabilityoftheunifiedsense.
Inconclusion,thespecialsenseshaveadegreeofindependencefromoneanothertheyareembodiedintheirrespective
senseorgans,andeachissensitivetoitsowngenusofspecialsensibles.Whatthismeansisthattheunifiedsensecan
performspecifictaskswithdifferentpartsofthebodilysysteminwhichitisimplemented.Inthisway,thereisadivision
oflabor,asdifferentorgansoftheunifiedsenseperformdifferentfunctions.Butthedivisionoflabordoesnotdividethe
unifiedsenseintomanyitdoesnotunderminetheunityoftheperceptualsystem.Thereforetheunifiedsensethe
commonsenseempowerstheperceivertobeasinglesubjectofperceptualawareness,withsensorsandhence
perceptualpowersofdifferenttypes,whichgiveitaccesstodifferentkindsofperceptibleforms.Itisasinglesense,with
variouskindsofperceptualsensitivitythatdefineitsconstitutionandcorrespondtothedivisionoflaborwithinit.Thus
thecommonsensecan,viathecommonpowerofthespecialsenses,performoperationsontheinputthatitreceives
throughthespecialsenses.Theseoperationsunifythecontentofperceptionintocomplexcontent.Suchoperations
include:comparisons,discriminations,andtheperceptionofthecommonsensibles(movement,number,magnitude,
etc.).Theseoperationsdeterminethetypeofpowerthecommonsenseis,andthetypesofactivityitcancarryoutwiththe
inputthroughthespecialsenses.
(p.262) ConcludingRemarks
InthischapterweexaminedthethreemorepromisingmodelsAristotleputsforwardtoaccountforthemetaphysicsofthe
commonsenseandcomplexperceptualcontent.Themeritsandinadequaciesofeachmodelhavebeenalreadydiscussed
indetailhereIwanttobrieflybringouthoweachcontributesusefulinsightstowardthefinalsolution.TheRelative
IdentityModelprovidesawayofthinkingabouthowdifferenttypesoffunctionalitycanbecoinstantiatedinoneandthe
samephysicalorgan,byanalogywiththecaseofapointthatisthelimitofmanysemilines.TheSubstanceModeldraws
onAristotlessubstantialholism,andisintroducedtomakeprogressonthequestionofhowthecommonsensecan
achieveaseamlessmultimodaloperationandseamlessmultimodalcontentgiventhephysicaldistributionofthesenses
indifferentsenseorgans.TheCommonPowerModelexplainshowthesenseshaveacommonpowerthatisshared
acrossthespecialsenses,ownedjointlybyallofthem,andwhichcontrolsthespecialsensesandmakesthemaspectsof
commonsense,namelytypesofperceptualabilityoftheunifiedsense.Wearenowinthepositiontounderstand
Aristotlesfinalposition,whichIshalldiscussintheoverallconclusions.
Notes
Notes:
(1).ThefirstiswherehedevelopstheRatioModel,seechapter6.
(2).Thispointwillbefurtherdiscussedinchapter7inrelationtoAristotlesgeneralessentialistcommitment.
(3).Seechapter4.
(4).Seechapter5.
(5).Withthesameprovisoasintheearlierchaptersthattheperceiveristheultimatecenterofperceptualawareness,via
thecommonsense,evenifforbrevityhereItalkasifthecommonsenseitselfwasthecenterofawareness.
(6).Alternativereadingshavebeendiscussedandcriticizedintheliterature.Forthemostrecentsurveyofadditional
alternativeinterpretationsofthepointexampleseeGregoric(2007,149157).
(7).TheremaybetwointerpretationsofAristotlesclaimthatthecommonsenseisdifferent,whenithasbecome
divisibleinitsactualization:hemaymeanthatthecommonsenseisdividedwhenoneperceiveswhitebylookingatthe
cloudsandsweetbytastingmilk,atthesametimeorthatthecommonsenseisdividedwhenoneperceiveswhitenow
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andsweetlater.
(8).ThepreciseconnectiveAristotleuseshereiswhenitbecomesdivisibleinitsactualizationbutthiscannoteasethe
conflictbetweendivisibilityandindivisibilitybyseparatingthemintime,sincethecomplexdiscerningcontentneedsto
besimultaneouswiththeperceptionsofthetwosensiblesthroughthedifferentsenseorgansasitdiscernsthesetwo
sensibles.Aristotledoesnotmakeuseoftimeseparationinhisargumentation.
(9).,,
(10).See,forexampleMetaphysics1035b2425andDA412b1024.
(11).Thisprinciplehasbeenarguedforintheliterature.IofferacontributiontothediscussioninMarmodoro(2009)
and(2013b).SeealsoScaltsas(1994).
(12).Whatunifiesallthepropertiesthatbelongtoasubstanceisnotthesemanticrelationthattheyallshare,ofbeing
predicatedofthesamesubject.Rather,itisthemetaphysicalrelationofbeinginasubjectthatdetermineshowallthe
propertiesrelatetothesubstancetheyqualify.Theyareallinasubjectinthesamewaybereftofnumericaldistinctness
oftheirown,andsubsumedinthenumericalonenessofthewholesubstanceasqualificationsofthewhole,ratherthan
asdistinctpartsofthewholetheironenessisqualitativeonlyinbeing,notnumerical.
(13).Itsmodallyvariedsensibilitiesmaydifferbetweenthemgenericallyorwithrespecttospecies,aswehaveseen
before.
