Guide To Power System Earthing Practice - Rev 10 (Jun 08)

Guide to Power System
Earthing Practice
June 2008
MEL-R168 Rev 10
(previously MCL-R1234)
Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)
Page i
Quality Assurance Record

Project Description:
System of Supply Working Party - Review of ECP 35
Document Number:
MEL-R168 Rev 10
Project Reference:
EEA 106
File name:
EEA Guide to Power System Earthing Practice Rev 10
Date of Issue:
23 June 2008
Prepared by: Bruno Lagesse in association with members of the EEA System of Supply Working Party
This report will be reviewed and approved by the EEA System of Supply Working Party.
Revisions
Rev
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Date
1-06-2007
22-06-2007
24-08-2007
17-10-2007
20-11-2007
10-12-07
12-12-07
14-12-07
08
17-04-08
09
10
23-05-08
23-06-08
Description
First draft
Second draft
Third draft Risk management section added
Fourth draft Distribution section significantly updated
Fifth draft Risk management section significantly updated
Sixth draft issued to Gerald Irving only with track changes to section 7
Section 7 completed. Draft for approval for industry consultation
Final draft for industry consultation
Section 2.3.2 and Section 7 completely edited. Parts of section 3 and
Appendix A has been updated.
Details on Cost Benefit Analysis added
Section 7.15 deleted. Small changes to risk assessment flowchart.
Page i
DISCLAIMER
EEA NZ Electricity Networks Guide to Power System Earthing Practice has been prepared by
representatives of the electricity industry for the purpose of providing principles on general earthing practices
for use by the generation, transmission and distribution sectors of the electricity industry. EEA NZ Electricity
Networks Guide to Power System Earthing Practice sets out general earthing practices considered
appropriate for the electricity industry; it is expected that the electricity networks companies will develop their
own procedures to implement these practices. Although the EEA NZ Electricity Networks Guide to Power
System Earthing Practice is recommended by industry representatives, it is not legally binding. As such, the
Electricity Engineers Association and the industry representatives involved in formulating EEA NZ Electricity
Networks Guide to Power System Earthing Practice can accept no liability or responsibility for any injury,
loss, damage, or any other claims caused by, or resulting from any inaccuracy in, or incompleteness of the
EEA NZ Electricity Networks Guide to Power System Earthing Practice.
COPYRIGHT 2008
Copyright is owned by the Electricity Engineers Association of New Zealand (Inc.) (EEA).
All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or copied in any form or by any means (graphic,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping, or information retrieval systems) without
the written permission of the copyright owner.
Page i
FOREWORD
The electricity supply industry has both general and specific safety responsibilities placed on it by the Health
and Safety in Employment (HSE) Act 1992, the Electricity Act 1992 and Regulations made under those Acts.
The industry recognises those legal responsibilities and has therefore developed EEA NZ Electricity
Networks Guide to Power System Earthing Practice as industry-wide safe earthing guidelines.
EEA NZ Electricity Networks Guide to Power System Earthing Practice does not override any legislative
requirements.
This Guide was produced for the Electricity Engineers Association of New Zealand by the following working
group members in consultation with engineers from the electrical power supply industry in New Zealand.
Mr. T Scott, Orion NZ Ltd (Chairman)

Mr. D Abercrombie, Vector Ltd
Mr. P Berry, EEA
Mr. R Griffiths, Westpower Ltd
Mr. S Hirsch, Orion NZ Ltd
Mr. G Irving, Transpower NZ Ltd
Mr. B Lagesse, Mitton Electronet Ltd
Mr. W Lowe, Energy Safety
Mr. A Marshall, Opus International Consultants Ltd (representing Telecom NZ Ltd)
Mr. M OBrien, NZCCPTS
Mr. G Ryan, Transpower NZ Ltd
Comments for the revision of this Guide are welcomed and should be forwarded to:
EEA Guide to Power System Earthing Practice - Convenor
PO Box 5324
Wellington
New Zealand
Page ii
CONTENTS
PREFACE........................................................................................................................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 1
SECTION 1 SCOPE, PURPOSE, INTERPRETATIONS, GLOSSARY AND NUMBERING....................... 2
1.1 PURPOSE..................................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 SCOPE......................................................................................................................................... 2
1.3 INTERPRETATIONS ........................................................................................................................ 2
1.4 RELEVANT ACTS AND REGULATIONS ............................................................................................. 3
1.5 RELEVANT STANDARDS AND DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................... 4
1.6 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS GUIDE ....................................................................... 4
SECTION 2 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................................. 6
2.1 GENERAL ..................................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR EARTHING SYSTEMS......................................................................... 6
2.3 HAZARDS AND ELECTRICAL CONCEPTS ......................................................................................... 6
2.4 EPR RISK MANAGEMENT ...........................................................................................................11
2.5 ACCEPTABLE STEP AND TOUCH VOLTAGE LIMITS .........................................................................11
2.6 CRITICAL DESIGN PARAMETERS ..................................................................................................12
2.7 EPR VOLTAGES TRANSFERRED ONTO THIRD PARTY ASSETS .......................................................13
2.8 TYPES OF EARTH ELECTRODES ..................................................................................................13
2.9 MATERIALS OF EARTH ELECTRODES AND CORROSION CONSIDERATIONS ......................................14
2.10 JOINTS OF EARTH ELECTRODES ..................................................................................................15
2.11 CURRENT RATING OF CONDUCTORS AND JOINTS .........................................................................15
2.12 HAZARD MITIGATION ..................................................................................................................17
2.13 SWITCHGEAR OPERATING MECHANISMS ......................................................................................18
2.14 SURGE ARRESTERS ...................................................................................................................18
2.15 STATION FENCING .....................................................................................................................19
2.16 CONNECTION POINTS FOR TEMPORARY EARTHS..........................................................................20
2.17 EARTH ELECTRODE ENHANCEMENT ............................................................................................20
2.18 TESTING AND MAINTENANCE .......................................................................................................20
SECTION 3 EPR RISK MANAGEMENT ...................................................................................................22
A. PROBABILISTIC METHOD ......................................................................................................................22
3.1 RISK IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS............................................................................................24
3.2 RISK EVALUATION CRITERIA .......................................................................................................25
3.3 COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION ..................................................................................26
3.4 PROBABILISTIC RISK MANAGEMENT FLOWCHART .........................................................................28
3.5 PERMISSIBLE STEP AND TOUCH VOLTAGE LIMITS .........................................................................29
B. DETERMINISTIC METHOD......................................................................................................................30
3.6 EXPOSURE DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................................31
3.7 PERMISSIBLE TOUCH VOLTAGES .................................................................................................32
3.8 PERMISSIBLE STEP VOLTAGES ....................................................................................................33
3.9 REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................36
SECTION 4 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES ...........................................................................................37
4.1 EARTHING SYSTEM IMPEDANCE REDUCTION ................................................................................37
4.2 GRADIENT CONTROL CONDUCTORS ............................................................................................38
4.3 NEUTRAL EARTHING RESISTORS .................................................................................................38
4.4 RESONANT EARTHING (PETERSEN COILS, ARC SUPPRESSION COILS, EARTH FAULT NEUTRALISER
EARTHING) ..........................................................................................................................................39
4.5 OVERHEAD EARTH WIRES (OHEW)............................................................................................39
4.6 CABLE SCREENS ........................................................................................................................40
4.7 SURFACE INSULATING LAYER ......................................................................................................41
4.8 SEPARATION OF HV AND LV EARTHING .......................................................................................42
4.9 TT SYSTEM OF SUPPLY ..............................................................................................................43
4.10 INTERFERENCE WITH SERVICES ..................................................................................................44
4.11 OTHER MITIGATION MEASURES...................................................................................................44
SECTION 5 HV A.C. STATIONS ...............................................................................................................46
5.1 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................46
5.2 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR HV A.C. STATION EARTHING SYSTEMS ............................................46
Page iii
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
5.14
5.15
5.16
5.17
5.18
5.19
5.20
5.21
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
5.30
5.31
5.32
5.33
DESIGN ASPECTS .......................................................................................................................46

IMPORTANT DESIGN PARAMETERS ..............................................................................................47
SOIL RESISTIVITY .......................................................................................................................48
MAXIMUM EARTH FAULT CURRENT..............................................................................................48
MAXIMUM EARTH FAULT DURATION .............................................................................................48
TOUCH AND STEP VOLTAGE HAZARDS.........................................................................................49
MITIGATION OF EPR HAZARDS ...................................................................................................49
TRANSFERRED VOLTAGES ..........................................................................................................50
430 V, 650 V AND 2,500 V EARTH POTENTIAL RISE (EPR) CONTOURS ........................................51
EQUIPMENT EARTHING CONDUCTORS .........................................................................................52
JOINTS FOR EQUIPMENT EARTHING CONDUCTORS .......................................................................52
DISCONNECTORS AND EARTH SWITCHES .....................................................................................53
REINFORCED CONCRETE PADS AND HOLDING-DOWN BOLT CAGES ..............................................53
BUILDINGS .................................................................................................................................53
FENCES .....................................................................................................................................53
LIGHTNING SHIELDING AND LIGHTING ..........................................................................................54
PORTABLE EARTHING CONNECTIONS ..........................................................................................54
CONTROL CABINET EARTHS/ ODJBS ..........................................................................................54
EARTHING OF CABLES WITHIN THE EARTH GRID ............................................................................55
TRANSFORMER NEUTRAL EARTHING ...........................................................................................55
GENERATOR NEUTRAL EARTHING ...............................................................................................56
VOLTAGE TRANSFORMERS AND CAPACITOR VOLTAGE TRANSFORMERS ........................................56
VT/CT SECONDARY CIRCUITS.................................................................................................56
400/230 V SYSTEM ....................................................................................................................56
CONDUCTOR AND JOINT SPECIFICATION ......................................................................................57
EARTHING OF CABLE WITHIN THE EARTH GRID .............................................................................57
FEEDER CABLES ........................................................................................................................57
OHEW ........................................................................................................................................58
POWER STATIONS, CUSTOMER SUBSTATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS...............................59
INSTALLATION AND COMMISSIONING ............................................................................................59
TESTING AND MAINTENANCE .......................................................................................................59
SECTION 6 DISTRIBUTION CENTRES AND EQUIPMENT ....................................................................61

6.1 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................61
6.2 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR DISTRIBUTION CENTRES AND EQUIPMENT EARTHING SYSTEMS ........61
6.3 DESIGN ASPECTS .......................................................................................................................61
6.4 RELIABLE DETECTION AND CLEARANCE OF HV EARTH FAULTS .....................................................62
6.5 EPR RISK MANAGEMENT ...........................................................................................................65
6.6 CONTROL OF DANGEROUS EPR IMPRESSED ON THIRD PARTY ASSETS AND PERSONNEL ..............71
6.7 SEGREGATED HV AND LV EARTHING ..........................................................................................73
6.8 EARTHING SYSTEMS FOR DISTRIBUTION CENTRES AND EQUIPMENT .............................................74
6.9 CONNECTION OF NEUTRAL TO EARTH ..........................................................................................74
6.10 EARTHING OF FITTINGS AT DISTRIBUTION CENTRES .....................................................................74
6.11 EARTHING OF FITTINGS AT DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT ..................................................................75
6.12 SAFETY WHILE OPERATING DISCONNECTORS..............................................................................75
6.13 EARTHING CONNECTIONS ...........................................................................................................76
6.14 LOW VOLTAGE EARTHING CONDUCTORS ASSOCIATED WITH LV SYSTEMS ....................................76
6.15 CONNECTIONS TO EARTHING ELECTRODES .................................................................................76
6.16 SURGE ARRESTERS ...................................................................................................................77
6.17 SOIL RESISTIVITY .......................................................................................................................77
6.18 TYPICAL EARTHING ARRANGEMENTS ...........................................................................................77
6.19 TESTING AND MAINTENANCE .......................................................................................................78
SECTION 7 OVERHEAD ELECTRICAL LINES 50 KV AC AND ABOVE................................................79
7.1 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................79
7.2 CORRIDOR MANAGEMENT ...........................................................................................................79
7.3 STEEL LATTICE STRUCTURES .....................................................................................................79
7.4 STEEL AND CONCRETE POLES ....................................................................................................81
7.5 WOOD POLES ............................................................................................................................82
7.6 ELECTRODES & COUNTERPOISE EARTHING .................................................................................83
7.7 OVERHEAD EARTH WIRE .............................................................................................................84
7.8 LIGHTNING SURGE ARRESTERS ..................................................................................................84
7.9 GUY WIRE INSULATORS ..............................................................................................................85
7.10 CLEARANCE OF EARTH FAULTS ...................................................................................................85
Page iv
7.11
7.12
7.13
7.14
TOWER FOOTING RESISTANCES ..................................................................................................87

EPR ASSESSMENT .....................................................................................................................89
LIGHTNING .................................................................................................................................93
VOLTAGES IMPRESSED ONTO OTHER CIRCUITS OR UTILITIES .......................................................94
APPENDIX A VOLTAGE LIMITS ..............................................................................................................97

APPENDIX B TYPICAL EARTHING ARRANGEMENTS .......................................................................105
Page v
PREFACE
This guide has been written to provide guidance based upon current industry best practice and international
standards.
INTRODUCTION
This guide is intended to provide general guidance on acceptable methods for ensuring the safety of earthing
systems associated with high voltage power systems and provide a means of compliance with relevant
safety legislation.
Page 1
SECTION 1 SCOPE, PURPOSE, INTERPRETATIONS, GLOSSARY AND NUMBERING

1.1
PURPOSE
The purpose of this guide is to give guidance and advice on safe earthing practices for high voltage
a.c. power systems adequate to meet the requirements of electricity safety legislation.
1.2
SCOPE
1.2.1
This document provides guidance on power system earthing in general as set out in sections 1 to 4,
and includes specific sections for:
(a) High voltage (HV) a.c. stations.
(b) Distribution centres, equipment and lines.
(c) High voltage a.c. transmission lines.
1.2.2
This guide does not apply to:

(a) Low Voltage (LV) earthing on consumers installations.
(b) Systems not operated at a normal frequency of 50 Hz.
1.3
INTERPRETATIONS
In this guide, unless the context otherwise requires, the following definitions apply:
1.3.1
Disconnector means any disconnector, earth switch, air break switch (ABS), air break isolator
(ABI), sectionaliser, etc.
1.3.2
Distribution centre means any substation from which electricity is supplied direct at low or high
voltage to an electrical installation that is to a consumer or end user. The distribution centre may
consist of one or more transformers on a pole, on the ground, underground, or in a building; and
includes the enclosure or building surrounding the transformer(s) and switchgear, if any, but does
not include HV a.c stations.
1.3.3
Distribution equipment means pole or pad mounted equipment such as lightning arresters, ring
main unit (RMU), capacitors, reclosers, regulators and disconnectors (ABS, ABI, sectionaliser, etc)
on a distribution network other than distribution centres.
1.3.4
Distribution system means that portion of an electricity supply system from where electricity at low
or high voltage is conveyed from a distribution centre, to the premises of consumers connected to
that distribution centre, but does not include distribution or service mains.
1.3.5
Earthed means electrically connected to the general mass of the earth.
1.3.6
Earth electrode means a conducting element or electrically bonded group of conducting elements
in electrical contact with the earth and designed for dispersing electric currents into the earth.
1.3.7
Earth fault current path means the complete loop through which earth fault current flows. It
includes system plant as well as dedicated earth connections and the main body of the earth.
1.3.8
Earth grid means a system of interconnected bare conductors buried in the earth providing a
common earth for fittings. The grid may be specifically designed to control surface potential
gradients.
1.3.9
Earth grid voltage rise (EGVR) means the voltage rise to remote earth on a metallic structure
connected to an earthing system during an earth fault.
1.3.10 Earth grid return current means the portion of earth fault current which flows through the earthing
system.
1.3.11 Earth potential rise (EPR) means a rise in potential on the earth surface relative to reference earth.
Page 2
1.3.12 Earth impedance in respect of an earth electrode system means the ohmic impedance at system
frequency between the electrode system and the general mass of earth.
1.3.13 Earthing conductor means a conductor connecting any part of an earth electrode to fittings
required to be earthed.
1.3.14 Earthing system means all conductors, electrodes, clamps or other connections used to provide a
path to earth.
1.3.15 High voltage (HV) means voltage exceeding 1,000 volts a.c. or 1,500 volts d.c.
1.3.16 Hazard means a source of risk or harm. In this case, an earth potential rise condition that could
cause harm to a person in the vicinity (or nearby plant).
1.3.17 HV a.c. station means a HV station which has a controlled access area and a specific earth grid.
This includes Transpower grid connection points, zone substations, HV switching stations,
generating stations (including switchyards), air insulated indoor substations, gas-insulated
substations (GIS), etc, but does not include distribution centres and distribution equipment.
1.3.18 Mitigation means a measure or measures taken to reduce the hazard or risk.
1.3.19 Multiple earthed neutral (MEN) System means a system of earthing in which the earthing
conductor within an electrical installation is connected to the neutral as well as to an earthing
electrode. In this system, the distribution system neutral is earthed at the point of supply at a
distribution centre, and at one or more points along the distribution or service mains, and provides a
continuous electrical path between the consumer and the distribution centre earthing point.
1.3.20 Normal Location means any urban or rural areas other than Special Locations.
1.3.21 Risk means a function of both the probability of an event and the consequence of that event.
1.3.22 Risk assessment means the determination that a given level of risk is tolerable or otherwise.
1.3.23 Special Location means any urban or rural area where a significant gathering of people may occur
particularly situations and/or where people may not be wearing footwear. Special Locations could
be found in areas such as within a schools grounds or within a childrens playground, or within a
public swimming pool area, or at a popularly used beach or water recreation area, or in a public
thoroughfare.
1.3.24 Stations means substation or generating station.
1.3.25 Step voltage means the difference in surface potential experienced by a person bridging a
distance of 1 metre with the persons feet apart, without contacting any other earthed object.
1.3.26 System voltage means the difference of potential normally existing between conductors, or
between conductors and earth (phase-to-phase in a multi phase system and phase-to-earth in a
single phase system).
1.3.27 Telecommunications system means all plant that is part of a telecommunications network. This
includes cables, aerial lines, pillars, exchange equipment, and customers fixed telecommunications
wiring and attached equipment (e.g. PABXs, phones, etc).
1.3.28 Touch voltage means voltage which will appear between any point of contact with uninsulated
metalwork and any point on the surface of the ground within a horizontal distance of 1 metre from
the vertical projection of the point of contact with the uninsulated metalwork.
1.4
RELEVANT ACTS AND REGULATIONS

This Guide was written to comply with the New Zealand Electricity Act and the New Zealand
Electricity Regulations. The Electricity Regulations are currently under review.
Page 3
1.5
RELEVANT STANDARDS AND DOCUMENTS

AS 2067-1984
Switchgear assemblies and ancillary equipment for alternating voltages above

1 kV.
AS/NZS 3835
Earth .potential rise Protection of telecommunication network users, personnel
and plant Parts 1 & 2.
AS/NZS 4853
Electrical hazards on metallic pipelines.
AS/NZS 60479-1 Effects of current on human beings and livestock. Part 1: general aspects
(Equivalent to IEC 60479-1:1994).
BS 7354
Code of practice for design of high voltage open terminal stations.
BS EN 50341
Overhead electrical lines exceeding a.c. 45 kV.
EEA
NZ electricity networks guide to risk based earthing system design.
ENA EG1
Substation earthing guide.
ENA C(b)1
Guidelines for design and maintenance of overhead distribution and transmission
lines.
IEEE Std 80
Guide for safety in a.c. substation grounding.
IEEE Std 81
Guide for measuring earth resistivity, ground impedance and earth surface
potentials of a ground system.
IEEE Std 81.2
Guide for measurement of impedance and safety characteristics of large,
extended or interconnected grounding systems.
IEEE Std 142
Recommended practice for grounding of industrial and commercial power
systems.
IEEE Std 524a
IEEE Guide to grounding during the installation of overhead transmission line
conductors.
IEEE Std 665
Standard for generating station grounding.
IEEE Std 837
Qualifying permanent connections used in substation grounding.
IEC 61936-1
Power installations exceeding 1 kV a.c.
IEC 60364-4-44 Electrical installations of buildings Part 4-44 Protection for safety Protection
against voltage disturbances and electromagnetic disturbances.
IEC 60479-1:2005 Effects of current on human beings and livestock. Part 1: general aspects.
ITU-T K33
Limits for people safety related to coupling into telecommunications system from
a.c. electric power and a.c. electrified railway installations in fault conditions.
ITU-T K53
Values of induced voltages on telecommunications installations to establish
telecom and a.c. power and railway operators responsibilities.
NZCCPTS
Application guide for earth potential rise.
NZCCPTS
Application guide for neutral earthing resistors/reactors.
NZCCPTS
Application guide for SWER HV power lines.
NZCCPTS
Application guide for cable separations Minimum separations between power
and telecommunication cables.
NZCCPTS
Application guide for costs apportioning.
NZCCPTS
Application guide for cable sheath bonding.
NZCCPTS
Fundamentals of calculation of earth potential rise in the underground power
cable distribution network.
SM-EI
Safety manual electricity industry (two manuals).
1.6
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS GUIDE

ABI
ABS
ALARP
CBA
CBR
CVT
DA
EPR
EGVR
HV
Hz
Ib
kg
KV
LV
MEN
Air Break Isolator

Air Break Switch
As Low As Reasonably Practical
Cost Benefit Analysis
California Bearing Ratio
Capacitor Voltage Transformer
Data Acquisition
Earth Potential Rise
Earth Grid Voltage Rise
High Voltage > 1 kV a.c.
Hertz
Permissible body current limit
Kilograms
Kilo-volts (1,000 volts)
Low Voltage 1 kV
Multiple Earthed Neutral
Page 4
NER
NET
NPV
NZECP
ODJB
OHEW
PVC
RCD
RMU
SWER
T
TFR
TT
VoSL
VT
Neutral Earthing Resistor

Neutral Earthing Transformer
Net Present Value
New Zealand Electrical Code of Practice
Outdoor Junction Box
Overhead Earth Wire
Polyvinyl chloride
Residual Current Device
Ring Main Unit
Single Wire Earth Return
Time
Tower Footing Resistance
Terra-Terra system of supply
Value of Statistical Life
Voltage Transformer
Page 5
SECTION 2 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

2.1
GENERAL
Depending on access, location and exposure levels, metal structures, and equipment that may be
livened to dangerous voltage levels as a result of an earth fault should be bonded to earth. This can
be achieved by permanent connections to electrodes in contact with the general body of earth.
Power system earthing is typically required to ensure that earth faults associated with the power
system are detected so that the earth fault protection devices are effectively operated to disconnect
the supply. When a fault on a high voltage power system causes current to flow to earth, the
earthing system should also ensure that the voltage difference between conducting parts that may
be momentarily livened, and which may be contacted by a person does not carry a significant risk.
Hazardous voltages between conductive parts may typically appear between the hand and one or
both feet (i.e. touch voltages), or between the two hands (i.e. reach touch voltages), or between one
foot and the other (i.e. step voltages). Such voltage differences can occur within power system
stations, and also on metallic structures along the length of, or close to power lines, under earth fault
current conditions. Earthing in conjunction with other mitigation measures can be used to control
dangerous voltage differences to acceptably safe levels.
During earth fault conditions voltage differences will exist between station equipment and the main
body of earth. These voltage differences may need to be controlled, to ensure that insulation
breakdown or failure does not occur on apparatus connected to points outside the station. Cable
sheaths, metallic pipes, fences, etc which are connected to the station earthing system will transfer
earth fault voltages from the station earth electrode to the remote points. Similarly, cable sheaths,
metallic pipes, etc. which are connected to remotely earthed structures but isolated from the station
earth electrode will transfer the earth fault voltage of the remote structure into the station.
2.2
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR EARTHING SYSTEMS

The performance of the earthing system(s) shall satisfy the safety and functional requirements of the
high voltage power system, including lines, substations and the associated fittings and equipment.
The earthing system may be used jointly or separately for the protective or functional purposes
according to the requirements of the power system.
The design, selection and installation of the earthing systems shall be such as to ensure:
2.2.1
Performance Requirements
The performance requirements for an earthing system include:
(a) Proper functioning of electrical protective devices. This entails reliable detection of HV earth
faults and either clearing the fault or minimising the resulting fault current.
(b) Manage the risks associated with step and touch voltages in accordance with Electricity
Regulations, applicable standards and guidelines.
(c) Manage the risks associated with EPR transferred onto third party plant, staff and users (i.e.
telecommunications, railways, pipelines, etc.) in accordance with Electricity Regulations,
applicable standards and guidelines.
2.2.2
Functional Requirements
The functional requirements for an earthing system include:
(a) Earth fault currents and earth-leakage currents can be carried without danger and without
exceeding design limits for thermal, thermo-mechanical and electro-mechanical stresses.
(b) The value of earthing impedance is in accordance with the protective requirements and is
continuously effective over the planned lifetime of the installation with due allowance for
corrosion and mechanical constraints.
2.3
HAZARDS AND ELECTRICAL CONCEPTS
2.3.1
Sources of hazards
Page 6
Electrical hazards in the form of touch, step or transferred voltages can appear on the metal
structures or equipment associated with, or nearby high voltage power systems, due to one or a
combination of the following factors:
(a) Electrical insulation failure, or mechanical failure or both, causing earth fault current to flow, and
EPR to occur.
(b) Human error, resulting in accidental livening of station equipment, and/ or lines circuits.
(c) Electromagnetic induction.
(d) Static charges induced on de-energised lines due to atmospheric conditions.
(e) Lightning strikes to in-service/ de-energised lines.
In addition to the above, electrical interaction can occur between power system earthing and nearby
third party systems. This interaction may involve EPR or transferred EPR, stress to the insulation of
telecommunication circuits, induced voltages, or the creation of voltage differences between the
EPR of power system earthing and the independent earthing (either local or remote) of other
systems such as private generating plant, or telecommunication systems. The consequences of
such differential voltages may involve both insulation breakdown and component failure (e.g.
electronic equipment).
In some cases common HV and LV network earths, may be of particular concern as detailed in
section 4.8.
The widespread use of power operated digital electronic equipment for modern telecommunication
equipment, such as cordless telephones, etc., has increased the possibility of damage to such
power/telecommunications equipment and of hazard to the users.
This Guide does not include detailed guidance on issues of EPR transferred onto third party
systems. For the telecommunication systems, detailed guidance is available from a series of
publications issued by the New Zealand Committee for the Co-ordination of Power and
Telecommunication Systems (NZCCPTS). The NZCCPTS publications are listed in section 1.5 of
this guide, and provide detailed information on assessing the likely degree of hazard involved and
suitable means of mitigating possible hazard. For pipelines, detailed guidance can be obtained from
AS/NZS 4853, Electrical hazards on metallic pipelines.
It should also be noted that the voltage-time safety criteria for telecommunications equipment and
users, differs from the step and touch values used in earthing design. The relevant criteria for
telecommunications equipment and users are detailed in the Electricity Regulations. Similar criteria
are typically used by the railway industry.
2.3.2
Earth potential rise (EPR)

An earth fault will result in an EPR. During an earth fault, there is significant current flowing from the
power source into the fault point. This current then returns to the source through the ground
surrounding the fault point or earth mat. The soil has inherent resistivity and the current flowing
through this resistance causes voltages to appear on the soil surface and consequently an EPR.
The value of this at the earth mat is determined by the resistance between the earth mat and the
remote earth as well as the magnitude of the earth fault current.
The soil surface voltages are highest at the fault location or the source substation earth mat, and
reduce as the distance from the fault location or the source substation earth mat increases.
Equipotential contours reflect all the locations that would have the same voltage on the soil surface
during an earth fault. The closer the contours are to each other, the steeper the voltage gradients
are. This results in:
a higher touch voltage;

higher step voltages close in, but lower step voltages further out;
smaller step voltage hazard zone;
lower EPR in the nearby soil;
smaller EPR hazard zones;
less problems with EPR hazard to nearby other utility plant (e.g. telecommunications plant).
If a human or animal contacts two different voltages simultaneously, a voltage difference will be
applied across the body. This will cause a current to flow in the body. The current that may be
Page 7
harmful is influenced by a number of factors including fault duration, the contact area, the body
current path and the impedance characteristics of the skin and the body.
Hand-to-hand or more typically hand-to-foot voltages are known as touch voltages. A touch voltage
occurs when the surface a person is touching and the surface a person is standing on, or a second
location that they are touching, are at different voltages. Hence touch voltages occur where there is
contact with a conductive structure where a current path occurs through the body to a location at a
different potential during an earth fault.
Foot-to-foot voltages are known as step voltages. A step voltage occurs when a stride is taken and
the soil surface under each foot is at different voltages. A step voltage can only be experienced
when both feet are in simultaneous contact with the ground and each foot is on a different voltage
contour. This results in a current path through the body from foot to foot during an earth fault.
The third category of EPR voltages are transfer voltages. Voltages can appear on any long metallic
object during an earth fault, that are in electrical contact with the soil surface and that passes across
the EPR voltage contours. Typical examples are wire fences, telephone wires or gas industry
pipelines. There are two separate consequences. Firstly, the metallic object will attain the EPR
voltage of the soil surface that it is in contact with. It may conduct or transfer this voltage from the
area close to the fault point to a location some distance away. A significant touch voltage may then
occur through a person touching the metallic object whilst standing on a soil surface well beyond the
immediate influence of the fault. Secondly, the reverse can also occur, where the metallic object
may conduct or transfer a low voltage into an area close to the fault point. The soil surface may
have attained a high EPR voltage as a result of the fault. A significant touch voltage may then
occur, again through a person touching the metallic object but in this instance with the person
standing close to the fault point.
2.3.3
Electric field (capacitive) coupling

Electric field (capacitive) voltages typically can be coupled onto an insulated metallic object in an
electric field from an energised circuit. A typical example of electric field coupling is the voltage that
appears on a de-energised overhead circuit running alongside an energised circuit.
When contact is first made with the isolated object, the capacitor will discharge and the final voltage
on the object is likely to be low. As long as the stored energy is not very large the discharge current
will be low. However, if the stored energy is large, such as on a relatively long de-energised circuit
in parallel with an energised circuit, the discharge current may be high and dangerous.
Bonding the isolated object to earth will effectively discharge capacitive coupled voltages.
Capacitive coupling is rarely an issue for the public. Electric utilities employees working on deenergised circuits or equipment have to take necessary precautions such as applying temporary
earthing to ensure that capacitive coupled voltages are minimised.
2.3.4
Magnetic field induction

Currents (steady state or earth fault currents) flowing through a circuit in parallel with metallic
conductors can cause hazardous voltages to be magnetically induced into the parallel metallic
conductor.
Induced voltages may be a hazard to telecommunications equipment and personnel and must be
limited to electrically safe values.
Induced voltages may also be a hazard in gas, oil or other pipelines, where they run parallel to high
voltage transmission or distribution lines. Hazards arise to personnel inspecting and maintaining
such pipelines.
Induced voltages may also be hazardous to the public on fences or other metallic conductors which
run parallel to power lines.
Magnetic field induction is not considered in more details in this Guide. Further information about
magnetic field induction may be obtained from:
Page 8
(a) CJC5-1997, Coordination of Power and Telecommunications Low Frequency Induction,

Standards Australia, 1997.
(b) AS/NZS 4853:2000, Electrical hazards on metallic pipelines.
2.3.5
Lightning strikes
Even though lightning activity in New Zealand is typically low compared to many other regions of the
world, lightning is still considered a significant source of hazards to employees. Lightning
overvoltages and currents can travel a long way over overhead lines and affect personnel working
on earthing systems.
It is impractical to provide adequate protection to personnel in the form of earthing and equipotential
bonding during lightning conditions because lightning surges typically have high current magnitude
and rate of rise.
This Guide does not cover lightning protection issues in detail.
coordination and lightning protection may be obtained from:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Information on Insulation
IEC 60071 Insulation Coordination (multiple parts).

