ISSUE BRIEF

No. 3978 | June 27, 2013

Cost of a Climate Policy:

The Economic Impact of Obamas Climate Action Plan
David W. Kreutzer, PhD, Nicolas D. Loris, and Kevin D. Dayaratna

resident Obama recently released his Climate

Action Plan, which is a continuation of the costly,
ineffective policies from his first four years in office:
Solyndra-style loan guarantees, nice-sounding but
too expensive efficiency mandates, and his war on
coal. It is this war on coal that would prove the most
costly, with hundreds of thousands of lost jobs and
$1.47 trillion of lost national income by 2030.
Bankrupting Coal Hurts American Families.
When Senator and presidential candidate Barack
Obama pushed his cap-and-trade plan in 2008, he
said that if someone wants to build a coal-powered
plant, they can. Its just that it will bankrupt them
because they are going to be charged a huge sum for
all that greenhouse gas thats being emitted.1
Congress rejected his and other cap-and-trade
plans, but in his recent speech on climate change,
President Obama vowed to go around Congress to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In case anyone
thinks the Administration has since backed off from
the anti-coal agenda, Obama climate advisor Daniel
Schrag just this week said that a war on coal is
exactly whats needed.2
In a speech on June 25, President Obama called
on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at

http://report.heritage.org/ib3978
Produced by the Center for Data Analysis
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views
of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage
of any bill before Congress.

reduce carbon dioxide emissions from new and existing power plants, which would adversely affect coalfired plants the most. These regulations are part of
a broader effort from the President to significantly
reduce coal as an affordable, reliable energy source
the effect of which is to drive up prices for American
families and businesses. The Heritage Foundation
modeled the effects of significantly reducing coalfired plants in America and found devastating economic effects.
Regulations Pile On. With 497 billion tons of
recoverable coal in the United Statesenough to
provide electricity for 500 years at current consumption rates3coal has the potential to be an
important resource long into the future. The EPAs
constant attacks on coal threaten to close off access
to this dependable energy source.
In March 2012, the EPA proposed a rule that
would prohibit new power plants from emitting
more than 1,000 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt of electricity generated. Without the addition
of carbon capture and sequestration, a prohibitively costly and technologically challenging requirement,4 the regulation would effectively ban the construction of new coal-fired plants.5 Whether the final
rule reflects the proposed rule remains to be seen.
The Presidents recent announcement also
threatens existing plants and would adversely affect
the more than 1,100 coal-fired generators at nearly 600 plant locations that generate 40 percent of
Americas affordable, reliable energy.6
Last year, the EPA finalized new mercury and air
toxics standards that will force utilities to use maximum achievable control technology standards to
reduce mercury emissions and other hazardous air

BACKGROUNDER
No. 2824 | July 11, 2013

Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back

James Jay Carafano, PhD, and James Phillips

gypts army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi, just as it

removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011, to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges
within the state. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions
of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down.
By taking steps to preserve public order, the military could help
to salvage Egypts chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy. Clearly, Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of
a surging rebellion against Morsis increasingly authoritarian rule.
To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the
United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible, attach tighter
strings to U.S. aid, and recalibrate the U.S. aid program to focus on
fighting terrorism and preventing food shortagesthe chief threats
to Egypts future.

Key Points

Morsis Threat to Democracy

President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy. He

ruled in a secretive, authoritarian, and exclusionary manner
that derailed Egypts democratic experiment and alienated far
too many Egyptians, even some of his former supporters. During
his year in office, he focused more on maximizing his own power
and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypts
worsening economic, social, and political problems. When challenged, he arrogantly ignored, marginalized, and demonized

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2824

Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage
Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

Egypts army was justified in

ousting President Mohamed
Morsi, whose increasingly
authoritarian rule was leading
Egypt into a civil war.
The army, however, is sitting on a
volcano and knows it.
The U.S. must recognize that
Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic
basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy.
To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the United
States should press the Egyptian
military to lay the groundwork
for a return to civilian rule as
soon as possible.
Washington should attach
tighter strings to U.S. aid and
recalibrate the aid program to
focus on fighting terrorism and
preventing food shortagesthe
chief threats to Egypts future.
No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypts deep
economic problems, but the
U.S. can encourage Cairo to
undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its
economy.

BACKGROUNDER
No. 2821 | July 11, 2013

Winning Without Fighting:

The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge
Dean Cheng
Abstract

Beijing hopes to win future conflicts without firing a shot. How? By using psychological warfare to manipulate both a nations leaders and
its populaceaffecting the thought processes and cognitive frameworks of allies and opponents alike. Indeed, the PRCs psychological
warfare operations are already underway despite the fact that there is
no active conflict. It is therefore essential that the United States counter such psychological operations now while preparing to use its own
arsenal of political warfare weapons should a conflict ever arise.

Key Points

ne of the elements distinguishing the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) from many of its counterparts is its continued role as a Party army. The PLA is, first and foremost, the armed
wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This distinction both
obligates the PLA to help maintain the CCPs grip on power and
gives it an additional set of tools with which to defend the CCP and
the Chinese state. At the moment, the PLA is not only planning for
operations on the physical battlefield; it is also preparing to conduct
political warfare, including what is termed the three warfares:
public opinion warfare, legal warfare, and psychological warfare.
Psychological warfare is in some ways the most far-reaching
of the three warfares. It involves the application of specialized
information and media in accordance with a strategic goal and in
support of political and military objectives.1 Such efforts are aimed
at a variety of potential audiences and usually involve operational
missions against an opponents psychology and cognitive capacities.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2821

Produced by the Asian Studies Center
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage
Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

Over the past decade, the Peoples Republic of China has exhibited growing interest in waging
asymmetrical warfare.
To this end, the PRC released
political work regulations for
the Peoples Liberation Army
addressing the importance of
waging the three warfares: public opinion warfare, psychological
warfare, and legal warfare.
The three warfares represent the PRCs commitment to
expanding potential areas of
conflict from the purely military
(i.e., involving the direct or indirect use of military forces) to the
more political.
Such expansion will be supported
by manipulation of an enemys
leadership, including through
intimidation and coercion, alienation, and deception.
To avoid being psychologically
outmaneuvered by a PRC intent
on winning without firing a shot,
the U.S. must strengthen its own
psychological warfare capabilities, including strategic communications, public diplomacy, and
media outreach capabilities, as
well as dedicated psychological
operations units.