(14).ItaketheDeSomnotobealaterworkthantheDeAnimaonthebasisofthereferencetothelatterat455a25.
(15).RegardingthisapparenttensionbetweentheDeAnimaandtheDeSomno,seepp.25960.
(16).DA425a30b3:Thesensesperceiveeachothersspecialobjectsincidentallynotbecausethepercipientsenseis
thisorthatspecialsense,butbecauseallformaunity:thisincidentalperceptiontakesplacewhenever[thecommon]
senseisdirectedatoneandthesamemomenttotwodisparatequalitiesinoneandthesameobject(e.g.,tothebitterness
andtheyellownessofbile)theassertionoftheidentityofbothcannotbetheactofeitherofthe[special]senses.Seealso
chapter4.
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ConclusionsOxfordScholarship
AnnaMarmodoro
PrintISBN13:9780199326006
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
Conclusions
AnnaMarmodoro
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.003.0009
AbstractandKeywords
Aristotlerecognizesthatinadditiontothespecialperceptiblepropertiesofobjectsthatareperceivedthroughtheeachof
senses,therearefurthertypesofperceptiblepropertyofobjectsthatareperceivedthecommonsensibles.Thecommon
sensiblesareshowntobetheepistemologicalfoundationforourperceptionofobjects.Theperceptionofthecommon
sensiblesrequiresadditionalontologyandmetaphysicalcomplexityphysical,andmental.Theadditionalontologyis
thecommonsense,whichisasuigenerissenseinthatithasnosenseorganofitsown,butreliesonthespecialsenses
foritsperceptualinput.Themetaphysicalcomplexityarises,ontheonehand,fromtheconstitutionalrelationbetween
thespecialsensesandthecommonsenseontheother,fromthecorrelationbetweenthephysicalandthemental
activitiesinthegenerationofcomplexperceptualcontents.
Keywords:Aristotle,commonsensibles,commonsense,complexperceptualcontent
PerceptionisintriguingtoAristotle.Itisafundamentalphenomenonitischallengingtoaccountforanditrequireshim
toinnovatemetaphysicallyinordertounderstanditandexplainit.Perceptionspansthedomainsofthephysicalandthe
mental,ofepistemologyandontology,withcomplexcorrelationsbetweenthem.Aristotlesthoughtdevelopsashe
examinestheproblem,andhismethodisexploratory,draftingamapofpositionsthathepioneershimselfofboth
unsuccessfulandfruitfulapproachestowardasolution.Althoughhedoesnotpresenthisfinalpositionasexplicitlyaswe
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mightlikehimto,thequestionsandinsightsthatdrivehimareclearanduponcloseexaminationsoarehisviewsonthe
perceptualfaculty.
Aristotlesanalysisofthephenomenonofperceptionrequireshimtodevelophistheoryofcausalpowersfurther, 1
exploitingthenotionofpotentialityatdifferentstagesofactivation.Histheoryofpowersisuniquelysuitedtothe
problemsthatariseinperceptionbecausecruciallyAristotelianpowersretaintheiridentitythroughdifferentlevelsof
activationandtransmissionoftheircausalinfluence.Ontheotherhand,whenappliedtotheanalysisofperception,his
powersontologyacquiresasophisticationthatmakesitaviabletheoryofcausalpowersfortodaysmetaphysics.
ButitisnotjustmetaphysicsandontologythatareadvancedbyAristotlestreatmentofperception.Hisaccountofhow
we(p.265) canperceiveobjectsfromperceivingpropertiesthroughoursenseorgansisgroundbreaking,bothinbeing
thefirsttoidentifytheproblemofcrossmodalbindingandinofferinganinnovativesolutiontoit.Herecognizesthat
perceivingproperties(e.g.color,smell,taste)throughthesensesisnotsufficientforperceivingobjectsfirst,becausethe
sensesdonotprovideasettingwhereintheperceivedpropertiescancometogetherintorepresentationsofobjects
secondly,becauseeveniftherewassuchasetting,nothingwouldbringtheperceivedpropertiestogetherinto
representationsofobjects.
TheresolutionAristotlegaveisthetopicofthisbook.Aristotlereckonsthatinadditiontothepropertiesofobjectsthat
areperceivedthroughthesenses,therearefurtheraspectsoftheobjectsthatareperceived,whicharethemselvesthe
epistemologicalfoundationforourperceptionofobjects.Theirperceptionisfarmorecomplexthanthatoftheproperties
ofobjects,requiringadditionalontologyandgreatmetaphysicalcomplexityatthelevelsofphysicalandmental
explanation.Thesefurtherperceivableaspectsofobjectsarethesocalledcommonsensibles(movement,rest,number,
shape,size),whichareperceivedthroughthespecialsenses,butnotbyanyoneofthemonitsown.Theadditional
ontologythatisthusrequiredisthecommonsense,whichisasuigenerissenseinthatithasnosenseorganofitsown
forthedetectionofsensibles,butreliesonthespecialsensesforitsperceptualinput.Therequiredmetaphysical
complexityisfound,ontheonehand,intheconstitutionalrelationbetweenthespecialsensesandthecommonsense
ontheother,inthecorrelationbetweenthephysicalandthementalforthegenerationofperceptualcontentsthatcontain
multimodalsensibles.Inaddressingthesechallenges,Aristotleultimatelyoffersanaccountoftheunityofthesubjectof
perceptionandtheunityofperceptualawareness.
