Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Journal of
Middle East Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
435
Subhi Labib
THE ERA OF SULEYMAN
CRISIS
THE MAGNIFICENT:
OF ORIENTATION
When the Prophet Muhammad died on 7 June 632, the larger part of Arabia had
already accepted Islam. In fact, Islam had created a solid Arab community that
dominated Arabia and was ready to begin its amazing expansive movement
in world history. The Arab conquests put an end to the Sassanid Empire and
deprived the Byzantine Empire of its Asiatic dominions up to the Taurus and of
all its African possessions. Muslim troops crossed Gibraltar and subdued almost
all the Iberian peninsula. In brief: with their conquests in the seventh and eighth
centuries (634-751) the Arabs became the neighbors of the Franks and Byzantines on the other side of the Mediterranean. In Asia the subjection of Persia
brought them into northern India and the Turkish vassal states of China in
Central Asia.
In the second half of the seventh century the Arabs began to establish themselves as a new power in Central Asia. They crossed the Oxus and gained a
permanent foothold in the areas beyond it. In the first half of the eighth century
Islamic troops conquered the Jaxartes' provinces where the centers of Hellenistic
culture and Buddhism were soon to become centers of Islamic and Arabic
culture.
A confrontation with China, whose Turkish vassal states were occupied by
Islamic troops, was inevitable. A 55-year struggle between China and the Arabs
ended in 751 when the Islamic forces annihilated a Chinese army on the Talas
River. China lost its control over Central Asia.
The Arabs' huge success was owing not only to Arab or Islamic military
capacity and religious zeal but also to the world situation at that time: the
weakness of both the Byzantine and Sassanid empires, centering on their
struggle for supremacy and their efforts to check the barbarian invaders. The
continuing challenge and gigantic imperial responsibilities took a heavy toll of
their resources and energy. Internal weaknesses were not easy to overcome. The
obvious disintegration in Persia, predating the clash with the Arabs, and the
revolts of Byzantine provinces in the East as well as unstable Byzantine rule in
the West accelerated the expansion of the Arabs. Furthermore the Byzantine
Empire was facing an insoluble problem - lack of manpower - and Gaulish and
Germanic Europe did not represent a Mediterranean power. The disunity of
India encouraged the Arabs to march upon northwest Indian areas, which had
already been incorporated into the Persian and Hellenistic cultures. Owing to
0020-7438/79/0300-0408
$0I.50
Press
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
436
Subhi Labib
local conflicts, the Arabs could invade the Indus Valley. China of the seventh and
eighth centuries was not strong enough to check the eastward drive of the Arabs.
It was not even able to support Persia against the invaders; when the defeated
Persian king sent several embassies to the son of heaven he declined to offer
any military help against the victorious Arabs.
The Arabs gained the support and cooperation of the indigenous population in
the area they conquered, thus furthering their expansive policy. On the western
front the Berbers took a major part in the invasion of Spain as well as in the raids
on Sicily and the western Mediterranean. They even supported the Arabs in
subduing rebellious Berber tribes and Berbers allied with Byzantium in the
Maghrib. On the eastern front (Oxus-Jaxartes) the Persian mawali (clients) who
fought with the Arabs were in fact fighting against their old 'national' enemies,
the Turks. On both frontiers, Islam became a dynamic factor of integration
and inspiration. The new Muslims of the conquered areas - Persia and the
Maghrib are the best examples - were now ready to die in establishing the Islamic
principles of equality among the believers. It was Islam that gave them backbone
and put into their hands a weapon against their masters: the Arabs and the
Arab Umayyad house (661-750). With the rise of the Abbasids the Empire
became primarily Muslim, and exclusive Arab predominance ceased. Power now
lay not with the Arab tribes but with professional soldiers and administrators.
The soldiers were Persians as well as Arabs; from the middle of the ninth
century, they were usually chosen from among the Turkish slaves of the
Caliphs, whose power by the beginning of the tenth century was in steady
decline.