BACKGROUNDER
No. 2824 | July 11, 2013

Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back

James Jay Carafano, PhD, and James Phillips

gypts army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi, just as it

removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011, to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges
within the state. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions
of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down.
By taking steps to preserve public order, the military could help
to salvage Egypts chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy. Clearly, Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of
a surging rebellion against Morsis increasingly authoritarian rule.
To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the
United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible, attach tighter
strings to U.S. aid, and recalibrate the U.S. aid program to focus on
fighting terrorism and preventing food shortagesthe chief threats
to Egypts future.

Key Points

Morsis Threat to Democracy

President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy. He

ruled in a secretive, authoritarian, and exclusionary manner
that derailed Egypts democratic experiment and alienated far
too many Egyptians, even some of his former supporters. During
his year in office, he focused more on maximizing his own power
and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypts
worsening economic, social, and political problems. When challenged, he arrogantly ignored, marginalized, and demonized

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2824

Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage
Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

Egypts army was justified in

ousting President Mohamed
Morsi, whose increasingly
authoritarian rule was leading
Egypt into a civil war.
The army, however, is sitting on a
volcano and knows it.
The U.S. must recognize that
Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic
basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy.
To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the United
States should press the Egyptian
military to lay the groundwork
for a return to civilian rule as
soon as possible.
Washington should attach
tighter strings to U.S. aid and
recalibrate the aid program to
focus on fighting terrorism and
preventing food shortagesthe
chief threats to Egypts future.
No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypts deep
economic problems, but the
U.S. can encourage Cairo to
undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its
economy.

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2824

July 11, 2013

opposition political parties, which he linked to foreign conspiracies.

Under these conditions, Egypts army justifiably
intervened to restore order in support of the majority
of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist
authoritarian regime. On July 3, Egyptian Defense
Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced
that Morsi, who had failed to meet the demands of
the people, was relieved of his duties and that the
Islamist-written constitution was suspended.
Unlike Gamal Abdel Nassers coup in 1952 or the
2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak, this
time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders, political leaders, and youth activists,
many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsis ouster in a televised statement.

During his year in office, Mohamed

Morsi focused more on maximizing
his own power and that of the Muslim
Brotherhood than on addressing
Egypts worsening economic, social,
and political problems.
The next day, the military authorities announced
that Adly Mansour, chief justice of the Supreme
Constitutional Court, had been sworn in as interim
president. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. As a judge, he could be well
suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi
had rammed through in December. mr. Mansour
pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the
2011 revolution so that we stop producing tyrants
and said that new elections were the only way forward, although he gave no indication of when they
would be held.
President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6, but this
appointment was later rescinded under pressure
from the Nour Party, one of the few Islamist groups
that supported the coup. Baradei, a secular liberal
who led the National Salvation Front, a coalition of
1.

leftist and liberal parties, frequently clashed with

the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when
he led the International Atomic Energy Agency.
It is expected that President Mansour will soon
announce the formation of a new government with a
cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers.
Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. The authorities have sought to arrest more
than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and
other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting
their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators, but
Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without
a fight.
Mohammed Badie, the supreme leader of the
Muslim Brotherhood, has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. Speaking
at Cairos Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on
Rejection Friday, Badie warned, We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him.1
Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out
of mosques on Friday to protest Morsis ouster. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by
anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere
that degenerated into widespread clashes, leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1,000 injured.
On Monday, at least 51 of Morsis supporters were
killed when troops responded to an attack on the
Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was
last seen before his ouster.
Egypts mushrooming political violence will be
hard to control. Even in the unlikely event that the
Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part
of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections, more radical Islamists are sure to push back
violently.
Islamist militants in the northern Sinai, a hotbed of Islamist extremism, launched coordinated
attacks against police facilities and an airport at
El Arish, the provincial capital. Ansar al-Sharia in
Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law), a new Islamist
group, announced its formation on an online forum
for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed
that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad
against Egypts new government. Similar organizations in Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia have served as
front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaedalike
terrorist organizations.

Matt Bradley, Tamer El-Ghobashy, and Reem Abdellatif, Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2013, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940.html (accessed July 8, 2013).
2

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2824

July 11, 2013

Islamist militants will likely soon expand their

attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army,
police, and government facilities; anti-Morsi political
groups; symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as
Tahrir Square; and symbols of foreign conspiracies
such as the U.S. embassy, American companies, and
other Western companies. Egypts Coptic Christian
minority, about 10 percent of Egypts more than 80
million people, will likely become even more of a
lightning rod for terrorist attacks. Islamists charge
that Egypts ancient Christian community was complicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi. There
will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks, particularly in southern Egypt, a focal point for sectarian violence.
The splintered Islamist movement is by no means
unified in support of Morsi. The Nour Party, a Salafist
movement that favors the immediate imposition of
Sharia law and resented Morsis high-handed efforts
to monopolize political power, joined non-Islamist
opposition parties in pushing for early elections.
Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and
ostracize the Nour leaders, who supported the military intervention.
An outburst of violence by Islamist extremists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypts
unfinished revolution. Left unchecked, it could
devolve into an even bloodier version of Algerias
civil war, which has consumed more than 100,000
lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an
Islamist election victory in 1991.

Sitting on a Volcano

Egypts army is sitting on a volcano and knows

it. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits, and
political stability will likely be elusive until the
countrys worsening economic situation is reversed.
Nearly one-quarter of Egypts workers are unemployed, and the figure is much higher for young
men, who form the shock troops for street protests.
Egypts economic woes have created a huge reservoir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the
siren call of radical ideologies, particularly Islamist
extremism.
The political turmoil and rising crime rates of the
past two years have severely hurt tourism, which
formerly generated the bulk of Egypts foreign currency earnings and provided jobs to about one of
every seven workers. Morsi further sabotaged the
tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor

Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group

that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997not
exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists.
Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once
again to undermine the new government.