(p.266) Theperceptualfacultyisphysicallyconfinedwithintheremitofthesenseorgans.Thesenseorgansare
dedicatedtospecificdomainsofsensibles,eachofwhicharedifferenttypesofperceptiblequalitycolor,sound,taste,etc.
Giventhisperceptualinput,Aristotlewantstoexplainhowtheworldisrevealedtousthroughourperceptualfaculty.
TheproblemsthatAristotlehastoaddressindevelopinghisaccountofperceptionrangefromthephysicalcontact
betweentheperceptualfacultyandtheworldtothecontentoftheresultingperceptualexperiences.Inofferingananalysis
ofthephysicalprocess,Aristotlefollowshisgeneralapproachofexplainingthecausalinteractionbetweenthe
perceptiblequalitiesinobjectsandthesenseorgansinusintermsoftheirrespectivecausalpowers.Hisaccountshows
howsuchinteractioncomprisesthefullestactivationofthesensiblesintheobjectsandofthesenseorgansofthe
perceptualfaculty.ThisaccountisthefoundationofAristotlesconceptionofaworldbustlingwithcolors,sounds,tastes,
etc.,whichweareabletoperceptuallyenjoybyfullyactivatingtheminperception.
TheaccountAristotleoffersofthewaythesensesenableustodiscovertheworldbyregisteringthepresenceofits
perceptiblequalitiesgeneratesachallengeforAristotlesexplanationoftheperceptualfaculty.Thereisaphysical
partitionoftheperceptualfacultyaccordingtothegeneraofdetectedsensibles,duetothedependenceofperceptionon
unimodalsenseorgans.Weperceivecolorsthroughsight,soundsthroughhearing,smellsthroughsmelling,etc.,but
therearemultifariouswaysinwhichthesesensiblesarecombinedinourperceptualawareness.Howdoesthiscome
about?
Theproblemgeneratedbyaperceptualawarenessofsensiblesofdifferentmodalitiesisthatnoneofthesenseorganscan
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bringaboutsuchamultimodalawareness.Eachsenseorgandetectssensiblesofonemodality,andsononecandetect
multimodalcontent.Ifso,as(p.267) awayoutoftheproblem,Aristotlecouldascribeperceptualawarenesstosome
otheractivitythantheinteractionofthesenseorganswiththesensibles.Forexample,itcouldbeanactivitythatreceived
inputfromthesenseorgansofdifferentmodalitiesandwasspecificallygeneratingperceptualawarenessofmultimodal
content.Butthepriceforthismovewouldbedivorcingthespecialdesignofeachsenseorgan,whichenablesittobe
sensitivetosensiblesofitsownmodality,fromtheawarenessofthesesensibles.Anotherwayofthinkingaboutthe
problemwouldbetostartwiththeassumptionthattherecouldbeacentraluniversaldetectorofsensiblesofany
modality.Butthiswouldbetheverydenialofthesignificanceofthededicateddesignofeachsenseorgan.Iftherecould
beuniversaldetectorsthatcouldgiverisetotheawarenessofsensiblesofanymodality,thentheunimodalsenseorgans
wouldnotbeneededinthefirstplace.
Aristotlehadgoodreasontothinknaturedidnotgothiswayrather,unimodalsenseorgansdetectsensibles,bringing
aboutawarenessthereof.Butthen,theproblemremains:howdoesmultimodalperceptualawarenessarisefrommodally
dedicatedsenseorgans?Aristotlesanswerissimple:theawarenessofsensiblesperceivedbythespecialsensesisthereby
alsoavailabletotheperceptualfacultycentrally,asaconstituentofcomplexperceptualcontents.Thecomplexcontents
ariseeitherasaresultofhowtheworldis,orasaresultofhowweperceiveit.Andthisispossibleonaccountof,broadly
speaking,twoperceptualmechanismsforcomplexmultimodalperceptualcontent:thefirstisthemechanismof
perceivingcommonsensibles(e.g.,shape,size,number,movement,etc.)andthesecondisthemechanismofperceiving
differencesbetweenvarioussensibles(e.g.,discerningwhitefromsweet).Theawarenessofdifferencesbetweensensibles
isthemostfundamentalperceptualability,whereastheperceptionofthecommonsensiblesisthegroundforour
awarenessofobjectsintheworld.
(p.268) Howistheawarenessofthesensiblesthatareperceivedbythespecialsensesmadeavailabletotheperceptual
facultycentrally,asaconstituentofcomplexperceptualcontents?ItisherethatwereachtheheartofAristotles
contributionwithhisaccountofcomplexperceptualcontent.Heanswersthisquestionthroughoriginal,ingenious,and
highlysophisticatedmetaphysicalaccountsofhowthespecialsensescombinewiththecommonsensetomakeupa
perceptualfacultythatdeliversmultimodalcomplexperceptualcontents.Additionally,hecarefullyexaminesanumberof
alternativeaccounts,whichhebelieveswouldnotgivetheanswer,notonlysothathecanbringouttheirmetaphysical
shortcomingsaspossiblesolutionstotheproblem,butalsosoastoengageingreaterdetailandsophisticationwiththe
conditionsontheunityoftheperceptualfaculty.