Andrew R Hileman, Insulation Coordination for Power Systems, Marcel Dekker Inc., 1999.
IEEE Std 998-1996 IEEE Guide for Direct Lightning Stroke Shielding of Substations.
IEEE Std 1313-1993 IEEE standard for power systems - insulation coordination (three parts).
IEEE Std 1410-2004 IEEE guide for improving the lightning performance of electric power
overhead distribution lines.
Note: All personnel are required to stop handling all conductors including those associated with any
earthing system until the lightning hazard has passed. This is a requirement from SM-EI 3.702.
2.3.6
Touch Voltage
Touch voltage is the voltage generated during an EPR event which may appear between any point
of contact with uninsulated metalwork and any point on the surface of the ground within a horizontal
distance of one metre from the vertical projection of the point of contact with the uninsulated
metalwork.
Touch voltages typically appear between a hand and one or both feet of a person touching a
temporarily livened earthed structure while standing on the ground surface one metre away from the
structure (see Figure 1).
A touch voltage may also appear between the two hands of a person simultaneously touching two
earthed structures that are temporary livened. This is termed the reach touch voltage and may only
be an issue if one or both objects are not bonded to the grid.
For a HV a.c. station with an earth grid, the maximum touch voltage which can develop in the mesh
of the grid is termed the mesh voltage. Because of the equipment and structures in a HV a.c.
station, it is possible for someone to be touching structures or items of equipment including mobile
plants while standing at the centre of a mesh.
Page 9
HV a.c.
station
Substation
Fence
Touch
Voltage
Step
Voltage
Touch
Voltage
Touch
Voltage
Step
Voltage
Reach
Touch
Voltage
Figure 1: Touch and Step Voltages around a Substation

2.3.7
Step Voltage
Step voltage is the difference in surface potential experienced by a person bridging a distance of one
metre with the persons feet apart, without contacting any other earthed object. Examples of a step
voltage are shown in Figure 1.
2.3.8
Transferred Voltage
The transferred voltage is a special case of touch voltage whereby a voltage is either transferred to
the substation from a remote point or is transferred from the substation to the remote point (see
Figure 2). In that case, the touch voltage may be approaching the full EGVR.
Where voltage rises on the earthing system are transferred by metalwork such as neutral conductors
of a MEN system, water pipes, and the like to locations remote from the installation, allowance may
be made for voltage drop in these conductors. Otherwise, the transferred potential should be
regarded as being equal to the EGVR.
HV A.C.
Substation
Substation
Fence
VTransferred EGVR
V = EGVR
IF
Third Party Fence
Remote
Earth
RGrid
Figure 2: Example of Transferred Voltage

Voltages may also be transferred to third party plant and equipment via the potential rise in the
ground. Additional information on the transfer of hazardous voltages on third party assets is
provided in section 2.7.
Page 10
2.3.9
Hazards to equipment
While humans (and animals) are susceptible to electric current, plant and equipment are also
susceptible. Any plant such as data and communications cables and equipment may be severely
damaged by high voltage gradients appearing on the earthing systems during an earth fault.
Limits for equipment can vary significantly and it is difficult to provide specific values. Modern
telecommunications equipment (cordless telephones, facsimile machines, multiplex equipment) is
susceptible to damage from excessive voltage. Close liaison between the network operator and
third parties shall be undertaken at the early stages of any development or alterations to either
partys network.
2.4
EPR RISK MANAGEMENT

The occurrence of earth faults on power systems causing hazardous voltage differences and the
presence of human beings in simultaneous contact with these voltage differences are probabilistic in
nature.
The concept of electrical safety formulated by The Electricity Regulations is that, there is no
significant risk of injury or death to any person, or of damage to any person or property, as a result
of the use of the works, electrical installations, or associated equipment, or of the passage of
electricity through those works, electrical installations, fittings, electrical, electrical appliances, or
associated equipment as the case may be.
For a dangerous situation to arise, a power system earth fault must be coincident with a person
being at a location exposed to a consequential hazardous voltage. Fortunately few human electric
shock incidents have been recorded in these situations to date.
A low earth resistance is not always necessary to provide a safe earthing system. The earthing
system design is required to keep the voltage gradients across the earthing system under earth fault
conditions within safe levels to prevent danger to persons or equipment.
Traditionally, an earthing system with a low overall earth resistance was considered to be safe but
there is not a simple relationship between the resistance of the earthing system (e.g. "10 ") and the
magnitude of shock voltage that can arise in any particular situation. Appropriate analysis is
therefore required that takes into account all the necessary factors and includes risk assessment.
Earthing system design and testing can show the existence of possible hazardous voltages. The
risks associated with these hazardous voltages should be identified and evaluated against given
criteria to determine whether the risk needs to be mitigated.
To manage the risk from EPR events, either of the following two methods may be used:
(a) The Probabilistic Method; or
(b) The Deterministic Method.
In section 3, the risk management concepts are developed further.
2.5
ACCEPTABLE STEP AND TOUCH VOLTAGE LIMITS

The hazard to human beings is that a current will flow through the region of the heart that is
sufficient to cause the heart to go into ventricular fibrillation. The current limits, for power-frequency
purposes, are derived from an established international standard such as IEEE Std 80 or IEC
60479-1 (AS/NZS 60479.1).
The current limits need to be translated into voltage limits for comparison with the calculated step
and touch voltages, taking into account the impedance present in the body current path. The
voltage limits should take into account the following factors:
(a) The proportion of the human body current flowing through the region of the heart.
(b) The human body impedance for the current path.
(c) The contact resistance between the human body contact points and conductive surfaces in the
return path (e.g. soil (at remote earth potential), earth electrode).
Page 11
(d) The duration of the current flow through the human body.
2.6
CRITICAL DESIGN PARAMETERS
2.6.1
The following design parameters are critical as they form the basis for the calculations and
assumptions which define the earthing systems required at locations where mitigation is required to
achieve electrical safety.
(a) Design fault currents
(b) Design fault duration
(c) Site soil resistivity
2.6.2
Design fault current

Prior to carrying out any earthing grid design, it is necessary to accurately establish the realistic
earth return fault current.
Often only a small proportion of the prospective earth fault current may return via the earth grid
proper. In some cases, fault current is diverted from the grid via cable screens, overhead earth
wires or other bonded conductors such as pipelines. Some of the earth fault current may also
circulate within an earth grid and not contribute to the EGVR. Therefore, before calculating the
EGVR, touch voltages and step voltages, it is important to first calculate the realistic earth grid return
current.
2.6.3
Design fault duration

For the calculation of allowable step and touch voltages, primary protection clearing time shall be
used.
For thermal rating, guidelines are given in section 2.11.
2.6.4
Soil Resistivity
The soil resistivity can vary significantly with soil moisture content. This is an important aspect that
needs to be considered when designing earthing systems. From a protection point of view, earthing
systems should be designed based on the highest value of soil resistivity likely to be encountered on
the site. However, the effect of soil resistivity variation on step and touch voltages depends on many
factors and no simple guideline can be applied.
Data on soil resistivity variation with "seasons" is not available for New Zealand. In many areas of
New Zealand, where the soil moisture content is relatively constant due to regular rainfalls,
"seasonal" resistivity variation may not be significant. However, significant seasonal changes in soil
moisture content in other areas may result in significant soil resistivity variation and where possible,
these should be taken in consideration.
For areas where significant seasonal variation in soil moisture content is expected, a conservative
value of soil resistivity should be used for a design. For these situations, designs should check the
sensitivity of safety levels to soil resistivity variations.
The Wenner method is the most commonly used method to measure soil resistivity. It also has the
advantage of being one of the simplest methods to use and is recommended. The raw data
obtained from the soil resistivity measurements is difficult to interpret and is not very useful for the
design of earth electrodes. The data needs to be converted into a model which is representative of
the soil resistivity at the site. Computer software can be used for this purpose.
When conducting soil resistivity tests it is important to carry out enough measurements so that an
accurate soil resistivity model of the site can be derived. Measurements at a minimum number of 12
probe separations are recommended to ensure an accurate soil resistivity model can be derived.
The larger probe separations should be in proportion to the size of the earth electrode/grid.
The soil resistivity model will give an indication of the structure of the soil at the site. If lower soil
resistivity layers are evident from the model, then the use of deep driven rods may be considered.
Page 12
2.7
EPR VOLTAGES TRANSFERRED ONTO THIRD PARTY ASSETS

During a HV phase to earth fault at a HV earthing system including HV conductive pole and LV MEN
system that is bonded to the HV earthing system, the resultant EGVR on the HV earthing system
can present a hazard to third party network plant, customers and personnel, by either of the
following mechanisms:
2.7.1
Hazard from nearby HV Earthing Systems or HV Conductive Poles

Third party plant such as telecommunications network plant in the road reserve (e.g. buried cable,
pits, pillars, pedestals, joints, cross-connect cabinets, electronic cabinets) or railway signalling
circuits or pipelines all are effectively referenced to remote earth. This means that EPR in the
ground may stress the insulation of any adjacent telecommunications network plant, railway
signalling assets and pipeline protective coatings to the full value of that EPR.
2.7.2
Hazard arising from Common HV/LV Earthing Systems

When a HV phase to earth fault occurs at a distribution transformer which has a common HV/LV
earthing system, the resultant EGVR appears on both the distribution transformer HV earthing
system and on the neutral of the LV MEN system supplied by that transformer. This means the
earth potential in all buildings supplied by the distribution transformer will rise to the level of the HV
earthing system EGVR (minus a small amount of volt drop along the neutral). Any mains-powered
third party equipment in those building which is also connected to a remote earth will be stressed by
virtually the full EGVR.
The main category of third party mains-powered equipment affected in this way is
telecommunication equipment including equipment located in residential dwellings such as fax
machines, answer machines, cordless phones, and, most commonly, computer modems. This
equipment will be connected to a (remote) Telephone Exchange earth reference via the
telecommunications network copper cable pairs, and hence will be stressed by the EGVR on the LV
MEN system.
For limiting interference to telecommunication networks Electricity Regulation 58 deems EPR or
induced voltages not likely to be hazardous where they do not exceed:
650 Vrms for fault durations 0.5 s
430 Vrms for fault durations > 0.5 s
Additional information on EPR transfer to third party plant may be obtained from the following
publications:
(a) AS/NZS 4853:2000, Electrical hazards on metallic pipelines.
(b) AS/NZS 3835:2006, Earth potential rise Protection of telecommunication network users,
personnel and plant Parts 1 & 2.
2.8
TYPES OF EARTH ELECTRODES

Only the following types of earth electrodes may be used:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Vertical rods or pipes driven not less than 1.8m into the ground.
Horizontal grid or mesh.
Horizontal bare buried conductors.
Electrodes embedded in foundations.
Metal reinforcement in concrete or other earth conductors in concrete.
Page 13
Table 1: Brief Guide on Selecting Earthing Electrode Designs

Description
Simple driven rod
Array of driven rods, horizontal conductors or
rings
Interconnection of a number of separate
earthing systems
Buried grid of horizontal conductors with or
without driven rods.
Interconnection of any of the above with other
large conductive structures (dams, foundations)
Example
Domestic or light industrial MEN earths
Roadside ground or pole mounted distribution
transformers
Distribution and associated LV MEN systems
HV a.c. stations
Power station
The design of the electrode should take into consideration the type and moisture content of the soil.
The type and embedded depth of the earth electrodes should be such that soil drying and freezing
will not increase the earth resistance of the earth electrodes above the required value. Where
practicable, the earth electrodes should be embedded below permanent moisture level, except for
electrodes which are used for gradient control. Typically, in New Zealand, a burial depth of at least
500 mm for horizontal conductors is recommended to minimise the effects of changes in
temperature and soil moisture content. In many situations, this depth is also adequate to avoid
freezing of the soil surrounding the buried earth conductor. Greater burial depth should be
considered in areas where freezing can occur for a significant portion of the year. Such areas are
typically associated with higher ground.
The addition of driven rods to an HV a.c station earth grid usually has a small effect on the
impedance of the earth grid unless the driven rods reach lower soil layers with a reduced resistivity.
Driven rods should be separated by at least a distance equal to the length of the rods. Additional
rods enclosed within rows of other rods are ineffective in reducing the overall impedance.
2.9
MATERIALS OF EARTH ELECTRODES AND CORROSION CONSIDERATIONS

In areas where corrosion is likely to be severe, the electrodes should be of hard drawn copper,
copper clad or stainless steel, or other metal of such nature or so treated as to be not less resistant
to corrosion than hard drawn copper, or copper clad or stainless steel.
In areas where corrosion is not severe, galvanized or plain steel electrodes may be used.
Aluminium shall not used as a buried electrode.
Copper is by far the most common metal used for earthing systems. It has a high conductivity and
has the advantage that it does not generally suffer from corrosion problems. Copper clad or copper
bonded steel is usually used for driven rods. The minimum thickness of the copper coating/sleeve
shall be 250 m (micron) to minimise the risk of rapid corrosion of the copper bonded or copper clad
steel rods.
Unfortunately, copper is often responsible for causing galvanic corrosion of other metals such as
steel which are buried in the vicinity of copper.
Corrosion can have a significant impact on the integrity of both the buried electrode and the earthing
connections. The design, selection of materials, and construction of the earth electrodes shall take
into consideration the possible deterioration and increase of resistance due to corrosion over the
expected life of the installation.
There are many causes of corrosion of earthing conductors and rods which include the following:
(a) Uneven distribution of moisture in the vicinity of the electrode.
(b) The acidity and chemical content of the soil, as well as the presence of foreign materials
including cinders, scrap metal or organic material.
(c) The presence of stray electric current particularly d.c.
(d) The interconnection of dissimilar metals in the soil or above ground where moisture is present.
The latter is among the most common causes of corrosion of earth electrodes. For example, the
connection of copper electrodes to galvanised steel water pipes may cause rapid corrosion of the
water pipes.
Page 14
The resistivity of the soil, as an electrolyte, is an important factor associated with corrosion. Soils
having resistivities lower than approximately 15 -m are likely to cause severe corrosion. Corrosion
should be slight in soils having resistivities higher than approximately 200 -m.
The mitigation of corrosion is complex and it is not possible to lay down rigid rules for good practice.
If corrosion problems are encountered or are anticipated, these should be investigated on a case by
case basis.
In areas where a considerable quantity of buried galvanised steel or structural steel is present near a
copper earth electrode, stainless steel may be an attractive alternative to copper.
The use of concrete to encase the earth electrode may be used to mitigate corrosion. Conductive
concrete may also be used. Concrete encased galvanised steel electrodes and steel reinforced
foundations can be effective earth electrodes.
Connections which are above ground should be protected from moisture using a waterproof
compound. Copper earthing connections should also be tin plated before being protected from
moisture.
2.10
JOINTS OF EARTH ELECTRODES

All buried connections, crossings and joints of earth electrodes should be welded using suitable
exothermic products and moulds or by brazing. Compression or wedge type fittings may also be
used underground provided these have met the requirements of IEEE Std 837. Bolted connections
shall not be used underground.
Exothermic products used for welding earthing conductors shall comply with the requirements of
IEEE Std 837. Exothermic mixtures shall only be used with the manufacturer approved moulds.
Exothermic mixtures from a supplier shall not be used in conjunction moulds from a different
supplier.
Exothermic welding shall only be performed by operators who have been specifically trained by a
suitably qualified representative of the equipment supplier or any accredited training provider.
Operators who have not carried out exothermic welds in the last six months should attend a
training/refresher course before attempting to weld.
Brazed joints above or below ground are acceptable. It is recommended to provide additional
mechanical retention before brazing a joint. Mechanical retention shall be provided to ensure that
enough brazing material flows into the interface between the two metals to fill the gap.
2.11
CURRENT RATING OF CONDUCTORS AND JOINTS

The conductor used for earthing of primary plant must be rated to withstand short circuit currents
without damage or deterioration.
When selecting a fault clearing time to be used for rating buried earth conductors, the following
should be considered:
(a) All earthing conductors forming the station or distribution transformer earth electrodes shall
meet the requirements of IEEE Std 80 conductor sizing factors, and a factor of safety as per
section 11.3, of IEEE Std 80 in determining the conductor size. A factor of safety is required to
take into account the long duration these conductors are expected to be in service and relied
upon, and the corrosive nature of the ground soil in which they are installed.
(b) A long established New Zealand practice of rating buried conductors for 3 s for the expected
worst case short circuit current may be used as this is considered to meet the requirements of
IEEE Std 80. Alternatively, a lesser time than 3 s may be used, but only if two reasonably
independent protection systems (that is 100% redundancy) will ensure fault clearance occurs in
the lesser time, even if any one item of the protection systems fails to operate, and provided
that the requirements of (a) above are satisfied. Protection system include relays, CTs, VTs,
d.c. supplies, communications systems (where appropriate) and CBs.
Page 15
Note: The term reasonably independent secondary protection systems is not intended to imply a
requirement for primary equipment to be duplicated, and only applies to secondary equipment
including current transformer cores, relay and communication systems, and in combination with
a highly reliable/ duplicated secondary d.c. / a.c. power supplies.
Earthing conductors also need to be physically robust.
The buried earth conductors in an earth grid can be rated for lower fault currents, as the fault current
will disperse into the ground. Typically the buried conductors are rated for 70 % of the highest
prospective fault current. Additional information is given in section 5.
For conductor rating calculations, ambient temperatures of 20C should be used for buried
conductors and 30C for above ground conductors.
For bolted or compression joints, the maximum temperature which the earthing conductor shall be
allowed to reach is 250C. A maximum temperature of 400C is allowed for earthing conductors
which are welded or brazed.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the conductor ratings for various sized conductors and various fault
durations (i.e. 0.5 s to 3 s) for both bolted and welded connections.
Further details on conductor ratings can be obtained from IEEE Std 80.
50000
0.5 s
45000
40000
35000
Fault Current (A)
1.0 s
30000
25000
2.0 s
20000
3.0 s
15000
10000
5000
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Conductor Size (sq mm)
Figure 3: Copper Conductor Ratings for Bolted Connections (250C)
Page 16
50000
45000
0.5 s
40000
Fault Current (A)
35000
1.0 s
30000
25000
2.0 s
20000
15000
3.0 s
10000
5000
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Conductor Size (sq mm)
Figure 4: Copper Conductor Ratings for Welded Connections (400C)

2.12
HAZARD MITIGATION
Once hazards associated with an earthing system are identified, mitigation shall be considered.
Some typical mitigation options are summarised in Table 2. These are presented as a guide only. It
is important that local conditions and all alternative options are considered during the planning of risk
mitigation. Various mitigation options are discussed in more detail in section 4.
Table 2: Mitigation Options
Mitigation Options
Reduction in earthing
system resistance
Advantages
Can reduce EGVR and
associated touch and
step voltages.
Disadvantages
May require
extensive additional
earthing at significant
expense (Note 1).
Installation of
gradient control
conductors
NER
Easy to implement.
Can extend step

voltage hazards
further out.
Cost, although offset
by lower ratings for
cable sheaths.
Resonant earthing
(Petersen coils)
OHEW
Cable screen
bonding
Crushed rock
Asphalt
Limits earth fault

currents. Limits induced
voltage into
telecommunications
circuits.
Eliminates EPR
hazards. Improves
system reliability.
Can greatly reduce EPR
and induced voltages.
Can greatly reduce

EPRs and induced
voltages.
Can reduce touch and
step voltage hazards
significantly.
Can reduce touch and
step voltage hazards
significantly.
Cost.
Cost, additional pole
loading, may create
more frequent EPR
hazard around towers
or poles.
May transfer EPR to
other areas.
Not easy to specify
correctly and
installation requires
care.
Asphalt requires
integrity checks.
Comments
Often only effective if earth resistance is
reduced to at least 40-50 % of power system
source impedance. Should be investigated
at early stages to check viability. Can be
very effective in significant urban areas by
bonding neutrals from adjacent MEN
systems to create an extensive earthing
system.
Very effective. Practical in most situations.
Extensively used for HV a.c station earthing.
Usually very effective for zone substations.
Reduces the risks on distribution centres
especially when the NER impedance is high
relative to the distribution centre MEN earth
impedance.
Extensively and successfully used in
Europe. Significant system and operation
changes.
Can be very effective.
Can be very effective. Requires proper

analysis to confirm suitability.
Very effective especially for substation
earthing. Preferred method for substations.
Should be considered as part of substation
designs. May not be effective for lines 66 kV
and above.
Very effective especially for substation
earthing and lower voltage distribution
system. May not be effective for lines 66 kV
and above.
Page 17
Mitigation Options
Separation of HV and
LV earthing for
Distribution Centres
Advantages
Eliminate the hazards
for the LV installation
and for third party
services supplied to the
customer installation
TT System
Easy to implement.
Install physical
barriers or fences
Isolation
(telecommunications)
Low cost, suited to

smaller areas of
hazards.
Minimal cost provided
few conductors require
isolation.
Can offer significant risk
reductions even with
lower physical
protection.
Low cost where few
customers affected.
Reduce fault
clearance times
May be easy to
implement.
Isolation of specific
metallic conductors
such as fences
Alternative power or
telecommunications
route
Disadvantages
Sometimes difficult to
implement. Not
commonly used in NZ
at present. Provides
no protection from
HV line to LV line
contact
Not presently used in
NZ. Will require
special dispensation
from the Regulator.
Requires
maintenance.
Comments
Can be effective.
Maintaining the integrity of the separation
may be difficult to achieve in practice. The
integrity may be compromised by LV
electrode encroachment on the separation
distance and by connections to other LV
neutrals.
May be difficult to maintain the integrity of
the system. Other contractors who do not
know about the system may change it back
to a MEN system.
Very effective.
Requires regular
integrity checks.
Very effective. Must ensure all conductors

located.
May involve
additional planning
issues and costs.
Dependent upon risks associated with new

route. Should always be considered.
High cost where

many customers
affected.
May require
significant protection
review and upgrade.
Very effective.
Only likely to be useful if hazardous voltages
do not exceed tolerable levels significantly.
Note 1: Since this may push out any EPR contours, there is a greater chance of affecting third party plant (e.g.
telecommunications networks). This may also push touch and step hazards further out possibly into new more sensitive
areas (e.g. a childrens playground).
2.13
SWITCHGEAR OPERATING MECHANISMS

Operating handles of earth switches and disconnectors may be a significant source of EPR hazards
if the handles are not sufficiently earthed. The manual operation of an earth switch or disconnector
may cause hazardous currents to flow through the earth switch or disconnector operating
mechanism. Since this operation requires the presence of an operator near the structure, the
operator may be subjected to hazardous touch and step voltages.
For earth switches or disconnectors located within earth grids, it is relatively easy to protect the
operator against hazardous voltages. If the earth grid has been designed to be safe from touch and
step voltage hazards, there is no risk to the operator. However, the operator may still be in a
position to receive a significant non-fatal electric shock. For this reason, additional safety measures
are usually taken to further limit touch voltages for the operator. An equipotential zone is created for
the operator by providing an earth mat (operator mat) where the operator would be standing to
operate the switch or disconnector. The operator mat is bonded to the operating handle but is not
bonded directly to the earth grid. In addition, it is advantageous to bond the operating rod/shaft and
the mechanism box to the support stand or directly to the earth grid. The use of insulating gloves
may also be considered.
For earth switches or disconnectors on a distribution network, it is more difficult to protect the
operator against hazardous voltages. The installation of a buried gradient control conductor under
the area where the operator will be standing could be considered. Alternatively, a driven rod is
installed under the position where the operator will be standing. The buried gradient control
conductor or the driven rod shall be bonded to the earth switch mechanism. These measures will
help to mitigate touch voltages on the operating handles but in most cases are unlikely to be
enough. The use of insulating gloves is recommended.
2.14
SURGE ARRESTERS
Earthing requirements for surge protection is different to earthing requirements for the control of
EPR hazards. For surge protection especially from lightning, the inductance of an earthing
conductor can have a significant effect on the overvoltage seen by an item of equipment. Because
high frequencies are involved in a lightning surge, even a straight piece of earthing conductor can
have a significant inductance. Also, the distance between the equipment and surge arresters can
have a significant effect on the overvoltage at the equipment.
Page 18
Typically, surge arresters should be placed as close to the equipment as possible and should have
short connecting leads to the equipment and to the earth electrode. Surge arresters shall not be
earthed to an earth electrode which is separate from the equipment earth electrode.
For distribution centre transformers, the best protection levels are achieved when the surge
arresters are installed directly on the transformer tank. The earth path between the surge arresters
and the transformer tank is then minimised and the protection effectiveness of the surge arresters is
maximised. When this configuration is implemented, the fuses typically end up on the supply side of
surge arresters relative to the transformer. Lightning surge current discharged by the arrester
passes through the fuses and may result in nuisance operation of the fuses. The frequency of
nuisance failures is dependent on the type and rating of the fuses.
Surge arresters used for the protection of cable terminations should be earthed as directly as
possible to the cable screens and to an earth electrode.
The placement of surge arresters in HV a.c. stations is dependent on the presence of overhead
earth wires on the lines. If overhead earth wires are used on the lines, surge arresters may be
placed further from the equipment being protected provided the risk of backflashovers close to the
substation on the lines is adequate. An insulation coordination study is usually carried out to
strategically place surge arresters around the substation so that all or most of the equipment is
protected.
For HV a.c. stations where the lines do not have overhead earth wires, the risk of equipment failures
is typically higher. Surge arresters should then be placed as close as possible to the transformers
and protection of the other substation equipment can be achieved by the use of surge arresters at
the station entrances.
When surge arresters are installed on a steel structure and the structure is relied upon for the
earthing of the arresters i.e. a transformer tank, it is necessary to ensure that the cross sectional
area of the steel is adequate (steel is significantly less conductive than copper) and that a good
connection is achieved on the steel structure. Paint films and rust on the steel structure shall be
avoided.
2.15
STATION FENCING
During an EPR event at a substation surrounded by a metallic fence, touch voltage hazards on the
fence may be significant. Therefore, the earthing of the fence is very important since the public
generally has access to the fence.
The design of the substation earthing system shall investigate hazardous touch voltages on the
fence and the risk associated with these. There may also be step voltages outside the fence which
may be hazardous to the public.
The following options for earthing the fence should be reviewed as part of the design:
(a) The fence is bonded to the earth grid and is either located within the earth grid or outside the
earth grid.
(b) The fence is located outside the earth grid and may be either earthed to a separate earthing
conductor or earthed through the metallic support posts.
Typical practice in New Zealand has been option (a) above. The fence is bonded to the earth grid
and is either located within or outside the earth grid.
Mitigation of touch voltages on a fence typically involves one or a combination of the following
measures:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
The reduction the earth grid impedance.

The installation of a strip of crushed rock or asphalt outside the fence.
The use of gradient control conductors.
The use of non-conductive (e.g. timber) fences.
Page 19
Note that if a fence is located outside the earth grid and is bonded to the grid, then the addition of a
gradient control conductor outside the fence effectively means that the fence is contained within the
earth grid.
To mitigate touch voltage hazards on the fence the option of locating the fence outside the earth grid
may also be considered. This involves providing a separation distance between the fence and the
earth grid, and bonding the fence either to a separate earth conductor or relying on the fence
metallic supports for earthing. Touch voltage hazards are mitigated by placing the fence at or near
an EPR contour which would result in acceptable touch voltages on the fence. A gradient control
conductor located outside the fence and bonded to the fence can be added to limit touch voltages if
required.
For this option to work effectively, it is necessary to maintain the same separation distance between
the fence and the earth grid around the whole perimeter of the earth grid. Also, the following should
be considered:
(a) It is necessary to maintain the separation distance between the fence and the earth grid at all
times. The separation distance may be compromised by other services such as metallic water
pipes or by other earth conductors added at a later stage.
(b) The falling of an overhead live conductor on the line may cause additional hazards. The risk of
a live overhead conductor falling on a fence is considered low.
(c) Variation in the soil resistivity around the site may cause touch voltages to appear on the fence
at various locations. This issue cannot be predicted by modelling and can only be verified by
testing.
2.16
CONNECTION POINTS FOR TEMPORARY EARTHS

The provision of earthing points for the application of temporary earths inside HV a.c. stations shall
be considered as part of the earthing design. The earthing points should be positioned to ensure
that temporary earths can be safely applied to equipment.
The provision for temporary earthing on distribution networks is beyond the scope of this document.
Industry guidelines for temporary earthing on distribution networks exist and should be consulted.
2.17
EARTH ELECTRODE ENHANCEMENT

Methods of electrode enhancement include the encasement of the electrode in conducting
compounds and the chemical treatment of the soil surrounding the electrode. These methods may
be considered in certain circumstances as a possible solution to the problem of high electrode
resistance to earth. They may also be applied in areas where considerable variation of electrode
resistance is experienced due to seasonal climatic changes.
2.17.1 Conductive Concrete and Other Compounds

The use of conductive concrete and other compounds is a practical means of reducing the
resistance of earth electrodes. It can also result in electrode resistance values that are less
susceptible to fluctuation with temperature, humidity and soil moisture content than non-encased
electrodes. In some circumstances, it may be the only practical way of reducing the electrode
resistance to within acceptable limits.
2.17.2 Chemical Treatment
Chemical treatment of the soil surrounding an electrode should only be considered in exceptional
circumstances where no other practical solution exists, as the treatment requires regular
maintenance. Since there is a tendency for the applied salts to be washed away by rain, it is
necessary to reapply the treatment at regular intervals.
Chemicals should only be applied if these are approved for use by local authorities.
2.18
TESTING AND MAINTENANCE

Owners of works are required to take all practicable steps to maintain their earthing systems to meet
the requirements for safety and functional operation and shall establish and operate administrative
Page 20
systems (including records of checks undertaken) that provide periodic safety checks at reasonable
intervals appropriate to the operating environment and operational risks.
The asset owner should determine appropriate inspections and tests intervals based on its
knowledge of its earth electrodes installation and design standards, and on its understanding of
environmental conditions and assessment of risk eg soil conditions, theft of copper, etc.
The earth impedance of an earthing system should be determined by testing at the time of
installation to verify that the actual earth impedance is below its maximum desired value and also to
establish a benchmark against which later measurements can be compared.
Continuity tests carried out to verify the integrity of earthing connections between equipment and the
earth grid and between the earth grid and the system neutrals should test to a common reference
point (or several common reference points depending on the size of the substation) using a microohmmeter. A maximum resistance of approximately 10 m per bond test should be obtained.
When work has taken place that may have interfered with the earthing system, the system in that
area shall be inspected and checked. All parts of the earthing system exposed by excavation should
be inspected for damage or deterioration.
Where there is any probability of significant corrosion of the buried earth grid, more frequent
inspections of the earth grid and connections shall be carried out and replacements made where
necessary.
To enable the integrity of the earthing installation over a long period of time and its suitability for
present fault levels to be assessed the following records shall be maintained:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Initial design calculations where applicable.

