Loving v.

Virginia
388 US 1
***Synopsis of Rule of Law. Restricting the freedom to marry solely
on the basis of race violates the central meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Facts.

[During Black History month we spotlight the landmark Supreme Court

case of Loving v. Virginia(1967), which declared anti-miscegenation
laws (laws banning interracial marriages) to be unconstitutional. The
Court unanimously held that prohibiting and punishing marriage based
on racial qualifications violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.]
In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman,
and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of
Columbia. Thereafter, Mildred Jeter and her new husband, Richard
Loving, returned to their home in Caroline County, Virginia. They were
happy to begin their new life together as married couple. But there was
a big obstacle to their marital bliss. The state of Virginia enacted laws
making it a felony for a white person to intermarry with a black person
or a black person to intermarry with a white person. The year was
1958, and Virginia was one of sixteen states that prohibited and
punished interracial marriages. Mildred was African American and her
husband Richard was Caucasian. Four months into their married life
they were indicted by a grand jury.
The following January, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge
and were sentenced to one year in jail. The trial judge agreed to
suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave the state for twentyfive years. The judge told Mr. and Mrs. Loving: Almighty God created
the racesand he placed them on separate continents. The fact he
separated the races shows that He did not intend for the races to mix.
The Lovings moved to Washington, D.C. and appealed their
conviction on the grounds that Virginia law, The Racial Integrity Law of
1924, violated their rights to equal protection of the law and due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue:
(1)
Was rational basis the proper standard of review by which to
evaluate the constitutionality of the statutes?
(2)
Were the Virginia miscegenation statutes constitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause?
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(3)
Did Virginia's anti-miscegenation law violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Held:
(1) and (2) For issues no. 1 and 2, the Court ruled both in
negative.
VAs statute is discriminatory on its face, as it discriminates
against generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of
different races. After applying strict scrutiny to the statute, the Court
tried to figure out if they were necessary to the carrying out of a state
objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was object
of the 14th Amendment to eliminate.
However, there is no independent issue aside from racial
discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that the
statute involves white interracial marriages is proof of the supremacist
intent of the States framers. The Court consistently denied the
constitutionality of such statutes. Bottom line is that the statutes also
deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. The freedom to
marry has long been recognized as an essential right that the Court will
enforce.
The mere fact that a statute is one of equal application does not
mean that the statute is exempt from strict scrutiny review. The
statutes were clearly drawn upon race-based distinctions. The legality
of certain behavior turned on the races of the people engaging in it.
Equal Protection requires, at least, that classifications based on race be
subject to the most rigid scrutiny.
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
(Constitution) prohibits classifications drawn by any statute that
constitutes arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The fact that Virginia
bans only interracial marriages involving whites is proof that the
miscegenation statutes exist for no purposes independent of those
based on arbitrary and invidious racial discrimination.
(3)
For the last issue, the Court ruled in affirmative. In a unanimous
decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were
generally "odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid
scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court
found, had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial
discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument that the
statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and
whites and found that racial classifications were not subject to a
"rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
also held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice
Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State."
SSS Employee Association V. CA
2

175 SCRA 686

G.R. No. 85279
(July 28, 1989)
Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the
unions demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of
the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off
of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay
and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees
with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent
employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and
benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of
the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain
amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed
acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. On June 11, 1987, the
SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of
SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS
Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work
and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the
strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council,
which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to
return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the
strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the
resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible
error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction
lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the
case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the
petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation
thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE
therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issues:
(1)

Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

(2)
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

Held:
(1)
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all
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workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,

and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes
helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of
the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the
1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of
government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to
limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1
of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the
civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November
24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged
by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and
Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to
organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On
one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service
law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the
government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation
that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular
No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior
to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions,
all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt.
employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are
denominated as governmentemployees and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having
been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions
memorandum prohibiting strikes.
(2)
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject
matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council
which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general

court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is

appropriate
Manila Public School Teachers Association vs. Laguio, Jr.
200 SCRA 323
Fact:
The series of events that touched off these cases started with the
so-called "mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the petitioning associations in both
cases, on September 17, 1990 to "dramatize and highlight" the
teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attentions
Issue:
Are employees in the public service prohibited from forming
unions
and
holding
strikes?
Held:
these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they
constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence
from, work which it was the teachers duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially economic reasons, should not principally resolve the
present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not identical.