The army cannot stabilize Egypt

without resolving Egypts worsening
economic problems, which will
require considerable American and
international support.
Egypt is imploding in a bitter political struggle
fought amid economic collapse, social turmoil, surging crime rates, widespread unemployment, falling
standards of living, and rising sectarian tensions.
The imminent bankruptcy of Egypts state-dominated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic
food shortages, bread riots, labor strikes, and growing political polarization. Foreign currency reserves
are nearly exhausted, which will make it difficult to
pay for wheat imports, which provide nearly half of
Egypts food consumption.
The army needs to put Egypts house in order
quickly and then get out of the way. It inevitably
will lose popular support the longer it rules, as it
did between Mubaraks fall in February 2011 and
Morsis purge of top army leaders in August 2012.
The army can only do so much to repair Egypts dysfunctional political system. Moreover, it cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypts worsening
economic problems, which will require considerable
American and international support.

U.S. Help Needed in the

Struggle for Freedom

Egypt, the largest Arab country, is a bellwether

for the Arab Middle East. The United States has a
national interest in stabilizing Egypt, preventing
the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state, and preventing the eruption of a full-blown civil war on
the scale of Algerias in the heart of the Arab world.
Washington also has a humanitarian interest in preventing food shortages if Egypts social fabric continues to unravel.
The Obama Administration has been asleep at
the switch for much of the past two years. It eagerly
3

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2821

July 11, 2013

very perceptions that inform decision making, from

the context to the biases. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at
every level of operations, influencing the course of
the conflict. To be effective, however, psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. Instead, peacetime psychological operations
are necessary, both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime
operations.

PLA writings emphasize that modern

information technology blurs the
lines between peacetime and wartime,
between military and civilian, and
among strategy, operations, and tactics.
Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an
opponents unconscious, implicit views in order to
make that opponent more susceptible to coercion.
By employing various forms of strategic communications, including diplomatic efforts, one can foster
a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for ones own policies and goals.
At the same time, such techniques attempt to isolate opponents, undermining their positions, portraying them as fostering ill intentions, and forcing
them to react to a variety of charges so that their
energy is dispersed.
In addition, employing all the tools of communications, including various forms of media, emphasizes ones own strengths as well as a willingness to
employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents
more effectively. All the while, one must be working to counter opponents efforts to foster their own
image of strength and unity. It is also likely that an
opponent will attempt to demoralize ones populace
and that appropriate defensive measures will have
to be taken.
In wartime, psychological operations shift
emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. The primary objective of such efforts
is to generate confusion, doubt, anxiety, fear, terror,

regret, and exhaustion in an opponent, especially

among senior military and civilian leaders. Ideally,
such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes.
Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim
to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels, thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. The ability to interfere with
an opponents information systems, coupled with
efforts to influence decision makers, can create a
strong psychological impact.
Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. Not only will this help generate
war-weariness among enemy forces and populations
and discourage resistance, but once the conflict is
concluded, such operations may facilitate peace
negotiations and induce more concessions. When
one defeats the enemy, it is not solely by killing the
enemy, or winning a piece of ground, but is mainly
in terms of cowing the enemys heart.6 In order to
undermine the opponents morale, one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties,
friendly elements in the opponents society, and similar outlets.
Finally, offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures,
since an opponent will also be trying to undermine
ones own forces, population, and leaders. One must
therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the
conflict, highlight ones successes and the enemys
failures, and instill confidence and support for the
Party and the state. Such defensive measures require
tight control of information flows in ones own society and the insulation of ones decision-makers and
decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. This need for control explains
Beijings efforts to limit cyber access to the larger
population, including the Great Firewall of China.

Chinese Concept of Psychological

Warfare Tasks

For the PLA, psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department
(GPD), working in coordination with the rest of the
PLA. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy

6. Guo, Psychological Warfare Knowledge, p. 14.

3

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2824

July 11, 2013

Islamist militants will likely soon expand their

attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army,
police, and government facilities; anti-Morsi political
groups; symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as
Tahrir Square; and symbols of foreign conspiracies
such as the U.S. embassy, American companies, and
other Western companies. Egypts Coptic Christian
minority, about 10 percent of Egypts more than 80
million people, will likely become even more of a
lightning rod for terrorist attacks. Islamists charge
that Egypts ancient Christian community was complicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi. There
will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks, particularly in southern Egypt, a focal point for sectarian violence.
The splintered Islamist movement is by no means
unified in support of Morsi. The Nour Party, a Salafist
movement that favors the immediate imposition of
Sharia law and resented Morsis high-handed efforts
to monopolize political power, joined non-Islamist
opposition parties in pushing for early elections.
Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and
ostracize the Nour leaders, who supported the military intervention.
An outburst of violence by Islamist extremists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypts
unfinished revolution. Left unchecked, it could
devolve into an even bloodier version of Algerias
civil war, which has consumed more than 100,000
lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an
Islamist election victory in 1991.

Sitting on a Volcano

Egypts army is sitting on a volcano and knows

it. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits, and
political stability will likely be elusive until the
countrys worsening economic situation is reversed.
Nearly one-quarter of Egypts workers are unemployed, and the figure is much higher for young
men, who form the shock troops for street protests.
Egypts economic woes have created a huge reservoir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the
siren call of radical ideologies, particularly Islamist
extremism.
The political turmoil and rising crime rates of the
past two years have severely hurt tourism, which
formerly generated the bulk of Egypts foreign currency earnings and provided jobs to about one of
every seven workers. Morsi further sabotaged the
tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor

Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group

that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997not
exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists.
Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once
again to undermine the new government.

The army cannot stabilize Egypt

without resolving Egypts worsening
economic problems, which will
require considerable American and
international support.
Egypt is imploding in a bitter political struggle
fought amid economic collapse, social turmoil, surging crime rates, widespread unemployment, falling
standards of living, and rising sectarian tensions.
The imminent bankruptcy of Egypts state-dominated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic
food shortages, bread riots, labor strikes, and growing political polarization. Foreign currency reserves
are nearly exhausted, which will make it difficult to
pay for wheat imports, which provide nearly half of
Egypts food consumption.
The army needs to put Egypts house in order
quickly and then get out of the way. It inevitably
will lose popular support the longer it rules, as it
did between Mubaraks fall in February 2011 and
Morsis purge of top army leaders in August 2012.
The army can only do so much to repair Egypts dysfunctional political system. Moreover, it cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypts worsening
economic problems, which will require considerable
American and international support.