The nomadic Turkish peoples began to play a decisive role in Islamic history the Maghrib excluded - in the tenth century. Before the end of that century and
during the eleventh century, several migrations of Turkish peoples deeply
affected the history of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The most important
Turkish migration into the Islamic East was that of the Saljiiqs, known by the
name of the family (Saljfq) that led them. The Saljuqs entered Ma-wara'
an-Nahr (Transoxiana) in the late tenth century and adopted Sunni Islam before
crossing the Oxus, that is to say, before their penetration into the Islamic world.
As auxiliary troops of the warring Muslim powers in Khurasan and Transoxiana
they soon overcame their masters. In the first half of the eleventh century they
even expanded their military and political power to Iran. In 1055 they entered
Baghdad as deliverers of the Abbasids or as champions of the Sunni cause, thus
putting an end to the Buyid (Shi'i) hegemony over the Abbasid (Sunni) Caliphate.
Not only did they seize power in the Abbasid Empire, they also challenged
Fatimid rule in Syria. Furthermore, they broke through the traditional frontiers
between Byzantium and the Islamic world. After controlling Armenia the Saljuqs
won a decisive battle against Byzantium at Manzikert, near Lake Van, in I071.
It was the most disastrous battle in Byzantium's later history. The immediate
result of Manzikert was the intensive migration of the Muslim Saljfq and Turcomen hordes into Asia Minor, the heartland of the Byzantine Empire in Asia.
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Not only in Syria and Egypt but also in North Africa, the Islamic ecumene
built an impregnable, unshakable barrier between Africa and the West. This is
the most decisive and definite change in the history of Africa from the rise of
Islamic world power to the Portuguese discovery of the Cape of Good Hope,
and even the Spanish discovery of America - that is to say from the seventh to
the sixteenth century. During this long period Islamic maritime power in the
Mediterranean deteriorated considerably. The long challenge with Byzantium
but, more importantly, with the Christian Western maritime trade republics primarily the Italian but also the Normans in Sicily and south Italy - put an end
to Islamic naval power in the Mediterranean. Never again, after the loss of
Cilicia, Crete, Cyprus, Sicily, Malta, and the Balearic Islands, did medieval
Islamic powers regain their position of superiority in Mediterranean waters.
Even the creation of a huge navy (with seven hundred vessels, considered the
biggest navy in the Mediterranean) by the Almohad Caliph 'Abdal-Mu'min
cannot minimize the significance of this basic historical change.
(II30-II63),
Only in the sixteenth century did the Ottomans revive Islamic naval power in
the Mediterranean for a limited period.
In terms of economic history and challenge, the Muslims gradually became the
only big business partners of the Italian merchants. In accordance with the
state's newly crystallized Islamic Mediterranean policy, these Italian merchants
were allowed to trade only at certain points on the Islamic Mediterranean coast.
In other words, the African and Asiatic (Syrian) coastline of the Mediterranean
remained an iron curtain built up by Islam to face the West. This Islamic front
was able to check all the crusading enterprises. Even the rapid Mongol expansion
in the thirteenth century did not destroy it; Egypt survived the Mongol storm.
Thus, no Asiatic or European power endangered Islamic superiority and penetration in Africa from the rise of the Islamic world power in the seventh century
until the Portuguese geographical discoveries in the sixteenth century. The
situation in Asia was somewhat different. The huge Mongol Empire established
a Pax Mongolica throughout Asia and opened its trade routes -from the
frontiers in Asia Minor and the Black Sea to the Chinese ports - to its neighbors.
Western merchants and Frankish missionaries began to cross Asia for the first
time since the rise of Islam. The Pax Mongolica or Pax Tartarica, which
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
438
Subhi Labib
lasted for about a century (from the middle of the thirteenth century to the
middle of the fourteenth) ended with the disintegration of the Mongol Empire.
During the Mongol era of world supremacy, however, no effective political or
military cooperation came into being between Mongols and Franks. Not less
important is the fact that Islam began to spread among the Mongols themselves
as well as among their Turkish subjects, thus expanding the Islamic ecumene.
