Government of the USA v. Hon.

Purganan
GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to
furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on
motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr.
Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the
issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before
it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his
Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he
be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant
for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered
his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower court.
ISSUE:
i.

Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the
prayer for bail

HELD:
Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed
to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.
i.

YES.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption
of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds
application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States
is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate
and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail
before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context
of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only
upon a clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community;
and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter
of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition cases therein
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived
essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in

Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his
extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the
consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election
to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would
be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to
stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. Extradition
proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his
ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the
resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, respondent.

FACTS:
An information was filed charging Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with Violation of Art. III,
Section 5, paragraph (a), subparagraph (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, allegedly
committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of September 1993, in the City of Olongapo, Zambales,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused VICTOR KEITH
FITZGERALD, actuated by lust, and by the use of laced drugs ("vitamins") willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously induced complainant "AAA," a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in prostitution
by then and there showering said "AAA" with gifts, clothes and food and thereafter having
carnal knowledge of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage and prejudice.
After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision against Fitzgerald.
Meanwhile, Fitzgerald filed with the CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of the Records and for the
Re-Examination of the Penalty Imposed, and a Motion for Bail.
On August 31, 2001, the CA granted Fitzgerald's bail application.
Thereafter, the RTC ordered Fitzgerald's temporary release on
September 4, 2001 upon his filing a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.
Hence, the People filed this Petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution annulled and
set aside. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail
despite the fact that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and
the evidence of his guilt is strong. It also questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said
Motion, considering that the case had been remanded to the RTC for new trial, In his Comment
and Memorandum, respondent counters that the grant of new trial negated the previous
findings of the existence of strong evidence of his guilt; and justifies his provisional release on
humanitarian grounds, citing as an extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and
deteriorating health.
ISSUE:

W/N the CA erred when it granted respondent's Motion for Bail

HELD:

With that procedural matter out of the way, we now focus on the substantive issue of whether
the CA erred when it allowed respondent to bail.
The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a
person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he
enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance
before any court, as required under specified condition. n sum, the circumstances of the case
are such, that for respondent, bail was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to the
discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance with the stringent requirements of Sec. 5,
Rule 114. And Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of bail upon evidence of the existence of
any of the circumstances enumerated therein such as those indicating probability of flight if
released on bail or undue risk that the accused may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
As it is, however, the CA, in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, admitted respondent to bail based,
"xxx not on the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail xxx," but "xxx primarily [on] the fact that
[he] is already of old age and is not in the best of health xxx," and notwithstanding its finding
that "xxx as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong xxx." The Resolution disregarded substantive
and procedural requirements on bail.

It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion filed
by respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latter's illness. Bail is
not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the
prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for
courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also be an existing
proposition for the "selective decarceration of older prisoners" based on findings that
recidivism rates decrease as age increases. But, in this particular case, the CA made no
specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment of such gravity that his continued
confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. It merely
declared respondent not in the best of health even when the only evidence on record as to the
latter's state of health is an unverified medical certificate stating that, as of August 30, 2000,
respondent's condition required him to "xxx be confined in a more sterile area xxx." That
medical recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself when, in its November 13, 2000
Resolution, it held that the physical condition of respondent does not prevent him from seeking
medical attention while confined in prison.
Moreover, there is a finding of record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar
offense. In its August 1, 1996 Order, the RTC noted that the circumstances of respondent
indicate an undue risk that he would commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending
appeal.
The foregoing finding was not traversed or overturned by the CA in its questioned Resolution.
Such finding, therefore, remains controlling. It warranted the outright denial of respondent's
bail application. The CA, therefore, erred when it granted respondent's Motion for Bail.