U.S. Help Needed in the

Struggle for Freedom

Egypt, the largest Arab country, is a bellwether

for the Arab Middle East. The United States has a
national interest in stabilizing Egypt, preventing
the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state, and preventing the eruption of a full-blown civil war on
the scale of Algerias in the heart of the Arab world.
Washington also has a humanitarian interest in preventing food shortages if Egypts social fabric continues to unravel.
The Obama Administration has been asleep at
the switch for much of the past two years. It eagerly
3

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2824

July 11, 2013

embraced Morsis Muslim Brotherhooddominated

government and was surprised that Egypts people
so quickly became violently opposed to Islamist
rule. The Administration gambled that the practical
responsibilities of governing would dilute the hostile
anti-Western ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Yet once in office, Morsi relentlessly expanded his
own power in a winner-take-all manner while
neglecting Egypts festering economic problems.
The Obama Administrations enthusiasm for
the Muslim Brotherhood led it to turn a blind eye
to Morsis power grabs, the rising persecution of
Egypts Coptic Christian minority, the crackdown
on pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) that the Mubarak regime formerly tolerated, and the restrictions that the Morsi government
placed on freedom of the press, freedom of speech,
and freedom of religion.
The Obama Administration failed to publicly criticize Morsis excesses, power grabs, and abuses. This
led Egypts secular and liberal opposition to turn
to Egypts army in despair, angry that the Obama
Administration uncritically supported the Morsi
regime. Many protesters demonstrating against
Morsi before the coup also carried signs protesting
President Obamas support for the Morsi regime.
Morsi, for his part, felt no need to compromise with
the opposition or temper his Islamist ambitions
because the Administration was reluctant to use the
leverage afforded by $1.5 billion in annual U.S. aid to
Egypt.
Secular, democratic, and liberal Egyptians
opposed to an Islamist takeover should be natural allies of the U.S., not leading a backlash against
American policy. The fact that Egyptians resent the
Obama Administrations courting of the Muslim
Brotherhood should be a wake-up call for the White
House. It is a sad sign that U.S. policy toward Egypt
has gone off the rails. Egyptian advocates of freedom
should know that Americans support their efforts
and do not side with an Islamist authoritarian leader
who is hostile to American values and policies.
The United States should support freedom in
Egypt to advance its own interests as well as those
of the Egyptian people. The interim government
established by the army has a better chance of laying
the groundwork for a democratic transition than did
Morsis regime, which was headed for dictatorship.

Military coups have advanced the prospects for

democracy at least two times in the past: Portugal
in 1974, and Egypt in 2011. It remains to be seen
whether Egypts latest coup will succeed in salvaging Egypts dim democratic prospects. However,
General el-Sissi reportedly was a student at the U.S.
Army War College in 2006, in which case he may
have absorbed the professional standards and nonpartisan apolitical tradition of the U.S. Army. In any
event, Egypts military leaders are much more likely
than Morsis cronies to advance freedom in Egypt,
support economic reforms to revive the economy,
and play a stabilizing role in the volatile Middle East.

What the U.S. Should Do

In addressing Egypts deepening crisis, the

United States should:

Press Egypts army to hold elections and step

aside as soon as possible. General el-Sissis
road map for a democratic transition included
no dates. President Mansour has laid out a vague
timetable for a constitutional referendum in four
and a half months and parliamentary elections in
six months. Washington should urge the interim
government to adhere to this timetable. It should
also find an inclusive way of writing a new constitution to establish the rules of the political competition before elections. The lack of a shared
understanding of the rules of the game enabled
Morsi to stage a power grab. The Administration
has called for a transparent and inclusive political
transition process, but the Muslim Brotherhood
and other Islamist parties should be allowed to
participate only if they publicly choose a path of
nonviolence.
Attach tight strings to any U.S. aid. The Obama
Administration has stopped short of calling the
armys intervention a coup to avoid triggering
an aid cutoff. Section 7008 of the Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2012, as contained in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, bars
any assistance to the government of any country
whose duly elected head of government is deposed
by military coup dtat or decree or, after the date
of enactment of this Act, a coup dtat or decree

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2821

July 11, 2013

very perceptions that inform decision making, from

the context to the biases. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at
every level of operations, influencing the course of
the conflict. To be effective, however, psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. Instead, peacetime psychological operations
are necessary, both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime
operations.

PLA writings emphasize that modern

information technology blurs the
lines between peacetime and wartime,
between military and civilian, and
among strategy, operations, and tactics.
Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an
opponents unconscious, implicit views in order to
make that opponent more susceptible to coercion.
By employing various forms of strategic communications, including diplomatic efforts, one can foster
a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for ones own policies and goals.
At the same time, such techniques attempt to isolate opponents, undermining their positions, portraying them as fostering ill intentions, and forcing
them to react to a variety of charges so that their
energy is dispersed.
In addition, employing all the tools of communications, including various forms of media, emphasizes ones own strengths as well as a willingness to
employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents
more effectively. All the while, one must be working to counter opponents efforts to foster their own
image of strength and unity. It is also likely that an
opponent will attempt to demoralize ones populace
and that appropriate defensive measures will have
to be taken.
In wartime, psychological operations shift
emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. The primary objective of such efforts
is to generate confusion, doubt, anxiety, fear, terror,

regret, and exhaustion in an opponent, especially

among senior military and civilian leaders. Ideally,
such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes.
Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim
to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels, thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. The ability to interfere with
an opponents information systems, coupled with
efforts to influence decision makers, can create a
strong psychological impact.
Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. Not only will this help generate
war-weariness among enemy forces and populations
and discourage resistance, but once the conflict is
concluded, such operations may facilitate peace
negotiations and induce more concessions. When
one defeats the enemy, it is not solely by killing the
enemy, or winning a piece of ground, but is mainly
in terms of cowing the enemys heart.6 In order to
undermine the opponents morale, one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties,
friendly elements in the opponents society, and similar outlets.
Finally, offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures,
since an opponent will also be trying to undermine
ones own forces, population, and leaders. One must
therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the
conflict, highlight ones successes and the enemys
failures, and instill confidence and support for the
Party and the state. Such defensive measures require
tight control of information flows in ones own society and the insulation of ones decision-makers and
decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. This need for control explains
Beijings efforts to limit cyber access to the larger
population, including the Great Firewall of China.