Ii
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
440
Subhi Labib
Balkans Mehmed's success was sure. His forces sent to south Italy in 1480
captured Otranto (near Brindisi). The fall of Otranto might have been followed
by the sack of Rome, but Mehmed died suddenly in 1481, while he was preparing
an immense expedition. The Ottoman forces did not penetrate into Italy and had
to evacuate during the rule of Bayezid II.
Furthermore, Mlehmed checked Uzun Hasan's power in the East. Uzun
Hasan (I423?-1474), originally the chief of the Turcoman tribes known as the
Ak-Koyunlu ( = the white sheep) or the Ak-Koyunlu dynasty or state, extended
his protection to the Greek Emperor of Trebizond as well as to the Turcoman
beys of Karaman, the bitter enemies of the Ottomans in east Anatolia. In 1472, he
even became an ally of Venice, Cyprus, and the Knights Hospitallers. He promised to send a force of 30,000 men to the shores of the Mediterranean where they
were to be joined by Venetians armed with firearms. This remained only a plan.
What really happened was a separate quarrel between the Islamic powers. At
first the Ottomans routed Uzun Hasan's forces. This victory was essentially owing
to the use of firearms by the Ottomans, and Uzun Hasan had to give up further
incursions into Ottoman territory. In I474 lMehmed's forces easily completed the
conquest of the Karamanid possessions. Thereafter the Ottomans had to face
the Dhu'l-Qadr (Zulkadir or Dhulghadir) in Elbistan, and their overlords, the
Mamluks, in southeastern Anatolia.
Mehmed died in 1481. Two sons survived him: Bayezid, the candidate of the
Devshirme party, and Jem, the candidate of the Turkish nobility. In their
competition for power Bayezid reached the capital earlier and became sultan. Jem
decided to resist but had to flee to Europe when he failed to gain power in
Anatolia. The story of Jem is unique in Ottoman history. The simple fact that a
brother of the ruling sultan was still living and free could disturb the internal
peace and order of the Ottoman state. The European powers, which were still
hopelessly fighting the Ottomans, understood how to make use of the opportunity. Even the Mamluk sultan in Cairo was now very anxious to catch the
victim that he once barely supported to gain power. In 1495 Jem died in mysterious circumstances, and the constant danger that a coalition of Christian powers
might invade the Ottoman Empire using Jem as their instrument was over.
Now Bayezid continued the work of Mehmed II: the consolidation of the
Ottoman power on the Danubian line, along the eastern Islamic frontier, and
in the eastern Mediterranean.
Bayezid's rival in Hungary was King Matthias I (I458-1490), son of the
Hungarian hero John Hunyadi. In the Balkanshe retained a small area in northern
Bosnia with the support of the Croatian nobility. No serious conflict occurred
between him and Bayezid. In fact Matthias Corvinus almost dropped the idea of
serious offensive operations against the Turks; instead he began to realize his
dreams of uniting Central Europe under his own rule and of acquiring the imperial crown. An unsuccessful Ottoman attack on Belgrade and raids into
Transylvania, Croatia, and Carinthia ended in 1495 when Bayezid once more
concluded a truce with Hungary, in order to concentrate on the Italian conflict.
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
442
Subhi Labib
Ottoman rule in Anatolia. Their leader, Shah Kuli, preached the end of Ottoman
domination. An Ottoman army drove Shah Kuli from Teke (in southwestern
Anatolia), where the revolt began, toward Kaysari in east Anatolia. Near this
town a battle was fought, in 151 I, in which the Anatolian Safavids were defeated
and chased from Asia Minor.