Results of periodic inspections and measurements.
Updating of fault level.
Drawings showing the earth electrode layout including location and size of all earth conductors
and driven rods, and the location of all grid connections and/or joints.
Additional guidelines are provided in sections 5, 6 and 7.
Page 21
SECTION 3 EPR RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk management is an internationally recognized tool used when designing systems and
processes. New Zealand Electricity Regulations reflect an outcome-based approach to EPR safety
involving risk management instead of requiring certain prescriptive criteria to be met as in the
Deterministic Method. This enables Network Companies to design systems based on optimising
costs but at the same time minimizing risks to the public.
To manage the risk from EPR events, either of the following two methods may be used:
(a) The Probabilistic Method
(b) The Deterministic Method
The Probabilistic Method identifies the types and extent of the region or area where an individual or
a group of individuals is potentially at risk. It then evaluates the likelihood of a hazard event
occurring when an individual or group of individuals is present.
The Probabilistic Method is suitable as a general approach and may be applied to any locations. It
is especially suitable for locations where hazard events are relatively rare and or where exposure
would be typically very short.
The Deterministic Method determines if hazardous step and touch voltages are present on the basis
of internationally acceptable limits of body currents. Probabilities of exposure to the hazard and of
the hazard occurring are not calculated. The method proceeds with the design of the earthing
system to ensure calculated body currents are reduced to acceptable limits.
The Deterministic Method has been adopted for controlled areas, such as substations, where faults
are relatively frequent. It is also adopted elsewhere as a threshold beyond which harm is
exceedingly unlikely to occur.
A.
PROBABILISTIC METHOD
During earth faults on HV network assets, there may be some areas or zones on or around the
structures where hazardous step and touch voltages occur. The risk associated with these
hazardous voltages must be managed. This may require a change in design to eliminate or reduce
the risk where required or in cases where the risk of harm is already acceptably low, no further
action is required.
The Probabilistic Method is an earthing system design process whereby the risk associated with
hazardous voltages is identified and evaluated against given criteria to determine whether the risk
needs to be mitigated.
This method is comprehensively described in the EEA Guide to Risk Based Earthing System
Design, and so here we will limit our account to its key principles.
The Probabilistic Method essentially consists of the following main elements:
Probability of
Presence in
Hazard Area
Probability of
Fault Event
Evaluate Pe
Probability of Ventricular
Fibrillation
Assume Pvf = 100%
Probability Indicator of
Fatality
Evaluate
& mitigate if required
The probabilistic approach used in this guide assumes that should a fault occur while a person is
located in a hazard area that:
(a) The person simultaneously makes electrical contact with the hazard.
(b) The contact resistance surfaces external to the person are conductive, that is typically the
ground conditions are damp, and the other point of contact is fully conducting, that is treated as
metallic or having no resistance.
(c) That the clothing and footwear of the person, age weight and condition are such that fatal
fibrillation will occur.
Page 22
The method then proceeds to evaluate the level of risk of death based on the above assumptions.
The risk associated with power system earth faults is dependent on two factors:
(a) The probability that a person may be exposed to a potentially hazardous voltage.
(b) The consequences of exposure to that hazardous voltage.
In the context of this guide, risk is therefore defined as:
Risk
The combination of the frequency or probability of a specified hazard occurring and the
associated consequence of that event
The risk assessment requires the frequency of earth faults to be estimated for a particular structure
or group of structures, and also requires estimation of the level of exposure individuals may have to
the hazards associated with these faults.
As only limited recorded data may be available for specific structures the assessment may need to
be based on records of typical fault statistics for similar assets. It may also require the type of land
use to be categorised and typical exposure levels to be applied.
The risk management process in the context of this guide is divided into the following steps:
Step 1
Collect basic data: earth fault current, fault clearing time, soil resistivity and probability of
earth fault occurring. Consider the effects that EPR transfer may have on all nearby third
party plant.
Step 2 Determine the minimum earthing system that could meet the functional requirements.
Detailed design is necessary to ensure that all exposed conductive parts, are earthed.
Extraneous conductive parts shall be earthed if appropriate. Any structural earth
electrodes associated with the installation should be bonded and form part of the earthing
system. If not bonded, it is necessary to verify that all appropriate safety requirements are
met.
Step 3 Determine the extent of the earthing system under consideration. Determine whether
adequate safety can be achieved by interconnection with other HV or LV systems earth
electrodes (i.e. by creating a large earthing system with a low resulting EGVR).
Step 4 Based on soil characteristics and the likely proportion of total earth fault currents flowing
into the local earthing system (see section 2.6), determine the maximum EGVR.
Step 5 Based on the earth fault clearing time and the top soil layer resistivity determine the
tolerable step and touch voltages as detailed in sections 3.7 and 3.8. Tolerable step and
touch voltage curves have been determined for various soil resistivities and for asphalt and
crushed rock. Additional tolerable limits may be determined as required following the
procedure detailed in Appendix A. The tolerable voltage limits may be used as means of
compliance as per Step 6 and Step 8 below.
Step 6 If the EGVR is below the tolerable step and touch voltages, the design is basically
completed and can proceed from Step 11.
Step 7 If not, determine actual step and touch voltages inside and in the vicinity of the earthing
system
Step 8 If the actual step and touch voltages are below the tolerable limits, the design is basically
completed. Proceed to Step 11.
Step 9 If not, assess the risk.
Step 10 If required, improve the design and identify and implement appropriate risk treatment
measures and then re-calculate the residual risk level following treatment. Typical
mitigation measures are discussed in section 4.
Step 11 Check on other requirements:
Determine if low voltage equipment is exposed to excessive stress voltage. If this is the
case, proceed with mitigation measures, which can include separation of HV and LV
earthing systems.
Assess and manage any inductive and conductive (EPR transfer) interference with third
party plant and personnel (e.g. telecommunications, pipelines, rail). Apply risk
assessment and treatment as required.
Page 23
Step 12 Consider the need to implement any particular precautions against lightning and other
transients.
Step 13 The design can be refined, if necessary, by repeating the above steps.
Step 14 Provide installation support as necessary to ensure the design requirements are fulfilled
and staff safety risk is effectively managed.
Step 15 Review the installation for physical and safety compliance following the commissioning
programme.
Step 16 Documentation of the earthing system design should include a physical installation
description (e.g. drawing), as well as details of the electrical assumptions, design
decisions, any risk analysis (context, assumptions, methodology, risk control options
adopted, etc.), commissioning data and supervision and maintenance requirements.
In the following sections, a brief outline of the Probabilistic Method is provided and the explanations
are limited to a simple case (base line case). This brief outline is by no means comprehensive and
before applying the risk assessment process, it is essential to be familiar with the details of the risk
assessment process which is contained in the EEA Guide to Risk Based Earthing System Design.
3.1
RISK IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS

All life has an associated level of risk however the nature of that risk is a significant factor in the
tolerance of society to it. The identification of the risk may be categorised according to the
consequence (shock, injury or fatality), whether the individual has a choice (voluntary or involuntary)
or whether multiple individuals are exposed to the hazard.
3.1.1
Identification of Voluntary and Involuntary Risk

Society allows little tolerance for involuntary risks associated with hazards for which there is no
escape, no warning and no opportunity for individual judgement. Public exposure to EPR events is
classified as involuntary risk.
Voluntary risk associated with activities for which individuals have control over the outcome (e.g.
smoking or not following correct maintenance procedures) are more tolerable as individuals may
choose to avoid exposure to the associated hazards. In such cases the occurrence of a hazard is
therefore often related to the exposure of the individual(s) who caused the hazard and risk analysis
can be complex. Thus, voluntary risk and risk to maintenance personnel who may be involved in
activities which may cause the hazard will not be included in the following summary of risk
assessment.
3.1.2
Individual and Societal Risk

The risk associated with a hazard may be classified according to the type and number of people
which that hazard may affect. The individual risk represents the acceptable risk to an individual,
while the societal risk represents the acceptable risk to single or multiple individuals of sensitive
members of society to whom injury or fatality may result in a widespread adverse social response
(e.g. a class of school children).
3.1.3
Quantitative Risk Analysis

A quantitative value may be determined which is proportional to the probability of individual
exposure when an earth fault occurs. The example given below is valid provided the following
conditions are applicable to the situation under review:
(a) The occurrence of earth faults is random.
(b) Earth faults are equally likely to occur independent of season or time of day.
(c) Earth faults are independent of exposure (exposed individuals do not cause faults and faults do
not cause individuals to become exposed).
(d) The length of an earth fault is considerably less than the average length of exposure.
For situations where one or more of the above conditions are not applicable, a more detailed risk
assessment shall be carried out as described in the EEA Guide to Risk Based Earthing Design.
Page 24
The probability that a dangerous event may occur may be calculated using an Exposure factor (Ef)
and an Earth Fault Frequency Factor (Ff).
The exposure factor represents the annual exposure of an individual to a hazard:
Ef =
Total duration of exposure per year (in hours)

Number of hours in a year
The earth fault frequency factor (Ff) represents the earth fault frequency:
Ff = Average number of hazardous EPR events per year
The probability P that the specified hazard event occurs when an individual is exposed to that
hazard.
P = Ef Ff
The societal risk is represented by the equivalent number of people N and accounts for the reduction
in tolerance for injury or fatality to large numbers of people. If n people are present in the hazard
area at any given time then the equivalent number of people is:
for n < 4
n
N= 2
n n for n 4
The scaling factor N may be used to calculate an equivalent probability Pe which is equivalent to the
individual risk probability after the adjustment N for societal tolerance has been introduced.
Pe = N Ef Ff
3.2
RISK EVALUATION CRITERIA

The calculated equivalent probability may be assessed according to the risk management matrix of
Table 3 to determine a qualitative estimate of the risk associated with a hazard.
Table 3: Risk Management Matrix
Equivalent
Probability
(per annum)
> 10
-4
-4
10 -10
<10
-6
-6
Risk Classification for

Individual Death
Resulting Implication for

Hazard Mitigation
High
Intolerable
Must prevent occurrence regardless of costs.
Intermediate
ALARP for Intermediate Risk

Must minimise occurrence unless risk reduction is impractical
and costs are grossly disproportionate to safety gained.
Low
ALARP for Low Risk

Minimise occurrence if reasonably practical and cost of
reduction is reasonable given project costs.
Risk analysis must always be applied with caution and wisdom. Risk analysis cases, which do not
prove straightforward or which give results that are significantly different from the standard solutions,
should be peer reviewed by a professional expert in safety related risk analysis.
3.2.1
The ALARP Principle

The As-Low-As-Reasonably-Practicable (ALARP) Principle is an internationally recognised tool for
the evaluation of risk. It offers an appropriate method for the evaluation of risks associated with
earthing hazards.
The ALARP region represents the limits in which the risk should be lowered to levels as low as is
reasonably practical and where some trade off between risk and the relative benefit may be
appropriate.
Page 25
This ALARP region is sub-divided into two areas. For the higher area the risk must be minimised if it
is reasonably practicable to do so and costs are not grossly disproportionate to safety gained.
This level of risk is described as Intermediate. For the lower area, the risk is termed Low and should
be minimised if it is reasonably practical to do so and if the cost of reduction is reasonable given the
project costs. Within the ALARP region, cost-benefit type analysis may be used to determine the
appropriate level of resources that should be allocated to reducing the risk associated with the
earthing system. Thus the ALARP principle allows cost to be taken into account in determining how
far to go in the pursuit of safety, so that if a risk reduction measure involves "grossly
disproportionate" cost, it is not "reasonably practicable".
3.3
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION

Cost benefit analyses can be applied to assess the cost of public deaths. In some cases it may also
be prudent to include indirect as well as direct costs in a cost benefit analysis. These indirect costs
may include legal costs and less tangible items like cost to reputation and corporate public image.
Where risk has been deemed to be intermediate then it is appropriate to carry out a cost benefit
analysis (CBA) to establish the relative cost of risk treatment or the value of the risk reduction
options. In the low risk case a CBA will also help establish whether any possible risk treatment
option is cost effective. In the case of human safety, to carry out such an analysis, it is necessary to
use a value of life figure normally referred to as the Value of Statistical Life (VoSL).
Various studies of VoSL carried out around the world [1], [2] show that values varying between
approximately $2 million and $20 million have been used in various countries including Australia and
New Zealand. Abelson [3] stated that given research findings as a whole and values employed in
Europe, $3 million to $4 million would appear to be a plausible VoSL for a healthy prime age
individual in Australia at present. In New Zealand, the Ministry of Transport uses a VoSL of $3.2
million. This value has been used by the Ministry in all safety evaluations across all three transport
modes (road, maritime and aviation), as decided by the Government in 1991 (NZ Gazette notice
4983).
The selection of a VoSL for carrying out CBAs when evaluating EPR risks need to account for the
following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
The publics expectation that power systems are safe provided they are not tampered with.
The possibility that those at risk may be vulnerable (young, old, infirm).
The involuntary nature of the risk to the public.
The utilitys image and reputation.
For the purpose of this guide, a VoSL of $10 million has been used.
For example, if the equivalent probability Pe has been calculated as 10-5, then the risk level is
Intermediate. This means that a cost benefit analysis should be done to determine if it is cost
effective to implement risk treatment measures. This equivalent probability is equivalent to one
individual fatality per 100,000 years (= Pe-1) and since the VoSL is $10,000,000, over a period of
100,000 years the liability per year is:
L=
VoSL
Pe1
= VoSL x Pe
= $10,000,000 x 1 x 10 5 = $100 per year
Where:
L
= Asset owners liability per year (dollars).
The present value of risk treatment can be calculated using the remaining lifespan of the asset, the
liability per year and the expected rate of interest on an alternative investment (discount rate). The
present value (PV) figure calculated is considered a positive return as the investment into the
elimination of hazards will result in a reduction of the liability equal to the PV.
Page 26
PV = L
i =1(1 + D)
L 1
1
D 1+ D
Where:
PV
L
D
Y
= Present value (dollars).

= The asset owners liability per year (dollars).
= Discount rate (fractional rate of interest).
= Number of years which the asset will remain potentially hazardous (years).
If a discount rate of 0.04 (4%) is used then the present value of the reduction in liability can be
calculated as approximately $2,148 for a remaining asset lifetime of 50 years. A discount rate of 4%
is used in this context as a conservative representation of the interest on the opportunity cost
investment. The choice of discount rate has a significant effect on the PV calculated and should be
chosen carefully [5].
The PV is used to provide a guide as to the appropriate level of expenditure that should be used
when determining whether risk treatment is a cost effective option. The PV is compared to risk
treatment costs to ensure that costs are not grossly disproportionate to the reduction in liability.
In this case, comparing this figure to the costs of risk treatment (say $5,000), it appears that the
implementation of treatment is not cost effective. However, as this Pe equates to an intermediate
risk, the cost is clearly not grossly disproportionate and so risk treatment should be applied.
In certain situations the implementation of a risk treatment option may not entirely eliminate the
probability of fatality, but merely reduce the probability to a lower value. A cost benefit analysis may
be applied using the amount by which the probability has been reduced to determine whether the
risk treatment option is worthwhile.
It should also be borne in mind that, even for low risk situations where CBA indicates risk treatment
is not required, a continuous monitoring and review process still needs to be carried out to ensure
that the overall risk level remains within the low risk region. In the case of high cost projects it may
be argued that relatively low cost risk treatment is always to be incorporated as this is the
precautionary approach.
Page 27
3.4
PROBABILISTIC RISK MANAGEMENT FLOWCHART

A risk management process is shown in the flowchart of Figure 5.
Step 1: Collect basic data
Earth fault current, fault clearing time, soil resistivity and probability of earth fault occurring.
Consider EPR transfer effects on nearby third party plant.
Step 2: Minimum design to meet functional requirements
Step 3: Determine whether adequate safety can be achieved by
interconnection via either the primary or secondary supply systems
Step 4: Calculate maximum earth grid voltage rise (EGVR)
Step 5: Determine step and touch voltage limits (refer Figure 6)
Step 6: EGVR step and

touch voltage limits?
Yes
No
Step 7: Determine actual step and touch voltages
Step 8: Actual step and

touch voltages step and
touch voltage limits?
Step 9: Risk Assessment
Yes
No
Identify the risk by identifying all hazards and extent of hazard

zones. This is achieved by comparing voltage limits (derived
in 3.7 and 3.8) with calculated or measured voltages.
Estimate people exposure to the hazards. Carry out
sensitivity analysis where required.
Assess the risk associated with a structure or group of
structures where appropriate.
Assess according to risk matrix.
Risk outcome
High
Intermediate
Low
Carry out Cost Benefit Analysis
Step 10:
Improvement of
design.
Apply risk
treatment options
Is risk reduction
impractical and
costs grossly
disproportionate
to safety gained?
No
Step 14: Construction

support
Yes
Risk generally acceptable
(see NOTE)
Step 15: Commissioning

programme and safety
compliance review
Step 11: Check on other requirements:

Inductive and conductive (EPR transfer)
interference. Apply risk treatment and
mitigation as required.
Check interconnection of HV and LV earthing
systems.
Step 16: Documentation

Details of:
design
risk analysis (context,
assumptions, methodology and
results)
risk control options applied
Step 12: Lightning and transient design considerations
No
Step 13: Requirements

are fulfilled?
Yes
Design complete
Figure 5: Risk Management Process

NOTE: For Low risk category, the risk is generally acceptable. However, risk treatment should be applied if the cost of the
risk treatment was small compared to the overall project cost. A cost benefit analysis may be required to assess the cost of
the risk treatment against the overall project cost.
Page 28
3.5
PERMISSIBLE STEP AND TOUCH VOLTAGE LIMITS

The hazard to human beings is that a current will flow through the region of the heart which is
sufficient to cause ventricular fibrillation. Permissible current limits may be derived from either IEC
60479-1 or IEEE Std 80. IEC 60479-1 curve c2 is the appropriate curve to be used for this purpose.
For earthing system design, current limits need to be translated into voltage limits for comparison
with the calculated step and touch voltages taking into account the impedance present in the body
current path.
For the purpose of applying the Deterministic Method or the Probabilistic Method, step and touch
voltage limits shall be derived based on the following criteria:
(a) The proportion of current flowing through the region of the heart.
(b) The body impedance along the current path. For voltage limits derived using IEEE Std 80
current limits, a fixed body impedance of 1,000 is used. For voltage limits derived from
IEC 60479 curve c2, the IEC 60479 50% body impedances are used.
(c) The applicable series resistance such as between the body contact points and the soil or
protective equipment such as shoes.
(d) The fault duration.
The sequence to be followed to determine the voltage limits is shown in Figure 6.
Determine applicable tolerable body
current limits
IEC604791:2005 Figure 20 curve c2
or
IEEE Std 80 formulas
Appropriate body impedance

IEC 60479-1 50% curve values
depend on voltage
or
IEEE Std 80 - fixed at 1,000
Appropriate heart current factor

depending of body current path
IEC 60479-1:2005, Table 12
(not applicable for limits based on IEEE
Std 80)
Add
foot-to-soil series impedance
and
shoe series impedance
if applicable
Permissible body current
Total circuit impedance
Calculate permissible step and touch

voltage limits across body contact
points
Permissible step or touch voltage limits

to compare against the calculated or
measured step or touch voltages
Figure 6: Method for Calculating Step and Touch Voltage Limits

Details of the method for calculating step and touch voltage limits are shown Appendix A.
Page 29
B.
DETERMINISTIC METHOD
The Deterministic Method consists of meeting safety criteria based on internationally acceptable
levels of risk. Design of earthing systems based on these safety criteria can be carried out where it
is not desirable to carry out a full risk assessment. In this process, the safety criteria are acceptable
step and touch voltage limits which may be applied to various situations and depends on the broad
risk associated with these situations. Two typical locations, Special Locations and Normal
Locations, were defined to represent broad risk categories and are detailed in section 3.6.
The Deterministic Method is typically used for HV transmission substation and distribution zone
substations where it is considered that any exposure to calculated body currents above appropriate
levels selected from international standards such as IEEE Std 80, or the IEC 60479 are
unacceptable. That is the Deterministic Method is used in situations where it is considered there are
both high contact voltage hazards and high fault frequency rates that electrical workers in these
environments can be exposed to. IEEE Std 80 sets the industry bench mark for the practices
applied to these kinds of locations.
The Deterministic Method may also be applied to distribution centres and distribution equipment
especially to those where a high public exposure can be expected.
The practice of classifying locations, into Normal Locations, and Special Locations, where there can
be very high exposure levels, provides a basis for mitigating around the perimeter of HV
transmission substations and zone substations. In these situations empirical formula may used to
mitigate the hazards to acceptable levels. Alternatively, the Probabilistic Method may also be used.
If the deterministic criteria are satisfied in areas accessible to the public then no further measures/
mitigation is required. It is only where the deterministic criteria are exceeded in such areas that the
more onerous probabilistic approach may be required.
Step and touch voltage limits are derived from the current limits of IEC 60479-1 or IEEE Std 80 as
detailed in section 3.5 and Appendix A. Earthing systems are designed to ensure that step and
touch voltages do not exceed these limits. The design process is illustrated in Figure 7.
Page 30
Basic data
Earth fault current, fault clearing time and soil resistivity
Determination of step and touch voltage limits

Refer section 3.5
Determination of earth grid voltage rise (EGVR)
EGVR step and

touch voltage
limits?
Yes
No
Determination of actual step and
touch voltages
Actual step and

touch voltages
step and touch
voltage limits?
No
Yes
Construction support
Check transferred EPR into third party
networks, fences, etc
Lightning and transient design considerations
Requirements
fulfilled?
Yes
Commissioning
programme and safety
compliance review
Documentation
Design details
assumptions
drawings
No
Improve design.
Design complete
Figure 7: Risk Management Process

IEEE Std 80 limits are typically used for evaluating EPR safety associated with HV a.c. stations and
are not covered further in the following sections since the derivation of limits from IEEE Std 80 is
relatively simple being based on formulae. For HV a.c. stations, impedances of shoes and gloves
have historically not been considered when assessing EPR safety for HV a.c. stations. This
approach has provided some conservatism to the designs. Additional information on the use of
IEEE Std 80 for HV a.c stations is given in section 5. More information about the IEEE Std 80 safety
limits may be obtained directly from the standard.
Step and touch voltage limits have been derived from the current limits of IEC 60479-1 and are
presented in sections 3.7 and 3.8.
3.6
EXPOSURE DEFINITIONS
3.6.1
Special Location
A Special Location is defined as any area where a significant gathering of people may occur in
particularly situations and/or where people may not be wearing footwear.
Special Locations could be found in areas such as within a schools grounds or within a childrens
playground, or within a public swimming pool area, or at a popularly used beach or water recreation
area, or in a public thoroughfare.
Special Locations can either be in urban or rural areas.
Page 31
3.6.2
Normal Location
A Normal Location is defined as any urban or rural area other than a Special Location.
3.7
PERMISSIBLE TOUCH VOLTAGES

Using the method detailed in Appendix A, touch voltage curves based on IEC 60479-1:2005 have
been calculated below for Special and Normal Locations. The calculations of touch voltages using
IEEE Std 80 current limits is easily achieved using equations as detailed in Appendix A and has not
been carried out in this section.
IEC 60479-1:2005 contains body impedance data for dry, water-wet and saltwater-wet conditions
and also for three surface areas of contact. For the purposes of this document, the body
impedances for dry and water-wet conditions and for the large contact surface area are considered
appropriate. However, the data for dry and water-wet conditions are very similar especially for fault
durations below 1.5 s. Therefore, as a simplification, only the slightly conservative data for the
water-wet conditions have been used.
3.7.1
Special Location
Acceptable touch voltage limits have been developed for use in Special Locations assuming the
following:
(a) Bare hands.
(b) One-hand-to-feet current path.
(c) The 50% human body impedance value in IEC 60479-1:2005, for the given voltage applied
across the body. (This human body impedance value is exceeded by 50% of the population.)
(d) Human body current derived from the 5% probability of ventricular fibrillation curve (IEC 604791:2005 curve c2, for the left hand-to-foot current path), for the appropriate maximum fault
duration.
(e) Additional contact impedance with the ground.
(f) Bare feet.
Typical permissible touch voltage curves in Figure 8 have been developed for use in Special
Locations. The curves apply for contact impedance with various soil resistivities between 50 -m
and 1,000 -m or contact impedance for crushed rock or asphalt. Shoe impedance shall not be
considered for Special Locations.
Permissible prospective touch voltage limits (V)
100,000
10,000
Asphalt
Crushed rock
1000 -m
500 -m
1,000
200 -m
50 -m
100
10
10
100
1,000
10,000
Fault duration (ms)
Page 32
Figure 8: Touch Voltage Limits for Special Locations excluding Shoe Resistance
NOTE 1:
For the curves in Figure 8 a resistivity value of 5,000 -m has been used for crushed rock and 15,000 -m for
asphalt.
The dashed section of the asphalt curves in Figure 8 indicates voltage limits for which the withstand voltage of the
asphalt layer may be exceeded (see section 4.7).
NOTE 2:
3.7.2
Normal Location
Acceptable touch voltage limits have been developed for use in various Normal Locations assuming
the following:
(a) Bare hands.
(b) One-hand-to-feet current path.
(c) The 50% human body impedance value in IEC 60479-1, for the given voltage applied across
the body. (This human body impedance value is exceeded by 50% of the population.)
(d) Human body current derived from the 5% probability of ventricular fibrillation curve (IEC 604791 curve c2, for the left hand-to-foot current path), for the appropriate maximum fault duration.
(f) Impedance of 2,000 per shoe.
Typical permissible touch voltage curves in Figure 9 have been developed for use in Normal
and 1,000 -m or contact impedance for crushed rock or asphalt.
Permissible prospective touch voltage limits (V)
100,000
Asphalt
10,000
Crushed rock
1000 -m
500 -m
1,000
200 -m
50 -m
100
10
10
100
1,000
10,000
Fault duration (ms)
Figure 9: Touch Voltage Limits for Normal Locations including 2,000 Shoes
NOTE 1:
NOTE 2:
3.8
For the curves in Figure 9 a resistivity value of 5,000 -m has been used for crushed rock and 15,000 -m for
asphalt.
The dashed section of the asphalt curves in Figure 9 indicates voltage limits for which the withstand voltage of the
asphalt layer may be exceeded (see section 4.7).
PERMISSIBLE STEP VOLTAGES

Using the method detailed in Appendix A, step voltage curves based on IEC 60479-1:2005 have
been calculated below for Special and Normal Locations. The calculations of touch voltages using
IEEE Std 80 current limits is easily achieved using equations as detailed in Appendix A and has not
been carried out in this section.
Page 33
IEC 60479-1:2005 contains body impedance data for dry, water-wet and saltwater-wet conditions
and also for three surface areas of contact. For the purposes of this document, the body
impedances for dry and water-wet conditions and for the large surface area of contact are
considered appropriate. However, the data for dry and water-wet conditions are very similar
especially for fault durations below 1.5 s. Therefore, as a simplification, only the slightly
conservative data for the water-wet conditions have been used.
The heart-current factor defined in IEC 60479 permits the calculation of currents through paths other
than left hand to feet which represent the same danger of ventricular fibrillation as that
corresponding to the body current curves c1, c2 and c3. AS/NZS 60479:1-2002 standard which is
based on IEC 60479-1:1991 did not include a heart-current factor for the foot-to-foot path.
Historically, the heart-current factor for the foot-to-foot path has been taken as one which is
conservative. In the IEC 60479-1:2005 standard, a heart-current factor of 0.04 has been introduced
for the foot-to-foot path. This implies that 25 times more current flowing through the foot-to-foot path
is required to create the same risk of ventricular fibrillation compared to the current flowing in the
left-hand-to-feet path. For example, a current of 2,000 mA from foot to foot has the same likelihood
of producing ventricular fibrillation as a current of 80 mA from left hand to both feet. The heartcurrent factor of 0.04 has been used in this Guide for calculating permissible prospective step
voltage limits (refer to Appendix A4).
3.8.1
Special Location
Acceptable step voltage limits have been developed for use in Special Locations assuming the
following:
(a) Foot-to-foot current path.
(b) The 50% human body impedance value in IEC 60479-1, for the given voltage applied across
the body. (This human body impedance value is exceeded by 50% of the population.)
(c) Human body current derived from the 5% probability of ventricular fibrillation curve (IEC 604791 curve c2, for the left hand-to-foot current path), for the appropriate maximum fault duration.
(d) Additional contact impedance with the ground.
(e) Bare feet.
Typical permissible touch voltage curves in Figure 10 have been developed for use in Special
and 1,000 -m or contact impedance for crushed rock or asphalt. Shoe impedance shall not be
considered for Special Locations.
Permissible prospective step voltage limits (V)
10,000,000
1,000,000
Asphalt
Crushed rock
1000 -m
100,000
500 -m
200 -m
50 -m
10,000
1,000
10
100
1,000
10,000
Fault duration (ms)
Figure 10: Step Voltage Limits for Special Locations excluding Shoe Resistance
Page 34
NOTE 1: For the curves in Figure 10, a resistivity value of 5,000 -m has been used for crushed rock and 15,000 -m for
asphalt.
NOTE 2: The dashed asphalt curve in Figure 10 indicates voltage limits for which the withstand voltage of the asphalt layer
may be exceeded (see section 4.7). Therefore the asphalt layer should be ignored in this case.
3.8.2
Normal Location
Acceptable step voltage limits have been developed for use in various Normal Locations assuming
the following:
(a) Bare hands.
(b) Foot-to-foot current path.
(c) The 50% human body impedance value in IEC 60479-1:2005, for the given voltage applied
across the body. (This human body impedance value is exceeded by 50% of the population.)
(d) Human body current derived from the 5% probability of ventricular fibrillation curve (IEC 604791:2005 curve c2, for the left hand-to-foot current path), for the appropriate maximum fault
duration.
(f) Impedance of 2,000 for a single shoe.
Typical permissible touch voltage curves in Figure 11 have been developed for use in Normal
and 1,000 -m or contact impedance for crushed rock or asphalt.
The prospective tolerable step voltage limits are very high especially for the shorter earth fault
durations and may be well in excess of the withstand voltages for asphalt, shoes and crushed rock.
Very high tolerable step voltages should be applied with care and due consideration given to the
withstand voltages involved. For this reason, it is recommended that footwear impedance should be
ignored when assessing step voltages and that only the prospective tolerable limit curves from
Figure 10 should be applied. Also, the additional series impedance provided by asphalt should be
ignored.
Permissible prospective step voltage limits (V)
10,000,000
Asphalt
1,000,000
Crushed rock
1000 -m
500 -m
100,000
200 -m
50 -m
10,000
1,000
10
100
1,000
10,000
Fault duration (ms)
Figure 11: Step Voltage Limits for Normal Locations including 2,000 Shoes
NOTE 1: For the curves in Figure 11, a resistivity value of 5,000 -m has been used for crushed rock and 15,000 -m for
asphalt.
NOTE 2: The dashed asphalt curve in Figure 11 indicates voltage limits for which the withstand voltage of shoes and asphalt
may be exceeded (see section 4.7). Therefore the asphalt layer should be ignored in this case.
Page 35
3.9
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
The Value of Life and Health for Public Policy, Peter Abelson, Macquarie University,
Economic Record Conference Edition, Vol. 79, pp. 2-13, June 2003.
The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the
World, Viscusi and Aldy, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and
Business Discussion Paper Series 2002.
Establishing a Monetary Value for Lives Saved: Issues and Controversies, Peter Abelson,
Sydney University, Cost-Benefit Conference, Office of Best Practice Regulation, Canberra,
November 2007.
The Social Cost of Road Crashes and Injuries: June 2007 update, Ministry of Transport,
New Zealand.
The shadow of the future: Discount rates, later generations, and the environment, Farber,
Hemmersbaugh, Vanderbilt Law Review 46: 267-304, 1993.
Page 36
SECTION 4 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES

In this section, measures which can be used to mitigate the risk of injury or death to people arising
from EPR events on power systems are presented. Most of the mitigation measures are concerned
with reducing the hazards.
4.1
EARTHING SYSTEM IMPEDANCE REDUCTION

Reduction in the impedance of an earthing system can be effective in reducing the EPR hazards.
However, since the fault current usually increases as the earth grid impedance decreases, the
effectiveness of the reduction depends on the impedance of the earth grid relative to the total earth
fault circuit impedance. For the reduction to be effective, the reduced impedance needs to be low
compared to the other impedances in the faulted circuit. Typically, the earth grid impedance must
approach the power system source impedance before the EGVR starts decreasing significantly.
For example, consider an earth fault at a zone substation fed via a 33 kV line from a Transpower
substation with a prospective earth fault level of 7 kA. The source impedance and the earth grid
impedance at the Transpower substation is approximately j2.7 and 0.5 respectively. Figure 12
shows the EGVR and the earth fault current at the zone substation as a function of the zone
substation earth grid impedance. For this example, the zone substation has been assumed to be
located close to the Transpower substation (i.e. the line impedance is approximately zero).
As the impedance of the zone substation earth grid is reduced from 20 to 5 the EGVR is only
reduced from 18.4 kV to 15.5 kV since the earth fault current increases from 0.9 kA to 3.1 kA. As
the zone substation earth grid impedance reduces below the power system source impedance, the
reduction in the EGVR becomes more significant.
7000
21000
18000
5000
15000
4000
12000
3000
9000
2000
6000
EGVR (V)
Fault Current (A)
EGVR
6000
Fault Current
1000
3000
0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
18.0
0
20.0
Grid Resistance (ohms)
Figure 12: Variation of EGVR with Earth Grid Impedance

If the earthing system earth impedance is reduced by enlarging the earthing system, then even
though the EGVR on the earthing system will reduce, the resultant EPR hazard voltage contours
may be pushed out further. In some circumstances, the increase in the size of the EPR contours
may be significant for a small reduction in the EGVR. As a result, the size of any transferred EPR
hazard zones will increase. Whether this is a desirable end result will depend on the specifics of a
particular situation.
If the earthing system earth impedance is reduced by bonding remote earths to it, then the resultant
reduced EGVR is also spread to the remote earths. This also introduces new transferred EPRs onto
the earthing system anytime there is an earth fault causing EPR at any of these remote earths.
Page 37
Examples of this include bonding pylons to substations via overhead earth wires, and bonding the
earthing system to extensive LV MEN systems. This mitigation measure can be very effective in
significant urban areas where an extensive earthing system can be obtained by bonding together
neutrals from adjacent MEN systems.
If the main problem that needs to be addressed is the size of the transferred EPR hazard zone, one
option that could be considered is making the earthing system smaller. This will shrink the size of
these hazard zones, but at the cost of increasing the EGVR on the system and the associated touch
voltages.
For this reason, a starting point for the design of many HV earthing systems could be to make them
no bigger than they have to be to meet essential performance requirements.
4.2
GRADIENT CONTROL CONDUCTORS

Touch voltages on a structure can be controlled by burying a conductor at a distance of one metre
from the structure. These conductors increase the voltage on the ground at the position where a
person could be standing thereby reducing the voltage difference between the structure and the
persons feet. These conductors are termed gradient control conductors and are widely used for the
control of touch voltages on earthed structures.
In HV a.c. stations, gradient control conductors are often used for the control of touch voltages
outside the station security fence. These conductors which are typically buried at a depth of 0.5 m,
one metre outside the fence, are very effective when used in conjunction with a one meter wide strip
of crushed rock or asphalt installed around the outside of the fence. Often this effective mitigation
measure cannot be implemented because the fence is installed on the boundary of the property.
When designing HV a.c. stations consideration should be given to installing the security fence at
least one metre into the property to provide for a strip around the fence.
Gradient control conductors can also be used to control touch voltages on distribution centres and
equipment.
Table 6 in section 6.5.2 details typical touch voltage levels as a percentage of EGVR, for various
pole or pad mounted transformer or equipment arrangements. The touch voltage on a pole or pad
mounted transformer and equipment is typically between 40% and 50% of the EGVR if the earth
electrode is distributed on two sides of the distribution centre or equipment. When the earth
electrode is installed on one side only, the touch voltage is typically between 60% and 70% of the
EGVR. If one gradient control conductor is installed at a distance of one metre around the earthed
structure, the touch voltage is reduced to approximately 20 30% of the EGVR depending on the
configuration of the earth electrode (i.e. to one side only or on two sides). The touch voltage can be
further reduced by the installation of a second gradient control conductor at a distance of one metre
out from the first conductor (i.e. two metre from the earthed structure). In this case, the touch
voltage is approximately 15 20% of the EGVR.
Step voltages can also be controlled with the use of gradient control conductors. Gradient control
conductors may be positioned in a concentric configuration at increasing distances from the
structure i.e. 1 m, 2 m, etc., and the buried depth of each gradient control conductor is increased as
the distance increases. However, this measure may not be always effective or practical. It may also
push the hazard further out from the structure.
4.3
NEUTRAL EARTHING RESISTORS

NERs are employed in distribution networks to limit the current that would flow through the neutral
star point of a transformer or generator in the event of an earth fault.
NERs can be very effective in reducing induction into parallel services such as telecommunication
circuits or pipelines.
NERs can also reduce the EGVR at a faulted site on a distribution line, but the reduction may not
always be significant and may not always result in a site which is safe from EPR hazards. For
example, with a 20 NER installed at an 11 kV source, the EGVR at a faulted site with an earth
electrode resistance of 10 will be approximately between 1.5 kV and 2 kV. For a faulted site with
a resistance of 50 , the EGVR may be as high as 4 kV even with the 20 NER.
Page 38
Many distribution centres and other structures such as concrete poles that are not bonded to an
extensive MEN system are likely to have earth electrode resistances of 50 or more. This implies
that conventional NERs, which typically have an impedance of no more than 50 , cannot usually be
used as a universal fix for EPR hazards in these situations. Additional measures for controlling EPR
hazards may often be required. (A Petersen Coil (see section 4.4) can however be very effective as
a universal fix for EPR hazards in these situations, even in areas of high soil resistivity.)
In urban areas, conventional NERs on 11 kV and 22 kV distribution systems can be very effective at
controlling EPR on structures and Distribution Centres that are bonded to significant MEN systems.
The use of NERs for the control of EPR hazards should be investigated on a case by case basis.
For a faulted site to be guaranteed to be safe of EPR hazards, the source impedance including the
NER should be approximately 10 times higher than the earth electrode resistance of the faulted site.
In general, this is unlikely to happen in practice except for high resistance NERs (ie 600 800 ).
Where standard NERs are used (with current limits of 200 500 A) this implies that the resistance of
the faulted site should be relatively low (i.e. less than approximately 2 ), to ensure that the NER
eliminates EPR hazards from the faulted site. Therefore, NERs on 22, 33 or 66 kV feeders may be
effective in eliminating EPR hazards at zone substations which typically have resistances of 2 or
less.
NERs have been successfully used in urban areas to control transferred voltages to
telecommunication circuit. Telecommunication equipment is typically able to withstand voltages well
in excess of what would normally be hazardous to human beings.
Operation and system changes such as the replacement of surge arresters may be required.
Detailed information is available in NZCCPTS Application Guide for Neutral Earthing Resistors or
Reactors.
4.4
RESONANT EARTHING (PETERSEN COILS, ARC SUPPRESSION COILS, EARTH FAULT

NEUTRALISER EARTHING)
A Petersen coil is an inductance that is connected between the neutral point of the system and
earth. The inductance of the coil is adjusted so that on the occurrence of a single phase to earth
fault, the capacitive current in the unfaulted phases is compensated by the inductive current passed
by the Petersen coil.
Upon the occurrence of an earth fault, the system capacitance discharges into the fault and the
faulted phase voltage collapses to a very low value leaving a very small residual current flowing in
the fault. This current is so small that any arc between the faulted phase and earth will not be
maintained and the fault will extinguish. Transient faults do not result in supply interruptions and in
some jurisdictions permanent earth faults can be left on the system without the supply being
interrupted while the fault is located and repaired.
Modern systems provide automatic tuning of the inductance to accommodate changes in network
topology.
To increase safety and to eliminate restriking faults on underground cables, some systems also
provide electronic compensation to reduce the remaining residual current and voltage on the faulted
phase to zero.
Resonant earthing can reduce MEN EPR to a safe level even in systems with high MEN resistance.
In many European countries, resonant earthing is the normal method of obtaining acceptable EPR
and hence acceptable step and touch voltages in electrical networks, and acceptable control of EPR
impressed on third party systems (telecommunications, railway, pipelines, etc.) and personnel.
4.5
OVERHEAD EARTH WIRES (OHEW)

OHEWs are typically used on transmission lines at or above 110 kV usually at least over the first
kilometre of line out from the HV a.c. station. OHEWs are also sometimes used on distribution lines
Page 39
(11 kV and above) for the first kilometre out from the substation but this is not common in New
Zealand.
While the primary purpose of the OHEW is to provide lightning shielding for the substation, bonding
of the OHEWs to the earth grid can significantly reduce earth fault current through the station earth
grid for faults at the station or at conductive poles or towers bonded to the OHEW.
Inductive coupling between the OHEW and the faulted phase conductor can significantly reduce the
earth return current during fault conditions at conductive poles or towers bonded to the OHEW.
This, in turn, reduces the EPR levels at both the substation and at the conductive pole or tower.
However the incidence of (transferred) EPR events at the conductive poles or towers will become
more frequent.
For a bus earth fault at a substation, the OHEWs can divert significant current away from the
substation earth grid. The net effect of the OHEWs is to reduce the impedance of the overall
earthing system (earth grid and tower/pole footing electrodes in parallel) thereby reducing the
EGVR.
While bonding the OHEWs to the station earth grid will have the effect of reducing the hazards at the
station, hazards at the nearby towers/poles will increase. The frequency of voltage rises at the
nearby towers/poles will increase since each station EGVR will be transferred to the nearby
towers/poles. On the other hand, bonding the OHEWs to the station earth grid will have the
opposite effect of reducing the voltage rise at the tower/pole bases for earth faults on the nearby
towers/poles.
Consideration must be given to the OHEW size (fault rating), particularly for the first few spans from
the substation. For the first two kilometres from the substation, the OHEWs should be rated for the
full station prospective earth fault current associated with the line voltages. However, it is not
necessary to rate the OHEWs for a 3 s fault duration. Shorter fault durations may be considered
depending on the protection schemes used.
4.6
CABLE SCREENS
Bonded cable screens provide galvanic and inductive return paths for fault current for both cable
faults and destination substation faults.
For an earth fault at a remote destination substation connected to a cable bonded at one end only,
all the fault current will return to the source substation via the associated earthing systems. The
result is typically a high EPR at both the source and destination substations, and possibly high
induced-voltages into parallel third party conductors (e.g. telecommunications conductors).
Bonding of cable screens to the earthing systems at both ends is advantageous in most situations.
However, the transfer of EPR hazards from a HV a.c. station to a remote site via the cable screens
should be considered as part of the design. For extensive cabled networks where screens are
bonded at both ends, the transfer of EPR hazards is unlikely to be an issue. In some cases, where
a low proportion of the distribution network is cabled, investigation may be necessary to determine
the extent of any EPR transfer issues via zone substations and LV neutrals.
The bonding of single core cables at both ends may affect the rating of the cables, depending on the
cable configuration (due to induced currents in the screens and sheaths). Care should be taken to
ensure the rating of the cable is adequate for the application. Alternatively cross bonding should be
applied.
The rating of the cable screen should be adequate for the expected fault current and for the current
induced in the screen during normal operation.
Detailed information is contained in NZCCPTS Application Guide for Cable Sheath Bonding (which
includes methods of calculation in the associated companion document).
Page 40
4.7
SURFACE INSULATING LAYER

To limit the current flowing through a person contacting a temporary livened earthed structure, a thin
layer of high resistivity material is often used on top of the ground surface. This thin layer of surface
material helps in limiting the body current by adding resistance to touch and step voltage circuits.
Crushed rock is used mainly, but not exclusively, in HV a.c. stations for the following reasons:
(a) To increase tolerable levels of touch and step voltages during a power system earth fault.
(b) To provide a weed-free, self draining surface.
Asphalt may also be used in HV a.c. stations but is likely to be more expensive than crushed rock.
Asphalt has the advantage of providing easy vehicle access. Vehicle access over crushed rock may
sometime be problematic especially if the base was not prepared properly and if the crushed rock
specification is not adequate.
Asphalt and crushed rock can also be used to control touch and step voltages around towers and
poles located in public access areas.
Limited data is available on the flashover withstand of asphalt which may be as low as 4 kV for a
50 mm thick sample. Therefore, where asphalt is used for mitigation, touch voltage should not
exceed 4 kV and step voltage should not exceed 8 kV. For applications where these limits are
exceeded, the withstand voltage should be considered based on the type of asphalt that is being
considered.
Chip seal and concrete shall not be used to control touch and step voltages due to their low
resistivity. However, reinforced concrete may be used to create equipotential zones for the control
of hazardous touch and step voltages.
When crushed rock is used to control touch and step voltage hazards, the following criteria shall be
used in the design:
(a) The resistivity of crushed rock is 5,000 -m provided the crushed rock complies with the
specification detailed below.
(b) The thickness of the crushed rock layer is 125 mm 25 mm.
Note:
(a) The insulating property of crushed rock can be easily compromised by pollution (e.g. with soil).
Therefore, regular inspection and maintenance of a crushed rock layer is required to ensure that
the layer stays clean and maintains its minimum required thickness.
(b) The insulating property of asphalt can be compromised by cracks and excessive water
penetration. The integrity of the asphalt layer used for surface treatment must be maintained.
All crushed rock material shall be screened and crushed from river-run gravel or quarried aggregate.
The source material shall consist of hard, sound material of uniform quality, free from soft or friable
stone, wood, clay, or other deleterious material.
Crushed rock comprising a combination of large and small particle sizes ensures sufficient
interlocking and thus is suitable for both driving and walking on. When tested in accordance with
NZS4407:1991, Test 3.8.2, the particle size distribution of the crushed rock shall comply with the
limits given in the table below:
Table 4: Crushed Rock Specification
Crushed rock particle size distribution limits
(% passing by dry mass)
Lower Limit
Upper Limit
37.5
100
100
26.5
65
85
Aperture (mm)
19
13.2
20
0
50
25
9.5
0
10
6.7
0
5
When tested in accordance with NZS4407: 1991, Test 3.14, each of the five crushed aggregate
fractions between the 37.5 mm and 6.7 mm test sieves shall contain not less than 90 percent by
mass of stones with at least two significant broken faces. Smooth river pebbles are unsuitable for
use in switchyards.
Page 41
The crushed rock shall be laid on a level well compacted basecourse surface (ie 100 mm AP40).
When asphalt is used in mitigating step and touch voltage hazards, a resistivity of 15,000 -m shall
be used. The asphaltic concrete shall be 50 mm minimum thickness to TNZ M/10 specification1 and
laid in accordance with TNZ P/92. A tack coat is required.
Close attention is required to the preparation of the ground prior to the application of crushed rock or
asphalt. The asphaltic concrete should be laid on a level well compacted basecourse surface
constructed in accordance with TNZ B/2 specification over a subgrade with a minimum California
Bearing Ratio (CBR) of 5%. The surface of the prepared basecourse should be sprayed with
weedkiller prior to the laying of asphaltic concrete.
Crushed rock or asphalt should not be used to fill in any hollows in the sub-grade.
4.8
SEPARATION OF HV AND LV EARTHING

When an earth fault takes place at the HV side of a distribution centre, the EGVR on the HV earth
electrode is transferred to the MEN system via the neutral conductor. For the earthing of the HV and
LV systems, two acceptable methods are to either bond the two earthing systems together or to
segregate them. Segregation is achieved by introducing a physical separation between the HV and
LV earthing systems.
Where there is a significant density of earth electrode on the LV system such as in urban areas, the
preferred method of earthing is to bond the HV and LV earthing systems. Large earth electrode
densities are typically achieved in large urban distribution networks which are interconnected via
cable screens bonded at both ends and via interconnected neutral conductors. The critical factor is
the overall EGVR of the earthing system and if it is low, then a bonded HV and LV earthing system
is preferred.
For systems with smaller densities of earth electrodes such as rural and smaller urban installations
where it is usually difficult to achieve low EGVR, it may be advantageous to control touch and step
voltage hazards on the MEN system and EPR hazard to telecommunications network users,
personnel or plant, by segregating the HV and LV earthing systems. Care is required to ensure that
the neutral of the segregated LV system is not bonded to the LV MEN of another transformer which
does not also have segregated HV and LV earthing systems.
Segregation of HV and LV earthing systems ensures that only a small portion of the EGVR on the
HV earthing system is transferred onto the LV earthing system. Touch and step voltages, and
voltages which are transferred to third party equipment such as telecommunication equipment are
controlled in this way. Mitigation of EPR hazards on structures connected to the HV earthing system
may be required.
Segregated HV and LV earthing systems may sometimes be difficult to maintain for the following
reasons:
(a) The integrity of the physical separation may be difficult to maintain into the future. Other
earthed structures may be installed at later stages within the physical separation distance. If
the minimum separation required is small, this is less likely to be a problem.
(b) The system is not currently commonly used in New Zealand and therefore may be compromised
in the future by a contractor who is unfamiliar with the system. However, if this practice
becomes more common, this should become less of a problem.
The minimum separation distance required between the Distribution Centre HV and LV earthing
systems is dependant on:
(a) the size of the HV earthing system,
(b) the maximum EPR on the HV earthing system,
(c) the distances to, and relative sizes of, the different earths bonded to the LV MEN system.
1
2
TNZ M/10, Specification for Asphaltic Concrete, Transit NZ. See also Notes to the Specification for Asphaltic Concrete.
TNZ P/9, Specification for Construction of Asphaltic Concrete, Transit NZ.
Page 42
Some typical minimum separation distances required between any portion of the HV and LV
earthing systems are given in Table 9 of section 6.7.
It must be noted that separate HV and LV earthing systems may not be effective in controlling
hazardous step and touch voltages in the event of a HV line to LV line contact at the distribution
transformer, or on a conjoint HV/LV line section. The following options may be considered for
protecting against HV to LV contacts:
(a) Ensuring the configuration of LV lines at the distribution transformer pole are such that a HV line
to LV line contact is unlikely.
(b) Replace the LV lines over conjoint HV/LV spans with:
LV buried cable,
LV lines on a separate poles, or
LV aerial bundled conductor cable that is insulated to withstand the full HV conductor
voltage.
Before considering the separation of HV and LV earth electrodes at distribution transformers it is
necessary to make sure that the transformer is able to withstand the maximum EPR on the HV
earthing system, without breaking down to the LV side of the transformer (e.g. via HV/LV winding
breakdown, transformer earthed core to LV winding breakdown, or transformer tank to LV neutral
breakdown). The withstand voltage on most 11 kV transformers should be adequate but on 22 kV
transformers the possibility exists that the EGVR on the HV earth electrode may cause a flashover
between the case and the LV winding or across the LV bushing.
Note: Transformers which are connected to segregated earth electrodes will be more at risk of
failures from lightning surges. If required, additional surge protection should be provided for these
transformers.
When the LV earthing system is segregated from the HV earthing system at a distribution centre, the
total earth impedance of the LV earthing system plus associated MEN earths, must be sufficiently
low to ensure the HV feeder protection to the distribution centre will trip. A safety factor of two
should be used in calculating this maximum earth impedance value. This means that the calculated
resistance shall be divided by the safety factor of 2 and ensures that the HV protection will operate in
the event of a HV line to LV line contact, or a HV/LV winding insulation breakdown in the distribution
transformer.
4.9
TT SYSTEM OF SUPPLY
The TT3 system of supply is an alternate method of connecting installations to the network that could
be considered for situations where there are only a few earth connections, such as in a rural area
where a single distribution transformer feeds a single farm house, or in urban areas where the
ground resistivity is high and/or the number of earthing connections to the neutral are limited. In
these cases, when applying the MEN system, it is normally impractical to reduce the voltage rise on
the earthing system to a safe value when the neutral connection is not intact. Furthermore the
current generated by a LV earth fault is unlikely to be sufficient to operate the service fuse.
Under the TT system, exposed metalwork within an installation is connected to the main earth but
not to the neutral. In practice, this is achieved by removing the neutral-earth link in the main
switchboard.
To provide effective earth fault protection, it is imperative that a RCD be employed and the main
switch is a convenient point at which to install this device. As the RCD is not required for personal
protection, and in order to minimize the risk of spurious trippings due to normal leakage within the
installation, a RCD sensitivity of 150 mA is suggested.
It should be noted that the TT system is currently not permitted under the Electricity Regulations and
it will be necessary to apply to the Secretary for a dispensation. Nevertheless, application of such a
system will ensure that the installation is safe in the event of a failed neutral connection, something
which may not be possible when employing the MEN system in the situations noted above.
Figure 13 below shows the typical configuration of a practical TT system that could be employed.
A description of the TT system of supply may be obtained from IEC 60364-4-44
Page 43
Distribution
Centre
HV
LV installation
L1
L2
RCD (150 mA)
L3
N
RA
TT
Figure 13: Configuration of a Practical TT System

4.10
INTERFERENCE WITH SERVICES

As described in section 2.3.2, EPRs caused by HV system earth faults can couple into third party
equipment such as telecommunication equipment or pipelines or railway lines where these are
located in the vicinity of the HV earthing system. Since telecommunication circuits and pipelines are
typically referenced to remote earth, voltages coupled onto the third party equipment by the power
system earth fault may be large depending on the value of the EPR voltage in the immediate vicinity
of the third party equipment.
Voltages on telecommunication equipment resulting from these EPR events can cause hazards for
telecommunication employees and or failure of equipment. EPR voltages in the ground surrounding
buried pipelines can cause failure of the pipeline insulating layer thereby compromising the cathodic
protection system which may be installed and increasing the risk of corrosion.
To mitigate EPR hazards on third party equipment caused by earth faults on HV earthing systems,
adequate separation is usually effective. Where it is possible, alternative routes should be
investigated for the power system or the third party equipment.
For telecommunication equipment, it may also be possible to mitigate the EPR hazard by isolating
the telecommunication equipment. Isolation of telecommunication equipment is usually cost
effective where few customers are affected. However, where many customers are affected, the cost
may be prohibitive.
For HV a.c. station isolation of water pipes, the telephone circuits and pilot cables is typically
provided to eliminate the transfer of EPR hazards.
4.11
OTHER MITIGATION MEASURES

Other mitigation measures which may be considered include:
(a) The installation of insulating barriers or fences
(b) Isolation of specific metallic conductors
(c) Reduction of fault clearing times
Access to structures where hazardous touch voltages may be present can be restricted by the
installation of safety barriers or fences. These barriers or fences would typically be non conductive
such as wood, plastic or rubber. For example, a tower could be surrounded by a wooden fence to
restrict access to the tower base, or a sheet of rubber could be wrapped around the base of a steel
or concrete pole. The installation of isolation barriers usually requires ongoing maintenance.
Isolation of specific metallic conductors may be considered in some cases. However, if a metallic
conductor could become alive, then isolation is not permitted.
Page 44
To ensure that touch voltages cannot appear on a water tap, isolation of the tap can be achieved by
the installation of a plastic section of pipe.
EPR hazards can be mitigated by the reduction in the fault clearing time. This may be easy to
implement in certain situations and may only be advantageous for cases where the hazardous
voltages do not exceed tolerable levels significantly. In some situations this may require significant
protection review and upgrade, and may prove impracticable. The need for adequate protection
grading may also limit the effectiveness of this measure.
Page 45
SECTION 5 HV A.C. STATIONS

5.1
INTRODUCTION
The most recognised publication on which the design of HV a.c. stations earth grids have been
based is IEEE Std 80 and HV earth grids which meet the requirements of this publication are
deemed to meet the requirements of this Guide.
A typical substation earthing arrangement is shown in Figure 22.
5.2
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR HV A.C. STATION EARTHING SYSTEMS

An earthing system for a HV a.c. station should be designed and installed to effectively handle the
expected maximum earth fault current and to limit EPR and gradient voltages so that there is no
significant risk of injury or death to any person over the planned lifetime of the installation.
To achieve this, the following requirements shall be met.
5.2.1
faults and either rapidly clearing the fault or minimising the resulting fault current.
(c) Controlling EPR transferred onto third party services, plant and staff (i.e. telecommunications,
railways, pipelines, etc.) in accordance with Regulations, applicable standards and guidelines.
5.2.2
5.3
DESIGN ASPECTS
The risk associated with EPR hazards on earthing systems of HV a.c. stations may be managed
either by the Probabilistic Method or the Deterministic Method. However, earth fault frequencies
typically associated with HV a.c. stations and the presence of workers on site sometime for long
periods dictate that the risks associated with the stations are comparatively high. For these reasons,
in practice the Deterministic Method is typically used for the design of the station earth grids. The
Probabilistic Method may be used for areas outside the security fence but this should be carried out
with caution because of the typically high earth fault frequencies for some types of fault.
An earthing system for a HV a.c. station consists typically of a buried horizontal grid of copper
conductors with or without additional driven rods. Usually the grid extends over the whole area
occupied by the substation.
The horizontal conductors are positioned to enable all metalwork in the substation (steel structures,
equipment stands, fences, etc) to be bonded to the earthing system so that a direct low resistance
path to earth is provided for earth fault currents.
When these high earth fault currents flow into the earth, earth potential gradients which may be
dangerous to people are established within and around the substation. These earth potential
gradients can be controlled by the use of additional earthing and other techniques.
Page 46
For a HV a.c. station earthing system, the design of the grid to provide low resistance connections to
earth for metalwork and to control step and touch voltages in most cases ensures that the grid
impedance is more than adequate to meet earth fault protection requirements.
If required, the earth grid may be extended beyond the substation structure fence and/or
interconnected with other earthing systems to ensure a sufficiently low overall resistance to remote
earth 4. Note, for new sites, this may form part of the site selection criteria.
In very large substations the impedance of the transformers on the low voltage side is generally a
fraction of an ohm. For instance a 90 MVA transformer may have a zero sequence impedance as
low as 0.2 ohm at 22 kV. This makes it evident that any appreciable resistance in the station
earthing system will have a major effect on the magnitude of the earth fault current.
Typical steps to be taken for the design of a substation earth grid are summarised below:
(a) One of the first tasks to be carried out is a site visit for the measurement of soil resistivity. The
soil resistivity data is then processed to determine a soil resistivity model for the site.
(b) The applicable earth fault currents are calculated.
(c) The applicable earth fault current durations are determined.
(d) Using the substation layout drawing, a basic earth grid is provided to form the substation earth
electrode. The basic earth grid typically consist of the following:
i. An earthing conductor surrounding the area covered by the substation equipment and
structures. This earthing conductor which encloses as much area as practical helps to
avoid high current densities.
ii. A grid is then formed by using parallel conductors within the loop. The parallel conductors
are typically laid along the structures or rows of equipment to provide for short equipment
connections.
iii. At all cross connections, the earth grid conductors are bonded together.
(e) The primary roles of the earth grid are to ensure that the earth grid impedance is sufficiently low
to enable effective operation of the protection system and that no dangerous surface potential
gradients exist. Therefore, using the soil resistivity model and the worst earth fault current and
duration touch, step and mesh voltages are reviewed. Transferred voltages are also reviewed.
(f) Depending on the outcome of the touch and step voltage review, additional grid conductors may
be required. Extending the earth grid beyond the substation fence may be an option that should
be considered and decisions need to be made concerning the bonding of the fence to the earth
grid.
(g) Driven rods may be required to reduce the impedance of the earth grid. To start with, driven
rods should be located at the corners of the grid. If required additional ground rods can be
located along the perimeter of the grid.
Horizontal grid conductors are buried at a shallow depth but not less than 500 mm below the surface
to control step and touch voltages over the grid area.
However the resistivity of the surface layer (top 1,000 to 2,000 mm) can in some locations fluctuate
widely because of seasonal drying or freezing, resulting in significant changes in grid impedance. In
such locations driven rods sufficiently long to penetrate into lower layers of soil with more constant
resistivity are provided to lessen the effect of seasonal changes on grid impedance.
The above concepts are developed in more detail in the following sections.
5.4
IMPORTANT DESIGN PARAMETERS

The following design parameters form the basis for the design of an earthing system for HV a.c.
stations:
(a) Soil resistivity.
(b) Maximum earth fault current.
(c) Maximum earth fault duration.
Note approval of other parties may be required (e.g. landowner).
Page 47
5.5
SOIL RESISTIVITY
5.5.1
Soil resistivity is a critical parameter for the design of an earthing system and for determining the
safety limits for the evaluation of touch and step voltage hazards.
5.5.2
The resistivity of the soil surrounding an earth electrode has a significant impact on its resistance.
Soil resistivity also has a bearing on the voltage gradients that are to be expected at the soil surface
during earth fault conditions.
5.5.3
The general moisture content of the soil should be considered and adjustment to the soil resistivity
data made if required.
5.5.4
The Wenner method is the preferred technique for measuring soil resistivity.
5.5.5
Soil resistivity tests shall be carried out at test-probe spacings that are proportional to the expected
dimensions of the earthing system.
5.5.6
The test-probe spacings for small to medium size substations ( 30 m x 30 m) should vary between
0.5 m and 40 m. For each test traverse, measurement of soil resistivity should be carried out for a
minimum of 12 different spacings of the test probes. Typical spacings may be: 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3,
4, 6, 8, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 and 40 m. For larger substations, probe spacings up to 60 m or more
should be used.
5.5.7
Soil resistivity tests shall be carried out away from metallic objects such as other earth electrodes,
buried water pipes, fences, etc.
5.5.8
The measured data shall be evaluated to determine a soil resistivity model for the site.
Determination of the correct soil resistivity model for the site is an important aspect of the design.
Earthing design software may be used to assist in determining a soil resistivity model on which to
base the earthing system design.
5.6
MAXIMUM EARTH FAULT CURRENT
5.6.1
Prior to carrying out any earthing system design, it is necessary to determine realistic earth fault
currents for the system.
5.6.2
Two distinct earth fault current values are used in the design of an earth grid:
(a) The maximum fault current which will flow in the earthing system is used for rating the earthing
conductors.
(b) The earth grid return current is used to evaluate EPR issues including touch and step voltage
hazards.
5.6.3
When calculating earth fault currents, the fault circuit impedances shall be taken into account since
these impedances (the overhead line and cables plus the earth impedances) may significantly affect
(reduce) the magnitude of the earth fault current.
5.6.4
The calculation of the earth fault currents shall include the d.c. offset.
5.6.5
Care must be taken in calculating the earth grid return current since only a proportion of the fault
current may return via the earthing system. In some systems, earth fault current is diverted from the
earthing system via cable screens or other bonded conductors such as pipelines.
5.6.6
Effects of network expansion on the fault current to be used for the design shall be considered.
5.6.7
Some EPR hazard mitigation measures, such as lowering the grid resistance, may result in an
increased earth grid return current. This shall be taken into account during the earthing design
process.
5.7
MAXIMUM EARTH FAULT DURATION
5.7.1
Two earth fault duration times are used in the design of an earth grid.
Page 48
5.7.2
For the sizing of the earthing conductors, an earth fault with duration shall be selected as detailed in
section 2.11.
5.7.3
For the evaluation of touch and step voltage hazards, either the primary or backup protection
operating times should be used depending on the location of the substation, on the protection
scheme and on the requirements of the utility. More information has been given in section 2.6.3.
5.8
TOUCH AND STEP VOLTAGE HAZARDS
5.8.1
The earthing system shall be designed to control step, touch and mesh voltages as far as is
practicable.
5.8.2
Earth fault durations need to be considered to determine the current that results in the worst case
when assessing hazardous touch and step voltages. To determine the worst case situation, earth
fault currents at different voltage levels and different fault durations cannot be directly compared. All
earth fault currents and associated durations should be converted to their one second equivalents
for comparison.
5.8.3
Tolerable step and touch limits should be calculated based on IEEE Std 80 or IEC 60479 fibrillation
current limits as in section 3 and Appendix A.
5.8.4
When designing according to IEEE Std 80, the calculated step and touch voltages are limited to
prevent heart fibrillation due to accidental contact by a person weighing 70 kg within the site
(restricted access areas) and 50 kg in public access areas.
5.8.5
Glove impedance shall not be included in the calculations of touch and step voltage limits. The
designer shall consider whether it is appropriate to include shoe impedance. In some situations it
may be prudent to exclude shoe impedance when considering hazards outside the security fence.
5.8.6
A record shall be kept of all information relating to the determination and control of shock currents.
5.9
MITIGATION OF EPR HAZARDS
5.9.1
Typical mitigation measures which may be used to control touch and step voltage hazards in an HV
a.c. station may include the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
Reducing the resistance of the earth grid.

Reducing the fault current flowing into the earth grid.
Reducing the fault duration.
Installing gradient control conductors.
Bonding OHEWs to the earth grid.
Bonding feeder cable sheath to earth electrodes at both cable ends.
Using surface treatment such as crushed rock or asphalt to increase tolerable touch and step
voltages.
5.9.2
Some of these measures are described in more detail in the following sections.
5.9.3
The earth grid voltage rise (EGVR) can be reduced by reducing the resistance of the earth grid.
However, where the source impedance is relatively low (high fault levels), reducing the earth grid
impedance may not reduce the EGVR by much (since the fault current may increase while the earth
grid impedance decreases). Therefore, the costs involved in achieving a lower earth grid resistance
should be evaluated against the benefit gained.
5.9.4
The use of NERs may be considered for the reduction of the EGVR of the earth grid and inductive
interference with telecommunication circuits. Note: the use of NERs is typically limited to the lower
voltages (11 kV to 33 kV).
5.9.5
The use of NERs may require review of the protection system and can have significant economic
implications. Surge arrester ratings need checking.
Page 49
5.9.6
Fault current flowing into the earth grid may also be reduced by diverting fault currents through cable
sheaths to other earth electrodes. The effect on the cables of diverting fault current into cable
sheaths (ie heating) should be considered.
5.9.7
Gradient control conductors buried 1 m outside and 1 m inside a security fence are effective in
controlling hazardous touch voltages on fences.
5.9.8
Bonding of the OHEWs to the earth grid may result in a substantial portion of the earth fault current
being diverted away from the earth grid. This may result in a significant reduction of the station
EGVR. However, connecting the OHEWs to the earth grid will usually have the effect of increasing
the hazard at the tower/pole bases. The frequency of voltage rises at the nearby towers/poles will
increase since each station EGVR will be transferred to the nearby towers/poles. On the other
hand, bonding the OHEWs to the station earth grid will have the opposite effect of reducing the
voltage rise at the tower/pole bases for earth faults on the nearby towers/poles.
5.9.9
When crushed rock is used to control touch and step voltage hazards for a zone substation, the
following criteria shall be used in the design:
(c) The resistivity of crushed rock is 5,000 -m.
(d) The thickness of the crushed rock layer shall be 125 mm 25 mm.
5.9.10 The crushed rock should comply with the specification given in section 4.7. Smooth uncrushed rock
is not suitable.
5.9.11 Asphalt is considered to be a suitable surface material for the control of surface resistivity provided
the touch voltage does not exceed approximately 4 kV. For design purposes a resistivity of
15,000 -m and a minimum depth of 50 mm shall be used for asphalt. Asphalt shall meet the
specification detailed in section 4.7.
5.9.12 When planning a new substation design, consideration should be given to allowing for at least a one
metre wide strip of land around the outside of the security fence for burying a gradient control
conductor and/or for applying surface treatment. Common practice is to allow a strip sufficiently
wide to facilitate inspection and maintenance, and to install an outer boundary fence. Note In rural
areas a stock fence is frequently used to prevent damage by stock to the station security fence and
to the surface treatment layer.
5.10
TRANSFERRED VOLTAGES
5.10.1 All conducting pathways including water pipes, telecommunications cables, gas pipelines etc., leaving
the earth grid area for remote locations shall be isolated, except for power cable sheath/armouring
and overhead earthwires (OHEWs) which are discussed further in sections 5.29 and 5.30.
5.10.2 Steam pipelines (which may require special attention with respect to touch and step voltages) are
normally bonded.
5.10.3 Isolation facilities are designed and tested at 25 kV A.C. for 1 minute as a minimum standard. Higher
test voltages may be required for locations having a higher voltage rise.
5.10.4 The design of substation earth grids shall consider:
(a) The transfer of earth grid potentials to a remote earth;
(b) The transfer of a remote earth potential into a station; and
(c) The breakdown of cable oversheaths because of voltage differences:
i. between metallic screens or sheaths earthed at the station and the ground surrounding a
cable;
ii. between metallic screens or sheaths earthed at a remote point and the ground surrounding
a cable;
iii. appearing in the ground surrounding a station in which the cable is buried.
5.10.5 EPR effects on telecommunication and other third party equipment located near a substation shall
be considered.
Page 50
5.10.6 Where it is deemed that a new earthing system installation or a modification to an existing earthing
system or the network may affect third party assets, third party representatives should be contacted
to discuss the appropriate mitigation measures.
5.10.7 Telecommunications circuits into high voltage stations may be protected by the appropriate use of
isolation transformers and/or optocouplers, high voltage insulated communications cables, and
specially designed cubicles with isolating barriers and isolated work platforms on the
telecommunications side of the cubicle.
5.10.8 Barrier isolation should be considered for control and communications cables so that it is physically
impossible for a person to touch the incoming and outgoing cable terminals simultaneously. This is
typically achieved utilising an insulating board mounted within a circuit isolation cabinet containing an
isolation platform and doors front and rear. The cables leaving the earth grid terminate on one side of
the board, with the local cabling on the other side. Isolating facilities are fitted to the off-site cable
terminals.
5.10.9 Metalwork bonded to the earth grid and projecting beyond the earth grid, or conductively coupled
because of its proximity may introduce a hazard from transferred potential and shall be considered
during the design and mitigated as required to achieve safety.
5.10.10 For existing substations with metal pipes leaving the substation, the transfer of hazardous voltages
off site shall be investigated. If required, transfer of voltage off the site shall be prevented by
isolating the metal pipes from the grid. This can be achieved by installing insulating sections of
suitable plastic pipes or other non-conducting material outside the boundary of the switchyard. The
length of insulating sections required depends on the EPR of the grid but shall have a minimum
length of 10 m. Metal pipes which pass the substation close to the earth grid shall also be
considered. For new substations, only plastic water pipes shall be used to enter the switchyard.
5.10.11 Adjacent metallic fencing not associated with the substation, should not be bonded to the substation
fence. Isolation capable to withstand the full earth fault EPR shall be used to isolate adjacent
metallic fences from the substation fence. The isolation measure shall be such as to prevent a
person from bridging the isolation barrier with outstretched arms. Assume a 2 m reach for a person.
5.10.12 Even with adjacent fences isolated from the substation fence, touch voltages may appear on
adjacent fences. The design shall consider whether additional isolation sections should be used to
reduce the risk associated with the transferred voltages on the adjacent fences.
5.10.13 Transferred voltages on earthing systems associated with local service supply transformers installed
outside the switchyard shall be considered and the EPR hazards evaluated and mitigated as
required.
5.11
430 V, 650 V AND 2,500 V EARTH POTENTIAL RISE (EPR) CONTOURS
5.11.1 The designer/reviewer co-ordinates with telecommunications representatives to ensure any

interference with telecommunications equipment, cables or lines is minimised so far as is reasonably
practicable and complies with the Electricity Regulations.
5.11.2 Induced voltages onto telecommunications systems are limited to:
(a) 430 V for faults of duration greater than 0.5 s (primary protection time);
(b) 650 V for faults of duration less than or equal to 0.5 s (primary protection time).
The design/review takes into consideration the following:
(a) Near substation facilities, telecommunications companies are concerned with:
(i)
The voltages on the earth bars and neutrals at any building, public, private or industrial
that has telecommunication cables or equipment;
(ii)
The voltage on the ground where there is a kiosk or junction box with
telecommunications equipment;
(iii) The voltage on the ground where there are telecommunications cables.
(b) The earth/neutrals of buildings may be affected by voltages, which are:
Page 51
(i)
(ii)
Impressed onto the earth/neutrals by rising to the earth potential;