Chinese Concept of Psychological

Warfare Tasks

For the PLA, psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department
(GPD), working in coordination with the rest of the
PLA. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy

6. Guo, Psychological Warfare Knowledge, p. 14.

3

ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3978

June 27, 2013

pollutants. By the agencys own admission, the rule

will cost $10 billion by 2015 but have only $6 million
in purported benefits from mercury reductions.7 In
addition, the EPA is also regulating coal combustion
residues and cooling water intake structures and is
considering more stringent smog standards, all of
which make the use of coal power more expensive.
Most recently, the Supreme Court granted the
EPAs request to review its cross-state air pollution
rule, which would compel companies to retire three to
seven gigawatts of electricity generation and retrofit
up to 576 plants.8 In the absence of these new regulations, U.S. air quality has improved significantly over
the past several decades. Emission of toxic pollutants
has dropped as much as 96 percent since 1980.9
The attack on coal reaches well beyond power
plant construction and operation. Although not a
new problem, regulations from the Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement and the Mine
Safety and Health Administration make building
new coal mining operations or expanding existing operations increasingly difficult.10 Coal mining
operations are subject to 10 federal environmental
laws as well as state requirements and regulations.
Climate Policy and Coal. While it may not be
clear exactly which policies will be used, it seems clear
that zeroing-out coal-fired electric power plants is a
goal of this Administrations environmental team.

This paper will analyze the economic impact of setting such a target. We look at the first 16 years of a
20-year phase-out of coal power: 20152030.
The analysis shows significant economic losses extend beyond the obvious areas of coal mining
and power generation. In particular, we find that by
2030:

Employment falls by more than 500,000 jobs;

Manufacturing loses over 280,000 jobs;

A family of fours annual income drops more than

$1,000 per year, and its total income drops by
$16,500 over the period of analysis;
Aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) decreases by $1.47 trillion;

Electricity prices rise by 20 percent;

Coal-mining jobs drop 43 percent; and

Natural gas prices rise 42 percent.

The Energy Markets Respond. The analysis

was carried out using the Heritage Energy Model
(HEM).11 As coal-fired power generation is ratcheted

1.

Senator Barack Obama (DIL), interview with the San Francisco Chronicle editorial board, January 17, 2008, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=DpTIhyMa-Nw (accessed June 26, 2013).

2.

Aaron Blake, Obama Science Adviser Calls for War on Coal, The Washington Post, June 25, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
post-politics/wp/2013/06/25/obama-science-adviser-calls-for-war-on-coal/ (accessed June 26, 2013).

3.

Institute for Energy Research, North American Energy Inventory, December 2011, http://www.energyforamerica.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/06/Energy-InventoryFINAL.pdf (accessed June 24, 2013).

4.

To date, no one has successfully operated a utility-scale carbon-capture power plant. Perhaps even more problematic is how to dispose of the
1520 super tankers worth of liquid carbon dioxide that widespread carbon capture would create.

5.

Under the proposed rule, those plants already in the permitting process would not be included.

6.

U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, What Is the Role of Coal in the United States? July 18, 2012, http://www.eia.
gov/energy_in_brief/article/role_coal_us.cfm (accessed June 24, 2013).

7.

Anne E. Smith, Technical Comments on the Regulatory Impact Analysis Supporting EPAs Proposed Rule for Utility MACT and Revised NSPS
(76 FR 24976), NERA Economic Consulting, August 3, 2011, http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Smith_EPA_report_0811.pdf (accessed
June 24, 2013).

8.

North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2010 Special Reliability Scenario Assessment: Resource Adequacy Impact of Potential U.S.
Environmental Regulations, October 2010, http://www.nerc.com/files/EPA_Scenario_Final_v2.pdf (accessed June 24, 2013).

9.

Steven F. Hayward, 2011 Almanac of Environmental Trends, American Enterprise Institute, April 2011, p. 34, http://www.aei.org/
files/2011/04/20/Hayward-almanac2011.pdf (accessed June 25, 2013).

10. Nicolas D. Loris, The Assault on Coal and the American Consumer, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2709, July 23, 2012, http://www.
heritage.org/research/reports/2012/07/the-assault-on-coal-and-american-consumers.
11. See the appendix for a description of the HEM and the methodology used in this paper.
2

ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3978

June 27, 2013

Appendix: Methodology
Overview of Heritage Energy Model. This
analysis uses the Heritage Energy Model (HEM),
a derivative of the National Energy Model System
(NEMS).15 NEMS is used by the Energy Information
Administration of the Department of Energy as
well as various nongovernmental organizations
for a variety of purposes, including forecasting the
effects of energy policy changes on a plethora of
leading economic indicators. The methodologies,
assumptions, conclusions, and opinions in this
report are entirely the work of statisticians and
economists at The Heritage Foundations Center
for Data Analysis and have not been endorsed
by and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
developers of NEMS.
HEM is based on well-established economic theory as well as historical data and contains a variety
of modules that interact with each other for longterm forecasting. In particular, HEM focuses on the
interactions among (1) the supply, conversion, and
demand of energy in its various forms; (2) American
energy and the overall American economy; (3) the
American energy market and the world petroleum
market; and (4) current production and consumption decisions as well as expectations about the
future.16 These modules include:

A Macroeconomic Activity Module,17

A Transportation Demand Module,

A Residential Demand Module,

An Industrial Demand Module,

A Commercial Demand Module,

A Coal Market Module,

An Electricity Market Module,

A Petroleum Market Module,

An Oil and Gas Supply Module,

A Renewable Fuels Module,

An International Energy Activity Module, and

A Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution

Module.