United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory

Bienvenido E. Laguesma

Union

(UPCSU)

vs

Hon.

(G.R. No. 122226, March 25, 1998)

Facts:
The petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It
appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for
certification on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter
and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the
ground that the route managers are managerial employees and,
therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of
Art 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees-Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
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organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible

for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for
resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, so far declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form,
assit or join unions, contravenes Article III, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
Issues:
(1)
Whether or not the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. are managerial employees; and
(2) Whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial
employees from forming, joining or assisting labour unions, violates
Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
(1)
YES. The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified
as mere supervisors because their work does not only involve, but
goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating
employees to accomplish objectives set by those above them. They
are not mere functionaries with simple oversight functions but
business administrators in their own right.
Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the
exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in
nature but requires the use of independent judgment." Thus, their
only power is to recommend. Certainly, the route managers in this
case more than merely recommend effective management action.
They perform operational, human resource, financial and marketing
functions for the company, all of which involve the laying down of
operating policies for themselves and their teams
The term "manager" generally refers to "anyone who is responsible
for subordinates and other organizational resources." Managers
constitute three levels of a pyramid:
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS: The lowest level in an organization at
which individuals are responsible for the work of others is called

first-line or first-level management. First-line managers direct

operating employees only; they do not supervise other managers
MIDDLE MANAGERS: Middle managers direct the activities of
other managers and sometimes also those of operating employees.
Middle managers' principal responsibilities are to direct the
activities that implement their organizations' policies and to balance
the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their
subordinates
TOP MANAGERS: Composed of a comparatively small group of
executives, top management is responsible for the overall
management of the organization. It establishes operating policies
and guides the organization's interactions with its environment
In the Case, entitled Worker's Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. PepsiCola Products Philippines, Inc., decided on November 13, 1991, the
Secretary of Labor found: we find that only those employees occupying
the position of route manager and accounting manager are managerial
employees.

(2)
Art. 245 do not violate Article III, Section 8 of the
Constitution. The real intent of Article III, section 8 is evident in
Lerums proposal. The Commission intended the absolute right to
organize of government workers, supervisory employees and security
guards to be constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar
absolute constitutional rights to organize for labor purposes should be
deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle managers. Nor
is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Section 8 of the
Constitution infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming
a union. The guaranteed right in Art. III, Section 8 is subject to the
condition that its exercise should be for the purposes not contrary to
law. In the case of Art 245, there is rational basis for prohibiting
managerial employees from forming or joining labor organization. For
the reason that these managerial employees would belong to or be
affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty
to the Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The union also
becomes company-dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in Union membership.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

City of Manila vs. Chinese Cemetery of Manila

40 PHIL 349 (1919)
Facts:
7

The City of Manila wants to expropriate a land owned by the

Chinese community as cemetery for the purpose of extending Rizal
Avenue for public use. The respondents contend that the land already
acquires a quasi-public character and many dead bodies are already
buried there. They stress that there is no necessity of taking the land
for public purpose since such is under Torrens title and the
expropriation will disturb the resting place of the dead. The plaintiff
contends that under the Charter of City of Manila, they may condemn
private lands for public purpose, such being an exclusive function of
the legislature and the only function of the court is to assess the value
of the land expropriated.
Issue:
Whether or not the court can inquire into the necessity of
expropriation.
Held:
The court ruled that the power of judicial review on expropriation
is not limited to the inquiry of the existence of law that grants a
municipal corporation to expropriate private lands for public purpose.
The court has the responsibility to (1) ensure that a law or authority
exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and (2) that the
right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. There
are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: (1) the land must be private; and, (2) the purpose must be
public. The taking of land in the exercise of power of eminent domain
of the state is not a judicial question but the court is bound to interfere
to prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature. The
very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not
follow, the taking of the land. The court ruled that the cemetery is a
public property and it found no great necessity to allow the
expropriation of the land by the City of Manila thus thereby affirmed
the decision of the lower court.
Moday vs. Court of Appeals
268 SCRA 368 (1997)
**Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Disapproval by SP of SB
Resolution

Facts:
Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the
mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of
Modays land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other
public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution
was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved
the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary
because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for
8

such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation

nonetheless.
Issue:
Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property
by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Held:
Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of
Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power
that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the
national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly
delegated to local governments, other public entities and public
utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be
valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just
compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may
declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when
such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred
upon the council or president making the same. This was not the case
in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other
available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to
declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is
valid.