Transferred onto the earth/neutrals via a MEN system.
5.11.3 The locations of the 430 V, 650 V and 2,500 V EPR contours are determined around the substation
site and affected areas outside the site. The fault current used in the calculations is as defined in
section 5.6.
5.12
EQUIPMENT EARTHING CONDUCTORS
5.12.1 All fittings and any uninsulated metalwork, other than cable screens or armouring and neutrals,
which are liable to become alive shall be connected to the earthing system with a minimum of one
conductor, capable of carrying full design fault current for the duration of any fault which may liven
the fitting or uninsulated metalwork (see Figure 22). Cable screens and armouring should be treated
in accordance with sections 5.28 and 5.29. Transformer neutrals are covered in section 5.21.
5.12.2 All equipment and support structures shall be earthed to the grid with a minimum of one earthing
conductor except power transformers which require a minimum of two conductors.
5.12.3 Tanks of power transformers shall be bonded to the earth grid via two diametrically separated
earthing conductors.
5.12.4 All earthing conductors shall be electrically and mechanically sound and rated for their application
(see section 2.11). Earthing conductors shall be installed in such a way that they are protected from
mechanical damage.
5.12.5 Earthing of equipment mounted on electrically conductive structures shall be by means of earthing
conductors connected directly to the grid or to the support structure. Bonding to the grid using
support structures shall not be made through bolted flanges. A short conductor jumper may be used
to provide bonding across a bolted flange.
5.12.6 Equipment bonding shall be made at either the earthing terminal welded to the equipment or holes
drilled and tapped to take a suitably sized bolts. Two holes spaced at 50 mm centres should be
provided in the earthing terminal or in the equipment frame. Tapping is not necessary if accessible
nuts can be used.
5.12.7 Surge arresters shall be bonded to the earth grid using the shortest possible electrical path.
Bonding to the earth grid can be achieved through steel support structures and separate earthing
conductors. A separate earthing conductor between the arrester and the grid is preferred for steel
lattice structures. For arresters mounted directly on the transformer tank, bonding to the earth grid
should be made through the transformer tank.
5.13
JOINTS FOR EQUIPMENT EARTHING CONDUCTORS
5.13.1 All bolted equipment connections and joints should be electrically and mechanically robust and
corrosion resistant. Intermediary bi-metal jointing devices shall be used if required, e.g. for
connecting copper to aluminium joints. The recommended bolt material to suit conductor and clamp
must be used. The bolts, washers and nuts may be stainless steel, Everdur, etc., as appropriate.
Where stainless steel is used, the bolts and nuts should not be made from the same type of
stainless steel, to avoid the nuts fusing onto the bolts. Type 316 is suggested for the bolts and type
304 for the nuts and washers. Alternative methods of preventing fusing between bolts and nuts may
be used. The torques applied to the nuts and bolts should not exceed the recommended values
from the manufacturer.
5.13.2 Before making or remaking a joint, all jointing surfaces should be smooth and free from burrs. Joints
with tinned or cadmium-plated surfaces should be cleaned thoroughly with a stiff non-metallic brush
or scouring pad (e.g. nylon). Jointing compounds shall be used as appropriate.
5.13.3 When a flat copper earthing conductor is to be bolted to an item of equipment, the copper surface in
contact with the equipment shall be tinned first.
5.13.4 A two-hole outdoor tinned lug shall be used for stranded earthing copper conductors.
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5.13.5 When a flat copper earthing conductor is to be run and secured to a galvanised steel structure, the
copper strap shall be stood off from the galvanised surface using a suitable insulating material.
5.14
DISCONNECTORS AND EARTH SWITCHES
5.14.1 A typical earthing arrangement for an earth switch is shown in Figure 23.
5.14.2 Bonding to the handle and to the linkage rod shall be carried out using a flexible lead or braid with a
minimum dimension of 50 mm2. Sleeves should be provided to ensure that the leads cannot bend
sharply at the lugs.
5.14.3 The operator earth mat shall be bonded to the operating handle using a PVC insulated earthing
conductor.
5.14.4 The operator mat shall not be directly bonded to the earth grid.
5.14.5 The operator mat shall be large enough to allow an operator to remain on the mat during operation
of the disconnector and earth switch.
5.14.6 The mat may be embedded into a concrete pad or installed on top of a concrete pad.
5.14.7 An equipotential bonding point shall be created near the mechanism box of manually operated
disconnectors and earth switches. The following shall be bonded to this equipotential point:
(a) The linkage (operating) rod.
(b) The mechanism box.
5.14.8 The earthing blades of earth switches shall be bonded to the earth grid with a separate earthing
conductor rated for the full fault current.
5.14.9 The support post/structure for the earth switches and disconnectors shall be bonded to the earth grid
at one location.
5.15
REINFORCED CONCRETE PADS AND HOLDING-DOWN BOLT CAGES
5.15.1 Bonding of concrete pads reinforcing should be considered as part of the design.
5.15.2 Typically, small reinforced concrete pads (covering an area less than 2 m2) are not required to be
bonded to the earth grid. Reinforcing of larger pads shall be bonded to the earth grid. Bonding shall
be achieved at one location only and a re-bar which is tied to many other re-bars should be selected.
5.15.3 Holding-down bolt cages are not required to be bonded to earth.
5.16
BUILDINGS
5.16.1 All metal components of substation buildings, including cladding, shall be bonded to the earth grid.
5.16.2 Reinforced concrete floors shall be bonded to the earth grid at 5 m intervals.
5.16.3 Adequate earthing straps should be provided within buildings containing primary equipment such as
switchgear for earthing of the equipment. At least two earthing connections shall be provided
between these earthing straps and the earth grid.
5.16.4 Metallic cable duct edging shall be bonded to earth.
5.17
FENCES
5.17.1 Switchyard security fences should be bonded to the earth grid unless it is advantageous not to bond
the fence to the earth grid for touch voltage hazard reasons. Careful consideration of all safety
aspects shall be carried out before making the decision of not bonding the fence to the earth grid.
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5.17.2 Bonding of fences shall be carried out at intervals not greater than 20 m. Support posts shall be
bonded at least at the corners of the switchyard.
5.17.3 Fences located outside the earth grid and not bonded to the earth grid shall be earthed to a separate
earth conductor or through the support posts. For the effective control of touch voltages on the
fence, the separation distance between the fence and the earth grid outer conductors should be
constant around the perimeter of the fence. Any remaining hazardous touch voltages between
fences located outside the earth grid and not bonded to the earth grid shall be mitigated following
the Deterministic Method or shall be assessed using the Probabilistic Method.
5.18
LIGHTNING SHIELDING AND LIGHTING
5.18.1 To create an effective pathway for transient over voltages due to lightning, the conductor connecting the
earth grid to an OHEW is as straight as possible.
5.18.2 The lightning protection system shall be designed as a separate system.
5.18.3 It is common practice in switchyards to use the station earthing system as the lightning earth
termination system. The lightning earth termination system may be a separate system but should be
bonded to the station earth grid. Isolation between the lightning earth termination system and the
station earth grid is permitted but is not recommended because in most situations it would not be
possible to maintain adequate isolation levels to prevent side flashes.
5.18.4 Lighting poles should form part of the shielding system for the lightning protection of the substation.
5.18.5 All lighting and lightning poles shall be bonded the earth grid.
5.18.6 It is not necessary to install a separate earthing conductor to the top of metallic lighting and lightning
poles.
5.18.7 Wooden lightning poles will require an earthing conductor between the rod at the top of the poles
and the earth grid.
5.18.8 Concrete poles may require an earthing conductor if there is not sufficient earthing integral in the
pole itself through the re-bar or internal earthing conductors.
5.18.9 Earthing conductors for lightning protection shall have a minimum cross sectional area of 35 mm2.
Larger earthing conductors may be required if the conductors are required to also carry significant
earth fault currents.
5.18.10 Lightning protection and quantitative analysis on the effects of lightning surges are beyond the scope of
this standard.
5.19
PORTABLE EARTHING CONNECTIONS
5.19.1 Terminals for the application of portable earths shall be provided to ensure that all equipment phase
terminals can be easily and effectively earthed.
5.19.2 The attachment points for the tail clamps should be designed to allow for easy connection of the
clamps.
5.19.3 It is usual practice to provide one tail clamp connection point for each head connection terminal.
However where equipment is compactly designed it may be possible to use one tail clamp connection
point. If a single connection point is used it is located so that the connection of earthing leads does not
interfere with maintenance activities.
5.20
CONTROL CABINET EARTHS/ ODJBS
5.20.1 The steelwork/chassis of each control cabinet shall be bonded to the earthing system in the control
room.
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5.20.2 An earth bar or stud shall be provided in the cabinet for the earthing of the cabinet to the earthing
system.
5.20.3 The cabinet steelwork shall be earthed using either an insulated 16 mm2 stranded earth wire or a 20
x 4 mm strap bolted to an 8 mm earthing stud welded to the cabinet interior or bolted directly to the
cabinet earthing terminal.
5.20.4 The equipment in each cabinet shall be earthed to the control cabinet earth bar or stud.
5.20.5 A minimum earthing conductor size of 2.5 mm2 PVC insulated copper is recommended for the
equipment earths.
5.20.6 For equipment which have separate technical/functional earth terminals (ie separate from the
equipment chassis earth) consideration should be given to connecting the technical earths from
each switchboard or group of cabinets to the station earth at one point only. This would require the
use of insulated earthing conductors and insulated earth terminals/bars.
5.20.7 Cabinet doors shall be bonded to the main cabinet steelwork unless the door is made mostly of
glass, in which case it may not be necessary to bond the cabinet door.
5.21
EARTHING OF CABLES WITHIN THE EARTH GRID
5.21.1 Screened twisted pair cabling for use in SCADA and data acquisition (DA) systems
The steel wire armour of SCADA and DA multicore cables should be earthed at both ends via glands
or metal clamps and the gland plates should be bonded to the station earth mat.
The copper screens of cables in series or radial connections must be securely interconnected using
4 mm PVC insulated cable and bonded to earth at a single point. In the outdoor junction box
(ODJB), the screen of the incoming cables should be connected only to those outgoing cables which
receive their cores.
5.21.2 Control, protection, instrumentation and 400 V power cables
The steel wire armour multicore cables should be earthed at both ends via glands or metal clamps
and the gland plates should be bonded to the station earth mat.
A spare core in a multicore cable should not be used as an earth wire. This is to minimise the
possibility of fault current flowing through it during system earth faults and damaging the cable by
overheating.
The screens of the multipair instrumentation cables must be earthed at a single point typically
located in the control building. If the screen of the same cable were to be earthed at a different part
of the station, current that could damage the screen could flow through the screen.
5.22
TRANSFORMER NEUTRAL EARTHING
5.22.1 The earthing of the power system neutral:

(a) Provides an earth reference for the power system;
(b) Prevents abnormal system over-voltages during intermittent earth faults; and
(c) Permits the selective operation of current operated earth fault protection.
5.22.2 Power system neutral earthing shall comprise one of the following connections:
(a) A solid connection, usually to the neutral terminal transformer star connected winding.
(b) An impedance connection employing a resistance, a reactance, a Petersen Coil, an earthing
transformer or a combination of earthing transformer and resistance.
5.22.3 For solidly earthed transformers, the neutral busbar and support insulators, if installed, and the
neutral conductor shall be adequately insulated if required to obtain a single point bond. The neutral
earthing conductor shall be rated for the full expected earth fault current.
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5.22.4 For impedance earthed transformers, the neutral earthing conductor system shall be insulated for
the maximum anticipated neutral point voltage.
5.22.5 Even if a connection of the neutral to the earth grid is provided through an impedance/resistance,
the earthing conductor shall be rated for the full expected earth fault current.
5.23
GENERATOR NEUTRAL EARTHING
5.23.1 A special situation exists in the case of generator neutral earthing. In these cases it is often
desirable to provide a relatively high impedance connection to earth in order to minimize the fault
current that would flow in the event of an earth fault. This reduces the risk of significant damage to
the stator windings or, worse still, the stator laminations, under earth fault conditions.
5.23.2 However, if the earth resistance is too high, this can lead to transient overvoltages occurring during
an earth fault because of the effects of winding capacitance.
5.23.3 For high voltage stator windings, a common approach is to apply a two winding Neutral Earthing
Transformer (NET) to the generator stator neutral terminal with a low voltage secondary resistor
chosen so that the reflected impedance in the primary side of the transformer is equal to the total
capacitive reactance of the generators and their associated cabling and unit transformers. This
provides sufficient damping to minimise the likelihood of transient overvoltages while at the same
time minimising the prospective fault energy within the stator windings.
5.23.4 Furthermore, to reduce the risk of earth fault current contributions from the connected network, a
delta winding is often used on the generator side of the unit transformer, to ensure that the only
source of zero sequence current is via the high impedance NET.
5.23.5 It is important not to create a potential earth loop path by having both the generator and transformer
generator-side neutral points (if a star winding is used) simultaneously earthed as this would allow
potentially high levels of third harmonic triplen currents to flow in the stator and transformer leading
to increased losses and possibly thermal damage if the equipment is not appropriately derated.
5.24
VOLTAGE TRANSFORMERS AND CAPACITOR VOLTAGE TRANSFORMERS
5.24.1 The primary neutral of outdoor voltage transformers (VT) and the neutral end of the capacitor in a
capacitor voltage transformer (CVT) should be bonded to the earth grid directly or through its
supporting structure. Bonding shall not be made through bolted flanges since these cannot be relied
upon to provide adequate bonding. Earthing jumpers should be used across bolted flanges. Neutral
earthing for a group of VTs shall be made either individually or first to a common point before being
bonded to the earth grid.
5.25
VT/CT SECONDARY CIRCUITS
5.25.1 Voltage and current transformer secondary circuit neutrals shall be earthed via an isolating link at
one point for a 3-phase set.
5.25.2 It may be necessary to parallel current transformer secondaries e.g. for bus zone protection. In this
situation the secondary circuit shall be earthed at one point only.
5.25.3 Delta-connected secondary windings shall have one phase earthed.
5.26
400/230 V SYSTEM
5.26.1 400/230 V systems within the boundaries of a substation should comply with the requirements of
AS/NZS 3000 except that:
(a) Separate earth conductors shall not be run between the main switchboard and subswitchboards since these are usually not rated for the expected fault current.
(b) A neutral to earth link shall not be inserted in the main switchboard.
(c) A neutral to earth link shall not be inserted in sub-switchboards.
5.26.2 The earth bar in the main switchboard and sub-switchboards shall be bonded to the earth grid.
5.26.3 If a substation has a local service supply from outside the substation, significant earth fault currents
may flow over the neutral conductor from the substation to the external MEN system or from the
Page 56
external MEN system to the substation. Also, the transfer of the full station EGVR to an external
MEN system should be considered. Significant EGVR may be transferred in this way to residential
or commercial properties connected to the external MEN system. The frequency of EPR events at
the station may create high risk for consumers connected to the external MEN system.
5.26.4 The neutral conductor from the local service supply outside the substation must be rated to carry the
full expected earth fault current.
5.27
CONDUCTOR AND JOINT SPECIFICATION
5.27.1 Earthing system conductors shall be sufficiently large to:

(a) Minimize the probability of mechanical damage;
(b) Minimize the consequence of minor corrosion; and
(c) Provide adequate current carrying capacity.
5.27.2 If necessary earthing systems should be upgraded where fault levels increase above the original
design level.
5.27.3 The required conductor size shall be calculated as defined in section 2.11 or using the method from
IEEE Std 80 or an equivalent standard.
5.27.4 All buried earthing conductors shall comprise copper conductors except in areas where corrosion
may be an issue. Suitable metals shall be selected for these areas.
5.27.5 The rating of the main earth grid conductor shall be calculated using a value of 70% of the maximum
earth fault current defined in section 5.6.
5.27.6 All buried earthing conductors shall have a minimum size of 50 mm2.
5.27.7 For the connections between HV equipment and the grid, the size of the earthing conductor shall be
based on the maximum earth fault current (100%). For structures that do not support energised
equipment, such as a fence, or sheet metal cladding on a building etc. the conductor shall be
appropriately sized taking a reasonable estimate of current share and the size of the metal being
bonded into account, but shall not be less than 50 mm2.
5.27.8 All equipment earthing conductors providing the connection to the earth grid shall have a minimum
size of 50 mm2.
5.27.9 The design fault time for all sizing calculations shall be as defined in section 5.7.
5.28
EARTHING OF CABLE WITHIN THE EARTH GRID
5.28.1 The screens of three core cables may be bonded to earth at both ends provided the screens are
rated for the full expected fault current that may flow.
5.28.2 The screens of single core cables shall not be bonded to earth at both ends if:
(a) The screens are not rated for the earth fault current which is expected to flow.
(b) The cable is not adequately rated taking into account circulating currents in the screens.
5.28.3 The screens of control, protection and communications cables shall be bonded to earth at one end
only.
5.28.4 If the screen of a control, instrumentation or fibre optic cable is not connected to earth at a cable
termination within the earth grid then it shall be adequately insulated from earth and not exposed to
touch.
5.29
FEEDER CABLES
5.29.1 There are advantages and disadvantages in earthing the screens of feeder cables at both ends.
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5.29.2 Bonding the screens to earth at both ends will result in earth fault current and EPR transfer to and
from the substation.
5.29.3 The effects of the transfer of earth fault current and EPR shall be considered as part of the design.
5.29.4 Bonding to earth of feeder cable screens at both ends may be considered if it is advantageous from
an EPR transfer point of view.
5.29.5 Where bonding of feeder cable screens at both ends is implemented for single core cables, ensure
that the cables are rated to take into account the effects of the circulating currents in the screens.
5.29.6 The screens of feeder cables bonded to earth at both ends shall be rated for the full expected earth
fault currents.
5.29.7 If it is not advantageous to bond a cable screen at both ends, then two options exist:
(a) The screen can be bonded to the station earth grid and isolated at the remote end; or
(b) The screen can be bonded at the remote end and isolated at the station end.
5.29.8 The isolated end of the cable requires enough isolation to ensure that a flashover does not occur
during an earth fault. Typical isolation level is 25 kV a.c for one minute as a minimum standard.
5.29.9 The isolation device shall be tested at the required voltage level for one minute.
5.29.10 When deciding which end of a cable screen should be isolated consideration shall be given to the
detection of an earth fault in the event of a cable fault.
5.29.11 Old cables that have no effective insulation over their screens cannot usually have their screens
isolated at one end.
5.29.12 These old cables often provide very good earthing for the substation and the design of the earth grid
shall be revisited if one or more of these old cables are replaced with new XLPE type cables.
5.29.13 If surge arresters are installed on a feeder cable termination to an overhead line, the screens shall
be bonded to the surge arresters and to earth.
5.29.14 Cross-bonding of long cable screens may be carried out in order to limit induced screen voltages
and screen circulating currents
5.30
OHEW
5.30.1 When considering the design of the earth grid and hazard mitigation, the effects from having
external OHEWs bonded to the earth grid should be considered. The design should aim for the
safest outcome, depending on whether the OHEWs are bonded or not.
5.30.2 OHEWs within the station shall be electrically connected to the station earth grid. If isolation is
required, this should be provided outside the switchyard.
5.30.3 Earth fault current flow along the OHEWs should be taken into consideration as part of the design
when calculating earth grid return currents.
5.30.4 The transfer of EPR hazards from the earth grid to the tower/pole bases shall be considered as part
of the design as well as the reduction in risk associated with earth faults at towers/poles with having
the OHEWs bonded to the station earth grid.
5.30.5 OHEW should be bonded to the terminal structure and to earth grid either through the terminal
structure or through a separate earthing conductor.
5.30.6 It is recommended to install a single disc insulator between each OHEW and the terminal gantry with
the bonding conductor bridging the insulator. This is required to prevent current flow through the
termination hardware.
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5.31
POWER STATIONS, CUSTOMER SUBSTATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS
5.31.1 Where a HV a.c stations are situated immediately adjacent to other stations, customer substations,
and large industrial sites, it is common practice to combine the earthing systems. This is beneficial
as it effectively creates a larger grid for the dissipation of fault current and the reduction in the
resistance to remote earth, thereby lessening the magnitude of the earthing requirement at both
installations. In some cases, particularly for small sites, care is required to ensure that no hazardous
voltages are transferred off-site onto the customers network.5
5.31.2 Earthing connections between physically separated earth grids (or parts of an earth grid) must be
comprised of at least two conductors connected to separate locations at each earth grid. Each
conductor must be rated for the maximum fault current that could flow between the earth grids.
5.31.3 Approval of other parties may be required.
5.32
INSTALLATION AND COMMISSIONING
5.32.1 Special precautions are taken when installing earthing components near underground services and
as such, details on the location of these services are provided in the design.
5.32.2 Typical underground services include water supply and fire fighting facilities, storm-water and
sewage drains, pipes, earthing, power, control, and communication cables.
Prior to commissioning, the installed earthing system is tested to:
(a) Ensure the integrity of the system i.e. ensure that the connections are correctly terminated and
continuity to the earth grid is complete;
(b) Validate the position of the relevant EPR contours;
(c) Validate the EPR safety of the design and confirm that the actual earth grid resistance to remote
earth is in accordance with the calculated design value.
The designer ensures that these tests can be easily and economically applied to the proposed earth
system.
5.33
5.33.1 The integrity of the earthing system should be verified by appropriate periodic inspections and tests.
environmental conditions and assessment of risk eg soil conditions, copper theft, etc.
5.33.2 The integrity of the earth bonding conductors should be tested at each HV a.c. station at regular
intervals. These tests should include all primary and secondary plants and in particular, the HV
switchgear and transformer neutral connections. Continuity tests should be carried out to a common
reference point (or several common reference points depending on the size of the substation) using
a micro-ohmmeter. Expect a resistance of less than 10 m per bond test.
5.33.3 Records of all tests and designs shall be maintained by the asset owner.
5.33.4 The recommended test and inspection intervals should not exceed those detailed in Table 9.
Note further information on the earthing of power stations and large industrial sites is contained in IEEE Std 142
Recommended Practice for Grounding of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems.
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Table 5: HV a.c. Station Routine Inspection Plan

Description
Visual inspection
to ensure integrity
of system
components
above ground
Frequency
1-2 years
Test to ensure
electrical integrity
5-10 years
Review of
earthing system
10-16 years
Description
Visual check of primary and
secondary plant earth conductors
and connections, and ground
surface.
Resistance measurement of primary
and secondary plant
earthing/bonding connections.
Substation earth resistance, and
touch and step voltage measurement
by current injection.
Complete review of zone substation
earthing, including check of fault
level, test results, risk analysis, and
applicable standards. Visual
inspection of buried conductors may
be required if inspection and test
results indicate issues.
Comments
Check earth conductors and connections for
physical damage, looseness and corrosion.
Check integrity of surface, i.e. weeds,
consistency/thickness of crushed rock.
Particular attention should be given to areas
of new installations or excavated areas and
to areas where the theft of copper may be an
issue.
For bond tests, record all plant to a common
reference point. Expect < 10 milliohms per
bond test.
This review should be completed earlier if

significant network or site works are
undertaken.
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SECTION 6 DISTRIBUTION CENTRES AND EQUIPMENT

6.1
INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, Electricity Regulations required Network Companies to provide a MEN system
neutral impedance to earth of 10 or less.
The origin of the requirement to achieve 10 is obscure. This requirement does little to ensure
electrical safety, and has resulted in distribution centre earth electrodes which are large and
expensive without significant safety gained from EPR hazards. The large earth electrodes
often required to achieve 10 meant that interference with third party assets was unduly increased.
With the removal of the requirement to achieve 10 , more flexibility is provided for the design of an
earth electrode to optimise cost and better manage the risk associated with EPR events, not only for
the equipment connected to the earth electrode but also for third party equipment.
6.2
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR DISTRIBUTION CENTRES AND EQUIPMENT EARTHING

SYSTEMS
An earthing system for a distribution centre and equipment should be designed and installed to
effectively handle the expected maximum earth fault current and to limit EPR voltages so that there
is no significant risk of injury or death to any person over the planned lifetime of the installation.
To achieve this, the following requirements shall be met.
6.2.1
faults and either clearing the fault or minimising the resulting fault current.
(c) Control of EPR transferred onto third party services, plant and staff (i.e. telecommunications,
railways, pipelines, etc.) in accordance with Electricity Regulations, applicable standards and
guidelines.
6.2.2
6.3
DESIGN ASPECTS
The performance requirements shall be considered as part of the design of earthing systems for
distribution centres and equipment.
6.3.1
Proper functioning of electrical protective devices.

The first performance requirement is to ensure the proper functioning of electrical protective devices.
For a protection system which detects the earth fault current and disconnects the supply, it is
important to ensure that where possible enough fault current flows to earth. The magnitude of the
earth fault current depends on the resistance of the earthing system associated with the faulted site.
Guidelines on how to achieve adequate resistances are provided in section 6.4.
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6.3.2
Manage the risks associated with EPR hazards

The second performance requirement involves managing the risk from EPR hazards associated with
earthing systems of distribution centres and equipment. This risk may be managed either by the
Probabilistic Method or the Deterministic Method.
It is usually not practical and economical to carry out specific earthing design for each site except if
the risk determined according to the EEA Guide to Risk Based Earthing Design has been
determined as high or at the high end of the intermediate band.
Typically, the Probabilistic Method is used to determine the risks associated with typical locations
around the network. Installations in similar locations are usually grouped into broad categories and
the risk calculated for each category. Based on the risk applicable to a category, mitigation
measures are determined for all installations in this category.
If it is not desirable to use the Probabilistic Method, the Deterministic Method may be used and the
installations or group of installations would be classified either as Special Locations or Normal
Locations.
Further information and guidelines are presented in section 6.5.
6.3.3
Control of transferred EPR hazards

EPR on earthing systems can cause hazardous voltages to be transferred into third party equipment
such as telecommunication equipment or pipelines or railway lines where these are located in the
vicinity of the earthing system. Because telecommunication circuits, railway signalling circuits and
pipelines are typically referenced to remote earth, the transferred voltages may be large depending
on the value of the EPR voltage.
The issue of transferred voltages to third party equipment needs to be discussed with the relevant
third party representative. Typically, when considering mitigation of hazardous voltages transferred
onto third party equipment the Deterministic Method is applied. In some circumstances, the
Probabilistic Method could be used provided the third party representatives are in agreement.
Additional information is provided in section 6.6.
6.4
RELIABLE DETECTION AND CLEARANCE OF HV EARTH FAULTS

ER 60 (1) (a) requires that works must incorporate an earthing system that ensures the effective
operation of protection fittings in the event of earth fault currents.
In an alternating current system which relies on earth fault current detection and disconnection of the
supply in the event of an earth fault, the earth fault current at a faulted site shall be such as to
ensure the correct operation of the protective devices which disconnect the supply.
Where fuses are used for protection, the impedance of the earthing system at a faulted site should
be such as to ensure operation of the fuses.
Where it is not economical or practical to achieve a low enough impedance of the earthing system at
a faulted site to ensure fuses operation in a timely manner, the impedance of the earthing system
shall be such as to ensure operation of the feeder protection.
The earth fault current flowing at a faulted site depends on the impedance of the earth fault current
path. Impedance of earth fault current paths for distribution systems may include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
The transformer winding impedance (source impedance);

The impedance of source substation earth grid;
The impedance of any NER or neutral impedance device;
The impedance of the distribution system phase conductor;
The impedance of the return earth path between the location of the fault and the distribution
centre earth electrode; and
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(f)
The impedance of the earthing system at the faulted site including the MEN system impedance.
Where segregated HV and LV earthing is used, the impedance of the HV earthing system at the
faulted site shall not include the LV MEN system.
A minimum factor of safety of two (2) shall be used when calculating the required resistance at the
distribution centre or the distribution equipment for the required protective device operating values.
This means that the calculated resistance shall be divided by the safety factor of two. This allows a
safety margin for events like seasonal variation in soil resistivity, physical damage to the earthing
system, or possible corrosion to part of the earthing system.
6.4.1
Fuse Operation
Fuses are installed on distribution centres and equipment and where possible, some Network
Companies prefer to have an earth fault on an item of equipment cleared by the fuses rather than by
the feeder protection. This is to ensure continuity of supply for consumers not directly affected by
the fault.
The following example shows how the resistance of the earth electrode at the faulted site is
calculated to ensure that fuses clear the fault before the feeder protection operates.
Example:
A 100 kVA, 11 kV transformer is protected by a set of T link fuses. Typically, the fuses may be rated
at 10 A for this size of transformer. The protection on this feeder at the zone substation is set to
operate at 20 A and in 1 s. The following criteria apply to this example:
(a) The transformer is located 10 km from the zone substation.
(b) The source transformer is a 10 MVA 8% with a solidly earthed neutral and has an impedance XS
of approximately 1j .
(c) The conductor is Gopher with a series resistance of 1 /km.
(d) The conductor impedance for earth fault calculations is approximately 1 + 0.4j per km with a
total impedance ZL = (RL + XL) of 10 + 4j for 10 km of line.
(e) The zone substation earth grid has a resistance RZone of 1 .
Typical total clearing time-current characteristics curve show that the 10T fuses require the following
currents IFuse to operate in the time indicated:
(a) 180 A, 0.2 s
(b) 92 A, 0.75 s
Ignoring the phase angle between the voltage and current, the total impedance ZT of the earth fault
current path is then:
ZT = |XS + RZone + ZL + RSite + RFault| = Vph/IFuse
= [(RZone + RL + RSite + RFault)2 + (XS +XL)2]
For the purposes of this calculation, it has been assumed that the impedance of the fault RFault is a
maximum of 1 .
To ensure that a fuse clears an earth fault in 0.2 s, the maximum allowed resistance for the earth
electrode at the faulted site is then approximately:
RSite
= [(Vph/IFuse)2 (XS +XL)2] - (RZone + RL + RFault)

= [(6,350V / 180A)2 (1j + 4j)2] (1 + 10 +1)
= 23
The above calculation does not allow for a safety factor of two as specified in section 6.4. Taking
into consideration the safety factor, the maximum allowed resistance for the earth electrode at the
faulted site is then approximately:
RSite
= 10 (0.2 s clearing time)
Page 63
This may not be easy to achieve in practice and a longer fault clearing time may be considered.
Repeating the calculations for a fault clearing time of 0.75 s gives the following maximum allowed
resistance for the earth electrode at the faulted site:
RSite
= 28 (0.75 s clearing time)
For a transformer connected to an MEN system, the resistances calculated above include the
resistance of the MEN system. If the MEN system is reasonably large, and the soil resistivity is
reasonably low, these resistances may be achievable with limited expenses and effort.
Discrimination between fuses and main protection may be difficult to achieve in practice. For
instance, in many rural networks one or more consecutive reclosers could be present on a
distribution line and the earth fault protection for each of these devices needs to be graded both in
terms of earth fault current and operating time. Often the final recloser could have an earth fault
setting as low as 5 A with an operating time of 0.4 seconds while distribution transformers further
down the line could be protected with 20 A fuses, depending on the transformer size. In this
situation, it would be impractical to provide discrimination through reducing the substation earth
electrode resistance because of the extremely low, and often unachievable values of resistance that
would be required.
Further negative impacts that can result from installing an extensive ground electrode to try and
achieve a very low resistance include substantially increased costs and much larger equipotential
contours that can increase the risk of damage to nearby telecommunication equipment.
6.4.2
Feeder Protection Operation

The example in section 6.4.1 illustrates that, for many situations, relatively low resistances are
required at the faulted equipment site to ensure that fuses clear an earth fault before the main feeder
protection operates. These low resistances may be difficult and expensive to achieve in practice
even if the resistance of a connected MEN system was included.
In many situations, it will not be possible to rely on the fuses and the main feeder protection will have
to be relied on to clear the earth fault.
The following example shows how the resistance of the earth electrode at the faulted site is
calculated to ensure that the fault is cleared by the feeder protection.
Example:
In this example, an 11 kV distribution system is considered:
Typical NZ HV earth fault protection settings are:
Rural
6A
Urban 40 A
The maximum earth fault total path impedance for 11 kV systems becomes:
Rural 6,350/ 6 = 1,058
Urban 6,350/40 = 159
It would be extremely rare for the sum of the Zone Substation earth grid impedance, Zone
Substation transformer source impedance and the 11 kV line (cable) impedance (for the earth fault
current path), to exceed:
Rural 60
Urban 10
For the HV earthing system of the distribution centre or equipment (including any bonded LV MEN
system) and the fault arc, this leaves a maximum impedance of:
Rural < 998
Urban < 149
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Applying the safety factor of two as specified in section 6.4, the maximum resistance allowed for the
earthing system of the distribution centre or equipment is:
Rural < 500
Urban < 75
Additional safety factors may be applied if Network Companies feel that these are required.
The above maximum distribution transformer HV earthing system earth impedance limits apply to
the earth impedance of the distribution transformer HV earthing system including any bonded LV
MEN systems and other HV earths.
Similar calculations can be carried out for 6.6 and 22 kV systems.
6.5
EPR RISK MANAGEMENT

Managing the risk associated with EPR hazards on and around distribution centres and equipment
earthing systems involves the use of the Probabilistic Method or the Deterministic Method.
The Probabilistic Method is typically used to identify risk associated with categories of structures
which are grouped according to their broad locations and the expected exposure of people to
hazards at these broad locations. A risk assessment of a complete network may be the starting
point in identifying which categories of installations may or may not require mitigation. For example,
small installations in rural areas where exposure to EPR hazards would be minimal may not require
any mitigation of EPR hazards if the risk associated with these installations is identified as low.
Once structures or group of structures which require mitigation have been identified, the Probabilistic
Method may be applied until the risk is deemed to be acceptable. Alternatively, if desired, the
Deterministic Method may be applied to mitigate the hazards to ensure that the risk is acceptable.
For the purposes of evaluating the risk associated with earth faults on earthed HV structures and
when considering mitigation measures for these structures, an understanding of the magnitude and
size of the hazard areas is required. This may be achieved through measurements of step and
touch voltage hazards on or through modelling of the affected structures using sophisticated
software.
In this section, typical data is provided on the expected EGVR for typical distribution systems and on
the magnitude of associated touch voltages. The extent of hazardous step voltage areas around
structures is also provided for typical structures and associated earthing systems. The step voltage
hazard areas are based on limits calculated using a top soil layer of 100 -m for a fault clearing time
of 1 s and effectively give an indication of the expected maximum areas for each voltage level.
Mitigation measures are also discussed.
6.5.1
Maximum EGVR on the HV Earthing System

The EGVR on the earthing system of distribution centres and equipment during an earth fault
depends on the various factors including:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
The source transformer impedance.