AnintuitivelystraightforwardmodelAristotleproposestostartwithistoapplyhisownoriginalmetaphysicalaccountof
mixingtoperception.HisideaintheMixedContentsModelisattractive:ifthecontentofperceptionisone,butcomplex,
thenitmaybeinastateofmixture.Aristotlehaselsewhereofferedasuccessfulmetaphysicalaccountofmixturesby
employinghisconceptionofbeinginpotentiality.Ingeneralterms,mixturesposeadifficultphilosophicalproblemonly
becausetheyareconstitutionallyuniformbutalsocomplex.Theyareuniformasamixture,butcomplexinthatthey
literallyconsistofthemixeditems,whichsurviveinit,ratherthanofwhatthemixeditemshavetransformedinto.
Aristotleundertakestoexplainuniformityandcomplexityofmixtures,anddoessobyshowingthatthethereisawayin
whichthemixeditemscanbebothpresentandabsent(transformed)inamixture.Inthemixture,theingredientshave
deviatedfromtheirnatureduetotheimpactofeachontheothersbutatthesametimethisdeviationisnotpermanent.
Insomecases,whentheinfluenceoneachothersubsides(e.g.,theseawaterevaporates),thetwooriginalitems(salt
(p.269) andwater)emergeagain.Whatissignificantaboutthisisthepossibilitythattheoriginalitemsarerecovered,
whichshowsthattheyhadsurvivedallalonginthemixture. 2ThisistheprincipleAristotletriestousetogiveananalysis
ofcomplexperceptualcontent.Ifthesensiblesthatimpactuponasenseorgansimultaneouslymix,thenthegenerated
perceptualcontentisone,becauseoftheuniformityofthemixedsensiblesandyetthetwosensiblessurviveinit,in
potentiality.
AristotleisclearabouttheshortcomingsoftheMixedContentsModelforperceptualcontent.Whereasinthecaseof
mixturesthecontentisuniform,inthecaseofcomplexperceptualcontent,thecontentcannotbeuniform.Itisnot
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sufficientthatthesensiblesbepotentiallypresentinthecomplexcontenttheyneedtobediscernibleinit.Furthermore,
theMixedContentsModelcouldnotservetoexplainmultimodalcomplexperceptualcontent.Sensiblesofdifferent
modalitydonotmix,andevenifsomecouldmix(e.g.coldandsound)therewouldbenosenseorganthatcouldbe
sensitivetotheresultingmultimodallymixedsensible.
AlongasimilarlineofinvestigationAristotleexploresthepossibilityofaccountingfortheonenessofcomplexperceptual
contentthroughthephysiologyofthesenseorgans.Heenvisionseachsenseorganasdividedintopartsthataresensitive
tospecifictypesofsensiblesofthatsensemodality.(Theassumptionhereisthattherearetypesofsensibleatthelevelof
generaandalsowithinagivengenus.)WiththismodelAristotletriestoexploittheonenessofasenseorganfor
accountingfortheonenessofthecontent,whileintroducingspecializationoftheorganspartstoexplainmultiplicity.
Theideaisthattheunityofagenusandthemultiplicityofitsspecieswouldaccountfortheunityandmultiplicityof
complexperceptualcontent.Soavisualperceptualcontentcouldcontaindifferentcolorswhoseawarenessderivesfrom
differentpartsofthesenseorganofsight.ThisiswhatIcalltheMultipleSensorsModel.(p.270) Aristotledoesrealize
thatthismodelcannotdeliveranaccountofcomplexcontent.Heisnotexplicitaboutthevariouswaysinwhichthe
modelfails,butonecanseethatthemodelwouldgivetoperceptualcontenteithertoomuchunityortoolittle.Either,as
withtheeyes,therewillbeasinglecontentfromthecontributionsofbotheyesoreachpartofasenseorganwould
functionasadifferentsenseorgan,whichbringsonebacktotheoriginalproblemoftheunityoftheircontent.
Takingamuchmoreabstractapproach,AristotlenextattemptstheRatioModelfortheunityofthecommonsenseandits
multimodalcomplexcontents.ThesimplestwaytothinkaboutthecontributiontheRatioModelmakesisthis:itoffersan
explanationofunityandmultiplicityinthewaythatthesecanbethoughttoexistinpatterns(orstructures).Asufficiently
abstractpatterncanhavemultiplerealizations.Forexamplethepatternofacrosscanbefoundintheshapeofjewelry,or
intheshapeofbuildings.Aristotleseemstothinkthereisapatterninthecomparisonbetweenthetypesofthesensesand
thetypesoftheirperceivedsensibles.Hisintuitionisnotsimplythatthereisasimilaritybetweentherelationofthetypes
ofsense(assighttohearing)andtherelationofthetypesoftheirperceivedsensibles(socolortosound).Hethinksalso
thateachrelation(ratio)exemplifiesaonenesswhichisoneandthesamewiththeonenessexemplifiedbytheother
relation(ratio).Justas1/3isarelationalstructurethatisone,andexemplifiesthesameonenessas4/12,sothe
multimodalcommonsenseisarelationalstructurethatisone(sighttohearingtosmelling,etc.),anditsunityisthe
sameastheunityofitsmultimodalperceptualawarenesses(colortosoundtoodor).Ultimately,theonenessofthe
relationalstructureofthesensesandtherelationalstructureoftheircomplexcontentspointstotheonenessofthe
operationalunityofthesensesandoftheirunifiedcomplexcontents.Profoundlyinsightfulasthismetaphysical
suggestionis,itdoesnotprovideanaccountofhow(p.271) theseunitiesarebroughtabout.Itdoesnottellushowthe
sensesareoperationallyunified,orhowthisresultsintheunificationoftheircomplexcontents.Forthisweneedtolook
furthertothesubsequentmodelsofthecommonsenseanditsperceptualcontents.