HEM is identical to NEMS with the exception

of the Commercial Demand Module. Unlike NEMS,
HEMs module does not make projections regarding
commercial floor-space data of pertinent commercial buildings.
Overarching the above modules is an Integrating
Module that consistently cycles, iteratively executing and allowing the various modules to interact
with each other. Unknown variables that are related
(such as if they are a component of a particular module) are grouped together, and a pertinent subsystem of equations and inequalities corresponding to
each group is solved via a variety of commonly used
numerical analytic techniques, using approximate
values for the other unknowns. Once these groups
values are computed, the next group is solved similarly, and the process iterates. Convergence checks
are performed for each price and quantity statistic to
determine whether subsequent changes in that particular statistic fall within a given tolerance. After
all group values for the current cycle are determined,
the next cycle begins. For example, at cycle j, a variety of n pertinent statistics represented by the vector
(xj1 , xj2 , ..., xjn )Rn is obtained.18 HEM provides a number of diagnostic measures, based on differences

15. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, The National Energy Modeling System: An Overview, http://www.eia.gov/
oiaf/aeo/overview/pdf/0581(2009).pdf (accessed April 3, 2013).
16. Ibid., pp. 34.
17. HEMs Macroeconomic Activity Module makes use of the IHS Global Insight model, which is used by government agencies and Fortune 500
organizations to forecast the manifestations of economic events and policy changes on notable economic indicators. As with NEMS, the
methodologies, assumptions, conclusions, and opinions in this report are entirely the work of CDA statisticians and economists and have not
been endorsed by and do not necessarily reflect the views of the owners of the IHS Global Insight model.
18. S. A. Gabriel, A. S. Kydes, and P. Whitman, The National Energy Modeling System: A Large-Scale Energy-Economic Equilibrium Model,
Operations Research, Vol. 49 (2001), pp. 1425.
4

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2826

July 11, 2013

the numbers of nuclear weapons that would meet

the requirements. President Obama indicated his
thinking more than a year ago in a speech at Hankuk
University in Seoul, South Korea: But even as we
have more work to do, we can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we
need.3
Since meeting deterrence and military requirements was clearly not foremost in President
Obamas mind when he chose these numbers, what
was? The overwhelming evidence suggests that he
was focused on reaching his declared goal of zero
U.S. nuclear weapons, which the fact sheet reaffirms in its first paragraph. Indeed, the true number
he desires is zero, but even he recognizes that the
American people will reject an attempt to go directly
to zero nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the numbers
recommended in the NPRIS were essentially chosen for aesthetic reasons. These numbers look about
right as an intermediate step between what is permitted by New START after its execution and zero.
This likelihood that President Obama is foremost concerned about reducing the number of U.S.
nuclear weapons in the pursuit of his aspiration for
zero nuclear weapons is bolstered by a statement by
the then-Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
during President Obamas first term. In July 2010,
General Kevin Chilton testified about the proper
relationship between the numbers and deterrence
capabilities:
I do not agree that [the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal] is more than is needed.
I think the arsenal that we have is exactly what
is needed today to provide the deterrent. And I
say this in light ofwhen we talk about the nondeployed portion of the arsenalit is sized to be
able to allow us to hedge against both technical
failures in the current deployed arsenal and any

geopolitical concerns that mightcause us to

need more weapons deployed.4

His testimony sharply contrasts with the assertion in the NPRIS that U.S. nuclear weapons may
now be reduced further.

The NPRIS

According to the fact sheet, the NPRIS:

Reaffirms the Presidents goal of achieving

the peace and security of a world without
nuclear weapons. Clearly, this has been and
remains President Obamas highest priority in
U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
Commits to reducing the number of U.S.
strategic nuclear weapons by up to onethird below New START levels. The second
most important aspect of the NPRIS is the commitment to reduce the number of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. The fact sheet states this
determination was made after a comprehensive
review of the requirements for nuclear forces. Yet
as detailed in the next section of this paper, the
preponderance of the evidence strongly suggests
that the scope of the reduction was chosen first
and the NPRIS was pursued to justify it. The fact
sheet further states that the U.S. intends to seek
the reductions in negotiations with Russia, but
fails to indicate that an agreement with Russia is
in any way necessary or that any agreement with
Russia will be concluded as a treaty in accordance
with the law.5
Asserts that the United States will maintain
a credible nuclear deterrent, in contrast to
the commitment to disarmament. Specifically,
it states the U.S. nuclear posture will remain

1.

The White House, Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States, June 19, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states (accessed June 19, 2013).

2.

Baker Spring, Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2466, September 16, 2010,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/twelve-flaws-of-new-start-that-will-be-difficult-to-fix.

3.

Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University, The White House, March 26, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university (accessed May 29, 2012).

4.

General Kevin P. Chilton, testimony in The New START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 1115): Views from the Pentagon, video file, Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate, 111th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 16, 2010, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/the-new-start-treaty-treaty-doc-111-5views-from-the-pentagon (accessed May 8, 2013).

5.

See 22 U.S. Code 2573.

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BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2826

July 11, 2013

Defers the question of reducing the disparity

between the U.S. and Russia in short-range
nuclear weapons. The fact sheet states that
NPRIS did not set out to address this matter, particularly in relation to such weapons deployed in
Europe. Deferring this issue represents a presidential repudiation of his commitment to the
Senate to address the matter, not just directly but
in short order.
States that the U.S. is focused on maintaining and improving strategic stability with
both Russia and China. Presumably, this further codifies the earlier stated policy that the U.S.
must remain vulnerable to nuclear attacks by
either Russia or China.
Notes that the President has directed the
DOD to begin updating and aligning its directives and contingency plans with the new
guidance and to implement them over the
course of the next year. The NPRIS is accompanied by a guidance document, in the form of
a directive to the Department of Defense. The
fact sheets states that the President has directed
the Department of Defense to use the new guidance resulting from the NPRIS to begin updating and aligning its directives and contingency
plans in order to implement this policy over the
next year. This requirement is designed to force
the Department of Defense, particularly U.S.
Strategic Command, to redesign the U.S. nuclear
posture in a years time. The accompanying DOD
employment report acknowledges that the DOD
has received this guidance document.8 For whatever reason, the President is in a rush.

Evidence of Arms Control and

Disarmament-Driven Numbers

The evidence in the NPRIS fact sheet supporting the argument that the numbers were chosen
for reasons of arms control and disarmament, not
for deterrence and defense, follows from the wide
variety of flaws in the reports recommendations,
which go beyond the numbers themselves. These

recommendations, if followed, would result in a dangerously weak U.S. deterrence posture for both the
U.S. and its allies. This is the inevitable result when
arms control and disarmament goals, not strengthening the overall U.S. deterrent, drive a review of the
U.S. nuclear force.

The most effective nuclear deterrent

for the U.S. against a repressive regime
would be a counterforce policy that
targets the regimes internal security
forces and strategic military forces.
The most significant flaws are:
Flaw #1: An obscure targeting policy. The
NPRIS states that U.S. policy is to narrow the requirements for its nuclear employment and targeting policy.
However, the reduced number of deployed strategic
nuclear weapons will drive the U.S. in the direction
of countervalue targeting, targeting populations
and economic centers. This is problematic because a
countervalue targeting policy is not compatible with
the values of the U.S. as a free country and therefore
is not compatible with a credible deterrent.9 No U.S.
President would choose to use nuclear weapons to
cause widespread death and destruction in an enemy
country in which the population is repressed and
poses no significant threat to the U.S. and its allies.
Further, history suggests that foreign tyrannies do
not value their people. Instead, they value the means
of repressing their populations and of threatening
free nations, including the U.S., that pose an ideological threat to their repressive regimes. Finally, because
the U.S. was founded on the principle of liberty, it values the security and prosperity of its people.
Thus, the most effective nuclear deterrent for the
U.S. against a repressive regime would be a counterforce policy that targets the regimes internal
security forces and strategic military forces, while
protecting and defending the populations and economic capacity of the U.S. and its allies. Indeed, the

8.

Ibid., p. 1.

9.

Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring, Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the 21st Century, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2747,
November 30, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/11/deterrence-and-nuclear-targeting-in-the-21st-century.
4

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2826

July 11, 2013

accompanying DOD report finds the argument in

favor of countervalue targeting so weak that it categorically denies the guidance from the White House
requiring that the DOD to pursue it.10
Accordingly, the problem with the NPRIS is
that a counterforce employment and targeting policy requires a larger and more capable force than
the one the NPRIS recommends. This contradiction exists between the White House guidance to
the Department of Defense and the DOD nuclear
employment report and within the DOD employment report. The repressive regimes that the U.S.
needs to deter maintain multiple levers of internal
repression and strategic military capabilities to
threaten the nations of the free world. Consequently,
they present larger numbers of targets, many of
them hardened against attack with reinforced bunkers, than would be presented by population centers
under a countervalue targeting policy. The problem
becomes even more pronounced if the U.S. faces
a coalition of strategic enemies made possible by
proliferation.
By way of reference, the numbers of deployed
strategic nuclear warheads found necessary by the
George W. Bush Administration to meet the requirement to defeat strategic attacks and deter them was
between 1,700 and 2,200. The plan included targets
that are hardened and deeply buried facilities, which
are fairly described as classic counterforce targets.
The NPRIS fact sheet says nothing about why it relies
on the target sets that are shrinking enough to permit reducing the number of operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads by one-third from the
1,550 accountable warheads under New START, not
to mention the 1,700 to 2,200 deemed necessary by
the Bush Administration.
Accordingly, dedicated advocates of lower numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal than
proposed by the Obama Administration have openly
argued for a minimal deterrence nuclear posture
based on countervalue targeting.11 These advocates
understand that a countervalue targeting policy

would permit a significantly smaller nuclear force,

admittedly under the questionable assumption that
such a targeting policy would present a strong deterrent posture toward current and future U.S. enemies,
whereas the counterforce targeting policy identified
in NPRIS must lead to relatively high numbers of
nuclear weapons.
The Obama Administration apparently has chosen to gloss over this apparent contradiction in the
NPRIS. Indeed, the fact sheet fails to identify clearly
the nature of the connection that the NPRIS makes
between its suggested targets and its recommended
number of weapons.
Flaw #2: Insufficient survivability for the
U.S. nuclear force. The reductions recommended by NPRIS would likely make the U.S. strategic
nuclear force less survivable. The fact sheet asserts
that a disarming strike against U.S. strategic
nuclear forces is exceedingly remote. However,
whether such a strike will remain exceedingly
remote would depend on the future structure of
the U.S. strategic nuclear posture. The NPRIS
provides only vague overall numbers. For example, in a letter to Senator John McCain (RAZ)
on November 14, 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta explained how automatic spending cuts
under the Budget Control Act of 2011 could affect
the defense program.12 An attachment to his letter
states that these cuts could eliminate the ICBM leg
of the triad.

Secretary Panetta identified

elimination of ICBMs as a plausible
result of President Obamas defense
budget policies.
Former Air Force Chief of Staff Larry Welch
explained the link between preservation of the ICBM
leg and survivability in a speech in Washington, D.C.,

10. U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy, p. 4.

11. For example, see Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy
on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council Occasional
Paper No. 7, April 2009, http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/OccasionalPaper7.pdf (accessed June 18, 2012).
12. Leon Panetta, letter to Senator John McCain, in press release, Statement by Senators McCain and Graham on Secretary Panettas Letter
Detailing Devastating Impact of Sequester, November 14, 2011, http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.
PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=a4074315-fd3e-2e65-2330-62b95da3b0e9 (accessed July 11, 2012).
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BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2826