The earth grid resistance of the source substation.
Additional neutral impedance (ie NER, etc).
The impedance of the earthing system at the faulted site.
The impedance of the interconnecting line or cable (which is dependent on the length).
On 11 kV rural feeders (and possibly some urban lines also) the EGVR at faulted sites is typically in
the range 1 kVrms to 6.3 kVrms (see Figure 14).
Page 65
Figure 14: Typical EGVR at 11 kV Faulted Sites

Figure 14 are based on the following parameter values:
(a) Zone substation earth grid resistance = 0.2
(b) Prospective earth fault current = 10 kA (lower prospective earth fault currents do not make a
significant difference except close to the substation)
(c) No NER
(d) Line conductor impedance = 0.4 + 0.4j per km
(e) 0 ohm arc resistance
For 22 kV distribution networks, the typical EGVR values will be double those shown in Figure 14.
The maximum EGVR on the HV plant earthing system, HV conductive pole (concrete or steel), or
distribution transformer earthing system will have a big impact on the requirements (b) and (c) of
section 6.2.1.
This maximum EGVR can be controlled by:
(a) Installing a Petersen coil at the source Zone Substation.
This virtually eliminates the earth fault current and the resulting EGVR.
(b) Installing a NER at the source Zone Substation.
This limits the maximum earth fault current level, but the reduction may not always be significant and
may not always result in a site which is safe from EPR hazards. This issue was previously
discussed in section 4.3.
Many distribution centres and other structures such as concrete or steel poles which are not
connected to extensive MEN systems, are likely to have relatively high earth electrode resistances
(> 50 ) in many areas of New Zealand with the result that a typical NER (10 50 ) will have a
limited effects on reducing EPR for these sites. Additional measures for controlling EPR hazards will
often be required in these areas. However, urban distribution centres, and other HV earthing
systems, bonded to an extensive interconnected urban MEN system, will typically have very low
earth impedances (0.1 - 3 ). Even relatively low impedance NERs can have a major impact on
reducing the maximum EPR on these earthing systems. The use of NERs for the control of EPR
hazards should be investigated on a case by case basis.
(c) Bonding the HV earth (or HV conductive pole) to an extensive interconnected MEN system.
Page 66
This lowers the effective impedance to earth of the earthing system. In some specific situations (ie
high risk situations), this may be very effective.
(d) Interconnection of isolated pockets of MEN systems to each other via the neutral.
This creates a much larger MEN system in urban areas and lowers the impedance to earth of the
earthing system.
(e) Using an overhead earth wire to bond the HV earth (or HV conductive pole) to other HV earths
and/or HV conductive poles, and possibly also back to the source Zone Substation earth grid.
This lowers the effective impedance to earth of the earthing system. However, the earth fault
frequency will increase for the bonded sites, since a fault at any of the HV earths (or HV conductive
poles) will result in EPR at ALL of the bonded sites. If the reduction in resistance gained does not
have a significant impact on reducing the EPR, the risk may increase resulting in a worse situation.
When considering this option, the risk should be carefully assessed.
In many cases, it is unlikely that bonding a few HV earths or conductive poles together will reduce
the effective impedance sufficiently to make a significant difference to the EPR unless the overhead
earth wire is bonded back to the source substation earth grid.
Note: A reduction in the impedance of an earthing system can be effective in reducing the EPR
hazards. However, as mentioned previously in section 4.1, the fault current increases as the
impedance decreases and the effectiveness of the reduction depends on the impedance of the
earthing system relative to the total earth fault circuit impedance. For the reduction to be effective,
the reduced impedance needs to be low compared to the other impedances in the faulted circuit.
Therefore, care should be taken to ensure that any method used to reduce the impedance of the
earthing system is effective.
6.5.2
Touch Voltage Hazards on Faulted Structures

Touch voltages around an earthed structure depend on the EGVR at the structure and on the size of
the earthing system. They can be estimated as a percentage of the EGVR for various combinations
of structures and electrodes. Typical touch voltage values as a percentage of the EGVR on
structures, for the case of homogeneous soil resistivity, are shown in Table 6.
Two types of earth electrodes have been considered:
(a) The electrode is located along a straight line on both sides of the pole or kiosk
(b) The electrode is located along a straight line on one side of a pole or kiosk
The effect of having a gradient control conductor around a pole or kiosk reduces the touch voltage
on the structure and this effect is also shown in Table 6.
Typically, touch voltages as a percentage of the EGVR vary between 40% and 70% on structures
where gradient control conductors are not used. If one gradient control conductor is buried (0.5m
deep) one metre away from the structure, the touch voltage as a percentage of EGVR will vary
between 25% and 30%. With two gradient conductors, at one metre and two metres away from the
structure, it is possible to reduce the touch voltages to approximately 15%.
Page 67
Table 6: Typical Touch Voltages as a Percentage of EGVR

Site Type
Conductive pole without additional
earthing
Pole
35%
Pole with two gradient

control conductors

earthing and with two gradient
conductors (1 and 2 m out)
Kiosk
Kiosk with electrodes on two sides

Pole mounted equipment with rods on
two sides
Pole
Kiosk with electrodes on one side
Rod
Pole mounted equipment with

electrode on one side
Rod
20%
Rod
50%
Rod
40%
Kiosk
Pole
Kiosk with gradient
control conductor
Kiosk with electrode on both sides and

one gradient control conductor
Rod
Pole with gradient
control conductor
Pole mounted equipment with

electrodes on two sides and one
gradient control conductor
Pole mounted transformer with

electrode on one side and one gradient
control conductor
60%
Pole with one gradient

control conductor

earthing and with one gradient
conductor (1 m out)
Kiosk with electrodes on one side and

one gradient control conductor
Typical Touch Voltage

as %EGVR
Typical Electrode
Rod
Rod
Kiosk with gradient

control conductor
Pole mounted transformer or kiosk with

electrode on both sides and two
gradient control conductors
60%
25%
25%
30%
Pole with gradient

control conductor
Rod
60%
30%
Pole with two gradient

control conductors
Rod
15%
In the above table the following parameters apply:

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
6.5.3
The conductive pole has a footing of 1.5 m to 3 m deep up to 0.3 m diameter.

The first gradient control conductor is at 1 m spacing from the pole or kiosk.
The second gradient control conductor is at 2 m spacing from the pole or kiosk.
The electrodes are made up of driven earth rods interconnected with bare copper wire.
Step Voltage Hazards around Faulted Sites

In this section, typical sizes of step voltage hazard areas have been estimated around poles without
additional earthing and around earth electrodes associated with equipment. These areas may be
used in assessing the risk, but when applying the Deterministic approach, actual step voltage
hazards should be calculated.
The sizes of step voltage hazard areas have been estimated using the worst case parameters to
obtain the maximum possible sizes. For example, the calculations are based on a maximum phase
Page 68
to earth voltage being present on the conductive pole or on the earth electrode. In many cases, the
EGVR will be lower than the phase to earth voltages and detailed in section 6.5.1 and these areas of
step voltage hazards may not actually exist.
The radii of hazardous step voltage areas around conductive poles (without additional earthing) for
various system voltages are shown in Table 7. Shoe impedance has not been included in these
step voltage calculations as recommended in section 3.8.2. These radii have been determined
using a worst case soil resistivity model i.e. a high resistivity layer on top of a much lower resistivity
layer.
Table 7: Radius of Step Voltage Hazard Area around Conductive Poles
System Voltage
(kV)
11
22
33
Radius of Hazardous Step Voltage Area (m)

Earth Fault Clearing Time = 1.5 s
1.5
0
2
1
2.5
1.5
Table 7 shows that the areas of step voltage hazards around poles are very small and in some
cases, it may be possible to ignore these hazards.
For step voltage hazards around earth electrodes associated with transformers and other
equipment, it is not as simple as specifying the radius around the earth electrode. In these cases,
step voltage hazards zones have been defined as the zone covered by a contour drawn at a
distance from any part of the earth electrode. This is illustrated in Figure 15 for an earth electrode
associated with a transformer kiosk.
Hazardous step
voltage zone
Distance from electrode
Earth electrode
(plan view)
Driven rod
Distance from electrode
Figure 15: Hazardous Step Voltage Zone around Electrode

Typical distances between the earth electrode and the end of the hazardous step voltage zone are
shown in Table 8 for various examples of earth electrodes associated with a transformer kiosk. The
electrodes considered consist of multiple driven rods of various lengths with the separation between
the rods equal to the length of the rods. Shoe impedance has not been included.
Table 8: Extent of Step Voltage Hazard Zone around Earth Electrodes
Earth
Electrode
2 x 1.8 m
2x5m
4x5m
10 x 5 m
Distance to Edge of Hazardous Step Voltage Area (m)

11 kV
22 kV
33 kV
11 kV
22 kV
33 kV
11
2
2.5
0
0
11
0
2
2.5
0
0
0
0
21
21
0
0
0
0
21
21
0
0
0
NOTE 1: Only present on the opposite side of the kiosk to the earth electrode
6.5.4
Touch and Step Voltage Hazards around Occupied Buildings

If a HV fault at a distribution centre results in hazardous EPR appearing on the associated LV MEN,
then touch voltage hazards may be created on conductive objects on the outside of buildings that
are bonded to the LV MEN (e.g. taps). Step voltage hazards are unlikely to be created in the vicinity
of the LV earth electrodes and other metallic objects connected to the MEN.
Page 69
6.5.5
Discussion of Mitigation Measures

Where required, mitigation of EPR should be based on information provided in section 4.
Mitigation of EPR hazards associated with distribution centres and equipment including conductive
poles (concrete and steel) would typically involve the combination of various measures.
NERs can be used to reduce EGVRs on earthing systems and usually have to be used in
conjunction with other mitigation measures. Better reduction in EGVR is obtained with higher
resistance NERs.
Touch voltage hazards may be mitigated using gradient control conductors. Additional mitigation in
the form of surface insulating layers such as crushed rock or asphalt may be used to further reduce
touch voltages. Touch voltages can only exist on earthed structures which can be touched. If a
structure cannot be touched then there is no risk to the public.
Isolation of structures from touch using insulating barriers such as wooden fences or protective
covers can be a very effective mean of mitigating touch voltage hazards. For example, earthed
equipment installed on a wood pole would not have hazardous touch voltage since all metalwork
within 2.5 m of the ground must be insulated. The same requirement applies to concrete poles but
touch voltage hazards may exist on concrete poles because of the conductive nature of the pole.
Step voltages are more difficult to mitigate than touch voltages. However, Section 6.5.3 has shown
that step voltage hazard areas around distribution transformers and equipment will either be very
small or will not exist. The risk associated with these step voltage hazards will be low for many
cases.
Step voltage hazards may be mitigated by using soil surface treatment such as the application of
crushed rock or asphalt. Restricting access, where possible, to step voltage hazard zones can also
be effective.
Mitigation of hazardous step and touch voltages associated with conductive poles may be difficult to
achieve in practice since the location of the poles often precludes the application of mitigation
measures. With most existing concrete poles it is not possible to make an electrical connection with
the reinforcing steel within the pole. Where it is desirable to mitigate hazardous step and touch
voltages on and around a conductive pole, the use of a wood pole or another non-conductive
material such as fibre-glass or a polymer may be considered in place of the conductive pole.
To mitigate hazardous EPR voltages transferred to the LV MEN system, segregation of HV and LV
earth electrodes may be considered (see section 4.8). This will only be effective if adequate
separation is provided between the HV earth and the LV earth to ensure that the transferred voltage
is within the required limit. Minimum separation distances are given in section 6.7.
In some circumstances, it may be advantageous to apply the TT system of supply to mitigate EPR
hazards. As previously stated special dispensation is required before the system of supply can be
changed from an MEN system to a TT system. Dispensation may be provided on a case by case
basis.
When using the Deterministic Method for the management of the risk associated with EPR hazards,
the following should be considered:
(a) Rural Areas
At customers buildings, where members of the public may touch an external earthed conductive
surface that is quite distant from any associated earthing system, the touch voltage is effectively the
full EPR on the LV MEN. As shown in section 6.5.1, EPR voltage on LV MEN systems connected to
HV earth electrodes may be between 1 kVrms and 6 kVrms.
Practical ways of mitigating hazardous EPR voltages at these customers buildings to anything close
to the required touch voltage limits for Normal or Special Locations are:
(a) Installing a Petersen Coil at the source Zone Substation.
(b) Having separate HV and LV earthing systems at the distribution transformer.
Page 70
(c) Restricting access to the earthed conductive surfaces.

(b) Extensive Interbonded MEN System
In an extensive interbonded MEN network, step and touch voltage limits applicable to Special or
Normal Locations are likely to be achieved without additional mitigation, due to:
(a) The very low earth impedance of the extensive interbonded MEN network.
(b) Direct connections between the extensive interbonded MEN network and the source zone
substation in the form of overhead earth wires or cable screens (where such direct connections
has been provided. This direct connection reduces the HV fault current returning through the
body of the earth and will result in a very low level of EPR on the LV MEN.
(c) HV fault current passing into the body of the earth through the extensive interbonded MEN
network earths will cause the potential in ground between these earthing points to rise, making
any potential gradients in the urban area shallower, and reducing the actual step and touch
voltages.
As a result, a simple HV earthing system comprising only two 1.8 m long earth rods will be all that is
required in many cases, when that HV earthing system is bonded to an extensive urban MEN
system.
An extensive interbonded MEN network should have an overall impedance to earth of less than
0.5 . This can be estimated by determining the resistance of representative sample of single
residential earth electrode resistances and dividing by the number of installations. For cable
networks where screens are bonded at both ends, the objectives may be met with fewer
installations.
(c) Smaller MEN Systems
To control the Touch and Step voltage hazard in areas with limited MEN islands one or more of the
following options may be considered:
(a) Install additional bonding between nearby MEN systems, to achieve an MEN impedance of less
than 0.5 .
(b) Install significant earth fault current limitation (e.g. NERs) to reduce the EPRs.
(c) A combination of the above.
Power Companies may do an audit of MEN interconnections (including any connections to the
source zone substation earth grid) in their urban areas, to identify opportunities to increase and
strengthen these interconnections, especially in multiple directions.
6.6
CONTROL OF DANGEROUS EPR IMPRESSED ON THIRD PARTY ASSETS AND PERSONNEL

During a HV phase to earth fault at a HV earthing system including HV conductive pole and LV MEN
system that is bonded to the HV earthing system, the resultant EGVR on the HV earthing system
can present a hazard to third party network plant, customers and personnel. Further details on EPR
transferred to third party assets have been provided in section 2.7.
This means that electrical systems should not be constructed near third party assets where
interference limits may be exceeded. Therefore, the identification of third party assets and
equipment shall form part of project planning for an earth electrode installation.
Adequate separation distances between electrical systems and telecommunication systems are
required to ensure that interference limits are not exceeded.
The Electricity Act requires that all third party stakeholders shall be notified of any new installation,
modification or extension to the HV network which will affect or is likely to affect third party assets
that are constructed in, on, along, over, across, or under a road. Notification is not required if the
work does not affect the third party asset. Notification should form part of the planning stages for the
intended work. Details of earthing arrangements and any interference mitigation measures
proposed should be included in this notification. Adequate notice should be provided to allow any
hazards to be identified, discussed, and where necessary mitigated, prior to commissioning.
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Alterations to existing HV network that could introduce new EPR hazards include the following:
(a) Increasing the earth fault current by increasing the line or cable size or replacing the source
transformer with a larger transformer.
(b) Increasing the voltage on an existing line (e.g. by upgrading an 11 kV line to 22 kV).
(c) Increasing the size of an HV earthing system. This will reduce the resistance of the HV earthing
system but it increases the extent of the hazard zone.
(d) Replacing a HV non-conductive pole (e.g. wood) with a conductive pole (e.g. concrete).
6.6.1
Telecommunications EPR Transfer Issues

For telecommunications interference issues, Networks Companies should contact the
telecommunications companies to discuss the appropriate minimum separations from the various
types of telecommunications plant that are appropriate for their area and any mitigation required.
The following issues concerning telecommunication EPR transfers should be considered:
(a) Rural Areas
In rural areas, the EGVR at 11kV/400V distribution transformers is typically in the range shown in
Figure 14. For 22kV/400V distribution transformers, the EGVR is typically twice those shown in
Figure 14. As a result, if the distribution transformer has a common HV/LV earthing system,
substantial damage often occurs to mains-powered customers telecommunications equipment in
buildings supplied by the transformer during an EPR event.
The associated insulation breakdown then results in the transfer of hazardous EPR (typically in the
range 1 kVrms to 6 kVrms) via telecommunications network cable pairs to the Telephone Exchange. In
the telecommunications network cable insulation breakdown to adjacent cable pairs is likely to occur
in many situations, spreading this EPR to other customers' premises. This can present a hazard to
telecommunications network customers, personnel and equipment throughout the area.
As discussed in section 6.5.1, the reduction of EGVR on HV earthing systems is possible but it is
usually impractical and uneconomical to reduce this EGVR to anything close to levels of 430/650
Vrms which would be required to ensure that telecommunications plant and equipment are not
affected. In these circumstances, the separation of HV and LV earth electrodes may be considered
to mitigate the risk (see section 4.8). As previously mentioned, separation of HV and LV earth
electrodes may not be very effective on networks where overhead LV is run under HV conductors
since HV to LV contacts on the lines will bypass the segregation of HV and LV at the transformer.
Section 6.7 gives the required minimum separation distances between HV and LV earth electrodes.
(b) Urban Areas with an Extensive Interbonded MEN System
In urban areas with an extensive interbonded MEN network, the EGVR is highly likely to be less than
430 Vrms, and may well be less than 280 Vrms. This is supported by Telecoms experience of an
almost total lack of damage history from power network faults in urban areas with an extensive
interbonded MEN network. Therefore, no mitigation of transferred voltages is expected to be
required in these areas.
(d) Smaller MEN Systems
To control the EGVR levels on LV MENs in areas with limited MEN islands one or more of the
following options may be considered:
(a) Install additional bonding between nearby MEN systems, to achieve an MEN impedance of less
than 0.5 .
(b) Install significant earth fault current limitation (e.g. NERs) to reduce the EPRs.
(c) A combination of the above.
Power Companies may do an audit of MEN interconnections (including any connections to the
source zone substation earth grid) in their urban areas, to identify opportunities to increase and
strengthen these interconnections, especially in multiple directions.
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6.7
SEGREGATED HV AND LV EARTHING

When providing segregation between HV and LV earths, the HV and LV earthing systems should be
designed to ensure that the protective devices operate effectively.
Adequate separation of HV and LV earth electrodes should be provided.
Table 9: Minimum Separation Distances between HV and LV earths
Size of MEN system
Medium to large MEN system
(> 50 customer earths)
Small MEN system
(5 to 50 customer earths)
Very small MEN system
(< 5 customer earths)
Size of HV earth electrode1
Minimum Separation Distance

(m)
Small or large
Small
Large
102
Small
302
Large
503
Notes:
1. Small means the earth electrode consists of two vertical driven rods spaced by the distance
equivalent to the length of the rods. Large means earth electrodes with more than two vertical
driven rods.
2. This minimum separation distance assumes that the closest consumer earth is at least 20 m
from the HV earth electrode.
3. This minimum separation distance assumes that the closest consumer earth is at least 50 m
from the HV earth electrode.
To practically achieve the larger minimum separation distances, consideration should be given to
installing the LV earth one span away from the HV earth.
Closer separation distances than the minimum distances given above may be possible and the
determination of these closer separation distances shall be by specific design.
Separate HV and LV earthing systems may not be effective in controlling hazardous step and touch
voltages in the event of a HV line to LV line contact at the distribution transformer, or on a conjoint
HV/LV line section. Options for protecting against HV to LV contacts have been discussed in
section 6.5.4.
For interbonded MEN systems segregation of HV and LV earth electrode may be practically difficult.
This is discussed further in section 4.8.
Transformers with segregated HV and LV earth electrodes must be able to withstand the maximum
EGVR of the HV earthing system, without breaking down to the LV side of the transformer (e.g. via
HV/LV winding breakdown, or transformer tank to LV conductor breakdown). The withstand
voltages on most 11 kV transformers should be adequate but on 22 kV transformers the possibility
exists that the EGVR on the HV earth electrode may cause a flashover across the LV neutral
bushing.
Note: Transformers which are connected to segregated earth electrodes will be more at risk of
failures from lightning surges.
When the LV earthing system is segregated from the HV earthing system at a distribution centre, the
total earth impedance of the LV earthing system plus associated MEN earths, must be sufficiently
low to ensure the HV feeder protection to the distribution centre will trip. A safety factor of two
should be used in calculating this maximum earth impedance value. This ensures that the HV
protection will operate in the event of a HV line to LV line contact, or a HV/LV winding insulation
breakdown in the distribution transformer.
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6.8
EARTHING SYSTEMS FOR DISTRIBUTION CENTRES AND EQUIPMENT

An earthing system for distribution centres or distribution equipment consists typically of one or more
driven rods in parallel and interconnected by buried horizontal copper conductors. For distribution
centres, two separate banks of driven rods have typically been used to facilitate disconnection of
each bank for resistance testing.
Modern test equipment is available to enable resistance testing to be carried out without
disconnecting the earth electrode. The use of such testing equipment would enable the installation
of a single bank of driven rods.
The length of the rods is typically between 1.8 m and 10 m.
6.9
CONNECTION OF NEUTRAL TO EARTH
6.9.1
In a low voltage alternating current system, the neutral conductor shall be earthed at or near the
distribution centre (see section 6.7). It should also be earthed at such other places as will ensure
that under fault conditions the earthing system provides a low impedance path for earth fault
currents. Where applicable, fault conditions shall include those faults involving the associated high
voltage system.
6.9.2
In calculating the earth impedance of a combined HV/LV distribution system, account may be taken
of all connections of the neutral conductor to earth, including:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
6.9.3
The earth connection at the distribution centre as specified in section 6.7;

Such earths as may be installed on the distribution system;
The earth connections at consumers installations; and
The effect of any permanent interconnections (ie, where no links are fitted) between the neutral
conductor of a given distribution system and the neutral(s) of other distribution system(s).
In a high voltage system, the neutral conductor shall be earthed at or near the source of supply by:
(a) Direct earthing of the neutral point;
(b) Earthing through an artificial neutral point obtained from an earthing transformer;
(c) Earthing in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b) of this section via an earthing resistor or
reactor.
6.9.4
In addition the neutral may be earthed at other points in the system.
6.10
EARTHING OF FITTINGS AT DISTRIBUTION CENTRES
6.10.1 This section applies to distribution centres.

6.10.2 All fittings associated directly with any high voltage system should be earthed as follows:
(a) A minimum of two independent earth electrodes shall be provided and connected in such a
manner that either can be disconnected independently for the purpose of testing; or
(b) Where equipment is available to allow for measurement of earth electrode resistances without
disconnection of the electrodes, a single earth electrode may be used.
6.10.3 The following fittings shall be connected to the earthing system of a distribution centre:
(a) Transformers and circuit breakers;
(b) Metallic cable sheaths or screens;
(c) Low voltage neutrals, except where separate HV and LV earthing systems are installed, in
which case only the LV neutrals shall be connected to the LV earthing system;
(d) Portable earth connection bar;
(e) Pad reinforcing mesh or electrode installed in the pad (for pad mounted equipment);
(f) Lightning arresters; and
(g) Any uninsulated metalwork within 2.5 metres of the ground that may become alive.
6.10.4 Bonding of fittings, LV neutrals and other earthed metal work should be done through earth bars.
One or more interconnected earth bars may be used depending on the requirements and space
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constraints. In some cases, it might be desirable to have one earth bar for all the local earthing
conductors and a separate earth bar for LV neutral, LV sheath and HV sheath conductors. Separate
terminal bars must be connected together by means of a suitably sized conductor.
6.10.5 Earth bars should be arranged in such a way that the disconnection of one earth connection does
not interfere with other earth connections.
6.10.6 Any metalwork liable to become alive within 2.5 metres of the ground and with which persons may
come into contact shall be connected to the earthing system (but may not require a separate
earthing connection) which may include the MEN system.
6.11
EARTHING OF FITTINGS AT DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT
6.11.1 This section applies to fittings of distribution equipment other than at distribution centres.
6.11.2 The following fittings should be connected to the earthing system of a distribution equipment site:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
Auto-reclosers;
Disconnectors (ABS, ABI, sectionalisers, etc.);
Metallic cable sheaths or screens;
Low voltage neutrals, if applicable;
Portable earth connection bar;
Pad reinforcing mesh or electrode installed in the pad (for pad mounted equipment);
Lightning arresters; and
Any uninsulated metalwork within 2.5 metres of the ground that may become alive.
6.11.3 Any metalwork liable to become alive within 2.5 metres of the ground and with which persons may
come into contact shall be connected to an earthing system (but may not require a separate earthing
connection). Any such metalwork may also be connected to a multiple earthed neutral system.
6.11.4 Considerations should be given to mounting the fittings of HV disconnectors above a height of 2.5 m
so that no part of the fittings is below 2.5 m above ground level especially in urban areas where the
risk are typically higher than in rural areas. This will ensure that the fittings cannot be touched by
members of the public.
6.11.5 The metal operating handles of all high voltage disconnectors shall be directly earthed unless the
handles are insulated to the full working voltage.
6.12
SAFETY WHILE OPERATING DISCONNECTORS
6.12.1 Unlike disconnectors located in HV a.c. station (see section 5.14), an environment where touch
voltages are unlikely to exist, disconnectors used on distribution network outside of substations will
typically have touch voltage hazards on them in the event of an earth fault. Since the disconnectors
are located mostly on private and public land, equipotential operator mats are not usually provided
for these disconnectors and operators may be at risk.
6.12.2 To avoid hazardous touch voltages on the operating handles, insulating gloves shall be used by
operators.
6.12.3 In addition, one of the following earthing options is recommended with option (a) being preferred:
(a) Install a gradient control conductor (i.e. a ring or loop) under the location where the operator will
be standing.
(b) Install a driven rod under the location where the operator will be standing.
6.12.4 The earth electrode should be bonded to the operating handle and rod using flexible leads or braids.
Sleeves should be provided at the lugs to ensure that the leads cannot bend sharply at the lugs.
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6.13
EARTHING CONNECTIONS
6.13.1 Conductor ratings for both bolted and welded connections for various fault clearance times can be
determined as detailed in section 2.11. These clearance times relate to the protection associated
with the portion of high voltage line.
6.13.2 Earthing conductors, where exposed, shall be:
(a) 0.6/1kV rated; and either
(b) Green or green/yellow PVC insulated; or
(c) Enclosed in insulating conduit.
Insulated conductors shall be used wherever electrical workers may come into contact with the
conductor.
6.13.3 Buried conductors shall be copper and shall be bare unless there are special reasons for using
insulated copper or other metals.
6.13.4 Earthing system conductors shall be sufficiently large to:
(a) Minimize the probability of mechanical damage;
(b) Minimize the consequence of minor corrosion; and
(c) Provide adequate current carrying capacity.
6.13.5 If necessary earthing systems shall be upgraded where fault levels increase above the original
design level.
6.13.6 For the connections between HV equipment and the grid, the size of the earthing conductor shall be
based on the maximum earth fault current (100%).
6.13.7 All earthing conductors should have a minimum size of 35 mm2.
6.14
LOW VOLTAGE EARTHING CONDUCTORS ASSOCIATED WITH LV SYSTEMS
6.14.1 Conductors used to connect the neutral terminal or bar of a LV system to the earth bar, or the
neutral conductor of an outgoing overhead line, shall not be smaller than that calculated for the HV
earthing conductors based on the expected fault current and duration.
6.15
CONNECTIONS TO EARTHING ELECTRODES
6.15.1 Where conductors which are connected to earth electrodes, and are accessible to the public (as at
pole type distribution centres or where the neutrals within the distribution system are connected to
earth) those conductors shall be protected against mechanical damage.
6.15.2 The conductors shall be bought out of the ground parallel and close to the foot of the pole and shall
be protected to a height of 2.5 metres. Fibreglass channel section or a suitable wood or a suitable
plastic material (i.e. PVC or Polyethelene) may be used to provide mechanical protection.
6.15.3 Joints between earthing conductors and earth electrodes shall be of adequate mechanical strength
and current carrying capacity and so arranged as to ensure that there will be no failure of the
connection under any conditions of use or exposure that may be reasonably anticipated. Clamps
and similar mechanical connections shall be so designed and constructed that the connection will
not slacken off under use.
6.15.4 Where conductors connecting driven electrodes in parallel are not kept above the ground, they shall
be buried no less than 0.5 metres below the surface. Connections of conductors to such electrodes
shall be made by brazing or exothermic welding processes or by suitable compression fittings.
Compression or wedge type fittings may also be used provided they have met the requirements of
IEEE Std 837. Bolted connections shall not be used underground.
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6.15.5 If test links (earth bars) are inserted in earthing conductors connected to electrodes, they shall be
bolted links and arranged so that the opening of one link does not interfere with earth connections
other than the one under test.
6.16
SURGE ARRESTERS
6.16.1 Lightning arresters should be earthed by a direct earth connection which presents a low earth
impedance path to high frequency currents. They should be bonded to the earthing point of high
voltage systems.
6.16.2 Surge arresters should be installed as close as possible to the equipment being protected and
should be earthed to the equipment casing/tank using the most direct path possible.
6.16.3 For transformers, the surge arresters can be mounted directly on the transformer tank or on a
bracket close to the bushing to minimise lead lengths.
6.16.4 Surge arresters used for the protection of cables should be mounted as close as possible to the
cable terminations to enable the leads used to bond the surge arresters to the cable screens to be
kept as short as possible.
6.16.5 The installation of surge arresters close to equipment may result in the protection fuses being
located on the supply side of the surge arresters which may increase nuisance tripping of fuses.
6.16.6 Any inadvertent break in the earth conductor of a surge arrester will raise the voltage of the
conductor connected to the surge arresters to full phase voltage.
6.16.7 Consideration should be given to selecting surge arresters based on temporary overvoltages which
are applicable to impedance earthed systems. Surge arresters would then not need to be upgraded
if a solidly earthed system was changed to an impedance or resonant earthed system.
6.17
SOIL RESISTIVITY
6.17.1 Where required for the equipment earth electrode design, soil resistivity should be measured using
the Wenner method.
6.17.2 Soil resistivity tests should be carried out at test-probe spacings that are proportional to the
expected dimensions of the earthing system.
6.17.3 For 11 kV and 22 kV rural and urban distribution installations, measurements should be taken for
test-probe spacings varying between 0.5 m and 15 m. For each test traverse, measurement of soil
resistivity should be carried out for a minimum of 12 different spacings of the test probes.
Recommended spacings are: 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 15 m.
6.17.4 Soil resistivity tests should be carried out away from metallic objects such as other earth electrodes,
buried water pipes, fences, etc.
6.17.5 The measured data shall be evaluated to determine a soil resistivity model for the site.
Determination of the correct soil resistivity model for the site is an important aspect of the design.
Earthing design software may be used to assist in determining a soil resistivity model on which to
base the earthing system design.
6.18
TYPICAL EARTHING ARRANGEMENTS

Typical earthing arrangements are included in Appendix B. These examples illustrate typical
earthing arrangements for a few specific situations. The user of this Guide should develop their own
earthing arrangements to suit their own situations where required.
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6.19
6.19.1 The integrity of the earthing system should be verified by appropriate periodic inspections and tests.
environmental conditions and assessment of risk eg soil conditions, copper theft, etc.
6.19.2 Resistance testing of all new earth electrodes or all electrodes of assets where work has been
conducted shall be carried out prior to connection to the MEN system.
6.19.3 Resistance tests on earth electrodes at distribution centres shall exclude the LV MEN system.
6.19.4 It is also recommended that the integrity of the earth bonding conductors be tested at regular
intervals. This is a continuity test across bonds. Expect a resistance of less than 10 m per bond
test.
6.19.5 Records of all resistance tests and designs shall be maintained by the asset owner.
6.19.6 For distribution centres and equipment sites, the test and inspection intervals should not exceed
those detailed in Table 10.
Table 10: Equipment Site Routine Inspection Plan
Description
Visual inspection
to ensure integrity
of system
components
above ground
Test to ensure
electrical integrity
Frequency
Description
1-2 years
Visual check of earth conductors,

connections and protective covers.
5-10 years
Resistance (bonding continuity)

measurement of plant
earthing/bonding connections. Earth
electrode resistance measurement.
Touch and step voltage
measurement where required.
Visual inspection of buried
conductors may be required if
inspection and test results indicate
issues.
Comments
Check earth conductors and connections for
physical damage, looseness and corrosion.
Particular attention should be given to areas
of new installations or excavated areas and
to areas where the theft of copper may be an
issue.
Compare resistance to earth with previous

results to check for any obvious trend (ie
resistance to earth decreasing over time).
For bond tests, expect < 10 milliohms per
bond test.
Page 78
SECTION 7 OVERHEAD ELECTRICAL LINES 50 KV AC AND ABOVE