Aristotleexplores,morepromisingly,thefollowingwaysinwhichcomplexityandonenesscancombine.Withthe
RelativeIdentityModelhepursuestheideathatsomethingthatisphysicallyone,whetheranentityoraprocess,couldin
specialcircumstancesmakeuptwoobjectsoractivities.Aristotleillustratesthismodelusingtheexampleofapoint,
whichisnumericallyone,butmakesuptwoormoredifferentlimits,onaccountofitsfunctionalrolesinrelationtothe
linesitisthelimitof.Thismodelgoessomewayinillustratinghowthemodificationsoftheonesenseorgancouldbe
thoughttomakeupdifferentexperientialcontents(e.g.,ofwhiteandsweet).Therearehoweverimportantdissimilarities
betweenthetwocases.Thedifferent(contraryoratanyrateincompatible)physicalmodificationsthatasensewould
havetoundergotoallowperceptionofcomplexperceptualcontentcannotbelikenedtodifferentfunctionalroles(suchas
beingthelimitof)andtheyarenotrelationalproperties.Thereasonwhythismodelcannotexplaintheunityofcomplex
contentisthatitpresupposesthatoneandthesameperceptualfacultywouldbefunctionallyrelatedtomodallydisjoint
sensibles(i.e.,unitiesofmodallydifferentsenses).Thusthemodelcannotbeusedtounifymodallydifferentsensibles
intocomplexcontents,sincesuchcontentslackmodaluniformity.Furthermore,themodelcannotexplainattributionof
functionalpowersofitsowntotheperceptualfaculty,suchasdiscerningmodallydifferentsensibles.Thereasonit
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cannotattributesuchpowerstoitisthat,accordingtothemodel,thereisnothingthatunifiesthefacultyatthefunctional
levelrathertheopposite,itisfunctionallydividedbutphysicallyone.Evenifultimatelyitcannotaccountfortheunityof
complexperceptualcontentandtheadditional(p.272) perceptualcapacitiesthefacultyofperceptionasawholehas,the
RelativeIdentityModeldoesofferawayofthinkingoftheunityoftheperceptualfacultyandthemultiplicityofitssense
organsandrespectivesensitivities.OneofthedescriptionsAristotlegivesofthecommonsense(i.e.,thefacultyof
perception)isintermsofthespecialsensesoperatingasone.Sointhisdescriptiononecanthinkofthecommonsense
asasinglesenseorganthathasspecialfunctionalrelationstodifferenttypesofsensiblesthisorganinstantiates
differentsensesjustasthepointinstantiatesdifferentlimitsonaccountofitsrelationstothedifferentlinesofwhichitis
apart.SotheRelativeIdentityModelcanaccountforatypeofonenessthatthefacultyofperceptioncanlayclaimto,and
akindoffunctionalmultiplicityderivedfromthewaythefacultyinteractswithitsenvironment.
Inconclusion,theRelativeIdentityModelcannotexplaineithertheonenessofcomplexperceptualcontent,orthe
additionalperceptualpowersthatthefacultyofperceptionhasasonesense,overandabovethepowersthatthespecial
senseshave.Nevertheless,theRelativeIdentityModelcapturesaspectsofthephysicalunityandfunctionalmultiplicityof
thecommonsensethatcharacterizeitsconstitutionandroleinperception.
Inhisefforttoshowhowunityiscompatiblewithmultiplicityofbeingandevenphysicalseparateness,Aristotle
introducestheSubstanceModel.Hereistheproblemthatitaddresses:Thecommonsenseiscomposedofthespecial
senses,whicharephysicallydistributedinthesenseorgansresponsiblefortheawarenessofthespecialsensibles.But
thecommonsenseisalsoabletohaveawarenessofperceptualcontentsthatcontainmultimodalsensibles,perceived
whollyorpartially(inthecaseofcommonsensibles)throughthespecialsenses.Thisabilityresultsfromthe
metaphysicalstructureofthecommonsenseandtheadditionalpowersitpossesses.Sothecommonsenseisafaculty
thatiscomposedofsubfacultiesof(p.273) differenttypes,whichoperatecollectivelyunderthecommonsensetogive
risetoperceptualcontentsthatarecomposedofsensiblesofdifferenttypes.Theoperationofthecommonsenseis
seamless,asitsperceptualcontentsareseamlesslycomplex,despitethemultiplicityoffunctionalitiesinvolvedandthe
physicaldistributionofthesenseorgans.Inbrief,thisisthecommonsenseseamlessoperationandseamlesscontent
challengethatAristotleneedstoaddress.Wehaveseensofarthatalthoughthefirstthreemodelsweexaminedcannot
adequatelyaddressthischallenge,theRelativeIdentityModeldoesofferaninsightintohowdifferenttypesof
functionalitycanbecoinstantiatedinoneandthesamephysicalorgan.TheSubstanceModelisintroducedspecifically
tomakeprogressontheseamlessoperationandseamlesscontentchallenge.
AsweknowfromtheMetaphysics,Aristotlesaccountofsubstancesisholistic,anddeliversmetaphysicalandfunctional
seamlessness.SubstancesforAristotleareunifiedwholes,ratherthanaggregatesofparts.Thekeyfortheirunificationis
theirfunctionality.Thesubstantialformisthetypeofthefunctionalunityasubstancehas.Thereisapatterntoit,firsta
developmentalandthenanoperationalpatternforeachsubstance,withinwhichthefunctionalpartsofeachsubstance
havetheirplace.Hence,asubstanceisconstitutedofactivities,andtheirrespectiveparts,whichcomprisethefunctional
unityofthewhole.Itistheroleofeachactivitywithinthewholethatmakesitacomponentofthesubstance,andgivesit
itsidentityinthewhole.Substantialunityisnotonlycompatiblewithcomplexityitpresupposesit.Multiplicityofbeing
inasubstance,therefore,resultsfromthefunctionalcomplexitythatgroundsitsunity.Theunityofthecomponentsis
seamlessbecausetheiridentityisderivedfromtheirplaceinthefunctionallyunifiedwhole.ThisiswhatAristotlebrings
totheproblemoftheunityofthecommonsenseanditscontents.Theconnectionwithhistheoryofsubstanceisthatthe
commonsenseisafunctionalunity,assubstances(p.274) are,andthatsuchunityiscompatiblewithmultiplicityof
function,whichrequiresmultiplicityofbeing.Insodoingheisexploitingthesignificanceofactivityfortheunityofboth
theperceptualfaculty,andthecontentsofitsawareness.Theperceptualfacultyisunifiedinitsactivity,whichproduces
multimodalperceptualawareness.Botharecomplex,buttheyareseamlesslyunifiedinthewaythatsubstancesare
seamlesslyunifiedthroughtheirfunctionalholism.
ThefinalmodelAristotledevelopsistheCommonPowerModel.Withthismodel,Aristotleattributestothespecialsenses
acommonpowerthatissharedacrossthespecialsenses,ownedjointlybyallofthem.Thecommonpowerbrings
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togetherallthespecialsensesintooneperceptualsystemthathasasinglefunctionalityasone.Thusthespecialpowers
ofthespecialsensesbecomeaspectsofthisunifiedsense,namelytypesofperceptualabilityoftheunifiedsense.The
CommonPowerModeldoesnotprovideafullaccountofthecommonsenseanditscontent,butratherfocusesonan
importantaspectofthestructureofthecommonsense.IconsideritcomplementarytotheSubstanceModel,inthesense
thattheCommonPowerModelclarifiesametaphysicalconsequenceimplicitinthefunctionalorganizationofthe
commonsensenamelytheneedforacommonpowercontrollingallthepowersofthespecialsenses.Thus,thetwo
modelsarecomplementaryalsointhesensethattheCommonPowerModeladdstotheontologyofthecommonsense
somethingthattheSubstanceModelitselfdidnotrequire(i.e.,thecommonpoweranditscontrollingfunctionwith
respecttothespecialpowersofthefivesenses).
RecallnowtheSubstanceModel:thereisanaspectofthemodelthatmightmisleadusinourunderstandingofthe
CommonPowerModel.TheSubstanceModelintroducesthesubstantialformasapossiblewayofaccountingforthe
unityofthecommonsense.OnemightthinkthatCommonPowerModelisnotquiteadifferentmodelitisrathera
redescriptionoftheSubstancemodel.(p.275) TherebyonemightassumethatwhenAristotletalksofthecommonsense
asacontrollingsensoryorganintheDeSomno,heisstillthinkingofthecommonsenseasasubstantialwhole,withits
ownsubstantialform.Buttherolesofasubstantialformandacontrollingpowerarenotthesame.Itisimportanthereto
focusonwherethedifferencelies.Thesubstantialformunifies,itdoesnotcontrol.Thesubstantialformcanbethought
ofasastructuraluniversalthatconfersrolesontheconstituentactivitiesandpartsofthesubstance,therebycontributing
totheirindividuationwithinthewholeandtotheirunityasawhole.Acontrollingpowerneednotdothisitinother
wordscancontrolwithoutindividuatingorunifyingwhatitcontrols.Aristotleofferstwodistinctmetaphysicalaccounts
ofthecommonsenseonefocusingonitsunity,withtheSubstanceModel,andonefocusingonitscontrollingfunction
overthefivesensesandtheirperceptualpowers,withtheCommonPowerModel.
MyoverallconclusionisthattheSubstanceModelandtheCommonPowerModelcombinedprovideafulleraccountof
theperceptualfacultythaneitherofthemdoesonitsown.Thefirstaccountsfortheunityofthecommonsenseandthe
secondforthestatusofthecommonsenseasaperceptualpoweritself,overandaboveitsunifyingroleinrelationtothe
fivesenses.Thusthecommonsensegivesmorethanmereunityandstructuretothesensesthatconstituteit.Itempowers
andenrichesitsconstituentswithfunctionalitiestheirunionalonecouldnotsecure.Itsoperationresultsinthe
generationofnewcontent(e.g.,awarenessofthecommonsensibles),overandaboveunifyingtheexistingcontentfrom
thespecialsenses(e.g.,discerningwhitefromsweet).Thegenerationofnewperceptualcontent,andtheunificationof
existingperceptualcontentintofurthercontents,isthenatureandroleofthecommonsense:forthereisonesense,and
thecontrollingsensoryorganisone,thoughdifferingwithrespecttowhatitistobea(p.276) facultyofperceptionin
relationtoeachgenus(e.g.,soundorcolor)(DS455a2022).
Notes
Notes:
(1).Thatis,beyondwhathehasalreadyachievedinhisphysicsandmetaphysics.
(2).ForAristotlethereisnocreationexnihilo.
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BibliographyOxfordScholarship
AnnaMarmodoro
PrintISBN13:9780199326006
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
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9/9
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GeneralIndexOxfordScholarship
AnnaMarmodoro
PrintISBN13:9780199326006
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
(p.285) GeneralIndex
air,79,3940,43,65,114,127,1312,1437,1512,175
Broackes,J.,98102,128
Broadie,S.,12730
Burnyeat,M.,11314
capacity.Seealsopowers
Caston,V.,10911,11617,151
cause,causation,3,13,22,273047,501,626,70,73,86,923,101,120,1269,1445,149,153,217
incompletenessof,41
change,416,1922,257,3341,467,50,53,56,6276,79,87,91,11215,126,133,1427,1513,158,190
Cambridge,1089,151
Spiritual,11314
Charles,D.,745,178
color
perceptionof,13,423,69,809,97102,105,11213,117,11924,1269,13250,1535,15660,1706,179
80,187,189,197201,210,2216,2301,234,242,2526,26570
contrarieties,78
counterfactual,27,29
crossmodalbinding,161,181,18990,195,203,219,265
definition,12,18,213,267,32,35,5763,83,95,99,115,126,249,257
dilemmaofActualitiesofMotion,4753
earth,79
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001/acprof9780199326006indexList1?print
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4/6/2015
elements.Seealsoair,earth,fire,water
fire,79,223,35,378,50,138
flesh
asperceptualmedium,1434,155
form
incidental,63,79
sensible/perceptible,82,98101,11418,136,14852,1856,210,236
substantial,35,63,79,24950,2735
transmissionof,3454,14652
functionalunity.Seealsounityofperception
Gregoric,P.,177,1856,2005,236
hearing,facultyof,1,434,62,73,77,81,85,10310,1212,131,135,1435,158,185,204,231,234,266,270
(p.286) holism,202,234,264,274
homonymy,118,249
imagination,42,2024
infallibility,856,120
Johansen,T.K.,1058,119,1501,2059
Kosman,A.,1038
matter,11,29,36,38,53,58,62,7982,89,11316,130,198,2523
mixture,9,2189,2334,2689
motion,21,23,356,41,457,506,61,93,95,138,146
necessity
natural,245
numericaldifference,sameness,19,745,103,127,138,195,2278,231,236,239,245,246,2489,263,271
Osborne,C.,177
perception
common,174,2068
experience,13,7980,848,914,1037,111,116,121,1259,1335,13840,14554,1568,165,169,1902,
212,21420,232,236
functionof,62,134,139,163,167,1845,196204,2226,238,2425,25262,2705
incidental,157,16571,174,17886,190,2078,263
mediumof,101,112,11819,125,1278,132,1389,14155,198
objectsof,13,424,78118,1205,1315,13841,14453,15573,17686,1978,201,20611,214,2178,
222,233,250,2567,260,2657
organsof,1,78,807,94,99101,106,11121,1326,139,14155,1578,170,175,178,184,18992,1978,
20711,21626,2324,238,2423,24955,2613,26575
secondorder,243
special(seesenses,specialsensibles,special)
perceptualcontent,86,1389,175,18990,192,200,210,214,2227,2378,243,269,2705
complex,12,11820,15665,1815,18995,199200,20612,21320,22835,240,2437,2503,258,262
75
unityof(seeunityofperception)
perceptualquality,98
powers
actionof,35,517,65,74,76,87,92,108,119,217
inactuality,35,13,1621,26,39,417,4950,5360,71,73,756,81,915,98,100,1049,125,12935,141,
146,2401,2445
ofagent/patient,237,30,3342,45,489,516,60,67,70,724,76
2/4
4/6/2015
andcausalactivity,3,137,201,256,33,37,41,528,614,67,6972,74,767,79,8592,96,1014,10811,
152,184,1935,202,206,2246,239,2523,256,261,267,2734
definitionof,12,18,213,26,32,35,579,68,99,126,257
disturbance,14653,217,234
interactionbetween,8,24,334,3841,46,545,612,6971,78,91,968,112,123,135,153,266
ofmover/movable,21,314,402,467,5060,701,945
partner,22,323
inpotentiality,45,11,1620,236,312,357,424,46,546,58,66,68,76,81,87,97,1029,120,132,146,
2189,233,240,264,2689
process,5,1320,26,35,39,41,54,6770,746,11617,120,142,154,162,175,193,266,271
completion,134,17,41
properties
intrinsic,125
monadic,279,302
(p.287) realization,1518,41,489,61,745,94,978,1034,110,119,121,123,129,270
regress,10,37,49,195
relations,10,1922,2634,4653,57,59,63,67,70,723,757,86,1048,111,115,11820,1234,12930,213,
227,2301,241,243,245,265,2702,2756
relativeidentity,2156,23746
Scaltsas,T.,11415,14950
sensefaculty,1067,150,177
sensemodality,15661,190,209,225,235,251,2669
senseobject,101,1067,119,150
senseorgan,64,78,81,837,94,99,101,106,11121,124,1346,139,14252,155,1578,175,178,184,18992,198,
2078,21011,217,21920,222,223,2256,2324,2423,2512,255,260,2657,26972
senses,12,3,33,78125,1367,1425,15688,22036,26575
common,116,15768,174212,21316,220,22633,23763,26575
special,64,81,856,111,120,15790,196200,20911,21315,225,229,232,234,24263,2658,2725
unityof,2,1634,167,170,1779,184,189,1956,2045,212,21315,21820,22736,23740,2467,253,