Like the Ottomans the Safavids recognized and represented the principles of
Ghazw and Futuwwa with their dynamic impact on both Islamic expansion and
Islamic urban communities in Anatolia. The Futuwwa was a brotherhood or
fraternity that combined Islamic ethics and mystical inclinations with the virtues
of the Turkish or Persian warrior. Akhism, a specific Anatolian Futuwwa with
Shi'i coloring, had already been acknowledged by Sunni authorities. It spread in
towns and dominated the Islamic 'guilds,' the groups of artisans and craftsmen,
which never possessed the monopoly of production and distribution in an Islamic
town. With the development of the Ottoman centralistic administration in the
fifteenth century and owing to their Shi'i links, the guilds lost the freedom they
had enjoyed during the early period of islamization and turkification of Asia
Minor. It was exactly during Bayezid's and Selim's rule that this fundamental
change was enforced. Both sultans simultaneously suppressed the 'guilds' and
Shi'ism in Anatolia.
In 1512 the ageing Sultan Bayezid II was forced to abdicate and give way to
his son Selim I (1512-1520), who led the inevitable war with the Safavid Shah
Isma'il of Persia and the Mamluk Sultan Qansufhal-Ghauri of Egypt.
The conflict of the three Islamic powers for hegemony in the Middle East
culminated in 1514 when Selim I defeated the Safavids at Chaldiran. There is no
doubt that the victory at Chaldiran was essentially owing to the new 'Frankish
Weapon,' the firearms which the Ottomans adopted rapidly, extensively, and
with great effect.
This Ottoman victory did not terminate Safavid rule; but the Safavids did
not dare to attack Asia Minor after their defeat at Chaldiran, and the Shi'i in
Anatolia were now at the mercy of Ottoman rule.
The Ottoman triumph at Chaldiran and the annexation of Dhu'l-Qadr by
Selim accelerated the decisive military confrontation between the Mamluks and
the Ottomans. In fact, the two big Sunni powers preferred to reckon up rather
than to face the Portuguese danger in the Indian Ocean with double energy.
Once more firearms decided the future of the Islamic Middle East. Like the
Safavids, the Mamluks did not even try to overcome or circumvent Ottoman
artillery by executing a massive surprise attack in the appropriate moment. With
their victory at Marj Dabiq in 1516 and Raidaniyya in 1517 the Ottomans
inherited the Mamluk empire, which included Egypt, Syria, northern Sudan,
great dominions and supremacy in the Red Sea area as well as overlordship of
Yemen and the Islamic holy cities. Selim also began the annexation of the Maghrib.
During the reign of Bayezid II began the Ottoman penetration into the western
Mediterranean. The fleet was employed to rescue Moorish refugees before and
after the fall of Granada in 1492. During Selim's rule the Ottomans gained a
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
444
Subhi Labib
in the south, where the Egyptian Mamluk and Yemenite forces were still fighting
against Ottoman domination in Yemen.
III
Selim left to his son Suleyman (1520-1566) an empire vastly increased in size
and resources and able to resume the offensive against the Christians on a
formidable scale. Belgrade surrendered to the Ottoman forces in August 1521
and the route to Hungary was open. On 29 August 1526 came the devastating
Hungarian defeat at Mohacs. Ten days later, the victors entered Buda. Twothirds of Hungary were now lost to the Ottomans. The victory at Mohacs
encouraged Suleyman to march upon Vienna. The siege of Vienna in 1529 was,
in fact, the most daring military enterprise in Ottoman history and the climax of
the Turkish drive westward. The Christians held out against the Turkish
assault, however, and it was not the Christian defence but the difficulties of the
Ottoman expedition which decided the future of the Ottoman assault on Vienna.
Problems of supply and transport were especially hard to resolve. In spite of his
earlier misadventure Suleyman repeated his march to capture Vienna in I532.
The campaign did not fulfill its aim, nor did he reach Vienna.
In spite of his failure to capture Vienna, Suleyman was the ruler of the biggest
empire in the 'ancient world' to the west of India. He challenged not only the
Archduke of Austria and claimant to the throne of Hungary, but also Charles V,
the last Emperor (15 I9-1556) of the Holy Roman Empire.
