What are the main factors which have

thwarted Russia s transition from

authoritarianism and prevented the
development
of
a
consolidated
democracy?

Introduction
The late eighties signified the end of the communist regimes in Europe. Most political scientists
understood the fall of the Eastern bloc as being part of the third wave of democratisation; a process
which was initiated in 19741, following the fall of the dictatorship in Portugal. Notwithstanding
similarities with the transitions in the South of Europe and Latin America, the ones in the former
communist states bear a very distinct characteristic. Indeed, in the later a simultaneous reform of
both the economy and the polity was needed. The passage from a central planned economy to a
free market capitalist one, rendered those transitions unique in history. The Russian case was more
o pli ated gi e the ou t s size a d ulti atio al ha a te . Most s hola s ag ee that ussia s
case was in need of a third transition; the creation of a federal system, which would ensure
decentralisation without causing national disintegration. Aim of the present essay is to highlight the
major factors which th a ted ussia s t a sitio , and prevented the consolidation of democracy in
the country. The reasons behi d the failu e of ussia s de o a a e numerous. Varying from
ussia s u de o ati i he ita e to the t a sitio per se, the effort to reform the polity and the
economy at the same time and the rather unsuccessful creation of a federal state. Prior to assessing
those factors, I deem necessary to provide with a concise definition of democracy.

Defining Democracy
In order to be able to understand which factors impeded the consolidation of democracy in Russia,
we need to establish what democracy is. Due to space restrictions, the current essay is not able to
present every definition of democracy available in literature. Instead, it follows Larry Diamond s
(1999), (2001) definition; a definition of liberal democracy. The importance of such a definition lies
with the fact that it provides us with the parameters we need to examine as well as the ideal state
that the country needs to reach.
Diamond focuses on liberal democracy and articulates the attributes of such a form of government.
In his definition, Diamond (2001) enumerates the features of a liberal democracy. Those are
constituted by the guarantee of the freedom of belief, expression, organisation and protest as well
as the guarantee of civil liberties, such as protection from state terror and unjustified imprisonment.
A rule of law should be secured, and citizens are to be treated equally and with respect of the due
process, under the independent authority of the judiciary. The final features involve civilian control
over the military and the presence of a pluralistic civil society and free media. Those criteria
constitute the standard by which the present essay judges the case of Russia. In their significant
work McFaul et al. (2004, pp. 4-5) ea h the o lusio that e e though ussia s egi e satisfies
some of the features mentioned above, Russia has e e ee a li e al de o a , and in recent
ea s the egi e has e o e less li e al (Michael McFaul, 2004, p. 5). Following this conclusion
a d o i i g it ith Dia o d s (1999, p. 20) findings, which show a causal link between the liberal
character of a democracy and democratic consolidation, we could move to the factors which explain
the egati e t e d of ussia s egi e.
1

For a detailed analysis of the third wave see, (Huntington, 1991)

Russias Nondemocratic Inheritance

Dia o d s (2001) definition of democracy, as we saw, stresses out the importance of vibrant civil
society institutions in conjunction with a democratic political culture. The present part of the essay
argues that the absence of such institutions i ussia s past o stitutes o e of the most important
fa to s ehi d ussia s failu e to eate a li e al de o a . Indeed, ussia s past is dete i a t of
ussia s politi al ultu e, and constitutes the main reason behind i il so iet s quasi total absence.
O Do ell s et al. (1986) study of the transition processes of several Latin American and European
countries concluded that all of the countries analysed, had so e of these ules a d p o edu es [of
democracy] in the past (1986, p. 8). Russia had almost none of these institutions to revive. Prior to
commencing the analysis of this factor, I deem necessary to provide a delineation of civil society.
Follo i g Fish s restrictive definition, the current essay ie s i il so iet as, the eal of
auto o ous, olu ta asso iatio s that pu sue li ited e ds i the pu li sphe e (1994, p. 31); a
definition emphasizing autonomy and excluding groups fused with the state.
ussia s communist past effect on the growth of a civil society is mainly based on the fact that the
regime managed to a large extent to eliminate social classes. By imposing complete state control
over the economy and the employment while separating material compensation from performance
and station, it created a society completely different from the one we observe in the West. As Fish
(1994, p. 33) notes, pea eful st uggle et ee a d within classes, waged by organisations based on
ideolog , se to , o upatio , a d p ofessio , is , afte all, u h of hat i il so iet is all a out .
The egi e s p a ti es ot o l inhibited the evolution of social classes, but also weakened other
sources of interest and identity, which normally serve as basis for the formation of civil society
i stitutio s. Fo i sta e the egi e s ep essio of all eligious o fessio s, greatly reduced the
possibility of religion or spirituality to function as sources for political organisations. Moreover, the
egi e s a o f ee asso iatio fo a e ds politi al, so ial, e o o i , sig ified the e adi atio of
the middle ground between state and society. People were left with only an ultra-personal sphere of
privacy, which involved only interpersonal relationships. The residual space was completely occupied
by the state, thus obstructing the creation of societal groups and organisations.
Nonetheless, during perestroika a large number of organizations came into light. The common goal
amongst those was the fall of the Soviet regime. Their mobilisational and expressive capacities were
significant, and thus played an important role i
eaki g the state s total o t ol o e the mass
media. La ou g oups su h as the oal i e s u io s also had a i po ta t pa t du i g So iet
U io s last ea s. Most of the
a ished i the post-Soviet setting. The reasons behind their
disappearance could be traced in the institutional chaos and disorganisation following the change of
regime.
ussia s past apa t f o effe ti g i il so iet s g o th, dete i ed the peoples politi al ultu e. I
this perspective, it as ot o l the ou t s o
u ist lega
ut also the Tsa s totalitarian rule
that played an important role. Indeed, the Tsar opposed the European idea of an enlightened king
and did not allow for reforms during his rule. In fact, the steps towards a constitutional monarchy in
Russia came too late in 1905, when the radicalisation of the society from centuries of oppression led
to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. The trajectory was again of negative trends, since a country that
had not witnessed industrialisation, and in which a vibrant working class was only present in a few
3