7.1
INTRODUCTION
Overhead electrical transmission lines form an extensive electrical network that transmits power
throughout the country to all the regional load centres. Each has a nominal operating extra high
voltage, ranging from 50 kV to 220 kV. For the purpose of this Guide these overhead electrical lines
are referred to as transmission lines. The integrity of each transmission line is critical to maintaining
a continuous electrical supply to any particular load centre. Consequently the transmission lines are
designed to operate with very low rates of failures that would cause an earth fault at a particular
transmission structure.
Sections of transmission lines may be close to roads and buildings where the public are regularly
present. The earthing systems for transmission line structures provide paths for electric fault
currents, such as from lightning, to flow safely to earth. This ensures that protection operates while
minimizing any hazards in the vicinity of the structures.
Transmission lines require high speed, high integrity protection to achieve rapid fault clearance.
Hence transmission line earth faults normally involve very short duration high fault currents, at a very
low incident rate.
Transmission lines are designed to achieve large power transfers. Through magnetic field induction
(refer to section 2.3.4) these create voltages on metallic conductors that run parallel to the lines.
Induction can be particularly significant for nearby power lines, telephone lines, conveyors, pipelines,
railways and fences. Induced voltages are continuously present whilst the transmission line is
operating, but substantially increase when the balanced transmission line magnetic field is distorted
when fault currents flow during a line fault.
Extra high transmission voltages impose a voltage by electric field capacitive coupling (refer to
section 2.3.3) on any nearby insulated metallic conductor. However, the electric field strength at the
insulated conductor is reduced because the transmission lines are normally some distance from
such conductors and consequently the stored energy, retained in capacitively charged metallic
conductors is not generally significant.
7.2
CORRIDOR MANAGEMENT
Transmission line structures must have safe earthing systems that provide a means of carrying
electric currents into the earth under normal and fault conditions. This must be achieved without
exceeding operating and equipment limits or adversely affecting continuity of supply.
The line support structure earthing arrangements direct earth fault currents, including lightning down
the structures to the earthed footings and buried electrodes. Hazardous voltages can occur on and
around transmission line structures during these earth faults. For a dangerous situation to arise a
power system earth fault must be coincident with a person being in the vicinity of the earthing
system.
Transmission line structures should preferably be sited away from locations where they would be
frequently visited, contacted, or subject to an inappropriate activity that increases the likelihood of an
incident. This will assist in minimizing the risk of exposure to a transmission line earth fault where a
person is close by and potentially exposed to a hazardous voltage. Alternatively barriers or fences
may be necessary.
The design of transmission lines should be such that the probability that a person would be in the
vicinity of a structure or be exposed to the danger of a hazardous voltage is unlikely or is minimized.
7.3
STEEL LATTICE STRUCTURES

Steel lattice structures are either painted or galvanised steel structures formed from steel cross
members bolted together to form a supporting lattice. They are electrically continuous with multiple
cross connections and bolted conducting paths. They should not require an independent downlead.
The structural members and the bolted connections should be sufficient to conduct both line fault
currents and lightning strikes directly to earth. This should occur without damage being sustained to
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the steelwork. The paint surface does not require special electrical attributes. There should be
sufficient contact through the bolt fittings to conduct the prospective fault current to earth.
7.3.1
Steel Lattice Structures Overhead Earth Wire (OHEW)

When a transmission line insulator fails or when the line is struck by lightning, the structure
steelwork should conduct some or all of the fault current to earth. When an OHEW is fitted a
proportion of the fault current should flow away from the structure along the OHEW to the substation
earth mat. Similarly when an OHEW is installed a proportion should find alternative paths to earth
across on the OHEW and down through a number of the adjacent steel lattice structures. Refer to
section 7.7.
OHEWs should be electrically connected to the steelwork through either the OHEW fixings or
through a dedicated jumper wire. Where a jumper wire is fitted this should be rated for the
prospective fault current. Typically a 37/2.25 mm low tensile annealed 1350 aluminium jumper
should be adequate for most applications. The installation of a single disc insulator should be
considered, fitted on the supporting fixings, and in parallel with the jumper wire. This ensures that
circulating currents do not flow through the fixings, and minimizes corrosion of the fixings. To be
effective, the insulator should have in excess of 300 mm electrical creepage distance.
7.3.2
Steel Lattice Structures Earth Electrode Connection

Steel lattice structures should be electrically connected to their foundations through external straps
to the reinforcing. These straps must be adequately rated for the prospective fault current, the
environmental conditions, and for mechanical strength. Typically 50 mm by 5 mm copper earth
straps should be connected from each leg to the steel reinforcement of the supporting concrete pile.
The concrete piles should act as the earth electrode for the structure. If these straps are on an
exposed section of the tower leg, their condition and integrity can be routinely monitored. This is not
always possible, particularly where theft is a concern in which case the straps may need to be buried
or covered.
The design of the joints, between the earth strap and the steelwork and the connection to the pile
reinforcement, must consider both the prospective fault current for the joint and prevention of the
corrosion of the joint. Typically these joints should either be bolted or formed with an exothermic
weld.
Supplementary earthing electrodes may be installed to reduce the tower footing resistance. These
should generally be connected with a non insulated copper 25 mm by 5 mm earth bar bonded to the
supplementary electrodes with exothermic weld or similar joints. The buried conductors should
typically be installed 300 mm below ground level following the route of the transmission line to
minimize impact to adjacent land owners, as they influence the EPR voltage contours. Where these
additional electrodes are required they should typically be to a depth of 4 m or greater and located
20 m from the tower legs to prevent drying out and achieve the most economic electrode
distribution. The electrode position should be either marked or the electrode connection mounted in
an inspection box.
7.3.3
Steel Lattice Structures Earthing Plate

An earthing plate should be located on each of the cross arms, and reasonably accessible for the
line workers to attach tail clamps close to their work sites. Typically the plates should be capable of
withstanding a fault of 25 kA for 1 second and wide enough to allow at least three tail clamps to be
secured to each plate. The galvanised earthing plates should be fixed with two bolts to the same
main tower member which should be at least 45 mm wide and 6 mm thick, to maintain the fault
current rating. To prevent corrosion, sealant or fresh galvanic rich paint should be applied to the
prepared mating surfaces when securing the plate. The upper portion of the plate should be
masked off during tower painting.
7.3.4
Steel Lattice Structures Earth Potential Risk

There should be no hazard from touching steel members during normal operation. Stray leakage
currents may be present, particularly when there is high humidity, but these should not be at levels
that are hazardous. Also, where structures are painted the touch voltage is unlikely to exceed the
insulation properties of the paint surface.
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In the majority of cases an earth fault is caused when either the line is struck by lightning or a
transmission insulator fails and hazardous voltages could occur both on and around the steelwork.
These will last for the duration of the fault. Generally faults should be cleared within 100ms.
The voltage that the steel could potentially reach in the event of an earth fault is the EGVR as
described in section 6.5.1 for distribution lines. The maximum EGVR occurs close to the substation.
The EGVR should progressively reduce with distance from the source, primarily due to the inductive
impedance of the transmission line. These issues are described in section 7.12.
In most cases during an earth fault, sizeable voltages occur on and around the base of the structure.
Where the voltage rise is potentially hazardous, the need and form of mitigation can be assessed by
applying the Probabilistic Method described in section 3.
7.4
STEEL AND CONCRETE POLES

Concrete poles used for 50 kV and above, particularly those used in the national grid should have
provision for bonding to the internal reinforcing or to an internal conductor. Consequently like steel
poles, concrete poles should be treated as conductive structures.
These transmission poles should not generally be used to mount plant or equipment other than line
surge equipment. An external equipment earth downlead should not be required, unless installed for
pole mounted equipment. These, where fitted, should be bonded to the internal reinforcement.
The cross arms of concrete poles may be steel or may be wood. In the case of steel cross arms, a
positive path to earth must be established to prevent pole damage with bonding of the crossarm to
the internal earth conductor, or reinforcement.
By installing binding wire between internal longitudinal reinforcement and the laterals on concrete
poles, sufficient multiple paths exist to form a conductive cage. This generally negates the need for
an internal conductor or an external downlead. The reinforcement should be bonded to any lightning
shielding such as arc horns, spikes or OHEWs. The reinforcement should also be bonded to steel
cross arms. The upper sections of insulated guys should similarly be connected either directly to the
reinforcement or to a bonded component. The poles must therefore have several external fittings
connected to the reinforcement that allow the bonding straps to be connected to the reinforcement.
A 120 mm2 copper bonding strap should typically have an adequate fault current capacity to connect
the external equipment to these fittings.
An above ground fitting should be provided on the pole to allow a permanent external earth
electrode, where installed, to be connected to the concrete reinforcement. Similar provision should
be made on the steel poles.
Concrete exhibits some insulation qualities, but is hygroscopic and attracts moisture, becoming
conductive when wet. It is therefore assumed to always be conductive, for transmission line design
purposes. The buried section should be assumed to be at ground potential.
The buried portion should act as an earth electrode. Generally for both steel and concrete poles,
supplementary permanent earthing electrodes are only required to ensure protection performance.
7.4.1
Workplace Earth Point Connection

When work is carried out on overhead conductors, by line workers from a position on a support
structure, a cluster mount or similar workplace earthing point shall be installed to achieve
equipotential zone bonding (EQZ). This should be located on the pole in close proximity to the work
site and below the point where the line workers feet contact the pole. The pole must have means
for the cluster mount or earthing point to make good electrical contact with the steel pole or be
bonded to the reinforcement of the concrete poles.
For steel poles a lug welded to the pole can identify the position where the cluster mount should be
fitted.
On concrete poles without a downlead, cluster mounts or an earthing point should be bonded or
mounted onto a pole fitting for equipotential zone bonding (EQZ). The pole fitting shall be connected
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to the reinforcement. Neither this fitting nor its internal connection to the reinforcement is typically
fault rated, so an independent temporary earth electrode should be installed when the cluster mount
is fitted. When the temporary earth electrode, cluster mount or workplace earth point are being used
to achieve an EQZ, these fittings and leads shall be rated for the prospective fault current as these
form the prospective fault path.
Where no means exist of making a cluster mount or workplace earth point EQZ bond to the concrete
reinforcement, then a potential difference may occur during a fault. Restrictions should be applied to
the use of the pole to access the transmission line. These should be designed to eliminate as far as
practical, the exposure of the line workers to a potentially hazardous voltage.
7.4.2
Steel and Concrete Pole Earth Potential Risk

Steel poles and concrete poles, like steel lattice structures, should both be regarded as conductive
structures during an earth fault and evaluated accordingly. Refer to section 7.3.4.
Concrete does have some insulation properties which make it less likely to present a touch hazard.
However the insulation properties are not always present and concrete is often punctured during
such an event with the limited cover between the earthed reinforcement and the touched surface.
The insulation qualities though significant should therefore be ignored and represent a further factor
of safety in the EPR assessment.
The foundations for steel lattice structures are more extensive than for poles. This has the effect of
reducing the EGVR for steel lattice structures. However concrete and steel poles are generally
earthed by a single foundation rather than being distributed as in the case of steel lattice structures.
The area where hazardous voltages may occur around poles is therefore smaller than for steel
lattice structures. The factor that predominates between these is site specific and shall form part of
the assessment.
7.5
WOOD POLES
Wood poles shall be considered to be partially conductive.
The insulation properties of the wood limit earth fault currents passing down the pole and prevent an
effective earth path. Consequently, except for special circumstances, the wood pole acts as an
insulator.
Where a line worker is climbing the wood pole, the pole shall however be considered sufficiently
conductive to be hazardous. Potentially the line worker may be simultaneously in contact with two
sections of pole and exposed to a hazardous potential difference.
A downlead may be fitted to a wood pole. This provides an effective earth path. Downleads are
only fitted where a path to ground is required to prevent lightning damage or to provide earthing for
equipment located on poles.
A wood pole, where fitted with a downlead, shall be considered to be a conductive structure and the
conditions described for the steel and concrete poles shall apply requiring metalwork to be bonded
to the downlead. An earth electrode shall be required to earth the downlead and achieve the
required footing resistance.
7.5.1
Workplace Earth Point Connection

When work on overhead conductors is carried out by line workers from a position on a wood pole, a
cluster mount or similar workplace earthing point shall be installed to achieve equipotential zone
bonding. This should be located on the pole in close proximity to the work site and below the point
where the line workers feet contact the pole.
Poles should have means for cluster mounts to be connected to the downleads where fitted. In other
cases two coach screws should be installed penetrating beyond the centre of the pole and at 90 to
each other, and should be bonded together. The coach screws should achieve the required
connection to the partially conductive central core of the wood pole. The cluster mount or earthing
point should be mounted onto one or more of these coach screws.
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The cluster mount shall be cabled to an independent temporary earth electrode. The cable should
provide a direct connection to this earth electrode. These fittings and leads shall be rated for the
prospective fault current as these form the prospective fault path. The earth electrode should be in
addition to any permanently installed electrodes.
7.5.2
Wood Pole Earth Potential Risk

Wood poles without downleads, are non conductive or partially conductive and are not hazardous
except potentially when they are climbed.
No hazardous touch or step voltages occur on or around the bases of wood poles. Consequently
wood poles without downleads can be used as a means of mitigation for EPR where steel or
concrete poles would otherwise require mitigation measures to be applied.
7.6
ELECTRODES & COUNTERPOISE EARTHING

Reducing the resistance to remote earth at a structure by providing a low impedance path to earth
for faults will assist in ensuring reliable protection operation for earth fault conditions. Good low
resistance to ground achieves low tower footing resistance (TFR). Generally, earthing to the
foundations or pole root and butt plate or OHEW achieves an adequate reduction in the TFR for
protection to operate. Where this is not sufficient supplementary electrodes or counterpoise earthing
should be considered and when adopted these should be directly connected to the structure.
Concrete is hygroscopic and hence attracts moisture. A concrete foundation in soil behaves as a
semiconducting medium with a resistivity typically of 30 -m. The connection from the support
structure to the concrete reinforcement should be made through a direct clamp or welded coupling.
No reliance should be given to a fortuitous connection. Care should be taken to prevent d.c.
currents that result from the rectification of any a.c. current at the steel concrete interface from
causing corrosion of the reinforcement
A threshold potential of 60 Vdc exists below which no
corrosion will occur. The design should be such as to ensure that this threshold is seldom
exceeded.
Galvanic corrosion shall be considered in the choice of materials, the jointing technique, and
equipment that is interconnected. However it should be noted that concrete reinforcement has a
similar potential electrolytic voltage as copper and therefore can be connected.
The suitability of connections to other earth networks should be assessed before the connection is
made. Unsuitable connections can result in a rapid loss of the buried earthing conductor.
Installations close to earth networks with cathodic protection should similarly be assessed.
Supplementary earth electrodes, where fitted, should be of an appropriate length to take advantage
of low resistance soil layers.
Freezing and seasonal variations in ground moisture levels may affect the resistivity of the first two
metres of soil typically requiring electrodes to be installed to a depth of 4m. The most effective
separation between driven rods to ensure maximum combined conductivity should be at least equal
to the length of the rods.
In high resistivity soils or where resistance to driving rods is encountered, the electrode can be
installed in an augured hole back filled with bentonite slurry or similar product.
Counterpoise earths and connections to the structure should be sufficiently deep to avoid them
being accidently damaged. Burial to a depth of 300 mm or more is adequate. By running these
counterpoise earths parallel to the transmission line route, the influence on other land users is
minimised, with the highest earth fault voltages remaining contained within the transmission line
corridor.
Typically, to optimise the design and eliminate single point failures, the copper electrodes are
positioned symmetrically either side of the support structure. Flat 25 mm by 5 mm copper
conductors are generally used for the counterpoise earth for ease of jointing and service life. The
support structure acts as the interconnection between the various counterpoise earths.
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7.7
OVERHEAD EARTH WIRE

Transmission lines may have one or more overhead earth wires (OHEW) suspended above the
phase conductors reducing the risk of being struck by lightning. A shield angle of 25 often reduces
the risk sufficiently, though this may be reduced to a shield angle of 20 for critical lines where the
normal risk of shielding failure can not be tolerated.
The OHEWs start at the substation, are directly connected to the substation earth mat and are
typically suspended over at least the first 1 km out from the substation.
Tower footing resistances of poles or towers should be below 20 for the section of OHEW within
1 km of the substation to prevent back-flash steep fronted wavefronts being imposed on the
substation. Refer to section 7.11.1.
OHEW also form an alternative earth return path to the substation. They are connected to the poles
or towers either via the suspension shackles or a bonding conductor. Refer to section 7.3.1.
A 37/2.25mm annealed AAC jumper conductor is sufficient for the fault energy, lightning
performance, and conductor movement that a conductor may typically be subjected to. An insulator
may be fitted where a bonding conductor is used to limit current flow through the alternative
suspension shackle path to earth. A single disc insulator with 300mm electrical creepage is
adequate.
The OHEW should be adequate for conducting both earth fault currents as well as lightning. In
general, they should be capable of conducting the majority (75%) of the highest possible fault
current without failing, and for a period in excess of the backup protection time, such as the circuit
breaker failed protection time, followed by an auto reclosing event. Refer to section 7.10.
To prevent damage by a lightning strike the OHEW should have individual strands - nominally
greater than 2.0 mm diameter.
The performance of the OHEW in conducting the maximum fault current depends on the inductance
(mutual coupling) of the conductor and to a lesser extent on its resistance. The OHEW should
therefore be located close to the phase conductor. The requirement for a specific shielding angle
between the OHEW and the phase conductors usually dictates how close the OHEW can be placed
to the phase conductors. The use of two OHEWs reduces both the resistance and the inductance of
the OHEWs whilst maintaining the shield angle.
The sag characteristics of the OHEW conductor are selected to be equal or less than the phase
conductors to prevent phase - OHEW clashing.
7.8
LIGHTNING SURGE ARRESTERS

Transmission lightning arresters are installed to reduce line outages and thereby improve
transmission line performance. They enhance the effectiveness of OHEWs and assist in eliminating
back-flashovers and flashovers across the line insulation. Surge arresters are usually employed
where poor ground conditions are encountered that otherwise make it difficult to achieve low tower
footing resistances.
Arresters operate rapidly when high voltages occur on the conductor, conducting these high voltage
currents to the earthed structure. By this action they limit the voltage across the line insulation to
less than its critical flashover voltage preventing an uncontrolled discharge over the insulation. As a
result, lightning strikes do not operate the protection and the transmission line remains in service.
The arrester characteristics (for either gapped or gapless arresters) should be matched to the
insulation withstand voltage and the transmission line operating characteristics. This is to ensure
that the arrester does not operate prematurely, and only when lightning over-voltages occur on the
transmission line. Transmission line arresters should be selected so that they do not operate for a
fault at the substation or on another transmission line. Should they operate during switching
operations, or for voltage transients, or power system over-voltages an increased frequency of earth
faults would be transferred to the line structures. The consequential EPR on these structures may
not be acceptable and it may also cause arresters to prematurely fail. Transmission line arresters
do not have the capacity for frequent operations as required from substation lightning arresters.
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Line arresters should have sufficient capacity for the energy transfer that occurs when they operate,
which may be a limitation for structures with low TFR. Gapless arresters fitted with a disconnector
device which isolates the arrester if it fails, allows failed units to be identified. Failed gapped
arresters are more difficult to locate and their condition should be regularly monitored. The gap
should be selected to prevent conduction under normal line operating conditions after the unit has
failed.
The devices mechanical mountings, flexible connections and failed unit disconnector device should
be designed to achieve the required levels of reliability assumed for the line in the EPR assessment.
7.9
GUY WIRE INSULATORS

It is often desirable to install insulators in transmission pole guys.
Currents may flow to earth in an uninsulated guy wire leading to corrosion on the fittings and
reduced soil adhesion to the buried fixings. These issues need to be considered and adequate
mechanical safety factors applied to the design of the guy wire fittings. Insulators should prevent
these earth currents.
Guy wires need to be taken into account when assessing EPR as uninsulated guy wires can conduct
earth fault currents beyond the area of the poles. Similarly line maintenance practices need to
address the risks to ground staff from exposed guy wires and the associated transferred EPR.
Insulators on the guys should prevent the potential exposure.
Insulators where fitted, should be selected to minimize corrosion to fittings that otherwise may
reduce the integrity of the guy system, Consequences of transferred EPR and risks to line workers
from exposed guy wires should also be considered. For conductive structures a nominal 28 kV
insulator rated for the ultimate tensile strength of the guy system should be sufficient. For non
conductive wood poles the guy insulator should be similar to the line insulator to prevent the
possibility of the guy acting as the earth path during an earth fault. It should also be rated to the
ultimate tensile strength of the guy system.
Insulators should be located so that line workers are not exposed to hazardous potential differences
in the event of an earth fault. Typically guy insulators are located at high level on the guys, with the
earthed bottom sections beyond the reach of the line worker both whilst climbing the pole and
working on the line.
In some cases an insulated tube may be installed on the lowest section closest to the ground to
prevent rodents climbing the guys but which also provides a supplementary measure preventing
inadvertent contact of the guy wire by the ground crew.
7.10
CLEARANCE OF EARTH FAULTS

Transmission lines are fitted with a variety of high performance relays designed to detect fault
currents flowing to earth. The design for the earthing of the transmission line shall ensure the
correct operation of these protection relays to detect the fault. This requirement shall be achieved
for the range of different network configurations, prospective fault currents and types of faults that
may apply.
The adoption of solid state protection equipment provides exceptional performance in terms of ability
to detect faults, discriminate between faults, and reliability to initiate fault clearance.
Faults are normally detected by protection equipment at both ends of each circuit. The protection
equipment closest to the fault may operate first, or the equipment at both ends may operate at the
same time depending on the zone where the fault occurs and protection settings. If the protection at
one end operates first, the assigned circuit breakers should open to disconnect that end of the
circuit. The detection of the earth fault is often signalled via a high integrity communication link to
the protection at the far end of the circuit. The protection equipment should then open the
associated far end circuit breakers to ensure the circuit is isolated and the fault is cleared.
This initial action may be followed by an auto-reclosing sequence, where an attempt is made to reclose the circuit breakers. Where the fault is no longer present the protection equipment is
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automatically reset. Where a fault remains, the protection again operates to clear the fault. Further
auto-reclosing should not normally be attempted.
In some locations or for certain network configurations the communication link may not apply. In
such cases, the opening of the far end circuit breaker should be dependent on the detection of the
fault by the far end protection equipment. The earthing design should take into account these
elements.
7.10.1 Earth Fault Clearance Times
Equipment shall be rated appropriately to ensure prospective fault currents can be conducted for the
duration likely to occur in service.
A range of network configurations should be analysed to determine prospective fault currents at the
particular location of interest. Protection performance should be assessed to determine how it will
perform with either a plant or system failure. The earthing system should be rated to ensure that
normal or single contingency events would not result in the failure of the earthing equipment. If such
a failure was to occur, the protection equipment may not operate to clear the fault and dangerous
voltages could then remain on conductive structures.
Often the communication link between terminal stations is duplicated so that failure of the
communication link can be considered as an abnormal and double contingency event. Provision for
communication link failure is then not necessary
Transmission line structures can be some distance from the source of electrical energy, in which
cases the potential fault currents can be significantly reduced by the line impedance. Assessment of
the earth fault currents should take this into account.
The protection times that are generally adopted assume zero fault impedance with no impedance
between the conductor and the connected conductive structure. Other impedances such as source,
line, and tower footing resistance should be allowed for. This approach is appropriate when
designing for worst case conditions.
The prospective fault current estimates should include an allowance for future network growth and
development. In addition, as the capacity of the earthing equipment may reduce with time it is
normal to apply a margin of safety to allow for a limited reduction in performance.
Often earthing equipment is designed to be adequate for a 3 second fault duration, though this can
be reduced to 1 second where protection backup times establish that longer faults need not be
considered. It may be established that this can be further reduced through careful consideration of
the possible events and the protection performance.
A fault is initially cleared as soon as the relevant circuit breakers are opened. After a short time the
auto-reclosing (where installed) sequence closes the circuit breakers, unless the fault has cleared
(e.g. lightning strike), fault currents will re-occur until the circuit breakers are again open. For
transmission lines further auto re-closing is not generally attempted. Protection settings are
generally selected to allow a shorter duration for the auto-reclose tripping of the circuit breaker.
When considering EPR hazards, earth fault currents are present for both of these two periods. The
longer of these two periods should be used in the hazard analysis. This covers the worst case as
any EPR hazard is removed when the fault is cleared. When determining tower fault frequencies,
the two periods, initial and autoreclose, should be considered as a single event rather than two
separate faults, as an individual would not generally remain in contact with the conductive structure
following the initial EPR event.
When rating plant, it is appropriate to assume heat is not dissipated in the interval between two
consecutive fault current periods and therefore the cumulative time for both periods should be used
for the duration of the earth fault in the calculation.
Fault currents are extinguished when the arc is quenched in the circuit breaker. This occurs before
the circuit breaker is fully open. The fault currents also may be reduced as soon as one of the circuit
terminals is isolated from the network with the opening of the first of the circuit breakers. The design
has an increased margin of safety by not including an allowance for these factors.
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7.11
TOWER FOOTING RESISTANCES

Tower footing resistance (TFR) is the resistance that the tower or pole has between the conductive
structure and remote earth. In the event of an earth fault, this series resistance applies between the
tower and the resistances of the earths soil layers. The value of the TFR is dependent on the
structures earth electrodes including any conductor in contact with earth. Considerable costs may
be incurred in constructing an earth electrode network to achieve a low TFR where high resistivity
soil conditions occur.
The TFR should be designed to achieve satisfactory earthing of the structure and where required
control the number of back-flashovers during lightning events.
The TFR shall be sufficiently low to ensure correct operation of protection and interrupting devices.
With modern electronic protection, very low measured earth fault power is required to operate the
protection. Though a low TFR is preferable, where modern protection is fitted a TFR in excess of
100 may be sufficiently low for the protection to operate satisfactorily.
7.11.1 Back-Flashover
In addition to the protection operation requirement described above, in certain situations a
reduced TFR may be required to prevent back-flashover. This should occur where the
structure is fitted with OHEW and is within 1 km of a substation. It should also occur where
low transmission line outage rates are a particular requirement.
Following a lightning strike to the OHEW, the tower or poles voltage can become raised to a very
high level unless the TFR is low. This high voltage may exceed the insulation level of the line and
result in a flash over across the line insulation from the structure to one or more phase conductors.
This back-flashover causes the circuit to trip and a steep voltage wavefront to be imposed on the
phase conductors.
OHEWs may be fitted for typically 1 km from the substation to shield the phase conductors from a
direct lightning strike. Steep voltage wavefronts are also created by back-flashovers resulting from
lightning strikes and if these back-flashovers occur close to the substation, severe steep voltage
wavefronts may enter the substation and risk causing failure of equipment. Substation equipment
insulation should be protected from these steep voltage wavefronts and hence from potentially
consequential catastrophic damage. When used in conjunction with low tower footing resistances,
the OHEW provides a system where the risk of back-flashovers occurring close to the substation is
controlled. To control back-flashovers, a TFR typically less than 20 should apply for each
transmission line structure within the shielded portion terminating at the substation. Steep voltage
wavefronts from lightning strikes would then only originate on conductors beyond the shielded region
and would be sufficiently attenuated before reaching the substation to be of concern.
Back-flashovers will often occur for a section of line comprising the adjacent structures closes to the
initial incident, though this is considered as a single event. A back-flashover will cause the
transmission line protection to trip and an outage to occur. Outages may need to be minimised on
critical lines, or double circuit outages (where two circuits are on a single structure) may need to be
minimised, or a particular design outage rate for a line may need to be achieved. In each of these
cases, the maximum acceptable TFR should be calculated and the proportion of lightning strikes
that will result in back-flashover determined. As this is an average performance criteria for the
transmission line, some groups of structures can be allowed to have higher TFR. To limit incidences
of back-flashovers this may require an average TFR of 10 .
7.11.2 Relationship to EPR
The TFR affects the EPR at and near the affected support structure and the resulting touch voltage
that an individual would potentially be exposed to during an earth fault. It also affects the extent of
hazardous step voltages around the affected structure.
Where a deterministic EPR assessment is followed the TFR should be shown to be appropriate to
limit touch and step voltages to acceptable levels.
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Where a probabilistic EPR assessment is undertaken the TFR should be shown to achieve an
acceptable probability of exposure to hazardous voltages. Where this is exceeded, mitigation
measures should be evaluated to reduce the probability. It should be noted that work to reduce the
TFR by installing a more extensive earth electrode network is likely to increase the area around the
structure where hazardous step and transfer voltages apply and may therefore be counter
productive resulting in an increased probability of exposure to hazardous voltages.
Wood poles are effectively non conductive and the requirements of TFR do not apply except where
a conductive down lead is fitted.
7.11.3 Periodic Measurement of Tower Footing Resistance
Tower footing resistance measurement shall be undertaken periodically.
Where the structures are in rural locations the frequency of inspection is usually dictated by the need
for protection and disconnection equipment to operate satisfactorily. Typically this can be achieved
with measurements carried out at regular intervals of a representative sample to establish that an
adequate proportion of line earth electrodes are operational.
In urban locations or where major farm buildings are within 30 m of a structure the frequency may be
increased. The interval is dependent on a number of factors. With properly designed earthing the
electrodes do not deteriorate rapidly and the earthing performance is dependant on multiple paths
which are not critical to maintaining earthing performance in the event of loss of any particular
element. By adopting an increased frequency of measurement early detection of any structure
earthing deterioration and reduced performance is possible. The frequency of measurement is
dependant on the criticality of the tower footing resistance. Hence for most locations, as the earth
fault frequency is relatively low, a 15-20 year interval of inspection and measurement may be
acceptable. For locations close to substations where equipment could be damaged, or for lines
where back-flashover prevention is critical an 8-10 year interval of inspection and measurement may
be desirable.
7.11.4 Record of Earth Network
A record should be made of the buried earth network.
The conductor type, the depth of the conductor, the electrode length, the type of tees and the
positions of conductors, tees and electrodes should all be recorded on a site plan for the structure.
Site plans should show the orientation of the transmission line, have a scale included and a
compass position showing the north reference.
7.11.5 Measurement of Tower Footing Resistance
Tower footings should be tested with proven instrumentation and by operators trained in their use.
Typically, a suitable instrument should be able to measure over the range 0.01 to 1999 and
achieve an accuracy within 10%. A suitable test method is the Wenner test arrangement. The
current spike should have a 70 m lead as a minimum, the potential spike a 50 m lead and two earth
spikes should be applied. Earth spikes with a length of approximately 400 mm should be adequate
for most measurements. The instrument should have a self diagnostic check which registers when
earth spike resistance is too high. During the test, values shall be recorded for the potential spike at
three or more distances from the structure. The results shall be correlated on site, so that and any
significant disparity between tests can be checked, and where appropriate selected tests can be
repeated.
The OHEW need not be disconnected where the measurement is to confirm that the earthing
system performance is adequate from a protection point of view. The OHEW should however be
isolated from the structure prior to testing or alternative measurement techniques adopted when a
low TFR is required. Generally this should be limited to structures requiring a low rate of backflashover or where specific EPR issues need to be assessed.
Alternative parallel earth paths will influence the measurement, and so where non-electric wire
fencing or similar is close to the structure the test connections need to be run out perpendicular to
this to minimise the influence of such earth paths on the measurement. The test leads should also
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be run perpendicular to the line to avoid interference from the line. Although both of these are
preferable, particularly the first, this is not always physically possible and in many cases, the test
leads have to be run underneath the line.
7.12
EPR ASSESSMENT
A deterministic approach as per section 3B may be adopted if a structure has a high incidence of
earth fault or other abnormal circumstances prevail.
Transmission line earth faults however are rare events occurring for an extremely short period of
time but during which dangerous voltages may be present. These characteristics are particularly
appropriate for a probabilistic method of assessment as per section 3A and therefore this form of
assessment should generally be used.
Generic type EPR studies may be undertaken for particular situations, such as for particular
categories of land use, to determine a broad level of risk associated with these particular categories.
Where an EPR assessment has been undertaken for a particular category of land use, this may be
applied to other categories of land use with similar levels of occupancy and EPR characteristics.
The probabilistic calculation assumes normal patterns of land use, and this should be reflected in the
basic generic type EPR studies undertaken.
The probabilistic approach uses typical or average data. To achieve a satisfactory margin of safety,
relevant parameters are applied that would rarely be exceeded. As a number of parameters are
involved, the separate margins accumulate making it extremely improbable that any specific event
would incur a greater risk than calculated.
Rural locations away from roads should typically not require an EPR assessment because of their
very low levels of occupancy, the low frequency of earth faults, and their short durations. An EPR
assessment should be undertaken where this does not apply including where buildings are close to
the structure or intensive farming practices such as vineyards are being adopted.
As wood poles are effectively non conductive if they do not have a conductive downlead, they
should not require an EPR assessment.
7.12.1 EPR Earth Fault Duration

Where there is adequate recorded data of clearance times for a particular transmission line this may
be used to determine a time that is not exceeded for more than 10% of earth faults.
Alternatively protection studies should be used to establish clearance times based on anticipated
normal protection and circuit breaker performance where this is likely to be achieved in 90% of
incidences. Protection systems and circuit breakers used in transmission lines have a very low
incidence of failing to operate, significantly less than 5%. Because of this low probability, backup
protection times should not typically be used in EPR assessments.
Generally where duplicate protection is fitted and dual communication links are used, 0.1 second
clearance times should be achieved. On lines where there is no reliable communication link and
detection by the far end protection is required to clear faults, clearance times of 0.15 seconds may
be more appropriate although they may be exceeded for structures close to the line end substations
where Zone 2 clearing times apply. In the limited areas where lines are not fitted with fast acting
high integrity protection, fault clearing times may be longer in which case the implications of
protection equipment failures should also be considered.
7.12.2 EPR Fault Current
A prospective maximum fault current should be calculated for each structure.
As the majority of earth faults are single phase to ground this is typically used as the fault criteria
with zero fault impedance. Each fault current should be calculated assuming feeds from both ends
of the transmission line, and applying the appropriate source, line and tower footing impedances.
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As OHEWs connect all structures together, structures on either side of the faulted structure
contribute to reducing the fault current. Typically a reduction of 80% is achieved in practice and this
reduction can be assumed in calculating the prospective fault current at a particular structure.
7.12.3 Region of EPR Hazard
For generic type studies, the following should be assumed:
(a) The region around the base of a structure needs to be of sufficient size to ensure identification
of prospective hazardous step and touch potentials during earth faults.
(b) A 500 -m soil resistivity in accordance with curve UD2 of BS EN 50341 standard should be
assumed for calculation of the contact impedance with the ground when calculating the foot to
ground additional impedance R2.
(c) A series impedance of 4,000 should be assumed for footwear in step calculations (ie 2,000
per shoe as per BS EN 50341 and Appendix A1) or 1,000 for footwear in touch calculations
except where 20% of the local population is known to not wear any footwear.
(d) Touch and step voltage limits shall be based on fibrillation current curve c2 from IEC 60479-1
as detailed in this Guide and as per BS EN 50341. The derivation of the voltage limits shall
follow the methodology detailed in this Guide (see section 3.5 and Appendix A). This
methodology is also detailed in BS EN 50341 for touch voltages.
A generic study can be adopted for specific sites where a similar degree of exposure is expected,
and where a similar region of EPR hazard is likely, and where the soil resistivity data is not
significantly above 500 -m.
Soil resistivity measurements shall be taken for the site. In non critical locations a homogeneous
soil with uniform resistivity should be adequate for the assessment. In critical urban locations the
assessment may justify greater accuracy with the resistivity to be split into two layers where this is
considered to be more representative of soil resistivity conditions. With the complexity of two layer
calculation and the limited difference that will result in the hazard area around the structure, this will
be only required rarely, restricted to locations with high levels of occupancy.
For specific situations beyond the scope of a generic study the assessment should be based on
actual soil resistivity site data.
Step and touch voltages around the structure should be assessed to determine their likelihood of
being hazardous. The fibrillation current curve c2 from IEC 60479-1 should be used to determine
levels of voltage that if exceeded cannot be tolerated. Voltage less than the maximum tolerable
value reflect a level that can be tolerated by the general population where there is a minimal risk of
ventricular fibrillation, and that is applicable to relatively rare short duration events such as earth
faults on transmission lines.
For step voltages a person shall be assumed to be at full stride with feet one metre apart. They
should be assumed to be walking towards the structure perpendicular to the ground voltage gradient
contours. In other words to give the worst case condition for the step voltages which occur at right
angle to the EPR contours around the structure at full stride with both feed in contact with the
ground.
For touch voltages a person shall be assumed to be standing on the ground one metre away,
touching the exposed surface of the conductive structure. Left hand to left foot body impedance
parameters should be applied.
The region where touch and step voltages exceed safe exposure limits, is hazardous.
Hazardous touch voltages caused by any transferred voltages should be identified. This includes
conductive objects that can be touched and can be hazardous where they form a continuous
conductive path to a location some distance away. This may provide a hazardous potential by either
transferring a voltage away from the structure, or by introducing an earth reference to the structure.
Mitigation measures are very effective in removing this by providing an insulated section or air gap in
the conductive path.
This also includes shorter conductive objects where these are close to the structure and typically
perpendicular to the EPR gradient contours, where the object can be touched and can be
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hazardous. A high resistivity surface around the object can be an effective mitigation technique (e.g.
bark or asphalt around a large metal kiosk).
The regions where transfer touch voltages exceed safe exposure limits and that remain potentially
hazardous following completion of the mitigation measures shall be identified. The extent of the
touch, step and transfer regions should be used to calculate the exposure factor Ef for the structure,
described in section 3.1.3 of this Guide.
7.12.4 EPR Earth Fault Frequency
Transmission line earth faults are infrequent and there is unlikely to be data related to a particular
structure. Typical or general data should be used for structures on the particular transmission line or
transmission lines derived from lines having similar characteristics including operating voltage.
Structures that have an unusually high frequency of earth faults should be investigated and the
cause of the high incident rate rectified to achieve an acceptable risk profile for the site.
Transmission lines should not operate beyond the characteristics for which they are designed, to
prevent increasing earth fault events.
Transmission lines should be carefully maintained and defective equipment replaced to maintain the
required low levels of earth fault frequency on transmission line structures, and to minimise those
caused by plant failure.
Structures fitted with OHEWs will be exposed to fault currents when structures either side have an
earth fault. This may increase the earth fault frequency, with up to three structures either side being
included.
The calculated earth fault frequency Ff should be used to calculate the probability of an event Pe
(see section 3.1.3)
7.12.5 EPR Mitigation
The EPR hazard assessment should identify regions where the level of occupancy requires the
hazards to be mitigated.
Where the initial assessment indicates the risk to be low or intermediate (see section 3) then this
should be further minimised where reasonable to do so. Typically mitigation to the value of $5,000
for low and $25,000 (2008 values) for structures with an intermediate risk should be appropriate for
urban locations. This expenditure is appropriate if it mitigates the risk and achieves a significant
reduction in the probability of exposure to hazardous voltages.
Where the probability of exposure from hazardous EPR needs to be reduced or where the costs of
further improvement are to be assessed, sections 2.12 and 4 identify the hazard mitigation
measures that should be considered.
Improvements in earth fault clearance times reduce the severity of the hazard as well as the
likelihood of exposure. For transmission lines, the risk is consequentially reduced and the
improvement is seen for the entire transmission line. This typically would be by adoption of high
performance and reliable protection schemes or enhanced communication.
The provision of physical barriers, non-metallic fences, bushes and signage are designed to deter
frequent exposure, limiting the occasions when an individual would be in direct contact with the
structure whilst standing on the ground. Alternatively, a 50 mm thick asphalt pad or a nonconductive covering or coating on the structure, interposes an insulating layer between the person
and the structure or ground. Such layers minimise the potential of exposure during an earth fault
from touching a structure and step voltage close to a structure.
The locating of seats, bus stops and public facilities close to a structure should be avoided (by
appropriate structure siting) to reduce occasions where the public are likely to remain for long
periods and congregate close to a structure.
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The erection of an OHEW provides a parallel return path for the fault currents. The diversion of a
major portion of the fault current through the OHEW reduces the fault current through specific
structures and also reduces the resulting EPRs, but the frequency of fault currents passing through
the structures on a line where OHEW exists will increase. The reduction achieved in the EPR is
more pronounced for low resistivity soils but the improvements may be relatively limited for high
resistivity soils. The assessment for installing OHEW should consider the reduced EPR voltage
levels countered with their increased frequency. Resonant earthing achieves a reduction in fault
current to levels that are non hazardous but may not be cost effective or practical on transmission
circuits. However, such a system does have the benefit of providing mitigation for the district or
region where resonant earthing is provided.
Reduction of structure TFR by the use of pole butt plates, counterpoise earthing and low resistivity
backfill lowers the EPR by providing a low impedance path to earth for fault currents. However as
the fault current to be dissipated increases there may be little effect on EPR, with only exceptionally
low resistivity soils achieving sufficient reduction to allow the step and touch voltages to be
considered not hazardous. Rather it may extend the area over which hazardous voltages occur and
hence the probability of exposure. The benefits may be limited to a reduction in probability of
exposure gained from lower transfer voltages, some of which will be below the level where they
need to be considered.
Grading rings reduce the potential difference that a person is exposed to, creating an equipotential
area around a structure and are particularly appropriate for localized touch voltage concerns. Their
viability is reduced for high resistivity soils. Where further reduction in voltage is required, multiple
concentric rings at increasing depths may be required. They, like the reduction of structure TFR,
increase the probability of exposure as they tend to extend the area over which hazardous voltages
and transfer voltages occur which may be more consequential.
The area where transfer voltages could be potentially hazardous to a person should generally be
minimised. For conductors located close to a structure, typically this is achieved by the removal of
the metallic conductor, reducing the continuous length of the conductor, inserting a section of high
dielectric strength material or improving its insulation characteristics to reduce susceptibility to EPR.
This may be in addition to or in place of a reduction in EPR as a result of a reduction in the fault
current.
Through applying a probabilistic assessment, improbable scenarios can be discounted and a typical
solution found for the particular type of conductor and its transfer voltage characteristics. Generally
this can be then applied for other locations where that type of conductor is encountered.
Earth faults on transmission lines are both rare and of exceedingly short durations. Transfer
voltages should be mitigated to prevent unacceptable levels of exposure of hazardous voltages to
an individual. It is not generally cost effective to exceed this and achieve an outcome where plant
and equipment would not potentially be damaged. Processes and procedures should be
implemented to minimise hazards to those employed on this type of equipment commensurate with
any remaining risk.
Typically it is more cost effective to repair the equipment where it is established that the equipment
failure was caused by an earth fault event than removing the possibility of it being damaged, whilst
ensuring plant providing important services are not installed close to transmission line structures.
7.12.6 Rural Area EPR Assessment
In locations remote from urban centres and roads, the occasions are generally limited where the
public are either in contact with, or adjacent to, a line support structure. The incidences of
transmission line earth faults are similarly rare and of such short duration, that there should be
negligible risk of a member of the public being present during an earth fault. Hence the risks, in a
typical rural area, of injury from an earth fault on a transmission line can be ignored.
To ensure this is the case, practices should be avoided that may either increase the likelihood of an
earth fault at a structure or increase the frequency of visits to the area where a significant EPR may
occur. The areas that should be considered are tree management, burn-off control measures,
pollution controls, irrigation practices, fencing, farm building location and cultivation where crops
require hand pruning or harvesting. General guidance for these is given below. Failure to do so
would require an EPR assessment to be undertaken as the risks may no longer be negligible.
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The Electricity (Hazards from Trees) Regulations details the issues with trees close to transmission
lines. By following these regulations the trees should not cause an increase in the rate of earth
faults and an EPR assessment should not be required.
Burn-offs, significant sources of emissions of particulates, dust, hot gas or corrosive particles, and
blasting, should either be managed or restricted as they potentially increase incidences of earth fault.
Established practices should be implemented and then an EPR assessment should not be required.
Guidelines should be followed on irrigators close to transmission lines. These guidelines should
address the issues that could potentially increase the frequency of earth faults, managing
movement, positioning of irrigators and use of upwards spray jets. The need for fitting of bird spikes
to transmission structures should be considered where irrigators may enhance bird activity and
insulator failures. The adoption of such guidelines ensures that the risk of exposure to a hazardous
EPR is not increased by irrigation.
Breaks in the fencing or wooden sections should be installed in stock wire fencing where these may
transfer a potentially hazardous EPR beyond the immediate area of the transmission support
structure. Electrified fencing should not need to be considered. Typically where a fence runs close
to a transmission line structure, a gap or a break in the wire fence 30m either side of the structure
should minimise the transfer. This consequently removes the risk of exposure beyond the
immediate vicinity around the structure from the voltages transferred on fencing. A further EPR
assessment should not then be required.
By ensuring a reasonable distance is maintained from the transmission support structure for farm
buildings that are frequently visited, their influence should be minimal and the buildings should not
significantly increase the probability of exposure and consequential need for an EPR assessment.
Crops that require hand pruning or harvesting should typically be avoided around a transmission
structure. The activity may significantly increase exposure of those undertaking the work to
potentially hazardous EPR in the event of an earth fault. Consequently an EPR assessment should
be undertaken and mitigation measures established should these activities occur close to the
transmission support structure.
7.13
LIGHTNING
Lightning strikes are generally the primary cause of earth faults on transmission lines. A lightning
strike is characterised by high peak current and with an exceptionally steep rate of increase. The
median peak current of the lightning strike is approximately 30 kA with a duration measured in
microseconds.
Transmission line earthing systems should safely direct lightning surge currents to earth, and
thereby prevent prolonged transmission line outages and damage to both the conducting structure
and the substation equipment.
New Zealand has a relatively low incidence of lightning with few populated regions exceeding a
ground flash density of 0.2 flashes/km2/year. Consequently transmission lines do not require the
same provisions for lightning strikes that are necessary internationally.
Where provided, the OHEW is positioned to intercept the lightning strike and shield the phase
conductors from direct strikes. Lightning discharge current passes along the OHEW and down the
connected structures. Where an OHEW is not installed the upper conductor is likely to be struck but
shields the lower conductors.
A flashover of the insulation may be expected from a lightning strike when the voltage on the
conductor reaches a value close to the insulation wet critical flashover voltage, and thus causing an
earth fault. This may occur for a small proportion of lightning strikes where the OHEW fails to shield
the conductor. It will occur for a large proportion of lightning strikes where an OHEW is not installed.
Once a flashover occurs, an earth fault is created when power follow current flows to earth and
though the voltage rapidly diminishes, it may sustain the fault, which then continues as a power
system fault.
Page 93
Transmission line protection should detect a sustained earth fault and isolate the relevant
transmission line. The duration of the outage before auto reclosing and re-energising the line should
be sufficient to allow the surge energy to be dissipated to earth and prevent a second trip from a
single strike. It should be rare for a lightning event not to be cleared in this way.
Lightning arresters when installed provide an active controlled path from a phase conductor to the
structure. This should clamp the voltage preventing a flashover or a back-flashover. Effectively,
power follow current does not flow through the surge arresters eliminating the need for the protection
to operate and averting the tripping of a transmission line struck by lightning.
The design for a transmission line with an OHEW should take into account the frequency of backflashover by calculating the percentage of lightning strikes with the capacity to cause a backflashover. A proportion of the lightning strikes may have sufficient current for this phenomenon to
occur and is more likely for structures with a high TFR or with a lower insulation rating. A backflashover occurs when the current flowing through a tower causes a voltage build up on the structure
beyond the withstand level of the insulation. Such phenomena typically causes an earth fault with a
flashover between the structure and a phase conductor, and in some instances will cause more than
one flashover.
Where two circuits are on a structure the design should take into account the frequency of a double
circuit outage and the implications for maintaining the supply, see section 7.11.1.
Where lightning strikes a conductor, substation plant and equipment connected to the conductor
needs to be protected from the severity of the rate of rise of voltage. Induction and surface corona
reduces the steepness of the voltage wavefront as it passes along the transmission line, reducing
the risk to equipment connected to the conductor. For this reason, it is advantageous to control
backflashovers close to the substation (see section 7.11.1) and ensure that both of the potential
causes of voltage surges originate far enough from the substation so that they are sufficiently
attenuated by the time they reach the substation. Backflashovers close to the substation should be
controlled by the installation of OHEWs for a distance out from the substation and by providing low
tower footing resistances for each tower on this section of line. Typically, a minimum line length of
approximately 1 km from the substation should be adequate.
The current capacity of components should not need to be enhanced to be adequately rated for a
lightning event due to the short duration of lightning events. Consideration should however, be
given to the significant mechanical forces that occur where currents are induced between close
parallel conductors during the lightning event. Typically, 70 kN fittings are used to secure OHEWs.
7.14
VOLTAGES IMPRESSED ONTO OTHER CIRCUITS OR UTILITIES

As described in section 2.3.3 capacitive coupling causes potentially hazardous voltages to be
created on nearby parallel de-energised circuits. This can have safety implications to maintenance
workers. This should be considered where transmission lines run parallel for several spans, to deenergised circuits on other lines that may be de-energized. This is more significant for a deenergised transmission circuit in close proximity particularly where structures can be shared by both
energized and de-energized.circuits. The design of the installation should identify any conductors
likely to be of concern for work safety, because of proximity between circuits so that the need for
special safe working procedures is identified.
Magnetic field induction should be considered as described in section 2.3.4 for conductors that are
within the transmission line corridor, are insulated and electrically continuous running parallel to the
transmission line.
During a transmission line fault, the earth fault current will typically be much greater than the nominal
operating capacity of the transmission line. Consequently the magnetic field induced voltage that
will occur on any parallel conductor during an earth fault will be greater than the steady state
induced voltage. The design of the installation should identify conductors that could potentially have
hazardous touch voltages present during a transmission line earth fault. As these earth faults are
infrequent and last for a very short period typically, a probabilistic assessment should be undertaken
for the associated risk as detailed for EPR in section 7.12.
Distribution line utilities are not likely to have the voltage insulation or earthing system capacity able
to discharge transmission voltages if a conductor inadvertently came in contact with an EHV
Page 94
transmission line. Where lines cross, distribution lines should be located below transmission lines
so that if a distribution line conductor falls the transmission voltage will not be transferred onto the
distribution line and apply potentially hazardous voltages onto the distribution network.
Page 95
Appendix A
Voltage Limits
Page 96
APPENDIX A VOLTAGE LIMITS

The following sections detail the calculation of permissible prospective touch and step voltage limits.
These calculations are based on the procedure from Figure 6.
A1
FIBRILLATION CURRENT LIMITS
A1.1
IEC 60479-1
The IEC 60479-1 standard contains a number of body current curves. Curve c2 which corresponds
to a 5% probability of fibrillation is considered by standards such as IEC 61936 and BS EN 50341 to
present a low risk and may be considered as an acceptable minimum requirement.
Curve c2 is shown in Figure 16. This curve applies to a current path of left hand to both feet.
10,000
Fault duration (ms)
c2
1,000
100
10
0.01
0.1
Body current, Ib (A)
Figure 16: IEC 60479-1 Curve c2

A1.2
IEEE STD 80
According to IEEE Std 80, the fibrillation current which a human body can tolerate depends on the
weight of the person and on the duration of the flow of the current through the body (ie on the
duration, t, of the earth fault).
For public access areas, IEEE Std 80 assumes a body weight of 50 kg and calculates the
acceptable body current as:
Ib =
0.116
t
A (for 50 Hz current, t = seconds)
(1)
For assessing touch and step voltage hazards in the restricted access area inside a station, IEEE 80
Std uses the following acceptable body current:
Ib =
0.157
t
A (for 50 Hz current, t = seconds)
(2)
The above equations are valid for fault durations, t, between 0.3 and 3 seconds.
Page 97
A2
SHOCK CIRCUIT
For step and touch voltage shock situations, parameters which are significant for the step and touch
voltage circuits are shown in Figure 17. The parameters are further detailed in the following
sections.
Earth Fault
Current
Touch Voltage, VT
Step Voltage, VS
Body Impedance, Zb
Shoes Resistance, Zst
Shoes Resistance, Zss
Contact
Resistance of
Feet-to-Soil, Zc
Figure 17: Step and Touch Voltage Circuits Parameters
For step and touch voltages, the relevant circuit parameters are:
(a) The body impedance, Zb.
(b) The resistance of shoes, Zss or Zst.
(c) The contact resistance of feet-to-soil, Zc.
Gloves resistance may also be considered. However, this parameter only applies to electrical
workers and since gloves are only used for certain operations, this parameter is usually ignored in
New Zealand.
A1.3
THE BODY IMPEDANCE

The body impedance depends on the voltage across the human body. The body impedance also
depends on the current path through the body. For example, the hand-to-feet impedance is lower
than the hand-to-hand impedance.
The European approach for calculating step and touch voltage limits is based on IEC 60479 and
uses body impedances which depend on the voltage across the body and considers the current path
through the body. The probability distribution of the body impedance is also considered.
The IEEE 80 approach uses a fixed body impedance of 1,000 and distinguishes between two
human body weights, 50 kg and 70 kg. The current path through the body is not considered.
A1.4
RESISTANCE OF SHOES
Footwear provides additional series resistance in the shock circuit. Resistance of shoes vary greatly
depending on the type of shoe and on whether the shoe is dry or wet. In addition to having a
resistance, a shoe will also exhibit a flashover voltage. The ability of a shoe to withstand voltage
depends on the type of shoe, on the amount of wear and on whether the shoe is dry or wet.
Resistance of shoe may vary from 500 to 3,000 k while the withstand voltage may vary between
500 V up to 20 kV. Low withstand voltage is typically associated with wet shoes.
Page 98
Various standards allow for shoe resistance as follows:

(a) BS 7354:1990 Substation Earthing allows a shoe resistance of 4,000 to be used for
substation earthing design.
(b) BS EN 50341-1 uses a shoe resistance of 2,000 for calculating touch voltage limits for
locations where people are expected to be wearing shoes.
(c) ITU K.33 standard allow the use of the following shoes resistances for calculating the voltage
limits:
Type and state of shoes
Dry shoes
Wet or damp shoes, hard soil
Wet or damp shoes, loose soil
Shoe Resistance (k)

Leather sole
Elastomer sole
3,000
2,000
30
0.25
The type and distribution of footwear is likely to vary greatly around New Zealand. In addition, a
culture of going bare-foot exists which further complicates the issue. Because of the wide range of
shoe resistances, it is necessary to select a relatively low value which can be used for determining
voltage limits.
For the purpose of this Guide, a value of 2,000 is recommended for all Normal Locations. This
value has been selected because it is the lowest value currently published in a standard.
There is only limited information on withstand voltage associated with footwear. BS 7354
acknowledges that the withstand voltage of worn footwear has not been well researched. This
standard recommends a limiting value of 5 kV for touch and step voltages. However, since there are
two shoes in series in a step shock circuit, a value of 10 kV has been recommended in this guide for
step voltages.
When considering the effect of shoe resistances, the touch voltage circuit will include the resistance
of two shoes in parallel while the step voltage circuit will include the resistance of two shoes in
series.
A1.5
CONTACT RESISTANCE OF FEET-TO-SOIL

The contact resistances between the feet and the soil may appreciably increase the resistance of
the shock circuit especially if a thin layer of high resistivity material is used on the surface.
For soil with a surface resistivity, s, the contact resistance is calculated as:
For step voltages,
Z cs = 6 s
(3)
For touch voltages,

Z ct = 1.5 s
(4)
As described in section 4.7, thin layers of high resistivity material can be used to reduce the current
flowing through the human body. For a thin layer of high resistivity material on top of the soil, a
derating factor, Cs is required to account for the difference in magnitude between the resistivity of
the thin layer (l) and the resistivity of the underlying soil (s), and also to account for the thickness
of the layer (hl).

0.091 - s
l
Cs = 1 2 hl + 0.09
(5)
The contact resistance is then calculated as:

For step voltages,
Page 99
Z cs = 6 C s l
(6)
For touch voltages,

Z ct = 1.5 C s l
A3
(7)
TOUCH VOLTAGE CIRCUIT

A typical touch voltage shock circuit for the situation depicted in Figure 17 is shown in Figure 18.
Prospective Touch
Voltage, VTP
Ib
Zb
Loaded Touch
Voltage, VTL
Zst
Zct
Ib
Figure 18: Touch Voltage Shock Circuit
The prospective touch voltage, VTP, may be determined by the acceptable body current, Ib multiplied
by the sum of the various impedances considered in the shock circuit.
VTP =
Ib
(Z b + Z s + Z ct )
F
(8)
For touch voltages, a current path of left hand to feet is assumed. According to Table 12 of IEC
60479-1:2005, F=1 for touch voltages.
Z ct = 1.5 s
(9)
If Z1s is the resistance of one shoe, then:

Z st =
Z1s
2
VTP = Ib (Z b + Z st + 1.5 s )
(10)
(11)
Prospective touch voltage limits can be calculated by substituting the relevant body impedances, soil
resistivities and the IEC 60479-1 or IEEE Std 80 body current limits.
Equation (11) can be re-written as follows:
VTP = Ib Z b + Ib (Z st + 1.5 s )
(12)
VTP = Ib Z b + Ib (Z st + Z ct ) or
VTP = VTE + Ib (Z st + Z ct )
(13)
Page 100
The term Ib Zb is the loaded touch voltage, VTL, and values of loaded permissible touch voltages for
Normal and Special Locations are shown in Figure 19.
1,000
Effective (Loaded) Touch Voltage Limits (V)
Based on C2 curve and

50% body impedance
100
10
10
100
1,000
10,000
Fault duration (ms)
Figure 19: Effective (Loaded) Permissible Touch Voltages

NOTE 1: The difficulty in calculating prospective touch voltage limits based on the IEC 60479-1 standard is that the human
body impedances are dependent on the voltage across the body. To calculate the correct touch voltage limit
corresponding to a tolerable body current limit an iterative process is required making the calculation complicated.
Because of this, the loaded touch voltage curve in Figure 19 has been produced to simplify the calculation of the
tolerable prospective touch voltages. The effective touch voltage curve has been derived based on curve c2 of
Figure 16 and on the voltage dependent 50% body impedances from IEC 60479-1:2005 for water-wet conditions
2
and large contact surface areas (10,000 mm ).
To calculate the permissible touch voltage limit for a particular fault duration, equation (13) can be
used.
The calculations of permissible touch voltage limits are shown in the following examples:
Example 1 using IEC 60479
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
The fault duration is 0.5 s.

The soil resistivity is 200 -m.
Shoes with a resistance of 2,000 are considered.
The situation is a Normal Location.
The permissible body current for 0.5 s is read from curve c2 in Figure 16. This value is 0.2 A.
The loaded touch voltage is determined as 200 V from Figure 19.
Therefore,
Ib = 0.2 A
VTL = Ib Zb = 200 V
Zst = 2,000/2 = 1,000
1.5 s = 300
From Figure 16 using curve c2 and 0.5 s.

From Figure 19 for 0.5 s.
For two shoes in parallel.
From equation (9).
The prospective touch voltage limit is then:

VTP = 200 + 0.2 * (1,000 + 300) = 460 V
This limit is similar to the value which can be read from the 200 -m curve of Figure 9.
Page 101
Example 2 using IEEE Std 80

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
The fault duration is 0.5 s.

Shoes with a resistance of 2,000 are considered.
The situation is a public access area ie 50 kg body weight.
Ib = 0.116/0.5 = 0.164 A
Zb = 1,000
Zst = 2,000/2 = 1,000
1.5 s = 300
VTP = 0.16(1,000 + 1,000 + 300) = 377 V
Note: The calculation of touch voltages is more complicated where a thin layer such as asphalt or
crushed rock is concerned and involves the inclusion of the term CS (see equations (5), (6) and (7)).
A4
STEP VOLTAGE CIRCUIT

A typical step voltage shock circuit for the situation depicted in Figure 17 is shown in Figure 20.
Prospective Step
Voltage, VSP
Ib
Zb
Loaded Step
Voltage, VSL
Zss
Zcs
Ib
Figure 20: Step Voltage Shock Circuit
The prospective step voltage, VSP, for a fault duration, t, may be determined by the acceptable body
current, Ib/F, multiplied by the sum of the various impedances considered in the shock circuit. The
factor, F, is the heart-current factor as detailed in section 5.9 of IEC 60479-1:2005.
For a foot-to-foot path, the heart-current factor of 0.04 is given in Table 12 of IEC 60479-1:2005.
VSP =
Ib
(Z b + Z s + Z cs )
F
Z cs = 6 s
(14)
(15)
If Z1s is the resistance of one shoe, then:

Z ss = 2 Z1s
VSP =
Ib
(Z b + Z ss + Z cs )
F
(16)
(17)
Page 102
Ib
I
Z b + b ( Z ss + Z cs ) or
F
F
Ib
= VSL + ( Z ss + Z cs )
F
VSP =
VSP
(18)
Prospective step voltage limits can be calculated by substituting the relevant body currents, body
impedances and soil resistivities as detailed in section A3 for touch voltages. The loaded step
voltage curves are given in Figure 21 for water-wet conditions and large contact surface areas
(10,000 mm2).
Effective (Loaded) Step Voltage Limits (V)
100,000
Based on c2 curve and 50% body

impedance and heart current factor
of 0.04.
10,000
1,000
100
10
100
1,000
10,000
Fault duration (ms)
Figure 21: Loaded Permissible Step Voltages

The calculation of a tolerable step voltage limit for a fault duration is shown in the following example.
The criteria for the example are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
The fault duration is 1 s.

Bare feet is considered.
The tolerable body current for 1 s is read from curve c2 in Figure 16. This value is 0.08 A.
The loaded step voltage is determined as approximately 1,500 V from Figure 21.
Based on the above criteria, the following are calculated:

Ib = 0.08 A
Ifoot to foot = 2 A
VSL = 1,500 V
Zst = 0
6 s = 3,000
From Figure 16 using curve c2 and 1 s.

Dividing by the heart-current factor, F = 0.04.
From Figure 21 for 1 s.
Bare feet.
From equation (15).
The prospective tolerable step voltage limit from equation (18) is then:
VSP = 1,500 + 2(0 + 3,000) = 7,500 V
A similar value can be read from Figure 10.
Page 103
Appendix B
Typical Earthing Arrangements
(Informative)
Page 104
APPENDIX B TYPICAL EARTHING ARRANGEMENTS
Equipment earthing
connection (conductor)
Fence earthing
connections
(conductor)
Power
system
neutral
Sub
switchboard
Support structure
earthing connection
(conductor)
Tank
connection
Main
switchboard
Neutral bar
Earth bar
Equipment pad earthing

Vertical
driven rod
Earth bar earthing
Control room reinforcing
earthing connection
(conductor)
No link between neutral and
earth bars of main switchboard
and sub switchboards
Earth grid
LTAC transformer
neutral point bonded to
earth and to neutral bar
of main switchboard
No earth conductor between

earth bars of main switchboard
and sub switchboards
Figure 22: Typical Earthing Arrangement in HV a.c. Station
Page 105
Operating/linkage rod
Copper riser/earthing
conductor from earth
grid to earth switch
blades
Operating/linkage rod
bonded to earth stud on
mechanism box or on
support stand
conductor bonded to
earth stud on mechanism
box or on support stand
Operators earth mat bonded

to handle via insulated
earthing conductor but not
bonded directly to earth grid.
conductor bonded to
support stand where
required
Operators earth mat
Earth grid
Figure 23: Typical Earthing Arrangement for Earth Switches in HV a.c. Station
Page 106
Connection to LV neutral
Connection to
neutral bushing
Pole mounted transformer
Connection to
transformer tank
Test link
Mechanical protection
of earthing conductors
to a height of 2.5 metres
above ground
Earth electrode system
Figure 24: Typical Earthing Arrangement for Pole Mounted Transformer
Page 107
Connection to metalwork
or other earthed equipment
CAUTION: LV neutral must

be suitably rated
Connection to
operating handle
Test link
above ground
Figure 25: Typical Earthing Arrangement for Air Break Isolator with other Equipment
Page 108
Lightning arresters to be mounted as

close as possible to the equipment
being protected
Connection to metalwork,
transformer tank and neutral,
cable screens or other earthed
equipment as required
CAUTION: LV neutral must

be suitably rated
or other earthed equipment
Test link
above ground
Figure 26: Typical Earthing Arrangement for Lightning Surge Arresters
Page 109
Metallic substation
enclosure
Insulated glands may be installed

on incoming cable for test
purposes or to insure EPR is not
transferred out if required.
Metallic sheathed
cables
HV
switchgear
c b a n
c b a n
Transformer
Transformer
Lightning
arresters
Foundation pad
reinforcing
Neutral bar
Connection to other
earthed equipment
Earth terminal bar
Figure 27: Typical Earthing Arrangement for HV Installations at Consumers Premises
Page 110
Kiosk
Neutral
bar
Other LV
neutrals as
required
c b a n
Transformer
Lightning
arresters
LV cable
neutrals
Pad
reinforcing
Earth
bar
(a) Transformer included within kiosk
Transformer
c b a n
HV cable
screens
Earth
bar
Kiosk
Neutral
bar
HV cable
screens
Lightning
arresters
Pad
reinforcing
Other LV
neutrals as
required
LV cable
neutrals
Earth
bar
(b) Transformer separated from kiosk

Figure 28: Typical Earthing Arrangement for Ground Mounted Kiosk
Page 111

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Quality Assurance Record

System of Supply Working Party - Review of ECP 35

EEA Guide to Power System Earthing Practice Rev 10

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

Mr. T Scott, Orion NZ Ltd (Chairman)

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

DESIGN ASPECTS .......................................................................................................................46

SECTION 6 DISTRIBUTION CENTRES AND EQUIPMENT ....................................................................61

TOWER FOOTING RESISTANCES ..................................................................................................87

APPENDIX A VOLTAGE LIMITS ..............................................................................................................97

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

SECTION 1 SCOPE, PURPOSE, INTERPRETATIONS, GLOSSARY AND NUMBERING

This guide does not apply to:

Earthed means electrically connected to the general mass of the earth.

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

RELEVANT ACTS AND REGULATIONS

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

RELEVANT STANDARDS AND DOCUMENTS

Switchgear assemblies and ancillary equipment for alternating voltages above

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS GUIDE

Air Break Isolator

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

Neutral Earthing Resistor

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

SECTION 2 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR EARTHING SYSTEMS

HAZARDS AND ELECTRICAL CONCEPTS

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

Earth potential rise (EPR)

a higher touch voltage;

Electric field (capacitive) coupling

Magnetic field induction

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

(a) CJC5-1997, Coordination of Power and Telecommunications Low Frequency Induction,

IEC 60071 Insulation Coordination (multiple parts).

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

Figure 1: Touch and Step Voltages around a Substation

Third Party Fence

Figure 2: Example of Transferred Voltage

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

EPR RISK MANAGEMENT

ACCEPTABLE STEP AND TOUCH VOLTAGE LIMITS

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

CRITICAL DESIGN PARAMETERS

Design fault current

Design fault duration

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

EPR VOLTAGES TRANSFERRED ONTO THIRD PARTY ASSETS

Hazard from nearby HV Earthing Systems or HV Conductive Poles

Hazard arising from Common HV/LV Earthing Systems

TYPES OF EARTH ELECTRODES

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

Table 1: Brief Guide on Selecting Earthing Electrode Designs

MATERIALS OF EARTH ELECTRODES AND CORROSION CONSIDERATIONS

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

JOINTS OF EARTH ELECTRODES

CURRENT RATING OF CONDUCTORS AND JOINTS

Guide to Power System Earthing Practice_v10 (Jun 08)

Fault Current (A)