In their conflict Suleyman and Charles had to determine the future of Italy
and the supremacy in the western Mediterranean. Suleyman's ally in this
conflict was Francis I, the bitter enemy of Charles V. The Ottomans possessed
every means to accomplish their supremacy in the western Mediterranean after
their overwhelming success in the eastern Mediterranean: great arsenals,
abundant timber, and good warriors. What they needed was an efficient high
command, a match for Andrea Doria, the best admiral of his time and the
Genoese ally of Charles. Suleyman appointed Khair ad-Din Barbarossa admiral
of the Ottoman fleet in the Mediterranean (I533). He and his splendid sailors
and corsairs were well trained in ceaseless sea forays against the Christians. In
1534 Barbarossa and the Ottoman fleet captured Tunis, but in the following year
Charles led a campaign, took it, and restored the Hafsid ruler under his suzerainty. Charles's Spanish troops were now stationed in La Goletta, the fortress
that controlled the Tunisian coast.
The challenge for supremacy in Italy reached its climax when Francis I
declared war on Charles in 1536, hoping to regain Genoa and to enter Milan.
Francis's ally, Suleyman, did not attack Italy at the same time. In 1537, after the
Ottomans had finished their naval preparations, Khayr ad-Din advanced to
Otranto, raided Apulia, and kept the command of the strait of Otranto. But in
spite of this success, neither Khair ad-Din with his big fleet, nor Francis, who
badly needed financial support, was able to stabilize his position in Italy. The
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Soon after Prevesa the Christian League lost its value. Then Venice aimed
essentially at getting Charles's support to stabilize its position in the eastern
Mediterranean, and Charles had to concentrate on defending his position against
the Berber corsairs in the western Mediterranean. In 1540 the Signoria had to
conclude a separate and humiliating peace treaty with the Porte. On the other
side, Charles renewed his attack upon the strongholds of the Muslim fleet and
corsairs in Barbary without success. The splendid imperial armada of 5I6 sails,
carrying I2,330 sailors and 24,000 soldiers, suffered a disastrous defeat in 1541 (at
Algiers) caused by storms and rains. After this natural catastrophe Charles was
neither ready nor able to repeat the assault. Consequently the Holy Roman
Empire as well as Europe's Mediterranean maritime powers acknowledged the
de facto Ottoman sea supremacy in the Middle Basin from their defeat at Prevesa
in 1538 till their victory at Lepanto in 1571. During this period the Ottomans
completed the conquest of Tunis in 1569, but the strong Turkish Armada which
attacked the Hospitallers in Malta in 1565 failed to crush the Christian resistance
in the central Mediterranean. In the Levant the Ottomans assured their
supremacy by taking Cyprus from Venice in 1570-1571. Once more the Christian
powers - Venice, Genoa, Spain, the Hospitallers, and the Pope - formed an
alliance to check the growing supremacy of the Ottomans in the Mediterranean.
In other words, the conquest of Tunis in I569 and of Cyprus in 1571 led to the
inevitable confrontation at Lepanto, the last decisive naval battle in the
Mediterranean until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Lepanto, which ended in the overwhelming defeat of the Ottomans (7
October I57I), also put an end to Islamic-Ottoman naval supremacy in the
Mediterranean, in spite of the fact that the Porte restored its fleet immediately
after the battle, that Venice concluded 'humiliating' peace terms with the Porte
in 1573, and that the Christians failed to vanquish the corsairs in North Africa.
Venice could not afford a long war with the Porte. Also, the brief period when
Phillip II had been able to concentrate his forces in the Mediterranean had come
to an end. Spain was now deeply involved in Western Europe and her financial
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
446
Subhi Labib
crisis could not allow any big military and naval engagement in the Mediterranean. Like Venice in 1573, Phillip had to make peace with the Porte in I581,
thus giving up the idea of revenge in Africa under the pressure of his precarious
position in Europe. In I588 the Spanish Armada was lost in the naval war
against England and during its journey back. Even after this Spanish catastrophe,
which created new chances for the Ottomans in the Mediterranean, the Porte
did not develop a new maritime policy which would assure Islamic supremacy
after the retreat of Spain and the decline of Venice. In fact, neither Suleyman the
Magnificent nor his successors began constructive plans for the future - either
in the Mediterranean or in the Indian Ocean; nor could the unhealable struggle
on the heretic front be overlooked or underestimated.