cities was bound to fail. Notwithstanding the various plans for the rapid industrialisation of the
country, the egi e e a e o e a d o e e t alised u til it adopted the idea of de o ati
e t alis . Nonetheless, the authoritarian Soviet state did manage to legitimise itself by appealing
to the political myth of equality. A concept that for Russians is closely related to democracy. For
decades, the people were unable to see beyond the Iron Curtain and were thus under the
impression that their country co stituted the odel of de o a . This fa t e de ed ussia s
transition different from the ones carried out in the rest of the former communist countries. For
instance in Eastern European countries, people held democratic values from their pre-Communist
past and those values combined with anti-Soviet sentiments led to the fall of the respective regimes.
Russians during perestroika did embrace Western values but the reason behind that was diverse. As
McFaul et al. ote, the de isi e fa to fo this switch in attitudes among the majority of the public
as the West s palpa le e o o i ad a tage, ot its politi al o ga isatio (2004, p. 270). During
the nineties, the failure of the economic reforms eroded people s faith in democracy given that the
ou t s u de o ati past e de ed thei i itial suppo t athe supe fi ial.

Russias Revolution from Above

I additio to the ou t s u de o ati past, ussia s t a sitio f o the o
u ist ule
impeded the creation of democratic institutions. T.L. Ka l s (1990) study of the transition process in
Latin America verified the causal link between the kind of transition and the kind of democracy that
emerges from it. Strong literature in the field suggests that a pacted transition, which is negotiated
amongst the political powers in place, is most likely to produce liberal democracy. ussia s t a sitio
as ot
i tue of a pea eful e olutio su h as i Cze hoslo akia o a egotiated transition to
democracy such as in Poland or Hungary, nor was it by virtue of a violent revolution from below as
the Bolshe ik e olutio , hi h i 9 o e th e the Tsa . The esse e of ussia s t a sfo atio
has been a state and elite-led revolution from above. During both phases of the transformation pro
and ante Yeltsi s ele tio as a hai a of the Co g ess of the People s deputies i Ju e 99 , the
people behind the ancien regime s o e th o
e e ot ussia's itize
ut opportunistic members
of the Communist Party and high rank state officials led by Yeltsin. Seizing the opportunity given by
Go a he s li e alisatio measures, they saw to promote more radical agendas for change.
Throughout this period, the masses were not mobilised and when they were, they were manipulated
by the elites. The citizenry had the role of protecting the revolutionaries from above, such as Yeltsin,
and not to overthrow what remained of the Communist regime. Indeed, this process encouraged
and facilitated many party and state apparatchiki to remain in power by moving into the new
ussia egi e s state elite. A e a ple of the a o e e tio ed p o ess ould e de the idea
better. Up to 1999, former party officials made up 36.7% of the Russian parliament. When combined
with fo e So iet state offi ials the
ade up of al ost %. Fi all , th ee of ussia s post-Soviet
Prime Ministers -Gaidar, Chernomyrdin and Primakov- as well as President Yeltsin himself were
members of the nomenklatura. As Hahn (2002) otes, it is ha d to i agi e i 9 , si ea s afte
the 1917 Russian revolution from below, former tsarist officials dominating the VPK(b)CC or the
Co g ess of the So iets (p. 500).
In addition to this lack of catharsis i ussia s politi al elite, the pe iod k o
as phoney
de o a laid the fou datio fo a p eside tial s ste , hi h follo i g Fish s (2001) findings has
4

generally had negative consequences for democratic consolidation. In August 1991 a group of
regime hardliners orchestrated a coup in order to restore the Communist regime. The democratic
group led by Yeltsin managed to emerge victorious. Following this event and until October 1993,
Yeltsin devoted little time to planning new political institutions. He chose to focus on dismantling the
Soviet system and press the economic reforms. The opposition, especially to his economic reforms,
grew over time leading to a major constitutional crisis, characterized by a constant struggle between
the President and the legislative. The events of October 1993 costing the lives to at least 147 people,
signified the end of an era. Yeltsin emerged again victorious and now the opposition had to accept
the ules i posed
the i to s. The e ussia o stitutio d afted
Yeltsi s g oup, ga e the
President extraordinary powers. As McFaul (1999) notes the office of the presidency as well as the
considerable powers at his disposal were a direct by product of the transition process and a true
obstacle to democratic consolidation.

The Simultaneous Reform of the Economy

A othe o sta le to ussia s de o ati path is constituted by the economic reforms, which were
imposed at the sa e ti e as the politi al o es. Follo i g Moo e s di tu
o ou geoisie, o
de o a
(Moore, 1993, p. 418), we could argue that Russia could not become a consolidated
democracy without a middle class. The simultaneous transition from the communist regime to a
democratic one as well as the transition from a central planned economy to a free market one not
only destroyed the hybrid middle class present in the Gorbachev era, but equally minimised the
possibility of the emergence of one in the near future. Soo afte the August oup i 99 , Yeltsi s
administration pressed for immediate reforms. Those involved a mass privatisation programme,
aiming to privatise the majority of the state s ast holdi gs. The p i atisation process, which came to
be known as piratisation , ga e ise to t o g oups of e o o i a to s; the ed di e to s a d the
oligarchs.
E e gi g f o ussia s transition from above the directors of the state s e te p ises sa to protect
their economic interests and pushed for a legislation, which would safeguard their companies from
outsider entrepreneurial groups. The struggle between the President and the parliament during
1991-1993 presented the perfect opportunity. The opposition inside the parliament managed to
secure their interests, by passing new legislation vis--vis the privatisation of large state enterprises.
Follo i g this legislatio ,
pe e t of ussia s o pa ies e ai ed u de the o t ol of thei
Soviet dire to s. O the othe ha d ussia s e olutio f o a o e, ga e ise to the oliga hs. This
group is made out mostly of former state officials, high rank party members as well as Soviet era
illegal e t ep e eu s . In the aftermath of the privatisation process, those oligarchs represented
ussia s e o o i elite. A e o o i elite, hose depe de e o the state as u uestio a le.
The emergence of those groups, did not facilitate the rise of a modern middle class necessary for a
civil society to grow. The lack of an entrepreneurial class, which would press for more democratic
efo s a d a ule of la th a ted ussia s path to de o a . As a result, currently in Russia there
are 7 small enterprises per 1000 citizens. Meanwhile in the EU, Japan and USA the average is of 45,
50, and 75 respectively. This shows undoubtedly, that Russia is far away from enjoying an
independent class of citizens who would push for democratic reforms.

In addition to the above, the nature of the economic reforms influenced the people s idea of oth
democracy and capitalism. During the nineties, unemployment rose significantly, welfare was
rendered minimal and even the expectance of life fell by a decade. As a result, the majority of
ussia s faith i de o ati i stitutio s as severely damaged. As noted in a preceding part, the
peoples suppo t fo de o ati efo s, as ai l ased o e o o i te s athe tha politi al
o es. O e the fa ed the ha sh ealit of Yeltsi s e o o i efo s, the asso iated li e al
democracy to poverty, unemployment and insecurity. Almost two decades would pass before we
it essed a h id iddle lass leadi g i il so iet s e uest fo efo s. Following the legislative
elections of December 2011, an unprecedented number of people protested against the allegedly
o upted ele tio esult as ell as Puti s pa t i ol e e t i the o uptio p o ess. The
p otests, as the a e S o e olutio suggests, did not last long. It indicates, nonetheless, a
growing middle class of young and well educated people, who could press for the necessary
democratic reforms in nowadays Russia.

Russias Third Transition

With a population of 145 million, a size of 170 million square kilometres and 172 nationalities,
Russia constitutes one of the largest and least homogeneous countries in the world. Given these
parameters, a third transition towards a federal state was necessary. The path towards a
consolidated democracy was once again thwarted by this process. Following Rustow (1970), we
come across the importance of national unity in the democratisation process. According to his
observations, an ethnically homogeneous state renders the consolidation of a democracy easier. In
addition to that, according to scholars such as Watts (1999), in order for federalism to work a legal
democratic ultu e is e essa . As al ead outli ed i the p e edi g pa t, ussia s politi al ultu e
was far from democratic, thus obstructing the creation of a federation. The process was
ha a te ised i itiall
the state s i a ilit to egotiate a legal o de ith the epu li s. This led to
an increased centralisation and the creation of a unitary state in federal clothing. ussia s trajectory
is captured in oss (2005, p. 347) comment, the ajo halle ge to the ussia state toda is not
confederalism or the threat of ethnic disintegration, but rather defederalization and the creation of
a centralized and authoritarian state under Puti . The state s e-emergence as a political player
could be observed in a number of instances.
During the early nineties, the lack of a constitutional order governing central and regional
authorities gave the opportunity to the autonomous republics of Tatarstan and Chechnya to declare
their independence. In their search for a greater political and economic autonomy, those republics
posed a serious threat to the transition process. Given the central go e
e t s i a ilit to add ess
these issues during the President-parliament power struggle, in March 1992 Yeltsin signed a
federation treaty, which granted the ethnic republics major powers. Among them, the recognition as
sovereign states as well as their right to secession constitute the most significant. The circumstances
changed rapidly as by December 1993, Yeltsin had already won the battle with the parliament and
presented the first Russian democratic Constitution. Following the entrance in force of the
constitution the republics were stripped of their rights to secession and sovereignty. This signified a
phase during which, the state initiated a centralisation process in order to control its federal
subjects. Most of the regional leaders remained in power through the corrupted contacts with the
6

central state. The critical situation in Chechnya frequently presents an opportunity for the state to
ascertain its role internally and at the same time an excuse for less democracy in the centre-regions
relatio ship. Puti s e a as i itiall
a ked
a u e of efo s, hi h highlighted e e
oe
the centrality of the state. His reform of the Federal Council as well as the law that enabled the
president to nominate the regional chief executives constitute the most enlightening examples.
Following the novel legislation, the President had the power to nominate the governors. The role of
the lo al legislatu e as di i ished i a si ple app o al of the p eside t s hoice. In case a
legislature was to oppose twice the p eside t s choice, the President could disband the legislature
and call for new regional elections. The ratio ehi d Puti s efo s as a gua l ei stati g the
state s e t al ole. Follo i g oss (2005) conclusion, Puti s efo s ha e ee d i i g the state
towards the reinstitution of the Soviet-style principles of hierarchy and centralised administrative
o t ol f o Mos o ; a path which obstructs democratic consolidation in both a national and
regional level.

Conclusion
ussia s path to a ds de o a
as a a priori diffi ult task. The ou t s u de o ati
inheritance played a major role in influencing the growth of civil society and shaping the ou t s
political culture. Those pre-existing factors led to the revolution from above, which constitutes the
most determinant one. The continuity of the political elites impeded a genuine participation the
citizenry and inhibited a negotiated transition, which would enable broader consensus amongst the
ou t s politi al po e s. This process had a domino effect which led to the power struggle
between the president and the legislative. During this unsettled period the constitution, the
economic reforms as well as the federal system were adopted. In a highly polarised political scene,
the imposition of the rules by the victor seemed the only possible way. All the above mentioned
factors led to a super presidential constitution, a highly centralised state in federal clothing and an
economy which failed to distribute wealth in a fair and just manner. Today ussia s hope fo
de o a lies ithi the g o i g iddle lass of ou g a d edu ated people i the ou t s ajo
cities. Whethe the a age to o e o e the o sta les of Puti s egi e is et to e see .

Bibliography
Diamond, L., 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Fish, S. M., 1994. Russia's Fourth Transition. Journal of Democracy, 5(3), pp. 31-42.
Fish, S. M., 2001. The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion. In: Postcommunism and the Theory of
Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 54-95.
Guillermo O'Donnell, P. S. L. W., 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Hahn, G. M., 2002. Russia's Revolution from Above. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Huntington, S., 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norma:
University of Oklahoma Press.
Karl, T. L., 1990. Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America. Comparative Politics, 23(1), pp. 1-21.
Larry Diamond, M. F. P. ed., 2001. The Global Divergence of Democracies. Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press.
McFaul, M., 1999. Institutional Design, Uncertainty, and Path Dependency During Transitions: Cases
from Russia. Constitutional Political Economy, 10(1), pp. 27-52.
Michael McFaul, N. P. A. R., 2004. Between Dictatorship and Democracy. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
Moore, B., 1993. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press.
Ross, C., 2005. Federalism and Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia. Demokratizatsiya, 13(3), pp. 347372.
Rustow, D. A., 1970. Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative Politics, 2(3),
pp. 337-363.
Watts, R. L., 1999. Comparing Federal Systems. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.