25863,26875
sensibles,44,87,93,97,989,102,104,1078,114,118,12930,144,1467,151,2246,26575
common,157,16888,190,20110,214,261,2657,272,275
special,64,81,85,11920,15662,16888,1908,210,225,230,232,238,2437,256,25961,272
encodingof,114,14950
sight/seeing,1418,26,44,70,819,99105,110,119,1367,1427,15661,16485,189200,20410,215,2213,
228,2318,243,247,25460,26670
NoDoubleVisionargument,1959
Shields,C.,114,11718
Silverman,A.,989,100,12730
sleep,137,202
smell,82,128,1435,14852,198,231,238,2656,270
Sorabji,R.,11214
soul,7980,162,1856,2025,212,2245,2345
subject,5,27,29,48,503,58,82,945,103,131,133,149,160,176,184,220,223,229,232,238,2468,2504,258
63,265
unityof,189212
substratum,46,601,83,96,241,2434,252
subtlerealism
3/4
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Aristotles,92,13941
taste,801,1367,1435,148,156,159,1647,179,1935,199200,219,228,231,242,247,2656
touch/touching,223,1424,16970,173,176,215,231,238
transmission,345,38,402,45,50,54,140,146,1489,152,264
unityofperception,2,1634,1779,184,189,1946,2045,21220,2279,2323,23740,2467,253,25861,265,
26875
vision.Seesight/seeing
water,5,79,62,64,108,143,1468,150,216,2689(p.288)
4/4
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IndexLocorumOxfordScholarship
AnnaMarmodoro
PrintISBN13:9780199326006
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
(p.289) IndexLocorum
ARISTOTLE
categoriae
6a36b228
6b28302829
7b52229
Topica
103a25759
Physica
200b32201a34546
201a91070n.53
201a91816
201a35202b555
201b313341,70n.51
202a5921
202a9123435
202a1042
202a131854,93
202a141574n.68
202a14165556
202a16175657
202a16209596
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4/6/2015
202a1874n.68
202a182057
202a21202b2489
202a2551,53
202a263152
202b133839,71n.59
202b5851
202b8974n.68
202b10145859,95
202b1160
202b141660
202b192261,75n.71
202b2964n.2
226a212322
226b2322
245a511145146
DeGenerationeetCorruptione
323a313323
327b2325218
328a2831219
329a35b38
329b21227
330a24297
330b3578
330b676
331b142489
337a2665n.8
DeAnima
412b2081
416b333583
(p.290) 417a71033
417a101487
417b2756
417b2021122n.21
418a34111,155n.17
418a36120n.14
418a61381
418a141785
418a1718168
418a1819168
418a1920169,186n.14
418a2023183
418a2024208
418a2325122n.25
418a26308283
418a31b34243
419a943
419a910145
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4/6/2015
419a1213139
419a1315145
419a1731142
419a2728148
419b1922131132
420a79132
420a1789
421b19238182
422a1011120n.9
422a1015148
422a2031185n.7
423b7139
423b1726143
424a2224117
424a2832121n.20
424a2932147
424b12114115
424b56120n.9
424b510155n.16
425a1416170,178
425a1516161
425a1620168169
425a19188n.20
425a2021168
425a2224164,166
425a2327182183
425a2728174
425a30b2165166,166167
425a30b3263n.16
425a31180181
425b1176
425b46171172
425b69172173
425b79187n.16
425b911173
425b1218195196
425b1417210
425b1826197
425b2324198
425b262793,94,103,107
425b26426a191
425b28426a14344,131
426a2692,122n.28
426a91194
426a912123n.28
426a151793
426a1518107
426a151997
3/6
4/6/2015
426a152644
426a2025102,130
426a232487
426b812260
426b815199
426b1718194
426b1722242
426b1729193
426b29427a1158,238239
426b29427a984,191
427a25239,246
427a45247
427a59191192,240
427a1014240241
429a1318120n.14
4301617132
431a488788
431a1720175
431a19b1228229
431a20b1235236n.16
DeSensuetSensibilibus
445b3789
445b1118122n.22
445b31446a148990
446a2425151
446b2126138
(p.291) 447b921217218
447b171984,1589,190191
447b1721216217
447b2021159
448b1820221
448b2021221
448b2324221,235n.8
448b2425222,235n.11
448b2629222223
448b2829223
448b304492224
449a25224225,225226
449a25225226
449a510209210
449a1013246247
449a1113248,263n.9
449a1316248
449a1619249
449a1819250
DeSomnoetVigilia
455a1215256
455a1222254255
4/6
4/6/2015
455a1314255
455a1516256
455a1517257
455a1719164165
455a19256
455a1922258
455a2022255,275276
Metaphysica
1010b1101378
1010b15181367
1010b1926134
1010b353688
1016b313674n.69
1019a33b112
1020a2412
1020b26323031
1025b2682425
1026b273525
1046a91110,126
1046a111311
1046a19281112
1047a67129
1047b351048a218
1047b351048a82324
1048a1221
1048a6737
1048b18261415
1049a121424
1049b121618
1050a34817
1053a31b8180
PLATO
Theaetetus
207e208a187n.16
5/6
4/6/2015
6/6

Anna Marmodoro Aristotle On Perceiving Objects

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Anna Marmodoro Aristotle On Perceiving Objects

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4/6/2015

WhereasBroackesholdsthatgenerallycolorsg arenotpowers,hedescribestherosesredg asifitwasapower.Ibelieve

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