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Flaw #5: The fact sheet offers no commitment to modernize nuclear delivery systems.
The U.S. needs to modernize the delivery systems
for its nuclear forces for reasons that go beyond the
need to replace the aging delivery systems. The U.S.
needs new systems that can ensure the timely, highly precise delivery of weapons against time-sensitive
targets, such as ICBMs mounted on mobile launchers. Speed and precision of the new delivery vehicles
should be key considerations in the modernization
effort. The NPRIS fact sheet does not mention these
requirements.
Flaw #6: The fact sheet mentions no recommendations for appropriate yields of the weapons in the arsenal. The yield of a specific nuclear
weapon is critical to maximizing its deterrent effect
under different circumstances. A key variable in
addressing the yield question is the accuracy of the
overall weapon system. Generally speaking, higher
accuracy permits lower yields in a counterforce targeting plan.
Maximizing the effectiveness of the deterrent is
even more important than the question of the relationship between accuracy and yields. Higher yields
do not always strengthen deterrence. For example, if
a President finds the yield to be too high to permit
its use under a given circumstance, it will detract
from deterrence if a potential enemy calculates in
advance that the President will recognize this problem. Disturbingly, the NPRIS fact sheet does not discuss the preferable yields for a full array of different
weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In fact, it does
not address the yield question whatsoever, and neither does the Department of Defense employment
report. This suggests that they assume that the
yields of the current array of weapons are appropriate in every instance and will remain so for the
indefinite future. This is a dangerous assumption.
Flaw #7: Command and control problems
are not seriously addressed. The overall capabilities of the nuclear command and control system are
essential to determining the overall survivability of
the force. However, improved command and control
systems for nuclear weapons are about more than
survivability. By outward appearances, both the
NPRIS fact sheet and the DOD employment report
fail to recognize the broader issues related to nuclear command and control.
Speed and reliability of communications are key
considerations for modernizing nuclear command

and control systems, particularly with ballistic missile submarines at sea. Further, the broader command and control structure should be integrated
with the global reconnaissance strike system, which
identifies strategic targets and rapidly and precisely directs weapons against the target. Accordingly,
nuclear delivery systems that can rapidly and precisely attack targets will be of little value if not supported by a command and control system that is integrated with the global reconnaissance strike system.
According to the fact sheet, the NPRIS addresses
neither issue.

De-alerting is an effective step for

artificially reducing the value of the
U.S. nuclear force to the point that
maintaining any such force can no
longer be justified.
Flaw #8: The NPRIS defers consideration of
the deterrence value of short-range weapons,
particularly for extended deterrence. U.S. nuclear weapons deter strategic attacks not only against
the U.S. itself, but also against U.S. allies around
the world, which is called extended deterrence. The
existing U.S. nuclear posture is considered weak by
some allies and friends, who are less confident in U.S.
assurances about and the commitment to their security. While U.S. strategic nuclear forces are essential
to strengthening extended deterrence, they are not
sufficient for this purpose by themselves. Forward
basing short-range nuclear weapons to address strategic threats to U.S. allies is also essential because
these forward-deployed nuclear forces are tangible
means of bringing U.S. allies into the overall deterrence posture. Further, these forward-deployed
weapons can fill in rungs in the escalation ladder,
which if left out would result in a relatively weak
deterrent. Finally, forward-deployed nuclear forces
increase the flexibility of the overall nuclear force
and add to the military effectiveness of the broader
nuclear force.
Accordingly, in its 2009 report, the Strategic
Posture Commission noted an emerging perception
among some U.S. allies and friends that U.S. weakness in non-strategic nuclear weapons was undermining their confidence in U.S. security assurances.
7

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2826

July 11, 2013

Specifically the report states, Some allies located

near Russia believe that U.S. non-strategic forces in
Europe are essential to prevent nuclear coercion by
Moscow and that modernized U.S./NATO forces are
essential for restoring a sense of balance in the face
of Russias nuclear renewal.15 The report further
stated, Overall equivalence is important to many
U.S. allies in Europe. The United States should not
cede to Russia a posture of superiority in the name
of deemphasizing nuclear weapons in the U.S. military strategy.16

The Strategic Posture Commission

noted an emerging perception among
some U.S. allies and friends that U.S.
weakness in non-strategic nuclear
weapons was undermining their
confidence in U.S. security assurances.
At the moment, Russia has a multifold advantage over the U.S. in short-range nuclear forces. The
President certified to the Senate during consideration of New START that he would address this matter and seek to reduce, if not eliminate, this disparity
in short order. He has not done so, and the fact sheet
acknowledges that the NPRIS did not address this
matter in any substantive way.
Flaw #9: The NPRIS fails to explain how U.S.
nuclear forces will be integrated with defensive
forces and conventional strike forces. In a proliferating world, the most powerful overall deterrent
the U.S. can present would balance defensive forces
and conventional strike forces with nuclear forces.
This means all three types of forces must be integrated in order to reinforce each other. Specifically,
all three must work within the global reconnaissance strike system because it can provide vital
supporting functions to each. For example, its early
warning capabilities will provide not only added
flexibility to the nuclear and conventional strike
forces, but also initial cueing and tracking to ballistic missile defense forces.

There is no evidence that NPRIS considered the

synergistic effects of fully integrating defensive,
conventional, and nuclear forces for strengthening
deterrence. Indeed, the fact sheet indicates that the
NPRIS sees U.S. defensive and conventional strike
forces as replacements for, not complements to, the
U.S. nuclear force in meeting deterrence needs.
Flaw #10: The Obama Administration continues to walk away from its commitments to
the Senate to modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure. On this point, the fact sheet
simply seeks to mislead the public. The President
is failing to keep some of his commitments to the
Senate to modernize U.S. weapons infrastructure,
such as accelerating construction of the Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)
facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
These commitments served as the political and
legal foundation for the Senates consent to the ratification of New START and its permission to let the
U.S. strategic nuclear force fall to the levels required
by the treaty. Now, the Administration is asserting
that the U.S. not only may safely reduce its strategic
nuclear arsenal to New START levels, but to onethird below New START levels. Simply put, the facts
indicate otherwise.
Flaw #11: The NPRIS provides no assessment
of the cost-effectiveness of the recommended nuclear force. The NPRIS, focused as it is on
reducing the numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, can
easily be interpreted to mean that the overall cost
of U.S. nuclear forces will also come down. However,
the Administration cannot honestly assert that the
overall cost-effectiveness of the nuclear force will
increase under the NPRIS. The NPRIS recommendations reduce the cost of the U.S. nuclear force and
its supporting elements by reducing the size of the
force, which will reduce the capability of the force.
Needless to say, the Administration is finding it
inconvenient to acknowledge that it is producing
a less effective nuclear force and a less effective
deterrence posture. The Administration is all too
happy to switch the subject and assure the America
people that they will live in a world free of nuclear
weapons.

15. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, Americas Strategic Posture (Washington, DC: United States Institute
of Peace, 2009), p. 20, http://media.usip.org/reports/strat_posture_report.pdf (accessed June 25, 2013).
16. Ibid., p. 21.
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