The important rivals of the Porte after the acquisition of the Mamluk empire
were the Shi'i Safavids. Suleyman found in France and Francis I a Christian ally
against Charles V. In the east Charles tried to establish his relations with Shah
Tahmasp (1524-1576). In 1529 Charles's envoys met the Muslim rival of the
Ottomans. This rapprochement between the Habsburgs and the Safavids had
relatively or almost no positive or military effect. At any rate, it was one of
Suleyman's pretexts to attack Persia, in order to solve frontier problems and to
take Iraq, where the Shah's governor of Baghdad had offered submission to the
Porte. In I534 Ottoman forces even succeeded in entering Tabriz. Shah
Tahmasp already knew that his forces could not match Suleyman's Janissaries
and field artillery. He avoided all risk of a great battle and even removed his
capital to Qazvin. In 1538 Basra was also annexed. There, the Porte established
an arsenal and a base of operations which had little strategic importance. In
1548 Suleyman marched once more upon Tabriz, but did not conquer it. He
returned to Istanbul in December 1549 without realizing conclusive results. A
protracted war (1553-I555) ended in the destruction of the Persian border
defenses that had long been the main point of departure for Persian raids into
Asia Minor. Now Suleyman was ready to conclude peace with the Safavids: in
the peace of Amasya (May I555) the Porte abandoned all claim to Tabriz but
retained Iraq, together with most of Kurdistan, western Armenia, and western
Georgia. This peace did not terminate the hostilities on the heretic front, which
drained Ottoman resources and manpower during the following centuries.
Suleyman did not entirely neglect his Islamic obligations in the south. In
1525 his admiral Salman Re'is exacted from certain Yemenite coastal areas a
nominal obedience; a confrontation with the Portuguese, however, did not take
place. In 1538 the Porte established Ottoman rule in Aden and ended Egyptian
resistance in the Yemen. With the reconquest of Basra in I546 Suleyman was
strategically able to attack the Portuguese from the Persian Gulf as well as from
the Red Sea. He sent three important expeditions against the Portuguese in the
Indian Ocean. The first, in 1538, was to support Bahadur Shah, the sultan of
Gujarat, to regain Diu. In spite of the huge armada the Turkish admiral ordered
the lifting of the blockade of Diu after about twenty days of siege. The two other
expeditions hopelessly tried to capture Ormuz on the Persian side of the Gulf,
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
448
Subhi Labib
between the Habsburgs and Valois (Francis I and his successor Henry II) was a
clear aim, and Suleyman missed its significance: this aim was to hinder the
Habsburgs' predominance in Europe, to hinder the concentration of power in
one hand. And this was, and is, exactly the backbone of the Germanic way of
political thinking and political behavior.
The other essential event that dominated the local history of Western Europe
in the sixteenth century was the Christian Reformation. To weaken the position
of Charles and the Habsburgs in Germany, Suleyman the Magnificent was ready
to encourage the Protestant movement. He even promised on oath that he would
not harm the Protestant princes if Germany came under his sway. Suleyman also
encouraged the spread of Calvinism in Hungary. The Ottoman campaigns against
Vienna and Austria, however, worked on Germany to the disadvantage of both
Francis I and Suleyman the Magnificent.
At any rate, the rise of Protestantism in the sixteenth century - after the
discovery of the Americas and the Cape of Good Hope - is the best proof that
Europe had overcome the Islamic pressure or Islamic danger and was in need of
an inner religious movement or Reformation to counterbalance the papacy and
the dominant Catholic Church.
v
Suleyman's activities did not match the new dimensions of the world in which
he lived, or, simply the contemporary politico-economic map.