The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision
of the CA. Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate in
the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public
use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the
power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of
private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for
public use and there must be just compensation. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan's disapproval does not render said resolution null and
void. Their power to declare a municipal resolution invalid is on the
sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or
the mayor to issue. Said resolution is valid and binding and could be
used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioner's
property. The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the
use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of
law must be observed. The necessity of exercising eminent domain
must be genuine and of a public character. Government may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken. Instant
9

petition is DENIED. The questioned decision and resolution of the CA

are affirmed. Temporary Restraining Order is lifted.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Carmen M. Vda. De Castellvi, et
al.
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), entered into a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi
on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in
1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other
facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established
on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP.
In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for
the land in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or
1959.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as
of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of
the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are the following, to wit:

1
2
3
4

The expropriator must enter a private property;

The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5 The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of
the property.
Only requisites 1, 3, and 4 were present. It is clear, therefore, that the
"taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to
occupy the property as lessee thereof.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court
has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.
10

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in

possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of court, on August 10,
1959. The taking of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining
the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26,
1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY vs. ERICTA

122 SCRA 759 (1983)---- G.R. No. L-3491
June 24, 1983
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6%
of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As
such, the Quezon City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang
Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial
park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to
donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta,
declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is
a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is
taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers.
They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under
its charter, in the exercise of local police power, to make such further
ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
contended that the taking or confiscation of property was obvious
because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and
deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the
police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the
police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which
states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
11

without due process of law (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1,

Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of
government by which the state interferes with the property rights,
namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are
said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes
of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537),
does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in
question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section
9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix
the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to
regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The
ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the
operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property
outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to
promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not
recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as
the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may
adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and
highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle,
growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every
holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of
their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. A property
in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of
property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to
such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them
from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations,
established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think
necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is
possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the
general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not
contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that
such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the
interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
12

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation

between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of
an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the
city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides
in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the
burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by
law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city
owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct
public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of
just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas
for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land
they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety,
health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which
are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious
and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in
turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual
lots are sold to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The
decision of the respondent court is affirmed.
________________________________________________________________________
______
National Power Corporation v Judge Jocson
206 SCRA 520 (1992)
Facts:
The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the
order issued by respondent judge in violation of deprivation of the right
of the petitioner for due process. The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain
cases in the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels of land
in relation to the necessity of building towers and transmission line for
the common good with the offer of corresponding compensation to
landowners affected with the expropriation process. However, both
parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby
13

prompting petitioner to bring the eminent domain case. Respondent

judge found existing paramount public interest for the expropriation
and thereby issued an order determining the provisional market value
of the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties. The
petitioner, incompliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited
corresponding amount of the assessed value of said lands in the
amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National Bank.
Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting
that the assessed value is way too low and that just compensation due
them is estimated as P29,970,000.00. Immediately the following day,
respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the
motion for reconsideration and ordered petitioner to deposit the
differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order while holding
in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said
order which the petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter,
respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay in full amount the
defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner assailed such
order to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondent judge hence this petition.
Issue:
W/N the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and
whether or not the petitioner was deprived of due process of law.
Held:
The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court
complaints on eminent domain proceeding and after due notice to the
defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession of the real
property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to
be held by the bank subject to orders and final disposition of the court.
The respondent judge failed to observe this procedure by failure to
issue the writ of possession to the petitioner despite its effort to
deposit the amount in compliance to the mandate of law. Furthermore,
the respondent judge erred in increasing the provisional value of
properties without holding any hearing for both parties. The instant
petition was granted by the court setting aside the temporary
restraining order and directing respondent judge to cease and desist
from enforcing his orders. There are 2 stages in the action of
expropriation: (1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
in the context of the facts involved in the suit; and (2) Eminent domain
action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the
Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners
whose findings are deemed to be final.

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