As we know now, in the north Suleyman did not confront the core powers of
Europe. He must have calculated the danger of Russia for the future of his
empire. Then he conceived the bold plan of uniting the Don to the Volga by
means of a canal which could have asserted Turkish control of the lower Volga
and the Caspian, thus providing a directly link with the Ozbecks who were
enemies of Persia and Turkey's allies in Central Asia. But this vital project, too,
was neglected by Suleyman's successors.
In the east his policy was almost unbelievable, in spite of all his victories.
Suleyman did not establish Ottoman Rule in Tabriz. He did not even overcome
the technical difficulties- problems of supply and transportation, the prerequisite for success in Tabriz. Almost the same problems led to his failure to
take Vienna.
More disastrous was his inadequate Mediterranean and Indian Ocean
policies. The backbone of naval policy was only the raiding principle of jihad,
which could not or did not promote a durable, solid, or progressive Ottoman
role in the Mediterranean. Suleyman, as well as his father Sultan Selim I and his
son and successor Sultan Selim II (1566-1574), challenged the Spanish penetration into Islamic North Africa, but none of them ever created a constructive
Ottoman policy there. The African coast became the corsair coast for centuries
to come.
Suleyman the Magnificant and Selim II continued the traditional Ottoman
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
450
Subhi Labib
areas of West Africa, as well as the Atlantic coast in order to correctly face or
compete with the rising transatlantic/Atlantic European/ Christian powers. Then
the European oceanic discoveries ended not only the traditional monopoly of the
Muslim intermediaries between East and West but also broke the traditional
frontiers of the challenge between East and West and erected new ones. In other
words, the European oceanic discoveries set new dimensions for the East/West
challenge which the Ottomans did not really or sincerely take into consideration.
For the Turks there was simply no compelling motive to undertake transoceanic journeys, because they possessed shorter routes to the Indian Ocean. But
it was, above all, trade beyond the oceans that stimulated changes in sea warfare
and progress in shipbuilding. Moreover, this accelerated the growth of world
trade; and the extension of jihad activities in the new world could as well have
kept the balance of power between the two traditional competing camps.
The Ottomans ended Venetian power in the Mediterranean, but the vacuum
was filled by the rising maritime powers of Western Europe, and not by the
Ottoman fleet or the capacity of the subject of the Ottoman Empire itself: in
1583 the English Capitulation Treaty with the Porte was confirmed and the
English Ievant Company, founded in 1581 as a joint-stock company, became a
regulated company in I6o5. At the same time English merchants began to show
their interest in the Aleppo-Baghdad-Persian Gulf-Indian trade traffic.
The Porte showed keen interest in the struggle of the Dutch Calvinists against
Catholic Spain, and in 1612 the Dutch were also granted capitulations, which
meant extraterritorial rights modeled after the Capitulation Treaty between
Francis I and Suleyinan the Magnificent.
It is important to remark that when the Portuguese reached the Indian Ocean
they immediately discovered that Muslim traders and Muslim shipowners
dominated the whole area. Neither the Mamluks nor the Ottomans, however,
succeeded in checking Portuguese expansion in the Indian Ocean area. The
essential success of the Ottomans in the south was that they hindered the
Portuguese only enough to win a foothold in the Red Sea which gradually
became, under Ottoman rule, a quiet backwater of Muslim commerce.
In fact, neither the Ottomans nor the Portuguese had the strength to win
absolute command of the Indian Ocean. It was only when maritime peoples,
Dutch and English, broke into the waters of the Indian Ocean that Europe and
the Cape route began to win a dominant share of the Eastern trade. Dutch and
English became the bitter rivals of the southern Islamic and Arabic businessmen,
who never enjoyed the imperial support of the Ottoman power.
To sum up: the Ottomans, primarily Suleyman the Magnificent, had
established an inadequate international policy. Then, instead of keeping pace
with the changing world after the crossing of the Atlantic, Suleyman initiated
capitulations in the Islamic world. In other words, Suleyman did not overcome
or break through the medieval concept of the foreign Islamic policies.
At any rate, it was in Europe and the Mediterranean area that the future of the
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OF UTAH
1970), I, 352-353.
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 09:48:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions